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LECTURES
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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
LECTURES ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

VOLUME I
INTRODUCTION
and
THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

Edited by
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PREFACE

The appearance of the first volume of this new English edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* is the result of a dream and of a journey. Nearly a decade ago, I began dreaming of the possibility of an alternative to the outmoded translation of an outmoded edition of a work of seminal importance for the whole of modern theology, philosophy of religion, and religious thought. One summer I began on my own a translation of the third volume of Lasson's edition, thinking primarily of a classroom text for courses like mine on Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. When others heard of my work through the Nineteenth Century Theology Group of the American Academy of Religion, the plan was expanded to include the entire work, to be prepared by a team of translators for publication in the new Texts and Translations Series of the Academy.

Such a project could have been launched only in a state of innocence respecting current Hegel scholarship. Through the good offices of Professor Richard Crouter, I was put in touch with the Hegel Archive, located at the Ruhr University in Bochum, West Germany, and in particular with Dr. Walter Jaeschke, a member of the editorial staff, who in 1970 had written an unpublished thesis on Hegel's philosophy of religion at the Free University of Berlin, demonstrating that not only the original *Werke* editions of 1832 and 1840, on which the 1895 English translation was based, but also Lasson's supposedly more critical edition of 1925–1929, were marred by serious defects. About the same time, I learned that two other scholars had been planning for several years to publish a new

edition of the lectures in both German and English—a plan that, as it turned out, never materialized. After several months of indecision, it was agreed that I would complete my translation of the third part, for which Lasson provided a more adequate text, correcting the most serious problems on the basis of materials to be furnished by Jaeschke. This would be a study edition, designed merely to fill the gap until the newly edited texts could appear in the historical-critical edition, being prepared at the Hegel Archive, in the 1990s. This study edition was published by Scholars Press in 1979 under the title *The Christian Religion*, and will be reissued in thoroughly revised and retranslated form as volume 3 of the present edition.

However, there was widely shared dissatisfaction with having to wait another fifteen years before the project could be resumed. A century and a half after the appearance of the first edition of Hegel's philosophy-of-religion lectures in 1832, there was still lacking an edition of these lectures adequate to the demands of critical interpretative scholarship. This lack had been expressed rather sharply during the preceding decade of Hegel scholarship, especially in Germany. But the need could not have been met even today were it not for a fortunate development, namely, the recent discovery of important new sources. A decade earlier, only Hegel's original manuscript of 1821 and the lecture series of 1824 could have been included in a new edition, but today the last two series, those of 1827 and 1831, can also be taken into account (the latter only in outline form). Just at the time that photocopies of the newly discovered manuscripts were being acquired by the Archive, strong interest was being expressed not only in a new English edition (on my part) but also in a new Spanish edition, on the part of Professor Ricardo Ferrara of the University of Buenos Aires. In the fall of 1980, Walter Jaeschke, Ricardo Ferrara, and I met in Bochum and agreed to proceed immediately with plans for a new edition to be published concurrently in German, English, and Spanish. Jaeschke was completing his work on the critical edition of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* and would have time to devote to the new project. The key editorial work would be done by him, with as much assistance as possible from Ferrara and me. Not only would the editorial

burden be lightened somewhat, but this would be a unique venture in international collaboration.

We agreed that the fundamental principle of the new edition should be that the four lecture series—1821, 1824, 1827, 1831—would be separated and published as autonomous units on the basis of a complete reediting of the sources. Hegel's conception and execution of the lectures differed so significantly on each of the occasions he delivered them that it was impossible to conflate materials from different years into an editorially constructed text, as was attempted both in the *Werke* and by Lasson, without destroying the structural integrity of the lectures and thus emasculating the textual context in terms of which valid interpretative judgments could be rendered. This basic weakness has skewed all previous attempts at interpreting Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion.

We also agreed that our editorial methods would be similar to, or at least congruent with, those being employed by the historical-critical edition, the *Gesammelte Werke*, which is being prepared at the Hegel Archive in Bochum on behalf of the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and being published by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. From the point of view of the critical edition, it would be advantageous to acquire experience in editing Hegel's lectures (none of which he published himself) in advance of the definitive treatment they would receive in the *Gesammelte Werke*, since in fact the critical principles for this task remained to be worked out. Moreover, editions of two different sorts were needed in any case. In the *Gesammelte Werke*, Hegel's lectures will be dispersed into several volumes. One volume, for which Walter Jaeschke has been assigned editorial responsibility, will contain all of Hegel's own lecture manuscripts, including not only that on the philosophy of religion but also manuscripts on philosophy of right, philosophy of history, logic and metaphysics, aesthetics, etc. Several other volumes will contain the student transcripts or notebooks of lectures given over a period of years. Because of this dispersal in the critical edition, the texts on a specific topic such as the philosophy of religion will need to be drawn together in another series and pub-

lished as a unit. Normally this would be done after the critical edition had appeared. But in view of the urgent demand for these materials, and in order to gain the requisite experience, *Meiner Verlag* agreed to launch without delay a second series. *G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte* ("Hegel's Lectures: Selected Transcripts and Manuscripts"). Part 1 of the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* was the first volume to appear in this series in 1983, with Parts 2 and 3 scheduled for publication in 1984 and 1985.

The English translation of this work is intended as the one and only critical edition in English. It will be unnecessary and inappropriate to reproduce the German historical-critical edition with its massive apparatus and dispersed chronological arrangement, not only on the grounds of practicality but also because scholars needing such specialized information should be competent in German. Future revisions of the English edition will be needed only if significant new manuscript finds occur. Rather than a yet more critical edition in English, we intend to issue an abridged edition in paperback when the three volumes of the present work have been completed, probably in 1986 or 1987.

In 1981, the National Endowment for the Humanities awarded a three-year translation grant to underwrite the basic expenses of preparing the English edition, of which I was designated project director and editor. A translation team was assembled, the permanent members of which are: Professor Robert F. Brown of the University of Delaware, whose previous scholarly work has been in the area of Schelling studies; Mr. J. Michael Stewart of Farnham, England, formerly acting chief of the English translation section of UNESCO, Paris, and an interested student of Hegel since his studies in German and philosophy at Cambridge and London; and the editor, who was introduced to Hegel research through earlier studies on Ferdinand Christian Baur and David Friedrich Strauss. Brown has translated the 1827 lectures and the appendix on religion and state; Stewart has translated the 1824 lectures and the Strauss excerpts of 1831, checking the other translations as well; while the editor's responsibility has been for Hegel's lecture manuscript. During the 1981–82 academic year, Professor Joseph P. Fitzer of St. John's University, Jamaica, N.Y., shared in the translation of the

1824 lectures. Professor H. S. Harris of Glendon College, York University, Toronto, a distinguished Hegel scholar and translator, has served as a demanding and faithful consultant to the project by thoroughly criticizing and revising all our translation drafts. His contribution has been indispensable, but the editor must assume final responsibility for the form in which the materials appear in print. A detailed account of translation principles is provided in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction.

Financial support has been provided by several other sources in addition to the Endowment. In 1980–81, my research leave at the Hegel Archive was supported by the German Fulbright Commission, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, the Association of Theological Schools, and the Vanderbilt University Research Council. I am appreciative of the hospitality afforded by the Archive and its staff during this period. The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung of Cologne generously provided the matching gift required by NEH, which permitted a further leave in the fall of 1983. Additional research expenses have been met by the Vanderbilt Research Council, by the University of Delaware's General University Research Program, and by supplementary grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities. For the generosity of support from all these sources I am profoundly grateful.

The many persons who have contributed in so many different ways to this project evoke an awareness that the association of Hegel's friends is not limited to that group of colleagues and students who gathered shortly after his death to bring out an edition of his works. Above all, I am indebted to the friendship of Walter Jaeschke, who was so receptive and willing to share this project with non-Germans, who worked so unremittingly to make it succeed, and who was so personally hospitable during my visits to Bochum; and to that of Ricardo Ferrara, whose philological skills, scholarly expertise, and collegial spirit made an invaluable contribution. The English translators and the consultant—Robert Brown, Michael Stewart, H. S. Harris—have worked harmoniously and with the utmost dedication, although for the most part the mails and the telephone have been our only link, dispersed as we are in three countries and four cities. Indispensable support was provided in Bochum by Gudrun Kilian, who prepared numerous typescripts

of the original documents and the final text. In Nashville, Daniel Jamros, S.J., helped with the source-critical analysis, while Elouise Renich Fraser was a superb editorial assistant; both are completing Ph.D degrees in religion at Vanderbilt University. Others have contributed directly and indirectly: Susan Mango of the NEH staff, John R. Miles of the University of California Press, Richard Meiner of Meiner Verlag, Robert Appleson and Stephen Smartt of Vanderbilt's Office of Sponsored Research, Jack Forstman, Dean of Vanderbilt Divinity School, and, at an earlier phase of the work, Kem Luther and Arnold Miller. At the final phase, my son, David Hodgson, and daughter, Jennifer Hodgson, helped with proofreading.

Dr. Jaeschke, Professor Ferrara, and I wish to express our appreciation to the following individuals and institutions for placing at our disposal copies of the original manuscripts, lecture transcripts, and other documents on which this edition is based: Professor Karl Larenz; Pastor Bernd Raebel; the Manuscript Division of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin; Houghton Library of Harvard University; the Universitätsbibliothek, Jena; the Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cracow; the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar; the Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Warsaw; Professor A. Gulyga and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Finally, a word to the reader. Given the innovative character of this edition, the Editorial Introduction must necessarily attend at some length to the sources, the previous editions, the critical principles, and the methodological procedures that have been instrumental in our work. These matters have an intrinsic interest and importance of their own. But in the final analysis they are not essential to an understanding of Hegel's thought. For that, one must simply begin reading. As Hegel himself points out, the only way to learn to swim is to go into the water. If you do not wish to wade through the whole of our introduction before taking the first plunge, I suggest that you at least familiarize yourself with the first section, which provides a general orientation, and the last two, which outline the structure and contents of the texts contained in this volume.

PETER C. HODGSON

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

- [. . .] = Editorial insertions in the text.
- < . . . > = Passages in the margins of the *Ms.*, including both passages integrated into the main text and unintegrated passages that are footnoted.
- ~ . . . ~ = Passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings. These symbols are used only in the case of textual variants, which offer a different version of the designated passage, usually from a different source, not textual additions, which occur at the point marked by the note number in the main text. Normally the variant is placed in the notes at the end of the parallel in the main text; exceptions are noted.
- = Freestanding en dash indicating a grammatical break between sentence fragments in footnoted *Ms.* marginal materials.
- ^{1 2 3} etc. = Footnotes containing (a) unintegrated marginal materials from the *Ms.*; (b) textual variants, additions, and deletions; (c) special materials from *W* and *L*, both variant readings and additions; (d) editorial annotations. The type of note is designated by an initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Notes are at the bottoms of the pages and are numbered consecutively through each text unit.

- [Ed.] = Editorial annotations in the footnotes; materials following this symbol are editorial.
- 34 | = Page numbers of the German edition, on the outer margins with page breaks marked by vertical slash in text. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. Part I: *Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion*. Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, 1983.
- [12a] = Sheet numbers of the Ms., in the text at the point of occurrence; “a” and “b” refer to the recto and verso sides of the sheets.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

- W W₁ W₂ = *Werke*. Complete Edition Edited by an Association of Friends. Vols. 11–12 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. 1st ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke (Berlin, 1832) (W₁); 2d ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer (Berlin, 1840) (W₂). When no subscript is used, the reference is to both editions. The *Einleitung* and *Begriff der Religion* are contained in vol. 11 of both editions.
- L = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. Edited by Georg Lasson. 2 vols. in 4 parts. Leipzig, 1925–1929 (reprint, Hamburg, 1966). The *Einleitung* and *Begriff der Religion* are contained in vol. 1/1.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

- Ms. = Hegel’s lecture manuscript of 1821
- D = Deiters transcript of the 1824 lectures
- G = Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures
- Ho = Hotho transcript of the 1824 lectures
- K = Kehler transcript of the 1824 lectures
- P = Pastenaci transcript of the 1824 lectures

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

<i>An</i>	=	Anonymous transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>B</i>	=	Boerner transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>Hu</i>	=	Hube transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>S</i>	=	Strauss excerpts from a transcript of the 1831 lectures

SPECIAL MATERIALS IN W AND L

These are given in parentheses and identify the no-longer-extant sources of the variant readings and additions making up the special materials found in *W* and *L*. Since the source of special materials in *W* relating to the *Ms.* cannot be identified with certainty in each instance, the source designation is omitted from these passages, although the probability in most cases is that it is from *Hn*.

<i>(Hn)</i>	=	Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures
<i>(MiscP)</i>	=	Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand
<i>(1827?)</i>	=	Unverified transcripts of the 1827 lectures
<i>(1831)</i>	=	Transcripts of the 1831 lectures
<i>(HgG)</i>	=	Notes by Hegel in the copy of <i>G</i> used by <i>W</i> ₁ and <i>W</i> ₂
<i>(Ed)</i>	=	Editorial passages in <i>W</i> ₁ and <i>W</i> ₂
<i>(Var)</i>	=	Variant readings in <i>W</i> or <i>L</i>

FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS

WORKS BY HEGEL

- Werke* = *Werke*. Complete Edition Edited by an Association of Friends. 18 vols. Berlin, 1832 ff. Some volumes issued in second editions.
- SW = *Sämtliche Werke*. "Jubilee" Edition, edited by H. Glockner. 22 vols. Stuttgart, 1927–1930. Based on, and largely a reprint of, the original *Werke*.
- GW = *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in Association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 40 vols. projected. Hamburg, 1968 ff.
- Berliner* = *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*. Edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1956.
- Briefe* = *Briefe von und an Hegel*. Edited by J. Hoffmeister and J. Nicolin. 4 vols. 3d ed. Hamburg, 1969–1981.
- Early Theological Writings* = *Early Theological Writings*. Partial translation of H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner. Chicago, 1948.
- Encyclopedia* = *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. (1817, 1830) Translated from the 3d German ed., with additions based on student transcripts and

- lecture manuscripts, by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. 3 vols. Oxford, 1892 (reissued 1975), 1970, 1971. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. 1st ed. Heidelberg, 1817: SW, vol. 6; forthcoming in GW, vol. 13. 3d ed., Berlin, 1830: *Werke*, vols. 6–7; SW, vols. 8–11 (both containing additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts); forthcoming in GW, vol. 19. 6th ed., based on the 3d ed. without additions, edited by F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959. Citations given by section numbers in the 1817 or 1830 editions.
- Faith and Knowledge* = *Faith and Knowledge*. Translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, 1977. *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie*. Tübingen, 1802. GW, vol. 4 (edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler).
- History of Philosophy* = *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. London, 1892. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Edited by K. L. Michelet. 1st ed., Berlin, 1833: *Werke*, vols. 13–15; SW, vols. 17–19. Because of variations between the two German editions, the English translation often does not correspond exactly to the cited German texts. A new German edition is being prepared by P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke.
- Nohl, = *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*. Ed-
Jugendschriften ited by H. Nohl. Tübingen, 1907 (reprint, Frankfurt, 1966). These and other early

- writings will be newly edited and appear in GW, vols. 1–2.
- Phenomenology of Spirit* = *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, 1977. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807. GW, vol. 9 (edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede).
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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION¹

1. Hegel's Lectures and the Philosophy of Religion

From the beginning of his academic career at the University of Jena in 1801, Hegel lectured frequently on a broad range of themes—philosophical encyclopedia, logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, anthropology and psychology, natural law, world history, aesthetics, and history of philosophy. But it was only after some twenty years, in the summer semester of 1821 at the University of Berlin, that Hegel lectured for the first time on the philosophy of religion—lectures that he was to repeat on three occasions, in 1824, 1827, and 1831, but which he himself never published.

Hegel's delay in addressing the topic of religion was not a sign of lack of interest. On the contrary, there was no topic in which he had a deeper and more abiding concern, as evidenced from his days as a theological student in Tübingen through the years spent in Jena and Nuremberg. Upon his departure from Jena, he wrote to a friend: "I was eager to lecture on theology at a university and might well have done so after some years of continuing to lecture on philosophy."² As headmaster at the Gymnasium in Nuremberg

1. Portions of this Introduction (Secs. 1–3, 4.a, 5) represent an abridgment and adaptation of the Introduction written by Walter Jaeschke for the German edition. For a more detailed and technical treatment of the matters here considered, the reader is referred to the German edition. Other portions (Secs. 4.b, 6–8) have been prepared exclusively for the English edition. Responsibility for the whole is assumed by the English editor, who wishes to express his appreciation for the permission to use Jaeschke's work, and for the assistance rendered by J. M. Stewart. The key to abbreviations, symbols, and short titles precedes this Introduction.

2. Hegel to I. Niethammer, November 1807, *Briefe* 1:196.

he gave religious instruction to the pupils, but when he returned to a university post at Heidelberg, from 1816 to 1818, he did not lecture on either philosophy of religion or theology, nor did he during the first years in Berlin. Philosophy of religion was in fact a novel topic at the beginning of the nineteenth century, not part of the ordinary agenda of the philosopher. Insofar as philosophy dealt with God, it was customarily in the form of rational theology, as a special branch of metaphysics. There were few precedents for treating philosophy of religion as an autonomous philosophical discipline, and Hegel's 1821 lectures represented an important step toward making it such. But the step was not an easy one to take, as successive efforts over the course of a decade to refine the treatment of the subject testify.

What actually led to Hegel's decision to take this step at the time he did can only be surmised. It was known that Hegel's colleague—and rival—on the theological faculty in Berlin, Friedrich Schleiermacher, had been preparing a major work in dogmatics at least since the time of Hegel's arrival at the University in 1818. Political and personal as well as intellectual conflicts had already developed between these two powerful figures.³ Some twenty years earlier, in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802), at the end of a devastating analysis of F. H. Jacobi's philosophy of faith, Hegel had advanced a brief but perceptive critique of Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion*.⁴ As the time approached for the actual publication of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, the first volume of which appeared at the end of June 1821,⁵ Hegel may well have concluded that it was necessary to provide a counterweight to a theological position about which he had reason to believe he would have deep reservations.

3. See Richard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-sided Debate," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (March 1980), 19–43.

4. *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 150–152 (GW 4:385–386).

5. Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed. (1821–22) (*Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 7/1, ed. H. Peiter [Berlin and New York, 1980], pp. xxx, xxxiv). Schleiermacher received the first copies on 27 June 1821, and during the next two months distributed copies to a number of friends. Vol. 1 contained only the Introduction and Part I of the system (about a third of the whole). The second and larger volume was not completed until December 1821, and it was published almost exactly a year after the first, on 29 June 1822 (pp. xxxi–xxxv).

While Schleiermacher and Hegel were not in direct contact, many students heard them both lecture, and Hegel could readily have learned from students the general orientation of Schleiermacher's theological program as well as his publication plans. Information would also have been available from Philipp Marheineke, a member of the theological faculty in Berlin, who was in close touch with both of them, and from Carl Daub, a former colleague at Heidelberg, who was familiar with Schleiermacher's thought and on friendly terms with Hegel. Schleiermacher's association with Wilhelm de Wette and J. F. Fries would have been a further clue to his position. It is evident that Hegel's decision to lecture on the philosophy of religion occurred rather suddenly,⁶ and the lecture manuscript was written hurriedly just before and during the course of the lectures. On 9 May 1821, shortly after the lectures had begun, but before the appearance of Schleiermacher's first volume, Hegel indicated what his expectations were in this revealing note to Carl Daub: "I hear Schleiermacher is also in process of having a work printed on dogmatics. The epigram occurs to me, 'One can go on paying for a long time with chips, but in the end one has to pull out one's purse all the same.' We'll have to wait and see whether this purse too will yield nothing more than chips."⁷

After volume 1 of the *Glaubenslehre* had appeared, Hegel wrote H. W. F. Hinrichs: "From Daub I look for an open declaration whether this really is the dogmatics of the United Evangelical Church that one has had the brazen effrontery to offer as such—admittedly only in a preliminary first part."⁸ Hegel's Preface to the

6. In a memorandum addressed to the Rector of the University of Berlin on 5 May 1820 concerning the appropriate topics for a philosophical curriculum, no mention is made of philosophy of religion as an independent discipline. See Hegel, *Nürnberger Schriften*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1938), pp. xxxiii–xxxiv, n. 1.

7. Hegel to C. Daub, 9 May 1821, *Briefe* 2:262.

8. Hegel to H. W. F. Hinrichs, 4 April 1822, *Briefe* 2:303; cf. the letter of 7 April 1822, *ibid.*, p. 305. The full title of Schleiermacher's work is: "The Christian Faith According to the Fundamental Principles of the Evangelical Church, Cohesively Set Forth." In the Preface to the first edition he remarks that this is the first dogmatics that attempts to set forth the fundamental principles of the Evangelical Church as a whole, including both the Reformed and the Lutheran communions. It is intended to serve as a theological basis for the union of the two Protestant confessions. Thus the terms "Protestant" and "Evangelical" are used synonymously. *Gesamtausgabe* 7/1:6–7.

treatise on philosophy of religion by Hinrichs⁹ should be viewed in the same light. Its well-known polemic directed against Schleiermacher should be read not as private disparagement of a colleague but as a means to discussion of religious policy in regard to the fundamental theological principles of the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union. In the 1824 lectures, Hegel's controversy with Schleiermacher's theology of feeling was brought into the open,¹⁰ but thereafter it subsided as new issues came to the fore.

According to the faculty records, Hegel's first series of lectures on the philosophy of religion lasted from 30 April to 25 August 1821—four hours per week for seventeen weeks—and had 49 auditors. The 1824 series lasted from 26 April to 26 August, and the number in the class rose to 63. By 1827, when the course lasted from 7 May to 10 August, Hegel was lecturing to 119 students, which made this one of the best-attended series of lectures he gave. The last series was offered in the summer of 1831, but no data are available.¹¹ The philosophy-of-religion lectures were always delivered in conjunction with those on logic and metaphysics, and there was in fact a close connection between the two disciplines in Hegel's mind, although their conjunction was due to the external fact that these less extensive lectures were scheduled during the shorter summer semester, while longer series, such as those on the history of philosophy, were reserved for the winter. But the fact that Hegel was addressing the two topics simultaneously reinforces the substantive connection between them and helps to account for the increasingly logical structure assumed by the lectures on religion.

Hegel was by no means an eloquent lecturer,¹² and it must be assumed that his delivery was particularly halting in those lectures he gave from manuscripts, as compared with those for which he could use an already printed compendium or text, such as the

9. See. H. W. F. Hinrichs, *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1822), pp. xviii-xix; cf. *Berliner Schriften*, p. 74.

10. See below, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52, and 1824 *Concept*, n. 37.

11. *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 744-749.

12. There is abundant testimony to this effect. See *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, ed. G. Nicolai (Hamburg, 1970), pp. 181, 203, 207, 246, 274, 276, 376-377, 421-422, 548.

Encyclopedia. He spoke slowly and repetitiously, with much pausing to clear his throat, to find his place as he thumbed through sheets, and to express his thoughts in the right words. But one distinct advantage of speaking from manuscripts—as in the case not only of the philosophy of religion but also of the philosophies of history and art and the history of philosophy—was that it allowed free rein to improve and rearrange the material, even to the point of complete reformulation. It is also the case that many more student transcripts were made of the manuscript lectures than of those for which a printed outline already existed, since the transcripts were the only permanent record available to students, and copies were in heavy demand. Hegel's slow pace of delivery made it possible for students to take verbatim notes. It was a common practice of the time for three students to sit beside one another, in turn writing down as exactly as possible what the lecturer said, subsequently combining their notes into a transcript of the whole. Some transcripts clearly were prepared in collaboration, while others derived from a common source. Still other students worked alone, either writing down the lectures in class or taking notes from which they later prepared a fair copy or a more freely edited copy. In any case, these transcripts (*Nachschriften*) were much more detailed and accurate records than student lecture notes customarily are today. They were more than what we would call "notebooks" but of course not exact reproductions.

Not only were copies of student transcripts in heavy demand and sometimes sold for a price, but also Hegel made use of the best of such transcripts for his own purposes. Marheineke reports, in his Preface to the first edition of the *Werke*, that Hegel made use of a copy of the transcript of the 1824 lectures prepared by K. G. von Griesheim (a military officer) when he lectured in 1827, and that he used a transcript of the 1827 lectures prepared by a Herr Meyer of Switzerland when he lectured in 1831—in each case jotting down his own additions and revisions in the margins of the fair copy at his disposal.¹³ As the present edition demonstrates,

13. Preface to *W*₁; in *W*₂ 11:xi–xii.

because of extensive changes in the later series, Hegel's original lecture manuscript of 1821, which he partly utilized in 1824 on the basis of extensive marginal additions and revisions, was no longer serviceable for the 1827 and 1831 lectures apart from a few small sections. Each new series of lectures was based on a revised copy of the preceding series, as well as additional miscellaneous papers; but especially in the last years much of the actual presentation must have been extemporaneous.

The three later series differed substantially from the 1821 series. As will be shown in detail in Secs. 7–8 below, the entire conception of the lectures changed over the period of a few years, changes that were reflected in both organization and substance even though Hegel's basic philosophical vision remained relatively constant. This is not very surprising when we consider that philosophy of religion was still a novel subject for Hegel, whereas he had already published major works on other topics covered by his Berlin lectures, such as logic and metaphysics, encyclopedia, and philosophy of right. Although religion had been partially and briefly addressed within the framework of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and the first edition of the *Encyclopedia* (1817), when Hegel began preparing his lectures on the philosophy of religion his task was nothing less than that of adumbrating for the first time a systematic overview of the subject. For the other disciplines on which he lectured, including the history of philosophy and the philosophies of history and art, as well as those for which published compendia were available, the stage of comprehensive systematization and codification had already been attained by the time Hegel moved to Berlin, but this was not the case with the philosophy of religion prior to the 1827 lectures. In other words, philosophy of religion was the last discipline for which this one-time student of theology developed a comprehensive framework of interpretation, and the several series of Berlin lectures provide a unique opportunity for tracing the development of Hegel's thought—but it is just this that the previous editions prevent us from doing. The development is not just of historical or biographical interest. Fundamental philosophical and theological questions are exposed as Hegel wrestles with alternative

formulations, arrangements, and connections, and the content is much expanded as he strives for a comprehensive treatment of all the major historical forms of religion. The lectures point to a continuous drawing on new sources and a constant reworking such that even parts in which the systematic conception remains unchanged are continually formulated anew. On the one hand the content is enriched from series to series, while on the other the whole design and architectonic is revised with a view to finding a form that matches the concept. We might go so far as to say that the only factor remaining constant through all the successive changes is the main division into "Concept of Religion," "Determinate Religion," and "Consummate Religion."

Two other factors contributed to the recasting of these lectures. The first was the concurrent series on other disciplines, notably the lectures on the history of philosophy, the philosophies of world history and art, and the proofs of the existence of God, which had a significant impact on the formulation of themes for the philosophy of religion. The second factor was the increasing criticism that Hegel's philosophy of religion was encountering from the side of theology. Just as concern over the implications of Schleiermacher's forthcoming *Glaubenslehre* for religious policy in Prussia may have been the instigating factor in Hegel's decision to lecture on philosophy of religion in 1821, so the dispute with contemporary theology runs like a red thread through the later lectures, as well as through the lesser writings of the Berlin period. Together with Hegel's Preface to Hinrichs' *Religionswissenschaft* in 1822, the second lecture series is where the dispute with Schleiermacher reaches its culmination. But from the mid-1820s there was another theological opponent to do battle with, in the shape of neopietism combined with Oriental studies as represented by F. A. Tholuck. While this theology may have seemed to offer welcome assistance in the struggle against latter-day rationalism, as is clear from Hegel's parting words to Tholuck, in fact a more bitter competitor for the Hegelian philosophy of religion was here emerging than rationalism and the theology of feeling had been. The 1827 lectures show Hegel less as an assailant than on the defensive—on the defensive, that is, against

the charge of Spinozism, by which was meant pantheism and atheism.¹⁴

Hegel's efforts in the lecture hall had little effect in stemming these attacks, and his most prominent supporters at the time—Hinrichs, Rust, Daub, Marheineke, Conradi, Göschel—had not actually attended his lectures on the philosophy of religion.¹⁵ It was only after Philipp Marheineke had edited and published them in 1832, a few months after Hegel's death on 14 November 1831, that these lectures first attained a public impact. It is an impact that continues to be felt a century and a half later, although the form conferred upon them by Marheineke (and by Bruno Bauer in the second edition of 1840) has long been recognized as inadequate.

2. The Sources of the Lectures

The task of improving upon the original editions is not lightened by the fact that during these same intervening years many of the best sources have been lost or destroyed. However, in recent years the situation has improved to the point that it is possible to put in hand an edition such as the one here presented.

The sources may be divided into three groups: (a) papers in Hegel's own handwriting, used for the preparation of the lectures; (b) student transcripts of the lectures as delivered; (c) previous editions, which preserve sources that otherwise are no longer available. A table correlating sources and editions, showing which

14. This charge appears to have been raised publicly for the first time by F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner, oder: Die wahre Weihe des Zweiflers*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), p. 231. Toward the end of the 1820s, the pietistic attacks on Hegel's "pantheism" and "atheism" increased. Among others, see Anonymous [Hülsemann], *Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: Absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus* (Leipzig, 1829); and *Ueber die Wissenschaft der Idee, Erste Abtheilung: Die neueste Identitätsphilosophie und Atheismus, oder über immanente Polemik* (Breslau, 1831).

15. The only evidence for an early impact of the lectures points ahead to a later phase of the dispute centering on the philosophy of religion. It is contained in Ludwig Feuerbach's letter to Hegel of 22 November 1828 (*Briefe* 3:244 ff.), where what he says about the relation between philosophy and Christianity stems essentially from his recollection of the 1824 lectures, which he heard. Feuerbach's later preoccupation with the sensible basis of religion in feeling, as found, e.g., in *The Essence of Christianity*, could well reflect an inversion of what Hegel said about feeling in 1824.

sources were used by which editions, is found at the end of the present section on p. 22–23; readers will find it helpful to keep it before them as they work through the next two sections.

a. Handwritten Papers

- (1) The Manuscript (*Ms.*) (Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Ms. germ. qu. 397)

The manuscript is dated 30 April–25 August 1821 (the first and last days of the summer semester) but does not bear Hegel's signature; it was Philipp Marheineke who added Hegel's name when he deposited it in the Royal Library of Berlin (now the State Library of Prussian Culture). The manuscript has been preserved in reasonably good quality. It consists of 104 sheets, written on both sides for a total of 208 pages. Each sheet is creased down the middle to form an inner and an outer half; the original text is written on the inner halves front and back, while the outer margins are filled with extensive additions. Sheet 3 (according to the former numeration cited by Lasson, No. 2) was interleaved at a later date and is of smaller size and different texture (see *Ms. Intro.*, n. 14). Between sheets 13 and 15, sheet 14 is interposed, which, as shown by internal reference marks, should be inserted on sheet 18a (see *Ms. Concept*, n. 57). The pagination by sheets was inserted subsequently by the Library; Hegel himself wrote numbers at the beginning of each of twenty-five folded signatures. While most of the signatures contain two double sheets, one laid inside the other, for a total of four single sheets or eight pages, the manuscript is not consistently made up in this way.

Originally the entire text was written in ink, as are most of the marginal additions, only a few being in pencil. Because of the cramped and irregular handwriting, the frequent occurrence of abbreviations, strikeouts, and incomplete sentences, and the extensive marginal additions, only some of which are keyed to the main text by reference marks or lines, the manuscript is exceedingly difficult to decipher and properly arrange. This complex task has been accomplished by Ricardo Ferrara and Walter Jaeschke, improving upon the earlier work of K.-H. Ilting and Georg Lasson.

There are now only relatively few passages about which uncertainty remains.

We do not know precisely when the manuscript was written. It is unlikely to have been composed much in advance, or to have been completed before delivery of the lectures began on 30 April, since to an increasing extent as one approaches the end it gives the impression of having been very hastily composed. It is more probable that it was begun shortly before the summer semester and completed during it. One of the sheets containing preparatory materials for the 1821 lectures, now deposited in Houghton Library of Harvard University, has the date 16 July and a calculation of the number of hours remaining for lectures before the end of the semester. Since this sheet undoubtedly predates the manuscript, 16 July would be the earliest possible date for compiling the concluding sections, dealing with the Christian religion.¹⁶

The original text, written on the inner halves of the pages, was almost certainly composed within the time frame indicated above (with the exception of sheet 3, the dating of which is uncertain). But, as we have noted, extensive additions are found on the outer halves of the pages. Some of these are marginal notes in the strict sense (letters to help articulate the text and keywords to act as signposts), while others are quite substantial amplifications of the text. Many of the latter are keyed to the main text by reference marks; sometimes the original text is struck out or enclosed in brackets and replaced by a new formulation in the margin.

Since Hegel did have recourse to the Ms. for the later lectures, especially in 1824, there are grounds for assuming subsequent revisions, which would have been made in the margins. This can be confirmed with certainty when either (a) Hegel refers to works that were published after 1821, or (b) there are reasons for assigning a specific marginal passage to one of the later lectures and not the first. With respect to the latter, for example, (i) an addition may only be intelligible in a context pertaining to one of the later series, or (ii) the substance of a marginal passage may not be reflected in

16. This hypothesis has been advanced by K.-H. Ilting in his edition of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*, vol. 1, *Die Vorlesung von 1821* (Naples, 1978), pp. 750–751.

student transcripts of the first series but only of a later series. There are instances of all three cases. For example, with reference to (a), Hegel refers to the second volume of Goethe's *Morphologie*, which appeared in 1823, in the margin of Ms. 58a (vol. 2). Two allusions to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* at Ms. 83a and 103a must have been written at a later time, probably in preparation for the 1824 lectures. Even if the later passages of the main text were written after Schleiermacher's work appeared in July 1821, there is no evidence that Hegel immediately became familiar with it. References to the actual content of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* are found only in the margins of the Ms. and must be regarded as later additions. An instance of (b) (i) is found at Ms. 76a (vol. 3) where Hegel revises a section heading to conform to the structure of the later lectures; the revision makes no sense in the context of the 1821 lectures. And an instance of (b) (ii) is found in the present volume at Ms. 2a (see below, Ms. *Intro.*, n. 5), where a marginal addition is not corroborated even by transcripts of the 1824 lectures but only of the 1827 series.

The fact that there are demonstrable instances where Hegel made later revisions to the Ms. (and we could cite other examples as well) suggests that this was a practice of his and that other instances also exist. But since we lack student transcripts of the 1821 lectures as delivered, with which the Ms. could be compared, any comprehensive dating of the marginal additions is impossible. In any event, it is a mistake to think of the Ms. in its complete form as simply coterminous with the 1821 lectures. It is important, therefore, to be able to distinguish the marginal passages from the main text, since these passages contain not only revisions made concurrently with the original composition but also later additions.

However, *too* great a scope should not be assigned to marginal additions made at a later date. As we have noted, Hegel's conception changed radically, especially in Part I, *The Concept of Religion*. Thus in the 1824 *Concept* there is only one topic for which it is likely that Hegel drew upon the Ms. in a comprehensive way, namely, Sec. B.2, "The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint." To be sure, thematic continuities occur in dispersed fashion in different contexts, but it is not likely that Hegel lectured from the Ms. in

these places; and in the 1827 *Concept* not a single passage is to be found where Hegel used the *Ms.* directly. Consequently, most of the marginal additions contained in Part I must date from 1821. The divergence between the different series is less in the case of the *Introduction* and Parts II and III, and here it is more probable that the revisions are of later date. But the number of changes introduced into the *Ms.* only for the 1827 series must be small, since Hegel based his 1827 lectures primarily on a copy of Griesheim's transcript of the 1824 lectures and on miscellaneous papers composed after 1821.

(2) The Miscellaneous Papers (*MiscP*)

A second handwritten source for the philosophy-of-religion lectures, one that unfortunately is no longer in existence, was made up of a large collection of miscellaneous drafts and notes, varying in their degree of completion, which we know about through Marheineke's Prefaces to the *Werke*. Marheineke distinguishes between (a) additional student transcripts of the 1824, 1827, and 1831 lectures; (b) Leopold von Henning's transcript of the 1821 lectures (now lost); (c) the lecture *Ms.* (referred to as Hegel's "first draft"); and (d) "a sizable bundle [*ein ansehnliches Convolut*] of preparatory materials Hegel had assembled for the lectures, materials in which some of the most difficult and detailed developments figured substantially, in some cases fully."¹⁷ In German this "bundle" has come to be known as the "Convolut," but on the assumption that in English neither this strange word nor its translation would make sense, we prefer to refer instead to the "miscellaneous papers" or *MiscP*.

Marheineke assigns no dates to the miscellaneous papers, and in all probability they cannot be dated, since they consisted of material from different years. However, there are a number of reasons for assigning the great majority of these papers to the later lectures rather than to 1821.¹⁸ The *Ms.*, as we have seen, was

17. *W*₂ 11:vii; cf. pp. vi, xii.

18. Ilting's hypothesis, which is of great importance for the conception underlying his edition, namely that *MiscP* is to be assigned in large part to 1821, is unwarranted. See *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 744. Some few miscellaneous papers may indeed date from 1821, such as *Ms.* sheet 3 mentioned earlier, and the papers contained in the Houghton Library described below.

evidently composed only shortly before and during the lectures, and it is unlikely that a large quantity of additional materials would have been produced between the compilation and oral delivery, or that such materials, had they existed, would not have been placed in the margins of the Ms. like other additions. Nor is it very plausible to regard *MiscP* as preparatory work for the Ms., since Hegel generally destroyed preparatory outlines once they had been included in new, more extensive compositions. On the other hand, as we have also seen, the later lectures departed considerably from the 1821 series, and since Hegel could no longer have used the Ms. as the basis for his oral delivery in whole sections, he would have needed to have written papers or notes in place of the original Ms. both in 1824 and 1827, and also, as far as can be judged, in 1831. If we did not know about the miscellaneous papers from Marheineke, we would have to postulate the existence of such papers for preparing the later lecture series. A further consideration, which simply reinforces the conclusion already reached, is that Hegel employed a similar practice of writing out additions and revisions for subsequent lectures on separate sheets in the case of the lectures on the history of philosophy and on aesthetics.¹⁹

(3) Other Relevant Handwritten Materials

From the literary estate of Karl Rosenkranz, Houghton Library of Harvard University possesses several sheets (one single, three double) containing preliminary materials relating to the treatment of Greek, Roman, and Christian religion in the philosophy-of-religion lectures.²⁰ The probability is that these are the sorts of sheets Hegel normally destroyed once he had composed his lecture manuscripts, since they are more schematic and contain allusions and references that did not find their way into any of the actual lectures;

19. Information to this effect is provided by the editors of these lectures for the *Werke* editions, namely C. L. Michelet and H. G. Hotho, respectively; cf. *Werke* 13:vi; 10/1:vii.

20. They have been published by Helmut Schneider in *Hegel-Studien* 7 (Bonn, 1972), 28–31, 32–46. On their identification with the philosophy of religion, see R. Heede, “Hegel-Bilanz: Hegels Religionsphilosophie als Aufgabe und Problem der Forschung,” in *Hegel-Bilanz: Zur Aktualität und Inaktualität der Philosophie Hegels*, ed. R. Heede and J. Ritter (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 70; and Ilting, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 747.

thus it is also likely that they did not belong to what Marheineke identified as "miscellaneous papers." How they came into Rosenkranz's hands is not clear; but since they do relate in a preparatory way to present the lectures, they will be included as appendices to volumes 2 and 3.

b. Transcripts of the Lectures

Altogether twenty-one student transcripts (*Nachschriften*) of the four series of philosophy-of-religion lectures are known to have existed; of these, eight have survived to the present—two in the State Library of Prussian Culture, West Berlin, one in East Germany, three in Poland, and two in private possession. While some of the best transcripts have been lost—indeed, all of those that were utilized by the original editors with the exception of Griesheim and Hotho—the situation is not as bad as might otherwise be expected, and it is relatively good when compared with others of Hegel's lectures read from manuscript.

The transcripts fall into three distinct types: (1) Verbatim transcripts (*Mitschriften*), taken down as Hegel was speaking. They have the advantage of immediately recording the actual words and sequences of a lecture series but are for the most part defective in that the text does not form a continuous syntactic whole (incomplete sentences, etc.). Only a few transcripts are of this type. (2) Fair copies (*Reinschriften*). This group is numerically the largest. While they were written up and edited from a syntactic point of view at home from notes and possibly shorthand taken in the lectures (sometimes by a small group of collaborators), these transcripts nevertheless seek to adhere to the original wording of the lectures and reconstruct it as far as possible. (3) Freely edited transcripts (*Ausarbeitungen*). These were completely rephrased by the student, working at home after the lectures, not intending to reconstruct them systematically as delivered by Hegel himself, but rather to grasp and reformulate the central argument in a distinctive personal form, often improving upon Hegel's oral delivery in the process.

The following transcripts have been used in the present edition:

(1) The Lectures of 1821

(a) *Leopold von Henning* (Hn). Unfortunately this transcript has been lost, but fragments of it can be reconstructed from the *Werke* and are printed as footnotes. According to Marheineke, it was of high quality; and if it is similar to a transcript prepared by Henning of Hegel's history-of-philosophy lectures, which has been preserved in the form of a copy made by Moritz Carriere, it was a fair copy. Marheineke made only slight use of Hn in W₁, but it was extensively employed in W₂, woven together with passages from the Ms. For reasons to be explained in Sec. 5.e, we have not specifically designated the special materials footnoted in relation to the Ms. as deriving from Hn, although most of them undoubtedly do. Two other transcripts of the 1821 lectures are known to have existed, by Carl Ludwig Michelet and Johannes Schulze, but both have been lost and neither was used in previous editions. Fragments of Michelet's transcript are recoverable, and, together with fragments of his transcript of the 1824 lectures, also lost, will be given in volume 3 of this edition.²¹

(2) The Lectures of 1824

(b) *Karl Gustav von Griesheim* (G). (Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Ms. germ. qu. 548, 549.) This is the best transcript of the 1824 lectures and serves as the basis of our text for the second series. It is a very comprehensive fair copy, totaling 648 pages of elegant script in two volumes, reflecting considerable revision from a stylistic point of view. It omits a large number of repetitions, and there are some minor gaps and errors of hearing or understanding. It does not seem to be the work of a single auditor, and possibly for this reason does not bear the name of the compiler, Griesheim, a Prussian military officer who made detailed transcripts of Hegel's lectures in the mid-1820s. According to Marheineke, Hegel utilized a copy of Griesheim's transcript when

21. These fragments are found in Michelet's *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, Part 2 (Berlin, 1838), pp. 649–650, 652.

he lectured in 1827, adding a few notes and revisions of his own. This was the copy used by Marheineke and Bauer for the *Werke*, but the copy deposited in the Staatsbibliothek bears no such annotations and thus is a different copy, although the text is probably the same.

(c) *Carl Pastenaci (P)*. (Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Warsaw.) This verbatim transcript of 256 pages in difficult script usefully supplements G in several respects. It is frequently more detailed and a closer approximation of Hegel's actual words, although complete sentences are sometimes lacking, and it breaks off toward the beginning of Part III. It was not used by the *Werke*, but Lasson employed it for parts of his edition.

(d) *P. F. (or F. P.) Deiters (D)*. (Privately owned by Professor Karl Larenz.) This is a complete, careful fair copy that has also been used to supplement G, although it is considerably shorter (232 pages). Since it came to light relatively recently, it was not used by any of the previous editions, although the third part has been published.

(e) *F. C. H. von Kehler (K)*. (Universitätsbibliothek, Jena.) An incomplete fair copy, covering only the *Introduction* and the beginning of Part I, but almost identical throughout with G. Since we must assume that they were prepared together, K does not provide an independent corroboration of G. The probable reason why K breaks off after twenty-four pages is that it was intended in any case to have copies made of G; if so, there may have been an original, unedited, possibly complete verbatim transcript forming the basis of K. Lasson makes some use of this transcript.

(f) *Heinrich Gustav Hotho (Ho)*. (Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Ms. Germ. qu. 1301.) This is a complete and for the most part extremely well edited text from the stylistic point of view, but it is not an authentic reproduction of Hegel's lectures as delivered. To supplement the painstakingly elaborated arrangement, keywords and brief summaries have been inserted in the margin. Both W_1 and W_2 as well as *L* made extensive use of

Ho, but we have limited its inclusion to selected passages in the footnotes.

Two other well-prepared transcripts used for the second edition of the *Werke*—namely, those by Friedrich Foerster and Carl Ludwig Michelet—have been lost. A free French version of a few themes from Part I, prepared by Jules Correvon, is still available but has not been used by this or any edition.

(3) The Lectures of 1827

The situation with respect to the lectures of 1827 is much less satisfactory than for 1824 since all of the transcripts used by both the original editors and by Lasson have been lost. According to Marheineke, a detailed transcript prepared by a Herr Meyer from Switzerland was used in both editions of the *Werke*, and furthermore a copy was given to Hegel, which he supplemented with marginal notes and revisions and used as the basis of his 1831 presentation. For the second edition of the *Werke*, Meyer was supplemented with a transcript by Gustav Droysen.²² When Lasson set to work after the First World War, both Meyer and Droysen had been lost, but Lasson was fortunate to discover two excellent transcripts in the Stadtbibliothek of Königsberg, which were in turn destroyed in 1945. One of these was an anonymous fair copy, the other a verbatim transcript made by Johann Eduard Erdmann. According to Lasson, these two transcripts agreed with each other to an astonishing degree and also with the text of the *Werke*.²³ Lasson's text, which is based on these transcripts, in fact agrees closely with the *Werke*, which makes us confident that the 1827 lectures can be accurately reconstructed from Lasson, using a method to be described in Sec. 5.c. The reconstruction is greatly assisted by the recent discovery of three additional transcripts of the 1827 lectures, all of which are inferior in quality to those employed by Lasson and the *Werke*, but which are essential to establishing the proper order of the text and to correcting and supplementing Lasson. These transcripts are as follows:

22. *W*₂ 11:vii, xii.

23. *L* 1/2:317–318.

(g) *Anonymous (An)*. (Privately owned by Pastor B. Raebel.) A complete and neatly written fair copy (109 pages) with a few minor transpositions in the text and a few additions in the margin, probably added later in the light of other transcripts. By comparison with *B* and *Hu*, the expression already seems colored by the compiler's own reflections.

(h) *Ignacy Boerner (B)*. (Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Warsaw, Evangelical-Reformed Church Library Collection, No. 934.)²⁴ This is a complete verbatim transcript of the lectures as delivered, totaling seventy-eight pages, in small script, very difficult to read. Many of the sentences are syntactically incomplete, and some passages are transcribed only in rapid, fragmentary fashion. However, the transcript often shows a word-for-word agreement with the text in *L* or *W*. One of the most valuable features of *B* is that it provides a marginal indication of dates for the lectures, thus helping to secure the proper order of the text. These dates essentially confirm those reproduced by Lasson from Erdmann (without the gaps evidenced by the latter, at least as reproduced by Lasson); and they indicate that during the last week of the course Hegel introduced an additional lecture on Wednesday, 8 August, whereas he normally lectured on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays.

(i) *Joseph Hube (Hu)*. (Biblioteka Jagiellonska, Cracow.) A complete fair copy, numbering 365 pages. Hube was a Pole whose German was often stylistically awkward and sometimes grammatically incorrect, but his transcript is very valuable in terms of content.

(4) The Lectures of 1831

A smaller number of known transcripts were made of the 1831 lectures, but they have all been lost and were not available even to Lasson. The only one to be used for both editions of the *Werke* was prepared by the philosopher's son, Karl Hegel, which Hegel himself also approved (according to Marheineke); in the second edition additional transcripts by Geyer, Reichenow, and Rutenberg

24. Information about this transcript was furnished by K.-H. Ilting.

were consulted.²⁵ The compiler of the latter was probably Adolph Rutenberg, who later belonged to the circle surrounding Bruno and Edgar Bauer and Karl Marx. In the absence of original transcripts, the recent discovery of the existence of a set of *excerpts* from a transcript of the 1831 lectures is of considerable import.

(j) *David Friedrich Strauss* (S). (Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Schiller-Nationalmuseum, Marbach.)²⁶ This consists of forty-nine pages of excerpts from an unidentified transcript of Hegel's 1831 lectures. Strauss went to Berlin for the express purpose of hearing Hegel, who died shortly after his arrival. During the winter of 1831–32, Strauss busied himself by making excerpts from transcripts of Hegel's lectures on logic, history of philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion—transcripts apparently given him by an unnamed jurist and long-time student of Hegel.²⁷ The excerpts of the philosophy-of-religion lectures are complete but not very extensive, especially for the *Introduction* and *Concept of Religion*. Thus they cannot replace the fragmentary 1831 texts that are identifiable among the special materials in the *Werke*. By comparing the final section of Strauss's excerpts from Part I on "The Relationship of Religion to the State" with the same section in the *Werke* drawn directly from an 1831 transcript (see below, pp. 451–460), we may assume that what Strauss offers is not so much actual excerpts from the notebook available to him as a paraphrase in his own words of the main themes. Since the excerpts summarize the contents of this section reasonably accurately, we may be confident about the reliability of the whole, even though the form has been shaped by Strauss's own literary style. The chief advantage of Strauss's excerpts is that they enable us to obtain for the first time a clear picture of the overall structure of the 1831 lectures, and to

25. W₂ 11:vi–vii, xii.

26. This manuscript has long been owned and catalogued by the Schiller-Nationalmuseum but only recently came to the attention of the Hegel Archive. Lasson was unaware of it.

27. Strauss to Christian Märklin, 15 November 1831, 6 February 1832. Quoted in J. F. Sandberger, *D.F. Strauss als theologischer Hegelianer* (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 192, 194.

discover, therefore, that structural differences between the 1827 and 1831 series are greater than had once been thought.

3. Previous Editions

a. Werke: First Edition, 1832 (W₁)

During the 1820s, Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion had little public impact beyond the small circle of students and associates who heard them. This situation changed rapidly less than a year after his death when the first edition of the lectures was published by Hegel's friend and colleague on the theological faculty, Konrad Philipp Marheineke. The work was published remarkably quickly. By 17 November 1831, a mere three days after Hegel's death on the 14th, an Association of Friends of the Deceased had been formed, agreement had been reached on the general design of a publication of his works, starting with the Berlin lectures on various topics, editors for the latter had been assigned, and Marheineke had begun to assemble Hegel's handwritten materials and relevant student transcripts.²⁸ The philosophy of religion was the first lecture series to be published, and by 6 May 1832 Marheineke was already in a position to sign the Preface to the first volume, despite the fact that as Rector of the University of Berlin he doubtless had heavy responsibilities. This rapid work can perhaps best be explained by the fact that the task of publishing these materials was invested with nothing less than religious significance. In his funeral oration, Marheineke stated that Hegel, now released from his earthly shell, lives on refined in the hearts and minds of all those who recognize his immortal worth, or who will come to recognize it in the future. In this context, the publication was designed to confer a lasting character to the resurrection of which Marheineke spoke, and this was served by Hegel's rapid canonization.²⁹

28. This is according to the testimony of Hegel's wife, Marie Hegel, in a letter to her sister-in-law, Christiane Hegel, 17 November 1831 (*Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, p. 483). On 12 December 1831 she reported to C. Daub that printing would begin shortly after the new year (*ibid.*, p. 505).

29. *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, pp. 474–475, cf. p. 672.

In the Preface to W_2 , Marheineke states that “the basic principle which guided me in editing the first edition was to confine myself primarily to Hegel’s latest lectures on this subject as the most mature evidence of his mind.”³⁰ He was vague about what he meant by the word “primarily.” There are in fact several passages in W_1 where Marheineke made use of Hegel’s own manuscript, and one where he employed Henning’s transcript of the first lectures.³¹ Apart from these instances, the sources used by Marheineke for W_1 were the transcripts for the 1824, 1827, and 1831 lectures compiled by Griesheim, Meyer, and Karl Hegel, respectively, plus Hotho’s freely edited transcript of 1824. Marheineke’s stated editorial objective was to achieve a mean between the form of a book that Hegel himself might have published on the subject (in other words, eliminating everything unsuitable for publication) and the form of oral lectures.³²

One distinct advantage of Marheineke’s method is that, as the result of being based on the later sources, this first edition is more homogeneous than the others, and there is less interference with the flow of Hegel’s thought. But the price paid for basing the edition on the later lectures, especially in conjunction with the principle of fusing the different series together and avoiding doublets, was an appreciable impoverishment of content. A wealth of detail, including some from the later series, was sacrificed in the interest of textual coherence. Marheineke’s claim to have worked in a spirit of impartiality is supported by the fact that rival factions had not yet broken out among Hegel’s followers, and that when they did break out, he could not easily be identified with any of them, nor could his edition.

If for no other reason than lack of time, Marheineke worked with a very broad brush. He simply juxtaposed lengthy related texts from the three later series without attempting to combine them into

30. W_2 11:vi.

31. Ilting was the first to call attention to this (*Religionsphilosophie*, p. 374), but he did not identify all of the passages.

32. W_2 11:xiv.

SOURCES AND EDITIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

SOURCES:

1821 *Lectures*

Hegel's own manuscript (*Ms.*) [Berlin]
 Henning (*Hn*)

1824 *Lectures*

Griesheim – fair copy 1 with Hegel's
 notes

Griesheim (*G*) [Berlin] – fair copy 2

Foerster

Michelet

Pastenaci (*P*) [Warsaw] – verbatim
 transcript

Deiters (*D*) [private possession]

– fair copy

Kehler (*K*) [Jena] – incomplete fair
 copy

Hotho (*Ho*) [Berlin] – freely edited

*Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own
 hand (MiscP)*

EDITIONS: *Werke*₁ (1832) *Werke*₂ (1840) *Lasson* (1925–1929) *This edition* (1983–1985)

* * *
 * (In this edition: special materials
 from *W*₂)

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* (In this edition: special materials
 from *W*₂)

SOURCES AND EDITIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (*continued*)

EDITIONS:		
	<i>Werke</i> ₁ (1832)	<i>Werke</i> ₂ (1840)
		<i>Lasson</i> (1925–1929)
		<i>This edition</i> (1983–1985)
SOURCES:		
1827 <i>Lectures</i>		
Meyer	*	*
Droysen		*
Königsberg Anonymous (possibly Meyer?)		
Erdmann		
Anonymous (<i>An</i>) [private possession]		
– fair copy		*
Boerner (<i>B</i>) [Warsaw] – verbatim transcript		*
Hube (<i>Hu</i>) [Cracow] – fair copy		*
1831 <i>Lectures</i>		
Karl Hegel	*	
Geyer		
Reichenow		
Rutenberg		
Strauss (<i>S</i>) [Marbach] – excerpts		
		*

* } (Used for this edition
in Lasson's text)
*

* } (In this edition: special materials
from *W*₂)
*
*
*
*

* = Source available and used by the edition(s) specified

a unified text. This principle of alternation between sources is evident even within a single series such as 1824, where Marheineke sometimes added passages from *Ho* to *G*'s text or used them instead of *G*. He did not attempt a comprehensive, detailed collation of several transcripts from one lecture series, nor of the three lectures—1824, 1827, 1831—into a single, editorially constructed unit.

b. Werke: Second Edition, 1840 (W₂)

D. F. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* (1835) brought into the open an emerging conflict among the followers of Hegel between theistic and nontheistic (pantheistic, atheistic, or humanistic) interpretations of his thought. Strauss attempted to demonstrate that certain ambivalences were to be found in Hegel's philosophy of religion, and especially his Christology, that could lend support to more than one line of interpretation; and in his essays defending *The Life of Jesus* he was the first to identify specifically the "right" and "left" wings of the Hegelian school.³³ Already reviews critical of Hegel's "pantheism" as evidenced in the first edition of the *Religionsphilosophie* had appeared from C. H. Weisse and F. A. Staudenmaier,³⁴ but these reviewers attributed the problems to Hegel's conception, not to the edition. But now the suspicion grew that the ambivalences mentioned by Strauss and others, such as Karl Rosenkranz, might be traced, at least in part, to the way the lectures had been edited.³⁵ These suspicions were shared by members of the Hegel family. The

33. David Friedrich Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, trans. George Eliot, ed. P. C. Hodgson (Philadelphia and London, 1972), esp. §§ 150–152; *Streitschriften zur Vertheidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie* (Tübingen, 1837), 3:94–95.

34. C. H. Weisse, "Über die eigentliche Grenze des Pantheismus und des philosophischen Theismus," *Religiöse Zeitschrift für das katholische Deutschland*, 1833, 1:31–51, 143–153, 227–239; 2:99–119, 244–269. F. A. Staudenmaier, review in *Jahrbücher für Theologie und christliche Philosophie* 1/1 (1834), 97–158.

35. As early as 5 January 1833 Strauss wrote to G. Binder that the *Religionsphilosophie* would not be well received because it was poorly edited. Quoted by T. Ziegler, "Zur Biographie von David Friedrich Strauss," *Deutsche Revue* 30/2 (1905), 344. See also Rosenkranz's review of *W₁* in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1833, pp. 561–581, 641–656.

younger son Immanuel wrote his mother, severely criticizing Marheineke's work and urging that a new edition be requested.³⁶

These considerations, together with the fact that editorial principles had continued to be discussed by the Association of Friends as new volumes were prepared, led to the decision to issue a new edition of the *Religionsphilosophie*. Immanuel Hegel preferred that the work be entrusted to Hotho or Rosenkranz, or as a last resort to Bruno Bauer. At that time Bauer was still identified as belonging to the extreme right wing of the Hegelian school, and Immanuel was fearful that he would prove to be too partisan and unphilosophical. But Hotho was unavailable, and the fact that only a little later Bauer was selected may be related to Marheineke's willingness to appear also as editor of the second edition, even though the entire work fell to Bauer.

Bauer had not only to do the actual work on the new edition; he was also free to determine the principles and procedures himself.³⁷ He took apart a copy of the first edition, inserting additions and corrections in the margin and interleaving single handwritten sheets with additional text, keyed by reference marks to W_1 . Some parts of the original text were struck out and replaced by handwritten material.³⁸ The additions bear no references of any kind to the sources used by Bauer. While regrettable, this is consistent with the practice of the first edition in giving no information about sources other than general and imprecise indications in the Prefaces.

From the Preface to W_2 we learn, on the one hand, that additional transcripts were drawn on for the later lectures: for the 1824 series,

36. W. F. Becker, "Fragen und Quellen zur Geschichte von Hegels Nachlass, II: Hegels hinterlassene Schriften im Briefwechsel seines Sohnes Immanuel," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 34/3-4:603, 604.

37. This is evident from the fact that, when Marheineke was ready to write the Preface to W_2 , he asked Edgar Bauer to find out from Bruno the principles he had followed in the revision and the use made of various sources, etc. See Edgar Bauer to Bruno Bauer, 29 December 1839, in *Briefwechsel während der Jahre 1839-1842 aus Bonn und Berlin* (Charlottenburg, 1844), p. 22.

38. The copy sent to press by Bauer for composition purposes has been preserved and is now in the possession of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The editors are grateful to the Academy for having made available to the Hegel Archive, through the intermediary of Professor A. Gulyga, a complete copy of these materials.

Foerster and Michelet; for 1827, Droysen; and for 1831, Geyer, Reichenow, and Rutenberg. These were used principally for purposes of collation with the transcripts already used in W_1 and did not result in a great expansion of the text. The new material in W_2 comes primarily from the first lecture series (i.e., Henning's transcript), of which extensive use is now made, as well as from Hegel's own handwritten materials—the manuscript and the miscellaneous papers—which are also extensively employed in accord with the intent of the Association of Friends to go back to Hegel's own manuscripts in revised editions of the *Werke*.

On the whole Bauer remained faithful to the conception to which Marheineke refers in his first Preface, that of holding the mean between a book and lectures. He tried to work the materials from the different series into one another to a greater extent than did Marheineke. But by attempting to insert materials from the quite differently conceived 1821 lectures (*Hn* and *Ms.*) into the structural fabric of the later lectures, Bauer introduced marked tensions that disrupt Hegel's train of thought and often make it appear to be illogical, inconsistent, and worst of all, ambivalent (the very problem that was to be overcome by the new edition). In this respect, Lasson's attack on Bauer's method is not so wide of the mark: the transpositions in the proper order of one or more of the lecture series to achieve the goal of integration are unjustified and result in just the opposite of integration, namely fragmentation. Moreover, Lasson was correct in criticizing the way that Bauer edited *Ms.* passages, which he worked into complete sentences of his own, sometimes even changing words. For example, he replaced "sensibility" (*Empfindung*) wherever it occurred in the *Ms.* by "feeling" (*Gefühl*). It was necessary for him to do so because he transposed the relevant passages from Part I of the *Ms.* to the last section of the *Introduction* treating the "division of the subject," and in order to establish the relation between that section and the discussion proper of feeling drawn from 1824 materials, he had to use the term "feeling" consistently in both places. It might appear that this is a harmless change on the grounds that, after Hegel had taken full cognizance of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* in the 1824 lectures, he simply substituted "feeling" for "sensibility" in his polemic

against theologies based on feeling.³⁹ This is true despite the fact that there are subtle differences between *Empfindung* and *Gefühl*, which Hegel himself recognized in the *Encyclopedia*. Thus when he polemicized against Schleiermacher's theology of *Gefühl* in 1824, he tended to construe *Gefühl* as though it were *Empfindung*, which added to the difficulty of grasping the distinctive nuances of Schleiermacher's theology. In other words, Hegel was reading Schleiermacher's "feeling" in light of his own earlier discussion of "sensibility" in the *Ms.*, and it is just this that is concealed by Bauer's editorial change.⁴⁰

The question has been much discussed again recently whether W_2 tends more to the right or left faction of the Hegel school, or is, on the contrary, neutral in character. This question can, in turn, be understood in one of two ways: it can refer to deliberate manipulation or to what is possibly an unintentional tendency of the second edition. The first option, deliberate manipulation, is ruled out by an analysis of the sources used by the two editions. The distinctive characteristic of each edition is readily explicable by the underlying editorial decisions, which it makes no sense to assume were determined by a specific interpretative slant: on the one hand, Marheineke's decision to make virtually no use of the *Ms.*, *MiscP*, and *Hn* in W_1 , and, on the other, Bauer's decision to draw on these very sources for W_2 . The latter decision was probably not Bauer's alone; in drawing on the surviving handwritten materials he was simply following the practice of other volumes of the *Werke* that had appeared in the interval. Marheineke's original decision not to use the sources he excluded was probably due to his accurate perception that they resisted integration into a whole. For where they do *not* agree with the later lecture series, these materials undermine the consistency of the thought process; and where they *do* agree, they lead for the most part to parallels, which Marheineke was at pains to avoid. However, once published editions of the other Berlin

39. See R. Heede, "Die göttliche Idee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Logik und Religionsphilosophie bei Hegel" (Doctoral dissertation, Münster, 1972), pp. 102–103. This is also the view taken by Walter Jaeschke in the Introduction to the German edition.

40. On this matter, see below, 1824 *Concept*, n. 20.

lectures had drawn on Hegel's handwritten materials, and once a lively conflict of interpretations had broken out in regard to precisely the philosophy of religion, the moment was opportune for a second edition that would draw on these materials both for the sake of completeness and in the hope of settling some of the interpretative issues.

During the time that Bruno Bauer was editing the second edition—from the summer of 1839 to early spring 1840⁴¹—he was undergoing a conversion from a former adherence to the Hegelian right to atheism. His public identification with the right-wing theologians led to contemporary charges that he had given the philosophy of religion a rightward twist, while his conversion to atheism, when it became known, led to later charges that he had given it a leftward twist. But there is no textual evidence for either charge, and it is quite conceivable that, given the state of flux in which he found himself, he resolved to adopt a purely neutral, critical stance, and to allow whatever ambivalences appeared to be present in the text to stand. Toward the end of his editorial work, for example, after the time when it is alleged he had converted to atheism (December, 1839),⁴² Bauer included a passage in which Hegel speaks affirmatively of the resurrection, and he appended an editorial note (the only such one in the entire work) stating that this text is found in Hegel's own handwritten manuscript—in other words, that it is indubitably authentic.⁴³ Thus there is no reason for doubting the accuracy of his own description of his procedure:

I have done the work with complete and utter impartiality, i.e., without any practical regard to this or that school. The times when Göschel and his opponents turned to Hegel to find a few keywords in support of their opposing propositions are past. I carried out the work without any partisan sympathy and with a purely theoretical interest. To the left and the right alike, I allowed the most radical critical arguments

41. This may be established from correspondence with his brother Edgar; see *Briefwechsel*, pp. 10, 22, 50.

42. See E. Barnikol, *Bruno Bauer: Studien und Materialien*, ed. P. Reiner and H. M. Sass (Assen, 1972), pp. 30 ff.

43. *W*₂ 12:300.

and the most orthodox turns of speech to stand in rude juxtaposition—as indeed they must stand, given the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy of religion.⁴⁴

With this principle Bauer consciously disappointed all expectations that the new edition would decide the dispute over Hegel's philosophy of religion, not with arguments, but as the result of editing. To be sure, Bauer did devote particular editorial attention to the topics that were in dispute, such as Christology and "pantheism," but the new material brought about no real resolution of these issues.⁴⁵ Perhaps nothing bears out Bauer's claim to impartiality so well as the fact that down to the present day, continuing attempts have been made to push or pull the edition in one direction or the other. These attempts began immediately after the first volume appeared with the charge, in a Hamburg periodical, that the new edition falsified the work in the interests of the interpretation advanced by the Hegelian right.⁴⁶ This attack obviously provoked Bauer's tongue-in-cheek retort that the new edition differed from the first "only in the greater prominence given to atheism."⁴⁷ Two decades later, in the controversy as to whether logic has a speculative-theological character, C. L. Michelet argued that the theistic interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of religion was refuted by *W₂*,⁴⁸ while Karl Rosenkranz could see no difference between the editions.⁴⁹ I. H. Fichte, on the other hand, thought he recognized a tendency toward the theistic and historical view in *W₂*, and saw in this the only possible explanation of why the right believed it could invoke Hegel himself in support of its interpretation.⁵⁰ All of these

44. Bruno Bauer to Edgar Bauer, 15 March 1840, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 49–50.

45. See E. Zeller's view of *W₂* in *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* 4 (1841), 219.

46. See Bauer, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 48–49.

47. Anonymous [B. Bauer], *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen: Ein Ultimatum* (Leipzig, 1841), p. 149.

48. C. L. Michelet, "Logik und Metaphysik: Rosenkranz und Hegel," *Der Gedanke* 1 (1860–61), 44.

49. K. Rosenkranz, *Epilegomena zu meiner Wissenschaft der logischen Idee* (Königsberg, 1862), p. 107.

50. I. H. Fichte, *Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie*, 2d ed. (Sulzbach, 1841), pp. 992 ff.

attempts have in common a characteristic already deplored by Bauer, namely, proof-texting. That is, an attempt was made to establish the dominant tendency of Hegel's work by citing isolated passages and ignoring the context and sources of these passages.⁵¹ But it is just the latter—namely, valid judgments respecting the context and sources of the materials composing the philosophy-of-religion lectures—that the two editions of the *Werke* are calculated to frustrate. Since the different lecture series are woven into a common structure, which is necessarily one established by the editor, and since no indication is given of the sources, it is impossible for an interpreter to establish the framework that is essential to valid interpretation.

When such a framework is established, we believe it will be evident that neither a leftward nor a rightward drift is discernible in Hegel's thought about religion during the Berlin years, but rather an attempt to work out the discipline of philosophy of religion in more rigorous fashion. Left- and right-wing interpretations would have been alien to his central intention of overcoming unproductive antitheses between tradition and criticism, faith and knowledge, revelation and reason, infinite and finite, theism and a-theism. But for those who could think only in such alternatives, Hegel must have appeared (and still does appear) to be a bundle of conflicting tendencies and contradictions. Undoubtedly this was Bruno Bauer's own final judgment, reinforced perhaps by the resistance of Hegel's materials to his smooth editorial touch.

c. The Lasson Edition (1925–1929) (L)

In his edition Georg Lasson sharply criticized W_1 , but above all W_2 —not least, it may be supposed, because the later interpretation of the philosophy of religion by Bruno Bauer was strictly anathema to him. Despite his evident aversion to Bauer, Lasson's criticism of his procedure is not without justification. This makes it all the less intelligible that Lasson's own procedure corresponds broadly to

51. A recent attempt along similar lines is made by G. Lämmermann, "Redaktion und Redaktionsprinzip der Vorlesung über Religionsphilosophie in ihrer zweiten Ausgabe," in *Die Flucht in den Begriff: Materialien zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie*, ed. F. W. Graf and F. Wagner (Stuttgart, 1982), pp. 156 ff.

that of the first two editors, and almost the only difference is that he further accentuates their faults. Apparently he did not consider their procedure to be wrong in principle but only incompetently executed. Thus he shared their illusory belief that all the student transcripts available to him could be combined into an editorially constructed train of thought. He did attempt to identify his sources in an apparatus at the back of each volume, but the information is often imprecise or incorrect, and he fragmented the materials to a much greater degree than the *Werke*, especially in Part II. His structural organization is based on the lecture manuscript, which is given in full and clearly identified at the beginning of each new section. But as far as Part I and to a considerable extent Part II are concerned, the *Ms.* is wholly unsuitable as a means of combining the other series, whereas in Part III, where the *Ms.* *could* have been used for this purpose, Lasson bases himself on the later lectures and in relation to W_2 introduces a number of changes especially at the beginning and end such as to confuse the still-acceptable way the material was arranged in W_2 . Nevertheless, his editorial conception worked best in Part III because here, despite the structural differences that still persisted between the *Ms.* and the subsequent lectures, the actual *order* in which topics were taken up did not vary significantly from 1821 to 1831. Thus it was possible to correlate the different lecture series under common section-headings without doing fundamental violence to them, even though their distinctive structural nuances were lost. However, Lasson's similar attempts in Parts I and II can only be regarded as disastrous, and his detailed editing of Part III left much to be desired.

For these reasons Lasson's edition, unlike the *Werke*, has had little abiding significance for the history of the influence of Hegel's philosophy of religion. Nor is it as important a source for a new edition as the *Werke*. The main loss of original source materials occurred *before* Lasson set to work. Of the sources used by the *Werke*, only the *Ms.*, *G*, and *Ho* were available to Lasson. The new, previously unknown sources on which Lasson could draw instead were not such as to replace the loss of *MiscP* and the transcripts from 1821 and 1831. For the 1824 lectures, Lasson was able to employ *K* (nearly identical with *G*) and *P* (used by Lasson only

from volume 2 on) in addition to *G* and *Ho*. For the 1827 lectures, Lasson was fortunate in having available two new transcripts, the Königsberg Anonymous and Erdmann, which were comparable in quality to those used by the *Werke*, Meyer and Droysen (by then lost). The principal losses that have occurred *since* Lasson are precisely the transcripts he used for 1827, which cannot be replaced by those presently available to us. Thus for our edition of the 1827 lectures, Lasson takes on the character of a source, although 1827 text could be extracted from his editorial conflation only by a painstaking process of source-criticism. Lasson's indisputable advantage over the *Werke* lies in his having published for the first time the complete *Ms.*, but the way he edited it introduced serious problems. Still, he was the first to attempt to decipher it *in toto*, and subsequent efforts have built upon his pioneering work in this regard.

d. Other Editions

At the beginning of this century, a reprint of the *Werke* was published by G. J. P. J. Bolland (1901) and an abridged version was issued by A. Drews (1905), but they have had no impact. The reissue of the lectures as volumes 15–16 of the Jubilee Edition produced by H. Glockner in the mid-twenties, and most recently that edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (1969) as volumes 16–17 of the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's works, have been widely disseminated, but they are of no scholarly significance. They are merely reprints of *W*₂; Moldenhauer and Michel append a few footnotes, but these involve no major change.

K.-H. Ilting's publication of Hegel's lecture manuscript⁵² is different in character and doubtless represents a major advance in deciphering the *Ms.* as compared with Lasson. At the same time, serious questions can be raised about the principles underlying the way the *Ms.* has been edited and also about the synoptic juxtaposition of text from *W*₂.⁵³ Ilting's decipherment of the *Ms.* has

52. G. W. F. Hegel, *Religionsphilosophie*, vol. 1, *Die Vorlesung von 1821*, ed. K.-H. Ilting (Naples, 1978).

53. See W. Jaeschke, "Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)," *Hegel-Studien* 18 (Bonn, 1983).

been thoroughly compared in the preparation of the present edition. However, our text is based directly on the Ms. itself and in no way uses Ilting as a source.

Portions of the second edition of the *Werke*—the *Introduction* and Part III, *The Absolute Religion*—were first translated into English by F. Louis Soldan. The translation appeared in successive issues of *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* between 1881 (vol. 15) and 1887 (vol. 21). In this fragmented and incomplete form it never had much impact, but it was a superior translation, both technically and philosophically, to the complete three-volume version published by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson in 1895.⁵⁴ This translation has been kept in print down to the present day and has had a considerable impact on Hegel studies in English. However, apart from the fact that it shares all the limitations of *W₂* itself, it does not provide a felicitous or precise rendering of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie* into English. Technical terminology is handled with a disconcerting looseness, and, in later portions especially, the translation has a rather stilted, awkward character. The work was begun by Sanderson—a more skillful translator than Speirs—but she died after completing only the first half, containing the *Concept of Religion* and the *Religion of Nature*.

4. Basic Principles of the Present Edition

a. Arrangement of the Texts

The fundamental principle guiding this edition, which distinguishes it from all previous ones, is that the texts of the several lecture series are given as separate and autonomous units in each of the three major divisions of the work, rather than being conflated into an editorially constructed text. The structure, arrangement, and to some degree even the total conception of the lectures changes too greatly from year to year to permit integration into a common text without utterly destroying the context in which specific passages occur as well as the design of the whole. And without an under-

54. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, 3 vols. (London, 1895, reprinted several times).

standing of context and design, responsible interpretative judgments are exceedingly difficult to render. It is precisely this problem that has plagued all previous scholarly study of the *Religionsphilosophie*, limited as it has been to the two editions of the *Werke* and Lasson. We may regard it as regrettable that a unified text cannot be produced—even, as in the case of others of Hegel's lectures, such as those on the history of philosophy, by taking one series as a basis and achieving a partial integration by appending individual passages from other series.⁵⁵ While we may be required to read through texts on the "same" topic three or four different times, this situation offers the unique advantage of seeing Hegel's mind at work as he struggled to achieve an adequate treatment of this subject, experimenting with different options and also responding to shifting interpretative exigencies.⁵⁶

The structural divergence between the lectures is greatest in the *Introduction* and Part I of the work, somewhat less in Part II, and least in Part III. While it might be possible to achieve an integration in Part III, since the *order* in which topics are treated in the four lectures is relatively constant, shifts in *design* would be obscured by doing so, and of course for the sake of consistency the materials must be edited according to the same principles in all three parts.⁵⁷ Thus our procedure is as follows: In each of the major divisions of the work—*Introduction*, *Concept of Religion*, *Determinate Religion*, and *Consummate Religion*—we give first the text of Hegel's own lecture manuscript, followed by the texts of the 1824 and 1827 lectures, and concluding with the excerpts by Strauss of the 1831 lectures. Special materials from the *Werke* are appended as foot-

55. See W. Jaeschke, "Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5/3 (1980), 54–55.

56. Perhaps the reader may derive some comfort from Marheineke's remark in the Preface to the first edition (*W*₁ 11:xv) that the burden imposed by repetitions is "compensated by the author's infinite richness of thought, since he is capable of grasping and portraying one and the same content continually in a new and different manner."

57. Therefore my earlier translation of the third part, based on Lasson's text, *The Christian Religion*, AAR Texts and Translations Series, no. 2 (Missoula, Mont., 1979), must be thoroughly revised and retranslated on the basis of the newly edited sources and the structural principles of this edition.

notes to the main texts at appropriate points: fragments from the Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures are appended to the *Ms.*; materials from the miscellaneous papers are attached primarily to the 1824 lectures, but some relate also to the 1827 lectures and possibly even to the *Ms.*; and identifiable passages from the 1831 lectures are appended to the 1827 text at corresponding points. Passages in both the *Werke* and Lasson that cannot be *verified* as based on 1827 transcripts are footnoted in relation to the 1827 texts. Variants from the sources have been held to a minimum and are normally given only in two cases: when the reading of the main text remains uncertain, and when it is impossible to differentiate with certainty between variants and special materials. These procedures will be fully described in Sec. 5.

Although Hegel's lectures are divided into three main parts—*Concept of Religion*, *Determinate Religion*, and *Consummate Religion*—and although this remains a constant feature from 1821 to 1831, previous editions have been divided in two and published as two volumes (strictly speaking, in Lasson's case, as four half-volumes in two bound volumes). In each case, Part II, *Determinate Religion*, has been cut in half, one half being appended to volume 1 and the other prefixed to volume 2. But this had the effect of utterly distorting Hegel's conception of *Determinate Religion*. For, contrary to the impression created by both the *Werke* and Lasson, Hegel himself did not give a twofold structure to *Determinate Religion* but a *triadic* structure. In the first three lectures he shows it as articulated into a triad consisting of (1) Nature Religion (primitive religion and Oriental religion), (2) Religion of Spiritual Individuality (Jewish and Greek religions), and (3) Religion of Purposiveness (Roman religion). In 1831 the triad undergoes a significant shift and is divided according to the schema of (1) Unity (primitive religion), (2) Cleavage (Oriental religions, including now Jewish religion), and (3) Reconciliation (Greek and Roman religions). Even among the first three lectures, significant variations occur within the basic triad. The 1821 lectures lack a treatment of primitive religion (the "religion of magic") entirely, while in 1827 the order of treating Jewish and Greek religion is reversed, so that now Jewish religion follows Greek. In 1824, Hegel coupled together

Jewish, Greek, and Roman religions as the second element in a triad consisting of Nature Religion, Religion of Spiritual Individuality, and Christian Religion. Thus *Determinate Religion* appears to take on a twofold structure, and it is this 1824 arrangement that is adopted by the *Werke* and Lasson. But in fact the “religion of spiritual individuality” always refers only to Jewish and Greek religion; the Roman deities, according to Hegel, are *not* spiritual individualities but abstractions lacking individuality. Thus even in 1824 Roman religion must be treated under a separate category, and the triadic structure within *Determinate Religion* remains; it is only when Hegel attempted to establish a schematic linkage among *all* the historical religions, including Christianity, that Roman religion fell into a kind of appendage to Jewish and Greek at the end of the second moment.

* The restoration of Hegel’s triadic design opens up new perspectives for interpreting the history of religion and the relationship of the determinate religions to Christianity. Conceived as a triad, the history of determinate religion appears as self-contained, and there is no longer any reason for characterizing the Christian religion as a third element following upon nature religion and the religion of spiritual individuality, or for having to think of Roman religion as somehow a “higher” stage of spiritual religion than Jewish and Greek, which it certainly is not in Hegel’s treatment. In other words, the picture is not that of a steady rise of determinate religion into Christian, but a cycling back of determinacy into finitude, immediacy, and expediency. The “reconciliation” offered by Roman religion is finite, self-centered, and thus unfulfilling. Because of the triadic structure of Part II as well as the complex variations Hegel played on the triad, it is essential that *Determinate Religion* be presented as a self-contained unit in the second volume of our edition.

b. Characteristics of the English Edition

Before proceeding to a more detailed description of how the various elements of the text have been edited, it is necessary to clarify the relationship of the English edition to the German. While the text of the English edition is identical with that of the German, it has

been edited in a somewhat different format. The German edition is intended as preparatory work for the historical-critical edition of the *Religionsphilosophie* materials in forthcoming volumes of the *Gesammelte Werke*, which is being published by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Thus, while it does not contain the massive text-critical apparatus that will be necessary for the critical edition, and while it modernizes spelling and punctuation whereas the critical edition will preserve original usage, it does anticipate the historical-critical edition in ways that are unnecessary for the English edition. The present edition is as “critical” as an English version needs to be—too much so, perhaps, in the eyes of our readers!—and scholars engaged in advanced specialized work will want to use the German in any case.

The principal difference is that the German uses a line-count system to key the textual apparatus and the editorial annotations to the main text. Such systems are more common in German scholarly works than in English, but regrettably they are expensive to produce. They have the distinct advantage of keeping the main text clear of footnote numbers and other needed editorial symbols. But they result in a more cumbersome apparatus, since every reference has to be keyed by line-count numbers followed by the text lemma. They are also difficult to use in the sense that the reader is not alerted by a mark in the text that a note occurs in the apparatus.

Instead of line counts we have used a footnote system, including all types of notes, textual and editorial, in a single numerical sequence at the bottoms of the pages, numbered consecutively through each major text unit. The type of note is designated by a brief initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Into the text we have introduced three sorts of symbols: (a) Square brackets [. . .] designate editorial insertions into the text. The German also uses these but more sparingly since it is not concerned to render the fragmentary character of Hegel’s lecture *Ms.* into syntactically complete sentences, as seems necessary for the English edition. All editorial additions to the *Ms.* are bracketed with the exception of articles and conjunctions. Editorial brackets are also used occasionally in the 1824 and 1827 transcripts. Section headings in the

Ms. are original unless bracketed; however, section headings for the 1824 and 1827 lectures are routinely editorial without being specially noted. (b) Angle brackets < . . . > designate passages found in the margins of the *Ms.*, which are integrated into the text wherever possible. The German edition identifies integrated passages not by marks in the text but by a notation in the apparatus in each case, keyed by line count and text lemma. Marginal passages that are relegated to the footnotes rather than being integrated into the main text are keyed to the text by a note number, and the note itself is prefaced, *Ms. margin*. Here the German uses a superscript ^R in the main text (meaning *Rand*, margin) and places the passage in the apparatus. In the case of both integrated and unintegrated marginal passages, the German edition often adds a phrase in the apparatus describing the location of the passage in the margin or how it is linked to the main text (whether by reference marks, insertion marks, or some other means). We have omitted all of this information. (c) Tilde marks (intended as variant signs) ~ . . . ~ designate passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings from sources such as *W*, *L*, different transcripts, or even the original source when it has a variant or incorrect reading. The note number usually occurs at the end rather than at the beginning of the corresponding passage in the main text (exceptions are noted), and the note itself is prefaced, e.g., *W₂ reads*. When the footnoted material represents an *addition* to the main text rather than a different version of it, it is simply keyed by a note number at the point of occurrence, and the note itself is prefaced, *W₂ adds*. Again, the German edition identifies all such passages by line counts and text lemmas in the apparatus.

In summary, then, while our main text contains more editorial marks than the German edition (especially in the *Ms.* sections), our footnotes are simpler and more efficient. Moreover, we have combined editorial annotations with other types of notes in a single sequence, whereas the German edition places editorial annotations in a separate section at the back of the volume, keyed to the text by page number, line count, text lemma, and marginal asterisks. Not only did we wish to avoid using more than one reference

system, but we thought it more convenient to have the notes at the bottoms of the pages where they are ready to hand. Our editorial notes, prefaced in each case by the symbol [Ed.], are of two types: (a) Notes containing information on references or allusions in the text. These are based on the annotations in the German edition and reflect the exhaustive reference work of Walter Jaeschke; however, we have frequently abbreviated the German version, since we do not give the extensive quotations from original sources provided by Jaeschke. Books listed in the "Frequently Cited Works" are cited only by short title in the footnotes. (b) Notes that help to clarify the structure and arrangement of the text and the development of the argument. Such notes are not found in the German edition and are the work of the English editor. They are not intended to provide an interpretative commentary on the text. We have not been as purist as the German edition in segregating textual material and editorial material (the German not only segregates the latter but also prints it in italic type); however, we believe that all of our editorial contributions are clearly distinguished.

The two editions have in common the modernization of spelling and punctuation, and the standardization of names and expressions in foreign languages. Additionally, in the English edition italicized emphasis is entirely the work of the editor. Hegel's lecture manuscript contains many emphasized words, which the German edition dutifully preserves but which we have ignored except when emphasis helps to bring out the meaning or structure in English. Conversely, the German edition hardly ever emphasizes words in the transcripts and materials from *W* and *L*, although *W*₂ contains abundant emphasis, most probably the work of Bruno Bauer. We have struck a middle course, italicizing only those words that are helpful for the conveyance of meaning and structure in English.

To facilitate comparison of the translation with the German text, the page numbers of the German edition are given on the outer margins, and the page breaks are noted by a vertical slash | in the text. Page numbers of the original sources—of the *Ms.*, of the Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures, of Lasson's text for the 1827 lectures, and of the second edition of the *Werke* for footnoted

special materials—are correlated with our section headings and footnote numbers in a table at the back. The German edition gives the original pagination on the inner margins at the tops of its pages.

5. The Method of Editing the Texts

a. Editing Hegel's Lecture Manuscript

Decipherment of the Ms. has been accomplished by the detailed text-critical work of R. Ferrara and W. Jaeschke.⁵⁸ Only a few passages remain about which there is uncertainty. Thus, while the work of previous editors (Ilting and Lasson) has been carefully compared, there is no need to indicate where their readings diverge from ours except at a few points where we have had to insert something into the text on a conjectural basis. This is not to make light of the extreme complexities of this text but only to say that we are confident of the final results.

The most difficult editorial decision concerns the handling of the large number of marginal additions. To relegate all of these passages mechanically to the footnotes would be a consistent procedure but would not do justice to their character. For the great majority of them represent subsequent expansions of the text, such as must be included in the text even if the fact of their not having originally formed part of it must also be indicated. They are not in the nature of marginalia but form component parts of the text itself, albeit formulated at a later time (even if not much later). Accordingly, these marginal additions are integrated into the text wherever possible and are designated by the marginal symbol (. . .), without a footnote reference.⁵⁹ On the other hand, some marginal annotations have the character of outlining the argument (sometimes in an alternative pattern) or of providing keywords for oral delivery and

58. For Vol. 1, typed transcriptions were prepared from photocopies of the original Ms. and checked against the original document as necessary. For Vols. 2 and 3, the text was established on the basis of the original, on loan from the State Library of Prussian Culture, Berlin.

59. We thus avoid the two extremes represented by Lasson and Ilting. Lasson integrated as many passages into the text as he could, but without any notation. Only the footnoted marginal additions are identifiable in his edition. Ilting footnoted *all* marginal passages, thus producing an extremely fragmented text.

occasional references. These are not incorporated into the text but are placed in the footnotes. Likewise, it has been necessary to footnote certain marginal passages, which in terms of their character could have been incorporated into the main text, but which would have interrupted its train of thought had we done so. Footnoted marginal additions are keyed to the main text by a note number. In most cases they are keyed to the first word of the *Ms.* line beside which they begin, except when they refer to a new sentence that begins within the line, or to an identical keyword that occurs in the main text. When Hegel provides reference marks or insertion marks for the marginal materials, whether integrated or unintegrated, these are always followed. The most difficult editorial decisions occur at points where marginal additions must be integrated but no reference or insertion marks are provided; here the sense of the text as well as the physical location of the marginal passage must be taken into account.

Hegel's deletions and insertions, in both the main text and the marginal passages, are for the most part not taken into consideration in the English edition; we simply give the text in its final form. The only exceptions are more extensive deleted passages, which have an informative value even if Hegel rejected them, and which are reproduced in the footnotes with the prefix, *Ms. canceled*. Hegel's frequently abbreviated words have been completed without notation. However, all words *added* to the text to complete sentences syntactically, with the exception of articles and conjunctions, are enclosed in square brackets. These occur quite frequently, especially in portions of the *Ms.* where Hegel composed rapidly. We concluded that it was both awkward and useless to transpose syntactically incomplete German into comparably incomplete English, and that our task rather was to convey meaning as precisely as possible in fluent English; but this required indicating where the words are the editor's rather than Hegel's. We have followed a minimalist policy in this regard, avoiding unnecessary embellishment of Hegel's expression and content. Punctuation helps in the construal of meaning, and the German edition's modernization of punctuation—replacing the *Ms.*'s indiscriminate use of dashes with commas, semicolons, and periods—has been of great assistance.

We have gone further, though, by inserting periods and starting new sentences in place of long strings of semicolons. Only in some of the more fragmentary footnoted marginal passages, where a syntactic framework can no longer be established, have we allowed Hegel's dashes to stand in their original form, i.e., as en-dashes with a space preceding and following.

Finally it should be noted that the pagination of the *Ms.* sheets is inserted into the text with square brackets; recto and verso sides of the sheets are designated by "a" and "b" respectively.

b. Editing the 1824 Lectures

Griesheim (*G*) is used as the *basic* text because its content is quite rich, it covers the entire course of the lectures, its sentences are complete, it compares favorably with the other transcripts, and Hegel himself selected it as the basis of his 1827 lectures, at least in part. Despite *G*'s evident quality, however, it is insufficient to base an edited text on a single transcript when others are available. To have a secure text for a given series, it is first necessary to collate several good, i.e., comprehensive and reliable, transcripts.⁶⁰

Accordingly, therefore, Pastenaci (*P*), Deiters (*D*), and Kehler (*K*) are used as *control* texts, in descending order of importance. Comparison between the verbatim transcript *P* and the fair copy *G* reveals that *G* has already done a certain amount of stylistic revision, such as omitting repetitions that commonly occur in oral delivery. *P* has preserved the character of an oral lecture much better than *G*, but since *P* is not complete and frequently does not provide whole sentences it cannot function as the basic text, although it serves as an excellent complement to *G*. *D* is of lesser importance since it is a stylistically revised fair copy and is not as rich in content as either *G* or *P*. Finally, *K* is of little use since it appears to be largely identical to *G* and covers only the *Introduction* and the beginning of Part I.

60. The collation required the preparation of complete typed transcriptions of all of the handwritten sources used, namely, *G*, *P*, *D*, *K*, and *Ho*. This time-consuming work was carried out by W. Jaeschke. The typescripts are now, however, available for the critical edition and for future scholarly use.

The 1824 text has been established by supplementing or correcting *G* with material from *P*, *D*, and only occasionally *K*. Since *P* is a verbatim transcript of the lectures as delivered, all passages in which it goes beyond *G* could unhesitatingly be used to supplement the text of *G* since these detailed formulations could not have been added later. But because *D* is a fair copy, supplementary material could be accepted from it only when there are grounds for assuming that a particular thought has not been fully transmitted by either *G* or *P*. Where *P* diverges from *G* and *D* provides no parallel formulation, *G* is usually retained except where *P* is more detailed. But where *P* and *D* agree in opposition to *G*, the text follows *P* and *D*. In view of the large number of cases where supplementary material has been taken into the text from *P* or corrections made in light of *P* and *D*, it has not been possible to flag editorial changes in the basic text, *G*. Over 2,000 such changes occur in volume 1, and there will be a larger number in volume 2, although the figure will be smaller in volume 3 since *P* breaks off shortly after the beginning and the remainder of the text is based only on *G* and *D*. Variant readings are given in the footnotes only in the few places where doubts remain concerning the correctness of our text; in these cases the source of the main text is identified as well as the source of the variant.

Finally, Hotho (*Ho*) serves as a supplementary text. This is a freely edited, quite ambitious reworking of Hegel's lectures. While it is a suggestive interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of religion, it is not a reliable record of the words actually used by Hegel when lecturing. Thus it cannot be introduced into the main text or combined with the other transcripts, and certainly not substituted for other sources, as was the practice of Lasson in Part I and of the *Werke* throughout.

Hence in our edition *Ho* is given only in the footnotes and only when one of the following conditions applies. In some cases it furnishes an alternative reading of a text for which *G*, *P*, and *D* afford unsatisfactory evidence (e.g., 1824 *Intro.*, n. 7). In other cases, it offers an expansion of the text given by other sources (e.g., 1824 *Intro.*, n. 12). Keeping in mind *Ho*'s general tendency to

condense, in the few places where it enlarges upon the other sources it is conceivable that it transmits an idea they have failed to retain. Finally, *Ho* is reproduced where its formulations have become so well known, have in fact become such fundamental propositions of the Hegelian philosophy of religion, that in the interests of research it would be difficult to ignore them. The most prominent of these is the statement, "Without the world God is not God" (1824 *Concept*, n. 97), a statement in which Hotho draws consequences from Hegel's presentation that were not drawn by Hegel himself, at least not in this pregnant form. Yet ever since the lectures were first published a century and a half ago, this statement has been one of the most commonly quoted. A similar embellishment by Hotho of Hegel's formulation of the speculative concept of religion as "the self-consciousness of absolute spirit" occurs in n. 120 of the 1824 *Concept*.

Editorial insertions into the 1824 text have been necessary only rarely, primarily to complete sentences in passages taken from *P*. However, sectional headings are entirely editorial. *G* and *P* have no such headings; *D* and *Ho* do, but these are clearly the result of later deliberation. The matter is complicated by the fact that Hegel modified the structure during the course of the series (see Sec. 8 below); thus the headings we have provided reflect the way the lectures actually developed, not their original plan.

c. Editing the 1827 Lectures

The 1827 lectures present an entirely different and much more difficult situation since all of the sources used by the *Werke* and Lasson have been lost. Even though three previously unknown transcripts have been discovered in recent years—Anonymous (*An*), Boerner (*B*), and Hube (*Hu*)—the text they provide, even when collated, is not remotely comparable to that of *W* or *L*. Moreover, the texts of *W* and *L* are in large part identical. Had we attempted to establish a text on the basis of the extant transcripts, it would have been markedly inferior to that of the earlier editions, to which scholars would have had to return in any case. Hence the text offered here derives essentially from Lasson.

The first step was to identify 1827 text in *L*, a task complicated by the fact that Lasson frequently conflated passages from the 1824 and 1827 lectures and rearranged the order of 1827 passages to suit his own editorial structure.⁶¹ Once *L*'s 1827 text had been identified and properly ordered, it was checked from start to finish with the extant sources for accuracy and completeness, corrected accordingly, and, where necessary, supplemented. On the one hand, all sentences for which there is no support in *An*, *B*, or *Hu* are removed from the main text of *L* and reproduced in the footnotes at the appropriate point, with the notation 1827? enclosed in parentheses. This is not meant to dispute their authenticity as 1827 text but only to indicate that confirmation of them is lacking in the currently extant transcripts. It remains a possibility that *L* included passages at these points that do not belong to the 1827 lectures, even when a similar text is found in *W*, since *L* could also have borrowed from *W*.

On the other hand, the sources have been used to correct and supplement the text of *L*. A correction has been made whenever *B*,

61. To complete this task, a line-by-line source-critical analysis of *L* was required. *L* clearly distinguishes only the *Ms.* text. 1824 text could be identified by comparing *L* with extant transcripts of the 1824 lectures (notably *G*, but also *P* and *Ho*). The remaining material in *L*'s main text was presumably 1827, and this material could be both confirmed and properly ordered by comparing it with *An*, *B*, and *Hu*. Once *L*'s 1827 text had been identified, a similar source-critical analysis of *W*₂ was possible, using the *Ms.*, the 1824 transcripts, and the reconstructed 1827 text to identify corresponding materials in *W*₂. When these were subtracted, the remaining passages in *W*₂ constituted the so-called special materials, and these could be identified as deriving from the Henning transcript of 1821, the miscellaneous papers, or the 1831 lectures by using principles to be described in Sec. 5.e. Finally, on the basis of the analysis of *W*₂, the sources used by *W*₁ could be readily identified. Confirmation of the accuracy of the work is provided by the fact that finally every passage in *L*, *W*₂, and *W*₁ could be identified as probably deriving from either the *Ms.*, 1824, 1827, or special materials available to *W*. This painstaking analysis was carried out by W. Jaeschke over a period of several years. For Parts I and III of the lectures, he relied in part on his earlier study, "Der Aufbau und die bisherigen Editionen von Hegels Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion" (M.A. thesis, Free University of Berlin, 1970). For Part II, he was assisted by P. Hodgson. Additionally, of course, in order to use the extant 1827 transcripts source-critically, complete typed transcripts had to be prepared of each of them, and this too was done by Jaeschke.

as a verbatim transcript of the lectures as delivered, gives a different reading, or when at least *Hu* and *An* are in agreement against *L*. All three sources have been used to supplement *L*, especially at those places (which occur frequently in Part II of the lectures) where *L* has omitted material in order to avoid repetitions between 1824 and 1827 text, or where in the process of combining the 1824 and 1827 series *L* found 1827 material that seemed to resist integration. Of the three sources, *B*, which is an unedited verbatim transcript of the lectures, is the most important. As fair copies, *Hu* and *An* are used as secondary evidence; while they do show considerable agreement, this does not extend to the word-for-word agreement that frequently exists between *B* and *L*. In the English edition it is not possible to designate the many places where *L*'s 1827 text has been corrected or supplemented by one or another of the extant sources.

The question could be raised why *L* and not *W* is used as the basis of the 1827 text, especially since the two editions agree so closely. The reason is that the editors of *W* also had available to them source material from 1831 as well as the miscellaneous papers. The fact that *W* furnishes relatively few self-contained passages from 1831 makes it likely that some 1831 material was incorporated into parallel sections of the 1827 series; thus we could not be as certain of 1827 text in *W* as in *L*. However, our reconstructed 1827 text has been compared from beginning to end with *W*₁ and *W*₂, and any significant divergences other than mere variant readings are indicated in the footnotes.

Lasson advanced the hypothesis that his anonymous transcript found in the Königsberg city library might have been identical with the transcript by Droysen used in *W*₂, given the close parallels between the texts, except that comparison with Droysen's handwriting ruled out this possibility.⁶² As a matter of fact, however, the agreement between *L* and *W*₁ is even closer than that between *L* and *W*₂. Accordingly, it is not the points of agreement between *L* and *W*₂ but the divergences that are explained by Bauer's use of Droysen. If, therefore, the Königsberg Anonymous is identical with

62. *L* 1/1:317–318.

anything, it must be with the Meyer transcript, which was utilized by *W*₁, even though it could not be the same *copy* of Meyer as that used by *W*₁, since the latter included notes in Hegel's own handwriting in preparation for the 1831 lectures. While the identification of the Königsberg Anonymous with Meyer is not proved (they might, for example, have derived from a common third source, or they might have been the result of a collaborative effort), the textual evidence supports it. While the hypothesis of a common source for *W* and *L* reduces the number of independent witnesses from two to only one, this is offset by the possibility that our text may in fact be based on a copy of the transcript approved by Hegel himself.

Section headings are the responsibility of the editor, even though their wording derives in part from suggestions contained in the transcripts. It is unlikely that Hegel himself dictated headings, but the 1827 lectures, unlike those of 1824, are structured in a rigorously systematic fashion, and there can be no doubt about their actual course. Further confirmation is provided by the dates found in the margins of *B*, and in a few cases also of *Hu*; these have been reproduced in our footnotes.

d. Editing the 1831 Lectures

The present situation is better than that at the time of Lasson, since, while no actual transcripts are available, the excerpts prepared by David Friedrich Strauss permit us to understand the course and structure of the 1831 lectures for the first time. It might have been possible to attach these excerpts to the 1827 text as footnotes, but this would have resulted not only in the fragmentation of the excerpts and a loss of the sense of the 1831 structure, but also in repetitions, since the excerpts could not replace the special materials from the *Werke*. Hence it was determined to present the Strauss excerpts as a whole at the end of each volume. Strauss offers such an altered conception of Part II of the lectures that questions about the authenticity of the excerpts might be raised. But such doubts must remain mere suppositions until such time as other, possibly divergent sources for the last lecture series come to light. Moreover, elements of this new conception are discernible in both editions of the *Werke*.

e. Editing the Special Materials in the Werke

After identifying all the known sources, we are left with a large body of "special materials" in the two editions of the *Werke*, i.e., materials that cannot be attributed to the *Ms.* or to the 1824 or 1827 lectures.⁶³ The special materials do not include variants of the latter two lectures. Variants are reproduced only where the main text is defective or a clear dividing line between special materials and variants is lacking. From the Prefaces to W_1 and W_2 , it is evident that the special materials fall into three main groups: the miscellaneous handwritten papers of Hegel (*MiscP*), Henning's transcripts of the 1821 lectures (*Hn*), and transcripts of the 1831 lectures. Source-critical principles permit a reasonably successful attribution of the special materials to one or another of these sources, although the reconstruction must remain hypothetical since these sources are no longer extant. We proceed by means of a sequence of criteria.

1. *Special materials from W_1 belong to the 1831 lectures.* Marheineke's Prefaces indicate as sources for W_1 essentially the 1824, 1827, and 1831 lectures. If materials from the 1824 and 1827 series, which are known, are subtracted, one is left essentially with special materials from 1831. However, two or three exceptions must be acknowledged. While Marheineke stated that "slight" use was made of Henning, only one such passage can be identified with certainty (W_1 12:245). There may also be a few passages attributable to *MiscP*, e.g., W_1 11:143–148. But by and large the special materials in W_1 derive from the 1831 lectures; this is especially the case where these passages have been slightly modified by W_2 in light of the additional 1831 transcripts to which it had access.

2. *Special materials that are found only in W_2 are quite probably from Henning or the miscellaneous papers.* Since according to Marheineke the distinguishing characteristic of W_2 is that it incorporates *Ms.*, *Hn*, and *MiscP*, and also that it avoids the repetitions of W_1 , which are probably due to the duplication of material from the later series, it is most unlikely that, apart from revising the 1831 text in the light of other sources as described above, W_2 should have incorporated yet other additional materials from 1831.

63. See above, n. 61.

These are the only two formal criteria for assigning the special materials. A distinction has still to be drawn between *Hn* and *MiscP*, but this can only be done on the basis of content.

3. *Special materials that are found only in W_2 and are related in terms of content to the 1824 and 1827 lectures probably represent part of the preparatory work for these series and therefore belong to *MiscP*.* This is especially the case where such materials replace passages in W_1 from 1824 or 1827, since here it is obvious that Bruno Bauer is following the practice adopted in other volumes of the *Werke*, namely, that of replacing or correcting the text derived from student transcripts by recourse to papers in Hegel's own handwriting. In all these cases the text of W_2 can be readily seen as a written preparation for the oral presentation that has come down to us in W_1 through the transcripts.

4. *Special materials from W_2 whose content is not related to the later lectures but to the *Ms.* are probably from *Hn* or from *Ms.-related MiscP*.* On the basis of materials presently available, it is not possible to determine with certainty which of these passages are attributable to *Hn* and which to *MiscP*. Some passages loosely parallel the *Ms.*, in the way one would expect an oral presentation to parallel a written lecture manuscript, and these seem clearly to derive from *Hn*. Others, however, represent a development of isolated keywords, such as those found in the margins of the *Ms.*, and these could be attributed either to a written basis, i.e., *MiscP*, or to an oral development without the benefit of written notes, i.e., *Hn*. As things stand at present it is not possible, therefore, to differentiate between *Hn* and *MiscP* relating to 1821. Regrettable though this is, it does not affect the attribution of these special materials to the *Ms.* It must be stressed, however, as explained in our discussion of sources, that it is highly unlikely that lengthy portions of *MiscP* relate to the 1821 lectures. Thus, although we have not so designated them in the footnotes, the special materials relating to the *Ms.* are for the most part derived from *Hn*.

5. *Passages in W_2 that remain after the removal of 1824 and 1827 materials and are virtually identical with the *Ms.* must be attributed to the *Ms.** In order to identify the special materials in W_2 it is also necessary to subtract all those passages in which W_2

follows the *Ms.*—even if it does not completely coincide with it. We know from Marheineke's Preface that the greater quantity of new material in the second edition came precisely from the *Ms.*⁶⁴ However, in accord with the conventions of the time, Bruno Bauer edited this material much more freely than would now be acceptable, forming an easily readable, smooth text out of Hegel's often contorted fragments. His method can be seen clearly from the well-known footnote on the resurrection, to which Bauer appended: "From the 1821 notebook in Hegel's own hand."⁶⁵ In fact, however, his text differs substantially from the corresponding passage in the *Ms.* (sheet 94b). Taking this divergence as a paradigm, one can detect lengthy passages in *W₂* that reproduce the *Ms.* with similar modifications. Obviously these passages should not be regarded as special materials—i.e., materials that stem from other sources such as *Hn* or *MiscP* and that might accordingly be used to clarify obscure matters in the *Ms.*

We have ignored all those divergences between *W₂* and the *Ms.* that seem to represent more or less minor editorial modifications on Bauer's part. But those that contain more extensive amplifications cannot reasonably be attributed to Bauer's editorial activity, and these have been put into the footnotes as special material when the divergence is independent, i.e., not suggested by actual formulations in the *Ms.* It is unlikely that extensive parallel formulations from *Hn*, or even *MiscP*, would have been used to edit the *Ms.* since Hegel's oral delivery seems for the most part to have been very freely based on the *Ms.* itself, and in these cases the *Ms.* text would have been the better source. Hence it may be assumed that, in order to complete the text of the *Ms.*, Bauer for the most part inserted relatively independent formulations from *Hn* (or *MiscP*) at places where Hegel lectured extemporaneously. However, since it is likely that some of Bauer's editorial changes were more extensive than this criterion recognizes, it is possible that some of what is reproduced in the footnotes as "special materials" is in fact just Bauer's version of the *Ms.* This is especially the case with shorter

64. *W₂* 11:viii.

65. *W₂* 12:300.

passages; the more extensive the reproduced special materials are, the more probable is their derivation from an independent source (*Hn*, only rarely *MiscP*).

6. *In the 1824 and 1827 lectures, where the text of W_2 diverges from W_1 , and where the source could be either *MiscP* or variant readings, passages should be attributed to *MiscP* when their length exceeds what would be expected of variants.* Divergences in regard to individual words or phrases are more probably merely variant readings from different student transcripts that were available to W_2 but not to us. The attempt to differentiate on the basis of length leaves a gray zone in which either case could be argued. These are designated by the notation *MiscP/Var?* or vice versa.

7. *Phrases that are identical in W_1 and W_2 , but diverge from *G* within a context formed by *G*, and are not supported by wording in other 1824 transcripts, probably derive from Hegel's own notes in his personal copy of *G* (*HgG*).* These are quite short, consisting mostly of single words and sentences that could be further developed orally. They are distinguishable from *MiscP* because they occur already in W_1 (and W_2 is certain to have reproduced them), and from variants from other transcripts of the 1824 series since W_1 used only *G* and *Ho*. Where the postulated identity of W_1 and W_2 cannot be verified because of a lack of context, a question mark is attached to the symbol *HgG*.

8. *Transitions between different lecture series and outlines of the argument that accord with the structure of *W* probably stem from Marheineke and Bauer.* These additions by the original editors are, of course, omitted from the present edition except in a few cases where the source attribution is uncertain; when included they are noted as (*Ed*), often with a question mark.

For the most part the special materials identified by the above criteria are reproduced in our footnotes at the point corresponding to where they occur in the *Werke*. The only exception to this concerns the materials assigned to 1831 that are occasionally adjoined to 1824 text by *W*. Since we are presenting the lectures in separate units, and since the 1827 and 1831 series are closely related (Hegel having used the Meyer transcript of 1827 as the basis of his last series), our principle is to attach special materials from 1831 to the

1827 series; if their position is altered from what it is in W_1 or W_2 the fact is noted. In general the wording of the special materials in W follows W_2 . Minor divergences between the two editions are noted as W_2 reads (*similar in* W_1); in the case of substantive differences, both versions are given. Page numbers of all passages from the *Werke* are given at the back, keyed to our footnote numbers. The objective of the present edition has been to extract all special materials that are found in the *Werke*, and thereby to do justice not only to the extant sources but also to the source character of the earlier editions.

6. Principles of Translation

Each member of the translation team has assumed primary responsibility for a specific lecture series running through the entire work in order to become familiar with the peculiarities and problems associated with that set of texts. These assignments are indicated in the Preface. All translations have been thoroughly checked and revised by our consultant and put into final form by the editor. Members of the team have read each others' drafts and made numerous suggestions. The checking process has, it is hoped, achieved both accuracy and consistency of style.

To achieve uniformity in the translation of terms, we have worked from a common glossary, which has gradually been elaborated as the project advanced. As a convenience to readers who know German and are interested in such matters, the German-English glossary will be printed at the back of volume 3. The index for each volume serves as an English-German glossary in the sense that the German is given in parentheses for key concepts. We must stress that our primary objective has been to achieve fluent as well as precise English, and there are obviously contexts in which the equivalences we have established do not work.

Several basic principles have guided translation policy:

(1) All English words that normally occur in lower case according to current English style are given in lower case without exception, including philosophical references to divinity and the absolute. Once one begins capitalizing Hegel's technical terminology—idea, spirit, concept, reason, etc.—there is no end to it. Nor

is capitalization an appropriate means to make conceptual or terminological distinctions (e.g., “existence” for *Dasein* and “Existence” for *Existenz*). The “down” style of contemporary English—at least American English—prohibits such artifices.

(2) Most English terms render one and only one technical German term, with a few unavoidable exceptions. For example, “idea” always translates *Idee*, never *Vorstellung* (for which “representation” is used, or occasionally “impression” or “notion” [the latter term never translates *Begriff*]). However, it is impossible to avoid using “know” for both *kennen* and *wissen*, or “thought” for both *Denken* and *Gedanke*. The distinction between *Anerkenntnis*, *Erkenntnis*, and *Kenntnis* is maintained by “recognition,” “cognition,” and “information,” respectively. But we have despaired of maintaining whatever distinctions Hegel intended between *Beziehung*, *Verhältnis*, and *Zusammenhang*, using “connection,” “relation,” “relationship,” etc., more in terms of context and idiom than exact equivalence.

(3) As few English terms as possible are used for each German term, although a one-to-one equivalence cannot be insisted upon in many cases. A notorious instance of this is *Bestimmung*, which is an unusually fluid concept in German, especially Hegel’s; although “determination” is our basic rendering, we regularly use three or four others as context and nuance require. Sometimes words shift from technical to colloquial connotations; e.g., the technical sense of *Gemüt* is “mood,” but colloquially it can mean “mind,” “soul,” “heart.”

(4) Hegel ordinarily uses terms with great precision and often intends quite exact distinctions and nuances, which we have attempted to preserve. The fault of many English translations of Hegel has been a readiness to sacrifice terminological rigor to a misguided quest for fluency. Generally speaking, the more precisely Hegel’s thought is rendered, the more intelligible it becomes. Despite his conceptual precision, however, Hegel does not invent terms or employ them in idiosyncratic ways, nor have we done so in translation; for example, *Dasein* means “existence,” or more technically, “determinate being,” but not “there-being.” Sometimes, however, without indulging in Heideggerian wordplay, he clearly has in mind the

etymology of terms, and when this is important for meaning we have attempted to convey it in translation.

(5) The materials constituting the philosophy of religion are either transcripts of lectures as delivered or notes in preparation of the same. We have attempted to preserve a sense of the spoken word and of Hegel's oral style. In the continual search for the right word or expression, Hegel frequently repeated himself, placing phrases into apposition, varying formulations slightly to bring out distinctive nuances. In referring to devotion, for example, he says, "But if we are of the opinion that we are finding God here, if we think to find God in this way, we must bear in mind that precisely in this devotion, in this relationless relating, where the separation has fallen away, the object of observation vanishes for us at this standpoint." Or: "I have a feeling of hardness, that is, I feel something hard, it becomes at the same time an object for me, it becomes a content." Our newly edited texts preserve all of these nuances as exactly as possible, and so does our translation. Moreover, it should be stressed that Hegel did not use language in abstract, abstruse, colorless ways. For him it was a powerful, sometimes earthy instrument of expression, and he exploited its potential to the fullest, mixing images, metaphors, and idioms in along with technical concepts. His polemic could be brilliant, his illustrations striking—such as his description of rationalist theologians as countinghouse clerks who keep the accounts of other people's wealth, or his reference to the Scholastic who won't go into the water until he has learned to swim. We have attempted to avoid as much as possible the risk that Gadamer says faces every translation: to be both clearer and flatter than the original.⁶⁶ Hegel has been flattened out in English often enough, but probably not much clarified!

(6) We have used generic terms for "human being" whenever appropriate. Hegel's intentionality is usually generic when employing such terms as *Mensch* and *Menschheit*, and we have translated

66. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 2d ed. (Tübingen, 1965), p. 364: "Every translation that takes seriously its task is both clearer and flatter than the original. Even when it is a masterly reproduction, it must lack something of the overtones that reverberate in the original."

accordingly. In instances when this is clearly not the case, we have used sex-specific terms. The situation with pronouns is more complex. Hegel of course uses the masculine personal pronoun when the antecedent is *der Mensch* and the feminine when it is *die Menschheit*; to solve this problem we have frequently switched to the plural when the German uses the singular. To avoid the monotonous repetition of “human being” and “humanity” we have sometimes used “person” or “people.” We construe “subject” and “spirit” as neuter. These and other adjustments do not seriously disturb the sense and syntax of Hegel’s language, and we believe they are in accord with his fundamental philosophical convictions, although we recognize that he like everyone else was shaped by prevailing linguistic and social conventions. We have not found a satisfactory alternative to the use of “his,” “him,” “himself,” etc., with reference to God, primarily because of the highly reflexive character of Hegel’s language about God. This is ironic because the German reflexive *sich* or *sich selbst*, so favored by Hegel, is not gender-specific. To render *Gott hat sich selbst geoffenbart* as “God has revealed self” or “God has revealed godself” was just too modernizing, and to write “God’s self-revelation has occurred” was tampering too much with the precise syntactic form of Hegel’s expression. Of course, since the word *Gott* is grammatically masculine in German, Hegel uses masculine personal pronouns when referring to it, and these are preserved in translation unless the word “God” can be tolerably repeated. But the reader should remember that it was above all Hegel who knew that the symbol “Father” is a mere *Vorstellung*, and that to speak of God as though he were a male being is conceptually inadequate.

Some specific translation problems have been discussed in editorial footnotes—for example, the distinction between *Empfindung* (“sensibility”) and *Gefühl* (“feeling”) (1824 *Concept*, n. 20), or the wordplay between *Andacht* (“devotion”) and *Denken* (“thought”) (*Ms. Concept*, n. 66). The latter term, *Denken*, normally refers to the *process* or *activity* of thinking as distinguished from what results from this process, namely “a thought” or “thoughts,” “the thought of” something (for which Hegel normally employs *Gedanke*). The English word “thought” can be used in both senses and is often a

more idiomatic rendering of *Denken* than the more literal “thinking.” When it occurs in the singular without an article, it generally translates *Denken*.

S. T. Coleridge⁶⁷ has given us terms by which to express two sets of Hegelian distinctions that are often confused in English—namely, the distinctions between *Phantasie* and *Einbildung* and between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. Hegel’s *Phantasie* is similar to Coleridge’s “fancy,” namely, the primary, inchoate moment of image-making in which the mind assembles and juxtaposes sensuous images but without fusing them into a unity. In Hegel’s epistemology it is the moment of “intuition” (*Anschauung*) that precedes “representation” (*Vorstellung*). This is what Hegel has in mind when he defines Hinduism as the *Religion der Phantasie*. But because “fancy” has taken on other connotations in modern English, and because what is intended is not “fantasy” in the sense of psychological illusion, we retrieve the older spelling “phantasy” to render Hegel’s meaning in English. “Imagination” (*Einbildung*) by contrast molds images into a synthetic unity; for Coleridge this appears to be an anticipation of “reason,” but for Hegel it remains a function of “understanding.” This brings us to the second set of terms, *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. *Verstand* or “understanding” is the faculty by which we generalize and arrange the recollected phenomena of sense intuition. It is analytic, abstractive, and merely reflective; it can synthesize only momentarily through the power of imagination. When we name something we refer it by means of some common character to a known class or familiar image. Thereby we “understand” it, we make it “stand under” a category or image. But we do not understand it in itself; we are unable to grasp and define a thing in itself, in a conceptually complete way, but merely name and represent it (often metaphorically) in terms of the various sensible ways it presents itself. The “grasping-together” or “conceiving” (*begreifen*) of a thing in the totality of its aspects and in terms of the universal logical principles by which actuality as such is known is “conceptual” thinking or “reason” (*Vernunft*). “Representation”

67. See especially *Biographia Literaria* (London, 1817), chaps. 4 ff.; and *Aids to Reflection* (London, 1825), Aphorism 8.

(*Vorstellung*), or thought in terms of the categories of the understanding, is the characteristic mode of cognition in religion; while it may have access to the true *content*, the *form* adequate to the content is that of the "concept" (*Begriff*) or speculative reason (*Vernunft*). It is important to recognize that representational thinking is not simply left behind but rather taken up into and preserved (*aufgehoben*, "sublated") in conceptual thinking. Feeling, intuition, phantasy, imagination, understanding, representation—these are all valid and essential moments in the total process of knowing, according to Hegel, but *absolute* knowledge is achieved only in the form of purely conceptual or rational thought.

To the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*, and to that between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff*, corresponds yet another between *Reflexion* and *Spekulation*. While the latter terms are often used synonymously in English, for Hegel they designate diametrically opposed modes of philosophical thinking—the one referring to the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity," i.e., Kantian rationalism, which construes reality in terms of the finite categories of the understanding, the other referring to speculative idealism, which, in the form of meditative thought (*Nachdenken*), is a "mirror" (*speculum*) of the rational structure of actuality itself.

The most complex translation problem we have faced focuses on the simple verb *sein* ("to be") and related forms: the present participle *seiend* and the nouns *Sein*, *Seiende*, and *Dasein*. Hegel clearly intends a distinction between "being" (*Sein*) as the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate philosophical category, referring to the pure possibility of being, and "existence" (*Dasein*), which is concrete, actual, determinate being.⁶⁸ Between these, *Seiende* has the connotation of "actually having being." It is formed from the participle *seiend*, not meaning "existing," as we would more naturally say in English, but "having being." Thus *ein Seiendes* is more "actual" than *Sein*, which is pure possibility, but it lacks the concrete, worldly, existential determinacy of *Dasein*. We can preserve these distinctions by translating *Sein* as "being," *Seiende* as "actual being," and *Dasein* as "existence" or "determinate

68. See 1824 *Concept*, pp. 265 ff. (esp. n. 11).

being.” The problem arises especially in the third person of the verb *sein*, *ist* (“is”) and *sind* (“are”). Often the more idiomatic renderings in English are “exists” and “exist.” Because German lacks a verb corresponding to *Dasein*, but has only the loanword *existieren*, *sein* often does double duty for “to be” and “to exist,” and when the reference is to finite objects, both translations are appropriate. Yet the infinite object, God, the absolute, the universal, the concept, cannot properly be said to “exist”; it has being or actuality, but not determinate worldly existence (except insofar as God *assumes* finitude in the moment of worldly diremption, but that is another matter). God “is,” but God does not “exist”; and to speak of the “existence of God” is to think representationally.⁶⁹

How then shall we translate such expressions as *Gott ist wesentlich in seiner Gemeinde*, *Gott ist für mich in der Andacht*, *dies Objektive ist als Affirmatives*? For the reasons given, we have had to use “is” in these contexts, but to prevent the verb from becoming a mere copula, an empty link, we have sometimes italicized it or added a predicate such as “present,” “known,” “found”: “God is essentially in his community,” “God is [present] for me in devotion,” “this objective [element] is [known] as affirmative.” Finally, we have avoided “exists” or “existing” for the participle *seiend*; thus, *eine anundfürsichseiende Wahrheit* is given as “a truth that has being in and for itself,” not as “a truth existing in and for itself.” We hope that the somewhat jarring effect of these renderings will soften as they become familiar.

7. The Structure and Development of Hegel’s “Introduction”

Our edition makes possible for the first time a comprehensive comparison of the structure of the four series of lectures Hegel presented on the philosophy of religion, as well as an analysis of the development in his conceptualization and treatment of this subject. We use the term “development” intentionally, since we wish to avoid two misleading views: that the first, incomplete, and “immature” version found in the *Ms.* is worked out with greater “maturity” in

69. Hegel is quite explicit about this in the 1827 *Concept*, pp. 415 ff. (cf. n. 111).

the later lectures; or that Hegel's originally fresh and creative insights give way to an increasing "scholasticism of the concept" during his latter days in Berlin. In our view, the *Ms.* is by no means a philosophically immature document, despite its external form. On the other hand it is a mistake to suggest that Hegel became increasingly rigid and set in his ways of thinking as he repeated the lectures. Just the opposite is the case: the later lectures display an unusual vitality and flexibility, a willingness to rework the whole in order to take into consideration new materials and new issues, and to find a form that matches the concept of religion itself. But the concept is already present, both germinally and explicitly, in the original *Ms.*, and thus Hegel's basic philosophical conception of *religion* does not significantly change during the Berlin period, even though his conception of the *philosophy of religion* does.

In this section and the next, we shall call attention to some of the main characteristics of structure and development in Hegel's *Introduction* and in Part I of the lectures, *The Concept of Religion*. A similar analysis of the structure and development of Parts II and III will constitute the editorial introductions to those two volumes. These introductory sections are in no way intended as a commentary on the text or as an attempt to interpret the philosophy-of-religion lectures within the larger framework of Hegel's thought. The analysis is purely internal, making no reference to other writings of Hegel or to secondary literature. For what follows, readers will be helped by referring to the tables providing a synopsis of the structure of the *Introduction* and the *Concept*, which are found on pp. 66–67, 78–79 respectively. It should be recalled that section numbers and headings in all of the documents except the *Concept of Religion* in the *Ms.* are the work of the editor and are not attributable to Hegel himself, although frequently wording in the text suggests the formulation used for headings. Reference will be made to the more detailed discussion of specific matters in the editorial footnotes, so as to avoid repetition between the introduction and the notes.⁷⁰

70. These references are cited not by page numbers but by note numbers, which run consecutively through each text unit. By using the running heads, readers can readily identify the appropriate text units.

All four lecture series begin with a brief prefatory depiction, couched in rather poetic terms, of what religion is wherever it is found, namely, the consciousness of God and occupation or concern (*Beschäftigung*) with God. This is the only part of the original manuscript repeated without much change in the subsequent lectures. Following these opening remarks, the introductions all address several themes in a similar order: the relation of philosophy of religion to philosophy and religion; the theological and philosophical situation of the time, which furnishes specific issues to be addressed by these lectures; and a survey of the three main parts of the ensuing treatment. But the specific way these themes are articulated differs considerably from one year to the next, with only occasional reliance on the original manuscript after 1821.

a. The Manuscript

Following the prefatory remarks, the *Ms.* inserts a special sheet (3a-b), arguing that the purpose of the philosophy of religion is to know God despite the widely held prejudice of the time that nothing can be known of God (see *Ms. Intro.*, n. 14). Following this insertion, which we have designated as Sec. 1, the *Ms.* returns to what was originally intended as the first task of the *Introduction*, namely, to treat the relation of the philosophy of religion to religion (Sec. 2). This relation consists in philosophy's recognition that religion is already everywhere present and presupposed in human experience, and that therefore philosophy's task is to *comprehend* religion, not *produce* it. While the existence of religion may be self-evident, in another sense it must be demonstrated, but that is a task reserved for Part I. For the moment the most important question facing the philosophy of religion is how religion as such or religious consciousness is *related* to everything else in human experience and consciousness. If the "theoretical" task of the philosophy of religion is to cognize God and religion, then its "practical" task is that of addressing the profound conflict that has developed in the modern world between the sacred and the secular. This is what is taken up in the longest section of the *Introduction*, Sec. 3 (n. 28). While Hegel's primary concern is to analyze this conflict or opposition, the analysis also contains an implicit criticism of the prevailing

theological tendencies of the Enlightenment and its aftermath—deism, rationalism, pietism—which in Hegel’s view utterly failed to heal the conflict. The conflict comes down, finally, to an opposition between religion and scientific cognition (Sec. 4): religion tends to withdraw into the realm of the noncognitive, i.e., feeling, intuition, piety, “faith.” This is the “discord of our time,” which it is the task of speculative philosophy of religion to heal (n. 58). The theologians cannot heal it since, in defending themselves against the onslaughts of science and criticism, they have given up all content in religion: they are like blind men, able to describe everything about a painting but the picture itself. The *Introduction* concludes with a brief “division of the subject” (Sec. 5), which offers not so much a survey of the ensuing parts of the lecture as a summary of the moments of the concept of religion, which serve as the speculative basis of the “division” (n. 71).

b. The 1824 Lectures

Following the Preface, the 1824 lectures introduce a new Sec. 1 (see 1824 *Intro.*, n. 5), which is concerned to define the subject matter of this “new” discipline (n. 7): its content is not just God as such but *religion*. However, “God” and “religion” are intimately associated. (Here Hegel draws into the 1824 *Introduction* a theme already set forth in Sec. A of the *Ms. Concept*.) Therefore the idea of God is also the concern of the philosophy of religion. But the idea of God is the “result” of the whole of philosophy that precedes the philosophy of religion, and is given to the latter discipline as a kind of presupposition—to be considered now, however, not as an abstract but as an utterly concrete idea, as infinitely appearing *spirit*.

In Sec. 2 (n. 25) Hegel develops more explicitly the polemic against the theological and philosophical views of his time that is already implicit in Sec. 3 of the *Ms. Introduction*. Although his target is ostensibly rationalist theology and historicist theology, it is evident that the real polemic is being increasingly directed against Schleiermacher (nn. 34, 35). After a brief interlude on the relationship of the philosophy of religion to positive religion (Sec. 3, n. 37), Hegel abruptly returns to the conflict with prevailing philosophical and theological views. In Sec. 4 he takes this up under the

theme of certain "preliminary questions" (n. 45) that seemingly must be disposed of before philosophy of religion can turn to its proper object, namely, religion as such and religious knowledge of God. After briefly treating the matter of double truth (faith versus reason), Hegel focuses on two positions to which he is diametrically opposed—the view that reason is limited to objects of sense experience, and that the objects of reason cannot be known as they are in themselves but only as they appear; and the view that religion has its proper domain in the realm of feeling. The two views share in common the conviction that God cannot be known cognitively. The first view is preeminently represented by Kant (n. 51), the second by Schleiermacher (n. 52); Jacobi combines the two in an especially unconvincing fashion (see 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27). But these preliminary questions must finally be set aside. They all assume that we must first investigate reason and establish its cognitive capacity (or incapacity) before proceeding to cognition. But the only way to investigate reason is to engage in the act of thinking, just as the only way to learn to swim is to go into the water. Thus the philosophy of religion has to start, not with an epistemological or experiential or affective prolegomenon, but with its own true and proper object, which is the object of religion, *God*. But because God is essentially rational, is rationality itself in the form of vitality and self-relating spirit, by starting with God we are also starting with reason, and the cognition of reason is not a prolegomenon but engagement with the subject matter itself. Religion is precisely the relationship of finite spirit to infinite spirit that is engendered by infinite spirit's self-knowing. Here we are brought to the brink of the speculative insight. But its insertion into the *Introduction* at this point disrupts Hegel's original plan for three parts: the relationship of the philosophy of religion to the whole of philosophy, its position vis-à-vis the needs of our time, and its relationship to positive religion. The third part was cut short by Hegel's preoccupation with the challenge to religious cognition and religious content offered by Schleiermacher's theology of feeling, which he now fully engages for the first time.

This engagement appears to have represented a kind of break-

through for Hegel to the properly speculative conception and treatment of the subject. In the "survey of the stages of our discussion" offered in Sec. 5, the mature systematic presentation of the whole of the philosophy of religion is articulated (n. 64), even though the actual execution of the first part, the *Concept of Religion*, in 1824 does not conform to the structure here envisioned. It should be noted that in 1824 as in 1821 the several proofs of the existence of God are associated with determinate stages of religious consciousness and therefore with the concept of God present in different historical religions (n. 72).

c. The 1827 Lectures

At the outset Hegel states that he will consider two topics: the relation of the philosophy of religion to the whole of philosophy, and the relationship of the science (or philosophy) of religion to the needs of our time. These two headings are obviously derived from the 1824 lectures, which is not surprising since Hegel was using the Griesheim transcript of 1824 as a partial basis of the 1827 lectures (see 1827 *Intro.*, n. 1). But as he proceeds, he departs considerably from this basis. As in 1824, Hegel's concern in Sec. 1 is to establish the appropriate subject matter for the discipline of philosophy of religion. He does so, however, not by showing that "God" is coimplicated in "religion," and that the idea of God is the result of the whole of philosophy preceding philosophy of religion. Rather, the argument now is that philosophy and religion have one and the same object, namely, "the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God." Hence we have given this section a heading different from the one indicated by Hegel. Religion and philosophy coincide in one, each is "the service of God" in a way peculiar to it. This linkage is deeply rooted in the theological tradition, starting with the church fathers (the Alexandrines in particular) and reaching a high point in the Middle Ages (Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas). We should note that a deeper appreciation of the Catholic tradition (as preserving speculative truth over against Protestant subjectivism) is characteristic of the 1827

lectures at several points. This section as a whole is new, having been worked out in detail in one of the miscellaneous papers (n. 6); but it draws upon fragments found in earlier lectures (the *Ms. Preface*, parts of Sec. 3 of the 1824 *Introduction*).

Sec. 2, "The Relationship of the Science of Religion to the Needs of Our Time," is the longest of the 1827 *Introduction*. It is not clearly organized, and, as we suggest in n. 11, it is something of a grab bag of themes taken over and highlighted from the corresponding Sec. 2 of 1824, in part also from Sec. 4 of the latter (for a summary of its contents, see n. 11). The battle with Schleiermacher is no longer so hot and fresh. Rather a new theological challenge is appearing on the scene, potentially a more bitter rival to speculative philosophy than rationalism and the theology of feeling had been, namely, neopietism combined with Oriental studies in the writings of F. A. G. Tholuck (n. 17). Tholuck dismissed the doctrine of the Trinity as foundational to Christian faith since it derives from Greek, Islamic, and Oriental speculation; for Hegel, by contrast, it is "the fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion." Hegel's defense of the doctrines of the Incarnation and Trinity is more prominent in the last two lectures, possibly because the philosophy of religion has now taken on a strictly logical structure, corresponding to the three moments of the self-mediation of the concept of God. The Trinity is the representational expression of the fundamental structure of actuality itself.

Sec. 3, the "Survey of Our Subject," is longer and more detailed in the 1827 lectures than in the earlier series (n. 61). The systematic structure of the subject is now clearly in view for Hegel, and he lays it out with precision. Prior to the detailed survey, he offers a speculative description of the moments of the concept of religion—self-identity, self-differentiation, self-return—which serve as the logical, rational basis for the actual historical appearance of the religions and the division of the subject into three parts. This description bears some similarities to the summary of the moments of the concept of religion at the end of the *Introduction* in the *Ms.*, and it could be one of the few points where the 1827 lectures go back to the *Ms.*, not to *G*. If so, this simply reinforces the evident

fact that Hegel did not suddenly discover the speculative, logical basis for the science of religion in 1827; it was already present in 1821 but had not yet been worked out in a formally satisfactory way.

d. The 1831 Lectures

Strauss's synopsis of the *Introduction* in the 1831 lectures is quite brief, and we cannot be confident that he has given a complete or balanced picture of it. It is evident that Hegel began the lectures once again with the rhetorical flourishes constituting the Preface (Strauss's first paragraph). However, Strauss's second paragraph seems to collapse Secs. 1 and 2 of the 1827 lectures into a single unit, concerned generally with the relations between philosophy, religion, and theology (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 2). Philosophy and religion have the same object, God, although today it is customary to oppose theology and philosophy. Theology is represented as being divided into two camps, rationalism and supernaturalism, both of which have relegated basic dogmas such as the Trinity to the background; here speculative philosophy can perform the service of protecting and interpreting these doctrines once provided by theologians. Philosophy can also agree to the coupling of God-consciousness and self-consciousness, as maintained by faith and piety, insisting only that this must be verified rationally, not just affectively. Hegel's temper seems to be more irenic, as though he were seeking an accommodation of sorts with his opponents—but this could be an entirely misleading impression, resulting from what Strauss selected to excerpt.


The excerpts provide much fuller detail on the "division of the subject." We have seen that already in 1827 the survey was much enlarged, and this trajectory might have been carried even further in 1831; but on the other hand it would be understandable if Strauss had regarded the outline of the entire lecture series of special importance and had focused attention on it. As in 1827, the speculative description of the moments of the concept of religion precedes the actual survey as its foundation. The striking changes in the ar-


Manuscript

1824 Lectures

1827 Lectures

1831 Lectures**





*Solid lines designate direct dependence on an earlier lecture series. Broken lines designate thematic similarities but no direct dependence.

**Reconstruction based on the Strauss excerpts; therefore not certain.

***The 1824 *Concept* does not actually conform to this structure until the last section.

rangement of Part II, *Determinate Religion*, have already been mentioned above in Sec. 4.a of the Editorial Introduction (see also n. 3 of the text), and will be examined in detail in the Introduction to volume 2.

8. The Structure and Development of "The Concept of Religion"

a. *The Manuscript*

Hegel originally intended only a twofold division of *The Concept of Religion* (see *Ms. Concept*, n. 1), the second part of which was to take up the matter already alluded to in the *Introduction* (Sec. 2), namely, the speculative demonstration of the *necessity* of the religious standpoint, whose existence must in the first instance be presupposed by philosophy; this was to be a "proof" of *religion*, not of God. In process of elaboration, the two sections grew to four.

The first section (Sec. A) was intended to provide a foundation for the demonstration in the sense of offering a preliminary description of religion and a derivation of its concept from its appearance in religious representation (n. 2). There are two main themes. The first is that religion is composed of two essential moments or elements, the objective side, which is God, and the subjective side, which is human consciousness. Religion consists essentially of the *relationship* between the two. The object sets itself into relationship and is not to be known simply abstractly; this is what it means to say that God is *spirit*. The subjective side does not merely remain locked into subjectivity but, in authentically religious experience, is "elevated" or "passes over" to the object. This is what happens in the actual observances and practices of religion, or *cultus*, and Hegel here offers the only discussion of the cultus to be provided in Part I of the *Ms*. In the later lectures, the discussion of the cultus is transferred to the very end, while in the 1824 lectures the cothematization of "God" and "religion" is drawn forward into the *Introduction*. The second main theme, beginning with the last paragraph of *Ms*. sheet 14b, is that the concept of religion appears and develops in the history of religion—seemingly

in contingent fashion, although “scientific” comprehension will grasp the meaning and rationality of this development, and thus be “reconciled” to it (n. 37).

The next two sections (Secs. B and C) should be read as constituting a single sustained, though complex, argument; it is clear that Hegel himself intended it thus, although he himself divided the one section into two. The scientific (or speculative) conception of the religious standpoint entails demonstrating its *internal* necessity by showing how finite consciousness raises itself to religion through an inward teleology. Internal necessity must be distinguished from *external* (Sec. B.1), which regards religion in functional terms as a means, as useful or expedient in the achieving of some end other than religion itself, whether it be ethical, political, or personal (n. 47). Having disposed of external necessity, Hegel discovers that he cannot proceed with the matter of internal necessity and its demonstration without first having an adequate definition of religion with which to work, a definition that recognizes that religion itself entails a process of “looking away,” “rising above,” and “passing over” from the finite to the infinite, and thus is not something posited by us but is an action of the object of religion itself (n. 54). At this point he inserts a special sheet, 14a-b (Sec. B.2, nn. 55, 57), which elaborates this speculative definition of religion, “speculative” because it grasps the unity of our consciousness of the absolute with the absolute’s *self*-consciousness as “the absolutely self-determining true that has being in and for itself.” Upon returning to the main text (Sec. B.3), Hegel further elaborates this speculative definition under the twin themes of “absolute universality” (thought, devotion) and “absolute singularity” (feeling, sensibility), which together constitute the religious relationship and the religious subject (n. 61). Here for the first time he introduces categories that will be of central importance for the depiction of religious consciousness in the later lectures.

On the basis of this definition, Hegel returns to the task of demonstrating the internal necessity of religion in Sec. C (n. 99). “Necessity” has to do with derivation from something other, in this case the finite world. The task is to trace phenomenologically the

movement of the natural and spiritual worlds as they return of themselves to the source of their truth in the absolute. This is the task of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (nn. 119, 120). But when we arrive at the goal, we discover that what appears to be the result is actually the foundation of the entire process, namely, the dialectic of differentiation and return that constitutes the divine life. The rise of finite consciousness to the absolute is at the same time the return of absolute consciousness to itself. The ultimate demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint is that religion does not merely *follow* from the natural-spiritual world but is its *truth*, its foundation. In *Hn* (or possibly *MiscP*), this “speculative reversal” is described metaphorically as “a stream *flowing in opposite directions*, leading forward to the other, but at the same time working backward, so that what appears to be the *last*, founded on what precedes, appears rather to be the *first*—the foundation” (n. 115).

Precisely why Hegel continued on into the fourth section (Sec. D) of the *Ms.* after attaining these speculative heights and thus fulfilling his initial objective of “proving” religion is unclear (n. 128). It appears that the religious standpoint is a *universal* standpoint, common to art, religion, and philosophy, and that part of the definition of the concept of religion is to establish its relationship to these three realms of absolute consciousness. If so, this is an agenda inherited from Hegel’s earlier treatments of religion in the *Phenomenology* and *Encyclopedia*. But unlike these earlier works, Hegel does not at this point discuss Oriental religion, Greek religion, and Christian religion, but rather launches into an analysis of the forms of religious consciousness correlated to these forms of absolute spirit, namely intuition, representation, and thought. Some of this material found its way into the later lectures, but not in the rich, complex, and suggestive form in which it is presented in the *Ms.*

b. The 1824 Lectures

These lectures are of particular interest because they represent a transition from Hegel’s first attempt at working out his treatment of the “concept of religion” in the *Ms.* to his mature systematization that is fully attained only in the 1827 lectures. Out of the exigency

of finding an alternative to the Schleiermacherian grounding of religion in feeling, Hegel achieved in 1824 a creative breakthrough to an adequate formulation of the speculative definition of the concept of religion—a formulation that eluded him in the *Ms.* although the insight was already present. But he arrived at it only at the end of a lengthy critique of inadequate understandings of religious consciousness, and the discovery came too late to permit an actual structuring of the 1824 *Concept* according to this formulation. So the 1824 lectures remain fluid and transitional, but just for that reason also vital and interesting.

Hegel begins with what apparently was originally intended only as an introduction to the main body of the presentation, analogous to Sec. A of the *Ms.* But the introduction grew to such proportions, despite his insistence at the outset that the matter was not worth a great deal of attention (see 1824 *Concept*, n. 3), that it consumed nearly three-fifths of the whole of Part I of the lectures. It was a classic instance of scarcely getting beyond the introduction before having to conclude. But the time was not wasted, and the material is rich and suggestive. For in this “introduction” Hegel sets out to show that the “empirical approach,” which starts with religion as it is given in immediate experience, and which limits itself to finite categories of consciousness, can never arrive at what is distinctively religious, namely the *relationship* of finite and infinite spirit. This is not to say that immediate experience is irrelevant. On the contrary, it represents the beginning of all knowledge—but it is only the beginning of knowledge, not the totality of it. Religion finally is not merely an empirical reality, something that can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of sense-based experience or immediate self-consciousness; rather it is a “speculative” reality because it is a “mirroring” (*speculum*) of the absolute precisely in the religious relationship to the absolute, precisely in the feeling and consciousness of the absolute. Therefore religion can be properly or adequately grasped only speculatively, not empirically. This is what Hegel finds lacking in Schleiermacher.

Hegel’s method in this first section on “Empirical Observation” (Sec. A) is not itself empirical. Rather he offers what might be described as a phenomenology of the empirical approach, viewing

religion as it appears to empirical consciousness, showing how this point of view arrives at its own limits and must be transcended. The point of view from which the phenomenology is carried out is already speculative; it proceeds within "speculative brackets." Thus in 1827 these materials could be transposed into Sec. B, which would describe the knowledge of God in terms of the second moment of the divine self-mediation, the moment of differentiation or consciousness. And these materials represent a quite thorough revision of the discussion of the religious relationship already undertaken from the speculative standpoint in Sec. B.3 of the Ms. The stages of religious consciousness traced in this section are immediate knowledge (the "faith" or "certainty" that God *is*), feeling (n. 20), reflection (in the form of understanding and representation), and finally reason or thought. We cannot do justice to the wealth of content in this brief summary. But we do wish to clarify the rather confusing form of presentation in Secs. A.3 and A.4 (nn. 35, 49). The two sections constitute a single argument. Empirical observation knows that, although God and myself *appear* to be undividedly one in feeling, in fact religious consciousness "in more determinate form" is aware of the antithesis between myself as a finite, feeling, particular subject and God as the infinite, independent, universal object. It is these distinct elements that constitute the religious relationship. But how is such a relationship between the finite and the infinite possible? From the point of view of empirical observation, only two options appear to be possible: either God remains what is totally other and beyond, the negation of finitude, of which I can have no cognitive knowledge; or finitude itself is what is exhaustively real and good, existing solely for itself. Finitude is related either *negatively* to God or *affirmatively* to itself; it cannot be related *affirmatively* to God. Finitude attempts to bridge this gulf in the form of "reflective" knowledge, which appears philosophically as "understanding" and religiously as "representation," but from this point of view the infinite remains either an incomprehensible beyond or a mere projection of the finite. Only from the point of view of reason or thought is it possible to conceive the infinite as that which "overreaches" the finite, both encompassing and transcending it as an "affirmative infinitude." Here the

perspective shifts from finite consciousness to the infinite self-mediation of spirit. There is no way of “passing over” from the finite to the true infinite unless the infinite itself constitutes the passage; but this is already the speculative insight.

The first two parts of Sec. B, “The Speculative Concept of Religion,” are transitional in character and draw upon material from Secs. B.2 and C of the Ms. (n. 117). In Sec. B.1 Hegel offers his most complete definition of religion as “the *self-consciousness of absolute spirit*,” mediated in and through finite consciousness. Thus “religion is not the affair of the single human being; rather it is essentially the highest determination of the absolute idea itself” (see not only the main text for this section but also the variant in *Ho*, n. 120). Philosophy requires that the necessity of this definition be *demonstrated*, and Hegel turns to this task in Sec. B.2, drawing rather directly upon Sec. C of the Ms. and arriving at the same conclusion, namely, that absolute truth cannot be the “result” of a demonstration but is “what is purely and simply first, *unique*.” Therefore absolute spirit develops a “counterthrust,” so to speak, against the teleological thrust of finite spirit and shows itself to be “the first and alone true.”

We are ready at long last to pass on to an *exposition* of the concept of religion. This is really the proper subject matter of Part II of the lectures, but, with only a small portion of the allotted time left for its treatment, the whole of what remains is condensed into a single section, Sec. B.3 (n. 131). If the concept of religion is absolute spirit in its self-mediation, then we can expect that religion will reflect the development or self-realization of absolute spirit in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reaffirmation or return to self. These moments of *the life of the eternal God* are definitive of the moments of *religion*: the abstract concept of God (God as abstract, universal, self-identical substance—an idea present in some form in all religions), religious consciousness or the knowledge of God, and religious practice or cultus (participation in the being of God). Finally, *philosophy of religion* must also be structured according to these moments. The second and third constitute what Hegel calls the theoretical and practical religious relationships, and the remainder

of the 1824 *Concept* is devoted to an exposition of these two relationships. Actually the first *relationship* encompasses the first *two moments*—the substantial, unitary God and differentiated human consciousness—and in the 1824 lectures Hegel does not treat the abstract concept of God as a separate theme (nn. 133, 136). Nor in Sec. B.3.a does he discuss the various forms of the knowledge of God since he has already treated them in Sec. A. Rather he offers a survey of different modalities of the “appearance” of God in the history of religion, from nature religion to the consummate religion, adapting and expanding some themes from Sec. A of the Ms. (n. 137). And in Sec. B.3.b he offers a kind of phenomenological history of the cultus in its various determinate forms, as well as considering “faith” as the characteristic activity of the cultus, and even throwing in a brief response to the charge of “pantheism”—an emerging issue, just on the horizon in 1824 (n. 146). Thus the transitional character of the 1824 lectures remains evident to the end.

c. The 1827 Lectures

In the third lecture series, Hegel begins at a point corresponding to the third and last section of the 1824 series, that is, with an exposition of the realization of the concept of religion in its three moments, which correspond to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God (see 1827 *Concept*, n. 6). All preliminaries have been dispensed with other than a brief discussion of the problem of securing a beginning, in which there are discernible traces of the proof of the necessity of the religious standpoint from Sec. B.2 of the 1824 *Concept*, and of the relation of the philosophy of religion to the whole of philosophy from Sec. 1 of the 1824 *Introduction*.

Sec. A, “The Concept of God,” has no parallel in the earlier lectures since Hegel now addresses this topic for the first time within the framework of Part I. The God that appears as the “result” of the whole of philosophy is an abstraction—abstract, universal, self-identical substance, “the self-enclosed.” The alleged advocacy of such a God by “identity-philosophy” has led to the charge of “Spinozism” or “pantheism” (nn. 11, 18). Hegel encountered such charges directed against his own philosophy for the first time in

the mid-1820s (n. 20), and he took the occasion of this new section of the *Concept* to refute them. In the first place, he argues, God's substantiality does not exclude God's subjectivity or spirituality. Not only is substance merely one moment, the first, in the definition of God as spirit; even in this first moment, the divine universality is not an undifferentiated monad but an "abiding unity," which includes distinctions within itself (n. 16). In the second place, no serious philosophy has ever simply identified God with everything that is. Authentic pantheism (whether Spinozistic or Oriental) identified God with the *essence*, the universal power, that is in all things, not with things as such. Since this essence is what, philosophically speaking, is actual or real, the world in the strict sense has no "actuality," although it does of course "exist." The tendency of Spinoza's philosophy is toward acosmism rather than atheism (nn. 27, 28), since above all it is the actuality of God that is affirmed by this philosophy rather than the actuality of the world. Those who accuse Spinoza (and Hegel) of "atheism" merely prove that they are unable to liberate themselves from finitude (since for them the "actual" must be the empirical), nor are they able to understand that the whole of philosophy is "a study of the definition of unity," i.e., of identity in difference.

Sec. B, "The Knowledge of God," is quite lengthy. Into it Hegel incorporates and systematically arranges a large body of material treating the various forms of religious consciousness—immediate knowledge (faith), feeling, representation, thought—inherited primarily from Sec. A of the 1824 lectures and Sec. B.3 of the *Ms*. The theme of religious knowledge corresponds to the second moment of the divine life, namely differentiation or distinction, which is the precondition of relationship. A God who is known and represented in the world is a concrete, differentiated God, not an abstract God. While there is considerable duplication of the 1824 lectures at this point, the material is more clearly organized. Feeling and representation are understood as *forms* or *modalities* of the immediate knowledge of faith (n. 49). Only representation can make judgments as to the *content* of what is known, but it does so imagistically or reflectively and thus is driven on to thought (n. 75).

The section on thought is unusually full, and in the third part

of it, on "Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God" (Sec. B.4.c), Hegel introduces another of his surprising innovations. Since thought must concern itself with the objectivity or reality-status of what is known, its primary task with reference to God is to demonstrate the necessity of God's "existence," a demonstration that constitutes the cognitive dimension of the religious "elevation to God" (n. 109). Philosophy of religion must concern itself not only with the proof of religion (the necessity of the religious standpoint) but also with the proof of God. In the 1827 lectures, Hegel brings his treatment of the various proofs—cosmological, teleological, and ontological, which in earlier lectures were considered in relation to the specific religions—together into the *Concept* at this point (n. 133). One can only hypothesize as to his reasons for doing so. The proofs clearly have a greater impact when they are considered together and shown to be intrinsic to the cognitive relationship to God. Perhaps this is partly Hegel's attempt to refute the charge of atheism directed against himself, perhaps also partly his attempt to repulse the *threat* of atheism that he rightly sensed to be just below the surface of the modern bourgeois-secular world. Hegel seems to have been preoccupied with the question of the reality-status of God during his last years in Berlin; he gave separate lectures on the proofs of the existence of God in the summer of 1829 and was preparing them for publication when he died in 1831. In his presentation Hegel is concerned among other things to overcome two sorts of "distortion" that are present in traditional versions of the proofs: the distortion that God "exists" like other finite entities (n. 111), and the distortion that finitude is the ground from which God's being could be demonstrated as a result (n. 132). The insight of the ontological proof is that the "elevation" to God is not an autonomous self-elevation of finite spirit into what could only be a spurious infinite, but, speculatively expressed, the return of true and infinite spirit to itself. The only genuine proof of the reality of God is God's self-proof.

The 1827 "Cultus" (Sec. C) is much abbreviated by contrast with that of 1824 (n. 169). It eliminates the historical survey, focusing instead on the essential elements of cultus, all of which are

rooted in the act of "enjoyment" or "partaking" (*Genuss*, n. 174) in God, both a sensible partaking and a higher, "mystical" partaking. The elements are devotion (not mere faith but an immersion in the spirit of God), the sacraments and sacrifice (elevation through negation sensibly accomplished), and the inward renunciation of oneself in repentance and purity of heart. When the latter is properly "cultivated," it becomes the basis of "ethical life," which is "the most genuine cultus." This hinted connection between the religious and the ethico-political is developed only in the last lectures, those of 1831.

d. The 1831 Lectures

The basic organization of the *Concept of Religion* in the last lecture series is similar to that of 1827, but interesting variations are introduced nonetheless. If Strauss can be relied upon, the central theme of Sec. A is the relationship between the concept of religion and the concept of God, which means that a proof of the existence of God takes the form of a demonstration of the necessity of religion. Both of these are matters that have been discussed in various places in the earlier lectures (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 4). The defense against the charge of pantheism and atheism that occupied so much of Sec. A of the 1827 *Concept* is lacking completely, replaced, so it seems, by a discussion of thought as the soil of religion and of absolute spirit's self-knowing in and through the knowing of finite spirit: "God knows himself in spirit, and spirit knows itself in God."

Sec. B is not oriented to the theme of the knowledge of God, with the focus on representation and thought, as in 1827, but rather to "the single forms of religion," namely, feeling, representation, and faith (n. 5). Rather than being the most primitive form, associated with immediate knowledge, faith now appears to be the highest before arriving at the speculative thinking of philosophy. Feeling and representation *issue* in faith rather than being *forms* or *modalities* of faith (n. 6). Hegel first considers the *grounds* of faith, the question whether it derives from outer authority or inner witness of the spirit, revising material that first appeared in Sec. B.3.b of

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF "THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION"*

1831 Lectures**

1827 Lectures

1824 Lectures

Manuscript


A. The Concept of Religion in General (10a-15b)

(to B.3.a,b, and Intro.) -----> (to C)

- A. Empirical Observation
 - 1. Immediate Knowledge
 - 2. Feeling
 - 3. Consciousness in More Determinate Form
 - 4. Relationship of Finite and Infinite
 - 5. Transition to Speculative Concept
- B. Speculative Concept of Religion
 - 1. Definition of the Concept of Religion

B. Scientific Conception of the Religious Standpoint

- 1. Distinction between External and Internal Necessity (16a-18a)
- 2. Speculative Definition of the Concept of Religion (14a-b)
- 3. Religious Relationship as Unity of Absolute Universality and Absolute Singularity (18a-22b)



*Solid lines designate direct dependence on an earlier lecture series. Broken lines designate thematic similarities but no direct dependence.

**Reconstruction based on the Strauss excerpts; therefore not certain.

the 1824 *Concept* and Sec. D.2 of the *Ms*. He then considers several relationships of faith: to the inner essence of the believer, to determinate modifications of spirit, to historical foundations, and to thought. Thought itself is seemingly not discussed in this section, and the lengthy treatment of the proofs of the existence of God is once again returned to the various determinate religions, as the division of the subject for the 1831 lectures already indicates.

Sec. C, the cultus, seems to be organized much as it was in 1827, although, if Strauss's excerpts are a reliable guide, it is considerably longer in proportion to other parts of the *Concept*. Hegel's central theme is that the cultus involves the conscious actualization of the reconciliation already implicitly accomplished within divinity, and therefore an overcoming in practice of the natural and spiritual cleavage that has arisen as the result of evil.

The most significant innovation in the 1831 *Concept* is the introduction of a new section on the relationship of religion to the state (Sec. D). Fortunately we have this not only in Strauss's excerpted version but also in the full text provided by W₂, printed on pp. 451–460 (see *Religion and State*, n. 1). Hegel was especially interested in recent political developments in France and Great Britain, namely, the July Revolution of 1830 and the introduction of the Reform Bill into Parliament in 1831, and his last published writing was an essay on the Reform Bill and its implications for English democracy. In the philosophy-of-religion lectures he wants to show both that ethical life is the most genuine cultus, i.e., the true service of God, and that religion is the true foundation of the state. But only a religion that recognizes that human beings are free in and through God is capable of founding the state, because what a people realizes in a state is precisely the consciousness of its freedom. The laws or principles of a state derive from God, but that is to say that they are laws of freedom, and freedom has its truth in religion. An unfree religion and an unfree state are perversions of the truth; that is what concerned Hegel about the recent developments in France and Great Britain. It is of great importance to work out a proper understanding of the relation between religion and the state. Medieval Catholicism set religion at odds with the

state by demanding "holiness" (celibacy, poverty, obedience) rather than "ethical life" (marriage, work, rational freedom). Protestantism affirmed ethical life and sanctified it, but tended to espouse an abstract freedom and equality, not attending to the political structures that would maximize freedom concretely despite the inequality of function necessarily introduced by organizational relationships. Religion and constitution, inner conviction and external law, must be unified in ways that thus far have been only dimly imagined.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

3

[2a]

[Preface]

Gentlemen!¹

The object of these lectures is the philosophy of religion, which in general² has the same purpose as the earlier type of metaphysical science, which was called *theologia naturalis*.³ This term included everything that could be known of God by reason alone, as distinct from a positive, revealed religion, a religion that is known from some source other than reason. The object of religion itself is the highest, the absolute,⁴ that which is absolutely true or the truth itself. This is the region in which all the riddles of the world, all contradictions of thought, are resolved, and all griefs are healed, the region of eternal truth and eternal peace, of absolute satisfaction, of truth itself.

1. [Ed.] Hegel's sheet 2a lacks any headings and simply begins with the word "Gentlemen!" The prefatory remarks are the only part of the *Introduction* from the Ms. repeated without much change in 1824 and 1827. The opening paragraphs of *W₂* also parallel the Ms. but with some variations, resulting from the interweaving of 1824 and 1827 materials.

2. Ms. adds: [on] the whole

3. [Ed.] In the school philosophy of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, natural theology was considered a philosophical discipline. Hegel was familiar with it primarily in its Leibnizian-Wolffian form, according to which the third and final part of *metaphysica specialis*, following rational psychology and cosmology, was *theologia naturalis*. Wolff defined it as "the science of what is possible through God, i.e., of what is in God, and of what can be known through what is in God." See Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata*, Part I, § 1. See also A. G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 800, 802.

4. Ms. margin: (a) Object. (b) Purpose of the philosophy of religion – on both in preliminary fashion this first hour)

Consciousness or thought is what distinguishes human beings from the animals. All that proceeds from thought—all the distinctions of the arts and sciences and of the endless interweavings of human relationships, habits and customs, activities, skills, and enjoyments⁵—find their ultimate center in the *one* thought of *God*. God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things; [everything] starts from God and returns to God. God is the one and only object of philosophy. [Its concern is] to occupy itself with God, to apprehend everything in him, to lead everything back to him, as well as to derive everything particular from God and to justify everything only insofar as it stems from God, is sustained through
4 its relationship with him, lives by his | radiance and has [within itself] the mind of God. Thus philosophy *is* theology, and [one's] occupation with philosophy—or rather *in* philosophy—is of itself the service of God.⁶

This object exists solely through itself and for its own sake. It is something that is ~absolutely self-sufficient, unconditioned, independent, free, as well as being the supreme end unto itself.^{7 8} Occupation with it can have no other end than this object itself. Such occupation is itself the freest activity; <through it spirit [is] liberated>; it is the activity in which spirit is disburdened of all finitude and is secured and protected against everything. It [is] occupation [2b] [with] the eternal. We may and must, therefore, contemplate a life in and with the eternal, and to the extent that

5. Ms. *margin*: <[–all] that we value and esteem, everything in terms of which humanity finds its vocation and happiness, and through which its art and science have their pride and glory—all . . . >

[Ed.] This marginal note was used in 1827.

6. [Ed.] *Gottesdienst* is the customary word for “worship,” which is a “divine service.” In this context the more literal rendering “service of God” seems appropriate since philosophy is the “worship” of God not in a cultic but in a serving sense.

7. *W₂ reads*: In religion, human beings place themselves in relationship to this center, in which all other relationships coalesce, and in so doing they raise themselves to the highest stage of consciousness and into the region that is free from connection with what is other [than itself]—the absolutely sufficient, the unconditioned, that which is free for itself, its own end and purpose.

8. Ms. *adds*: As the object is, so then is . . .

we sense this life and feel it, (this sensation) is the dissolution of everything imperfect and finite. It is the sensation of blessedness, (and nothing else [is to be] understood by blessedness.)

(Since God is in this way the principle and goal, the truth of each and every deed, initiative, and effort,) all persons have therefore a consciousness of God, or of the absolute substance, as the truth of everything and so also of themselves, of everything that they are and do. They regard this occupation, the knowing and feeling of God as their higher life, as their true dignity, as the Sunday⁹ of their lives. Finite purposes, (disgust at) petty interests, the pain of this life, (even if only [in] isolated moments that are themselves unhappy,) the troubles, burdens, and cares of "this bank and shoal of time,"¹⁰ pity and compassion—all this, | like a dream image, 5 seems to float away (into the past like the soul that drinks from the waters of forgetfulness,¹¹ its other, mortal, nature fading into a mere semblance, which no longer causes it anxiety and on which it is no longer dependent.) As from the highest peak of a mountain, remote from all distinct views of the earthly scene, we look up into the blue sky and from afar peacefully survey all the limitations of the landscape and of the world—so in religion, delivered from the harshness of this actual world, we see it with the spiritual eye only as a floating semblance, which, in this pure region, only mirrors its lights and shades, its contrasts, softened, in the radiance of satisfaction and love, into eternal rest. In this intuition and feeling, we are not concerned with ourselves, with our interests, our vanity, our pride of knowledge and of conduct, but only with the content of it—proclaiming the honor of God and manifesting his glory.

This is the universal intuition, sensation, consciousness—or what

9. Ms. margin: (Sunday: (α) pain – thus finite interests float away; (β) substance of everything; (γ) blessing in [the midst of] concrete life)

10. [Ed.] *dieser Sandbank der Zeitlichkeit*. Cf. Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, act 1, sc. 7. Hegel apparently quotes from the translation by Joh. Joachim Eschenburg (1779).

11. [Ed.] A reference to the underworld river *Lêthê*, the personification of oblivion. The souls of the departed drank of this river and thus forgot all they had said or done in the upper world. This myth is found in many forms, from Plato (*Republic* 10.621a-c) to Dante (*The Divine Comedy*, *Purgatory*, Cantos 30, 33). However, it is not certain that Hegel had any specific form of the myth in mind.

you will—of *religion*. To investigate and become cognizant of its nature is the aim of these lectures.^{12 13} [3a]

[1.] On the [Purpose of the] Philosophy of Religion¹⁴

I wanted to make this cognitive knowledge [of God and religion] the object of my lectures because, (in the first place,) I believe it has never been so important and so necessary that this cognition should be taken seriously once more. (The special interest and importance of the philosophy of religion for our time lies here.) For
6 the doctrine that we can know nothing of God, that we cannot | cognitively apprehend him, has become in our time a universally acknowledged truth, a settled thing, a kind of prejudice.¹⁵ And anyone who grasps the thought, or tries to, of entering upon the cognition of God, of comprehending his nature in thought, can therefore expect that no one will pay any attention at all, that such a thought is regarded as a long-refuted error, deserving no further attention. The more the cognition of finite things is expanded—and the extension of the sciences has now become almost boundless, all fields of knowledge (having enlarged [their scope] beyond all compass)—the more the sphere of the knowledge of God has contracted. There was a time when all (science) was a science of God. It is the distinction of our age, by contrast, to know each and every

12. *Ms. margin*: (The very first thing – to grasp the specific purpose of the philosophy of religion)

13. *Ms. margin*: (See special sheet)

[*Ed.*] I.e., sheet 3a-b, immediately following.

14. [*Ed.*] This section is contained on a separate sheet, 3a-b, designated by Hegel for insertion at this point (n. 13). Although it might be surmised that it was written and used at a later time since it appears on different, smaller paper than the rest of the *Ms.* and was originally out of order, having been inserted before the actual beginning of the lectures, it was probably a part of the original lectures. *W₂* reproduces this material with some minor variations and expansions, which most likely derive from the Henning transcript of 1821. This material is not found in its present form in later lectures, although echoes of it occur in the 1824 lectures. The heading “On the Philosophy of Religion” probably refers to the words in the marginal notation on sheet 2b (n. 12) and is shorthand for “On the Purpose of the Philosophy of Religion.” However, the general character of this heading apparently misled the curator who first numbered the sheets of Hegel’s lecture manuscript into concluding that it should be located at the beginning since sheet 2a, where the lectures actually begin, has no heading at all.

thing, indeed to know an infinite mass of objects, but only of God to know nothing. There was a time when [one] cared, was driven indeed, to know God, to fathom his nature—a time when spirit had no peace, and could find none, except in this pursuit, when it felt itself unhappy that it could not satisfy this need,¹⁶ and held all other cognitive interests to be of lesser import. Our age has renounced this need and the efforts to satisfy it; we are done with it. What Tacitus said of the ancient Germans, that they were *securi adversus Deos* [indifferent to the gods],¹⁷ [3b] we have again become with respect to cognition [at least], *securi adversus Deum*. It is no longer a grief to our age that it knows nothing of God; rather it counts as the highest insight that this cognition is not even possible. What the Christian religion (like all religions) proclaims as the supreme, the absolute commandment, “Ye shall know God,” is now accounted mere folly. Christ says, “Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect.”¹⁸ This lofty demand | is an empty sound to the

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15. [Ed.] Hegel here refers to the widely held view of his time, deriving from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, that human cognition is unable to achieve secure results when it goes beyond the realm of experience, but rather, to the extent that it assumes the existence of the ideas it posits, produces mere “phantoms of the brain” (B 269, B 571). Thus the existence of God is undemonstrable for theoretical knowledge. Together with the doctrine of the *Critique of Practical Reason* that the existence of God may at the same time be assumed as a postulate of practical reason, this led to the view of contemporary philosophy and theology that the existence of God may indeed be *assumed* but not *cognitively apprehended*, and that therefore God is not an object that can be known. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 611 ff.; *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 128 ff. (*Werke* 5:124 ff.). These views were popularized by Jacobi; see especially his *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 426–427 (*Werke* 4/2:155), and his correspondence with Fichte (*Werke* 3:7). In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:500, 511 (*Werke* 15:635, 646), Hegel refers additionally to Fichte and Bouterwek in this connection. See J. G. Fichte, *Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschrift gegen die Anklage des Atheismus* (Jena, 1799), p. 51 (*Gesamtausgabe* 6:52); and F. Bouterwek, *Apodiktik: Festsetzung des Grundes aller Wahrheit und Beweise* (Halle, 1797), p. 212.

16. W_2 adds: The spiritual conflicts to which the cognition of God gives rise in the inner life were the highest that spirit knew and experienced within itself.

17. [Ed.] Tacitus, *Germania* 46. However, Tacitus was speaking of the Finns, not the Germans, whom he was contrasting with the superstitious Romans. Thus Tacitus meant this expression in a positive sense, as Hegel himself recognized (*Berliner Schriften*, p. 708).

18. [Ed.] Matt. 5:48.

wisdom of our time, which has made of God an infinite phantom, far removed from our consciousness, and which likewise [has reduced] human cognition to a vain phantom of finitude, to schemas [that are] the fulfillment of appearance. How, then, are we supposed still to observe this commandment or to attach a meaning to it—"Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect"—if we know nothing of God and of God's perfection? How should this [be] a commandment for us, whose knowledge and will are so limited and oriented throughout only toward appearances,¹⁹ and for whom the truth ~—and God is the truth—²⁰ is supposed to remain simply a beyond? With respect to its content, we must regard such a point of view as the last step in the degradation of humanity. Yet at the same time humanity is all the more arrogant in that it has proved this degradation to be its supreme achievement, its true definition, and there is only this formal aspect that still has any interest, [namely,] that humanity [has reached] the conclusion through cognition itself [that] its cognition grasps everything else *except* the true. [More will be said] on this later. <This [is] the more specific concern of the science of religion in our time, which has been handed [to us].>

I declare such a point of view and such a result to be directly opposed to the whole nature of the Christian religion, according to which we should *know* God *cognitively*, God's nature and essence, and should esteem this cognition above all else. The question whether [we have this cognition] through faith, authority, revelation, or through reason (as it is called) is of no consequence in this connection, since the cognition [associated with the point of view we have described] is as much finished and done with the content that revelation gives us of the divine nature as it is with the rational content.

<But it is in the interest of rationality that we have here to consider this standpoint and its wisdom more closely. We shall have to come

19. [Ed.] A reference to Kant's argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that we are able to know cognitively appearances only, not things as they are in themselves.

20. *W₂ reads:* and what else, we must ask further, would be worth comprehending if God is incomprehensible?

back, however, to consider it in a more precise way; and we shall then treat it more thoroughly. Let it suffice for the present to have drawn attention to it, and to have explained that these lectures | have rather the purpose of knowing God—doing just the opposite of what it does and of what it holds to be the ultimate achievement.²¹ [2b]

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[2. The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to Religion]

²²First of all, the most definite consciousness regarding our aim must [be] this: that the religion present and presupposed in everyone is the stuff that we merely want to comprehend. It is not [for us to] seek to produce this foundation; [4a] rather this is what must already be explicitly present in everyone. (It is not a question of bringing something substantially new and alien into humanity.) That would be like trying to introduce spirit into a dog by letting it see spiritual creations, or eat witty remarks, or chew on printed matter; or like²³ trying to make a blind person see by talking to that person about colors. Those who have never enlarged their hearts (beyond the bustle of finite life,) or looked into the pure aether of the soul with enjoyment, who have not felt the joy and peace of the eternal, (even if only dimly in the form of yearning,) do not possess the stuff that we here speak of. They may perhaps have an image of it, but the content is not their own thing; it is an alien matter they are wrestling with.

It may happen that religion is awakened in the soul through the philosophical cognition of it, and that religious feeling arises in a person thus; but this is not necessary, and it is not itself the

21. *Ms. adds:* First of all we have . . .

[*Ed.*] The text breaks off at the bottom of the sheet and a possible continuation has been lost.

22. *Ms. margin:* (But the more specific introduction to what I have proposed in these lectures requires that first of all I treat in general the relation of the philosophy of religion to religion; [this is its] purpose [?] insofar as it can be accomplished in preliminary fashion . . . and indeed: (α) Relationship of philosophy of religion as [something] belonging to a subject; (β) relationship of knowledge to religion)

[*Ed.*] The bottom corner of the *Ms.*, where this marginal notation is located, is missing, and our reading is uncertain at some points.

23. *Ms. reads:* or as little

aim of philosophy—(not what is called edification, which is the aim of preaching, directed to the heart, to the singularity of the subject as this one person.) Philosophy does, of course, have to | develop and represent the necessity of religion in and for itself, to comprehend that spirit advances and must advance from the other modes of its willing, imagining, and feeling to this its absolute mode. <[Its] necessity [is] that it is the destiny and the truth of spirit.> But it is a different task to raise the individual subject to this height. The caprice, the perversity, the indolence of individuals may interfere with the necessity of their universal spiritual nature; [they may] deviate from it and try to establish a peculiar standpoint for themselves, and hold to it. The subject can quite simply be evil, for this option too lies within freedom—(to slip into the standpoint of opinion, untruth, and laziness, or adopt that standpoint and stick to it knowingly.) The planets, plants, and animals cannot deviate from the necessity of their nature, from the laws of their species, <[i.e.,] from their truth. They become what they ought to be; “is” and “ought” [are] not divided.> But human freedom contains free choice within itself and can sever itself from human necessity and laws; it can work and act against the human vocation. Therefore, even if [philosophical] cognition were to perceive the necessity of the religious standpoint clearly, and even if the will were to experience in actuality the nothingness of its separation, this does not hinder the will’s ability to persist in its obstinacy <and to stand apart and at a distance from its own necessity and truth.> [4b]

Anyway, it can happen that religion first dawns in mind and spirit through philosophy, just as the feeling of religion is awakened by and comes by other paths. It is awakened first by the general religious instruction that we receive from our youth [up]. But, as we said, this is not to be represented as a necessity; in regard to any individual, it is not as though cognition | had to verify itself by bringing forth religion in this or that subject. By a shallow style of argumentation one can build an argument against cognition to the effect that this or that person possesses it and yet remains aloof from religion—so cognition is no help, it is not the way and the means to religion.²⁴ And cognition *will* and *shall* not be this either.

For, as we said, its end is to know and comprehend the religion that already *exists*—and not by so doing to lead this or that person to religion, to make someone religious when that person neither possesses nor wants to possess anything of religion. (Still less should we maintain that cognition is the one essential path to religion. The metaphysical *theologia naturalis* was looked upon as though it ought to achieve this. [But] philosophy must presuppose that the subject [has] got this far by itself.) (More [will be said] later on the precise relationship of cognition to religion.)

In fact, however, no one is so utterly depraved, so lost, so bad, and so wretched as to have no religion at all or to have [no] knowledge or awareness of it—even if it were only to fear it or long for it or hate it.²⁵ Since we are human beings and not animals, [religion] is not an alien sensation or intuition for us. But what matters is the relationship of *religion* in human beings to *everything else* in their world view, consciousness, cognition, purposes, and interests; this is the relationship that philosophical cognition is concerned with and upon which it essentially works.^{26 27} |

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24. Ms. margin: (Blame assigned – this really so intended)

25. W₂ adds: For even in the latter case one is still inwardly occupied and involved with it.

26. Ms. margin: ((β)) Source of the cleavage as opposed to that original impulse toward religion. This brings us closer to our intention. Its mediation, reconciliation – other standpoints – mention and expound the two major standpoints of religion)

27. W₂ adds: In this relationship resides the source of the cleavage from the original and absolute impulse of spirit toward religion, and here too all the manifold forms of consciousness and their most widely differing connections to the interest of religion have been shaped. Before the philosophy of religion can sum itself up in its own distinctive concept, it must work itself through all those ramifications of the interests of the time that have at present concentrated themselves in the widely extended sphere of religion. At first the movement of the principles of the time still remains outside philosophical insight, but this movement pushes on to the point that it comes into contact, conflict, and antagonism with philosophy. We shall consider this opposition and its resolution when we have examined the opposition as it still maintains itself outside of philosophy, and have seen it develop until it reaches its consummation, at which point it inwardly involves philosophical cognition.

[Ed.] While the first sentence of this passage appears to be an expansion of the marginal note contained in n. 26, the subsequent reference to the “interest of the

[3. Opposition between Religious Consciousness
and the Rest of Consciousness]²⁸

²⁹Without philosophical insight, the relationship of religion to the rest of consciousness is such that the two are conceived in isolation from each other. They constitute two kinds of occupation, two regions of consciousness, [5a] between which we pass back and forth only alternately.³⁰ For our actual worldly doings, we have a number of workdays, during which we are concerned with our particular interests and our worldly goals, (our needs, pleasures, and satisfaction) in general. Then there is Sunday, when all these things are set aside, when we collect ourselves, live for ourselves,

time” and the “principles of the time” (expressions not used in the *Ms.*) suggests the ambience of the 1827 lectures. In *W₂* the passage serves as a transition to the first major section division of the Introduction, “The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Its Presuppositions and to the Principles of the Time.” On the other hand the passage is preceded and followed in *W₂* by material from the *Ms.* The basis of the passage could be either *Hn* or *MiscP*, editorially reworked to fit the context.

28. [Ed.] This constitutes the longest section of the Introduction, in which Hegel describes the opposition that he perceived to have developed in his time between religious consciousness and “the rest” of consciousness, or between religious feeling/disposition and scientific, cognitive knowledge. The expression used throughout this section, *übriges Bewusstsein*, is translated “the rest of consciousness.” It refers to that region of consciousness which is “left over” or “remains” (*übrig*) after specifically religious consciousness has been distinguished or removed from it. “The rest of consciousness” includes both our ordinary, everyday way of viewing the world and modern, scientific knowledge, which, in accord with the principles of understanding (*Verstand*) of the Enlightenment, views things in terms of purely immanent relationships and constructs a finite system of the universe in which God is not needed and has no place. Hegel regarded this opposition as unfortunate, but he was also convinced that the prevailing theological attempts to overcome it, by means of either a rational supernaturalism or a theology limited to religious experience, had failed. The former is unscientific, the latter is noncognitive. Only a speculative philosophy of religion can achieve a true reconciliation of cognition and religion (see Sec. 4). Although this section is not repeated as such in the later lectures, the implicit criticism contained within it of the philosophy of understanding of the Enlightenment, the theology of reason (which by means of “argumentation” attempted to explain away contradictions and miracles), and the philosophy and theology of feeling was expanded and reworked in the 1824 and 1827 lectures.

29. *Ms. margin*: (To explain this more precisely)

30. *Ms. margin*: ((α) The aspects of the rest of consciousness filled with contingencies, (β) with finite things)

i.e., for our true essence³¹ and for the essential higher nature that is within us, released from our absorption in necessary business and labor of every kind. Free from labor and in contemplative mood, we raise ourselves above everyday life. It is the same in scientific activity; ([here] we have so much to know specifically.) The | cognition of nature and its laws, of natural objects, the science of law, and so forth—these are all specific realms of knowledge, essentially different from the science of God, which is itself a peculiar and specific science as against them.

12

Upon closer inspection this distinction has, in general, a double modification. (Religion appears at first to have the same dignity and recognized status in both modifications, and it is on the other side, that of the rest of life and consciousness, that the distinction emerges. On this account the distinction appears to be quite innocent since it does not [pretend] to affect religion and leaves its dignity and status alone.)

(α) The religion of the pious person,³² i.e., of one who truly deserves to be so called, (involves—like religion in general (suffice it to say for the present)—(αα) an unreflective, uncontested faith in God (whose known image is presupposed), a trust, an obedience without opposition. For example, it is one thing to believe in God or the gods, and quite another to *say*, “*I believe* in God.” In the latter there is already reflection, consciousness of an opposite view [to my faith]; now the need for justification, argumentation, polemics, etc., comes in. (ββ) [But the religion of the pious person is] not isolated and thus [is not merely] a faith or trust [occurring] in the human relationship to God;³³ [it] is not kept in isolation and is not cut off from the rest of one's existence and life but rather breathes its influence over all of one's sensibilities and actions. Pious consciousness refers all purposes and objects to God as their infinite and ultimate source. Every moment of one's finite existence and

31. *Ms. margin*: (Two standpoints of religion that we know – to which our time generally holds and must hold)

32. *Ms. margin*: ((α) Goes indifferently and cheerfully about his work – after serving God he serves his own special ends, the unselfconscious life of custom)

33. *Ms. adds in margin*: ((ββ) Not isolated)

13 affairs, of one's suffering and joy, is lifted out of this restricted sphere and thereby produces an image and a sense of one's eternal essence. (In like manner, the rest of one's life and | consciousness remains within the mode of sensation, of trust, of custom, obedience, habit, reflective activity; [one] is what circumstances and nature have made of one, and one accepts one's situation, one's life and rights, as they come along: it is so. With respect to God, [it is all his] gift, and particular happenings are a fate beyond understanding. They [are] enjoyed thankfully, or [are] offered up to God freely; [they are experienced as] a gift, i.e., [as] arbitrary grace, or as an equally incomprehensible fate.)

This relationship does not appear straightaway to involve the sundering of religion from the rest of consciousness; ([it is] only a passing over, only a relinquishing, of that sphere in feeling.) Rather [it involves] the other standpoint—a relationship which, especially from the standpoint of our reflection and culture, can be regarded as occurring frequently—(whereby the rest of consciousness is subjugated under that higher region.)

(β) [The second modification] appears at first to involve the same sort of relationship, but the contents of its related aspects are maintained in a quite different status. According to what is admitted, religion is still regarded as and pronounced to be supreme, but [with respect to] the real situation, things are [5b] different. (As we said, the distinction emerges from the secular side and at first appears not to affect religion at all. Hence it is from this side that corruption and disunity creep over into religion. The distinction may be briefly described as the development of the free human understanding and human aims. We are accustomed to this distinction (the development of human reason and human aims) because cognition, understanding, and reflection thereby enter into human life,) and because in life and science (reflection) and understanding are awakened and consciousness has become independent. The understanding has willed absolute, firm ends such as right and the state, objects that are to exist in and for [themselves] and for the sake of the understanding. Thus, too, [consciousness] cognizes
14 the laws of nature and the properties, orders, | and characteristics

of natural things and of the products of spirit.³⁴ Thus research and cognition, like the willing and the actuality of these ends, are a *human work*, a work of the human understanding; it is what *we* have brought forth. (We are not just the ones who know this or have these rights, etc.) We are here in our own property, which we (have not merely received. We do indeed start from what is, from what we find present; but what we make of this through our knowing and willing, that is *our* affair, *our* work, and we are aware that it is our work,) [which we] *ourselves* have produced. These productions, therefore, constitute our honor and glory; they make up a vast and infinite wealth—the world of our insight and knowledge, (of our external possessions, our rights, and our deeds.

Thus spirit has entered into this antithesis—[as yet] naively, without knowing it—but it becomes a conscious antithesis, ~[with whose] stages and advances we are not here concerned.³⁵ One side [of the antithesis] is that wherein [spirit] knows itself as its own (in its rights and its cognition generally, determining itself from itself independently and autonomously). The other [side is that] in which spirit [recognizes] a higher power and absolute duties, duties without corresponding rights; whatever it receives for [doing] its duties remains merely [a gift of] grace.)³⁶ The religion that we have on this basis is now distinguished from the first region. We restrict cognition and scientific knowledge to that former region, and [only] sensibility and faith are left to the sphere of religion.³⁷

~(Cognition, [however,] is conditioned [in its] objects and ends; [it] is also necessarily cognizant of the conditionedness of its knowing and doing—of its dependence in respect of its material upon something external to it. This is where the connection of its two

34. *Ms. canceled:* This cognition can be developed in detail; it treats of what is and is complete on its own account

35. *W₂ reads:* For spirit now moves between two sides, whose distinction has actually developed.

36. *W₂ adds:* On the one side, the autonomy of spirit is the foundation; on the other, it conducts itself humbly, dependently.

37. *Ms. canceled:* In the former, spirit is engaged in knowing itself; from the latter, knowledge is excluded, and may—or may not—remain [merely] general.

15 autonomous sides with each other comes in.³⁸ This is [the point at which] we confess | that everything surely has been created by God—everything that makes up the content of what we know and of what we take into possession and use as means for our own ends, including even spirit and the faculties of spirit, which, as we say, we employ in order to obtain that cognition.

But this concession is immediately cold and lifeless because it lacks just what constitutes the vitality of this consciousness,³⁹ that in terms of which it is present to itself, knows itself, is conscious of itself—[namely] insight and cognition, the means by which it knows something for itself. It is [also] fruitless because in this separation it stops short at the simple generalization that everything is a work of God. (The reason is that everything determinate and finite belongs to cognition, to humanly self-positing ends.) With the most diverse things—the course of the stars and their laws, elephants, ants, human beings—this reference [to God] consists simply in the single claim that God has created them. This religious reference of particular objects [to God] therefore becomes [6a] very boring;⁴⁰ it runs on and on in the same fashion; the repetition becomes burdensome. The matter is disposed of once and for all by the simple admission that everything [has been] made by God, which is self-evident. Then in the course of knowledge and in the pursuance of goals no further thought is given to it. It can begin
16 to look as though the admission | was made just to get rid of the

38. *W₂ reads*: Nevertheless, even the side of autonomy is conditioned in its activity, and its cognition and will must experience this conditionedness. Human beings demand their rights, but whether these rights are actually conceded them is independent of them, and in this respect they depend on an other. In matters of cognition they proceed from the organization and order of nature, which is something given. The content of their sciences is material extraneous to them. Thus the two sides, that of autonomy and of conditionedness, enter into a relationship with one another.

39. *Ms. margin*: (Impatient – likewise tedious – [everything] made [by] God – determinate opposition not recognized)

40. [*Ed.*] Hegel has in mind here not only naive religious piety but also the theodicy that justifies things as they are by the repetitious claim that God has created everything. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:340–342 (*Werke* 15: 465–466), Hegel writes: “The result of Leibniz’s theodicy is an optimism supported

matter, or perhaps in order to be covered outwardly in this respect. [In short,] the concession may or may not be made seriously.

Piety—the first attitude—is never tired of lifting up its eyes to God on each and every occasion, even though it repeats itself every day and every hour in the same fashion. “(For cognition such repetition would be boring because pious sensibility or faith sticks altogether to the singular [occasion]; in every moment it is wholly what it is, without looking backward or forward in reflective comparison. Cognition, on the other hand, essentially makes this comparison and has a consciousness of this unity or uniformity. [In cognition we] must keep [the uniformity] in view.

In this second configuration the expression and the consciousness of this quite general and abstract relation are immediately present. But in the first it is not so expressly contained, and as a result the sundering of religion from the rest of consciousness does not [seem] to take place. Instead, what is most noteworthy seems to be the abiding [of consciousness] in unity precisely because the disjunction between the divine and cognition as self-positing is not [yet] present: [humanity has] not yet eaten of the tree of knowledge. [We shall discuss] the peculiar | mode of separation here present in more detail later in dealing with the particular configurations of [our] religion.

17

(αα) This much [has been] noted generally [concerning] the thoroughgoing contingency marking the *content* of the determinate consciousness of piety. Pious thoughts [remain] as valid with respect to this [content] as to that; [likewise with] sensations of gratitude. Good and evil destiny (or fortune and misfortune) are dispensations [of providence; one] accepts whatever comes just as it comes (in its singularity, variety, immediacy), without reflecting on it. Even with the most disparate things, one is as good as another. But this appears

on the lame and wearisome thought that God, since a world had to be brought into existence, chose out of infinitely many possible worlds the best possible.” Why should this be the case? “When Leibniz answers, ‘God made it so,’ this is no answer at all. We wish to know the definite reason of this law; such general determinations sound pious, but are not satisfying.” Cf. Leibniz, *Theodicy*, I, § 8 (p. 128) (*Philosophische Schriften* 6:107).

more specifically in the)⁴¹ way that this piety considers things in order to make its reflection more thorough, [namely,] by dealing with the structure and arrangement of natural things in terms of their teleological relations, and similarly by regarding every petty incident of individual life, like the great events of history, as proceeding from divine purposes, or as directed by and leading back to them. With respect to the relation to deity, this view does not, therefore, confine itself to a purely general relation to God's creativity and power; rather the divine activity [is] a determinate relation, and the manifold materials of intuition, occurrences, [etc.], <are set in relation to one another, God [being] the one who activates these relations.> A more detailed content comes in: the animals and their environment [are] so constituted that [they can] forage for food, nourish their young, be protected against harm, survive the winter, defend themselves against predators, etc. In human life, [one observes] how through this or [that] apparent accident or misfortune human beings have been led to happiness, whether it be temporal or eternal. [6b] In brief, the act and will of God are here

41. *Ms. first draft in brackets*: These two attitudes have this in common: the relation of God to the other world of consciousness is wholly indefinite and general. The second of these attitudes has indicated this at once in the expression quoted ["God has created all things"]. Pious consideration has thereby made itself more thorough.

W₂ reads (parallel to second draft): Here on the other hand, where cognizing and defining on one's own terms are concerned, it is a matter essentially of this comparing and the consciousness of uniformity, and then a general proposition is enunciated once and for all. On the one side the understanding holds sway, while over against it is the religious feeling of dependence. (b) Even piety is not exempt from the fate of falling into a ruptured state. Rather, the rupture is already intrinsically present in it, so that its actual content is only manifold and contingent.

[*Ed.*] The first draft is found in the main text of the *Ms.*, but is replaced by a lengthy marginal addition, which represents a second draft, and which we have given in the main text instead of the first draft. *W₂* offers a parallel to the second draft, to which it then attaches the first draft. The reference in *W₂* to "the religious feeling of dependence" is an allusion to Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube*, § 9 (see below, 1824 *Concept*, n. 37). Since the first volume of Schleiermacher's work was not published until the end of June 1821, Hegel could not have referred to it at this point in his lectures, and the parallel in *W₂* must, therefore, be from a source other than Henning. References to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* are first found in those parts of the *Ms.* written after June 1821, e.g., *Ms.* sheet 69a (see vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*).

viewed in terms of specific activities, natural circumstances, events, etc. Divine activity has a ⟨specific⟩ content.

(ββ) [But the following] is now self-evident. This content itself [is] finite, these ends are contingent; they are picked up momentarily, and likewise they are forgotten again straightaway without rhyme or reason. For example, the | wisdom of God in nature [is] marveled at [because he] armed the beasts with the means both to obtain their food and to defend themselves against their enemies. Teeth, claws, and stings [serve] the survival purposes of individual animals. Bees [have] stings to protect themselves, but these are of no help since a person [can] take sulfur, for example, and kill a whole hive of them. The mouse—a rodent—feeds in order to stay alive, but the cat catches it and eats it. [Some] bushes have thorns, while other plants have no such protection, [but even] where that protection is found the rose still gets plucked. Of course, the fact that the mouse is eaten and the bees are killed also has a purpose, [namely,] the preservation of the cat and human uses; but in this way the former purpose, the preservation of bees,⁴² is reduced to a means.

In fact, it is the progress of knowledge that has caused the depreciation and downfall of this external teleological view.⁴³ To begin with, better cognition at least demands consistency, and it recognizes that purposes of the kind that were taken to be divine (the purposes of God's wisdom) are [actually] subordinate and finite. [They show] themselves to be null and void, [and hence they] cannot be considered by that same observation and experience to be the object of the eternal divine will.

If this way of viewing things is adopted, and its inconsistency thereby ignored, then, because of the inconsistency, it is essentially indeterminate and superficial because—(as in pious feeling gener-

42. [Ed.] Hegel does not write "mice and bees." This may have simply been an oversight, or there may be a reason for it, namely, a play on the idea of preserving bees. Human beings "preserve" or "keep" bees as a means to a specific human end; the cat does not "preserve" the mouse in this fashion.

43. [Ed.] Hegel here alludes to Kant's distinction between relative, external purposiveness and internal purposiveness in the *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 63, 82 (*Werke* 5:366–369, 425).

ally)—each and every content (no matter what) can be assimilated under it, [just] as it is. For there is nothing, no arrangement, no event, for which a useful trait could not be pointed out in some direction or other. In general, this⁴⁴ is no longer an ingenuous piety of feeling, but rather the piety that begins from the general thought [7a] of a purpose or good and subsumes and rationalizes the present case under it. But with this kind of rationalizing, piety finds itself in the predicament that— | ([in dealing with] immediate existence or phenomena, immediate natural objects or things)—however many expediciencies and uses it points out, there are just as many inexpediciencies and harms that can be held against it. What is beneficial to one is disadvantageous to another and therefore is inexpedient. The preservation of life and of the interests that depend upon existence are at one time advanced, but at another time they are just as much endangered and destroyed.⁴⁵ So it is in fact a contingent content that is referred to God, but this—which can just as well [be] or not [be]—is directly inappropriate to the concept of God.⁴⁶

For this much is implicit in the representation of God generally—that he or his ways of acting are universal and necessary. Such inconsistency destroys this universal determination; indeed, one can

44. *Ms. margin*: (comes to consciousness, to cognition)

45. *W₂ adds*: Thus it is inwardly disruptive that, contrary to God's eternal mode of activity, finite things are raised to essential ends.

46. *Ms. margin*: (This treatment of expediency before the cognition of the necessary.

The same separation of the material is always found. The consideration of external expediency is the externality of the matter. [When one thing is] useful for another, then it is not an end in itself. [To be] for another is its own reference, its own nature. [The making of] a tree into lumber for building is not part of the nature of the tree. [When] reference [to another is] the proper and immanent nature of the thing referred, identical with its distinctive character, [then this reference] is its necessary character. [This] can be seen as the point of transition [from piety] to the other side.)

[*Ed.*] Hegel prefaces this marginal addition with a notation concerning its proper location. However, neither the notation nor the addition itself are keyed to the main text by a reference mark. We have located them at the point to which the initial notation is physically adjacent, but the discussion of the cognition of necessity does not begin until several lines further along in the main text.

make it quite ridiculous. Piety is thus thrown out by its own mode of argument. Once we have begun with thought and the relations of thought, we must above all seek and demand the consistency and necessity that properly belong to it, and set them up against the standpoint of contingency. "[Thought] passes over to cognition proper, which was previously characterized as a moment of the self, for the ego or thought [is] in general a relation, to be precise, a relating of what is."⁴⁷ Cognition ranges over what is and its necessity, as in the relation of cause and effect, of ground and consequent, of force and its expression, and of the generic universal to these singular existences, which precisely are subject to contingency. In this way, cognition (or science) (takes away from them the contingency that they have in their immediacy); it puts the multifarious materials in an immanent relationship with one another;⁴⁸ it considers the relationships that the wealth of finite phenomena have to one another, and in this [way] encloses within itself the world of finitude to [constitute] a *system of the universe*,⁴⁹ so that cognition has no need of anything for the system that is outside the system itself. [7b]

⁵⁰For what a thing is follows from its perception and observation. We know from experience—from our own intuition, feeling, consciousness, etc., or that of others—what natural things are, what

47. *W₂ reads*: With this, the principle of the self is at once completely developed. I, as simple and universal, as thought, am relation in general. Since I am for myself as self-consciousness, these relationships should also be for me. To the thoughts and images that I make my own, I give the character that I myself am. I am this simple point, and whatever is for me I will cognize in this unity.

48. *Ms. margin*: (Accordingly as a thing is constituted in this or that fashion, it is related to another)

49. [*Ed.*] Hegel may be alluding here to the French Enlightenment, especially to Holbach's *Système de la nature* (London, 1770), and J. B. Robinet's *De la nature*, new ed. (Amsterdam, 1763). Cf. Hegel, *Werke* 15:521. Hegel may not be referring directly to these works but rather to Jacobi's characterization of the cognition that moves from effects back to causes. Cf. Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, p. 419 (*Werke* 4/2:149). In fact, Hegel identified Jacobi's description of cognitive "understanding" with the form of it that appeared in the French Enlightenment.

50. *Ms. margin*: "(a) (α) To grasp the determinateness of things [is to grasp] what [they] are – not according to their contingent determinateness but according

the modes of activity of spirit are. Furthermore, we ask where these things come from, what their grounds and causes [are]. Here the question has the sense of an inquiry into their specific particular causes and relations, [while] God as | cause is wholly universal. 21 [When we inquire into] the cause of lightning, (or of the fall of the Republican constitution in Rome,) or the cause or ground for this or that human law⁵¹—and of these as effects or consequences—what we want to know is the ground of this [particular] phenomenon, not the ground that answers for everything but exclusively just for this specific thing;⁵² and the ground of such a thing [is] such as must be sought and established in the finite sphere only—i.e., a finite ground. Cognition of this kind, therefore, does not transcend, or even desire to transcend, the finite sphere.⁵³ It is a universe of cognition that does not need God and lies outside of religion. These cognitions constitute a kingdom of what we call the sciences and special technical knowledge. They are not religion and have nothing directly to do with religion. In them, cognition is dealing with its own relationships and connections; thereby it has all determinate material and content on its side, and nothing whatever is left for the other side, the side of the infinite and the eternal.

to their essential determinateness – whereby they are what they are – their most essential [determinateness is] their most general – plants, quadrupeds, land –

(β) Relation of the determinate as determinate. – Finite things are determined – therefore in relation to others – not a contingent but a determinate [relation to] the original cause [from which] they [are] derived.)”

W₂ reads: From the constitution of things we proceed to their connections in which they stand in relation to an other—not however in a contingent but in a determinate relation, in which they point back to the original cause from which they are derived.

51. *W₂ reads:* Thus it is no longer sufficient to speak of God as the cause of lightning, or of the fall of the Republican constitution in Rome, or of the French Revolution; one soon discovers that the [divine] cause is only an entirely general one and does not yield the desired explanation. With respect to a natural phenomenon or this or that law . . .

52. *Ms. margin:* (A proximate [ground] or a series of proximate [grounds] – an immanent, specific relation – specificity ought also to reside in the relation)

53. *W₂ adds:* since it is able to apprehend everything in its finite sphere and is privy to all that happens.

⁵⁴To religion belongs the absolute content—but without any cognition according to this concept of it. This cognition weaves and moves among its relations and connections of cause and effect, of grounds and consequents, which, as we have said, are themselves necessarily determinate. (<[It] takes possession of the finite, draws it into | its sphere, finds [it] to be incongruous with the infinite; [this is] just such an infinite as is distinguished from the finite.> All determinate content devolves upon it, and to be cognizant means to become aware of the connectedness and necessity ingredient in the finite. ⁵⁵Religion, therefore, shrivels up into simple feeling, [8a] into a contentless elevation of spirit into the eternal, etc., of which, however, it knows nothing and has nothing to say, since any cognizing would be a dragging down of the eternal into this sphere of finite connections. 22

Consequently, *les sciences exactes*⁵⁶ [stand] opposed to religion. These two sides [confront each other as follows: on the side of religion⁵⁷] the heart and mind [are] filled with divine substantial consciousness and sensation, (<[with] freedom, self-consciousness,> but without consistency in regard to the determinate, this being, by contrast, contingent; [on the side of cognition] a coherent connectedness of the determinate [prevails], <a familiarity with the finite and with the thought-determinations of this nexus of connections,> a system on its own account but without solid substance, without God. [The religious side has] an absolute content, an absolute totality [with] God (<[as its] center. Everything submerged in and related to him, posited only by him, [is] idealism.> [There is] only the positive, but [it is] abstractly positive. [The other side has] a finite content, finite knowledge and consciousness, necessary connections without a midpoint. [The former is] not cognition, [the latter is] cognition.

54. Ms. margin: <A kingdom of finite content [over against] the infinite content – (b) The infinite distinct from the finite>

55. Ms. margin: <(c) A shriveling>

56. [Ed.] On the general distinction between the exact sciences and religious cognition, Hegel alludes (e.g., in *Encyclopedia* [1830], § 62) to Jacobi. Cf. Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 419–420 (*Werke* 4/2:149–150).

57. [Ed.] In this paragraph, the contrast between the two sides is made by repeating α and β several times, which we have replaced by words in brackets.

[4. Need for the Reconciliation of Religion and Cognition]⁵⁸

Philosophy of religion [demonstrates] this equation⁵⁹—the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite, the reconciliation of the heart (with religious cognition, of the absolutely substantial feeling with intelligence.)⁶⁰

23 This [is] the need of the philosophy of religion, the necessity of philosophy in general.⁶¹ In this reconciliation there must | be a correspondence to the highest demand of cognition, of the concept and reason. Cognizing or conceiving can surrender nothing: [neither] infinite, substantial certainty, (freedom, [nor,] insofar as anything is definite, the necessity and dependence [of cognition],) [nor] its worth and sublimity, [nor] knowledge, insight, conviction. But the absolute content cannot give anything up either. [God cannot be] drawn down into finitude and delivered to us in a merely sensible or crude form. His majesty consists precisely in the fact that he does not renounce reason, [for then his majesty would be] something irrational, empty, and grudging,⁶² not something communicated in spirit and in the highest form and inmost being of spirit.

58. [Ed.] Having established the opposition between religious consciousness and the rest of consciousness, or between religion and cognition, in the preceding section, Hegel now describes the need to reconcile the opposing sides. The fundamental task of the philosophy of religion is to achieve this reconciliation. The need for reconciliation is most acutely felt in the Christian religion because it is precisely in this religion that estrangement is most sharply thematized. Christianity also goes further than the other religions in actually achieving reconciliation, although cognition here remains finally at the level of doctrine or *Vorstellung*, and contemporary theology draws back into the realm of feeling. This gives rise to the “discord of our time,” which it is the task of the philosophy of religion to resolve. Jacobi’s thought in particular was an example or expression of this “discord,” and Hegel may have had him especially in view.

59. [Ed.] *Ausgleichung*. This term could also be translated “equalization,” “accommodation,” “settlement,” etc.

60. Ms. margin: ((α) The eternal or infinite; (β) determinate in itself. (α) In and for itself; (β) myself, my reflection, self-consciousness, my freedom – absolute objectivity – and subjectivity. (α))

61. Ms. canceled: This need is clearer in the Christian religion – law, world, revelation, and then faith – proof.

62. [Ed.] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 982b–983a (cf. below, 1827 *Concept*, n. 45).

In the Christian religion this need [for the reconciliation of the two sides] is more directly present perhaps than in the other religions, for [the following reasons]:

(α) It has its very beginning in an absolute cleavage, [and there is felt] need only in cleavage. Pagan religion contains (from the start) a more serene state of reconciliation. The Christian religion is not so serene; [it] awakens the need itself, takes its start from anguish, awakens this anguish, disrupts the natural unity of spirit (i.e., the unity of humanity with nature); [8b] it disturbs natural peace. [This is] the same as original sin: [human being is] evil from the start and has with it, therefore, a negative element in its inmost being. [That] human being is good by nature [is] a doctrine of recent times⁶³ [that] annuls the Christian religion. Therefore, this cleavage of the subject, of the ego, from the infinite, absolute essence (drives spirit back into itself.) (This reconciliation itself [occurs] in faith, [in] the form of revelation as opposed to reason, and more recently, to cognition.) [From] the standpoint of cognition, purpose is the unification, the reconciling of the two sides.⁶⁴

(β) But [there is] this reconciliation directly in naive faith too, in the sphere of feeling or sensation. Then, later on, consciousness is faith, the holding [of its content] to be true, the knowledge that begins from the | representation that I am other [than what I ought to be]—sinful, remote, estranged. (Spirit [is turned in] upon itself against its immediate natural being.) Christian faith starts from the representation that I am not this, [not] serene like the Greeks; it puts me once more [into] division. [I am] the subject, [and I ask] whether [faith] is actually the case, whether [it is] true. 24

(γ) This truth of the promise: what is represented [is] true to begin with on the basis of authority. I am transported into an intelligible world, [a world of] cognition: this is the nature of God, (his attributes and modes of activity.) Whether it is so rests on the intuition and assurance of others, [on] confirmation. [The cognition

63. [Ed.] See below, 1824 *Concept*, n. 47.

64. [Ed.] The reference to purpose (*Zweck*) as the instrument of unification is suggestive of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*.

is] referred to myself; thought, cognition, reason occur precisely within me. My freedom [is] put before my eyes in my sinfulness; my freedom [is] in my thinking: I am on my own. The Christian religion does not merely *say* that I should know; cognition, rather, is part of its very nature. (α) In the Christian religion I am to retain my freedom—indeed, I am to become free in it. In it is the individual, the subject; the welfare of the soul, the salvation of the individual as an individual, not merely of the race, [is] the essential purpose. This subjectivity, this selfhood (not selfishness) is precisely the principle of cognition itself. ((β) At the same time God's essence and nature [are] manifest—the development of his content.) [9a]

Hence the Christian [religion] is essentially doctrine; it offers representations and thoughts. Even if these are *only* representations of God and of his nature and activity, they are, [nonetheless,] representations of the universal content and object, and on this account [they are] immediately thoughts. Since it belongs under the principle of cognition, the Christian religion gives this content in a developed form, and as essentially for representation, but separate from the modes of immediate opinion and intuition and from a simple adherence to intuitions and representations. Having been thus separated, | [doctrine is] not therefore naive but [is] a representation
25 opposed to this natural resting in intuitions and representations appropriate thereto. At the same time it is not merely something subjective but is also an absolute, objective content that is in and for itself, and has the characteristic of truth. [Remember] the distinction already remarked on between my naively holding something to be true and [my holding it] with this characteristic [i.e., as doctrine]. Thus the Christian religion touches the antithesis, the general antithesis, between feeling, the form of immediate intuition, trust, and reflection, knowledge. The two together provide a developed doctrinal system⁶⁵ of religious truth, a content of and for cognition. [Christianity] has revealed what God is, so that we now *know* what he is.

The Christian religion, therefore, contains cognition within itself

65. [Ed.] *Lehrbegriff*. This term was often used in this sense in seventeenth-century dogmatics.

essentially and has stimulated cognition to develop in all its consistency as form, a world of form, and at the same time to oppose itself to the form in which the Christian content exists as a given⁶⁶ truth, only for representation and feeling. <[In the latter form] a contradiction [is found, for here the content exists] not in its necessity, i.e., [as] cognition, and it is not free; yet the content [is] developed in a connected chain of distinct representations, hence [as] necessary thoughts, not thoughtlessly.> This is what the discord of our times rests on. Educated reflection must enter into [the sphere of] religion, but at the same time it finds it unendurable there and becomes impatient with it. Religion, on the other hand, or religious feeling, is distrustful of reflection, or of reason as it is called. [9b] ²⁶ Either reflection leaves religion alone, | putting it to one side, something, as it were, about which one only [wants to keep] the peace, [or⁶⁷ it] sticks with inconsistency. Religion does not fit the pattern of the rest of consciousness or the requirements of cognition. Without seriousness of spirit, one can, in inconsistency and thoughtlessness, be satisfied with everything.⁶⁸

(α) [We can] cast ourselves upon feeling with educated reflection, but this is to do violence to oneself, to renounce cognition and rationality. [In this case,] spirit cannot be integrated or maintain its integrity.

(β) Religion [can be] reduced to mere yearning: religion [as a matter of] willing and not-being-capable. Yearning has urges and representations but remains a subjective lack. It does not master this lack, and, without seriousness of spirit, lets itself remain in this inconsistency.

(γ) Or [there can be] indifference toward religion because cognition, the rationality of spirit, is not found in it. [Indifference] lets it remain unsettled, simply leaves it alone.⁶⁹

66. *Ms. margin*: <Freedom and necessity>

67. [*Ed.*] Hegel originally wrote "or" in the *Ms.* but then apparently accidentally canceled it.

68. *Ms. canceled*: (α) Indifference toward religion because it is without cognition. Reason cannot launch into it. (β) Feeling

69. *W₂ reads*: If discord arises between insight and religion, it must be removed by cognition or it will lead to despair and drive out reconciliation. This despair is

(δ) Or [there can be] the demand to occupy oneself with it, [as do,] for example, the theologians. This occupation, [however, is] merely busying oneself with it, an expansion and extension [of it]. The historical aspect provides enough to keep one busy: it allows one to indulge in erudition [concerning] historical circumstances, philological criticism, the study [of] church history, how something was established by this or that council and why, what the grounds [were] for these [decisions], how these views [came about, etc.]. In all this, one is always dealing with religion and its content, and [yet] it is only religion that is not taken into account. A blind man can be concerned with the size of a painting, the canvas, the varnish, the history of the painter, the fate of the picture, [its] price, into whose hands [it has fallen, etc.]—and yet see nothing of the picture itself.

⁷⁰This [situation] confronts religion especially [in our time]. Cog-

the consequence of one-sided reconciliation. One rejects one side and holds fast to the other, but no true peace is obtained thereby. On the one hand, the self-cloven spirit rejects the demand of insight and wants to return to naive religious feeling. But in this, spirit does violence to itself, for the independence of consciousness demands satisfaction and does not allow itself to be forcibly set aside. The healthy spirit is incapable of renouncing independent thinking. Religious feeling becomes yearning, hypocrisy, and retains an element of nonsatisfaction. The other form of one-sidedness is that of indifference toward religion: one either leaves religion alone as an unsettled matter or finally opposes it. Such is the consistency of shallow souls.

70. *Ms. margin:* “(α) Religious feeling [is] distrustful of the finitude involved in cognition, of the subject’s holding fast to itself in its being-for-self.

(β) Cognition, reason [are] distrustful of the totality of feeling, [of its] lumping together everything that is developed and dispersed into a unity – and [of]

(αα) [its] lack of freedom: [the subject] does not retain itself in thought as an object

(ββ) [its] arbitrary caprice: holding [something] to be true or valuable, a reverencing [of God] that nonetheless passes into determinacy”

W₂ reads: When the two sides have thus developed and enter into a reciprocal relationship, they are mutually distrustful. Religious feeling distrusts the finitude involved in cognition, and charges science with vanity because in science the subject is self-related and self-contained, and the ego, as the cognizing principle, exists for itself vis-à-vis everything external. On the other side cognition is distrustful of the totality in which feeling maintains itself, and in whose unity it lumps together everything that is dispersed and developed. Cognition is afraid of losing its freedom if it should accept the demands of feeling and unconditionally accept a truth that

nition [is] not reconciled with religion; [there is] a dividing wall. Cognition [does] not risk a serious consideration [of] | religion or take a fundamental interest in it. Philosophy of religion has to remove this hindrance. On the other side, [its task is to give] to religion the courage of cognition, the courage of truth and freedom. [10a]
 27

[5. Division of the Subject]

[On the one hand we have] religion as naive faith, feeling, intuition, in general in [the form of] immediate knowledge and consciousness. On the other side [are found] the relinquished immediacy of spirit, the standpoint of reflection, the relationship of religion and cognition as external to each other. Philosophy of religion, [by contrast, offers] a thinking, comprehending cognition of religion; [in it] the absolute substantial content and the absolute form (cognition) [are] identical.

We have now to consider in more detail the concept of religion: that is to say, these two moments are developing in this absolute object, no longer external to one another but identical and therefore being just the form [of the concept] in general. Then [we shall

it does not see clearly and distinctly. And when religious feeling steps forth from its universality, projects purposes for itself, and thus makes a transition to determinacy, cognition can see in this only arbitrary caprice, and it would see itself surrendering to chance if it were to pass into determinacy in the same way. If, therefore, reflection as educated must enter into religion, it finds it unendurable there, and it becomes impatient of all its determinations.

[Ed.] The marginal notation is found at the bottom of sheet 9b with no reference mark. It replaces an earlier and shorter notation, around which it is written, "Religious feeling [is] distrustful of cognition." Apparently Hegel first intended the latter as a parallel to the statement, "Cognition [is] not reconciled with religion." Then he enlarged upon the original notation as a way of explaining the "dividing wall"—a wall of distrust—between religion and cognition, resuming a theme first introduced at the bottom of sheet 9a. The passage in W_2 is clearly an expansion of the outline found in this marginal notation. When lecturing, Hegel *may* have introduced this material not here but in the context of his earlier reference to "distrust," since the latter includes the statement that reflection finds its entry into the sphere of religion to be "unendurable" and becomes impatient with it.

28 consider] the division of the subject and [offer] a survey of the more specific parts and the course of our treatment.⁷¹ |

(α) The *concept of religion* [comes] in the first place from representation or [is] taken from science as a presupposition, but then too the major moments of the necessity of the religious standpoint [are established]—the latter in terms of the first of the so-called proofs of the existence of God.⁷²

(β) [As for] what follows, the whole of our treatment—indeed, even immediate religion itself—is nothing other than the *development* of the concept,⁷³ and that [in turn] is nothing other than the

71. [Ed.] The sequence does not follow the order that seems to be indicated here. Hegel in fact provides the division and survey *before* taking up the concept of religion “in more detail”—assuming that the latter is a reference to the whole of the first part of the work, not just to the one-sentence summary given here. By contrast with the surveys in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, the one in the *Ms.* is very brief and is given in the speculative terminology of the *Logic*. The “absolute and genuine method of cognition” is the *speculative* method, which recognizes that the *history* of religion must be understood ultimately as nothing other than the development and self-positing of the *concept* of religion, which in turn takes on actuality and determinateness (is raised to the status of *idea*) by means of this historical instantiation. At the same time, the actual description of the determinate religions will be *phenomenological* since it will trace the various forms of finite consciousness assumed by the absolute idea as it emerges and advances through the history of religion.

The consummation of this process entails a return of the concept to itself in the sense that it has become completely objective to itself in the representational forms of the Christian religion. Religion now has itself (or its concept) as its object, not some external object such as natural or human representations of deity as in the determinate religions. The concept of religion entails precisely the unity of subjective consciousness and its object, namely God as absolute idea or spirit; this unity, and hence the concept of religion itself, is consummated in the absolute religion, whereas in the earlier religions a tension persists between consciousness and its object.

72. [Ed.] Hegel first envisioned only two parts to *The Concept of Religion*—the derivation of the concept from representation and the demonstration of its necessity—but expanded them to four as he wrote out the lectures. The “proofs” in question are the cosmological proofs, which may be viewed as coincident with the demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint from the constitution of the finite world (see *Ms. Concept*, n. 99). However, Hegel does not treat these or other proofs of the existence of God specifically in the *Ms. Concept*; rather, in the *Ms.* the proofs are taken up only in Parts II and III of the work (see n. 73). It is only in the 1827 lectures that the proofs are treated in Part I.

73. *Ms. margin*: (Proofs of the existence of God)

[Ed.] Since the development of the concept entails its self-actualization, its being

positing of what is contained in the concept. This positing constitutes the reality of the concept; it elevates and perfects the concept into the *idea*. Furthermore, this positing, insofar as it is at the same time a simple determinateness of the concept, is the further progressive determining of the concept, and the entire treatment [is] nothing other than the consummation of the determinations of the concept. This [is] the absolute and genuine method of cognition.⁷⁴

(γ) But what is the *consummation* of the determinations of the concept? Can it proceed on into the spurious infinite?⁷⁵ On the contrary, all genuine progressive determination returns into itself. [10b] The consummation of the determination of the concept means nothing other than that the concept of religion itself is [fully] posited. Determination [generally is] only a positing of what the concept already is implicitly, only a duplication of it. This determining is a distinguishing in general, and, more precisely, [in the form of] reality, objectivity, objectification. The consummation [of it] means that the concept has become completely objective⁷⁶ to itself; in it is manifest what it is, its determinateness, its very self: the concept is for itself, it is manifest to itself.

The consummate religion is the one in which the concept has returned to itself, the one in which the absolute idea—God as spirit in the form of truth and revealedness—is an object for consciousness. The earlier religions—in which the determinateness of the

posited as real, there is a sense in which the whole of the treatment also constitutes a sustained proof of the existence or reality of God as the absolute idea. In the 1821 and 1824 lectures the various proofs—cosmological, teleological, ontological—are dispersed through the second and third parts of the work and are taken up in relation to specific religions, while in the 1827 lectures all the proofs are gathered into a special section in the first part.

74. *Ms. margin*: (Various standpoints or determinations of religion – i.e.,

(α) various religions

(β) distinct determinations of God, which all remain within the absolute concept of God

(γ) proofs of the existence of God)

75. [Ed.] On the concept of the “spurious infinite,” see *Science of Logic*, pp. 138 ff. (GW 11:79 ff.).

76. *Ms. reads*: whole

[Ed.] Hegel wrote *gänzlich* (“whole”) but may have intended *gegenständlich* (“objective”).

29 concept is deficient, being poorer and more abstract—are determinate religions, which | constitute the stages of transition for the concept of religion on the way to its consummation. The Christian religion will disclose itself to us to be the absolute religion, and we shall treat its content accordingly.

INTRODUCTION THE LECTURES OF 1824

31

Preface¹

I have deemed it necessary to devote a separate section of philosophy to the consideration of religion. Let us first consider how the philosophy of religion is connected with philosophy in general; this is tied up with the question of our present-day interest in religion and philosophy; and this in turn is linked to the relationship of the philosophy of religion, and of philosophy, to positive religion.

To begin with, we must recall in general the object that we are dealing with in the philosophy of religion. Our object is the object of religion itself; it is the supreme or absolute object. The philosophy of religion has as its goal, as its content, the region in which all the riddles of the world, all the contradictions uncovered by profound thought, are resolved, and in which every pain of feeling is dissolved and healed, the region of eternal rest, of truth. Human beings are truly human through consciousness—by virtue of the fact that they think and by virtue of the fact that they are spirit. This gives rise to manifold images and configurations, i.e., the sciences, the arts, political interests, the relationships that are connected with human

1. [Ed.] *D* has an initial heading, "The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Whole of Philosophy," which we have located below as the heading for Sec. 1. Following the first paragraph, in which the main themes of the *Introduction* are summarized, Hegel repeats the opening remarks from the 1821 *Ms.*, in which he offers a general characterization of what religion and its object are. These remarks are the only part of the *Introduction* repeated without much change in all the lectures. To identify them we are using the term "Preface," which, however, is not found in any of the auditors' notebooks. Only after this "preface" does Hegel turn to the first of the topics that he indicates he will consider.

freedom and will. From here flows all that brings them respect, satisfaction, honor, and happiness, all these interests have their center, find their end and their beginning, their truth, in one thought, in the thought of God. God is known in religion; God is the sustaining center, which breathes life into all these configurations in their existence. If we consider this object [God] in relation to others, then we can say that it *is* strictly for its own sake; it has no such relation [to others] and is strictly in and for itself *the unconditioned*, the free, the unbounded, that which is its own purpose and ultimate goal.

32 Religion appears as what is occupied with this object. Occupation with this ultimate, final end is thus unreservedly free and is therefore its own end since | all other aims go back to this final end; though previously valid for themselves, they disappear in the face of it, no other aim holds out against it, and all are resolved in it. Occupation with this object is fulfilling and satisfying by itself, and desires nothing else but this. Hence it is the absolutely free occupation, the absolutely free consciousness. This occupation is the consciousness of absolute truth; as a mode of sensibility it is the absolute enjoyment we call blessedness, while as activity it does nothing but manifest the glory of God and reveal the divine majesty. For the peoples have generally regarded this occupation, their religious consciousness, as their true merit, as the sabbath of life in which finite aims, limited interests, toil, sorrow, unpleasantness, earthly and finite cares—² in which ² all the unpleasantness and misery of the everyday world—waft away in devotion's present feeling or in devotion's hope. All of it wafts away into a kind of past. Psyche³ drinks from this river of forgetfulness, and in its doing so earthly cares and worries waft away, and the whole realm of temporality passes away into eternal harmony.

This image of the absolute that religious devotion has before it can have a greater or lesser degree of present liveliness, certainty, and enjoyment, or can be presented as something longed or hoped for, something far off, otherworldly. ²But it is never isolated, for it

2. *Ho reads*: where, on the bank and shoal of temporality, [Ed.] See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 10.

3. [Ed.] See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 11.

radiates into the temporal present.⁴ Faith is cognizant of it as the truth, as the substance of present existences; and this content of devotion is what animates the present world, what operates effectively in the life of the individual, ruling over one's commissions and omissions, over one's volition and action. This is the representation that religion has of God generally, and the philosophy of religion makes this content the content of a particular treatment. | 33

1. The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Whole of Philosophy⁵

"Since I have deemed it necessary to give it this separate treatment, I must remark that it had previously escaped my notice that *theologia naturalis* was an object of the Wolffian philosophy,⁶ which introduces the nature of God into the content of philosophy."⁷ However, Wolff's treatment stays within the bounds of the metaphysics of the understanding then current, and is to be viewed rather as a science of the understanding than as one of rational thinking. This manner of approach does not seem to alter the fact that this science

4. Thus also *W₁; W₂ (MiscP/Hn?)* reads: Indeed, it remains ever a certainty and, as something divine, radiates into the temporal present; [so] even amid the fearfulness that yet torments the soul here in this region of temporality, there is also the consciousness of the efficacy of truth.

5. [Ed.] This heading is found in *D* at the very beginning of the text. The section, which actually begins at this point, contains two main themes: the relation between "God" and "religion," and the suggestion that the idea of God is both the "result" of philosophy and the beginning of the philosophy of religion. While this material is new to the *Introduction*, replacing the first two sections of the *Ms.*, the first theme actually borrows and reformulates material from Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the *Ms.*, while the second theme anticipates the beginning of the *Concept* in the 1827 lectures. The first section of the *Ms. Concept* contains what amounts to a second introduction to the lectures as a whole, and some of this material was retrojected into the 1824 and 1827 *Introductions* (see below, *Ms. Concept*, n. 2).

6. [Ed.] See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 3.

7. *Ho* reads: Since it is deemed necessary to make this object the content of philosophical treatment, we can remark to begin with that this is now happening for the first time.

[Ed.] Hegel's claim to have, for the first time, made not merely God but religion the object of philosophical treatment is transmitted only by Hotho. For that reason its authenticity should be regarded as doubtful, although a support for it is the fact that the text of Griesheim's transcript is not very convincing. In any event, Hotho's formulation can be viewed as an indication of the awareness of the novelty of

could not have the same goal as ours. But it called itself essentially "theology," and its content and object was God as such. Our object, however, is not just God as such; the content of our science is religion. In regard to that concrete science we can say that, because it was only a science of the understanding, its concept of God was restricted to the sterile result of an abstract essence of the understanding.⁸ To the extent that God is grasped as an essence of the understanding, God is not grasped as spirit; to the extent that God is grasped as spirit, however, this concept includes the subjective side within it, the side that is introduced into this concept when it is defined as religion.

Our concern here is therefore not with God as such or as object, but with God *as he is [present] in his community*. It will be evident that God can only be genuinely understood in the mode of his being as *spirit*, by means of which he makes himself into the counterpart of a community and brings about the activity of a community in relation to him; thus it will be evident that the doctrine of God is to be grasped and taught only as the doctrine of *religion*. Regarding the relationship of the two sciences in general, a further point to be noted is that our science is not differentiated from philosophy. Philosophy in general has God as its object and indeed as its only proper object. Philosophy is no worldly wisdom, as it used to be

philosophy of religion as an academic discipline. Only toward the end of the eighteenth century did it begin to be established as a separate philosophical topic. See, e.g., *Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Exegese und Kirchengeschichte*, ed. H. Ph. C. Henke, 5 vols. (Helmstedt, 1794–1796); K. H. L. Pölit, *Beitrag zur Kritik der Religionsphilosophie und Exegese unsers Zeitalters: Ein Versuch auf Veranlassung der neusten zur Begründung einer reinen Religionswissenschaft angestellten Untersuchungen* (Leipzig, 1795); L. H. Jakob, "Philosophische Abhandlung: Über die Religion," in *Annalen der Philosophie und des philosophischen Geistes, von einer Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer*, ed. L. H. Jakob, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1796).

8. [Ed.] The concept of God as an "essence of the understanding" (*Verstandeswesen*) is less a concept of natural theology itself than of the criticism of it, especially by Kant. Hegel could be thinking, on the one hand, of Kant's concept of the noumenon as something that is not given to the intuition but can be known only by means of the understanding, thus remaining problematic (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 306); and, on the other hand, of the concept of the *ens rationis ratiocinatae*, whose objective reality is attainable at least by practical reason (*Critique of Judgment*, § 91).

called; it was called that in contrast with faith. It is not in fact a wisdom of the world but instead a cognitive knowledge of the nonworldly; it is not cognition of external existence, of empirical determinate being and life, or of the formal universe, but rather cognition of all that is eternal—of what God is and of what God's nature is as it manifests and develops itself. 34

To this extent, then, we have here the same object generally as in philosophy pure and simple; but there is also a difference.

In philosophy the supreme [being] is called the absolute or the idea, and it is superfluous to go back any further. In the Wolffian philosophy this supreme [being] is called *ens*⁹ or thing, and it¹⁰ promptly announces itself as the sort of abstraction that does not in principle correspond to our representation of God. In more recent philosophy¹¹ the absolute is not merely an *ens* of this kind, for it is not so completely abstract; but what we call the *absolute* and the *idea* is still not for that reason synonymous with what we call *God*.

In order to make the difference plain we must first consider what “meaning” itself means. When we ask what this or that “means,” we are asking two different questions, in fact two opposite questions. In the first place we call what we have in mind—the significance, purpose, or general thought of the expression or work of art in question—“the inner.” This is what we are asking for. But the inner is *universal* representation or determinateness; it is *the thought* in general. When we ask in this way what God is, what

9. [Ed.] In natural theology God is not designated simply as *ens*, but as *ens a se* (being from, or of, itself) or as *ens perfectissimum* (most perfect being). See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, §§ 29 ff. and §§ 24–26; and Pars posterior, §§ 6–10. The fact that God must surely also be designated as *ens* (Pars prior, § 4) follows necessarily from the definition of *ens*, for otherwise God would be denied existence. See also Wolff's *Philosophia prima sive ontologia* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1736), §§ 134, 137; and A. G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 819.

10. Thus also W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: and to point out that in the Wolffian philosophy this supreme [being] was called *ens* or thing; for it

11. [Ed.] With the expression “more recent philosophy” Hegel alludes—as he also does in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 233, 405 (GW 11:146, 254)—to Schelling's philosophy, in particular to his *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, originally published in the *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik* (ed. Schelling), 2/2 (1801), 1–127 (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/4:105–212).

the expression "God" means, we want the thought; it is the thought that is supposed to be delivered up to us—the representation we no doubt have. Consequently it signifies that the concept should be delivered up, and so what we call in philosophy the "absolute" or the idea is of course the meaning. What we want to know is the absolute, the idea, the conceptualized nature of God, the nature of God grasped in thought, or the logical essence of the same. This is one meaning of "meaning," and to this extent what we call the "absolute" is synonymous with the expression "God."

35 But there is another sense in which we ask, when the opposite is what is wanted, namely, when we start from pure categories of thought | and not from representation. It may be that spirit is not at ease in the categorial definition chosen, that it is not at home there and asks what this pure category of thought can mean. For example, there is the category of the unity of subjective and objective, or of the unity of the real and the ideal; we may understand each of the terms on its own account, may know what "unity," "objective," "subjective," and the like are, and yet we can very well say that we do not understand the category in question. In a case of this kind, if we ask what it means, the "meaning" is the opposite of what it was before.¹² What is wanted here is an intuition or a representation of the thought-category, an example or an accompaniment of the content that has so far only been given in thought. "Our expression "example" contains the representation and intuition of this already."¹³ If we find a thought-content of this kind

12. *Ho adds:* For if earlier we wished to investigate the innermost essence, the concept of an object lying before us, its externality would not suffice for us; in the same way, now that we have it before us according to its innermost essence, according to the thought of it, what impels us is the opposite need of investing this pure thought with externality.

13. *Ho reads:* At the same time, in the word "example" the externality is indeed acknowledged as merely an accompaniment, whereas the pure thought is acknowledged as the substantial. And this twofold meaning of "meaning" points us to the idea as the inner concept or the pure thought, which, however, likewise proceeds to its externalization and furnishes itself with examples of itself, and in doing so remains the essential and yet becomes for itself the example of itself.

[*Ed.*] Hegel's point is based on an untranslatable wordplay. An "example" (*Beispiel*, lit. "playing with") is really an "accompaniment" (*Beiherspielendes*, lit. "playing beside or alongside").

difficult, the difficulty lies in the fact that we have no representation of it. It becomes clear to us through the example, and [we] say that now we know what such a thought-content means. Spirit is thus for the first time present to itself in this content.

When we begin in this way from the representation of God and ask for the meaning, what is wanted on the one hand is the idea of God, the absolute, the essence grasped in the concept; and this meaning is ~coincident with the logical idea.¹⁴ But God is this: not merely to be *in* himself, but to be just as essentially *for* himself. God is spirit, not finite spirit but absolute spirit. That God is spirit consists in this: that he is not only the essence that maintains itself in thought but also the essence that appears, the essence that endows itself with revelation and objectivity. |

36

Although we consider the idea of God in this way in the philosophy of religion, we at the same time also have before us the mode of God's representation. God represents only himself, and does so only to himself. This is the aspect of the existence of the absolute. Thus in the philosophy of religion we have the absolute as our object not merely in the form of thought but also in the form of its manifestation. Thus the universal idea is to be grasped in its utterly concrete meaning, ~which involves the characteristic of appearing, of revealing itself.¹⁵ This aspect of existence, however, is itself to be rethought ~in philosophy¹⁶ and grasped by thought.

But [pure] philosophy in its customary divisions [first] considers the logical idea, the idea as it [is] in thought, not just for our thoughts but in the way that the content is thought itself or the categories of thought themselves.¹⁷ Beyond that, philosophy points

14. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (*Var*) reads (*similar in D*): in common with logical philosophy: the logical idea is God, as God is in himself.

15. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: that of essentiality as such, as also its activity of issuing forth, of appearing, of revealing itself. We say in common parlance that God is lord of the natural world and of the spiritual realm: God is the absolute harmony of the two, the producer and activator of this harmony; here neither the thought and concept, nor the manifestation and existence, of God are lacking.

16. *Ho* reads: since we are looking at things philosophically *W* (*Var*) reads: (since we are in the sphere of philosophy)

17. *Ho* adds: —indeed the whole totality of categories developing themselves through themselves and out of themselves.

to the absolute in its process of production, in its activity—and this activity is the absolute's path in coming to be for itself, in becoming "spirit. God"¹⁸ is thus the result of philosophy, a result that is recognized "not merely to be the result but to be eternally producing itself, the act of production and equally the beginning of the first [step]."¹⁹ These determinate configurations of the idea or of the absolute—nature, finite | spirit, "the world of consciousness"²⁰—are embodiments of the idea; but they are determinate configurations or particular modes of appearance of the idea. They are configurations in which the idea has not yet penetrated through to itself in order to be as absolute spirit.

In the philosophy of religion we consider the "idea"²¹ not merely in the way it is determined as idea of pure thought, nor yet in its finite modes of appearance, but as the absolute, or as the logical idea—except that at the same time we also consider it in the way this idea appears and manifests itself, though in its *infinite appearance* as spirit. Spirit is what manifests itself, what appears but is infinite in its appearance; spirit that does not appear *is not*; it reflects itself back within itself.²² This then, in general, is the position of the philosophy of religion "vis-à-vis"²³ the other branches of philosophy. God is the result of the other branches: in the philosophy of religion this end is made the beginning. *That God* (as result) *appears* is what we make into our particular object—God as the *utterly concrete idea* together with its infinite appearance, which is identical with the substance, with the essence [of reality]; this is the content, the specification of this content.

18. *Ho reads*: spirit as knowledge of the activity itself. The absolute's knowledge of itself as absolute

19. *Ho reads*: not to remain merely one-sidedly in the character of result but, as what has returned to itself from itself, to know itself equally as what is utterly the first. *W (Var) adds*: The one-sidedness of the result is sublated in the result itself.

20. *Thus P*; *Ho reads*: the will, the state W_1 *reads*: the will W_2 (*Var reads*: the world of consciousness, intelligence, and will

21. *W (HgG) reads*: logical idea, having being in itself,

22. *Similar in W_1* ; W_2 (*MiscP adds*: Also contained in this characterization of appearance is finite appearance, i.e., the world of nature and the world of finite spirit; but spirit exists as the power of these worlds, as bringing them forth from itself and itself from them.

23. *Ho reads*: first vis-à-vis philosophy in general, and then

This is the content of the philosophy of religion, expressed abstractly. We treat this content with our thinking reason, and the definition of our treatment as thoughtful [*denkend*] brings us to the topic of how the philosophy of religion stands with reference to our contemporary needs, i.e., its relationship to the theology of our time, to the church, and to the representation of God.²⁴

Thus far we have considered philosophy of religion as the treatment of the concrete idea of the divine in rational form, as the conceptualizing | cognition of God. Now we turn to its relationship to our contemporary needs, to the contemporary view of religion and God.

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2. The Position of the Philosophy of Religion vis-à-vis the Needs of Our Time²⁵

If we call the cognition or knowledge of God “theology” generally, whether we approach it from the standpoint of philosophy or from that of theology in the narrower sense, we seem at first to be treading the same path as the theology that used to be called rational theology. It is the universal highroad or the universal mode in which what is known of God is said of God. We know namely that in the Christian church and chiefly in our Protestant church there was set down a *doctrinal system* [*Lehrbegriff*], a content that was uni-

24. *Ho reads*: for thoughtful or rational consideration discovers the antithesis to other contemporary modes of consideration.

25. [*Ed.*] The heading is found in *D*. In this section Hegel develops more explicitly and consistently his controversy with the theological and philosophical views of his time, which are rooted in the Enlightenment. The so-called “rational theology” (*Vernunfttheologie*) is really based on understanding (*Verstand*) and rationalistic argumentation (*Rasönnement*) or exegesis rather than on reason (*Vernunft*) in the proper sense. More recent forms of rational theology share with the theology based on feeling (*Gefühl*) the conviction that in the strict sense nothing can be known of God. Finally there is the purely historical approach in theology, which gives up any claim to its content, dealing only with historical data like “countinghouse clerks” who handle other people’s money but have no wealth of their own. All these approaches have the effect of driving a fatal wedge between religion and cognition, the former being relegated to a private realm and the latter reserved for the everyday secular world. This criticism is already present in Sec. 3 of the *Ms. Introduction*, which addresses the opposition between religious consciousness and the rest of consciousness, and the present section can be viewed as a further development of themes first introduced there.

versally valid and universally accepted as the truth, as [stating] what God's nature is. This content has generally been called the creed: in the subjective sense, what is believed, and objectively, what is to be known as content in the Christian religion, what God himself has revealed that he is. This content can be called *dogmatics*: the doctrinal system of the church, the content [of its teaching] concerning what God's nature [is] in relationship to humanity and in the latter's relationship to God. (New definitions have been added to this old *symbolum*, which nonetheless are not our concern here.)

39 | In the Protestant church the doctrinal system is at the same time supposed to be based essentially upon the Bible; it does not exist merely in the spirit of the church but also has an external footing in the Bible.

Later on, so-called [pure] thinking turned against this content in the name of "Enlightenment." It left the doctrinal system in place and also left it the Bible as foundation, but arrived at its own divergent views and sought to interpret the word of God in a different way. This took place in the guise of exegesis.^{26 27} Because exegesis draws upon reason for counsel, what happened is that a so-called *rational theology*²⁸ came into being, opposed to the doctrinal system in the form established by the church. In part, this

26. Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: We know that the faith of the church, more specifically the Protestant church, is set down as a doctrinal system. This content has been universally accepted as truth, and as a definition of what God is and what human beings are in relationship to God. It has been called the creed: in the subjective sense, what is believed, and objectively, what is to be known as content in the Christian community and as what God himself has revealed. As a common and established doctrine this content is now set down partly in the apostolic *symbolum* [the Apostles' Creed] and partly in the later symbolical books [the Protestant confessions]. In this regard the controlling determination in the Protestant church is that the Bible is the essential foundation of doctrine.

(a) Reason as argumentation has now come to the fore in the cognition and specification of the doctrinal content. Initially, to be sure, this took place only in such a way that the doctrinal content and the Bible as its positive foundation were supposed to subsist unshaken, and thinking was only supposed, as exegesis, to adopt the thoughts of the Bible.

27. W (*HgG*) adds: But in fact understanding had established its views and thoughts by itself in advance; only after that was attention given to how the words of scripture admit of explanation in accord with those views.

28. [Ed.] Hegel is not referring so much to the metaphysical *theologia naturalis* or *theologia rationalis* as to the exegesis and dogmatics of the theological rationalism

was the church's own doing, in part it was the doing of [the thinking] to which the church is opposed. In this rational theology it is exegesis that plays the primary role. Here exegesis takes over the written word, interprets it, and professes only to make the understanding of the word effective and to remain faithful to it.

But where interpretation is not mere explanation of the words but discussion of the content and elucidation of the sense, it must introduce its own thoughts into the word that forms the basis [of the faith]. There can only be mere interpretation of words when all that happens is that one word is replaced by another with the same scope. If interpretation is *elucidation*, then other categories of thought are bound up with it. A development of the word is a progression to further thoughts. One seemingly abides by the sense, but in fact, new thoughts are developed. Bible commentaries do not so much acquaint us with the content of scripture as with the mode of thought of their age.

In a commentary the sense of the word is supposed to be indicated. But indicating the sense means bringing the sense out into consciousness, into representation; and this other representation makes its influence felt in the exposition of what the sense is supposed to be.²⁹ | The most sharply opposed views are exegetically demonstrated by theologians on the basis of scripture, and in this way so-called holy scripture has been made into a wax nose.³⁰ All of the heresies have appealed to scripture, as has the church.

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of his day, represented by J. F. Röhr and J. A. L. Wegscheider among others. In particular Hegel would have been familiar with the exegesis of H. E. G. Paulus, his early friend and patron and later his opponent. See H. E. G. Paulus, *Philologisch-historischer Commentar über das Neue Testament*, 4 parts (Lübeck, 1800–1805).

29. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) adds: Yet even in the exposition of a philosophical system that is already developed within itself, like that of Plato or Aristotle, it is the case that the expositions come out differently in accord with the inwardly determined mode of representation of those who undertake them.

30. [Ed.] Hegel was probably familiar with this expression through Lessing. See in particular Lessing's *Axiomata, wenn es deren in dergleichen Dingen gibt: Wider den Herrn Pastor Goeze, in Hamburg* (Braunschweig, 1778) (*Sämtliche Schriften* 13:128): "The inner truth is no wax nose that every rascal can shape in conformity to his own face as he wishes." The expression "wax nose" itself, however, may be traced back to the twelfth century—e.g., to Alain de Lille (*Migne Patrologia Latina* 210.333). In the fifteenth century, Geiler von Kaisersberg applied it specifically to scripture (see M. D. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* [Paris, 1957], p. 361).

31~~ Since a so-called theology of reason arose and was produced
41 in this manner, we can on the one hand say | that we find ourselves
on common ground [with it], that reason has to be a factor; and
if the interpretation that emerges is supposed to be in accordance
with reason, then we can here claim the right to develop religion
freely and openly out of reason, without taking as our starting
point the specific word [of scripture]. It is therefore at this point
42 that we consider the nature of God and of religion in general. |

31. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads (*parallel in main text follows*): b. The theology of reason that arose in this way did not, however, confine itself steadily to the task of exegesis in the realm of the Bible, but as free cognizing assumed a relationship to religion and to its content generally instead. In this more general relationship the concern and the result cannot be anything else than that cognition should take possession of everything that is determinate in the sphere of religion. As an instance, the doctrine of God advances on to characteristics, attributes, and actions of God. Cognition takes possession of this determinate content and shows that it belongs to it. On the one hand it grasps the infinite according to its own finite fashion, as something determinate or as something abstractly infinite; and then, on the other hand, it finds that all particular attributes are inappropriate to this infinite. Thereby it destroys the religious content in its own way and totally impoverishes the absolute object. To be sure, the finite and the determinate, which this cognition has drawn within its sphere, direct it to something otherworldly, but it grasps this [object] itself in a finite manner as an abstract, supreme being (*höchstes Wesen*) utterly lacking all character. The Enlightenment—in other words, the consummation of finite cognition just depicted—purports to set God exceedingly high in calling God the infinite for which all predicates are inappropriate and unjustified anthropomorphisms. But when it grasped God as the supreme being, it in actuality made God hollow, empty, and impoverished.

c. It may now seem that the philosophy of religion finds itself on the same soil as this rational theology of the Enlightenment, and hence in the same antithesis to the content of religion; but this is a semblance that immediately dissolves.

α. That rational consideration of religion which was only an abstract metaphysics of the understanding grasped God as an abstraction that is *empty ideality*, and with which the finite is contrasted externally. Also, from this standpoint morals as a particular science constituted the knowledge of what pertains to the actual subject with regard to action and behavior, whereas the aspect of the human being's relation with God stood divorced from it. On the other hand, the thinking reason that no longer maintains itself abstractly, but sets out from the faith of human beings in the dignity of their spirit and is impelled by the courage of truth and freedom—this reason grasps the truth as something concrete, as fullness of content, [i.e.] as an ideality in which determinateness or the finite is contained as a moment. For it, God is therefore not the void but spirit, and this determination of spirit does not remain for it merely a word or a superficial determination; instead the nature of spirit unfolds for it in that it cognizes God essentially as the triune. God is thus

This rational theology has on the whole been called the theology of the Enlightenment. Pertinent here, however, is not merely this kind of theology but also the kind that leaves reason aside and expressly rejects philosophy, and then erects a religious doctrine from the plenitude of its own argumentative power. Though biblical words lie at its basis, to be sure, *private opinion* and *feeling* still remain the controlling factor. It very often happens that philosophy is set aside in the process, that philosophy is represented as something ghostlike that must be ignored because it is uncanny. Philos-

grasped in the way in which he makes himself into his own object, and then in the way in which the object in its differentiation remains identical with God, and God himself loves himself in it. Without this determination of the Trinity, God would not be spirit and spirit would be an empty word. But if God is grasped as spirit, then this concept includes the subjective aspect within itself, or unfolds itself to [include] it, and, as thinking consideration of religion, the philosophy of religion embraces the entire determinate content of religion.

β. But with respect to the form of thoughtful consideration that confines itself to the word of holy scriptures and claims to interpret it with reason, the philosophy of religion only seems to stand on common soil with it. For that treatment lays out the basis of Christian doctrine from the plenitude of its own argumentative powers; and although it allows the biblical words to retain their subsistence, private opinion still remains the principal determination to which the assumed biblical truth must be subordinated. Hence this mode of argumentation clings to its presuppositions and operates within the reflective relationships of the understanding, without their being subjected to criticism. As rational cognizing, however, the philosophy of religion is opposed to the arbitrariness of this argumentation, and is [based on] the reason of the universal, which presses toward unity.

Philosophy is therefore so far removed from finding itself upon the general highway of rational theology and of exegetical argumentation that these tendencies for the most part seek rather to combat it and cast suspicion upon it. They protest against philosophy, but only in order to retain for themselves the arbitrariness of their argumentation. They call philosophy something private, whereas philosophy is in fact nothing but rational and truly universal thinking. They regard philosophy as something spectral, such that one does not know what it is but which is rather uncanny in any case; but this representation of it only shows that they feel more at ease in sticking to their unregulated, arbitrary reflections, to which philosophy grants no validity. If the theologians who operate in exegesis with this mode of argumentation, and who appeal to the Bible to support all their fancies, while opposing philosophy and denying the possibility of cognition—if they have in fact carried things so far and debased respect for the Bible so severely—then spirit must look about for another source in order to secure a truth full of content, if it is indeed the case that no *cognition* of God's nature is possible on the basis of a correct elucidation of the Bible.

ophy, however, is nothing other than cognition through reason, the common feature in the cognition of all human beings; and to the extent that one rejects philosophy, one rejects with it the very principle of the common rationality of spirit, in order to leave the door open to ~private reason.³²

43 In the rational theology of more recent times the principal role is played by this way of looking at things, bringing reason into the lists against itself and combating philosophy on the grounds that reason can have no cognition of God.³³ The consequence is that no meaning for the expression “God” remains in theology any more than in philosophy, save only the representation, definition, or abstraction of the supreme being—a vacuum of abstraction, a vacuum of “the beyond.” Such is the overall result of rational theology, this generally negative tendency toward any content at all in regard to the nature of God. The “reason” of this kind of theology has in fact been nothing but abstract understanding masquerading under the name of reason, and it has ventured as far in this field as has the reason | that claimed the possibility of cognition for itself. The result is that one only knows in general *that* God is; but otherwise this supreme being is inwardly empty and dead. It is not to be grasped as a living God, as concrete content; it is not to be grasped as spirit. If “spirit” is not an empty word, then God must [be grasped] under this characteristic, just as in the church theology of former times God was called “triune.” This is the key by which the nature of spirit is explicated. God is thus grasped as what he is for himself within himself; God [the Father] makes himself an object for himself (the Son); then, in this object, God remains the undivided essence within this differentiation of himself within himself, and in this differentiation of himself loves himself, i.e., remains identical with himself—this is God as Spirit. Hence if we are to speak of God as spirit, we must grasp God with this very definition, which exists in the church in this childlike mode of representation as the relationship between father and son—a representation that

32. W_1 (*HgG/Var?*) reads: private argumentation.

33. [Ed.] Hegel has in mind the views of Kant and Jacobi; see above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15.

is not yet a matter of the concept. Thus it is just this definition of God by the church as a Trinity³⁴ that is the concrete determination and nature of God as spirit; and spirit is an empty word if it is not grasped in this determination.

But when modern theology says that we cannot have cognition of God or that God has no further determinations within himself, it knows only that God *is* as something abstract without content, and in this way God is reduced to this hollow abstraction. It is all the same whether we say we cannot have cognition of God, or that God is only a supreme being.³⁵ Inasmuch as we know [only] *that* God is, God is the *abstractum*. To cognize God means to have a definite, concrete concept of God. As merely having being, God is something abstract; when [God is] cognized, however, we have a representation with a content. If the representation to the effect that God is not to be cognized were substantiated through biblical exegesis, then precisely on that account we would have to turn to another source in order to arrive at a content in regard to God.

34. [Ed.] The neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity, which Hegel criticizes here and elsewhere in the *Lectures*, may be traced to deism and the so-called neologians, e.g., W. A. Teller and J. G. Töllner. But, as Hegel's excerpts from Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* demonstrate (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 684 ff.), his criticism is directed primarily against this work since it treats the doctrine of the Trinity only in the concluding four paragraphs. See Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 187: "But the ecclesiastical doctrine that three persons of equal essence and equal power subsist in the one and undivided divine essence is not, so comprehended, of equal value with the other, proper doctrines of faith, but is only an appended [*verknüpfender*] proposition" (this paragraph is not in the 2d ed.). See below, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 17.

35. [Ed.] The designation of God as a "supreme being" (*höchstes Wesen*, *être suprême*, *summum ens*), is common in the deistic literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see Herbert of Cherbury, *De Veritate* [London, 1645], pp. 210 ff.), as well as in the school philosophy (see Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, *Pars posterior*, §§ 6 ff.). But since Hegel is here referring to "modern theology," it can be surmised that his equation of the noncognizability of God with the designation of God as a supreme being contains a hidden polemic against Schleiermacher, perhaps against Schleiermacher's statement that, even if the idea of God were not available from some other source, "pious excitations would be available, so that the effort would arise, when thoughtful reflection has advanced far enough, to form the idea of the supreme being by means of considering these excitations. The concept [of God] that has been formed in this fashion is solely what we are concerned with in what follows." See Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 9 (this passage is not in the 2d ed.); cf. § 2, 10.

Whether it is substantiated by the Bible must be left to the theologians. Although we may seem to be sharing common ground with rational theology (because our definition of God is that of thinking reason), in what follows we shall nonetheless see that rational theology is precisely the staunchest opponent of philosophy. In this respect it is a need of the present day to be cognizant of God through thinking reason, | and thereby to obtain a living, concrete representation of the nature of truth. The result of rational theology is expressed by saying that we cannot be cognizant of the truth. God is truth. But to the extent that human beings have faith in their own dignity, in the dignity of their spirit, and have the courage of truth and freedom, they are driven to seek truth. Truth is no empty shell [but] something concrete, a fullness of content. It is this fullness that modern theology has emptied out. Our intention, however, is to regain such a fullness by means of the concept."

44 It is to be noted that there is a type of theology that wants to adopt *only a historical attitude* toward religion; it even has an abundance of cognition, though only of a historical kind. This cognition is no concern of ours, for if the cognition of religion were merely historical, we would have to compare such theologians with countinghouse clerks, who keep the ledgers and accounts of other people's wealth, a wealth that passes through their hands without their retaining any of it, clerks who act only for others without acquiring assets of their own. They do of course receive a salary, but their merit lies only in keeping records of the assets of other people. In philosophy and religion, however, the essential thing is that one's own spirit ~itself should recognize a possession and content, deem itself worthy of cognition, and not keep itself humbly outside."³⁶

45 This is therefore the relationship [of the philosophy of religion to the theology of our time]. In view of this plague the more explicit need that arises is that of regaining, for the true, essentially through philosophy, a fullness, a content, and an import. |

36. W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: itself should enter with the utmost interest into an inner connection, not only occupying itself with something alien to it but drawing its content from what is essential and deeming itself worthy of cognition. Here human beings are dealing with the value of their own spirit and are not permitted to stay humbly outside it, standing about at a distance.

3. The Relationship of the Philosophy of Religion to Positive Religion³⁷

In the third place, finally, theology is not merely rational theology, which brings it only to the abstraction of the I, to this emptiness or lack.³⁸ There is still a theology that has a content—a content consisting of the church's doctrine—which we call the content of a positive religion. The philosophy of religion seems at first to stand on the same side [with what] is called rational theology, but it is in fact opposed to it; and it seems to be even more opposed to the theology that holds to the church's positive doctrine. But just as in the first relationship the reverse is the case, so here, too, it will be shown that the philosophy of religion is infinitely closer to positive doctrine.

The antithesis of reason and faith, as it used to be called, is one that arose long ago in the Christian church;³⁹ the church often feared the destruction of its doctrine by philosophy and on that account was hostile to it. But rational theology is hostile to philosophy because a content might be able to gain entry through philosophy, | and for that reason it declares every elucidation of the content to be an obfuscation.⁴⁰ 46

37. [Ed.] This is the third topic that Hegel promised to take up in the opening paragraph of the *Introduction*, but he treats it only briefly. He contends that philosophy of religion is actually closer to "positive religion," that is, historically mediated and revealed religion based on the doctrinal content of the church, than it is to rational theology. However, a division has emerged between the philosophy of religion and the teaching of the church, a division that presupposes a doctrine of double truth—"two kinds of reason and two kinds of spirit"—and Hegel's critique of this notion is what constitutes the substance of this section. Catholic theology with its speculative proclivities avoided this split more successfully than did Protestant theology.

38. W_1 (HgG/Var?) adds: or [merely] historical theology, which has only alien [i.e., other people's] thoughts about God.

39. [Ed.] This antithesis may be traced back to the ancient church but not to the New Testament. In *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 55 (GW 4:315), Hegel contended that modernity has transcended this antithesis; but in his Preface to Hinrichs's *Religionsphilosophie* he expressed doubts about the success of this transcendence (see H. W. F. Hinrichs, *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* [Heidelberg, 1822], p. i; *Werke* 17:279).

40. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads: Philosophy of religion cannot therefore stand opposed to positive religion, and to the church doctrine that has still preserved its content, after the fashion in which the metaphysics of the understanding and

Regarding the relationship of the philosophy of religion to the church's doctrine (insofar as this doctrine [*Lehre*] is not that emptiness [*Leerheit*] but has solid content), it is to be noted that there cannot be two kinds of reason and two kinds of spirit,⁴¹ a divine and a human reason or a divine and a human spirit that would be strictly distinct from one another, as if their essence were strictly opposed. Human reason, human spiritual consciousness or consciousness of its own essence, *is* reason generally, is the divine within humanity. Spirit, insofar as it is called divine spirit, is not a spirit beyond the stars or beyond the world; for God is present, is omnipresent, ~and strictly *as spirit* is God present in spirit.⁴² God is a living God who is effective, active, and present in spirit. Religion is a begetting of the divine spirit, not an invention of human beings but an effect of the divine at work, of the divine productive process within humanity. What has emerged as religion, and is a product of the divine spirit, shows itself first as faith. So we must have faith that what has emerged in the world is precisely reason, and that the generation of reason is a begetting of the spirit and a product of the divine spirit itself. The expression "God rules the world as reason" would be irrational if we did not ~concede that among the

argumentative exegesis oppose them. Rather it will become evident that it stands infinitely closer to positive doctrine than it seems to at first glance; it will become evident in fact that the reinstatement of church doctrine (reduced to a minimum by the understanding) is so emphatically the work of philosophy of religion that the rational theology which operates only through understanding decries it as an obfuscation of the spirit precisely on account of this its authentic content. The dread of the understanding and its hatred of philosophy derive from its apprehension at seeing that philosophy takes its reflective process back to the fundament, i.e., to the affirmative upon which it founders; and yet philosophy arrives at a content, at a cognition of God's nature, in spite of the fact that every content seems already to be annulled. Every content appears to this negative tendency to be a darkening of spirit, while it seeks forever just to remain in the night that it calls "Enlightenment," and there of course it must deem the ray of cognition's light to be a hostile one.

41. [*Ed.*] The doctrine of double truth may be traced back to the thirteenth century. Somewhat later it was propounded especially by William of Ockham and Pomponazzi, but was rejected by the church at the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517).

42. *Ho reads:* as spirit present in the spirits. *W (Var) reads:* as spirit in all the spirits.

peoples nothing is higher than religion [and that it is] the divine spirit that has accomplished everything in them.⁴³ |

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We should also mention as a historical note that in the Catholic Church, particularly in former times, there was no such separation between philosophy | and church doctrine, for Scholastic philosophy

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43. W_1 (Var) reads: accept the fact that God also relates himself to religion and that the divine spirit has brought it forth among the peoples. The different religions are only different views of one and the same thing. W_2 (MiscP) reads: accept the fact that God also relates himself to religion and that the divine spirit operates in the determination and shaping of it. But the development of reason that is completed in thinking does not stand in antithesis to this spirit, and therefore this development cannot be distinguished strictly from the work of spirit itself, which it has brought forth in religion. The more that human beings in their rational thinking give the thing itself control within themselves and renounce their private concerns, the more they comport themselves as universal consciousness and their reason seeks not its own concern in the sense of something particular, the less will reason fall into that antithesis; for reason is itself the matter, it is spirit, the divine spirit. The church or the theologians may disdain this support or take it amiss when their doctrine is made rational; they may even repel the efforts of philosophy with proud irony and may ridicule its “contrived” truth—although its efforts are not directed against religion in a hostile way, but rather seek to ground the truth of religion. But this contumely avails no longer and becomes mere vanity once the need for cognition is awakened and [an awareness of] cognition’s split from religion. In that situation insight has its rights which can no longer be in any way denied, and the triumph of cognition is the reconciliation of the antithesis.

Although philosophy, as the philosophy of religion, distinguishes itself sharply from the tendencies of understanding that are basically opposed to religion in a hostile way, and is by no means the hobgoblin that people ordinarily imagine it to be, we do still find nowadays the starkest antithesis of philosophy and religion posited as a contemporary shibboleth all the same. All the principles of religious consciousness that are fully developed at the present time—though their forms may [otherwise] be in the sharpest contrast with each other—agree at least in being antagonistic to philosophy or in seeking at all events to prevent it from concerning itself with religion. For this reason it is still our business to consider philosophy in its relationship to these contemporary principles. Our expectations from this consideration are all the more favorable because, along with all the antagonism toward philosophy coming from so many sides (indeed from almost every side in present-day consciousness), it will become evident that the time has nevertheless now arrived when philosophy can occupy itself with religion in a manner that is unconstrained as well as auspicious and beneficial. For *either* our adversaries are those forms of the severed consciousness that we have considered above (they adopt in part the standpoint of the metaphysics of the understanding for which God is something empty and the content has disappeared, and in part the standpoint of feeling, which has withdrawn into its empty inwardness after the loss of absolute content, but concurs with that metaphysics in the result, i.e., that any determination is unsuited

was the philosophy of the church. Speculative philosophy has, in fact, been more in evidence in the Catholic Church than in the Protestant. "This cleavage first occurred in the Protestant Church."⁴⁴

4. Preliminary Questions⁴⁵

"We could now proceed to deal with the object, with the thing itself. But it seems necessary on external grounds to discuss certain preliminary questions first, questions that must seemingly be disposed of before we can advance to the science [of the philosophy of re-

to the eternal content because it is indeed only an abstraction); or else we shall see how the contentions of philosophy's opponents contain nothing but what philosophy contains for *its* principle and as foundation for its principle. This contradiction, that the opponents of philosophy are the opponents of religion who are overcome by philosophy, and that they nonetheless implicitly possess the principle of philosophical cognition within their own reflections, is grounded in the fact that they are the historical element out of which the consummate philosophical thinking has itself taken shape.

44. *Thus G; Ho reads (similar in P, but canceled)*: The separation whose reconciliation is the goal of the philosophy of religion first came into being in the Protestant church. For what has appeared in the world as religion is the absolute truth not yet as conceptual truth, even though the content is true. The labor of elevating these represented [truths] to the concept is at the same time the teaching of the philosophy of religion.

45. [Ed.] At this point Hegel seems to change course. He abruptly drops the discussion of the relationship of the philosophy of religion to positive religion, which has uncovered the question of double truth. Not only this but other "preliminary questions" seem to have to be disposed of before philosophy of religion can turn to its proper object, the thing itself, namely God and the religious knowledge of God. He enumerates several of these questions—not only that of double truth, but also the question of the limits of reason, the view that God is apprehended only in the mode of feeling and has no objectivity over against the consciousness of the believer (and thus is likely to prove to be a fiction), and the notion that philosophy of religion must first demonstrate that there *is* a God before God can be cognitively grasped. But these and all other so-called preliminary questions must be set aside, Hegel says, because they cannot be investigated and settled in advance of actually *doing* philosophy of religion. The only way to investigate the capacity of cognition is to engage in cognitive acts. Against the prevailing view of his time Hegel argues that there is no epistemological prolegomenon to philosophy that is not already speculative philosophy. The preliminary methodological questions are not to be disposed of in preliminary fashion but only in connection with the content or object of the philosophy of religion, which gives itself in the process of cognizing it. Method and content are finally one and the same.

ligion] proper. Such questions are bound to occur to us; they must do so if we are familiar with the culture of our time, i.e., with the philosophical culture and with the interests of theology. There are viewpoints, preliminary questions, | and modes of representation, 49 which seem to make it necessary that, before we proceed to the philosophy of religion, it must be recognized and shown that such a science exists. There are views that reject it, that deem it impossible.⁴⁶ Hence we have to discuss such positions; we do not do so, however, in order to resolve these preliminary questions, but rather to show that we have to leave these views aside, and that what is essential in them comes within the purview of our science itself and is settled there.⁴⁷

Therefore, with reference to the content of these major views, in the *first* place what we have before us is not religion in general but what we call a positive religion, a religion that is acknowledged to have been revealed by God and to rest upon an authority higher than human authority, and which for that reason appears sublime, outside the domain of human reason. The initial difficulty in this view is that we would first have to argue for reason's entitlement

46. [Ed.] It is not certain which views Hegel is alluding to. It seems unlikely that the possibility of a philosophical thematization of religion as such was being questioned, but rather the possibility of a *speculative* philosophy of religion, such as Hegel's, which was at the same time a speculative theology. Thus it may be assumed that Hegel again has Kant's and especially Jacobi's views in mind; cf. the latter's reference to "unphilosophy," which is a "nonknowing" (Jacobi, *Werke* 3:9).

47. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: Before we can proceed to the treatment of our object itself, it seems indispensable to settle several preliminary questions, or rather to embark upon inquiries about them, upon the assumption that the question whether any such treatment, any such rational cognition of religion, is possible at all, depends on the outcome of these inquiries. The investigating and answering of these questions seems to be unavoidably necessary because they have especially preoccupied the philosophical and popular interest evident in the deliberations of our time, and because they involve the principles on which present-day views about the religious content rest as well as our views about the cognition of it. If we refrain from any such investigation, it will at least be necessary to show that our doing so does not happen by chance, and that we have the right to do so, because what is essential in that investigation falls within our science itself and all those questions can be settled only in it.

Therefore we have only to notice here the obstacles that the contemporary culture and view we have been considering set against the justification for cognizing religion conceptually.

and capacity to concern itself with such truth and such teaching of a religion as purportedly lies beyond the domain of human reason. We certainly agree that reason must enter into relation with what is called religion. In this respect we can proceed in the traditional way. It has been said, and is still said,⁴⁸ that positive religion exists on its own account, that we are to offer no opinion on its doctrines [but simply] are to respect and esteem them. On the other side stands reason or comprehending thought, and never shall these twain come into contact or reason make connection with those teachings of the revealed religion. This was how they wanted to preserve the freedom of philosophical investigation in former days. They said it is a subject matter by itself that should do no harm to positive religion, but they subordinated its results to the teaching of positive religion. "We do not want to give our investigation this posture."⁴⁹ In and for itself it must be viewed as only a pretense; i.e., it is false that both of these—both belief in, standing fast in, positive religion, and free philosophical investigation—can subsist peacefully alongside one another. There is no ground for supposing
50 that faith in the content or in the doctrine of positive | religion can still persist when reason has convinced itself of the contrary. The church has been both correct and consistent in not allowing this comparison to be made.⁵⁰ Human spirit in its innermost aspect, [in its] conviction about the nature of God, is not, in this most inward conscience, the sort of divided thing in which the two sides of a contradiction could subsist—faith [on one side and] a reason on the other that had achieved results deviating from this teaching

48. [Ed.] While Hegel may be alluding to the scholastic doctrine of double truth, and to Schleiermacher's attempt to establish a sharp demarcation between worldly wisdom and Christian theology (see *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 2), it seems clear in this context that he has more in mind the attempt by certain philosophers to argue for the lack of relation between reason and positive religion, notably Vanini, Bayle, and Descartes, who are mentioned in this connection in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:140–142, 238 (*Werke* 15:246–248, 352). See, e.g., Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1:25 (p. 195).

49. *Ho reads*: However, we do not concede to the two fields this posture of indifference [to one another].

50. *W (HgG) reads*: in not allowing the view that reason might be opposed to faith and yet could subordinate itself to it.

of positive religion. This, then, is the first preliminary question, in which the right of reason is to be demonstrated, its right to concern itself with the [positive] teachings of religion.

The *second* preliminary question relates to an impression, a proposition or a view, regarding what reason and cognition are, that can almost be regarded as the focal point of the plague of the present age. Those mentioned in the preceding sphere only contend that reason cannot cognitively apprehend the truth of God's nature; they do not deny the possibility of cognizing other truths, since for them only the highest truth is uncognizable. According to the second position, however, reason is entirely debarred from cognitively apprehending truth at all. Its contention is that if cognition relates itself to spirit in and for itself, to life, to the infinite, it only produces errors, and that reason must forgo all claims and all attempts to grasp any aspect of the infinite affirmatively; for through comprehension the infinite is annulled and downgraded to the finite.⁵¹ This result in regard to reason, this denial of reason, is supposed to be a result of rational cognition itself. The first thing we have to do, according to this tendency, is to investigate the cognitive subject

51. [Ed.] Hegel's account does not permit a positive identification of the two positions to which he refers. Both could be ascribed to Kant. On the one hand there is Kant's position that, insofar as it lifts itself above the domain of possible experience, reason begets mere thought entities or phantoms of the brain (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 571; also B 269). By the second position Hegel could have in mind Kant's doctrine that even within the domain of experience things are not cognized as they are in themselves but only as they appear (see *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15). Hegel does not strictly separate the two views that he distinguishes and criticizes. Even in characterizing the second view he returns to the hypothesis of the noncognizability of the infinite. The formulation that the attempt at comprehension degrades the infinite to something finite certainly points to Jacobi: "To uncover conditions of the unconditioned, to discover a possibility in the absolutely necessary, and to wish to construe it in order to be able to comprehend it, seems obviously to be a nonsensical understanding. . . . Should a *concept* of what is unconditioned and unconnected (and hence extranatural) become *possible*, then the unconditioned must cease to be the unconditioned; it must itself take on conditions; and the *absolutely necessary* must start to become the *possible*, in order that it can be construed." Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 424–426 (*Werke* 4/2:153–155). In a letter to Fichte, Jacobi wrote: "That it knows nothing of God is no reproach to transcendental philosophy, for it is generally recognized that God cannot be *known*, only *believed*. A God who could be known would be no God at all" (*Werke* 3:7).

beforehand, in order to establish cognitively its capacity to have cognition of God and thereby to establish the possibility of a philosophy of religion.

Because knowledge of God does not fall within the comprehension of reason, there coheres with this standpoint the view that consciousness of God is rather sought only in the form of *feeling*—that religion has feeling as its source, and that the relationship of the human spirit to God is to be confined only to the sphere of feeling | and is not to be transposed into thought or into comprehension. Surely if God and divine things are excluded from the realm of necessary and substantial subjectivity, if knowledge is excluded from this realm, then nothing remains but the realm of contingent subjectivity; that is the realm of feeling.⁵² If in regard to God we could appeal only to feeling, then we would have to wonder how any kind of objectivity is still attributed to this content, i.e., to God. The materialistic views⁵³ have been more consistent in this respect. They have regarded spirit and thought as something merely material, a combination of material forces; they have re-

52. [Ed.] The view that religion has its proper place in the realm of feeling (*Gefühl*) was widespread in Hegel's time and took different forms. Probably Hegel had especially in mind Jacobi's position, which, following Hume, established a close connection between faith and feeling. See esp. Jacobi's *David Hume über den Glauben*, pp. 44, 47 (*Werke* 2:161, 163). See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. John Oman (New York, 1958), p. 45. J. F. Fries described feeling as the "presentiment" (*Ahndung*) of the eternal in the finite, distinguishing it as a special organ from both knowledge and faith; see his *Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung* (Jena, 1805), esp. p. 176. Fries's conception was adopted by W. M. L. de Wette, among others: see de Wette's *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik* (Berlin, 1813). The fact that Hegel did not yet argue polemically against the founding of religion on feeling in his manuscript of 1821, but for the first time in the lectures of 1824, indicates that he had Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, which had appeared in the meantime, especially in view. See Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 8, "Piety in itself is neither a knowing nor a doing, but an inclination and determination of feeling" (in the 2d ed., § 3, Schleiermacher drops "inclination" and adds "or of immediate self-consciousness"); and § 9, "The common element in all pious excitations, and therefore the essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, that is, the feeling of being dependent on God" (in the 2d ed., § 4, Schleiermacher revises this proposition considerably, concluding it: "or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God"). See also below, 1824 *Concept*, nn. 20, 37.

53. W (HgG) adds: or, as they may otherwise be designated, the empiricist, historicist [*historisch*], and naturalistic views, at least

duced spirit and thought to feeling and sensation, and accordingly taken God and all representations [of God] as products of feeling, and denied objectivity to God. The result is then atheism. God is thus a product of feeling, of my weakness—a product of pain, hope, fear, joy, cupidity, and so forth. What is rooted only in my feeling is *only for me*; what is in my feeling is what is mine, but it is not what is his [God's?], is not independent in and for itself.⁵⁴ It seems necessary therefore to show beforehand that God is not simply rooted in feeling, is not merely *my* God. The former metaphysics,⁵⁵ therefore, always used to begin by proving that there is a God, that God is not merely rooted in feeling, that God is not merely something subjective but is something objective.

Connected to this is then the *fourth* preliminary question, inasmuch as one starts by demonstrating that there is a God—that there are not mere feelings of God but an objective God, that God is, that God is an *object*. Proving God turns out to be the summons to the philosophy of religion. One might suppose that our inquiry must also begin at this point.

It may appear as though the other sciences hold over philosophy the advantage that their object is already acknowledged in and for itself. In arithmetic, numbers are conceded in advance; in geometry, space; in medicine, illnesses.^{56 57} | The object of philosophy is not,

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54. [Ed.] “What is mine” (*Meinige*) involves a pun on “subjective opinion” (*Meinung*), and “what is his” (*Seinige*), a pun on “being” (*Sein*). There is probably also an allusion here to the struggle for recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, chap. IV.A (“me” against “him”), which becomes, in the “unhappy consciousness” of chap. IV.B, a hopeless struggle with “the unchangeable” (God).

55. [Ed.] Hegel apparently refers here especially to natural theology as a special part of this metaphysics, and to the role played by the proofs of the existence of God in it. See Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, § 4; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 810; and, earlier, Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. XI (*Chief Works* 2:51). The tradition of placing the proofs of the existence of God at the beginning of natural theology goes back to scholasticism, especially to Thomas Aquinas.

56. W (HgG) reads: human bodies and illnesses.

57. W₂ (1831) adds (similar in W₁): and they are not called upon to demonstrate that there are such things as space, bodies, or illnesses. Philosophy as such therefore seemingly has the disadvantage of having to secure a being for its objects *in advance*, before it begins. Should one in any case concede to philosophy that there is a world, philosophy is nonetheless promptly challenged if it wishes to presuppose likewise the actuality of the incorporeal in general, of a thought and spirit free from matter, let alone to presuppose the actuality of God.

and should not be, of this kind. Since its object is not something already granted, philosophy, and more specifically philosophy of religion, must first demonstrate its object. From this it would follow that before philosophy exists it should prove that it exists, that it is. It would have to prove its existence prior to its existence.

These then are the preliminary questions that must be settled first, so it seems, and the very possibility of a philosophy of religion depends upon their being settled. But if these points of view are valid (i.e., that conceptual thought has no relationship to positive religion, or that religion is only a feeling), then philosophy of religion is directly impossible, since in order to show its possibility those hindrances must first be eliminated. So it seems at first glance, and a brief accounting needs to be given of why we are pushing these preliminary questions to one side. Why we do so must be briefly sketched in its main features, in order to remove this difficulty. The initial demand is that we should first investigate reason generally, the cognitive capacity or conceptual thought, before proceeding to cognition. This demand is involved in all of these views. We picture the project of cognition as though it were something that came about by means of an *instrument* with which one wants to grasp the truth. On closer consideration, the demand that we should first cognize this instrument is inappropriate, however plausible it may seem. The critique of the cognitive capacity is a stance taken by Kant's philosophy and by our time.⁵⁸ It was believed that a great discovery had been made at this point, but, as so often happens in life, the belief was a mistake. Just when people think they have done the cleverest thing is when they have done the

53 silliest.⁵⁹ |

Reason is to be investigated—but how? It must be investigated rationally, it must be cognized. This is possible only through rational thinking, through rational cognition; any other way it is impossible.

58. W (HgG) *adds*: and its theology.

59. W₂ (MiscP/Var?) *reads*: For ordinarily when people have a fancy that they take to be quite clever, they are the most foolish, and their satisfaction consists in having discovered a splendid twist for their foolishness and ignorance. As a rule they are indefatigable in twisting about when it comes to fashioning a good conscience regarding their laziness and avoiding the issue.

This demand directly involves a requirement that annuls itself. If we ought not to begin philosophizing until we have cognized reason rationally, then we cannot begin at all, for in cognizing we *are* comprehending rationally; but we are supposed to relinquish this rational comprehension, since it is precisely reason that we are supposed to cognize. This is the same demand as that Gascon⁶⁰ makes who does not want to go into the water until he is able to swim. To learn to swim one must go into the water. One cannot make cognition into one's object without thereby behaving cognitively at the same time.

Here in the philosophy of religion it is more precisely God, or reason in principle, that is the object. God is essentially rational, is rationality that is alive and, as spirit, is in and for itself. When we philosophize about religion, we are in fact investigating reason, intelligence, and cognition; only we do so without the supposition that we will get this over first, apart from our [real] object; instead the cognition of reason *is* exactly the object, is what it is all about. Spirit is just this: to be for itself, to be for spirit. This is what finite spirit is; and the relationship of finite spirit or of finite reason [to infinite spirit or reason] is engendered within ~religion~⁶¹ itself and must be dealt with there. Also pertinent here is the distinction between a science and conjectures concerning a science. These conjectures are contingent; but insofar as they are thoughts containing viewpoints relating to the matter, they must fall within the treatment itself, though in their proper order and where they are necessary; then they are not [just] contingent bubbles of thought that arise within us. The other factor is that the viewpoints underlying these questions, insofar as they | are involved in the matter, are brought up along with [the evolution of] the content itself. In this way those viewpoints even occur within religion itself, and we thus come to the relationship of reason to positive religion.

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The [infinite] spirit that makes itself an object gives itself essentially the shape of a *representation*, of something given, of some-

60. [Ed.] Thus G; the 1827 lectures read "Scholastic." No other 1824 source gives the anecdote. See below, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 51.

61. Thus G, P; D reads: science W (HgG/Var?) reads: philosophy of religion

thing appearing to the other [finite] spirit *for which* it is. Spirit appears for the other as something given, something coming to it in a higher mode; and therein lies the necessity that the relationship of spirit [to spirit] comes to be a positive religion. Spirit comes to be for itself in the shape of representation; the positive aspect of religion is brought forth in the shape of [spirit's being] the other *for* the other, *for which* spirit is. Similarly, the definition of religion—according to which it is *cognitive*, is the activity of reason or the activity of conceptualization and thought—lies within religion itself; this cognitive attitude toward God falls within religion itself, just as the standpoint of feeling does. Feeling, too, must show itself in religion. Feeling is the subjective aspect, what pertains to me as this single individual. When I feel I thereby appeal to myself, and thus relate myself back to my singular subjectivity; others can have other feelings and thereby appeal to themselves, too. With thinking, on the other hand, we are on common ground. Both this standpoint [of *thinking*] (inasmuch as God gives himself this ultimate singularization of thisness, [becoming] the object for a cognizing activity and the object for a thinking activity) and [*what is*] *thought* (inasmuch as God thus gives himself the relationship of God to the feeling subject) must be treated within religion.^{62 63} Thus the determination that God *is*, the determination of what has being in and for itself, this determination of [God's] being, is a determination that falls essentially within the treatment of religion, within the treatment of the nature of its object. |

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62. [Ed.] *Auch dieser Standpunkt—insofern sich Gott diese letzte Vereinzelung des Dienen gibt, zu dem Gegenstand als einem Erkennenden und dem Gegenstand als Denkenden—, und der Gedanke—insofern er sich das Verhältnis Gottes gibt also zum fühlenden Subjekt—muss auch innerhalb der Religion abgehandelt werden.* The German of this sentence is difficult to construe, and the meaning is not entirely clear. The basic point seems to be that acts of cognition and states of feeling are possible within religion because God, by entering into otherness as a singular “this,” and by relating himself to subjective feeling, makes himself to be the object of such acts and states. Similarly, as the next sentence indicates, the determination that God *is* falls within the treatment of religion rather than being something that must be demonstrated in advance, abstractly. On this last matter, see below, n. 72.

63. W₁ (HgG/Var?) *adds*: If we also say that feeling and devotion are essential, this is only because there is a spiritual relationship or spirituality in this feeling. W₂ *adds*: because there is a spiritual relationship or spirituality in this feeling.

5. Survey of the Stages of Our Discussion⁶⁴

The more precise division of our treatment is as follows. The first topic is the concept of religion itself in general; the second is the necessary or determinate religion, religion in its determinateness; the third is religion in its infinitude, the absolute religion as existing. The concept of religion is not yet religion in the way it exists, while determinate religion, just because it is determinate, does not yet correspond to the concept. Religion contains within itself the infinite absolute content. Determinate religion does not correspond to this content, for it is finite. The infinite religion is what first corresponds to the concept; it is the consummate religion, i.e., the Christian religion.

1. The Concept of Religion

We have to consider the moments [of the concept] in more detail. Taken in its speculative, absolute sense, the concept of religion is the concept of the spirit that is conscious of its essence or of itself. The mode and manner of consciousness, the way that spirit itself is for itself or is objective to itself, is, as a rule, *representation*, and thus absolute consciousness is *religion*. It is *philosophy* to the extent that spirit is conscious of itself not in the mode of representation but in that of *thought*. This is now the *speculative concept*, spirit conscious of itself.

Now, speaking more precisely, the following moments are contained in this concept. First, we consider the determinateness, the

64. [Ed.] The heading for this section is found in *P*; the first two subheads are in *G*, while the third is editorial. It is noteworthy that the *Concept of Religion* in the 1824 lectures does not correspond to the summary given here until the last section, and then only partially. The summary describes the three moments of the concept of religion, which correspond to the logical moments of the concept as such, namely the moments of universal substance (the metaphysical concept of God), differentiation or consciousness (the theoretical religious relationship), and sublation of the difference or the cultus (the practical relationship). But Hegel adopted this logical structure of the *Concept of Religion* only in 1827; the 1824 *Concept* is still largely concerned with preliminary matters, such as the establishment of the speculative standpoint vis-à-vis the empirical, and a continuing polemic against the views of the time. Hegel clearly had arrived at his mature conception of the lectures by 1824, but it is as though he were distracted from putting it into place by his preoccupation with opposing views—a preoccupation that is at its height in 1824.

metaphysical content, the pure thought of it. Second, because it is a consciousness, pure thought does not stay pure but enters into the distinction of consciousness. In this consciousness we have two sides, the object and the subject for which this object is; this is the standpoint of finite spirit within religion. Spirit rules in religion. According to its concept, in and for itself, spirit is infinite, and spirit rules insofar as it differentiates itself inwardly; but as the inwardly self-differentiating spirit that gives itself consciousness, as spirit in relation to an other within its distinction, it is finite. And it is just from this standpoint of finite spirit that we are to consider the shape in which its essence is object to it. The *first* moment is therefore the *substantial* one, the *second* the standpoint of *consciousness*, while the *third* is the sublating of this finite standpoint of consciousness, the uniting of both sides, the *cultus*. The concept | of religion [is] the substantial basis of religion, the substance that is one. The standpoint of consciousness is the subordinate moment of difference. Then there is the return to the first, substantial standpoint. [First] the concept is for us, [though] in actuality it is what is *inward*; at the second stage it *appears* as object, as something *external*; only at the third stage is it *one*, does it become *cultus*. These three moments belong to the idea of religion in general, to religion insofar as it is idea. The first is the *abstract* concept, the second the process or the *realization* of the concept, and the third the *identity* of the first two.

II. Determinate Religion

What is second, then, is that we have to consider determinate religion, religion in its determinateness. The route from abstract to concrete is based on our method, on the concept, ~or rather on the nature of the concept. The fact that the concept resolves to determine itself, that absolute spirit resolves to be in a determinate mode, we can present in the following manner.⁶⁵ Spirit *is* in the most *concrete* sense. The absolute or highest being belongs to it. But spirit is, and this being belongs to it, only insofar as it is *for* itself,

65. W (HgG) reads: not on the fact that much particular content is at hand. Our view distinguishes itself totally from this.

i.e., insofar as it posits itself or "brings itself forth; for it is *only as activity*."⁶⁶ It is not immediate; natural things are immediate and abide in this [immediate] being. Spirit's being is not immediate in this way, but only as self-producing, as making itself for itself.⁶⁷ Spirit comes to itself; this is a movement, an activity, a mediation of itself with | itself. It involves distinctions and directions, and this succession of directed movements is the path by which spirit comes to itself, for spirit is itself the goal. The absolute goal is to recognize itself, to be for itself. That it cognizes itself, that it is as object for itself, that it grasps itself in the complete intuition and complete consciousness of itself, is object to itself in the way that it is in itself, and comes to complete cognition of itself—this goal is its true goal. This process by which spirit produces itself or comes to itself, this path it takes, contains distinguishable determinations and distinct moments. The path is not yet the goal. Spirit does not reach the goal without having traversed the path, is not at the goal from the outset; that which is most perfect [i.e., complete] must traverse the path *to* the goal.⁶⁸ Something cannot be perfect from its very beginning, but only when it attains itself, attains its goal. Therefore spirit is this process and is perfect only at its goal. At the stations of its process spirit is not yet perfect; its consciousness concerning itself is not yet authentic; it is not yet manifest to itself according to its truth; it is revealed to itself only at its goal. Inasmuch as spirit is essentially this activity of self-production, these are stages of its consciousness, but it is conscious of itself only according to these stations. These distinct stages now yield the determinate religions;

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66. W_1 reads: brings itself forth and to consciousness. W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: brings itself forth. But in this its activity it is knowing, and it is what it is only as knowing. Thus it is essential for religion not to be only in its concept, but to be the consciousness of what the concept is; and the material in which the concept carries itself out, as the plan so to speak, the material it makes its own and shapes in conformity with itself, is human consciousness—as, for example, right, too, only is because it exists in spirit and engages the will of human beings, and because they know it as the determination of their will. In this way the idea first realizes itself, whereas it was posited beforehand in the first instance only as the form of the concept.

67. W (*HgG*) adds: through negation, as subject, otherwise it is only substance.

68. W (*HgG*) adds: in order to gain it.

[a determinate] religion is a consciousness of universal spirit that is not yet for itself as absolute. This consciousness, at each stage, of the spirit that has not yet penetrated to itself, is spirit's determinate consciousness "but not yet absolute consciousness; i.e., it is determinate religion."⁶⁹ We therefore have to consider the determinate religions, imperfect as they are, because they are stages of the path of spirit. It is the very nature of spirit itself that it forges this path, for *it is* only through the fact that it *becomes for itself*.

We now have to consider these determinate religions in three ways. *First*, we must look at the determinateness of any such religion as a pure determination of thought, i.e., we must consider its metaphysical concept. What will present itself to us in this metaphysical
58 determinacy is the content that, in the older tradition | of philosophy—[for example, in the] Wolffian philosophy⁷⁰—took the form of the "proofs of the existence of God." We shall consider in more detail how this form of "giving proofs" is deficient and faulty. In more recent times we no longer hear of these "proofs," since "proof" as such is only a procedure of the understanding, [whereas] here only speculative reason suffices. Besides being representations, these "proofs of God's existence" also have a certain content, a thought-content, and it is noteworthy that these different proofs correspond to the different stages of determinate religion. (The fact that there are a number of proofs⁷¹ already speaks against them, since a proof must on its own account be adequate and exhaustive if it is suited to the nature of its object.) Therefore the different

69. W (HgG) reads: the path of spirit's education.

70. [Ed.] Hegel probably refers to Wolff in particular because in Wolff's *Theologia naturalis* the proofs not only are given but also determine the conception of natural theology. The existence and attributes of God are demonstrated a posteriori in the first part and a priori (taking the concept of the most perfect being as the point of departure) in the second part. For Wolff's demonstrative claim, see esp. his *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, §§ 2–4.

71. [Ed.] Hegel is thinking in particular of the cosmological, physico-theological, and ontological proofs. He does not discuss other, more ancient proofs (such as the proof *ex consensu gentium*—"from the consensus of the peoples") or more modern proofs (such as the moral proof in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 86–89). A similar criticism of the multiplicity of proofs already is found in Wolff's *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, § 10: "In natural theology it is not requisite, and not even fitting, to expound God's existence with multiple proofs, for one proof suffices."

proofs of God's existence have a content; and it is precisely the different stages of the determinacy of religion that are expressed by their similarly determinate thought-content. In other words, the succession of the different determinate religions is contained in the succession of proofs.⁷² This is a higher justification for these very proofs of God's existence, as we shall see. (It is easy to recognize their negative aspect, but difficult to recognize their affirmative import.) [Thus] the first step is [that we give an account of] the thought-determinacy of God and simultaneously of the determinacy of the finite and its sublation, in the course of which, by means of sublation, the very representation of God is supposed to arise—and we hold fast the pure thought-determinacy of religion, of a specific stage of religious consciousness.

The *second* step is that we consider the shape or the *representation of this determinacy*, i.e., what shape this determinacy must have. Religion is such a consciousness insofar as in religion there occurs that determinacy of consciousness for which the object is on the whole a represented object and not a conceived object; in other words, the subjective consciousness is a representing and not a conceiving consciousness (the latter is philosophy). We have to show that, in order to make itself capable of being represented, spirit must advance to the form wherein it is a subjective consciousness of something represented.

The *third* aspect is the *particular cultus*, the church of such a religion—the cultus or the mode of unification of the thought-determinacy and the representation. The historical side of religion (i.e., of the religions) is then linked especially with these two aspects, the modality of the shape and of the cultus. For it should be noted, in connection with determinate | religion, that these determinacies, of which we take cognizance one after another [in logical order], have also been necessarily present in the world. When we consider the sequence of the determinate religions under the guidance of the

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72. [Ed.] This helps to explain why in the 1821 and 1824 lectures Hegel considers the different proofs in relation to the concept of God as it appears in each of the determinate religions, rather than setting forth a demonstration of God's "existence" in advance of the concrete discussion. However, the latter is just what he does in 1827 by gathering all the proofs into the *Concept*.

concept, as ruled and determined by the concept, the sequence of the historical religions emerges for us from it, and thus we have the history of religions before us at the same time. For what is *necessary* through the concept must have *existed*, and the religions, as they have followed one another, have not arisen in a contingent manner. Instead it is spirit that governs what is inward, that has brought it forth. It is not the work of chance, and it is absurd to see contingency here.⁷³ Therefore the religions, in the way they have followed one another in history, are not determined externally but instead by the concept itself; they are determined by the very nature of spirit itself, which has forced itself into the world in order to bring itself to consciousness of itself. It traverses a process by which it brings itself to consciousness of itself. Inasmuch as we consider the consciousness of spirit and these determinate religions according to the concept, this is a purely philosophical treatment, but at the same time also a treatment of what *is*. Philosophy on the whole does not consider *what is not*; only *what is, is rational*. ([I mean] what *actually* is, not the merely phenomenal or the merely existing.)⁷⁴

III. [The Revelatory Religion]

The third stage is that in this very course of the determinate religions the concept loses its finitude, loses this inadequacy of its existence, which it has in consciousness; it sublates its own untruth and comes to be as it is, arrives at genuine consciousness of itself. This is then the *revelatory* or *manifest religion*, and not only the *revealed* religion—manifest, whereas formerly religion was always still veiled, was not in its truth. The fact that what we cognize as the concept of religion is also the content of *this* religion holds good to begin with in the mode of representation. The content of religion itself

73. W (HgG) *adds*: in the manner of the historian.

74. [Ed.] The treatment of the cultus in the 1824 *Concept* is largely devoted to a survey of the development of the concept of religion through its history, specifically the fundamental and distinctive forms assumed by cultic practice. This survey appears to be an expansion of a similar brief survey given at the end of Sec. A of the Ms. *Concept*, and the preceding paragraph contains echoes of the Ms. at this point, too.

is found in a religious mode. Only when the time had come⁷⁵ did spirit become manifest; for the very movement of spirit, this path upon which it alone posits itself as spirit, whereby it becomes all things as spirit and arrives at the goal, is a path that falls within existence and hence in time. Religion | is for the universal consciousness, the nonphilosophical consciousness, for consciousness of spirit generally; and thus for this general consciousness spirit is an object in a sensible mode, in representation; only in philosophy is spirit an object as concept.

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This is therefore the general survey of our procedure. This procedure will to a certain degree be a theodicy.⁷⁶ Spirit is not only an abstract, otherworldly spirit, but living and contemporary spirit, [which] is present within consciousness and is effective. For this very reason spirit itself has to appear within consciousness and to pass through the [mode of] appearance, in order then *to be for itself*.

75. [Ed.] Hegel alludes to the New Testament idea of the fullness of time. See Mark 1:15, Gal. 4:4, Eph. 1:10.

76. [Ed.] With the term "theodicy" Hegel situates philosophy of religion in the ancient tradition of the "justification of God," which reaches back into antiquity and in particular to Stoicism. He is probably thinking above all of Leibniz's *Essays on Theodicy* (1719) (*Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 6).

INTRODUCTION THE LECTURES OF 1827

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Preface¹

What we must take into consideration is first the relation of the philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole, and second the relationship of the science of religion to the needs of our time.

The object is religion. This is the loftiest object that can occupy human beings; it is the absolute object. It is the region of eternal truth and eternal virtue, the region where all the riddles of thought, all contradictions, and all the sorrows of the heart should show themselves to be resolved, and the region of the eternal peace through which the human being is truly human. All the endless

1. [Ed.] None of the extant manuscripts has an initial heading. One might suppose, on the basis of the summary statement in the opening sentence, that the first topic to be considered, beginning immediately in the next paragraph, is "the relation of the philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole." But this summary is misleading since the first topic Hegel considers—and only after what we are calling the "Preface"—is rather different (see n. 5). The summary of the first of the two points to be considered actually reflects the 1824 lectures, which indicates that Hegel used the Griesheim transcript of 1824 when he lectured in 1827, changing the content of the latter lectures as he proceeded. The first long paragraph ("The object is religion . . . our intent to consider") is based on the opening remarks in the *Ms.*, which Hegel repeated in 1824 and 1827. In order to identify this common material we are using the heading "Preface," although it is not an expression used by Hegel himself. The 1827 "Preface" cannot be reconstructed from either *W* or *L* since both of them tightly interweave materials from 1821, 1824, and 1827 in an editorial version of Hegel's opening remarks. Our text at this point is based on the transcript of the Polish student Hube, whose German left something to be desired. His staccato sentences, rapid shifts of images, and grammatical infelicities have been smoothed out a bit, but the style is not characteristic of Hegel and the contents are abbreviated.

intricacies of human activity and pleasures arise from the determination of human being as implicitly spirit. Everything that people value and esteem, everything on which they think to base their pride and glory, all of this finds its ultimate focal point in religion, in the thought or consciousness of God and in the feeling of God. God is the beginning and end of all things. God is the sacred center, which animates and inspires all things. Religion possesses its object within itself—and that object is God, for religion is the relation of human consciousness to God. The object of religion is simply through itself and on its own account; it is the absolutely final end in and for itself, the absolutely free being. Here our concern about the final end can have no other final end than this object itself. Only in this context do all other aims experience their settlement. In its concern with this object, spirit frees itself from all finitude. “This concern is the true liberation of the human being and is freedom itself, true consciousness of the truth.”² Everything [else] drops into the | past. Finite life seems like a desert. Religion is the consciousness of freedom and truth. If our concern with it is a feeling then it is bliss, and if an activity then it has to manifest God’s glory and majesty. This concept of religion is universal. Religion holds this position for all peoples and persons. Everywhere this concern is regarded as the sabbath of life. Truly in this region of the spirit flow the waters of forgetfulness from which the soul drinks.³ All the griefs of this bank and shoal⁴ of life vanish away in this aether, whether in the feeling of devotion or of hope. All of it drops into the past. In religion all cares pass away, for in it one finds oneself fortunate. All harshness of fate passes into a dream. Everything earthly dissolves into light and love, not a remote but an actually present liveliness, certainty, and enjoyment. Even if [the bliss of] religion

2. *Thus Hu with An*; *W₁* reads: In its concern with this object, spirit unburdens itself of all finitude. This concern leads to satisfaction and liberation. *W₂* (*Var/1831?*) reads: In the region in which spirit concerns itself with this aim it unburdens itself of all finitude and gains ultimate satisfaction and liberation; for here spirit no longer relates itself to something other and limited, but to the unlimited and the infinite instead. This is an infinite relationship, a relationship of freedom and no longer one of dependence.

3. [Ed.] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 11.

4. [Ed.] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 10.

is put off into the future, it is still radiant in life here and now, or in the actuality within which this image is effective and substantial. Such is the universal content of religion among human beings; this content it is our intent to consider.

1. Comparison of Philosophy and Religion with Regard to Their Object⁵

⁶But it should be noted straightaway that the proposal to “consider” it involves a relationship to it that is already twisted out of shape. For when | we speak of “consideration” and “object” we are distinguishing the two as freestanding, mutually independent, 63

5. [Ed.] In this section Hegel does not consider “the relation of philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole,” as he suggests in his initial summary statement (see n. 1), but rather offers a comparison of philosophy and religion with regard to their object (hence our editorial section heading). Hegel makes two basic points: that the object or content of philosophy and religion is one and the same, and that the connection between philosophy and religion has already been established in the tradition. While this section may be considered to be new, it draws on materials from earlier lectures, including parts of the *Ms. Introduction* and Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the *Ms.*

6. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads (parallel in main text follows):* Since we remarked earlier that philosophy makes religion the object of its consideration, and since this consideration now seems to have the aspect of something distinct from its object, it looks as if we are still standing in the relationship where both sides are independent of one another and remain separate. In assuming this observational relationship, we would be stepping outside of the region of devotion and enjoyment that religion is; the object and the [act of] consideration as the movement of thought would then be as distinct as (for example) the spatial figures in mathematics are distinct from the spirit that considers them. But this is only the relationship as it appears to begin with, when cognition is still severed from the religious side and is *finite* cognition. If we look more closely, however, it is evident that in fact the content, need, and interest of philosophy is something it has in common with religion.

The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its very objectivity, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is not worldly wisdom but cognition of the nonworldly; not cognition of external mass or of empirical existence and life, but cognition of what is eternal, of what God is and what flows from God's nature: for this nature must reveal and develop itself. Hence philosophy is only explicating *itself* when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. Since it is the concern with eternal truth, which is in and for itself, and indeed since it is the occupation of thinking spirit (not of [individual] caprice and of particular interest) with this object, philosophy is the same activity as religion. In its philosophizing, spirit immerses itself just as vitally in this object, and relinquishes its particularity in the same way. For it

fixed sides that are mutually opposed. For example, space is the object of geometry, but the spatial figures that it considers are distinct from the considering spirit, for they are only its "object." So if we say now that philosophy ought to consider religion, then these two are likewise set in a relationship of distinction in which they stand in opposition to one another. But on the contrary it must be said that the content of philosophy, its need and interest, is wholly in common with that of religion. The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only explicating *itself* when

penetrates its object just as the religious consciousness does, which also has nothing of its own but only wants to immerse itself in this content.

Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself the service of God; it *is* religion, because it involves the same renunciation of subjective fancies and opinions in its concern with God. Thus philosophy is identical with religion, and the distinction [between them] is that philosophy exists in a way peculiar to itself, distinguished from the mode we are accustomed to call "religion" as such. What they have in common is that they are both religion; what distinguishes them consists only in the type and mode of religion [that each is]. They differ in the peculiar character of their concern with God. But this is where the difficulties lie, which seem so great that for philosophy ever to be one with religion counts as an impossibility. The apprehensive attitude of theology toward philosophy and the [mutually] hostile stance of religion and philosophy arise from this. In the perspective of this hostile stance (as theology construes it), it seems that philosophy works to corrupt the content of religion, destroying and profaning it, and that the concern of philosophy with God is completely different from that of religion. This is the old antipathy and contradiction that we already see among the Greeks; for even among the Athenians, that free and democratic people, books were burned and Socrates was condemned to death. But now this antipathy is held to be an acknowledged fact, and more so than the just-asserted unity of religion and philosophy.

Old as this antipathy is, however, the linkage of philosophy with religion is just as ancient. Already for the Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists, still situated within the pagan world, the folk deities were not deities of phantasy but had become deities of thought. Afterward this linkage found a place in the work of the most eminent church fathers, who adopted an essentially conceptual approach in their religiosity, by setting out from the assumption that theology is religion together with a thinking, comprehending consciousness. The Christian church owes to their philosophical instruction the first beginnings of a content of Christian doctrine.

This uniting of religion with philosophy was carried through even more fully in the Middle Ages. So far were they from believing that conceptual knowing might be injurious to faith that it was regarded as essential to the further development of faith itself. These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—developed the definitions of the faith still further on the basis of philosophy.

it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. For the *thinking* spirit is what penetrates this object, the truth; it is thinking that enjoys the truth and purifies the subjective consciousness. Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself | the service of God,⁷ as is religion. But each of them, religion as well as philosophy, is the service of God in a way peculiar to it (about which more needs to be said). They differ in the peculiar character of their concern with God. This is where the difficulties lie that impede philosophy's grasp of religion; and it often appears impossible for the two of them to be united. The apprehensive attitude of religion toward philosophy and the hostile stance of each toward the other arise from this. It seems, as the theologians frequently suggest, that philosophy works to corrupt the content of religion, destroying and profaning it. This old antipathy stands before our eyes as something admitted and acknowledged, more generally acknowledged than their unity. The time seems to have arrived, however, when philosophy can deal with religion more impartially on the one hand, and more fruitfully and auspiciously on the other. 64

This linkage between them is nothing new. It already obtained among the more eminent of the church fathers,⁸ who had steeped themselves particularly in Neopythagorean, Neoplatonic, and Neoaristotelian philosophy. | For one thing, they themselves first passed over to Christianity from philosophy; and for another, they applied that philosophical profundity of spirit to the teachings of Christianity. The church owes to their philosophical instruction the first beginnings of Christian doctrine, the development of a *dogmatics*. (Of course it is often said to be a pity that Christianity ever required a determinate content and a dogmatics. We shall have to say more later about the relationship [of the dogmatic content] to religious sensibility, to the purely intensive element in devotion.) 65

7. [Ed.] See *Ms. Intro.*, n. 6.

8. [Ed.] Hegel is presumably thinking in particular of Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, even though in the sense of orthodox dogmatics the latter two do not count as church fathers, or do so only in a qualified way. Perhaps he is also thinking of Augustine. Nowhere can more exact information about the church fathers be obtained from his work.

We can see the same linkage between theology and philosophy in the Middle Ages, too. Scholastic philosophy is identical with theology; theology is philosophy, and philosophy is theology. So far were they from believing that thinking, conceptual knowing, might be injurious to theology that it was regarded as necessary, as essential to theology itself. These great men—Anselm, Abelard, etc.—built up theology out of philosophy.~ Thus Anselm said: *cum ad fidem perveneris, negligentiae mihi esse videtur non intellegere quod credis.*^{9 10} |

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2. The Relationship of the Science of Religion to the Needs of Our Time¹¹

~Although it follows upon a period when the antipathy became

9. [Ed.] “When you have achieved faith, it seems to me to be negligence not to understand what you believe.” This is an abbreviated quotation from memory, taken from Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo*, chap. 2: *Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei credamus, priusquam ea praesumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intellegere* (Migne *Patrologia Latina* 158.362b.) “As the right order requires us to believe the deep things of Christian faith before we undertake to discuss them by reason; so to my mind it appears a neglect if, after we are established in the faith, we do not seek to understand what we believe” (translation by S. N. Deane, *St. Anselm: Basic Writings* [LaSalle, Ill., 1962], p. 179). While Hegel was familiar with the major works of Anselm—the *Cur Deus Homo*, the *Monologion*, and the *Proslogion*—and considered this eleventh-century theologian to be a seminal figure in the history of speculative thought about God, he probably knew Abelard only from the accounts in the histories of philosophy by Jacob Brucker, Dietrich Tiedemann, and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, to which he refers in commenting on Abelard in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*.

10. *W₂* (*MiscP*) adds: In constructing its world for itself over against religion, cognition would have made only a finite content its own. But in that it has developed itself further, i.e. into the true philosophy, it has the same content as religion.

But if in a preliminary way we now seek out the distinction between religion and philosophy as it comes to prominence within this unity of content, we find it to be as follows.

11. [Ed.] This heading, suggested by the summary statement in the opening paragraph (see n. 1), designates the longest section in the 1827 *Introduction*. It is not clearly organized and appears to be something of a grab bag of themes taken over and highlighted from the 1824 *Introduction*. For example, the first topic, the reduced doctrinal content of present-day theology, is a modification of the critique of historical theology in Sec. 2 of the 1824 lectures. The second topic, in which Hegel argues that the knowledge of God, while based on immediate experience,

once more a presupposition,¹² the present day seems again to be more propitious for the linkage of philosophy and theology. In support of this view two circumstances must be underlined. The first concerns the content, the second the form.¹³ With reference

also has cognitive content, further develops the critique of the theology of reason and the theology of feeling found in the same section of the 1824 *Introduction*. The argument that there can be no investigation of the cognitive faculty in advance of cognition draws upon one of the "preliminary questions" in Sec. 4 of 1824, namely, that there is no epistemological prolegomenon to philosophy that is not already speculative in character. Only the summary description of speculative method—which achieves a unification of opposites in which the element of difference is not extinguished but sublated—appears to be new. It is clear that in 1827 Hegel's conflict with the philosophical and theological views of the time becomes the dominant theme of the *Introduction*. However, this polemic does not spill over into *The Concept of Religion* as it does in 1824, so it may well be that Hegel determined in 1827 to concentrate the polemic in the *Introduction*, allowing *The Concept of Religion* to be organized according to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God, quite apart from partisan considerations. Some material from Sec. A of the Ms. *Concept* is also included here—material of an introductory character no longer appropriate to the 1827 *Concept*.

12. [Ed.] A reference possibly to the confessionalism of the Lutheran Reformation with its attack on Scholastic thought, and certainly to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophies that sharpened the distinction between natural and revealed (positive) religion in a manner critical of the latter.

13. *W₂ (MiscP) reads*: Thus in accordance with all its base ramifications, the contemporary view unconcerned with knowledge of God does not hesitate, in the blind arrogance that is peculiar to it, to turn against philosophy. Yet philosophy is the liberation of spirit from that disgraceful abasement; and philosophy has drawn religion forth once more out of the level of profoundest suffering that it was forced to undergo from that standpoint. The very theologians who are still at home only in that state of vanity have dared to complain against philosophy for its destructive tendency, theologians who [themselves] no longer possess any of the content that is subject to possible destruction. In order to repulse these objections, which are not only unfounded but even more frivolous and unprincipled, we need only to look briefly to the way in which the theologians have rather done everything [they could] to dissolve the determinate character of religion. They have (1) thrust the dogmas into the background or declared them to be unimportant, or have (2) considered the dogmas only as alien definitions by other people and as mere phenomena from a history that is long gone. When we have reflected thus upon this aspect of the content, and have seen how philosophy reinstates it and renders it secure from the depredations of theology, then we shall (3) reflect upon the form of that standpoint, and shall see here how that orientation, which in its form is antagonistic to philosophy, is so ignorant about itself that it does not even know in what way it contains implicitly within itself the very principle of philosophy.

to the *content*, the reproach has usually been brought against philosophy that by it the content of the doctrine of the revealed, positive religion is suppressed, that through it Christianity is destroyed. Only a so-called natural religion¹⁴ and theology has been admitted in philosophy, i.e., a content that the natural light of reason could supply regarding God; but it was invariably considered as standing opposed to Christianity. At present this reproach that philosophy is destructive of dogma has been removed, and in fact the theology of our time, i.e. of the last thirty to fifty years, has on its own part effected this removal.

67 In recent theology very few of the dogmas of the earlier system of ecclesiastical confessions have survived or at least | retained the importance previously attributed to them, and others have not been set in their place. "One could easily arrive at the view"¹⁵ that a widespread, nearly universal indifference toward the doctrines of faith formerly regarded as essential has entered into the general religiousness of the public. For though Christ as reconciler and savior is still constantly made the focus of faith, nevertheless what formerly was called in orthodox dogmatics the work of salvation has taken on a significance so strongly psychological and so very prosaic that only the semblance of the ancient doctrine of the church remains. In lieu of the former dogmas we now behold in Christ merely "great energy of character and constancy of conviction, for the sake of which Christ deemed his life of no account."¹⁶ This is now the universal object of faith. Thus Christ is dragged down to the level of human affairs, not to the level of the commonplace but still to that of the human, into the sphere of a mode of action of which pagans such as Socrates have also been capable. And so, although Christ has remained the focal point of faith for many

14. [Ed.] The idea of a "natural religion," as contrasted with revealed religion, is common throughout the Enlightenment. See in particular Herbert of Cherbury (with whose thought Hegel would not have been familiar), Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume. The idea of a "natural light of reason," however, may be traced back to Bacon, Thomas Aquinas, and Cicero.

15. W_2 (Var) reads (similar in W_1): One can easily convince oneself [of this] by considering what now actually passes for the dogmas of the church

16. [Ed.] This quotation cannot be identified in its present form. Hegel may have conflated passages with which he was familiar from rationalistic exegesis and dogmatics in a fashion such as this.

people who are religious and also more profound in outlook, it must still seem that the most weighty doctrines have lost much of their interest, faith in the Trinity for example, or the miracles in the Old and New Testaments, etc.¹⁷

If a large part of the educated public, even many theologians, had to declare with hand on heart whether they hold those doctrines of faith to be indispensable for eternal blessedness, or whether not believing | in them would have eternal damnation as its consequence, there can surely be no doubt what the answer would be.¹⁸ “Eternal damnation” and “eternal blessedness” are themselves phrases that may not be used in so-called polite company; such expressions count as ἄρρητα.¹⁹ Even though one does not disavow them, one still would be embarrassed to have to declare oneself about them.²⁰ And if one has read the books of dogmatics, of

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17. *W₂ (1831) adds (similar in W₁):* The divinity of Christ, i.e., the dogmatic element proper to the Christian religion, is set aside or reduced to something universal only. Indeed this did not only happen in the Enlightenment, but it happens also in the work of more pious theologians. Both parties agree that the Trinity may have entered Christian doctrine from the Alexandrian school, or from the Neoplatonists. But although it must be conceded that the church fathers studied Greek philosophy, it is still primarily immaterial where that doctrine came from. The question is solely whether it is true in and for itself. That point, however, is not investigated, and yet that doctrine is the fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion.

[*Ed.*] From the allusion to “more pious theologians,” as well as from the Preface to the 2d ed. of the *Encyclopedia* (1827), we can assume that Hegel here has especially in mind F. A. G. Tholuck, whose *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* was published in 1826. Tholuck was convinced that the doctrine of the triad was widespread in Islamic thought and in late Greek philosophy, and that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is closely linked with Neoplatonism. In his *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), Tholuck argues that, while the speculative idea of the Trinity may be “decorative timbering” (*Fachwerk*), it can never be the foundation of the house of faith (pp. 219–220). Hegel responds to this view critically in his letter to Tholuck of 3 July 1826 (*Briefe* 4/2:60–61).

18. [*Ed.*] On the neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity among Hegel’s theological contemporaries, see above, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 34, as well as the preceding note.

19. [*Ed.*] Literally, “inexpressible.” *W* adds as an explanatory comment: “such things as one is averse to [or dreads] expressing.”

20. *W (1831) has express in place of declare and adds:* In the doctrinal theologies of these theologians we shall find that the dogmas have become very lean and shriveled up, though there may, to be sure, be a great flurry of words.

edification and sermons of our day, in which the basic doctrines of Christianity ought to be expounded or at any rate taken as fundamental, and one were obliged to pass judgment on whether in the greater part of current theological literature those doctrines are expressed in an orthodox sense and without ambiguity or escape hatches, then again there is no question what the answer would be. If now theology no longer places such importance on the positive doctrines of Christianity, or for that matter if through their interpretation these doctrines are enveloped in such a fog, then one impediment to the philosophical comprehension of dogmas drops away, which used to arise from the fact that philosophy was considered to be an opponent of the teachings of the church. If those doctrines have declined so sharply in their interest, then philosophy can operate without constraint in regard to them.²¹

69 The most important sign that these positive dogmas have lost much of their importance is that in the main these doctrines are treated *historically*.²² As far as this historical procedure is concerned, it deals with thoughts and representations that were had, introduced, and fought over by others, with convictions that belong to others, with histories that do not take place within our spirit, do not engage the needs of our spirit. What is of interest is rather how these things have come about in the case of others, the contingent way in which they were formed.²³ The absolute way in which

21. W (1831) reads: It seems that, in accord with the general education of most of them, the theologians themselves endow the principal doctrines of positive Christianity with the importance that was formerly ascribed to them (when they were even valued as principal doctrines) only after they have been enveloped in a fog of vagueness. Now if philosophy ever did count as the opponent of church doctrine, it can be an opponent no longer; for the doctrines whose ruin philosophy seemed to threaten are no longer valid in the universal conviction. So when it considers those dogmas in a conceptual manner, a great deal of the danger for philosophy from this quarter should therefore have been set aside, and philosophy can operate without constraint in regard to the dogmas that have declined so sharply in interest for the theologians themselves.

22. *Precedes in L* (1827?): This theology, which adopts only a historical attitude with respect to the cognition of God, and which is indeed a cornucopia of cognitions but only of an external sort, clings tightly to merely historical perspectives and piles up a mass of content as external information.

23. *L* (1827?) adds: The subject is there dealing not with its own commitments to believe, with a cognition that should belong to it and be for its own benefit, but

these doctrines were formed—out of the depths of spirit—is forgotten, and so their necessity and truth is forgotten, too, and the question what one holds as one's own conviction meets with astonishment. The historical procedure is very busy with these doctrines, though not with their content but rather with the external features of the controversies about them, with the passions that have attached themselves to them, etc. For this reason²⁴ philosophy no longer has to face the reproach that it devalues the dogmas. Instead it suffers the reproach of containing within itself too much of the teachings of the church, more than the generally prevailing theology of our time.²⁵ |

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The other circumstance that seems to favor the renewed linkage of theology and philosophy concerns the *form*. Here indeed it is a question of the conviction of the age²⁶ that God is revealed immediately in the consciousness of human beings, that religion

with a cognition of the opinions and views of others, not with the thing itself; the thing itself would benefit anyone concerned with it. W_2 (Var) reads: formed and appeared; and the question what one holds as one's own conviction meets with astonishment. W_1 (Var) reads: formed and appeared.

24. W (1831) reads: Here theology has by its own act been set in a sufficiently abject position. W_1 (1831) adds further: For this reason philosophy seems to be in little danger when it is reproached for treating the Christian dogmas in a thoughtful way, or indeed for opposing the church doctrines themselves. If there are now only a few dogmas, or if these dogmas are now only a matter of history, then philosophy could no longer be opposed to them, and then

25. W_1 (1831) reads: It is also quite correct that philosophy contains infinitely more than the more recent superficial theology. The latter is wholly built upon just that reflection for which philosophy will not grant any validity, and it reduces the positive doctrines to a minimum. The reinstatement of the authentic doctrine of the church must emanate from philosophy, for philosophy is what guides that vacuous reflective activity back to its ground, that is, philosophy is that in which it goes to the ground [i.e. perishes]. The one circumstance that can be called propitious for the philosophical consideration of religion concerned the content.

26. *Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* Because of the emptiness of the standpoint we are considering, it might seem that we have only referred to the reproaches that it raises up against philosophy, in order to declare expressly that our own aim, which we, by contrast, shall not relinquish, is to do the opposite of what that standpoint holds to be ultimate—namely, to have cognition of God. Yet it still has in its form an implicit aspect in which it must actually hold a rational interest for us; and under this aspect the more recent stance of theology is even more propitious for philosophy. For bound up with the fact that all objective determinateness has collapsed into the inwardness of subjectivity, there is precisely the conviction

amounts just to this point, that the human being *knows God immediately*. This immediate knowing is called "religion," but also "reason" and "faith," too, though faith in a sense different from that of the church. "All conviction *that* God is, and regarding *what* God is, rests, so it is surmised, upon this immediate revealedness in the human being, upon this faith."²⁷ This general representation is now an established preconception.²⁸ It implies that the highest or religious content discloses itself to the human being in the spirit itself, that spirit manifests itself in spirit, *in this my own spirit*, that faith has its root in the inner self or in what is most my own, that my inmost core is inseparable from it. This is the general principle,

27. [Ed.] While Hegel may also have Schleiermacher in mind at this point, in his view it was primarily Jacobi who laid the theoretical foundation for the theology of immediacy with the claim that all human knowledge derives from an attitude of immediate certainty that he called "faith." In a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, Jacobi wrote: "We have all been born into faith and must remain in faith, just as we have all been born into society and must remain in society. *Totum parte prius esse necesse est*. How can we strive for certainty if we are not already acquainted with it, and how can we be acquainted with it otherwise than by means of something that we already acknowledge with certainty? This leads to the concept of an immediate certainty that not only requires no grounds but utterly excludes every ground, and is purely and simply the representation itself harmonizing with the represented thing. Conviction based on grounds is a certainty at second hand. . . . If every truth-claim that does not spring from rational grounds is faith, then conviction based on rational grounds must itself come from faith and receive its force from faith alone" (Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 215–217 [Werke 4/1:210–211]). Jacobi's views are summed up in the epigram: "The element in which all human cognition and agency takes place is faith" (*ibid.*, p. 228 [p. 223]). See also his *David Hume*, pp. 24 ff. (Werke 2:145 ff.). On Hegel's criticism of these views, see his *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 63 remark; see also below, Ms. *Concept*, n. 68.

28. *Thus L; similar in An; Hu reads:* This contention is completely familiar and requires no further discussion. *Follows in L* (1827?): Later we shall discuss more precisely how it came about. For the present we take it in its direct sense, without any polemical orientation against philosophy, as the contention that the consciousness of God is immediately present in [human] spirit along with its consciousness of itself. *W₁ (Var) reads:* All conviction . . . in the human being. This contention in the direct sense, aside from the fact that it has given itself a polemical orientation against philosophy (we will deal with that later), requires no proof, no corroboration. *W₂ (Var) reads:* Regarded now from this standpoint, all knowledge, all conviction and piety, rests upon the fact that in [human] spirit as such the consciousness of God is immediately present along with its consciousness of itself. (a) This contention in the direct sense, aside from the fact that it has given itself a polemical orientation against philosophy, is valid as such and requires no proof, no corroboration.

the way in which religious faith is defined in recent times as immediate intuition, as knowledge within me | that absolutely does not come from without. Its effect is utterly to remove all external authority, all alien confirmation. What is to be valid for me must have its confirmation in my own spirit. The impetus can certainly come from without, but the external origin is unimportant. *That I believe is due to the witness of my own spirit.*

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Now this being-present or manifesting of that content is the simple principle of philosophical cognition itself: namely, that our consciousness has immediate knowledge of God, that we have an absolutely certain knowledge of God's being. Not only does philosophy not repudiate this proposition, but it forms a basic determination within philosophy itself. In this way it is to be regarded as a gain, as a kind of good fortune, that basic principles of philosophy itself are active as general preconceptions in the universal [i.e. popular] mode of representation, so that the philosophical principle can more easily gain general assent among educated people.²⁹

³⁰[However, in the first place,] in regard to this immediate knowledge it is noteworthy that the principle does not stand still at this simple determinacy, this naive content. It does not express itself merely affirmatively. Instead the naive knowledge proceeds polemically against cognition and is especially directed against the cognition or conceptual comprehension of God. What it demands is not merely that one should believe, should know immediately. What it maintains is not simply that consciousness of God is conjoined with self-consciousness, but rather that the relationship to God is only and exclusively an immediate one. The immediacy of the connectedness is taken as precluding the alternative determination of

29. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) adds: In this general disposition of the spirit of the age, not only has philosophy therefore secured an outwardly favorable position (it has no dealings with what is external, least of all where philosophy and occupation with it exist as a state institution), but it is inwardly favored if its principle already lives of its own accord as an assumption in the spirit [of the people] and in their hearts. For philosophy has this principle in common with contemporary culture: that reason is the locus of spirit in which God reveals himself to human beings.

30. In B's margin: 8 May 1827

[Ed.] See below, n. 49.

72 mediation, and because it is a mediated knowledge philosophy is disparaged on the grounds that it is only a finite knowledge of the finite. |

More precisely, the *immediacy* of this knowledge is supposed to reside above all in the fact that one knows *that* God is, *not what* God is. The expansion, the content, the fulfillment of the representation of God is thus negated. But what we call "cognition" involves knowing not only *that* an object is but *also what* it is; and knowing what it is, not just in a general way or having a certain acquaintance with it, some certitude about it, but knowing what its determinations are, what its content is, so that our knowing is a fulfilled and verified knowledge in which we are aware of the necessary connectedness of these determinations.

It is claimed that God cannot be cognized at all, but that we are only aware that God *is*; this we [supposedly] *found* in our consciousness.³¹ If we first set aside the polemical orientation of this claim and consider only just what is involved in the assertion of immediate knowledge, it is this: that on the one hand it is our spirit itself that bears witness to this content, that the content does not come from without or only through instruction. On the contrary, our conviction about it rests on the assent of our own spirit, on our consciousness, that spirit finds this content within itself.³² On the other hand, consciousness also relates itself to this content, so that this consciousness and this content, God, are inseparable. In fact it is *this connection* in general, this knowledge of God and the inseparability of consciousness from this content, that we call *religion in general*. But at the same time the implication in this assertion of immediate knowledge is that we ought to stop short with the consideration of religion as such—more precisely, with the consideration of this connection with God. There is to be no progressing to the cognitive knowledge of God, to the divine content

31. [Ed.] This standpoint is found in the contemporary philosophy originating from Jacobi. See above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15.

32. *W₁ (1831)* reads: [it is] a self-limitation, which, with respect to its origin, is even acknowledged by philosophy, but then also resolved and exhibited in its one-sidedness and untruth by philosophy.

as this content would be divinely, or essentially, in God himself. In this sense it is further declared that we can know only our relation to God, not what God himself is. "Only our relation" falls within what is meant by religion generally.³³ That is why it is that nowadays we merely hear religion talked about but find no investigations into God's nature or what God might be within himself, | how God's nature must be defined. God as such is not made the object [of inquiry] himself; God is not before us as an object of cognition, and knowledge does not spread out within this sphere. ~Only our relation to God, or religion as such, is an object [of inquiry] for us. Our discussion concerns religion as such and does not, or at least not very much, concern God. Expositions of God's nature have become ever fewer. What is said is only that human beings ought to have religion. The connection religion has with philosophy and the state is discussed, but not God.³⁴

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But if we elucidate what is implied in the thesis of immediate knowledge, what is immediately declared by it, then God himself is expressed in relation to consciousness in such a way that this relation is something inseparable or that we must consider both sides together, ~and this is the essential object of our consideration.³⁵ ~This is itself the philosophical idea, and is not opposed to

33. [Ed.] Here Hegel draws the consequences of the contemporary assertion of the noncognizability of God; cf. *Ms. Intro.*, n. 15. Perhaps he has specifically in mind Schleiermacher's view that the divine attributes do not denote "something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which we relate our feeling of absolute dependence to God." *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 64; in the 2d ed., § 50, the concluding clause is revised to read: "... in which the feeling of utter dependence is to be related to him."

34. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) reads: and does not display differentiated determinations within it [i.e. in God as object of cognition], so that it is itself grasped as the relationship of these determinations and as relationship within its own self. God is not before us as object of cognition, but only our connection with God, our relationship to him. And while expositions of God's nature have become ever fewer, it is now demanded only that human beings ought to have religion or ought to abide in religion, and there is not supposed to be any advance to a divine content.

35. *Thus B*; *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): We can, to be sure, distinguish subjective consciousness on the one hand, and God as object, God [viewed] objectively, on the other. This is an essential distinction in the entire doctrine of religion. But at the same time it is said that there is an unbreakable, essential relation between the two, and this is the important thing, not what one opines or fancies about God.

74 the philosophical concept.³⁶ According to the philosophical concept God is *spirit*, concrete; and if we inquire more precisely what spirit is, it turns out that the basic concept of spirit is the one whose development constitutes the entire doctrine of religion. If we ask | our consciousness for a provisional account of what spirit is, the answer is that spirit is a self-manifesting, a being for spirit. *Spirit is for spirit* and of course not merely in an external, contingent manner. Instead it is spirit only insofar as it is *for* spirit. This is what constitutes the concept of spirit itself. Or, to put the point more theologically, God's spirit is [present] essentially in his community; God is spirit only insofar as God is in his *community*.³⁷

Because the inseparable unity of consciousness with God is affirmed in what immediate knowledge contains, this inseparability therefore contains what is implied in the *concept of spirit*: [namely,] that spirit is for spirit itself, that the treatment cannot be one-sided or merely treatment of the subject according to its finitude, i.e., according to its contingent life; instead it [must be] considered under the aspect in which it has the infinite absolute content as its object. When the subject is considered by itself (the subjective individual as such) it is considered in its finite knowing, its knowledge of the finite. By the same token it is also maintained regarding the other side of the relation that God is not to be considered in isolation, for that is not possible. One knows of God only in connection with consciousness.³⁸

~~What has been stated are the basic characteristics that we can regard as immediate impressions and unmediated convictions of

36. *Thus B; W₂ (Var) reads*: Now what this contention contains as its real kernel is the philosophical idea itself, except that it is held by immediate knowledge within a limitation that is resolved and exhibited in its one-sidedness and untruth by philosophy. *W₁ (Var) reads*: If we set in relief what this contention contains, [we see] it is the philosophical idea itself.

37. *W₂ (MiscP) adds*: It is said that the world or the sensible universe must have onlookers and must be for spirit. And so God, too, must be for spirit all the more.

38. *W₂ (1831) adds (similar in W₁)*: and thus the unity and inseparability of the two determinations, i.e., of knowledge of God and of self-consciousness, itself presupposes what is expressed in identity, and the dreaded identity is contained right in this unity and inseparability.

the age | relating expressly to religion, to knowledge of God.³⁹ Therefore only what are basic elements or fundamental concepts of philosophy of religion can be linked up with this foundation. "This also provides us with an external justification"⁴⁰ for forging a path to our science without having to be polemical toward the views that supposedly stand in the way of philosophy. Certainly these contentions do oppose themselves to philosophical cognition,⁴¹ for there is no limit to that lack of awareness about the knowledge of God which is opposed to philosophy. But exactly those contentions, which for this reason maintain that they are contradicting philosophy, that they are contesting it and are most sharply opposed to it—if we look at their content, the determinate view they express, then we see that in themselves they exhibit agreement with that which they assail.

The result of the study of philosophy is that those walls of division, which are supposed to separate absolutely, become transparent; or that when we get to the bottom of things we discover

39. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W₁*): I have taken them straightforwardly according to what they contain, and have left to one side their opposition from the standpoint of philosophical cognition. We are still only in the introduction.

40. W₁ (Var) reads: Through this agreement with respect to the elements, to which attention has been drawn, an external justification is first of all provided in regard to our discussion

41. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* In fact we thus see the basic concept of philosophy present as a universal element within the culture of the age. And it is also evident here how philosophy does not stand above its age in the form of something completely different from the general determinateness of the age. Instead one spirit pervades actuality and philosophical thought, except that the latter is the true self-understanding of the actual. In other words, there is but one movement by which the age and philosophy themselves are borne along, the difference being simply that the determinateness of the age still appears to be present contingently, it still lacks justification, and so it can even yet stand in an unreconciled, hostile antithesis to that genuine and essential content, whereas philosophy, as justification of the principle, is also the universal peacemaking and reconciliation. Just as the Lutheran Reformation led the faith back to the primary centuries, the principle of immediate knowledge has led Christian cognition back to the primary elements. But if this reduction also causes the evaporation of the essential content at first, then it is philosophy that cognizes this principle of immediate knowledge itself as a content, and leads it on as such to its true unfolding within itself.

absolute agreement where we thought there was the most extreme antithesis.⁴²

76 More specifically, these contemporary impressions are polemical against the amplification of the inherent content. We are to believe in God, but in general are not to know what God is, are not to have any determinate knowledge of | God. The possession of determinate knowledge is what is meant by "cognition." On this basis theology as such has been reduced to a minimum of dogma. Its content has become extremely sparse although much talking, scholarship, and argumentation go on. This tendency is principally directed against the mode of amplification called dogmatics. We can compare this shift in attitude to what was done for the purpose of the Reformation. Then the amplification of the system of hierarchy was contested, and the leading of Christianity back to the simplicity of the first Christian era was offered as the defining goal. Similarly, it is basically characteristic of the modern period that the doctrines of the Protestant church have been brought back to a minimum. But despite theology's reduction of its knowledge to a minimum it still needs to know many things of different sorts, such as the ethical order and human relationships. Moreover, its subject matter is becoming more extensive; the learning displayed in its manifold historical eloquence is highly accomplished.⁴³ Thus one is engaged not with one's own cognition but with cognition of other people's representations. We can compare this bustling about of theology with the work of the countinghouse clerk or cashier, because all the active bustle is concerned with the alien truths of others.⁴⁴ It will become

42. *Thus also* *W*₂; *W*₁ (1831) *adds*: One must know only what is here the essential category of thought. Faith is also a knowledge, but an immediate knowledge. Thus the antithesis reduces to the abstract determinations of immediacy and mediation, which we have to refer to only in logic where these categories of thought are considered according to their truth.

43. *L* (1827?) *adds*: But because this proliferating content is not developed from the concept, does not and is not supposed to come about according to the concept, or according to cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, according to argumentation, which is opposed to rational cognition.

44. *W* (1831) *adds the following, after giving the 1824 version of this analogy*: Theology of this kind does not find itself any longer in the domain of thought at all; it does not any longer deal with infinite thought in and for itself, but deals with

plain in our treatment of the science of religion that it is the peculiar concern of reason to form itself into an all-embracing intellectual realm. The main thing about this intellectual formation is that it occurs *rationally*, according to the necessity of the subject matter, of the content itself, not according to caprice and chance. |

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"Because it has thus contracted exclusively into the knowledge *that* God is, theology has extended its object to embrace ethical life and morality; and because this extension itself is not supposed to occur via cognition, it takes place *arbitrarily*, rather than according to necessity."⁴⁵ This argumentative thinking makes some assumption or other, and proceeds according to the relationships of the understanding [employed in the kind] of reflection that we have developed within us through our education, without any criticism of these relationships. That approach is gaining ground in this science [theology]. In contrast, development by means of the concept admits of no contingency. That is just why it is so fervently denounced, because it chains us down to proceeding according to the necessity of the thing rather than according to fancies and opinions.

That argumentative method involves assumptions, which themselves can in turn be called in question. Yet the argumentative theology of the Christian church pretends nevertheless to possess a firm footing, asserting, "For us the firm footing is the Bible, it is the words of the Bible." But against this one can quote the essential sense of the text, "the letter kills,"⁴⁶ etc. One does not take the words [of the Bible] as they stand, because what is understood by the biblical "word" is not words or letters as such but the spirit with which they are grasped. For we know historically that quite

it only as a finite fact, as opinion, representation, and the like. History occupies itself with truths that used to be truths, i.e., for others, and not with truths such as would be the possession of those who concern themselves with them.

45. W₁ (1831) reads: Although theology has severely reduced its actual knowledge of God to a minimum, it still needs to know many things of different sorts, such as the ethical order and human relationships. Moreover, its range and subject matter is becoming more extensive. But because, in the case of this proliferating content, this does not and is not supposed to come about according to the concept, according to cognition, it takes place arbitrarily, according to argumentation, which is opposed to rational cognition.

46. [Ed.] See 2 Cor. 3:6. "The written code kills, but the Spirit gives life."

opposite dogmas have been derived from these words, that the most contrasting viewpoints have been elicited from the letter of the text because the spirit did not grasp it. In these instances appeal was to the letter, but the genuine ground is the spirit.

78 The words of the Bible constitute an unsystematic account; they are Christianity as it appeared in the beginning. It is *spirit* that grasps the content, that spells it out.⁴⁷ How it is done depends on how spirit | is disposed, on whether it is the right and true spirit that grasps the words. This true spirit can only be the one that proceeds within itself according to necessity, not according to assumptions. This spirit that interprets must legitimate itself on its own account, and its proper legitimation is the subject matter itself, the content, that which the concept substantiates.

Hence the authority of the canonical faith of the church has been in part degraded, in part removed. The *symbolum* or *regula fidei* itself is no longer regarded as something totally binding but instead as something that has to be interpreted and explained from the Bible. But the interpretation depends on the spirit that explains. The absolute footing is just the concept. To the contrary, by means of exegesis such basic doctrines of Christianity have been partly set aside and partly explained in quite lukewarm fashion. Dogmas such as those of the Trinity and the miracles have been put in the shadows by theology itself.⁴⁸ Their justification and true affirmation can occur only by means of the cognizing spirit, and for this reason much more of dogmatics has been preserved in philosophy than in dogmatics or in theology itself as such.

⁴⁹We should note in the second place the consequence of imposing

47. W (1831) adds after an interpolation from the 1824 lectures: Whether the Bible has been made the foundation more for honor's sake alone or in fact with utter seriousness, still the nature of the interpretative explanation involves the fact that thought plays a part in it. Thought explicitly contains definitions, principles, and assumptions, which then make their own claims felt in the activity of interpreting.

48. [Ed.] See 1824 Intro., n. 34, and above, n. 17.

49. In B's margin: 10 May 1827

[Ed.] If the following comments on investigating the cognitive faculty itself are "in the second place," then presumably what is first, in the discussion of the form of religious thought, is the preceding analysis of the immediate knowledge of God culminating in the remarks on its assumptions in relation to biblical authority (see above, n. 30). Both points are marked by a date notation in the margin of B.

upon philosophy, in particular upon philosophy of religion, the demand that before we embark upon cognitive knowing we must investigate the nature of the cognitive faculty itself; only this investigation of the instrument would show for certain whether we can rightfully try for cognition of God. We wanted just to proceed to the thing itself without turning to further preliminaries. But this question lies so close to our concern that it must be attended to. It seems to be a fair demand that one should test one's powers and examine one's instrument before setting to work.⁵⁰ But plausible as this demand may appear, it proves to be no less unjustified and empty. With such analogies it is often the case that forms that suit one context do not suit another. How should reason be investigated? Doubtless rationally. Therefore this investigation is itself a rational cognizing. For the investigation of cognition there is no way open save that of cognition. We are supposed to cognize reason, and what we want to do is still supposed to be a rational cognizing. So we are imposing a requirement that annuls itself. This is the same demand as the one in the familiar anecdote in which a Scholastic declares that he won't go into the water until he has learned to swim.⁵¹

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50. [Ed.] Hegel's thought is fundamentally at odds with a procedure that grants to epistemology, whether of the Cartesian, the empiricist, or the critical variety, a prior and privileged position within the philosophical enterprise. Cf. his critique of this procedure in the opening paragraphs of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where his principal targets (as in this passage) are the critical philosophies of Kant and Reinhold.

51. [Ed.] This anecdote is contained in a collection of witticisms written in Greek, known as φιλογέλως ("Friend of Laughter"), collected by Hierocles of Alexandria and Philagrios the Grammarian in late antiquity. See *Philogelos der Lachsfreund: Von Hierokles und Philagrios*, ed. A. Thierfelder (Munich, 1968), p. 28: § 2. "A Scholastic who wanted to swim was nearly drowned. He swore never again to go into the water until he had learned to swim." In the 1824 *Introduction* (see above, n. 60), Hegel alludes to the same anecdote, but, according to G, uses the term *Gascogner* ("Gascon") instead of *Scholastikus*, thus appearing to convert it into an ethnic joke about Frenchmen from Gascony, reputedly noted for their boasting. However, such a change makes little sense, and since only G gives this version he probably simply misunderstood Hegel or reconstructed the anecdote later from memory incorrectly. Hegel also used the anecdote in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*; a student notebook of 1825–26 gives the Greek form σχολαστικὸς, as does the 2d ed. of these lectures in the *Werke* (see *History of Philosophy* 3:428), while the 1st ed. simply reads: "a man who wanted to swim" (*Werke* 15:555).

Besides, in philosophy of religion we have as our object God himself, *absolute reason*.⁵² Since we know God [who is] absolute reason, and investigate this reason, we cognize it, we behave cognitively. Absolute spirit is knowledge, the determinate rational knowledge of its own self. Therefore when we occupy ourselves with this object it is immediately the case that we are dealing with and investigating rational cognition, and this cognition is itself rational conceptual inquiry and knowledge. So the [critical] requirement proves to be completely empty. Our *scientific cognition is itself the required investigation* of cognitive knowing.

The second circumstance⁵³ requiring discussion at this point is the following observation. We should recall here what we said by way of introduction, that on the whole religion is the highest or ultimate sphere of human consciousness, whether as feeling, volition, representation, knowledge, or cognition. It is the absolute result, the region into which the human being passes over as that of absolute truth. In order to meet this universal definition, consciousness must already have elevated itself into this sphere transcending the finite generally, transcending finite existence, conditions, purposes, and interests—in particular, transcending all finite thoughts and finite relationships of every sort. In order to be within the sphere of religion one must have set aside these things, forgotten them. In contrast with these basic specifications, however, it very frequently happens when philosophy in general and philosophizing about God in particular are criticized, that finite thoughts, relationships of limitedness, and categories and forms of the finite are introduced in the service of this discourse. Opposition that draws upon such finite forms is directed against philosophy generally and especially against the highest kind, the philosophy of religion | in particular. Belonging to such finite forms is the im-

80 mediacy of knowing or the “fact of consciousness.” Examples of

52. L (1827?) adds: God is essentially rational, a rationality that, as spirit, is in and for itself.

53. [Ed.] The ensuing paragraphs challenge a simplistic application of the Kantian categories of finitude to the religious object. Perhaps this makes them the “second circumstance” in the passage on investigating the cognitive faculty, the first being the more general discussion of the preceding two paragraphs.

such categories include the antitheses of finite and infinite and of subject and object, abstract forms that are no longer in place in that absolute abundance of content that religion is.⁵⁴ They must of course occur in our science, for they are moments of the essential relationship that lies at the basis of religion. But the main thing is that their nature must have been investigated and cognized long beforehand. If we are dealing with religion scientifically, this primarily logical cognition must lie behind us. We must long since have finished with such categories.⁵⁵ The usual practice, however, is to base oneself on them in order to oppose the concept, the idea, rational cognition. These categories are employed entirely uncritically, in a wholly artless fashion, just as if Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* were nonexistent, a book that put them to the test and arrived in its own way at the result that they can serve only for the cognition of phenomena and not of the truth.⁵⁶ In religion, however, one is not dealing with phenomena but with the absolute content.⁵⁷ How totally improper, indeed tasteless, it is that categories of this kind are adduced against philosophy, as if one could say something novel to philosophy or to any educated person in this way, as if anyone who has not totally neglected his education would not know that the finite is not the infinite, that subject is different from object, immediacy different from mediation. Yet this sort of cleverness is brought forward triumphantly and without a blush, as if here one has made a discovery.

~That these forms~⁵⁸ are different everyone knows; but that these

54. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): In the spirit (or in the disposition that has to do with religion) determinations wholly other than such meager ones as finitude and the like are present, and yet what is supposed to be important in religion is subjected by argumentative [criticism] to determinations of this kind.

55. [Ed.] Hegel refers here to his criticism of the categories of the understanding in his *Science of Logic*.

56. [Ed.] See Ms. Intro., n. 15.

57. W₂ MiscP/Var? adds: But the Kantian philosophy seems in the view of that argumentative thinking to have come into existence only so that we might operate all the more unabashedly with those categories.

58. Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads: Here we merely note the fact that such determinations as finite and infinite, subject and object (and this always constitutes the foundation of that clever and cheeky chatter)

determinations are still at the same time inseparable is another matter. | There is reluctance to ascribe to the concept this power, though it can be encountered even in physical phenomena. We know that in the magnet the south pole is quite distinct from the north pole, and yet they are inseparable. We also say of two things, for example, that they are as different as heaven and earth. It is correct that these two are plainly different, but they are inseparable. We cannot point out earth apart from the heavens, and vice versa. Immediate and mediated knowledge are *distinct* from one another, and yet only a very modest investigation is needed in order to see that they are *inseparable*. Hence, before one is ready to proceed to philosophy of religion, one must be done with such one-sided forms. From these considerations it can easily be seen how difficult it is for a philosopher to engage in discussion with those who oppose philosophy of religion in this fashion; for they display too great an ignorance and are totally unfamiliar with the forms and categories in which they launch their attack and deliver their verdict upon philosophy. Being unfamiliar with the inner spirit of the concepts, they bluntly declare that immediacy is surely something different from mediation. They utter such platitudes as something novel, but in so doing they also assert that immediate knowledge exists in isolation, on its own account, wholly unaffected, without having reflected upon these subjects, without having paid attention to their outer nature or inner spirit to see how these determinations are present in them.⁵⁹ This kind of opposition to philosophy has | the

59. Thus also *W₁; W₂ (MiscP)* adds: Actuality is not accessible to them, but alien and unknown. The gossip that they direct in hostility against philosophy is therefore school chatter, which saddles itself with empty categories that have no content; whereas we in the company of philosophy are not in the so-called "school" but in the world of actuality, and we do not find in the wealth of its determinations a yoke in which we might be confined, but we move freely within them. And then those who contest and disparage philosophy are even incapable of comprehending a philosophical proposition through their finite thought. Just when they perhaps repeat its very words they have distorted it, for they have not comprehended its infinity but have dragged in their finite relationships instead. Philosophy is so patient and painstaking that it carefully investigates its opponent's position. Admittedly that is necessary according to its concept, and it is only satisfying the internal impulse of its concept when it cognizes both itself and what is opposed to it (*verum index sui et falsi* | "truth is the touchstone of itself and of the false": Spinoza, *Opera* 4:124,

tedious consequence that in order to show people that their contentions are self-contradictory one must first go back to the alphabet of philosophy itself. But the thinking spirit must be beyond such forms of reflection. It must be acquainted with their nature, with the true relationship that obtains within them, namely the infinite relationship, in which their finitude is sublated.

Only slight experience is needed to see that where there is immediate knowledge there is also mediated knowledge, and vice versa. Immediate knowledge, like mediated knowledge, is by itself completely one-sided. *The true* is their unity, *an immediate knowledge that likewise mediates*, a mediated knowledge that is at the same time internally simple, or is immediate reference to itself. That one-sidedness makes these determinations finite. Inasmuch as it is sublated through such a connection, it is a relationship of infinity. It is the same with object and subject. In a subject that is internally objective the one-sidedness disappears; the difference emphatically does not disappear, for it belongs to the pulse of its vitality, to the impetus, motion, and restlessness of spiritual as well as of natural life. Here is a unification in which the difference is not extinguished, but all the same it is sublated.⁶⁰ |

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320)). However, it should be able to expect as *quid pro quo* that the antithesis will now also desist from its hostility and cognize philosophy's essence peaceably. That, however, does not ensue, and the magnanimity of wanting to acknowledge its opponent and heap coals of fire on his head is of no avail to philosophy, for the opponent will not keep quiet, but is persistent. But when we see that the antithesis dissipates like an apparition and dissolves into a mist, then our only wish for the contest is to render an account of ourselves and of conceptual thought, and not simply to gain the verdict over the other side. And to convince the opposition fully, [or to have] this personal influence upon it, is impossible because it remains within its limited categories.

60. L (1827?) adds: However, the argumentative method of the finite understanding that was mentioned has not elevated itself to such concepts. It uses them in a crude, coarse fashion without thinking them through. W_2 (MiscP) adds instead: Since in the following discussion we are beginning with religion, with the supreme and the ultimate, we must now be able to assume that the futility of those relationships has long been overcome. But at the same time, because we did not commence with the beginning of science but expressly considered religion, we must have regard also, within religion itself, for the sort of relationships of the understanding that ordinarily come under consideration above all in connection with religion.

3. Survey of the Treatment of Our Subject⁶¹

~After making these remarks, if we wish to get closer to our object itself, all that still remains by way of introduction is to give an outline of its articulation, to provide in the most general way a conspectus or a survey of our science and of how it is internally divided, so that we may be historically informed about it.⁶²

There can be but *one method* in all science, in all knowledge. Method is just the self-explicating concept—nothing else—and the concept is one only. Here too, therefore, the *first moment* is, as always, the *concept*. The *second moment* is the *determinateness of the concept*, the concept in its determinate forms. These forms are necessarily involved in the concept itself. In a philosophical mode of treatment it is not the case that the universal element, or the concept, is set forth at the beginning as though merely for the sake of its prestige. In the way in which they are prefixed to the single sciences, however, concepts such as nature, right,⁶³ and the like are general definitions that are placed at the beginning, although one

61. [Ed.] This heading is adopted from *An*, which reads literally: "Conspectus of the Treatment of Our Object." The paragraphs preceding the detailed survey of the three parts of the philosophy of religion offer a speculative description of the moments of the concept of religion in the process of its self-explication and self-manifestation—the moments of pure conceptuality (universality), self-determination (differentiation, particularity), and self-reunification (reestablishment, consummation, subjectivity), which serve as the logical, rational basis for the actual historical appearance of the religions and the division of the subject into three parts. These paragraphs seem to be an expansion of the brief survey at the end of the *Introduction* in the 1821 *Ms.* (sheets 10a-b), which also is couched in the speculative terminology of the *Logic* (see above, *Ms. Intro.*, n. 71). The 1827 lectures then add a detailed division and survey, which is lacking in the *Ms.* Having been through the lectures on two previous occasions Hegel now, in 1827, had a clear idea of what would actually follow.

62. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (Ed?) reads:* With this reference to the discussion itself that is to follow we now directly provide the general survey or division of our science.

63. [Ed.] From the three basic philosophical sciences of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* (logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit), others can be distinguished, such as the "science of right" (*Rechtswissenschaft*). *Recht* is occasionally translated below as "law," although in Hegel's own *Philosophy of Right* the concern is not principally with law in the juridical sense but with the broader foundations of civil society and the state. In this derogatory sentence, however, Hegel is not referring to his own work but to the individual sciences as set forth by others.

is embarrassed by them because nothing depends on them. What really matters instead is the detailed content, chapter by chapter. A so-called concept of this kind has no further influence on this subsequent content. It indicates roughly the field where the investigator is, and in which the issues are located, so that content from another domain may not be introduced [inadvertently]. But the content—e.g., magnetism or electricity—is what counts as the subject matter, whereas the prefixed concept is [only] the formal aspect.⁶⁴

The concept constitutes the beginning in philosophical treatment, too. But here it is the substance of the thing, like the seed from which the whole tree unfolds. The seed contains all of its characteristics, the entire nature of the tree: the type of its sap, the pattern of its branches, etc. However, these are not preformed, so that if one took a microscope one would see the twigs and leaves in miniature, but they are instead enveloped in a | spiritual manner. Similarly the concept contains the entire nature of the object, and cognition is nothing but the development of the concept, the development of what is contained in the concept but has not yet emerged into existence, is not yet explicated, not yet displayed.

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Therefore the *first moment* is the *concept of religion* or religion in general, and the *second* is our consideration of *determinate religion*. And we do not derive the determinateness from outside, but rather it is the free concept that impels itself to its own determinateness. It is not the same in this case as when one treats right or law empirically, for example. The determinate details of the history of law do not follow from the concept, but we derive them from another source. There we first define in general what “right” designates; but the determinate legal systems such as the Roman and the German have to be taken from experience. Here, on the contrary, the determinateness has to result from the concept itself. The determinate concept of religion, then, is religion in its finitude, finite religion, something one-sided constituted in opposition to other religions as one particular type set against another.

64. Thus, also W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP/Var?) adds: But in such a mode of consideration the prefixed concept, for instance right, can also become a mere name for the most abstract and most contingent content.

For that reason we consider in the *third place* the concept as it comes forth to itself out of its determinateness, out of its finitude, as it reestablishes itself out of its own finitude, its own confinement. This *reestablished concept* is the infinite, true concept, the *absolute idea* or the *true religion*. These are therefore the three divisions in general, expressed in abstract terms.

Religion in its concept is not yet the true religion. The concept is true within itself, to be sure; but it also belongs to its truth that it should realize itself, as it belongs to the soul that it should have embodied itself. To begin with, this realization is a determination of the concept; but the absolute realization is when this determination is adequate to the concept. This adequate concept-determination is the absolute idea, the true concept. This progression is the development of the concept, and initially this development is
85 the experience, cognition, and knowledge of what religion is.⁶⁵ |

The concept that we have here before us is now *spirit itself* without qualification. It is spirit itself that is this development and that is active in this way. Spirit, if it is thought immediately, simply, and at rest, is no spirit; for spirit's essential [character] is *to be altogether active*. More exactly, it is the activity of *self-manifesting*. Spirit that does not manifest or reveal itself is something dead. "Manifesting" signifies "becoming for an other." As "becoming for an other" it enters into antithesis, into distinction in general, and thus it is a *finitizing* of spirit. Something that is *for an other* is, in this abstract determination, precisely something finite. It has an other over against itself, it has its terminus in this other, its boundary. Thus spirit that manifests itself, determines itself, enters into existence, gives itself finitude, is the second moment. But the third is its manifesting of itself according to its concept, taking its former, initial manifestation back into itself, sublating it, coming to its own

65. *Similar in W₁; L (1827?) adds:* The stages that we accordingly have to traverse are: first, the concept of religion; second, religion in its determinate existence; third, the infinite, absolute religion. As concept, religion is still without determinate being [*Dasein*]. In determinate being it is incommensurate with its concept. In the absolute religion concept and determinate being correspond for the first time and for that reason become the idea of religion.

self, becoming and being *explicitly* the way it is implicitly. ⁶⁶This is the rhythm or the pure eternal life of spirit itself. If there were not this movement, then it would be something dead. Spirit is the having of itself as object. Therein consists its manifestation, ~in its being the relationship of objectivity, its being something finite.⁶⁷ The third moment is that it is *object to itself*, is reconciled with itself in the object, has arrived at freedom, for freedom is being present to itself.⁶⁸

⁶⁹The division, as we are setting it out beforehand, | whose various parts and content we now propose to specify in more detail, is⁷⁰ only historical. But it is adopted for the simple reason that it is also necessary according to the concept.

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66. *Precedes in W₂ (1831) (similar in W₁):* According to the moments of the concept, the presentation and development of religion will therefore occur in three divisions. We will consider the concept of religion: first in general; then in its particularity as self-dividing and self-differentiating concept, which is the aspect of primal division [*Ur-teil*, i.e. judgment], of limitation and difference, and of finitude; third, the concept that closes with itself, the syllogism or the return of the concept to itself, out of its determinateness in which it is unequal to itself, so that it comes to equality with its form and supersedes its limitedness.

67. *Thus also W₁; W₂ (Var) reads:* but above all it is a relationship of objectivity, and in this relationship it is finite.

68. *Thus also W₁; W₂ (MiscP) adds:* This rhythm, in which the whole of our science and the entire development of the concept is in motion, also recurs, however, in each of the three indicated moments, for each of them in its determinateness is the totality implicitly, until the totality is posited as such in the final moment. Hence, although the concept appears first in the form of universality, then in the form of particularity, and finally in the form of singularity, or if the entire movement of our science is such that the concept becomes the judgment and consummates itself in the syllogism, the same development of moments arises in every sphere of this movement. The only qualification is that in the first sphere the development is held together in the determinateness of universality, whereas in the second sphere, that of particularity, it allows the moments to appear independently, and only in the sphere of singularity does it return to the actual syllogism that mediates itself in the totality of the determinations.

69. *Precedes in W (1831):* Thus this division is the movement, nature, and activity of spirit itself that we, so to speak, simply witness. It is necessary through the concept, but the necessity of the progression has to exhibit, explicate, and prove itself only in the development itself.

70. *L adds:* therefore

[*Ed.*] The "therefore" makes sense only in the context of the preceding passage from *W*, which is also included in *L*.

I. The Concept of Religion⁷¹

As we have already stated, we shall consider in the first part the concept of religion. In the simple concept of religion what appears as content, or as the determination of the content, is solely the universal. Determinacy, or particularity as such, is not yet present. Hence the basic definition, or the character, of this first part of the philosophy of religion is that of *universality*.

In its concept religion is the relation of the subject, of the subjective consciousness, to God, who is spirit. In its concept regarded speculatively it is therefore spirit conscious of its own essence, conscious of its own self. Spirit is conscious, and that of which it is conscious is the true, essential spirit. True spirit is *its* essence, not the essence of an other. To this extent religion is forthwith explicitly *idea*, and the concept of religion is the concept of this idea. The idea is the truth, the reality of the concept in such a way that this reality is identical with the concept, or is determined simply and solely through the concept. If we call the concept "spirit," then the reality of the concept is consciousness. Spirit as concept, universal spirit, realizes itself in the consciousness that is itself spiritual, the consciousness for which alone spirit can be. |

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Religion is therefore *spirit that realizes itself in consciousness*. Every realization, however, is a relationship in which two aspects must be considered: the elevation of the human being to God, the consciousness that itself is conscious of God, of spirit; and the spirit that realizes itself in consciousness. These two aspects are connected with one another. This is the first moment in the idea, their connection, that in which the two sides are identical. This does not mean the commonality, however, or the superficial universality in which we liken several things to one another, but rather the inner unity of the two. So this *first moment* of the idea is the *substantial unity*, the universal in and for itself, the purely spiritual without further determination. Universality is the foundation. Only with determinate religion do we have determinate content.

The *second moment* to this initial universal one is precisely what

71. *In B's margin*: 11 May 1827
[Ed.] The heading is in B.

is called “relationship,” the going apart of this unity. Here we have subjective consciousness, for which this universal in and for itself exists, and which relates itself to it. This can be called “elevation of the human being to God,” because the human being and God are related [to each other] *as distinct*. Precisely what is called religion first makes its appearance here. We have to consider this relation according to its particular determinations. The first of these is feeling; and certainty in general, or faith, is classed under it. The second determination is representation. The third is thought, the form of thinking. We shall have to inquire more closely at this point to what extent religion is a matter of feeling. The form of representation is next for consideration after that, and the form of thought is third. Under this last determination we will most especially speak of religion.

Whenever we philosophize about religion, we are engaging in religious thinking. From this religious thinking in general we have to distinguish the type of religious thinking that we have to deal with here as a characteristic of the abstract concept of religion, and that is a thoughtful activity of the understanding.⁷² This thoughtful understanding will show itself to be what used to be called “proofs for the existence of God.” We will consider here the significance of this “proving.” Today the “proofs” have fallen into neglect or into contempt | because it is supposed that we are beyond all that. But for the very reason that they were authoritative for more than a thousand years⁷³ they deserve to be considered more closely. Even if we discover that they have deficiencies, we shall see at any rate what is genuine in the procedure they express, namely that they in fact display the process of the elevation of the human being to God, except that the form of understanding obscures it. We shall show what they lack in order to be the form of reason. Thus we need to consider the form of reason in contrast with that of the understanding, and to see what is wanting in the latter in order to express

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72. *W₁ (Var) reads (similar in An, B):* In this religious thinking we have in particular to deal at first only with what is a thoughtful activity of the understanding.

73. [Ed.] Hegel appears to have in mind here the form that the proofs for the existence of God assumed in the ancient world—e.g., in Xenophon, Plato, Cicero, Augustine, and Boethius.

this process, which takes place in every human spirit. If one thinks on God, one's spirit contains the very moments that are expressed in this procedure.

Religion is for everyone. "It is not"⁷⁴ philosophy, which is not for everyone. Religion is the manner or mode by which all human beings become conscious of truth for themselves. Here we must consider the modes of consciousness, especially feeling and representation, and then also thoughtful understanding. The concept of religion has to be considered in this universal mode in which the truth comes to human beings; and therefore the second moment in our consideration is the relationship of the subject [to God] as the feeling, representing, thinking subject.

"The *third moment* in this first part is"⁷⁵ the sublation of this antithesis of the subject and God, of the separation, this remoteness of the subject from God. Its effect is that as a human being one feels and knows God *internally*, in one's own subjectivity, that as this subject one elevates oneself to God, gives oneself the certainty, the pleasure, and the joyfulness of having God in one's heart, of *being united with God*, "being received by God into grace" as it is phrased in theological parlance. This is the *cultus*.⁷⁶ The simple form of the cultus, namely the inner cultus, | is devotion in general. But what is best known within devotion is the *mystical attitude*, the *unio mystica*.⁷⁷

74. W_1 (Var) reads: Not so

75. Thus B; L (1827?) reads (similar in W_1): If we have recognized spirit in general, the absolute unity, as the first moment, and as the second the relationship of the subject to the object, to God (not yet to a determinate God, to a God with determinate content, and similarly not yet [having] determinate sensations, determinate representations, determinate thoughts, but merely feeling, representation and thinking in general), then the third is

76. L (1827?) adds (similar in W_1): To gain for oneself this certain apprehension that God accepts human beings, and receives them into grace, is not only a matter of relationship or of knowledge, but is also a deed, an action.

77. W_1 (1831) adds in conjunction with a passage from 1824: The highest concept is the knowledge of spirit. Absolute spirit knows itself; this knowledge is distinguished from it and is therewith the distinct knowing that finite spirit is. In finite knowing, absolute spirit knows itself, and, vice versa, finite spirit knows its essence as absolute spirit. This is the universal concept of religion in general. We have then to consider the forms in which religion in general occurs, as feeling, as

II. Determinate Religion⁷⁸

Determinateness must issue from the concept. The concept as such is what is still enveloped, and the determinations or moments are contained within it but not yet spread out.⁷⁹ God, the concept, judges or divides [*urteilt*]; that is, God determines. Only now within this category of determination | do we have existing religion— religion that at the same time *exists determinately*.

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We have already noted above that spirit is in principle not immediate—it is not [found] in the mode of immediacy. It is living, is active, is what it makes of itself. The living thing is this *activity*. Stone or metal is immediate, it is complete and remains just as it is. But anything alive is already this activity of mediation with itself.

representation, and especially as faith, which is the form in which this knowledge by spirit of itself occurs. Finally there is the cultus or the community. In the cultus the formal consciousness frees itself from the rest of its consciousness and becomes consciousness of its essence; the cultus consists in the consciousness that God knows himself in the human being and the human being knows itself in God. As knowing itself in God, the subject, within its inmost self, is the subject in its genuineness. That is the basis of its life as a whole. Its life also then applies itself outwardly, for the subject has a worldly life that possesses that true consciousness as its substantial ground; i.e., the way in which the subject determines its goals in its worldly life depends upon the substantial consciousness of its own truth. This is the aspect under which religion reflects itself in worldliness. This is therefore the knowledge of the world, and to that extent philosophy has been called “worldly wisdom” (though it is, above all, knowledge of absolute spirit). In this way religion also ventures out into the world. The morality and political constitution of the people must have the same character as its religion; for morality and the political constitution are governed wholly by whether a people has only grasped a limited representation of freedom of spirit, or has attained to the true consciousness of freedom. In an appendix to this first part I will say something more about this connection of religion and the political constitution.

[Ed.] See below, pp. 451–460. This allusion to the treatment of the relationship of religion and the state can be viewed as an additional indication that this passage belongs to the 1831 lectures, since only in that year did Hegel fully take up this theme.

78. *B* reads: II. The Second Part or Determinate Religion

79. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): [They] have not yet received the legitimation of their distinction. This distinction is the judgment or primal division [*Urteil*], the category of determinateness, the second [sphere] in general. The concept, or merely inner subjectivity, determines itself to objective existence; for only through being its own result is it the concept for itself explicitly. With respect to absolute spirit this point is presented as follows:

The plant is not yet complete when the bud is present, for this meager existence of the bud is just its abstract initial existence. [To exist] it must develop, must first bring itself forth. And finally the plant recapitulates its unfolded self in the seed—this its beginning is also its final product.⁸⁰ In the case of the plant there are two sorts of individual. The seed corn, which is the beginning, is something other than what is the completion of its life, into which this unfolding ripens. It is the same for living things generally, for the fruit is something other than the initial seed. But because it is altogether alive, spirit is just like this. At first it is only implicitly, or is in its concept; then it enters into existence, unfolding itself, bringing itself forth, becoming mature, and bringing forth what it is in itself, the concept of its own self, so that what is implicit, its concept, may now be explicit. The child is not yet a rational human being, for it has merely a capacity, is to begin with merely implicit reason, implicit spirit. Only through its formation and development does it first become spirit, for spirit is only genuine spirit insofar as it is the final stage.⁸¹

Therefore the concept in general is only the first moment. The second is its *activity of self-determining*, of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. These distinctions are nothing else but the determinations that the concept itself inwardly contains. In respect to the concept of religion, to the activity of the religious spirit, this self-determining yields the determinate or ethnic | religions.⁸² The different forms or determinations of religion, as mo-

80. *L* (1827?) *adds* (similar in *W*): In the same way the animal goes through its cycle to beget another animal; and the human being, too, is first a child and, qua natural being, goes through the same cycle.

81. *W* (1831) *adds*: This is also called self-determination, entering into existence, being for an other, bringing its moments into mutual distinction, and spreading itself out. These distinctions are nothing else but the determinations that the concept itself contains within itself.

82. *L* (1827?) *adds*: The religious spirit has stages in the formation of the consciousness of its absolute essence. At every stage its consciousness is determinate consciousness of itself, the path whereby spirit is educated; it is consciousness regarding the determinate aspects of its concept even though it is not absolute consciousness of the concept in the totality of its determinations.

ments of the concept, are on the one hand moments of religion in general, or of the consummate religion. They are states or determinations of content in the experience and the consciousness of the concept. On the other hand, however, they take shape by developing on their own account in time and historically. Insofar as it is determinate and has not yet traversed the circuit of its determinations, with the result that it is finite religion and exists as finite, religion is *historical* and is a *particular shape* of religion. By indicating, in the series of stages, the principal moments in the development of religion, how these stages also exist in a historical manner, I will in effect be furnishing a single sequence of configurations, or a history of religion.

III. Absolute Religion⁸³

Here spirit,⁸⁴ being in and for itself, no longer has singular forms or determinations of itself before it in its developed state, and knows itself no more as finite spirit, as spirit in some sort of determinateness or limitedness. Instead it has overcome those limitations and is explicitly what it is implicitly. Spirit's knowing of itself as it is implicitly is the *being-in-and-for-self* of spirit, the consummate, absolute religion in which it is manifest what spirit is, what God is; and this religion is the Christian religion. That spirit must run its course in religion as in all else is necessary in spirit's concept. It is spirit only by virtue of the fact that it is for itself as the negation of all finite forms, as this absolute ideality.

I have representations and intuitions, which constitute a specific content: this house, etc. They are my intuitions and represent themselves to me. But I | could not represent them to myself if I had not grasped this content within myself. This entire content must be

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83. *B* reads: III

84. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: The manifestation or development and the determining do not proceed to infinity and do not cease contingently. The genuine progression consists rather in the fact that this reflection of the concept into self terminates itself when it actually returns into itself. Thus the very appearance is infinite appearance, the content is in conformity with the concept of spirit, and the appearance is such as the spirit is in and for itself. The concept of religion has itself become objective for itself in religion. Spirit,

posited within me in a simple and ideal way. Ideality means that this being [that is] external [to me] (i.e., its spatiality, temporality, materiality, and mutual externality) is sublated. Inasmuch as I know this being, its contents are not represented things, being outside one another; rather they are within me in a simple manner. Though a tree has many parts, it nevertheless is merely simple in my representation. Spirit is knowledge. For it to be knowledge, the content of what it knows must have attained this ideal form, it must have been negated in this manner. What constitutes spirit must have come into its own in such a way. Spirit must have been educated, must have traversed this circuit. These forms, distinctions, determinations, and finitudes must have been, in order for it to make them its own and to negate them, in order for what it is in itself to have emerged out of it and stood as object over against it, yet at the same time be its own.

This is the path and the goal by which spirit has attained its proper concept, the concept of itself, and has arrived at what it is in itself. And it only arrives at it in this way, the way that has been indicated in its abstract moments.⁸⁵ The Christian religion appeared when the time had come.⁸⁶ This time is not a contingent time, a discretionary or whimsical choice, but is rather grounded in an essential, eternal decree of God. That is, it is a time determined in the eternal reason and wisdom of God, not one determined in a contingent fashion. Rather it is the concept of the matter, the divine concept, the concept of God's own self.

This is the preliminary presentation of the plan of the content that we wish to consider.

85. W (1831) *adds*: The revealed religion is the revelatory or manifest religion because God has become wholly manifest in it. Here everything is commensurate with the concept; there is no longer anything secret in God. Here the consciousness of the developed concept of spirit exists, the consciousness of being reconciled not in beauty, or in gaiety, but *in spirit*.

86. [Ed.] See 1824 *Intro.*, n. 75.

PART I
THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

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[10b]

The concept [of religion is] (α) first [set forth] on the basis of *representation* in order that we may become familiar with it and, more precisely, with how our discussion will be arranged. But (β) the *necessity* of this concept, i.e., of the religious standpoint in general, [is to be developed].¹

A. THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION IN GENERAL²

(α) [We know] this concept on the basis of representation. We know initially that religion [is] consciousness of God in general, whether this consciousness has the form of feeling, representation,

1. [Ed.] The outline that Hegel gives here is incomplete. It includes only the first two sections: A. The Concept of Religion in General, and B. Scientific Conception of the Religious Standpoint. The agreement of the outline as given here with the first sentence of Sec. B indicates that Hegel initially did not intend to distinguish between the "scientific conception" (Sec. B) and the portrayal of the "necessity" of the religious standpoint (Sec. C). Whether Sec. D, on "the relationship of religion to art and philosophy," was originally planned or was conceived only in the process of writing out the manuscript can no longer be determined with certainty. In favor of the latter supposition, however, is the fact that Hegel ordinarily prepared complete outlines of what he intended to discuss; hence an original twofold division of the *Ms. Concept* is to be assumed.

2. [Ed.] This section heading is found in the *Ms.*, preceded by an "a." Hegel begins by providing not a definition of the concept of religion but rather a preliminary description and derivation of it from its appearance in religious representation. At

cognition, concept, knowledge, or whatever else it might be. But the object that we are considering is religion itself, and in it we immediately encounter [11a] these two moments: (α) the *object* [that is] *in* religion, and (β) consciousness, i.e., *the subject*, the human being that comports itself toward that object, religious sensibility, intuition, etc.

If we proposed to treat merely the object as such, God, then this philosophy of religion would be what earlier was expounded under the so-called *theologia naturalis*,³ a part of the older metaphysics, the doctrine of God and the divine attributes, etc. And then morals, religious morals, of course, would be a special science, treated in part directly as duties toward God and duties toward human beings, insofar as the latter are sanctified by their relation to God.

96 In this fashion the objective and subjective sides are separated. We seem at the outset to have established a larger range to (our) object *arbitrarily* because we include the other side of the relation of the human being to God in our discussion. However, | there is nothing arbitrary about this. If we intended to treat only the *theologia naturalis*, i.e., the doctrine of God as an object, as the object of religion, then the concept of God itself would lead us over to religion as such, if this concept were taken in a genuinely speculative [sense] and not in the manner of the old metaphysics [as] determinations of the abstract understanding. ~The concept of God is God's *idea*, [namely,] to become and make himself *objective* to himself.⁴ This is contained in God as *spirit*: God is essentially in

the end of the section he shows how the essential moments of the concept of religion manifest themselves in the various stages of the history of religion. Thus we have here, following the general *Introduction* to the lectures as a whole, another, specific introduction to *The Concept of Religion*. This section offers the only discussion of the cultus found in the *Ms*. In the later lectures the cultus becomes a distinct moment of the concept of religion.

3. [Ed.] Cf. the structure of Wolff's *Theologia naturalis*: following the existence of God, the *intellectus*, *potentia*, *voluntas*, *sapientia*, *bonitas*, and *ius Dei* are treated, as well as creation and divine providence. Morals is the subject of another science: Christian Wolff, *Philosophia moralis sive Ethica methodo scientifica pertractata*, 4 vols. (Halle and Magdeburg, 1750–1752).

4. [Ed.] The "idea," according to Hegel, entails the actualization of what is conceptual; it is the "absolute unity of the concept and objectivity" (*Encyclopaedia*

his community and has a community; he is objective to himself, and is such truly only in self-consciousness [so that] God's very own highest determination is self-consciousness. Thus the concept of God leads of itself necessarily to religion—⟨[to] determinacy, knowledge, cultus.⟩ God is incomplete, integrates himself, has truth for the first time, and is true only as absolute idea, i.e., when the side of God's *reality* is posited for itself and in identity with the concept.⁵ [11b]

⁶If now this definition of God were not already present in the *consciousness* of the community, it is [nevertheless] present in and for itself ⟨and is present in every religion.⟩ God is essentially something that is represented, known, intuited, etc., is found in the feeling of reverence, thankfulness, etc. Precisely this, as we said earlier,⁷ is the goal, the consummate religion—that God should come to be known as this totality, which spirit | is; therefore God is not less [than] spirit.⁸ Spirit does have its own immediate nature, its physical, organic nature, but does not know it in its determinacy and truth and has [only] a rough, general representation [of it]. Human beings live in the state; they themselves are the vitality, activity, and actuality of the state. But the positing, the becoming conscious of

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[1830], § 213). It is intrinsic to the divine idea that it should actualize or objectify itself in nature and finite spirit; in this fashion God becomes spiritual—becomes absolute *spirit*, does not remain merely absolute *idea*.

5. *W₂ reads*: The movement in the preceding sphere is, generally speaking, the movement of the concept of God, of the idea, in becoming objective to itself. We have this movement already in the representational expression: God is a spirit. Spirit is not something singular but is spirit only insofar as it is objective to itself and intuits itself as itself in the other. The highest determination of spirit is self-consciousness, which includes within itself this objectivity. God, as idea, is subjective for what is objective, and objective for what is subjective.

6. *Ms. margin*: (Knowing, known – itself as object – divine consciousness not for another. – Spirit of God in human being – grace of God – as though human beings were spectators – [or] were aliens – [as though] what was taking place in them were something alien)

7. [Ed.] See *Ms. Intro.*, p. 111.

8. *W₂ reads*: What is here of special importance, however, is that the concept should also actually be known in its totality; and, in accord with the degree to which this knowledge is present, a particular stage of religious spirit is higher or lower, richer or poorer. Spirit may have something in its possession without having a developed consciousness of it.

what the state is, is not present simply because of that. That the state is perfect means precisely that everything that [is] implicit in it, i.e., in its concept—even if to begin with it is merely a state such as Nimrod's⁹—should be developed, posited, made into right and duty, into law. This development gives rise to wholly different rights and duties for the citizens. But what is substantial in these relations and hence in the state—e.g., property, marriage, defense of the sovereign, etc.—is present also in an undeveloped society.^{10 11}

98 (β) However, another aspect enters into consideration with the determination that the subjective aspect is an essential moment [of religion]. For, to begin with, | the objective and subjective aspects are different—the former being object for the latter. (At first, [there is] only a general relation between them,) an unspiritual relationship, [such that the religious object appears as] something alien and external, an infinite power vis-à-vis the subject. This objective [being] can appear for the subject's knowing as completely other, as completely unknown on this side (or however the relationship

9. [Ed.] Referring to Josephus's account in *Antiquities of the Jews* 1.4, Hegel describes Nimrod, son of Cush, "the first on earth to be a mighty man" (Gen. 10:8–12), as follows in *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*: "He united men after they had become mistrustful, estranged from one another, and now ready to scatter. But the unity he gave them was not a reversion to a cheerful social life in which they trusted nature and one another; he kept them together indeed, but by force. He defended himself against water by walls; he was a hunter and a king. In this battle against need, therefore, the elements, animals, and men had to endure the law of the stronger, though the law of a living being" (*Early Theological Writings*, p. 184).

10. W_2 reads: And the ultimate decision that rests with subjectivity as to what is to be done for the whole—this is found equally in an undeveloped society and in a perfect state; only the specific form of this substance differs in its stages of development.

11. [Ed.] The point of this difficult paragraph is that, just as the substance of ethical relations can be present implicitly in an undeveloped state, or just as spirit may have a physical, organic nature but does not yet know the real meaning of this nature, so also the concept of God can be present implicitly in every religion without having yet been brought to specific consciousness; and the goal of the history of religion is that the God-concept should become known in its totality, just as the goal of the state is to raise its ethical substance into specific, positive law. The point is summed up by the sentence from W_2 quoted in n. 8: "Spirit may have something in its possession without having a developed consciousness of it."

of knowing is [described]). Further, however,¹² it is the relationship of the will, of actuality, the subject as separate, [being] a single individual [existing] for itself. But since God is the absolute essence for the subject—the substance of the absolute subject—the singular being knows itself to be only an accident or predicate, something vanishing and transient over against it—a relationship of might, the sensation of fear, etc. But equally the relationship is not a negative but also a positive one: ⟨love⟩. The subject [is] ⟨implicitly⟩ identical [with the absolute essence], which is *its* substance, *its* subject, and is *in* the subject, [12a] is *its* essence, not the essence of another. This unity, this reconciliation, this restoration of oneself, giving oneself, from out of the previous cleavage, the positive feeling of sharing, of participating in this oneness, partaking of one's positive character, ⟨fulfilling oneself, [achieving] divine knowledge⟩—this is a form of doing or acting that can at once be more external or internal in character; in general it is the cultus. (At first the cultus is of more limited significance, [involving] action that is one's own, to be sure, yet at the same time essentially external and public; the inner action of disposition [is] not so much emphasized.)¹³

12. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Love⟩

13. *W₂ reads:* When the moment of subjectivity is further defined, so that the distinction is made between God as an object and the knowing spirit, the subjective side is defined in this distinction as that which belongs on the side of finitude, and the two sides are at first so opposed to each other that their separation constitutes the antithesis of finitude and infinitude. This infinitude, however, being still burdened by the antithesis, is not the true infinitude; to the subjective side, which exists for itself, the absolute object is still an other, and its relation to the latter is not self-consciousness. But these circumstances also give rise to the relation consisting in the fact that the finite knows itself as nothing in its state of separation, and knows its object as the absolute, as its substance. Here there first occurs the relationship of fear vis-à-vis the absolute object, since, in contrast with the latter, individuality knows itself only as an accident or as something transient and vanishing. But this standpoint of separation is not the true one; rather it is what knows itself to be nothing and what therefore has to be sublated, and its relationship is not only a negative but also within itself a positive one. The subject knows the absolute substance into which it has to sublate itself to be at the same time *its* essence, *its* substance, in which, therefore, self-consciousness is implicitly conserved. It is this

99 "The cultus belong essentially to the concept of religion; while the concept of God, in terms of the determinacy that it has at each stage, | is necessarily also the determinacy of this relationship to God. Thus in theology [is found] the *plan of salvation* as the inner history and successive stages of activity of mind and heart, of what transpires and rightly transpires in the soul, as well as the sacraments, <ecclesiastical> actions, duties, etc."¹⁴

"The subjective and cultic aspect of religion is, therefore, the other essential element in the consideration of religion generally. [We are to consider] the basis on which the characteristics of the two correspond to each other—the form and content of the concept of God, and the relationship to God; the one is a copy of the other, and from the one [we must] learn to understand the other."^{15 16}

"[We have] already observed that the *theologia naturalis* as reflection upon the mere idea of God [has] become inconsistent—strictly speaking, unspiritual. The highest determination of God is

unity, reconciliation, restoration of the subject and its self-consciousness, the positive feeling of sharing and partaking in this absolute and actualizing one's unity with it—in this sublation of the cleavage—which constitutes the sphere of the *cultus*. The cultus comprises the entire sphere of internal and external activity that has as its purpose this restoration of unity. The term "cultus" is usually taken only in the more limited sense of referring to external, public action, while the inner action of disposition is not given much prominence.

14. *W₂ reads*: However, we shall conceive of cultus as that activity which, encompassing both inwardness and outward appearance, in general brings about restoration of unity with the absolute, and which in so doing is also essentially an inner conversion of mind and heart. Thus the Christian cultus, for example, contains not only the sacraments and ecclesiastical actions and duties but also the so-called "plan of salvation" as an absolutely inner history and as the successive stages of activity of the disposition—generally speaking, a movement that transpires and rightly transpires in the soul.

15. *W₂ reads*: At every stage of religion we shall always find these two sides—that of self-consciousness or of cultus, and that of consciousness or of representation—corresponding to each other. As the content of the concept of God or consciousness is determined, so too is the relationship of the subject to God; or in other words, so too is self-consciousness determined in the cultus. The one element is always a copy of the other, the one refers to the other. Both modes, of which the one holds fast only to objective consciousness and the other to pure self-consciousness, are one-sided, and each brings about its own annulment.

16. *Ms. margin*: (History of religions – difficult)

to be real spirit, [but he is] not recognized; that God is spirit, is personal, [is] indeed said, | [yet he is] hardly even this [for natural theology] but rather essence.¹⁷ [On the other hand] it is equally one-sided to consider and comprehend religion *only* as something *subjective*—i.e., to make the subjective side its only real concern. (Human beings have a representation of objectivity because they are conscious beings. [Here we see] the barrenness and decay of worship; journeys that do not arrive at place or destination.) This is especially the attitude and the way of viewing [religion] in our time; religion is an orientation toward God, a feeling, speaking, and praying directed toward God above—but [only] *toward* God, [hence] (a nullity for God, a shooting into the blue)—which accordingly means that we *know* nothing of God, have no acquaintance with the divine content, essence, and nature; [12b] [we are oriented] toward a place that for us is empty.

Spirit is, however, $\langle(\alpha)\rangle$ essentially consciousness: that which is in it as sensibility, how consciousness is subjectively determined, must be an object for it; i.e., [it must] be conscious of it, know it. (β) Precisely God should be for it something different from its subjectivity and finitude. Thus [God is] to be known, cognized by consciousness as an object, not in external fashion but intuited spiritually. In the Christian religion, moreover, the previously hidden and concealed divine essence, content, and determination have been made open or manifest. (γ) Religious sensibility should contain just this, | being set free from its subjectivity¹⁸ and possessing within itself what is substantial, as against the accidental character of our opinions, preferences, inclinations, etc. This substantial content is precisely what is fixed in and for itself, independent of our sensi-

17. *W₂ reads:* Thus it was a one-sided view when the earlier natural theology comprehended God only as an object of consciousness. This way of reflecting upon the idea of God, for which God properly could be understood only as essence, even if such words as “spirit” or “person” were used, was inconsistent, for if it actually had been carried through it would have had to lead to the other, subjective side, that of self-consciousness.

[*Ed.*] On natural theology's definition of God as “essence,” see 1824 *Intro.*, nn. 8, 9, 35.

18. *Ms. margin:* (Objectively preserved, affirmed)

bility, and must [be recognized] as something objective that subsists in and for itself. But the drawing of lines,¹⁹ merely being oriented [toward God], does not reach this genuine, unifying, self-subsistent object.²⁰ ²¹It does not achieve a true and actual renunciation of itself.²² For this acknowledgment of something higher and wholly indeterminate, these lines that are drawn toward it, have no hold on, determination by, or connection to this object itself; they are and remain *our* doing, *our* lines, *our* goal—something subjective. The further consequence then is [that] since the self-subsisting object to which we owe our bounden duty is not present to hand, all worship shrivels into mere feeling. The cultus contains actions, enjoyments, assurances, confirmations, and a verification of something higher; but no faith and conviction can get a foothold on the basis of these specific actions and of such self-generated assurance since the objectively binding moment is lacking in them. What remains the foundation is only subjective sensibility. [13a]

Certainly, it is infinitely important to have emphasized this subjective side so much, the side which Luther called *faith*;²³ but it is

19. [Ed.] In the *History of Philosophy*, Hegel ascribes an "inward weaving and drawing of lines" especially to Novalis: see *Werke* 15:644 (this passage not in the Eng. trans.).

20. *W₂ reads*: The cultus now becomes completely barren and empty, its activity a movement that makes no advance, its orientation toward God a relation to a nullity, a shooting into the blue. But even this merely subjective activity is intrinsically inconsistent and must dissolve itself. For if the subjective side is also to be specified in some fashion, it is implied by the conception of spirit that it [too] is consciousness and that its determinacy becomes an object to it. The richer the disposition, the more fully determinate it is, the richer must the object be for it too. In order for feeling to be substantial, its absoluteness must in addition be such that it frees itself from its subjectivity; for the substantial element that should belong to it is directed precisely against the accidental character of opinion and inclination, is in fact something fixed in and for itself, independent of our feeling and sensibility. It is the objective, which subsists in and for itself. If the substantial element remains only shut up within the heart, it is not recognized as something higher, and God is only something subjective. The orientation afforded by subjectivity remains at best a drawing of lines into empty space.

21. *Ms. margin*: (Subjectively posited)

22. *W₂ adds*: while in the cultus, by contrast, spirit should free itself of its finitude and feel and know itself in God.

23. [Ed.] See below, p. 243.

not the only aspect. It is vain and in itself empty and incomplete; and the truth is that it should equally contain the objective element—(as the object [is], so [is] the subject, and vice versa.)

Giving religion a purely subjective direction—my heart [is] everything—has destroyed the cultus. Just as one must proceed from one's subjective heart to deeds, so too consciousness must advance to an objective knowledge; the one is most intimately bound up with the other. What individuals intend in their relation to God depends upon | their representation of God;²⁴ and conversely they cannot intend anything specific in regard to God if they think they have not, and cannot have, any cognition or cognizance [of God]—specifically a determinate representation of him as an object ([that] is regarded as having being objectively in and for itself.)²⁵ 102

(α) This is the general [definition] of the cultus: it is the eternal relationship, the eternal process (of knowing) in which the subject posits itself as identical with its essence. However, whatever is not originally | one implicitly, cannot be posited as one, nor can that whose distinction [is] not *implicitly* [sublated] ever be sublated. This oneness of being belongs to what is *in-itself*, i.e., to the absolute, 103

24. W_2 adds: their self-consciousness corresponds to their consciousness

25. W_2 adds: Only when religion is an actual relationship, involving the discrimination of consciousness, does the cultus actually take form as the sublation of the ruptured elements and [become] a vital process. But this movement of the cultus is not limited only to the inner life in which consciousness liberates itself from its finitude, is the consciousness of its essence, and the subject as knowing itself in God has penetrated into the foundation of its life. Rather this its infinite life now also develops itself outwardly; for the worldly life led by the subject also has as its foundation this substantial consciousness, and the ways and means by which the subject determines its purposes in worldly life depend upon the consciousness of its essential truth. It is in connection with this side that religion reflects itself into worldly or secular life and that knowledge of the world makes its appearance. This going out into the actual world is essential to religion, and by means of this transition into the world, religion appears as morality in relation to the state and the entire life of the state. As the religion of the peoples is constituted, so also is their morality and government. The shape taken by the latter depends entirely on whether a people has reached only a limited representation of the freedom of spirit or has the true consciousness of freedom.

The more precise determinations of the cultus are as follows: the moment of presupposed unity, the sphere of separation, and the freedom that reestablishes itself in the separation.

substantial content. In this content, in its own absolute object, consciousness must, therefore, represent to itself its own implicit unity as its essence. The human form, the incarnation of God, must appear as an essential element of religion in the definition of its object—in the lower religions it may be just *this* being, this immediate determinate being, a unity with the finite in base forms [such as] stars (and animals) ^{~26}—so-called anthropomorphism. It is only the empty specter of abstract absolute essence that one must have renounced. It is relevant also in this connection that only [one] moment of God's being exhibits human or other forms of determinate being, appears externally, or reveals itself inwardly in dreams or an inner voice. [13b]

104 ~This, therefore, [is] the determination of absolute unity, but | (β) the second [determination] is the moment of separation, of difference. (<²⁷The world generally, reality, [is] on the one hand united with God—the finite within the infinite, [as] its garment, shape, existence—[and on the other hand] related indifferently to God as a posited, created reality.> God [is] the absolutely positive; therefore what differs from him [is] the negative. This negative appears on the side of worldly essence, of human being. This negative of God is evil, or wickedness in general. This determination is likewise an absolute moment in the whole of religion.^{~28}

26. *W₂ reads:* This process of sublating the rupture appears to fall only on the subjective side, but it is also posited in the object of consciousness. Through the cultus unity is attained, but what is not originally one cannot be posited as one. This unity, which appears as an accomplishment or result, must also be recognized as having being in and for itself. For what is an object to consciousness is the absolute, and the latter's distinctive characteristic is that it is the unity of its absoluteness with particularity. This unity is therefore in the object itself, e.g., in the Christian representation of the incarnation of God.

Generally speaking, this implicit unity—more specifically the human form, the incarnation of God—is an essential moment of religion and must be present in the determination of its object. In the Christian religion this determination is completely developed, but it also appears in the lower religions, even if the only indication of it is that the infinite manifests itself in unity with the finite in such fashion that it appears as *this* being, this immediate determinate being, in [the form of] stars or animals.

27. *Ms. adds:* (αα)

28. *W₂ reads:* This is the moment of presupposed unity, a unity that must enter into the concept of God in such a way that the object of consciousness (God) exhibits the content of the entire concept of religion and is itself the totality. The moments

~(γ) The subjective moment to the object [is] itself a moment of this object, and, as implicitly one with it, [is] also a positive moment; it too must finally | come forth and be present in the figurative representations of religion. This absoluteness and infinitude of self-consciousness is represented in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. To begin with, the outstanding characteristic of the latter is duration in time; and in this way immortality, the fact that spiritual self-consciousness is itself an eternal, absolute element, is represented as a sublimation or elevation, a being snatched up out of time.²⁹ 105

of the religious concept are thus seen here as unified. Each of the aspects of the true idea constitutes the same totality, which is the whole. The specific contents of the two aspects consequently are different not in themselves but only in their form. The absolute object therefore determines itself for consciousness as totality that is in unity with itself.

(b) This totality now also appears in the form of separation and finitude, which confronts that self-unified totality as its other side. The moments of the content of the entire concept are here posited as separating themselves from one another, as differentiated, and consequently as abstract. The first moment on the side of differentiation is that of *being-in-itself*, being that is identical with itself, formlessness, objectivity in general. This is matter as representing what subsists indifferently. To be sure, form can be brought into it, but still only as abstract being-for-itself. Then we call it *world*, which appears in relation to God partly as the garment, clothing, or form of divinity, or as something in contrast with God.

Over against this moment of indifferent being-in-self there now stands *being-for-self*, the negative in general, or "form." In its initially indeterminate form, this negative appears as the negative element in the world, while the latter is the positive element, that which subsists. The negativity that is opposed to this subsisting element, to this feeling of self, to the maintenance of existence, is *evil*. In contrast with God, with this reconciled unity of being-in-self and being-for-self, there appears the element of difference—the difference between the world as subsisting positively and the destruction and contradiction evident in it. Here the questions suggest themselves, which pertain to all religions with a more or less developed consciousness, as to how evil is to be reconciled with the absolute unity of God, and wherein the origin of evil lies. This negative element appears initially as evil in the world, but it also reverts to identity with itself, in which it is the being-for-self of self-consciousness—or *finite spirit*.

29. W₂ reads: This negative that gathers itself into unity with itself is now once more something positive because it relates itself simply to itself. As evil it appears in entanglement with positive subsistence. But the negativity that subsists or is present for itself and not in relation to an other, the inward, infinite negativity that reflects itself into itself and has itself as object, is actually the *ego*. This self-consciousness, and its inward movement itself, evince finitude and self-contradiction. Disturbance occurs within it; evil makes its appearance within it, and this is the evil of the world.

106 This is religion in general, and these are the more precise determinations of the concept, which directly constitute its content. The concrete spirit of religion, wherever it exists, drives forth these determinations since they reside in its concept, | and consequently they appear at every stage. However, we remarked earlier,³⁰ both with respect to the method of science and with respect to the progressive determination of the concept, that the consummation of religion itself brings forth its concept and makes it objective to itself. Once it has been thus objectified, it is developed, and the totality of its determinate characteristics is posited in it. (αα) It should be noted that the latter emerge in this revelatory religion as essential moments of the content, (together with the consciousness of the content) and with the determination of being the truth—i.e., [they appear] as objective and in the system of the objective object. (Positive cognition first emerges as such in the consummate religion (i.e., not the mere explanation of myths).) These characteristics also appear in the determinate [15a]³¹ religions, however, sprouting up fortuitously, like the flowers and creations of nature, as foreshadowings, images, representations, without [our] knowing where they come from or where they are going to. (In this immediate mode [of their being there is] not yet the reflection that this is the truth and the right, whether [their immediate being is] an intuition (an-

(c) I, however, who am free, can abstract from everything; this negativity and seclusion are what constitute my essence. Evil is not the whole of the subject, which enjoys rather a unity with itself that constitutes the positive or good side, the absoluteness, the infinitude of self-consciousness. It is this ability to abstract from all that is immediate and external that constitutes the essential moment of the seclusion of spirit. This seclusion is removed from the temporality, change, and vicissitude of the world, from evil and estrangement; and, as the absoluteness of self-consciousness, it is represented by the thought of the immortality of the soul. Initially the striking characteristic of the latter is duration through time; this elevation over the power and vicissitudes of change is represented, however, as belonging implicitly and originally to spirit, not as first of all mediated through reconciliation. Thus an advance is made to a further characteristic—namely, that the self-consciousness of spirit is an eternal, absolute moment in eternal life, into which it is transposed beyond time (this abstraction of change), and beyond the reality of change, beyond cleavage, when it is taken up into unity and reconciliation, which are presupposed as originally present in the object of consciousness.

30. [Ed.] See *Ms. Intro.*, pp. 110–111.

31. [Ed.] *Ms.* sheet 14a-b was inserted at a later date in this position. A reference to it occurs on sheet 18a, where it properly belongs (see below, n. 56).

thropomorphic Oriental incarnation), or an image (Greek), or a thought and an actuality (Christian); [but] this last is present, common, actual.)³²

(ßß) In the scientific portrayal of the necessity of these content-determinations, however, the concrete idea is necessarily the last one—as we remarked already.³³ For the idea in its initial [phase] is simple and abstract, [while the scientific portrayal] is what was described above under the totality of the idea.³⁴ It contains precisely the development, i.e., the objective, separately posited determination, of the concept, and this positing is the portrayal of the necessity and the proof of it. Thus, we are anticipating when, with respect to the scientific verification, | we speak of those stated moments of a religion which have not yet arisen in its consciousness of its objects, even if they are present in its intuition, feeling, and configuration; for, having not yet emerged from the concept, they [still do not] constitute an essential moment of the determination of the absolute object in that religion. In other words, God is not yet represented under this determination of the totality of religion.³⁵

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32. *W₂ reads:* The essential moments of the concept of religion manifest themselves and make their appearance at every stage in which the religious concept has existed at all. They differ from the true form of the concept only because they are not yet posited in the totality of the concept. The determinate religions are not indeed *our* religion, yet they are included in ours as essential though subordinate moments, which cannot be lacking in absolute truth. Therefore in them we have to do not with what is foreign to us but *with what is our own*, and the recognition that this is so is the reconciliation of true religion with false. Thus the moments of the concept of religion appear at lower stages of development, though as yet in the shape of presentiments and as natural blossoms and creations that sprout up by chance. What determines the characteristics of these stages throughout, however, is the determinacy of the concept itself, which at no stage can be lacking. The thought of the incarnation, for example, pervades all religions. General concepts such as this are found in other spheres of spirit as well.

33. [*Ed.*] This cross-reference is not clear. Hegel may be referring to his discussion on p. 186 of the self-objectification of the idea.

34. [*Ed.*] Hegel may be referring here to the conclusion of the *Introduction*, but he does not speak specifically there of the "totality of the idea." He refers to the "totality" of the spirit on p. 187.

35. *W₂ reads:* In like manner the moments of the concept are actually present in the determinate religions, in intuitions, feelings, unmediated shapes; but the *consciousness* of these moments has not yet developed; they have not yet been raised to the determinacy of the absolute object, and there is as yet no representation of God when the concept of religion in its totality is defined in this way.

But the determinacy itself in which these characteristics are posited at a [definite] religious standpoint constitutes the principle of this religion itself, and they must appear in it as they are determined within this element. [15b]

⟨(α)⟩ In the cognitive awareness of these characteristics lie principles through which the religions of the peoples can and must be grasped. This is one of the most difficult tasks facing comprehension. A survey of these religions reveals what supremely marvelous and bizarre flights of fancy the nations have hit upon in their representations of the divine essence and of their [own] duties and modes of conduct. To cast aside these religious representations and usages as superstition, error, and fraud is to take a superficial view of the matter, just as it is superficial to see in them only the fact that they spring from piety, and so to accept them as something pious, no matter what other constitutive characteristics they may have.

⟨(β)⟩ The history of religions depends on [comprehending] the precise formation-process of the representations of God. No matter how much this history is compiled and elaborated, it mainly lets just the external and apparent side be seen. The higher need is to apprehend what it *means*, its positive and true [significance], its connection with what is true—in short, its *rationality*. After all, it is *human beings* who have lighted upon such religions, so there must be *reason* in them—in everything contingent there must be a higher necessity.³⁶ | [We need] to study the history of religion in this sense, and at the same time to be *reconciled* to what is horrifying and tasteless in it; it is not a question of *justifying* it,³⁷ or judging it to be right and true in all its forms—human sacrifice, or the

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36. W₂ adds: We must do them this justice, for what is human and rational in them is also our own, although it is in our higher consciousness as only a moment.

37. [Ed.] The German text reads: . . . *sich mit dem zugleich auch versöhnen, was Schauerhaftes, Abgeschmacktes darin vorkommt, rechtfertigen, richtig, wahr finden, wie es in seiner ganzen Gestalt ist . . . , davon ist nicht die Rede*. The question is whether the word “justify” (*rechtfertigen*) is connected grammatically with the clause that precedes, in which case Hegel seems to say that the history of religion is to be justified by comprehending it and reconciling ourselves to what is horrifying in it; or with the clause that follows, in which case he says that it is not to be

sacrifice of children [for example]; but we need at least to recognize its origin, the source from which it has sprung, as *human*. This [is] the higher reconciliation.³⁸ [But] the history of religion is not our purpose; [we do] not intend to venture upon it here—contingency and locality pervade all these forms. [16a]

B. SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF THE RELIGIOUS STANDPOINT³⁹

[1. The Distinction between External and Internal Necessity]

This scientific conception means nothing else than the (portrayal) of the *necessity* of the religious standpoint—and that not as a *conditioned*, *external* necessity but as an *absolute* necessity. Hence we need to become aware of what spiritual process or movement it is that is going on inwardly as it raises itself to religion.

There is, [to be sure,] a way of viewing external necessity that treats religion as a means, as an activity with an [external] aim. But religion is thereby degraded into something contingent, which is not in and for itself but is an arbitrary thought of mine that I can also discard; it possesses in and for itself nothing objective but is [only] what I have chosen to think. (The true view, the substantial relationship, and the distorted, false relationship, lie very close to one another.)⁴⁰ For example, it was said by the ancients that a city, a state, or families, individuals, perished because they despised the gods, and [conversely] that reverence toward the gods, their veneration and worship, would preserve and benefit states and indi-

justified, only comprehended and reconciled. The punctuation of the *Ms.* is ambiguous, since commas both precede and follow *rechtfertigen*. The parallel passage in *W₂* chooses the first option (probably reflecting the interpretation of the editor, Bruno Bauer), while we have elected the second. Not only is the second reading more plausible in terms of meaning, but also it seems more likely that *rechtfertigen* is part of the series *rechtfertigen, richtig, wahr finden*.

38. *W₂* adds: with this entire sphere, the reconciliation that completes itself in the concept.

39. [Ed.] This heading is found in the *Ms.* with a "b" written above it.

40. *W₂* adds: The distortion of the latter appears to be only a slight displacement of the former.

109 viduals; in the same way in the Christian religion | the fortune and advancement of individuals [is said to] rest upon or be advanced by their religious sensibility.

The practice of righteousness attains stability⁴¹ only when religion forms its basis, when its most inward [mode], namely conscience, first finds in religion its absolutely genuine sense of duty, an absolute security regarding its obligation. Furthermore, it is religion that consoles the individual in suffering, misfortune, and death. The state must rest essentially on religion; the security of attitudes and duties vis-à-vis the state becomes for the first time absolute in religion. Against every other mode of obligation one can supply excuses, exceptions, counter reasons. [16b] If one knows how to disparage the laws, the regulations, and the individuals who govern and are in authority, to regard them from a point of view from which they are no longer worthy of respect, [one can do this]. ~For all these objects~⁴² have at the same time a contemporary, finite existence. They are so constituted as to invite reflection and investigation with a view to justifying them or criticizing them, etc.; [in short,] they invite subjective consideration. It is only religion that suppresses all of this, nullifies it, and thereby introduces an infinite, absolute obligation. <To sum up:> reverence for God or the gods secures and preserves individuals, families, states; contempt for God or the gods dissolves rights and duties, the bonds of families and states, and leads to their destruction.

These are considerations of the highest truth and importance. If now it were inferred from this proposition as [the result of] experience—(or if it were in fact laid down as a fundamental truth, whether immediate or what you will)—[that] therefore religion is necessary, (<[that] an essential and substantial connection [obtains between religion and ethical obligation],> then this would be an external sort of conclusion. (Possibly, however, it might initially
110 [appear] deficient only with respect to | subjective cognition, and no twisted aspect or posture need be given to the content itself.) If,

41. W₂ adds: and the fulfillment of duty is secured

42. W₂ reads: For all these characteristics are not simply what they are implicitly and inwardly; rather they

however, the conclusion of the reflection is stated as follows: "Therefore religion is useful for the purpose of individuals, governments, and states, etc.," then a relationship is introduced whereby religion is treated as a means; the primary purpose is something other [than itself]. In general, it is quite correct that the purposes and intentions of individuals, governments, and states [gain] subsistence and solidity only when based upon religion. What is misleading here is that whatever is construed as a *means* [17a] is at the same time degraded into something contingent. A *condition* or *cause* is something else; the indispensable condition for owning something is to have what it costs.

But in religion we have ~to do⁴³ with *spirit*, which is highly versatile. Already the physical organism, in responding to diseases, exercises certain necessary properties of the remedies,⁴⁴ but at the same time is indifferent to their specific character, so that a choice of remedies is possible. Likewise, when spirit has something as a means and can use it, the means is degraded into something specific; [spirit] is conscious of its freedom to use either it or something else. Thus if religion is a means, spirit knows that it can use it, and also that it can use something else. It stands over against religion (so that) it can choose to rely upon itself. Moreover, spirit has the freedom of its own aims or purposes. Its power, its cunning, its control of human opinions, etc.—these are also⁴⁵ means. And precisely in the freedom of *its* purposes—which implies that its purposes are valid and religion only a means—it has the freedom to make its own force, cunning, power, and authority⁴⁶ into pur-

43. *Ms. reads:* to be

44. *Ms. margin:* ((α) Choice among the remedies)

45. *Ms. margin:* ((β) These are its purposes – a finite purpose)

46. *Ms. margin:* (You must have religion so that . . .)

The complaint is that human beings have no religion; thus [we find] the spirit of disobedience toward governments, lavishness, luxury, etc.

When one is addressing those who are subjects, it is wasting breath to say that people ought [to have] religion in order to be good subjects; [it] may appear expedient for governments [to say this]. But this presupposes that the people have made it their aim to be content with what governments want of them. If this is already their purpose, if they have made up their minds to do this, then they require no other means [such as religion] in order to decide upon it.)

111 poses— | in the pursuit of which it is able to dispense with religion or directly oppose it.⁴⁷

It would then be a question whether spirit should resolve upon, or rather know itself to be obligated to, those purposes that are involved with religion. But this obligation itself, this necessity of its having certain purposes, together with the disregard of other more agreeable purposes, would lead to objective purposes having being in and for themselves, independent of free will—([would lead] perhaps [to something that was] no longer a mere means, that is, [to purposes] bound up [with] the religious sphere or directly with religion [itself]. [To use it as a mere means would be] *hypocrisy*, for religion should be what exists in and for itself.) [17b]

Objective purposes require the surrender of subjective interests, opinions, and purposes, and this negative aspect is included when one says that the veneration of God is the foundation of the true well-being of individuals, peoples, states, governments, etc. The latter is a consequence of the former, which is thus the main thing; it has its own definition and determinacy and regulates human purposes and intentions, which are not what is primary and properly self-determining. Such a slight change in the attitude of reflection alters and entirely destroys the first meaning [referred to above].

That necessity which is [mere] utility is⁴⁸ precisely for this reason

47. [Ed.] The point of the discussion thus far may be stated as follows. The attempt to demonstrate the *external* necessity of religion involves showing that religion is a necessary means to some end, ethical, political, or individual. But religion can never be a means to an end other than itself; religion is its own end. Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated from the principle of means that religion is *necessary* to anything else, even though it undoubtedly plays a useful social or political role. For if religion is a mere means, then the versatile human spirit can, if it chooses, make use of other means and get along quite well without religion. Nor is it the case that people actually need religion in order to conclude that they should subject themselves to governments (cf. n. 46). On the other hand, Hegel does not conclude from this that religion is not in fact the foundation or substance of individuals, peoples, and states. It is; but precisely for this reason it is not a *means* but a *condition* or *cause* (see the next two paragraphs).

48. *Ms. margin*: (Observations [drawn] from the field of utility [are] not [proper]. For example, [religion is supposed to offer] solace and compensation for suffering; but there are forms of suffering for which one ought not to let oneself be consoled.)

an *external, contingent* necessity, which is capable of being inverted.

Thus we are here talking about *inner, <rational>* necessity, which has being in and for itself, a necessity that free will and evil are indeed capable of opposing. ~The question of the extent to which religion cannot be eradicated | in anyone, or the extent to which one can succeed [in freeing oneself of it], is an empirical, psychological question because it has to do with the contingency of free will—the pinnacle on which the I that has being for itself is able to position itself.⁴⁹

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⁵⁰The more precise understanding of the necessity of the concept [of religion] is that religion⁵¹ (α) is conceived of as a result; but (β) as a result that equally sublates itself as a result—<the primary truth in which everything is mediated, upon which everything else depends>; and (γ)⁵² it is the content itself that in and through itself passes over to posit itself as a result. [This is] objective necessity, not merely for subjective convenience ~and in a subjective sense, in the way that a geometrical theorem is proved: “If this is so, then this follows, etc.” Here the process [of the proof] elicits a recognition of the necessity in us only subjectively, but the object itself is not produced.⁵³ [18a]

With respect to religion as something spiritual in principle, (<immediately>) is the case that in its existence *it is itself this process and this passing over*.⁵⁴ With natural things, e.g. the sun, [we have

49. *W₂ reads:* But then this free will belongs to a sphere outside, attaching itself to the I, which, as free, is able to position itself on the pinnacle of its being-for-self. Such free will is no longer connected with the necessity [of which we speak]; it is no longer necessity's own self-inverting nature, as is the case so long as necessity is understood merely as utility.

50. *Ms. margin:* (Universal necessity; [necessity] generally)

51. *Ms. margin:* <(α) Mediation; (β) sublation of the mediation>

52. *Ms. reads:* (β)

53. *W₂ reads:* It is not *we* who set this necessity in motion; rather it is the *action of the content itself*, or, the object may be said to produce itself. Subjective derivation and cognitive movement occur, for example, in geometry: the triangle itself does not go through the process that we follow in the course of recognition and proof.

54. [*Ed.*] The idea of religion as a “passing over” (*Übergehen*) from the finite to the infinite, from the sensible to the intelligible, from human being to God, is central to Hegel's interpretation. Religion is itself this act of passing over, which is not something posited by us. It is precisely this that constitutes the inner, rational, objective necessity of religion. See further below, pp. 207–208.

before us] an immediate existence at rest in an immediate apprehension, and in such an intuition or representation no consciousness of an act of passing over is present. The religious thought of God by contrast is a *looking away*—a forsaking of the immediacy of the finite, and a *passing over* to the intelligible world, to a gathering-into-self—or, [defined] objectively (as in artistic intuition), to the gathering up of what is immediately perishable into its absolute, substantial essence. (However, [we must] come to an understanding of the pure concept [of religion] more precisely in its simple abstract moments, which previously we have taken up in more concrete form, as derived from representation, in order to apprehend more definitely the thing whose necessity we have to grasp.)⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ [14a]

[2. Speculative Definition of] the Concept of Religion⁵⁷

~Religion [is] the consciousness of *the true* in and for itself. Philosophy is by definition consciousness of *the idea*, and its | business

55. [Ed.] This marginal notation indicates that Hegel has changed his conception of the structure of the lectures. Before proceeding with the development of internal necessity, he now believes it is necessary to introduce a definition of the “pure concept” of religion, a definition that he had not in fact offered in the first section. The first part of the definition is contained on a special sheet designated by the symbol “D.” This sheet was later inserted into the Ms. at the wrong place and given the number 14; however, there can be no doubt about its correct location. Following the insertion Hegel continues discussing the definition of the concept of religion for several more sheets and does not return to the question of the internal necessity of the religious standpoint until sheet 22b in a new section headed “Necessity of This Standpoint” (our Sec. C below). Thus the bulk of the second section on the “Scientific Conception of the Religious Standpoint” does not treat the matter of the internal necessity of the religious standpoint but rather develops a definition of this standpoint. The flow of the discussion is from external necessity to definition of the concept to internal necessity.

56. Ms. margin: (D. See special sheet)

57. Ms. reads: D. On the Concept of Religion.

[Ed.] This section is contained on special sheet 14a-b, designated for insertion in the Ms. at this point by the symbol “D” (see n. 56). In it Hegel offers a brief general or “abstract” definition of the concept of religion. He also describes this definition as “speculative” because it holds together religious *consciousness* and its *object*, “the true in and for itself,” God as “the absolutely self-determining true.” Ordinarily these are grasped as abstract, opposed elements, but speculation knows that religious consciousness entails a “rising above” and “passing over” to the absolute, and that the absolute in turn mediates itself with itself in and through the consciousness of it. Hegel develops the speculative concept of religion more fully in the 1824 lectures.

is to grasp everything as idea. The idea, however, is the true [expressed] in thought, not in intuition and representation. But the true [expressed] in thought is that the concrete, the actual, posits itself in ruptured form—ruptured into opposed, abstract determinations. Concrete actuality is grasped as the unity of these determinate oppositions: this is the *speculative element*. We intuit and represent the whole; reflection then makes distinctions upon and within our intuition. But it keeps these distinctions apart, as such, and forgets the unity that embraces them, perceiving them as one only within a third term external to them, not as unified in themselves. Thus, for example, among animals species and individual are a unity, a unity of universality and singularity. Thus too, becoming [is] being and nonbeing; but we let a representation [of] becoming satisfy us—and of being and nonbeing likewise; to grasp them, thus separated, in unity, this is the speculative [insight] that the understanding resists. Philosophy [is] consciousness of the speculative because it grasps (all) the objects of pure thought, both natural and spiritual, (and it grasps them in the form of thought.) This [is] the true *as* true, as the unity of what is differentiated.

Now religion itself is the standpoint of the consciousness of the true; ([it is] the consciousness of the most completely universal speculative content as such,) not of *something* that is true, not of this or that, not of something that on one side is still finite and untrue, but rather of the absolutely true, of the universal, of the absolutely self-determining true that has being in and for itself. But this absolutely self-determining true *is* only as the idea.⁵⁸ If God [is] not [conceived] as this unity, [as] the absolutely self-determined and | self-determining absolute, [14b] then [we have] that infinite abstraction, the supreme being [*das höchste Wesen*]. [God is properly conceived] only as having within himself the differentiated infinite universalities, [as having] within himself determinateness, i.e., limit, i.e., [as having] difference within himself, and [having it] as difference.^{~59}

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58. *Ms. canceled*: The world, God, etc., are representations insofar as they are not, like God, conceived as that unity.

59. *W₂ reads*: (a) Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the idea, such that everything is apprehended as idea; the idea, however, is the true in thought, not in mere intuition or representation. The true in thought means more precisely

This speculative [element] is what comes to consciousness in religion. Otherwise, God is an indeterminate, empty name. This is the religious standpoint. This consciousness [is] not [to be found] in any other sphere; [there is] actuality and truth of a kind, to be sure, but not the highest, absolute truth, for the latter can be found only (α) in the perfect universality of determinate characteristics, and (β) in the state of being determined in and for itself—not, that is, in simple determinacy (for this [is defined] vis-à-vis an other), but rather in the determinacy that contains the other within itself.

Accordingly, religion itself as such exists as this speculative [element]. (It is this speculative [element] as a state of consciousness, so to speak.) But its object and everything else [exist] in the more

that it is concrete, posited as divided within itself, and indeed in such a way that the two sides of what is divided are opposed categories of thought, of which the idea must be conceived as the unity. To think speculatively means to resolve everything actual [into its parts] and to oppose these to each other in such a way that the distinctions are set in opposition in accord with the categories of thought, and the object is apprehended as the unity of the two. Our intuition has the whole of the object before itself; our reflection distinguishes, apprehends different sides, recognizes a manifold in them, and severs them. In this distinguishing, reflection does not maintain the unity of the two. Sometimes it forgets the whole, other times the distinctions; and if it has both before it, it still separates the properties from the object and so positions both that that wherein the two are one becomes a *third*, which is different from the object and its properties. In the case of mechanical objects, which fall into the sphere of externality, this circumstance may have a place: the object is only the lifeless substratum for the distinctions, and its quality of oneness is only the gathering together of external aggregates. In the true object, however, which is not merely an aggregate, an externally united multiplicity, the object is one with its distinguished characteristics, and it is speculation that first grasps the unity in this very antithesis as such. It is in fact the business of speculation to apprehend all the objects of pure thought, of nature and of spirit, in the form of thought and thus as the unity of what is distinguished.

(b) Religion, then, is itself the standpoint of the consciousness of the true, which is in and for itself; consequently it is the stage of spirit at which the speculative *content* becomes an *object* to consciousness. Religion is the consciousness not of this or that truth in individual objects but rather of what is absolutely true, of the truth as the universal, the all-encompassing, outside of which there lies nothing at all. The content of its consciousness is further the universally true, which is in and for itself, which determines itself and is not determined from without. While the finite requires an other for its determinacy, the truth has its determinacy, its limit, its end within itself; it is not limited through an other, but the other is found within it.

concrete forms of representation: God and community, the cultus, absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity.

Here the concept of religion [is] initially more abstract. Its two moments, the moments making up the antithesis [to which we have referred, are] (α) absolute universality, pure thinking, and (β) absolute singularity, sensibility.⁶⁰ [18a]

[3. The Religious Relationship as the Unity of Absolute Universality and Absolute Singularity]⁶¹

Religion is the consciousness of the true in and for itself as opposed to sensible, finite truth, sense perception, (etc.)⁶² This [is] the more precise understanding of the | definition of religion that we are acquainted with initially from representation. 116

Consciousness of the true that has being in and for itself without limit and wholly universally:⁶³ this is an *elevation, a rising above*, a reflecting upon, a *passing over* from what is immediate, sensible, singular (for the immediate is what is first and not therefore the

60. *W₂ reads:* Religion is accordingly this speculative [element] in the form, as it were, of a state of consciousness, the aspects of which are not simple categories of thought but rather are concretely filled. These moments can be none other than the moment of thought, active universality, thought in operation, and actuality as immediate, particular self-consciousness.

61. [*Ed.*] Here we return to the main text, which elaborates on the general "speculative" definition of the concept of religion contained on special sheet 14a-b. At the end of the latter Hegel notes that the two moments of the concept are "absolute universality" and "absolute singularity." These moments are now treated under the forms of devotion (*Andacht*, cf. n. 66) and religious sensibility or sensation (*Empfindung*, cf. n. 67), and as the conflict between infinite consciousness and finite self-consciousness. Speculation recognizes that these two moments and their relationship are held together and in fact constitute the religious subject. (This accounts for our editorial sectional heading at this point.)

62. *Ms. margin:* (Religion in and through thought – and the object itself, and indeed –

(α) The highest thought – religion in its form, abstract concept, this totality –

(α) moment of thought

(β) of sensibility

(γ) of representation –

The three moments [are] inseparable)

63. [*Ed.*] There follows a series of key terms that describe the essential activity of religious consciousness: *Erhebung* ("elevation," "rising above"), *Übergehen* ("passing over"), *Ausgehen* ("going out"), *Fortgehen* ("going on," "progression").

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elevation); and thus it is a *going out* and *on* to an *other*—(not to a third, and so on into infinity, [for then] the other itself again becomes finite and is not an other,) but [to a] *second*. But therefore it [is] at the same time a sublation of the progression to and production of a second since this second should rather be the first, the truly unmediated and unposited. This is the process of spirit in general, and since, | as thus immediately posited, it is the absolutely universal, therefore this activity is *thought*, and this unlimited universal, God, is the highest thought. [It is] not thought *implicitly* (in the way that intuition [is]). Thought is intrinsically activity; [that is,] thought as such [is activity], not thought as subjectivity. It does not matter whether [it is] defined as in the subject or according to its objectivity.) [Thus thought] is posited as object, as the universal. This [is] its content and essential determination.

At this point [it should] be noted first of all that God and religion exist in and through *thought*—simply and solely in and for thought. And even though religious sensation may subsequently [take up] this object again and the relationship to it as feeling, the undifferentiated unity [is] just the unity of thought with itself. Thankfulness, (resignation, etc., introduce themselves.)⁶⁴ [18b]

⁶⁵This thinking is the foundation, the substantial relation. It is what is meant by *devotion*, not thought in the regular or formal sense.⁶⁶ For while it may well extend to the absolute object, it does

64. *W₂ reads*: The first moment in the concept of religion is indeed the *purely* universal, the moment of thought in its perfect universality. It is not this or that which is thought; rather *thought thinks itself*. The object is the universal, which, as active, is thought. As the act of rising up to the true, religion is a *going out* from sensible, finite objects; if this becomes merely a *going on* to an other, then it is a false progression *ad infinitum* and the sort of talk that gets nowhere. But thought is a rising up from what is limited to the absolutely universal, and religion exists only through thought and in thought. God is not the highest sensation but the highest thought; even when God is brought down to the level of representation, the content of this representation still belongs to the realm of thought.

65. *Ms. canceled*: ((I sense God – cannot be said – I am thankful – I sense *thankfulness* toward God))

66. [*Ed.*] The connection between devotion (*Andacht*) and thought (*Denken*) is undoubtedly strengthened for Hegel by the fact that the terms are related etymologically. The root of *Andacht* is formed from the imperfect of the verb *denken*, namely, *dachte*. Devotion is a form of thought that attaches itself to its object in the mode of dependence or immediacy. Thus it is to be distinguished from thought “in the regular or formal sense” (our translation of the adjective *förmlich*).

not constitute an independent progressive movement of thoughts, a development of the objectivity of the object and a consequence of subjective activity; [it is not] reasoning or speculating, the relating of reasons, consequences, purposiveness. [Devotional] thinking does not advance of itself to conceptual relations. Thus [it is] the wholly universal, undeveloped, subjective [way of] thinking and rising up into the wholly universal abstract element. <[Its] object [is] the wholly universal as such, the all-encompassing. (Whether the content [in its] objectivity is further posited by means of thinking or in some other way will be discussed later.)>

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For itself, this devotion is not yet *sensibility* [*Empfindung*] or *feeling* [*Gefühl*]⁶⁷ as such but rather the purely abstract orientation, a rising above everything limited and finite. There is [also] *devotional* sensibility, but this [is] a further determination of devotion. <This is quite peculiar to religion as distinct from other modes of consciousness, and also from the other kind of thinking, [which deals with] relationships, causes, and grounds, [where] everything is finite and limited.>

[(α)] The most immediate consequence, when we hold fast to this standpoint, is that thought is the element, the absolute and original mode of activity or state to which the consciousness of the divine pertains: God is only in and for thought. Consequently, *only human being has religion essentially*. The animal has sensation and feeling, but by means of thought human being distinguishes itself from the animal and therefore has religion. Here we come up against what is usually said, namely that religion is something apart from, independent of, and alien to thought, indeed that thought is opposed to and detrimental to religion. But it is precisely the same

67. [Ed.] While this phrase suggests that the terms *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* are closely related for Hegel, there is in fact a subtle distinction between them, which he sometimes observes and sometimes does not. (See 1824 *Concept*, n. 20.) To preserve the distinction, we always translate *Empfindung* as "sensibility" or "sensation" and *Gefühl* as "feeling." The term *Empfindung* predominates in the 1821 *Ms.* (more, however, in the *Concept* than in the *Introduction*), while *Gefühl*, which Schleiermacher had elevated to a major theological category and a topic of controversy in *Der christliche Glaube* of 1821–22, is the prevalent term in Hegel's 1824 and 1827 lectures. Hegel's use of *Empfindung* was probably influenced by Jacobi; cf. the latter's *David Hume*, pp. 200–201 (*Werke* 2:283–284). In the material it takes from the *Ms.* and *Hn*, *W₂* consistently changes *Empfindung* to *Gefühl*.

with thought in regard to right and ethical life: I have right and ethical life only insofar as I *know* myself to be free and know ethical life [to be] free substance. [I] know myself as this essential, infinite [being]; [I] know this infinitude, universality, [as] the substantiality of [my] will—speaking generally, [as] the rationality of will. All this is not *my* willing, my interest and purpose as this single, particular individual, but rather simply my universality, my essentiality. Otherwise [there is] only desire, force, free choice, etc.⁶⁸ It is one of the gravest and crudest errors of our time that *thought* is not recognized to be the element and essential form in all of this, | as well as the sole fundamental content. (Religious sensation ought to be something specific, otherwise it is not intelligible.)⁶⁹

68. (Reason – Jacobi – revelation, immediate knowledge of God – is thought, in thought)

[Ed.] Hegel is here apparently referring to Jacobi's early equation of faith and immediate knowledge; cf. 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27. See also Jacobi's *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung* (Leipzig, 1811) (*Werke* 3:277). Jacobi held that all knowledge is derived from immediate sense experience. "He regarded all 'immediate' knowledge as a direct 'revelation' of being. The mark of this 'revelation' was an unshakeable *faith*, a feeling of immediate certainty, an inescapable conviction of real existence." Thus H. S. Harris in his Introduction to Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 26 (see pp. 25–32).

69. W, reads: The most foolish delusion of our time is the opinion that thought is detrimental to religion and that the more thought is abandoned, the more secure religion becomes. This misunderstanding originates in a fundamental misconception of the higher spiritual relationships. Thus, in regard to right, good will is taken explicitly as something opposed to intelligence, and one is given credit for an all the more genuine good will the less one thinks. To the contrary, right and ethical life consist solely in the fact that I am a thinking being; i.e., I do not look upon my freedom as that of my empirical person, which belongs to me as this particular person, and in terms of which I could subjugate the other person by means of cunning or force, but rather I regard freedom as a universal that has being in and for itself.

If we now say that religion has within itself the moment of thought in its complete universality, and that the unlimited universal is the supreme, absolute thought, we do not as yet here make the distinction between subjective and objective thought. The universal is object and is thought purely and simply, but not yet developed and further defined within itself. All distinctions are as yet absent and annulled within it. Everything finite vanishes, everything disappears and is at the same time included, in this aether of thought. But this element of the universal is not yet more exactly defined; out of this liquid element and in this transparency nothing has as yet taken shape.

(β) But, as we said, this thinking is *devotion*, not objectively self-developing thought, not the sort of thought that spreads itself out in and through itself to contents, definitions, [19a] conceptual relations. In this abstraction (and hence even immediacy), thought lacks the moment of (form, determinateness, finitude on its own account, being-in-and-for-self,) ⁷⁰ of being infinitely determined within itself. This constitutes the other side, the other extreme of the syllogism. ⁷¹ It is consciousness in its singularity as such, the subject in its immediacy as this particular thing, [existing] not universally but with and according to its needs, circumstances, sins, etc.—speaking generally, in accord with its wholly empirical, temporal character.

(γ) In religion, I myself am the *relation* of the two sides as thus defined. I the *thinking* subject, and I the *immediate* subject, are one and the same I. And further, the relation of these two sides that are so sharply opposed—(of utterly finite consciousness and being and of the infinite)—is [present] in religion for me. This is the *speculative* definition of religion; (only thereby and to this extent is it speculative.) In philosophy the speculative, defined in terms of its antithesis, has a different meaning; of this we shall speak later. ⁷² [It has] the form of thought and [of] reconciliation in thought: thought has already begun to strip away the rigid oppo-

The progression occurs when this universal determines itself for itself, and this self-determining then constitutes the development of the idea of God. In the sphere of universality the idea itself is initially the material of determinacy, and the progression appears in divine figures; but the other, the configuration [itself], is retained in the divine idea, which is still in its substantiality, and under the character of eternity it remains within the womb of universality.

[Ed.] The German edition attaches this passage from W_2 to the one contained in our n. 64, construing the whole as a parallel to the main text between the beginning of n. 64 and the end of n. 69. However, it does not appear to offer a parallel to the intervening material.

70. [Ed.] This marginal notation replaces the word “determinateness” in the main text, which is not canceled.

71. W_2 reads: The particularization that is still retained in the sphere of the universal constitutes, therefore, when it actually comes to appearance as such, the other vis-à-vis the extreme of universality.

72. [Ed.] Hegel is apparently referring to Sec. D, “The Relationship of Religion to Art and Philosophy.”

sition, rendering it more fluid through the element of universality, bringing it closer to reconciliation. | The standpoint of religion is that in it the speculative consists in the unity of this rigid antithesis.⁷³ Here and for the moment this is a fact; later its necessity [will be demonstrated].⁷⁴

In thinking, I raise myself above all that is finite to the absolute and am *infinite consciousness*, while at the same time I am *finite self-consciousness*, indeed to the full extent of my empirical condition. Both sides, as well as their relation, exist for me [in] the essential unity of my infinite knowing and my finitude. These two sides seek each other and flee from each other.⁷⁵ I am this conflict and this conciliation, which exist in myself and for myself. (I myself as infinite am opposed to myself as finite, and as finite consciousness am opposed to myself, to my thinking and consciousness, as infinite.) I am what intuit, senses, and represents this union and conflict. I am their holding together, the effort put forth [19b] in this holding together, the labor of mind and heart to master this opposition, which likewise exists for me.

⁷⁶From the side of my subjective, empirical singularity, I sense or intuit myself to be finite, or represent or think of myself as such (in [my] formal thinking). These distinctions are not so important here; compared with the content of consciousness, which is the main thing, these forms are initially of indifferent value. |

73. *W₂ reads:* While in philosophy the rigidity of these two sides is lost through *reconciliation in thoughts* because both sides *are* thoughts (the one is not a purely universal thinking nor the other of empirical, singular character), religion only arrives at the enjoyment of unity by lifting these two rigid extremes out of the state of cleavage, reworking them, and bringing them together again. But by thus stripping its extremes of the form of cleavage, rendering the opposition fluid in the element of universality, and bringing it to reconciliation, religion remains always akin to what is thought, even in its form and movement; and philosophy, as utterly active and opposition-uniting thought, occupies a position directly adjacent to religion.

74. [Ed.] See below, pp. 221–232.

75. *W₂ adds:* At one time, for example, I accentuate my empirical, finite consciousness and place myself in opposition to infinitude; at another time I exclude myself from myself, condemn myself, and give preponderance to infinite consciousness. The middle term contains nothing other than the characteristics of both extremes. They are not the pillars of Hercules, confronting each other harshly.

76. *Ms. margin:* (More precise form of this relation)

I am the relation of these two sides;⁷⁷ these two extremes are each just me, who connect them. The holding together, the connecting, is itself this conflict of self within the unity, this uniting of self in the conflict. In other words, *I am the conflict*, for the conflict is precisely this clash, which is not an indifference of the two (as) distinct but is their bonding together. I am not *one* of the parties caught up in the conflict but am both of the combatants and the conflict itself. I am the fire and water that touch each other, the contact ((now separated and ruptured, now reconciled and united)) and union of what utterly flies apart; and it is just this contact that is itself this double, clashing relation as relation.⁷⁸ |

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77. W₁ adds: which are not abstract characteristics such as "finite and infinite," but are each of them the totality.

78. W₁ adds: As forms of this relation of the two extremes, we shall acquaint ourselves with

- (a) feeling
- (b) intuition
- (c) representation.

Before entering upon this subject, we shall have to become acquainted with the entire sphere of these relations in its necessity, insofar as it contains, as the elevation of finite consciousness to the absolute, the forms of religious consciousness. In investigating this necessity of religion, we shall be obliged to conceive religion as posited through what is other [than itself].

To be sure, in this mediation, when it opens for us the way into the sphere of those forms of consciousness, religion will present itself already as a *result* that immediately *sublates itself as result*; consequently it will present itself as the *primary* thing, through which everything is mediated and on which everything else depends. We shall thus see in what is mediated the counterthrust of the movement and of the necessity, which both moves forward and thrusts backward. But this mediation of necessity is now also to be posited *within religion itself*, so that in fact the relation and the essential connection of the two sides, which are comprised in the religious spirit, may be known as necessary. The forms of feeling, intuition, and representation, as they proceed necessarily one from the other, now propel themselves to that sphere in which the inner mediation of their moments proves itself to be necessary, i.e., to the sphere of thought in which religious consciousness will comprehend itself conceptually. These two mediations of necessity, of which one leads to religion and the other takes place within religious self-consciousness itself, comprise therefore the forms of religious consciousness as it appears as feeling, intuition, and representation.

[Ed.] This passage shows strong evidence of editorial revision, especially in terms of its use of the general future tense and the division into feeling, intuition, and representation, which lies at the basis of the treatment of the religious relationship in W₃, but which is found in none of the available manuscripts.

Initially this relation, this consciousness, exists as such (not I as knowing and the known object); it exists as relation, as devotion itself on the one side—a pure, simple raising and imagining [of oneself] into the higher, the highest, the universal element. But this devotion is at once *sensibility* too: these [are] the moments of *religious sensibility*.⁷⁹ This relation is called “sensibility” because I comport myself in it in the mode of immediacy; it is my immediate relationship, i.e., I exist as this singular, empirical self-consciousness. I exist in the mode of sensibility to the extent that I am immediately determined, a determinacy⁸⁰ [that] is immediately mine as [being] in this empirical [ego]. I see an object, [20a] feel an object with my fingers; thus for me it is something other, external to me. But | seeing this blue, feeling this warmth, is at the same time my subjective determinateness, which is in me and unseparated from me. I sense in a fashion similar to sentient nature generally in its sensibility. Sensing is this fluidity,⁸¹ this immediate reflection within me, this immediate making into mine of what simultaneously remains something other (but [exists] for me; thus [it is] only [as] sensation and life, distinction vis-à-vis myself, not an other,) that I am so determined. (I as this particular [self am] not an object. [I am] myself, my unity with myself, maintaining unity with myself—[I am] mine in this complete diversity.)

79. Ms. margin: (More precise nature of sensibility in general)

80. Ms. margin: ((α) Determinacy simply; (β) in this empirical [ego])

81. W₂ reads: Since I have a determinate character in feeling, I comport myself in it in the mode of immediacy. In feeling I am this single empirical I, and the determinacy of my feeling belongs to this particular empirical self-consciousness.

A distinction is thus implicitly contained in feeling. On the one side am I, the universal, the subject; and this transparent, pure fluidity, this immediate reflection into myself, becomes disturbed by an other; but in this other I keep myself entirely with myself. The alien characteristic becomes, so to speak, fluid in my universality, and that which is for me an other, I make my own. When another quality has been put into what is lifeless, this particular thing has acquired another quality too. But I, as feeling, maintain myself in that other which penetrates me, and continue to be, in the determinacy, I. The distinction in feeling is, in the first place, an inner one in the I itself: it is the distinction between me in my pure fluidity, and me in my determinacy. But this inner distinction, owing to the fact that reflection enters into it, is none the less also posited as such. I separate myself from my determinacy, place it as other over against me, and subjectivity is for itself *in relation* to objectivity.

In intuition and representation, then, my activity enters in order to remove this determinacy as not mine, externalizing it, making it objective. Thus [we have] two determinacies: (1) I have this determinacy within me; and (2) it is not in me. I have thus divested myself of my determinacy and in so doing have sublated my immediacy as such. With that I have entered the sphere of the universal as such (as the identity of what is differentiated.) [It is] the same with inner feeling. I am determined, am immediately angry or compassionate, find myself so determined; it exists as mine, as the determinateness (of this particular individual.) Likewise there is a transition not to external intuition but only to representation and recollection [when I] represent the content, ingredients, and determinacy of feeling; [I must] make the wrath, the wrong, the injury that I [have] suffered, the sorrow, pain, forlornness and loss, an object of representation. Anguish and sorrow that speak [are] not concentrated [within me]; injury [is] not immediately identical with me; [I] withdraw myself from the injury and from determinacy in general. [Here there is] a distinguishing of subject and object; but precisely this being-for-myself of subjectivity in relation to objectivity is the form of objective, universal subjectivity, the externalizing of sentient singularity.

Now it is said that sensibility is *only* subjective, something particular and peculiar to me. This appears to be opposed to the fact that | in the cleavage I first constitute [myself] as subject over against 124 [20b] object; and subjectivity (this limitedness) exists only vis-à-vis objectivity.⁸² But in fact (1) this antithesis, namely that I as subjectivity exist vis-à-vis objectivity, is a relation, an identity distinguished from this distinction, and it is at this point that universality begins.⁸³ (2) Sensibility as such, on the other hand, is the I in this

82. *W₂ reads:* It is customary to say that feeling is only something *subjective*; but I am "subjective" only with reference to an object of intuition or representation by positing an other over against me. Thus it would seem that feeling cannot be termed something subjective because the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity has not yet appeared in it.

83. *W₂ adds:* Because I stand in relation to an other and distinguish the object from myself by intuiting and representing [it], I am the connection between these two, myself and the other—a distinguishing whereby an identity is posited. I am related to the object by *overreaching* it.

immediate, simple unity, wholly filled with determinacy, which my I does not transcend. ⟨[I] am a particular being;⟩ [I] do not [go beyond] the content that I transcend by detaching it from myself in external intuition or representation of the content of inner sensation. Thus as sentient, I am something entirely particular, thoroughly immersed in determinacy. In the strict sense of the word, I am subjective, *only* subjective without objectivity and without universality. ⟨In intuition and representation [I am] a subjective, particular content with the form of objectivity; but in sensation [I am] a particular content without any form of objectivity, and just for this reason [I am] completely determined subjectively vis-à-vis every form of objectivity.⟩

125 ⁸⁴⟨The speculative relationship is initially sensed in immediate, unpurified fashion—both of its sides [related] to the universal, the objective—but [as] a conflict [within] my determinacy. The conflict itself drives [me] beyond sensibility to representation. Sensibility is quite obviously only one aspect and exists together with representation.⟩ |

The *types* of sensibility [are now to be considered].

⁸⁵This is the nature of sensibility: it is religious insofar as it possesses a distinctive content and distinctive determinacy, and this determinacy is what was mentioned earlier. [It involves] determinacy as infinite thought of the utterly universal, determinacy as wholly empirical subjectivity, and the speculative relationship of both of them. I sense this in myself—it is my conflict—⟨and also the reconciliation and resolution of it.⟩ ⟨I am at peace with myself, identical in and with my empirical self.⟩⁸⁶ ⟨Why is sensibility claimed to be necessary for religion? Precisely because religion has thoroughly permeated me as this particular person, because it is

84. *Ms. margin*: ⟨Religious sensation – sensation of this conflict – of itself already drives beyond sensation⟩

85. *Ms. margin*: ⟨(α) Mere representation without sensibility – interest, immediate unity with me – love, children, parts of myself, of my actual self-consciousness⟩

86. *W₂ reads*: If now the essential religious relationship resides in feeling, then this relationship is identical with my empirical self. Determinacy, as the infinite thought of the universal, and I as wholly empirical subjectivity, are conjoined in me in feeling; I am the immediate unification of the two, the resolution of their conflict.

not merely a representation, thought, wish, means, etc., but rather exists subjectively entirely in this identity with me. In the mode of feeling, my whole empirical existence [is] gathered into one, and [is] at the same time wholly and completely recognition of the universal. Religion is all the more inward the more universal is sensibility, i.e., the more it permeates all aspects of me in integral fashion—a feeling such that the entire empirical self [is] drawn into the religious relation in all its aspects, successively and side by side.) It must at the same time be noted, however, that because I find myself determined on the one hand as this empirical subject, and on the other hand in such fashion as to be raised into a wholly different region, and am sensible of passing to and fro from one to the other, and of the relationship of both—in this experience precisely I find myself determined against myself or distinguished from myself. That is, [21a] I am driven by the content of this very sensibility of mine into [its] antithesis, i.e., to | consciousness as such and to representation in general, (even if now intuition,) for what distinguishes representation from sensibility is reflection, [or] the advance to the distinguishing of a subject and object. We do not need to discuss here how consciousness itself and representation are more precisely distinguished. Consciousness as such (as distinct from self-consciousness) has in principle an external object. Intuition [has] this externality in its objective, complete character, ([in its] genuine, determinate character,) in [the form of] spatiality and temporality; in representation as such the object [is] simultaneously posited within me.

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The essential point is that religious sensibility immediately and on its own account advances to consciousness, to representation. (α) This is characteristic not only of religious sensibility but of human⁸⁷ sensibility generally, for the human being is spirit, consciousness, representation. There is no sensibility that is not also representation. (β) But other modes of sensibility are [driven to representation] only by the nature of | the case itself, so to speak,

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87. Ms. canceled: ((β) resides, however, immediately in the I of the religious [person])

[by] the inner necessity (of the form of determination, [i.e.,] the I and [its] determinacy.) But *religious* sensibility contains in its very content not only the necessity but also the actuality of the antithesis, and consequently it contains *representation*. In religious sensibility I am made external to myself; my universal thought is the negation of my particular, empirical existence.⁸⁸ Because I feel this, I feel that [empirical] side as a determinacy that falls outside of me; or, because I am in this fashion, I feel myself negated, estranged from my universal self—[I am] disowning myself (in repentance, for example), negating my empirical consciousness.⁸⁹

This relationship should be carefully noted. The necessity of representation for sensibility is a matter of far-reaching significance.^{90 91} (α) It is a common prejudice that [21b] intuition, representation, cognition, etc., should exclude sensibility. One can still go on sensing when one has an objective representation before oneself (intuition, cognition, etc.). On the contrary, sensibility nourishes itself, gives itself permanence, renews and kindles itself afresh, *by means of* representation. Anger, indignation, hatred are just as

88. *W₂ reads*: This transition to reflection is characteristic not merely of religious feeling but of human feeling in general. For human being is spirit, consciousness, representation; there is no feeling that does not contain within itself this transition to reflection. In every other feeling, however, it is only the inner necessity and nature of the case that impels to reflection; this alone is the necessity that distinguishes the I from its determinacy. Religious feeling, on the contrary, contains in its content, in its very determinacy, not only the necessity but the actuality of the antithesis itself, and consequently reflection. For the content of the religious relationship is just the thought of the universal, which is itself already reflection, hence the other moment of my empirical consciousness, and the connection of the two. Therefore in religious feeling I am alienated from myself, since the universal, thought having being in and for itself, is the negation of my particular empirical existence, which appears in regard to it as a nothingness, which has its truth only in the universal. The religious relationship is unification, but it contains the power of judgment [*die Kraft des Urteils*].

89. *Ms. adds*: and

90. *Ms. canceled*: (Only religious sensibility – not representation, even less thought. Representation does not at all sublate what is sensed. (α) Merely a representation without sensibility)

91. *Ms. margin*: (At an earlier point above [we considered] representation without sensibility; here [we consider] (α) what it would be like if sensibility must be without representation; (β) what religion is without doctrine)

active in sustaining and invigorating [themselves] by <representing> the many aspects of the enemy and of the injustice [they suffer] as are love, good will, and joy through the equally manifold connections of the object which they present to themselves. If we do not *think*, as we put it, of the object of our hatred, anger, or love, etc., the sensibility and inclination are extinguished; if the object disappears from representation, then the sensibility disappears [too], and every wholly external stimulus stirs up anguish and love [afresh]. One of the means of weakening sensibility [is to] distract the mind [*Geist*], bringing other objects before its intuition and | representation, transplanting [it] to other situations and circumstances in which those manifold aspects are not available to representation. Representation must [then] forget the object—and forgetting is, for hatred, worse than forgiving, just as for love being rejected is worse than mere unfaithfulness.

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<(β) Religious sensibility must advance to representation and doctrine.> All that raises human beings above the level of animal sensation is that their sensibility is at the same time knowledge and consciousness. Human beings know themselves while animals know nothing of themselves; human beings know only themselves, even in consciousness, when they withdraw themselves from immediate identity with determinacy. [22a] Precisely to the extent that the religious relation is viewed as being *only* in the mode of sensibility,⁹² religion dies away into something devoid of representation and action and loses all determinate content—of this we shall speak further later on.⁹³ [Our topic now is] the importance of religious doctrine, [so we must point out] at once the folly of the notion that the religious relation exists only as sensibility, that only religious sensibility as such is religion, indeed even to the exclusion of representation, cognition, thought—as if sensibility cannot occur in conjunction with the latter.

<[Still [to be] considered in regard to sensibility is where the

92. *Ms. margin*: <[Religion is] not merely certainty, subjective sensibility, the identity of my empirical I, but also *truth* in and for itself, and therefore religious doctrine [as well as] art, imagery, and other [forms of] representation>

93. [*Ed.*] See below, p. 239–240.

particular types of religious sensibility fall.)⁹⁴ Specifically, it has been shown⁹⁵ that in religious sensibility the empirical, particular form of subjectivity is contained. By virtue of its very nature, this is [contained] in sensibility as particular interests, particular determinacy in general. Religious sensibility as such itself contains *both* the contrast between the determinacy of empirical self-consciousness and that of universal thought or intuition *and* their relation and unity. Religious sensibility swings back and forth between the determinacy of their antithesis and their unity | and satisfaction.⁹⁶ In the determinacy of separation, together with the fact that the universal is the substantial against which the self-aware empirical consciousness also feels its essential nothingness—indeed that of its still positive (volitional) existence—this representation, this determinacy in general, is the sensation of *fear*. Being aware of one's own inner existence and conviction as of no account, along with self-consciousness on the side of the universal condemning the former, results in the sensation of *repentance*, of *anguish* about oneself, etc. Being aware that one's empirical existence, furthered on the whole or in one or another of its aspects—and indeed not so much through one's own self-activity [as through] a connective power external to one's [22b] strength and prudence, which [is] represented as and attributed to the universal's having being in and for itself—results in the sensation of *thankfulness*, etc. The higher unity of my self-consciousness generally with the universal, and the certainty, security, and sensation of this identity, is *love*, *blessedness*.

⁹⁷Generally speaking, this [is] the determinate standpoint and

94. *Ms adds:* We still have to speak of the *types* of religious sensibility.

95. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 216. At the place to which he here refers, Hegel initially intended to treat the “*types* of sensibility,” but then inserted remarks on the “nature of sensibility” and also alluded to the meaning of empirical subjectivity.

96. *W₂ adds:* . . . differing as the relationship of my subjectivity to the universal determines itself in accord with the particular mode assumed by the interest in which I happen at the time to exist. Accordingly the relation of the universal and empirical self-consciousness can be extremely varied in character: the highest tension and hostility of the extremes, or the highest unity.

97. *Ms. margin:* (Concept [of] sentient devotion. (α) Devotion: universal, speculative thought. (β) Sentient: my immediate singularity. (γ) Both elements accordingly pushed to extremes. Relation of the two is itself universally objective and sentient in my egoistic singularity.)

concept of religion—this speculative intuition, this self-consciousness, sensing and sensed, [hence] representing. The next point concerns the cognition of the *necessity* of this standpoint and its proof—the cognition of its truth, of the fact that it is the true and the veracious. |

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C. NECESSITY OF THIS STANDPOINT^{98 99}

When we consider the nature of this necessity, it will be evident that and why it [can]not here be treated in detail; our concern is, rather, just to understand it and its procedure.

¹⁰⁰Specifically, the religious standpoint contains: (α) The *objective* and *universal*—not in any sort of determinateness (e.g., a species or right), nor [as] *a universal* ([such as] will or freedom as universals). [What it contains is] rather *the* utterly unlimited universal or concrete that nonetheless encompasses utterly everything within itself—the natural and spiritual world in its full expanse and in the endless articulation of its actuality. (β) The *subjective*—likewise in the full expanse of its self-consciousness. (γ) The two sides are totalities only because and to the extent that each has incorporated the other within itself implicitly. The objective totality includes also the spiritual world, which [takes shape] by incorpo-

98. *Ms. margin*: <(d) Difference from philosophy and art>

99. [*Ed.*] This heading stands in the *Ms.* with a “c” written above it. In this section Hegel offers a demonstration of the “internal” necessity of the religious standpoint and its object from the constitution of the finite world—in effect a form of the cosmological proof of the existence of God (cf. *Ms. Intro.*, n. 72), and a “phenomenological” approach to the truth of religion by contrast with the “speculative” definition of the concept of religion in the preceding section. By tracing phenomenologically the immanent teleological movement of nature and finite spirit to their goal and foundation in the absolute idea, Hegel provides a convenient summary of “the whole sphere of the philosophical sciences.” The notation contained in n. 98 appears to anticipate the final main section division of the *Concept*, which occurs on *Ms.* sheet 25b: “d. Relationship of Religion to Art and Philosophy.” It is not related to the three points contained in the preceding marginal notation, which are designated by Greek letters.

100. *Ms. margin*: <[We must] first remind ourselves [of the two sides of the religious standpoint]: the universality and fulfillment of both sides. Objective world in itself, subjective [world] for itself>

rating and subsuming the [natural] world in its imagining and thinking. For subjective consciousness shapes and deepens itself within itself by means of reciprocal interaction with its world.

131 The inexhaustible wealth of everything in the universe [23a] is contained and understood in the religious standpoint; and this standpoint itself has the sense that it is the *absolute truth* of this wealth, that the latter as it is in and for itself exists only from this standpoint, | and that all other modes of its existence are past, external, ephemeral, untrue, miserable, self-contradictory, self-destructive. As a result, spirit is unable to remain or sustain itself at any of these stages.

⟨[Its] true satisfaction [is that] it exists in this expression for the sake of its satisfaction, [its] subjective position. The presupposition [is that] spirit [is] the truth.⟩ The assertion that the religious standpoint is the *truth* of the world contains on its objective side *the true*, which has being in and for itself, and which we call *God*; and on the subjective side, the fact that religiousness is the *true actuality of self-consciousness*,¹⁰¹ ⟨its true life, [its] experienced, conscious truth.⟩ The objective proof, the objective necessity [of the religious standpoint] consists therefore in the *cognition of truth*. This cognition is not such that we presuppose a concept of God and religion, (α) the correctness of which we would have to demonstrate, and (β) then seek the subjective cognitive grounds for this content, cognitive grounds without which we would not be convinced. Primarily,¹⁰² therefore, it is not a question of proving some such

101. *W₂ reads*: The standpoint of religion shows itself in this transition [to the absolute] as the standpoint of truth, in which the whole wealth of the natural and spiritual world is contained. Every other mode of existence of this wealth must here prove itself to be an external, arid, miserable, self-contradictory and destructive mode of actuality, which involves the end of truth and contains the aspect of untruth—a mode of actuality that returns into its ground and source only from the standpoint of religion. By means of this proof [of the necessity of the religious standpoint] it is then made clear that spirit cannot stop short and remain at any of those stages, and that only religion is the true actuality of self-consciousness.

102. *Ms. margin*: ⟨[It is not a question of] proving that this *representational image* “God” is truly actual, but rather that this *content* is what is true. We could then even discard representation or reduce it to that content—the content [that is] true in and for itself.⟩

proposition [as]: "God is thus and so," "Religion is this and that." Such propositions contain as a presupposition the representational images "God," "religion." It is a question of the *necessity of the content* in and for itself, or of discovering in the cognition what it is that is the true. (The only presupposition [that we need to make is] that we do not wish to halt and remain in any subjective standpoint other than what we discover corresponding to its concept.)

This true, however, is the *idea*, which has two aspects: (α) the two sides of the idea itself; (β) their unity. The former are the totality of the | subjective, the latter [the totality] of the essence of the subject generally and of the world, (nature.) The truth [resides] only in this consummation of the two sides in a totality: only in this do they exist and posit themselves as identical. [23b]

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(A proof [is] subjective knowledge of the necessity) [of something]. Necessity¹⁰³ [involves] derivation from something other. ([It involves] dialectical movement in general. Consciousness [means]: I am, I have finite judgment. But there *is* actually nothing; no external grounds or derivation have been adduced [to prove the existence of consciousness]. We only consider consciousness the way it is given:

(α) Two independent [things subsisting] in one are contradictory, such as movement;

(β) Therefore movement [is] not [a matter of] consciousness [but is] a negative result;

(γ) But more precisely the object [of consciousness is] something that sublates itself, an ideal in space and time, otherwise manifold and one;

(δ) The object of consciousness disappears for it; the object is not something external to it, not still external to it, but rather [is] itself at the same time an object distinguished by the way it is determined.

This [is] the course [of the proof] in general. Where does the religious standpoint come from? [It entails] truth in [its] full and universal significance, encompassing within itself all fulfillment. [It

103. Ms. margin: (Necessity (α) in itself)

comes] from the whole range of worldly appearance in its full and concrete significance. The course [of the proof] can be richer or more abstract, can be mounted from any detail. Vanini's straw:¹⁰⁴ here [we have] abstract finitude, [which] does not satisfy our definition of God. | The other [is that] from which we are to begin.)¹⁰⁵

133 ⟨(α)⟩ ~This other is nondivine being, the finite world, finite consciousness, | ⟨our activity, the sublation of finitude.⟩¹⁰⁶ ~Finitude

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104. [Ed.] Lucilius Vanini (1585–1619) was an Italian freethinker who was tried and convicted on charges of atheism, for which he was burned at the stake. In self-defense at his trial, he picked up a piece of straw from the ground and said that already this straw was proof enough for him of the existence of God. He was, literally, grasping at straws. Hegel was familiar with this report from various sources, such as the histories of philosophy by Brucker and Buhle, to which reference is made in his discussion of Vanini in the *History of Philosophy* 3:138 (*Werke* 15:244–245). See also J. G. Herder, *God: Some Conversations* (1787), trans. F. H. Burkhardt (New York, 1940), p. 112.

105. *Ms. in brackets*: Consideration of nature and spirit: the dialectic of nature has its truth in spirit, spirit [has its truth] in and for itself—spirit in its appearance, in consciousness.

[Ed.] This original version in the main text is replaced by the preceding marginal addition.

106. *W₂ reads*: As far as the proof of this necessity is concerned, the following remarks may be sufficient.

When it is to be shown that something is necessary, it is implied thereby that it has started from something *other*. Here the other of the true, divine being is nondivine being, the finite world, finite consciousness. Now if we are to begin from this as the immediate, finite, and untrue, and indeed as an object of our knowledge, and as immediately comprehended by us in its determinate quality—if therefore we are to begin in this fashion from what is first, then it shows itself in its progression not to be as it immediately gives itself to be, but rather as destroying itself, becoming, referring to an other. Therefore it is not *our* reflection and consideration, our judgment, which tells us that the finite with which we begin is founded on something that is true. It is not *we* who adduce its foundation. Rather it is the finite that shows implicitly that it is resolving itself into something other and higher than itself. We follow the object as it returns of itself to the source of its truth.

Now, while the object that forms the starting point perishes in its truth and sacrifices itself, it does not thereby disappear; rather its content is posited in the determination of its ideality. We have an example of this sublation and ideality in consciousness: I relate myself to an object and then consider it as it is. The object, which I at once distinguish from myself, is independent: I have not made it; it did not wait for me in order to exist; and it remains when I go away from it. Both, I and the object, are therefore two independent things, but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things, in which they are posited

[is] the antithesis (α) in itself [of] nature and spirit as [they are] in themselves;¹⁰⁷ but also (β) for each other: consciousness, spirit, exists for itself vis-à-vis an other, but since this other exists for it, it exists in its consciousness; [it is] the world of its consciousness, the external, immediate world in its representation; [it is] determined by the world, but equally the world is its own, the world of its spirit.

⟨⟨ β)⟩ ~⟨Our cognitive activity is a sublating, omitting, abstracting [activity], which at the same time is an objective activity, [having] the form [of] the sublation of finitude.⟩¹⁰⁸ Now the necessity of this world is to sublimate its finitude. ~The latter is ($\alpha\alpha$) sublated implicitly | *for us* in the concept; the logical is implicitly the identity

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as one. In that I have knowledge of the object, these two, I and the other, are one in my simple determinateness. If we genuinely comprehend this, then we have not only the negative result that the oneness and independence of the two should be sublated. This sublation is not merely empty negation but rather the negative of the two from which I have started. The nothing is thus only the nothing of the independence of the two, the nothing in which both determinations are sublated and ideally contained.

Should we now desire to see how in this fashion the natural and spiritual universe returns to its truth in the religious standpoint, the detailed consideration of this return would constitute the whole sphere of the philosophical sciences. We should have to begin here with nature; it is the immediate. Spirit would in that case be opposed to nature, and both, insofar as they confront one another, are finite.

107. *W₂ reads:* Two ways of considering the matter may here be distinguished.

In the first place, we could consider what nature and spirit are *in themselves*. This consideration would show that implicitly they are *identical in the one idea*, and that both are only the mirror of one and the same or have their one root in the idea. But this itself would still be an abstract consideration, limited to what these antitheses are in themselves, not comprehending them according to the idea and reality. The distinctions that essentially belong to the idea would be left unobserved. This absolute idea is the necessary element, the essence of both nature and spirit in which what constitutes their differences, their limit and finitude, falls away. The essence of spirit and nature is one and the same, and in this identity they are no longer what they are in their separation and quality.

108. *W₂ reads:* In this act of consideration, however, it is our cognitive activity that strips these two of their distinctness and sublates their finitude. It is from outside these limited worlds that they are limited and that their limitation disappears in the idea, which is their unity. This falling away of the limitation is a looking away that occurs in our cognitive activity. *We* sublimate the form of their finitude and arrive at their truth.

[of nature and spirit]; in their identity they are not, however, what they are in their [respective] qualities. (Spinozism, Schellingian philosophy.¹⁰⁹)^{~110} $\sim(\beta\beta)$ But likewise [as qualitative immediacies] they sublata *themselves in themselves*, (not in a contingent but in a necessary fashion; i.e., the other is an other only according to form, otherwise it has the same content, is connected identically.) [This is] objective activity, the action of objective necessity, of objective connections.^{~111} [(1)]¹¹² In *nature* the connecting has its form likewise as an in-itself; [these connections] are the positing of [nature's] other.¹¹³ Its concept is this sublation which appears in them as their progression through a ladder of stages (externally related: solar system, earth, plants, sentient animals, thinking human beings. [This is] because necessity [resides] in nature.)^{~114} $\sim(2)$ But the ne-

109. [Ed.] For the explanation of this allusion, see the passage from W_2 contained in n. 110. Hegel is referring to Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677) and to Schelling's "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie," *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*, vol. 2/2 (1801) (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/2:105–212).

110. W_2 reads: This way of comprehending the matter is to this extent more *subjective* in character, and what presents itself as the truth of this finitude is the idea that has being in itself—the Spinozistic *substance* or the *absolute*, as Schelling conceived it. It is shown from natural things as well as from the spiritual world that they are finite, that the truth is the disappearance of their limitation in the absolute substance, and that the latter is the absolute identity of both—of the subjective and objective, of thinking and being. But substance is only this identity. We eliminate from substance the determinateness of form and quality [of finite things], which therefore is rigid, cold, motionless necessity, in which cognition, subjectivity cannot be satisfied because it does not rediscover in it its own vitality and distinctions. This phenomenon is found in ordinary devotion: we rise above finitude and forget it, but yet it is not truly annulled just because we have forgotten it.

111. W_2 reads: The second way consists in understanding the necessity that the self-sublation of the finite and the positing of the absolute are *objective* in character. It must be shown of nature and spirit that they sublata *themselves* in accord with their concept, and their finitude may not be removed merely by a subjective taking away of their limitation. This is, then, the movement of thought, which likewise is the movement of the thing itself, and it is the process of nature and spirit itself, from which proceeds the true.

112. *Ms. margin*: $\langle(\beta)$ Necessity in the object itself

113. [Ed.] "[these connections] . . . [nature's] other" translates *sie sind das Setzen ihres Andern*. The antecedents of the pronouns *sie* and *ihres* are not certain.

114. W_2 reads: (a) *Nature*, therefore, is to be considered as what it is in itself—as the process whose final truth is the transition to spirit, so that spirit proves itself

cessity of nature | is to become *spirit*, i.e., that the idea which it is 136
 implicitly should come to be *for itself*, that the concept which is its
 inner essence should also become object to it, its external essence,
 should come within its own element, that of unity with itself.¹¹⁵
 (This distinction [occurs] with spirit, not with nature, which [is] as
 it [is].) But spirit, precisely as the object | for itself, exists as that 137
 which it is, in and for itself, in its identity with itself; but it is this

to be the truth of nature. It is the proper character of nature to sacrifice itself,
 consume itself, so that psyche comes forth out of this burnt offering and the idea
 rises into its proper element, into its own aether. This sacrifice of nature is its process,
 which has the more exact characteristic of appearing as a progression through a
 ladder of stages whose distinctions have the form of being externally related. The
 connection is only something internal.

115. *W₂ reads*: The moments through which the idea passes in the garb of nature
 are a series of autonomous figures. Nature is the idea implicitly and *only* implicitly,
 and the mode of its existence is *to be outside itself* in complete externality. The
 more precise mode of its progression is that the concept enclosed within it breaks
 forth, absorbs the crust of externality, idealizes it, and, in rendering the shell of
 crystal transparent, makes its own appearance. The indwelling concept becomes
 external, or conversely, nature immerses itself within itself, and externality consti-
 tutes itself a mode of the concept.

Thus an externality emerges, which is itself ideal and which is held within the
 unity of the concept. This is the truth of nature: *consciousness*. In consciousness I
 am the concept, and that which exists for me, of which I have a consciousness, is
 my existence in general. In nature, my existence is not known but is only an external
 thing, and it is first spirit that knows this externality and posits it as identical with
 itself. Sensation, which is the culminating point and end of nature, already contains
 a being-for-self, so that the determinacy that a thing has is at the same time ideal
 and is taken back into the subject. The qualities of a stone are mutually exclusive,
 and the conception that we form of it is not in it. In sensation, by contrast, external
 qualities do not exist as such but are reflected into themselves, and here begins *soul*,
subjectivity. Here identity, which as gravitational force is only a striving for what
 ought to be, has stepped into existence. In gravitational force there always remains
 an element of mutual exclusion, the different points repel one another, and this one
 point, which is sensation, being-within-self, does not come to the fore. But the whole
 force and life of nature is ever pressing toward sensation and spirit. While, however,
 in this progression spirit appears as necessary through nature, as mediated through
 it, yet this mediation is of such a kind that it at once sublates itself. What stems
 from the mediation shows itself to be the ground and truth of that from which it
 has stemmed. To philosophical cognition, the progression is a stream *flowing in*
opposite directions, leading forward to the other, but at the same time working
 backward, so that what appears to be the *last*, founded on what precedes, appears
 rather to be the *first*—the foundation.

such that it also exists as an other for it. (¹¹⁶Spirit, also [is] a [totality], has its determinacy in its being as appearance; that is, what is in and for itself, the idea, should exist for it and appear to it. Nature is only appearance; for us, implicitly, in the view of thinking, it is idea. In it these two aspects are extrinsic to each other. But spirit itself is the thinking view¹¹⁷ so that the idea ought to be for it. The finitude of spirit and this division thus stand in correlation.) Spirit is such as to be in and for itself as idea—i.e., [24a] its determinate characteristics should be ideal, should be maintained as encompassed in its unity; but also it should on its own account be distinct from its characteristics (just (because [they are] for it, hence the distinction)); it should exist as relationship, i.e., as consciousness.

138 These two moments are themselves initially to be distinguished. What is in and for itself does not exist for the consciousness of spirit; what is in and for itself initially has the form of an *other* for consciousness, an external world; and what it is in and for itself is likewise only an object of the thinking view. Its defining characteristic is that its being-in-and-for-self becomes relationship, and vice versa its relationship, | or consciousness, becomes being-in-and-for-self. This stage is *religion* because it is precisely the self-consciousness of the idea itself, or because the idea (exists) as self-consciousness. These two sides [are] distinguished initially thus: What is in-and-for-self determines itself outwardly to the distinction (α) of consciousness in general, but (β) to the bringing forth of an objective world, of a necessity that itself has its own freedom as its basis and substance.¹¹⁸ We have, therefore, to consider at first the

116. Ms. reads: (β) Spirit, ($\alpha\alpha$) also . . .

117. [Ed.] *die denkende Betrachtung*. This difficult-to-render phrase could also be translated "the contemplation of thinking" or "thinking contemplation."

118. W₂ reads: (b) Spirit itself is initially *immediate*. It comes to itself in order to be for itself, and its vitality consists in coming to be for itself through itself. In this process essentially two sides are to be distinguished: in the first place, what spirit is in and for itself, and in the second place, its finitude. First it is relationless, ideal, enclosed within the idea; second, in its finitude it is consciousness, and, since an other exists for it, it stands in relationship. Nature is only appearance; it becomes idea for us in the view of thinking; thus its own transfiguration, spirit, is found outside it. By contrast, the determinate character of spirit is that the idea lies within

necessity on both sides, on each [side] for itself,¹¹⁹ since they are initially distinct and separated. This result then is just | to posit this their necessity as identical. *Ethical life* is this substantial foundation of spirit, while consciousness [is] *morality, free self-consciousness*, which develops that foundation as infinite form in its determinate moments, and has now its own freedom in this its nature. Here consciousness, being-for-self, and substantial essence become equivalent to one another, and there is now only their finitude—the divine life [as an] existence in finitude—[to be sublated].¹²⁰ [24b]

spirit itself and that the absolute, that which is true in and for itself, is for spirit. In its immediacy spirit is still finite, and this finitude has the form such that initially the nature of spirit in and for itself is distinguished from what enters into its consciousness. But the determinate character and infinitude of spirit is such that its consciousness and its idea concur. This consummation of spirit and the resolution of the differences in that relationship can be conceived according to the double aspect of being-in-and-for-self and consciousness of it. The two are initially distinguished: what is in and for itself does not exist for consciousness and has still the figure of an other for spirit. But the two stand in a reciprocal relation such that the progression of the one is at the same time the advance of the other.

119. Ms. margin: (*Phenomenology of Spirit*)

[Ed.] This notation is originally placed in the margin alongside items (α) and (β) but then is connected to this point by a line. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Hegel shows how absolute spirit manifests itself first in consciousness in general—in the consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason of subjective spirit; then in the bringing forth of an objective world, the realm of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), i.e., “objective spirit.” The next stage is that of religion. Hegel’s marginal reference to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* indicates that he is here summarizing the leitmotiv of that work—namely, the rise of finite consciousness to the absolute—and construing it as a form of demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint.

120. W₁ reads: In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, spirit is considered in its appearance as consciousness, and the necessity of its progression to the absolute standpoint is observed. The figures of spirit and the stages produced by it are there considered as they enter into its consciousness. What, however, spirit knows, what it is as *consciousness*, is one thing; the *necessity* of what spirit knows and of what exists for it is something else. The former, namely, the fact that its world exists for spirit, is a mere fact of existence and therefore appears as contingent. The latter, the necessity by which this world has come into being for it, does not exist for spirit at this stage of consciousness but rather is hidden from it, exists only for philosophical contemplation, and pertains to the development of what spirit is conceptually.

In this development a stage is now reached where spirit attains to its *absolute consciousness*, a stage at which rationality exists for it as a world; and since on the

"This now is the course of philosophy [and of] the concrete development [of the world]—(that the truth of everything [should be] the content in and for itself—this corresponds to what we call the religious standpoint. [It] need not have this [philosophical] development; [it can subsist as] nature and spirit in general.) But [this involves] the antithesis [of] universal and singular self-consciousness, or [of] infinite and finite, unity [and multiplicity], which themselves are abstract and do not exhaust what is contained in the representation of God. Every logical stage is such a development; e.g., God is absolute essence, i.e., the logically universal essence or substance, absolute subject, subject as such, the pure universal.¹²¹

140 And when we say "God," this word signifies *the absolute, all-encompassing fulfillment*, (the truth of everything [that subsists] as this world of finitude and appearance.) The relationship of this fulfillment to the unity of the divine essence | may be defined in various ways. God is its power generally, the substance of the accidents, having or encompassing [everything] within himself.

¹²²Thus the portrayal of the absolute as the absolute power and concrete encompassment of this wealth [of a world] lies behind us.

¹²³This representation is the presupposition, the point, from which

other hand as consciousness it develops toward consciousness of the being-in-and-for-self of the world, this is the point at which the two approaches, which at first were different, coincide. The consummation of consciousness is that the true object should exist for it, and the consummation of the object, the substantial, of substance, is that it should be for itself, i.e., distinguish itself from itself and have itself as an object. Consciousness propels itself toward consciousness of the substantial, and the latter, the concept of spirit, propels itself toward appearance and relationship in which it exists for itself. This final point, where the movement of both sides coincides, is the *ethical world*, the *state*. Here the freedom of spirit, which advances on its course independently like the sun, exists as a present, available object, as a necessity and an existent world. Here, likewise, consciousness is consummated; individuals find themselves completed in this world of the state; in it they have their freedom. Consciousness, being-for-self, and substantial essence have reached concurrence.

121. Ms. adds: Proofs of the existence of God.

122. Ms. Margin: ((γ) Necessity [is] the absolute form – in the absolute itself – necessity as such and its course not behind us)

123. Ms. margin: ((αα) (αα) Form – (αα) This course [is] onesided – departure from an actual being – this itself [has being] only as something posited)

we begin. The necessity is that this wealth should immerse itself in this its truth. But since the initial significance of this universal is merely to be the universal determinate in and for itself, and since as concrete, as idea, it consists in casting off from itself, it posits and develops *determinacies*. We have to consider this development and hence this necessity within our science.¹²⁴ This development is the universal's self-determination, and the forms of this determination are *the principal moments of logic*, which likewise constitute the form of the whole sphere of wealth mentioned above. God's internal self-development has thus the same logical necessity as the development of the universe, and the latter is implicitly divine only to the extent that, at each of its stages, it is the development of this form. [25a]

Here, then, we ourselves shall also (have) to consider this necessity, which as necessity occurs in the same form [in both spheres of development]. We have then to speak more exactly also of the intellectual form of this necessity—the shape that it has in the *proofs of the existence of God*. The difference exists only with respect to the signification of the material or content, which in the former is the absolutely universal as such, and in the latter is the specific genera and spheres [of the finite world].

¹²⁵With regard to the material, it may be remarked additionally that, as unfolding itself in God,¹²⁶ this material yields only divine configurations and | moments, [while] in the field of finitude, it 141

124. *W₂ reads:* (c) But this appearance of the divine life still occurs in the mode of finitude, and the sublation of this finitude is the *religious standpoint*, in terms of which God is object of consciousness as absolute power and substance into which the whole wealth of the natural and spiritual world has returned. The religious standpoint as development of the natural and spiritual universe offers itself in this progression as the absolutely true and primary, having nothing behind it as a permanent presupposition, but having absorbed the whole wealth of the world into itself. The necessity is rather that this entire wealth has immersed itself in its truth, namely, in the universal that has being in and for itself. But since this universal [is] determinate in and for itself, and as concrete, as idea, in fact consists in casting off from itself, it thus develops determinacy out of itself and posits it for consciousness.

125. *Ms. margin:* ((ββ)) Material – fulfillment as the intelligible, eternal world)

126. *W₂ reads:* Initially, with regard to the material, this development is indeed different since, as proceeding into pure universality,

yields finite configurations and spheres. To this extent this material and its configurations are wholly different, despite the fact that the bare form of necessity [in them] is the same. But, further, these two sorts of material—the internal self-development of God and the development of the universe—are not so absolutely different. God is the truth, the substance of the universe, not merely an abstract other. Thus it is the same material. It is the intelligible divine world, the divine life within itself, that develops. But these spheres—the activity of the divine life—are the same as the life of the world. The world's life, however, is only appearance while the divine life is eternal. Thus the life of the world [appears] in the divine life in its eternal form—everything [appears] *sub specie aeterni*. For example, the finite world, nature and finite consciousness, are the antithesis, the other of the idea. As religion represents it, there is
 142 in God the other of God, | God's Son, i.e., God as other, the other that remains within love and within divinity; and the Son is the truth of this finite world. Thus it is not intrinsically an other material, whose necessity would only be observed, (but rather in and for itself the same material, i.e., for the first time the truth.)¹²⁷ [25b]

127. W_2 reads: The latter, the divine life in the modality of appearance, in the form of finitude, is viewed in that eternal life in its eternal form and truth, *sub specie aeterni*. Thus we have finite consciousness, the finite world, nature, what presents itself in the world of appearance. Generally speaking, this constitutes the antithesis of otherness to the idea. In God the other of the simple idea, which still is in its substantiality, also comes forth; but there it retains the character of divine eternity and remains within love and within divinity. This other that remains in the condition of being-in-and-for-self is, however, the *truth of the other* as it appears as finite world and as finite consciousness. The material whose necessity we have considered is thus in and of itself the same, whether it presents itself in the divine idea as in and for itself or whether it appears as the wealth of the finite world, for the latter has its truth and transfiguration only in the world of the idea.

The necessity that appeared to lie behind and outside the religious standpoint when it was derived from the preceding stages of the natural and spiritual world, we now see to lie within it, and necessity is thus to be posited as its inner form and development. In passing on to this development, we begin once again with the form of appearance and first consider consciousness as it appears in relationship at this standpoint, working through and developing the forms of this relationship until the inner necessity [of the religious standpoint] is developed and completed in the concept itself.

[Ed.] The last paragraph has been editorially revised in order to serve as a transition to the next section of W_2 .

(D. THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION TO ART
AND PHILOSOPHY)¹²⁸

That the true acquires this signification of the absolutely universal—i.e., the unity encompassing all determinacy, the world, within itself, and comprising it ideally within itself as its power—and that this is the absolutely true—such then is the starting point of the philosophy of religion, and the necessity of this truth is the [philosophical] science that precedes it. But the necessity as such or as form, and the substantial material content, emerge themselves as the development of the idea and of the material in its element.

The religious standpoint [is] the truth as cast into itself, as cast into the true, [its] essence and object; [it is] self-consciousness as that for which the true itself and the whole of its empirical consciousness, i.e., of the *universum* of its world, exist—this standpoint is a *universal standpoint*, common to *art*, *religion*, and *science*. It is part of the definition of the concept of religion to establish more precisely its differentiation and determination.¹²⁹ Essentially it is a

128. [Ed.] This heading is found in the margin of the Ms. In the main text the new section is marked by a "d," and the same letter is written above the marginal heading. It should be recalled that Hegel's original plan did not call for a fourth section on this topic. The section as it stands reflects a transition from Hegel's earlier treatment of religion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* to his mature presentation in the later Berlin lectures (i.e., those of 1824 and 1827). In the earlier works Hegel treated religion as one of the three forms of "absolute spirit," the other two forms being art and philosophy, and the primary task was that of establishing the relationships and differences between these three forms (see esp. *Encyclopedia* [1830], §§ 553–577). Also in these works Hegel at this point considered Greek religion as the instance of the religion of art and Christianity as that of the revelatory (or revealed) religion. The section heading that Hegel adds to his lecture manuscript reflects this earlier treatment. But in the philosophy-of-religion lectures he will not treat the specific religions until the second and third parts. So this section evolves toward a discussion of the forms of religious consciousness: intuition, representation, conceptual knowledge or thought. Precisely this is what is taken up under the second moment of the concept of religion in the 1824 and 1827 lectures.

129. *Ms. margin*: (Simultaneous determination of the side of objectivity – essentially the process, movement of making the object subjective. Art [is a form of] sensibility just as much as religion. However, in contrast with art, sensibility [may be recommended] because artistic intuition [remains] external; but [it may be recommended] equally in contrast with doctrine, which can also remain merely memory and representation.)

143 question of the *form* in which the absolute truth is [found] in religion. |

To understand more precisely what this involves, we must here recall what was established earlier¹³⁰—that when religion generally is located in the thinking of the universal, within which it integrates the antithesis of this my singularity, and when the unity is defined initially as my sensibility, a consciousness or objectification of this content is at the same time postulated as essential. The form of the distinction of religion from art and philosophy therefore falls strictly¹³¹—i.e., initially—within the determination of this objective relationship, for precisely this relationship itself is the distinction or the form [of religion]. Now this relationship can be nothing other than (a theoretical one, a modality of consciousness, for it concerns the form, the objectivity as such.) [It has] the character (α) of *immediate intuition*, (β) of *representation*, (γ) of *thought* in the strict sense of conceptual, speculative thought of what is true. [26a]

[1. Intuition]

¹³²The content, that which exists for consciousness, is the same [in each], and these forms cannot be distinguished as though representation and thought were not present in art and its consciousness, while art (immediate intuition) and thought were not present in religion. These [forms] interpenetrate each other essentially, because each of them, while thus distinguished, is at the same time the totality of consciousness and self-consciousness. (Art [is] likewise religion, and of itself art [is] one-sided without religion. The art work [has its being] in the subjective consciousness of the artist, the observer, and the community ([its] images). Religion as such, and the relationship of consciousness to it: religion as the religion of art [is] truth under the determination of contingency, externality; religion as such [pertains to] what is higher, to representation [as] the form of its content.)

130. [Ed.] See above, pp. 216 ff.

131. *Ms. margin*: (Objectivity as such, not merely as my representation)

132. *Ms. margin*: (Art – merely the objective mode [of consciousness]. Art can [be present] in every religion – whether [as] subject matter or [as] mode)

Art rests [upon] and derives from the interest in portraying the spiritual idea for consciousness and initially for *immediate intuition*—just because human being is consciousness, intuitive consciousness, not merely sensation; and, as we indicated earlier,¹³³ because the standpoint of religion is higher, it is not the standpoint of sensation but a more complete and developed standpoint. The *truth* is the law and content of art as well as of religion. Its portrayal is something produced by humans, made sensible and external, posited [in existence].¹³⁴ [Artistic] truth ordinarily has a twofold sense: (α) [that] of *accuracy*—the representation, the existing portrayal, that agrees with the object as otherwise known. In this sense art is formal—it is the imitating of given objects. The content can be what it will; the law of [formal] art is not beauty. But also to the extent that beauty is the law, art can be taken as *form*, and in other respects have a circumscribed content, like the genuine truth itself. (β) Truth in the genuine sense is the *correspondence of the object with its concept*, the *idea*; and this¹³⁵ is the content of art in and for itself—a content that concerns, of course, the substantial, wholly universal [26b] elements, essential aspects, and powers of nature and spirit.

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The artist portrays this idea in a sensible and hence in a limited figure—in its ideality, but individualized, so that the | contingencies

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133. [Ed.] See above, pp. 221 ff.

134. *W₂ reads:* Art has been engendered by the absolute spiritual need that the divine, the spiritual idea, should be [present] as *object* for consciousness and initially for immediate intuition. The law and content of art is the truth as it appears in spirit, and it is therefore *spiritual* truth, but at the same time *sensible* truth for immediate intuition. Thus the presentation of truth is a work of humanity, but it is posited in an external fashion, so that it is produced under the conditions of sense. When the idea appears immediately in nature as well as under spiritual conditions, when the true is present in a dispersed multiplicity of things, the idea is not yet gathered into one center of appearance but still appears in the form of externality. In immediate existence, the appearance of the concept is not yet posited in harmony with the truth. By contrast, the sensuous intuition that gives rise to art is necessarily a product of spirit, not an immediate, sensuous configuration, and it has the idea as its vital center.

In what may be regarded as constituting the entire sphere of art, there may be other elements included than those which have just been alluded to.

135. *W₂ adds:* as the free expression of the concept unhindered in any way by contingency or caprice,

of the sensible cannot be dispensed with. He stands back from his art work; thus for intuition the work is simultaneously a quite ordinary external object, (which has no sense of self and does not know itself,) and which exists in intuition as the idea that it portrays. This idea now exists as such in the intuiting subject, in subjective consciousness. This involves a community, which knows what is portrayed and represents it as the substantial truth. It also [involves] the cultus in order that this representation should not remain something external, but that self-consciousness should in fact annul the externality, the | dead relationship, the separation, and attain to the conscious feeling of having *its* essence in the object. But this¹³⁶ is already *religion*; the work of art is of itself lifeless, it is not self-consciousness—the idea in its intuitive immediacy.¹³⁷

136. *Ms. margin*: (Religion of art – symbol – the figure still separated from the content)

137. *W₂ reads*: The artist, then, has to present the truth in such a way that the reality in which the concept has its power and dominion is at the same time a sensible reality. Thus the idea is [found] in sensible form and in an individualization that cannot fail to have the contingent character of the sensible. The work of art is conceived in the mind of the artist, in which the unification of the concept and reality has *implicitly* taken place. But when the artist has released his thoughts into externality and the work is completed, he withdraws from it.

Thus the work of art is, so far as intuition is concerned, initially an external object of a quite ordinary sort, which has no sense of self and does not know itself. The form, the subjectivity, which the artist has given his work, is only external, not the absolute form of self-knowing, of self-consciousness. Consummate subjectivity is lacking in the work of art. This self-consciousness belongs to subjective consciousness, the intuiting subject. In contrast, therefore, with the work of art, which inwardly is not something that knows, the moment of self-consciousness is the other, but a moment that is utterly a part of the work—a moment that *knows* what is portrayed and represents it as the substantial truth. Since the art work does not know itself, it is inwardly incomplete and, because self-consciousness belongs to the idea, it requires the completion that it obtains through the relation of self-consciousness to it. Furthermore, the process by means of which the work of art ceases to be only an object takes place in this consciousness, and self-consciousness posits what appears to be an other to it as identical with itself. This is the process that sublates the externality in which the truth appears in the work of art, annuls these dead relationships of immediacy, and occasions, in the intuiting subject, the conscious feeling of having its essence in the object. Since this characteristic of entry-into-self out of externality belongs to the subject, a separation comes about between it and the work of art. The subject is able to consider the work wholly externally, to take it to pieces, or make inquisitive, aesthetic, or learned remarks about it—but the process that is *essential* for intuition, the necessary completion of the work of art, in turn annuls this prosaic separation.

"The Turk [threatened the painter with condemnation because he had] painted a fish without a soul. But the spectator—(the community)—is the soul.¹³⁸ Orientals [are] further removed from this distinction, [which constitutes] a return into oneself, to theoretical consciousness."¹³⁹

"In this way religion and art are mutually integrated; [but only] insofar as they [have] come to be distinguished is there such a thing as art at all. | Hence art, which [is] absolute, does not and cannot exist without religion, and it is only the objective portrayal of the content of religion in sensuous intuition or [in] image[s] and myths."¹⁴⁰

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138. [Ed.] In other words, the Turk was unable to understand that life can be represented by an artistic image that in itself is lifeless. Similarly an animal sees a painting as only a dead object, not as a representation of an aspect of life or reality. Only the consciousness of the spectator intuits "soul" in the work of art. The community—the religious community?—is already self-consciousness, subjectivity, and does not require something other than itself to bring it to life.

139. *W₂ reads:* In the Oriental substantiality of consciousness, this separation has not yet been reached, and therefore artistic intuition has not been consummated either, because it presupposes the higher freedom of self-consciousness, which is able freely to oppose to itself its truth and substantiality. Bruce, when in Abyssinia, showed a Turk a painted fish, but what the latter said was: "On Judgment Day the fish will accuse you of not having given it a soul." The Oriental wants not only the form but also the soul. He remains absorbed in unity, not attaining to the separation and process in which on the one hand stands the truth as embodied without soul, and on the other the intuiting self-consciousness, which in turn annuls this separation.

[Ed.] James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile in the Years 1768–1773*, 5 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1790) Book 8, chap. 13. This work was translated into German in 1790–91. Apparently the conversation to which Hegel refers occurred in Upper Egypt, not in Abyssinia.

140. *W₂ reads:* If we now look back on the progression that has been made in the religious relationship, and if we compare intuition with feeling, we see that indeed truth has emerged in its objectivity, but what is deficient in its appearance is that it remains in a state of sensible, immediate autonomy, that is to say, in that autonomy which in turn sublates itself, does not have being in and for itself, and likewise shows itself to be a product of the subject since it only attains to subjectivity and self-consciousness in the intuiting subject. In intuition, the totality of the religious relationship—namely, the object and self-consciousness—has fallen apart. The religious process belongs, actually, only to the intuiting subject, but is not yet complete in the subject and requires the sentient, intuited object. On the other hand, the object is the truth, but yet it needs, in order truly to be, the self-consciousness that lies outside it.

The progression that is now necessary is that the totality of the religious relationship should be posited as it actually is and as a unity. The truth attains objectivity

[2. Representation]¹⁴¹

¹⁴²But religion, then, is this totality of the two [art and religion]. With respect to the consciousness of its content, however, it is not bound and strictly limited to the form of immediate intuition and mythical image. To be sure, there must be a religion whose intuition occurs essentially in the mode of art. [27a] ¹⁴³But since religion is of itself the subjective side in the element of self-consciousness, *representation* [*Vorstellung*] is altogether more essential for it—
 148 representation [as] distinguished from *image* [*Bild*]. The image [is] sensuous, | [derives] from what is sensuous; [it is] myth. Representation [is] the image elevated into its universality: [it is] thought, full of thought, and is a form for thought too. For example, the representations of right and ethical life, (of virtue and bravery,) of the world and evil, are spiritual in character, stemming essentially from thought and freedom. But also more sensible [words such as] “battle” and “war” are representations, not images. Hence religion [is] the inner, depth dimension [of] what is at hand, in the mode and form of simple thought. “God,” “soul,” and “world” can also combine with images—[e.g., God’s] “begetting”—but thought is the overriding factor.¹⁴⁴ (Thought deals in relations, starting by

in which its content, in and for itself, is not merely something posited but is [found] essentially in the form of subjectivity, and the whole process takes place in the element of self-consciousness.

[Ed.] Both paragraphs show traces of editorial reworking.

141. Ms. reads: <(<β)>

142. Ms. margin: (Independence [of] religion – art not necessary [for it] – thus [art] can have this significance or not. Religion [is] a distinctive subjectivity, feeling, cultus – also an objectivity, a higher, distinctive subjectivity, representation – transposed into a subjective mode.)

143. Ms. margin: (Representation of God [vs.] image of God. The representation of a battle, [as against] the image in its singularity, [is its] signification, [its] purpose, essence, determinacy, and description—the spiritual aspect, thinking intuition, highlighted in simple [abstraction]. Enemy: immediate explanation of the word.)

144. W₁ reads: We can readily distinguish between image and representation. It makes a difference whether we can say we have a representation or an image of God; likewise with respect to sensible objects. The *image* derives its content from the sphere of the sensible and presents it in the immediate mode of its existence, in its singularity and in the contingency of its sensible appearance. But since the infinite multitude of individual details, as they are present in immediate existence, can never be duplicated as a whole by even the most exhaustive presentation, the image is

singling out the essential feature. E.g., in the representation of right [there is] an abstraction from other, contingent, characteristics: [this is the way of] reflection, argumentation.)^{145 146}

To the extent that religion gives its content essentially in the form of representations, it has a *doctrine*—namely, that of *truth*.

(αα) Its content is and has the validity of *truth*.¹⁴⁷ [Religion] has something polemical | about it since the content is not grasped immediately in sensuous intuition or figurative [*bildlich*] fashion but as mediated by the process of abstraction, [through] raising the figurative or sensible into the universal. [This is an elevation] that is linked with the rejection of the figurative—a rejection that seems initially to concern only its form but [actually] concerns its content also insofar as religious opinion was bound up with the figurative; and the figurative, the beautiful, has precisely the signification that the universal, the thought, the concept is *not separated* from its image [*Bild*] (which, accordingly, is not a *symbol*). A symbol presupposes reflection, [the presence] of separation. Religious representation, therefore, has the characteristic of being *true* as against the figurative and precisely as against the whole imperfect modality

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always of necessity something limited. For the religious intuition that is able to portray its content only in imagery, the idea disintegrates into a multitude of figures in which it delimits and finitizes itself. The universal idea that appears in the sphere of these finite figures, but only in them and only as their basis, therefore remains concealed as such.

Representation, by contrast, is the image elevated into the form of universality or thought so that the one fundamental quality that constitutes the essence of the object is held fast and is kept in mind representationally by spirit. If, for example, we say “world,” in this one sound is gathered and united the entire wealth of the infinite universe. When the consciousness of the object is reduced to a simple determinate thought, it is representation, which for its appearance requires only the *word*—this simple utterance that remains within itself. The manifold content that representation simplifies may be derived from the inner life, from freedom, and then we have representations of right, ethical life, evil; or it may also be taken from external appearance, and then we may, for example, have a representation of battles or of wars.

145. *Ms. in brackets:* (Furthermore, the cultus is an essential part of religion – subjective consciousness and its process, movement, identification.)

146. *Ms. margin:* <(α) Truth, Doctrine – (β) Faith>

147. *Ms. margin:* <For [it occurs as] representation, which should, however, be objective, not subjective. Intuition and art already of themselves are objective.>

of intuition and imagery, which as sensuous cannot truly grasp the absolute from the very start.¹⁴⁸ [27b]

150 ~(ββ) Moreover, its representations have the significance of truth as *objectivity* in contrast with the other mode [of truth, that] of subjectivity. (The sensible also | is implicitly subjective, i.e., finite.) [They have the significance] of objectivity, so that the content [of religion] *is* in and for itself, [is] not something posited, remaining within me, a movement in me. In contrast with religious sensibility, [representation gives] objective duties, objective faith, the fact that there is something higher than this empirical consciousness of mine, no matter what I call "mine." Rather, in and for itself [this higher being is] secure in its substantiality against me.¹⁴⁹ The religious sensibility of our time [is the yearning] to envisage God in oneself—one's consciousness of the divine as self-consciousness, *oneself* as divine—deification of oneself. Truth as objective [has] perished [in the face of this] obstinacy in the form of religious sensibility. Self-forgetfulness, renunciation (of one's opinion, is not present here—
151 a peculiar phenomenon! What | will come of it is not [for us] to say; force and suppression must appear [if consciousness is] no longer open to objective faith.)

148. W₂ reads: Religion, when raised up into the form of representation, immediately has something polemical about it. The content is not grasped immediately in sensuous intuition or figurative fashion but as mediated by the process of abstraction. What is sensuous and figurative is elevated into the universal, and with this elevation is necessarily linked a negative attitude toward the figurative. But this negative attitude concerns not merely the form (in which case the distinction between intuition and representation would lie in that only); it also touches the content. The idea and the mode of presentation are so closely related for intuition that the two appear as one, and the figurative has the signification that the idea is essentially linked to it and could not be separated from it. Representation, by contrast, proceeds on the assumption that the absolutely true idea cannot be grasped by means of an image and that the figurative mode is a delimitation of the content. It therefore sublates the unity of intuition, rejects the unity of the image and its meaning, and brings this meaning into prominence for itself.

149. W₂ reads: Finally, religious representation has the significance of truth, of objective content, and is thus directed against other modes of subjectivity, not merely against the figurative mode. Its content is that which has validity in and for itself, which remains substantially fixed as against my suppositions and opinions, and is inflexible as contrasted with the fluctuation of my desires and likings.

~(γγ) *Doctrine*. Religion can be *taught*, it can be *imparted*, starting from representation: pedagogy. ([Present-day teachers] do not know how to begin the teaching of religion.) [It is] a misunderstanding [to suppose that children should simply] remain within the love of parents and teachers in order to nourish the sensation of obedience, as though this sensation itself were what is religious.¹⁵⁰ [A person must] first return | to love of the awesome object, but precisely by transcending oneself in it—i.e., having liberated oneself

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This has reference to the essence of representation generally. With regard to its specific form, we have to make the following remarks:

(a) We saw that in representation the essential content is posited in the form of thought, but this does not mean that it is already posited *as* thought. Thus when we said that representation is oriented polemically toward the sensible and figurative, and comports itself toward them negatively, this does not yet imply that it has liberated itself from the sensible absolutely and has posited the latter ideally in a complete way. This is first attained in actual thought, which elevates the sensible qualities of the content to universal categories of thought, to the inner moments or distinctive determinacy of the idea. Since representation is not this concrete elevation of the sensible to the universal, its negative attitude toward the sensible means nothing other than that it is not yet truly liberated from it. It is still essentially entangled with it and needs it and this struggle against the sensible in order to be itself. Thus the sensible belongs essentially to representation even if the latter is never able to allow it to have independent validity. Moreover, the universal of which representation is conscious is only the abstract universality of its object, only its indeterminate essence or approximate nature. In order to define the essence, it again requires the determinacy that belongs to the sensible, the figurative, but assigns the latter, as sensible, the position of being distinct from what it signifies, and treats it as a point at which it is not possible to remain, as something that only serves to represent the proper content that is distinct from it.

On this account, then, representation stands in a state of constant unrest between immediate sensible intuition and thought in the proper sense. Its determinacy is sensible in character, derived from the sensible, but thinking has infiltrated itself; in other words, the sensible is elevated by way of abstraction into thinking. But these two, the sensible and the universal, do not interpenetrate each other thoroughly; thinking has not yet completely overcome sensible determinacy, and even if the content of representation is the universal, yet it is still burdened with the determinateness of the sensible and needs the form of natural life. But it remains always the case that this moment of the sensible is not valid on its own account.

150. *Ms. margin*: ([It is] alleged [that] fear can remain in the memory, in representation, [as] something alien in me. [The ego] wants only to have itself: selfishness. [Instruction] can equally well have an effect on the heart [and bring about] a consciousness of the true.)

from oneself, having made oneself empty and pure, having surrendered oneself.¹⁵¹ Parents do love and should love their children just as they are, good or bad, together with all their naughtiness, and people have indeed [represented] the love of God toward them in this fashion. They direct this love according to their inclination and opinion; they abide in love—in and against all divine and human laws; they violate these laws, tread them under foot, and believe and say that they have not injured love.^{152 ~153} [This is] the energy

151. *Ms. margin*: (Fear of God – negativity of one's self – fear and love [of God] – the same [with] the relationship of parents and teachers)

152. *Ms. margin*: (Subjectivity of love without fear; love is the restoration of subjectivity itself as subjective particularity)

153. *W₂ reads*: After we have seen the general characteristics of representation, this is now the place to touch upon the pedagogical question of recent times, namely, whether religion can be *taught*. Teachers who do not know how to begin the teaching of religion hold that instruction in religion is out of place. But religion has a content that must be represented in objective fashion. This implies that this represented content can be communicated, for representations are communicable by means of words. To warm the heart, to excite the sensibilities, is another matter: it is not to teach but to interest my subjectivity in something, and it may well be provided by an eloquent sermon, but it is not teaching or doctrine. If, indeed, we proceed from *feeling*, positing it as primary and original, and then say that religious representations come from feeling, this is correct in one respect, insofar as the original determinateness resides in the nature of spirit itself. But on the other hand, feeling is so indeterminate that it can contain anything, and the knowledge of what lies in feeling does not belong to feeling itself but is only given by the instruction and doctrine that communicate the representation. The instructors referred to want children and people in general to remain within their subjective experience of love, and they represent the love of God as being like that of parents for their children, who do and should love them just as they are. They pride themselves on abiding in the love of God, and while they tread all divine and human laws under foot, they believe and say that they have not injured love. But if love is to be pure, it must first renounce selfishness, it must have liberated itself—and spirit is liberated only when it has come outside itself and once it has intuited the substantial as an other, a higher, over against itself. Spirit truly returns to itself only when it has taken up an attitude toward the absolute power, toward the awesome object, only when it has come outside itself in this object, has liberated itself from itself, has surrendered itself. That is to say, the fear of God is the presupposition of true love. What is true in and for itself must appear to the disposition as something independent in relation to which it renounces itself; and only through this mediation, through the restoration of itself, does it attain true freedom.

of their self-will—the religiosity of Sand¹⁵⁴ and his love for his parents. Transgression [is] let loose to its own devices—a completely selfish piety—a gang of colts!¹⁵⁵ [28a]

(δδ) <Faith and Love.> When objective truth [occurs] for me, I have emptied myself of myself, have kept nothing for myself, and at the same time have laid hold of this truth as my own. I have identified myself, [my] abstract ego, with it, and have maintained my self-consciousness in it, but as pure and passionless. This relation is called faith; from my side [it is] implicitly within me, speaking the content to me. <Faith is the same as what religious sensibility is, [namely,] the absolute identity of the content with me; but in such a way that faith expresses the absolute objectivity that the content has for me. The church and Luther knew quite well what they meant by faith. They did not say that one is saved by αἰσθησις, sensibility, conviction, love, but that one is saved by faith.>¹⁵⁶ | [Faith is] the inner testimony of my spirit, therefore not a historical, learned testimony, but one without the necessity of the concept <and [without] determination as my determination. [It is] concrete, a conjunction,> a distinctive mode of truth—~the absolute content

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154. [Ed.] In 1819 a theological student in Jena by the name of Karl Sand (1795–1820) murdered the journalist and poet August von Kotzebue, whom the students suspected of being a Russian agent. The event became a *cause célèbre* in Prussia, and the Berlin rationalist theologian Wilhelm de Wette wrote a letter of condolence to Sand's parents in which he suggested that Sand's motives were pure. Subsequently de Wette was dismissed from the faculty by the government for this action, a dismissal that Hegel defended amid considerable controversy. See K. A. von Müller, *Karl Ludwig Sand*, 2d ed. (Munich, 1925).

155. [Ed.] *Pferdchen* (?) *Rotten*. The Ms. is difficult to decipher at this point. If this reading is correct, “gang of colts” is probably a metaphorical reference to the student fraternities with which Karl Sand was associated. Hegel believed that these student groups, inspired by a subjectivist philosophy, were encouraging romantic political terrorism.

156. *W₂ adds*: Thus in the absolute object I have freedom, which essentially includes the renunciation of my own opinion and particular conviction. Now since, in comparison with feeling, in which the content occurs as the determinateness of the subject and hence as contingent, for representation the content is lifted up into objectivity, it is more in connection with the latter that the content should justify itself on its own account on the one hand, and on the other, that the necessity of its essential conjunction with self-consciousness is developed.

of thought and truth [in] representations. But [with respect to] form [faith is]: (α) a content, a thought given over against me, [whereas] ~reason with respect to its form and necessity is nothing given, not instinctive,¹⁵⁷ [nothing] only implicitly acceptable or given; (β) [its] content [is] the development of objective reason, a series of doctrines [in] the form of immediacy, [claiming that] something is the case.¹⁵⁸ <[This involves] argumentation—the antithesis of my concepts, principles, laws. The form of the concept, its content, [is] an identity. [There are] two ways in which religious doctrine perishes: (α) sensibility, (β) argumentation. First [it is] reduced [to] argumentation, then to sensibility, subjectivity. [It is given] a false representation, as though [it had been] rendered comprehensible. [The result is its] corruption.

¹⁵⁹<The form of the objectivity of representation [was considered] earlier: as faith [it exists] *for me*. [There are] different ways of

157. *W₂ reads:* My connection with the content is not yet truly developed, and it appears only as something instinctive. The I, which turns itself in this fashion to the content, does not need to be merely this simple and ingenuous I; it already can be inwardly molded in various ways.

158. *W₂ reads:* However, with reference to what primarily concerns the content itself, the value the content has in representation is that of something given, of which all that is known is that it is so. Then over against this abstract, immediate objectivity, the conjunction of the content with self-consciousness appears, initially, as one that still has a purely subjective nature. The content, it is then said, commends itself to me for its own sake, and the witness of the spirit teaches me to recognize it as truth, as my essential determination.

159. *Ms. in large parentheses:*

(γ) Concept [of] Philosophy (See below)

I do not need to say much more on the situation and definition of philosophy; its form has been indicated earlier. — (α) The subjective <need of thought>

[*Ed.*] Apparently Hegel originally intended to begin the third part of the section at this point, the one treating the relation of religion to philosophy and speculative thought. But then he drew large parentheses around this heading and the first two sentences following it, indicating that he intended to cancel this material or postpone the transition; he also added the words “see below” to the right and slightly above the heading. In fact, the discussion of faith as a form of religious representation continues for several more paragraphs without a break, and the text then turns to the relationship between representation and thought. Only later, where he has added a “c” to the text (see below, n. 173), does Hegel take up speculative or conceptual thought in the strict sense. Both *W₂* and *L* locate the transition to thought at the later point.

coming to faith; the certainty of this content [exists] for me.) Religion in its peculiar form produces *conviction, certainty, | faith*, in a distinctive way—a way that has simultaneously the nature of something subjective in it—a *testimony of the spirit*, in general, divine illumination. (For example, the infinite idea of the incarnation of God—this speculative midpoint—penetrates forcefully and irresistibly into the mind that is not darkened by reflection or that [has raised itself] out of the process of reflection.) Birth, training, and custom [induce faith]; we know nothing else. [It arises from] miracle, the historical mode, and from the Word and the letter. ([It answers to] the needs of my heart as this particular [individual], speaks not only to my spirit but [to my heart]; otherwise I do not know which way to turn.) The history of religion, its wondrous expansion, [corroborates faith]. Thousands, millions, [have] found in it their *consolation, happiness, dignity*. This sort of authority based on human commonality [determines faith]. If all [believe] something, then it must very probably be correct; to cut oneself off is always perilous and perverse. [One] must think twice [before] setting one's own authority (which [is] [mere] opinion) against this general authority.¹⁶⁰

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(All of these circumstantial ways and means can be brought into the form of demonstrations of the truth of a religion; and (except for the testimony of one's own spirit) most proofs—e.g., those offered by Hugo Grotius¹⁶¹ for the Christian religion—are of this sort.¹⁶² The form of the proofs introduces the form of argumentation, of reflection; it cannot concern the content of truth in and

160. *W₂ reads*: Or it may be that we reflect on the wondrous way that religion has expanded, and how millions have found in it their *consolation, happiness, and dignity*. To cut oneself off from this authority is declared to be perilous, and the authority of one's own opinion is laid aside in its favor. But here too a false turn is taken in that personal conviction is subjugated to general authority and is silenced in relation to it. The consolation lies only in the supposition that the manner in which millions have regarded the matter must probably be right, and the possibility remains that, on being looked at once again, it may turn out to be otherwise.

161. [Ed.] Hugo Grotius, *De veritate religionis Christianae*, new ed. (Amsterdam, 1679), 2:33–49.

162. *W₂ reads*: have obtained this form from the Apologists.

for itself, [but] demonstrates [merely] credibility, probabilities,
 155 etc.)¹⁶³ | [28b]

The beginnings of reflection, in particular, which go beyond holding fast to what is given, can and do confuse me, and the confusion is all the more dangerous and serious to the extent that the ethical and all other purchase on myself, on life, on activity and the state, is weakened by confusion regarding this region. The experience that I cannot help myself by means of reflection and thought, that I cannot stand on my own at all, is the need of religion generally; and indeed the absolute demand for something secure throws me back from thought upon religion, and leads me to an adherence to
 156 the substantial and inwardly solid content in the form that it | is given.¹⁶⁴ To cast myself on the content in this way also means that

163. *W₂ (1831) adds:* and instead of considering the truth in its being-in-and-for-itself, it is able to understand it only in connection with other circumstances, occurrences, and conditions. Moreover, although apologetics with its argumentation passes over into thought and the drawing of conclusions, and wants to establish grounds that are supposed to be different from authority, nevertheless its major ground is still an authority, namely, divine authority, [claiming] that God has revealed to humanity the content that is to be represented. Without this authority, apologetics cannot function for even a single moment, and this perpetual mixing up and confusion of thinking, concluding, and authority is essential to its standpoint. But since from this standpoint it is inevitable that the argumentation should go on *ad infinitum*, the supreme divine authority is in turn seen to be one that itself stands in need of proof and rests upon an authority. For we were not present and did not see God when he revealed. It is always only *others* who tell and assure us of it, and precisely the testimonies of these others, who lived through the history, or who first learned it from eyewitnesses, ought, according to this apologetic, to be the means of connecting our conviction with a content separated from us temporally and spatially. Yet even this mediation is not absolutely secure, for all depends on the character of the medium that stands between us and the content and that is provided by the perception of others. The capacity to perceive demands prosaic understanding and its cultivation, conditions that were not present among the ancients. They lacked the capacity to comprehend history in its finitude and to draw out the inner signification of that finitude since for them the contrast between the poetic and the prosaic was not yet clearly established. And if we posit the divine within the historical, we always fall into the fluctuation and instability characteristic of everything historical. Prosaic understanding and unbelief are opposed to the miracles reported by the apostles, as, on the objective side, is the lack of appropriate relationship between miracle and the divine.

164. *W₂ adds:* Yet this return to the content is not mediated by the form of inner necessity, and is only a result of despair, in that I know not where to turn, nor how to help myself in any other way than by taking that step.

inasmuch as this final dependence on myself, this irony with respect to everything, [has been] given me by thought, [and inasmuch as I] have learned how to make everything totter, and in so doing remain standing as a god above the ruins of the world,¹⁶⁵ I now decide solely for myself what I want and what is convenient for me (without at the same time making the generally valid a rule), and ensconce myself in the final, highest vanity.

⟨The relation of philosophy to this content is different; or more exactly, the [religious] form [exhibits] a deficiency.⟩ The requirement of philosophy is to permeate [this content] with thought. The absolute identity of the subjective and objective [is] implicit; for me it [is found] in this element. ⟨[Philosophy has] the requirement to carry thought through to the point that it should prevail¹⁶⁶ and not remain subjective vanity.⟩

[*Representation and Thought*.¹⁶⁷] The content of religion [is present] in this fashion for me. What does it lack? With respect to form, [it has] the *shape of representation* in contrast with *thought*, [and thus appears] as not necessary. Necessity [is to be understood] in terms of the concept and of freedom. [The content is] (α) within itself, (β) opposed to me [as] the subjective concept of my freedom

165. [Ed.] The allusion to "irony" has reference to Friedrich Schlegel: cf. the *Lyceum* Fragments Nos. 7, 42, 48, 108; the *Athenäum* Fragments Nos. 51, 121, 253, 305, 362, 431; and the *Ideen* No. 69; in *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, vol. 2, ed. H. Eichner (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna, 1967). The allusion to "the ruins of the world" has reference to J. G. Fichte, *Appellation an das Publikum* (Jena, Leipzig, and Tübingen, 1799), pp. 110, 112 (*Gesamtausgabe* 5:451–452). The latter allusion is found in other writings by Hegel—e.g., in the *Fragment of a System* (1800) (*Early Theological Writings*, p. 318 [Nohl, p. 351]); in *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 174 (GW 4:402); and in *Science of Logic*, p. 230 (GW 11:144).

166. [Ed.] The *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* 2:194 (*Werke* 14:384) show that Hegel is here alluding to the *voûs* of Anaxagoras, and indeed to a formulation given by Aristotle in *De anima* 3.4.429a18–21.

167. [Ed.] The Ms. adds a "β" in the margin, which probably corresponds to the "α" bracketed earlier (n. 159). While it does not make much sense to include the β without the α, the β does mark a transition to the next topic, the distinction and relation between *Vorstellung* and *Denken*. Thus we have added the bracketed subheading in place of the β. It then becomes clear that the section on "representation" as a whole includes in succession the topics of truth, objectivity, doctrine, faith, representation, and thought (the latter being a transition to the final section).

(in it [the subject has] its freedom and concept). Freedom [is] not an accidental convergence [of things].

Thought, freedom [as] distinguished from reflection, [are] concerned to make the [so-called] *beyond comprehensible*. To make [something] *common* means (α) to make it finite; (β) [it means that] I am satisfied with the matter, as in the church. [29a]

The distinctive way in which the truth occurs in religion has been defined as representation. (<[Its] content—the world, God—[is] established on its own account [and is] drawn together into the form of simplicity, although in itself [it has] a highly multifarious content.> [We have] to consider more precisely: (α) the sort of connection that these representations | have among themselves: (β) the sort of connection [that they have] with me; i.e., with my inmost being and conviction, with my knowledge of them as my essence.

(α) Of itself, a representation [is] something whole and concrete—"God," "world," "battle"—set forth in the simple form of universality, independently. No implicit connection mediates the content by means of itself. Hence [it is] not portrayed as true in itself and necessary; that is to say, [neither is the determination] of the identity of concept and reality grasped, nor [are] the differently distinguished determinations grasped in their identity with each other. This is reflection, argumentation, thinking, deliberation as such. Categories of thinking as such are forms of connection, which can also be fixed once more as representations, and then thinking itself actually occurs in the form of representation, [namely, as] understanding. "[Religious representation] has essentially the nature of a connection that does not belong to thinking as such, (hence) a representational connection, a connection derived from analogy, from the figurative, or a more indeterminate representation of a certain mode of connection itself,"¹⁶⁸ one that thereafter remains

168. *W₂ reads*: But even if all these ways of mediating the connection of the content of representation with self-consciousness attain their goal, and even if apologetic argumentation with its reasons has brought many to conviction, or if I with the needs, impulses, and sorrows of my heart have found consolation and comfort in the content of religion, it is only accidental that this has taken place. It results from the fact that precisely this standpoint of reflection and disposition has not yet been disturbed, nor has the presentiment of something higher been awakened in it. Thus it is dependent upon a contingent deficiency.

reserved particularly for religious content. "Creating" is not a "grounding" or "causing": it is something higher than these limited thought-categories and contains the speculative relationship, the producing by the idea. "Begetting" is by contrast a figurative expression of the relationship of the absolute idea within itself, an expression derived from life,¹⁶⁹ which to be sure bears the idea within itself, but in a natural fashion. |

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(β) [This being so,] the mode of connection would constitute the necessity of the content. But in representation the content [stands] in [29b] this relation to itself, not in a connection, not as under necessity; and hence this figurative, analogical connection itself [is] not one of *thought*, [is] not posited as an *identity in difference*. <This [representational] connection then also determines the form and content of the connective matrix. Because its content is the truth, and thus is in and for itself speculative and mystical in nature, it is merely its form that is stripped away [by philosophy], and the former [the connective matrix] is presupposed. Thus the content remains> ¹⁷⁰for me *something given*—<what is [called] *positive* and, to the extent [one is speaking] polemically, *revealed*, immediately given, i.e., not comprehended. The eternal decree [is equivalent to] a lack of connection between the universal and particular. (γ) Religion also remains with general representations. Providence, wisdom, the ways [of God] are incomprehensible. (δ) The ground of the confirmation, the connection of this content and my knowledge, belong to eternal faith.> [The content,] that is, has and retains the form of an externality over against me. I make it *mine*. | ~But however concretely determined I (the I who thus appropriates it) am in other respects (heart, need, mood), as the essentially and absolutely concrete I, i.e., I as the concept, I am not [contained] in it, nor identical with it. This is what constitutes the need¹⁷¹ and drive of rational insight. All that is meant by the indeterminate word "reason," "rational insight," is, not that within me there is anything that is certain and stands fast, but that there is within me

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169. Ms. margin: (Son)

170. Ms. apparently not canceled: Thus this content is

171. Ms. margin: {It} corresponds otherwise to *concrete* characteristics, exigencies, demands)

that which stands fast for itself, objective in and for itself, established within me, i.e., it is grounded within itself, is determined in and for itself. Such, however, is the pure concept.¹⁷² Whatever further determinate content it may have in relation to will or intelligence, the substantive point is that such content should be known by me to be grounded within itself, that I have in it the consciousness of the concept. That is to say, I have in it not only certainty or conviction, i.e., conformity to principles otherwise held to be true, by subsuming [it] under such principles, but also the truth *as truth in the form of truth*—in the form of the absolutely concrete and of that which harmonizes within itself purely and simply.

[3. Thought]^{173 174}

Now it is this characteristic¹⁷⁵ that is added by the *philosophical cognition of truth*. But from this it is immediately clear that only

172. W₂ reads: I, however, do not consist merely of this heart and mood, or of this good-natured reflection, which is compliant to and naively welcomes the apologetics of the understanding, and which is only too glad when it becomes aware of agreeable arguments. Rather, I have yet other and higher needs. I am further determined concretely in an entirely simple, universal way, such that the determinateness within me is pure and simple. That is to say, I am the absolutely concrete I, thinking determining itself within itself: I exist as the concept. This is another way of my being concrete. Here not only do I seek reassurance for my heart, but also the concept seeks satisfaction; and it is as compared with the concept that the religious content in the mode of representation retains the form of externality. Although many a great and richly endowed mind, and many a profound intelligence, have found satisfaction in religious truth, yet it is the concept, this inwardly concrete thinking, that is still not satisfied and that asserts itself initially as the drive of rational insight. If the as yet implicitly indeterminate word "reason," "rational insight," is not merely reduced to the fact that something or other is certain for me as an external quality—if, on the contrary, thought has so determined itself that the object is secured for me on its own account and is founded in itself—then it is the concept as the universal thought that particularizes itself within itself and remains identical with itself in this particularization.

173. Ms. reads: <(c)>

[Ed.] Hegel originally wrote a "γ" in the margin, which he later changed to a "c." Since he often used roman letters for major divisions and Greek letters for subdivisions, he apparently intended by this change to designate the third major division of the section, that concerned with thought (*Denken*). He would thus distinguish this sectional division from the preceding series of paragraph markings,

the whole of *speculative philosophy* is capable of doing this, and simultaneously that nothing is further from its intention than to overthrow religion, i.e., to assert that the content [30a] of religion cannot for itself be the truth. On the contrary, religion is precisely the true content but in the form of representation, and philosophy is not the first to offer the substantive truth. Humanity has not had to await philosophy in order to receive for the first time the consciousness or cognition of truth. |

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¹⁷⁶(Religious content is undermined in two ways, for all that their professed intent is to maintain religion—we are not speaking here

to which “γ” and “δ” had been added in the last marginal notation. This would be appropriate in light of his cancellation of the apparently premature transition to the third section on sheet 28a (see n. 159). However, even in this last section he concerns himself not so much with speculative thought per se as with the contrast between it and abstract understanding (*Verstand*)—a contrast that accounts for the enmity between philosophy and religion, despite the fact that philosophy has no intention of overthrowing religion. We should keep in mind that this entire discussion oscillates between a comparison of religion with art and philosophy and an analysis of the modes of religious consciousness.

174. Ms. margin: ((α) Concept, connection within itself, absolute necessity of the idea – (β) Liberation of the subjective concept)

175. *W₂ reads*: Thus it is that representation dissolves itself into the form of thought, and it is this determination of form

176. Ms. margin: (Absolute correspondence [*Angemessenheit*] of content and form)

W₂ reads: The inner connection and absolute necessity into which the content of representation is transposed in thought is nothing other than the concept in its freedom, so that all content becomes a determinate quality of the concept and is harmonized with the I. The determinateness is here utterly my own; in it spirit has its own essentiality as an object, and the givenness, authority, and externality of the content over against me vanish.

Thereby thought gives to self-consciousness the absolute condition of freedom. Representation still stays within the sphere of external necessity, since all its moments, while relating themselves to each other, do so without giving up their independence. The relationship of these configurations in thought, by contrast, is the relationship of ideality, so that no configuration stands apart or on its own account is independent; rather each has the aspect of a show or semblance vis-à-vis the others. Thus every distinction, every configuration is something transparent, not subsisting on its own account in dark and impenetrable fashion. Consequently, the distinguished moments are not independent and do not offer resistance to each other, but rather are posited in their ideality. The condition of unfreedom in which both the content and the subject find themselves has not vanished because the *absolute correspondence* [*Angemessenheit*] of content and form has entered into play. The

of outright evil and godlessness. Philosophy is opposed to both of them and takes up a position against them.)

161 U *Conceptual cognition* must be well distinguished from *abstract understanding*. Understanding reflects; [in it] we have | presuppositions of *finitude* to which we ascribe absolute validity, making them into rules and standards, applying them to the idea and to absolute truth, thereby subverting absolute truth, which rather is infinite.¹⁷⁷

* 1 (α) *Understanding* (¹⁷⁸makes the sensible form the main thing.) It first makes into entirely determinate finite relationships the expressions that contain implicitly a speculative thought but are also expressed partly in imagistic, figurative form or as analogies—e.g., original or hereditary sin, outpouring of the Holy Spirit, begetting. [It treats hereditary sin] like the hereditary disease of a family or [like] a contingent [inheritance] of property: in the case of the former, a misfortune of nature; in the case of the latter, [it is] naturally not unjust that one [child] should inherit property from parents while another does not—([that one] has a good example, a good upbringing) without meriting it. But in the absolutely spiritual [arena of] the good, persons each have responsibility for their

content is within itself free, and its appearing within itself is its absolute form; and in the object the subject has before it the action of the idea, of the concept that has being in and for itself, which it itself is.

177. *W₂ reads*: There is something quite characteristic about the action of reflective thinking when it appears as *abstract understanding* and concerns itself with representation, since the latter expresses inner qualities and relationships in a sensible, natural, or generally external fashion. Since reflective understanding, besides, always has presuppositions of finitude to which it ascribes absolute validity, making them into a rule or standard, subverting by comparison the idea and absolute truth, so too it turns sensible and natural qualities, in which representation still wants simultaneously to be able to recognize the thoughts of the universal, into wholly determinate, finite states of affairs, holds fast to this finitude, and then declares representation to be in error. In part, it is still the characteristic dialectic of representation that is contained in this activity of understanding, and hence the enormous importance of the Enlightenment—which that action of understanding was—for the enlightenment of thought. In part, however, the dialectic of representation is also driven thereby beyond its true compass and transposed into the territory of formal free will.

178. *Ms. adds*: (Understanding)

own deeds, for what they do, for the sins they commit. [Yet for the understanding all this is regarded as] happening without responsibility, befalling one in external fashion [like an inheritance]. Either the understanding first of all gives such absolute relationships the itch in order [to be able] to scratch them,¹⁷⁹ (or it thinks that something is thereby done for the truth of religion. [Thus it produces] spiritless | dogmatics, faith in line with external actuality, proofs of the understanding—and this external actuality as such is supposed to constitute these proofs! Θεὸς ἀγαπητός.¹⁸⁰ On such [externalities] the knowledge of absolute truth is supposed to be established!)¹⁸¹

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179. [Ed.] *Entweder Verstand gibt solchen absoluten Verhältnissen erst die Krätze, um sie zu kratzen.* It is quite likely that Hegel borrowed this turn of phrase from G. E. Lessing, who used an expression from Bolingbroke's *Hudibras* in reference to the translator Bergmann, saying that Bergmann "gives the itch (*die Krätze gibt*) to his author in order to be able to rub him." In other words, he misunderstood what the author had written and then rebuked him with learned annotations because of some nonsensical phrase that he himself introduced. See Lessing's *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend*, no. 4, "Über den Bergmannschen Bolingbroke" (*Sämtliche Schriften* 8:10). This metaphor was apparently a favorite of Hegel's since it appears in several of his writings: see Nohl, *Jugendschriften*, p. 61; GW 4:220; *History of Philosophy* 2:368 (*Werke* 14:580); and *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 573 remark.

180. [Ed.] Instead of Θεὸς ἀγαπητός ("God the beloved," a passage that occurs nowhere in the New Testament), Hegel apparently intended to cite Θεὸς ἐμλογητός ("God the blessed"). This would then be a cryptic reference to Rom. 9:5, a passage which rationalist theologians by various exegetical maneuvers attempted to interpret as proving the divinity of Christ. Hegel gives his own version of the rationalist argument in the 1824 lectures (pp. 339–340), but there he conflates Rom. 9:5 and 1 Tim. 3:16, resulting in a thoroughly confused situation. For a complete explanation, see 1824 *Concept*, n. 156.

181. *W₂ reads:* Thus, for example, in the image of original or hereditary sin the inner relationship of thought is at the same time grasped in terms of natural qualities; but yet, by speaking in this way, representation means with the expression "sin" to raise the natural element, which resides in the quality of inheritance, into the sphere of the universal. The understanding, by contrast, comprehends the relationship in the modality of finitude and thinks *only* of natural possession or of hereditary disease. In this sphere it is freely conceded that, as far as children are concerned, it is a matter of accident that their parents should have had property or have been burdened with disease; children inherit nobility, property, or evil without merit or guilt. If we reflect further on the fact that the freedom of self-consciousness is elevated above this relationship of contingency, and that in the absolutely spiritual arena of the

~(β) It then needs no great effort for the understanding to show that these finite relationships to which it [has] brought the speculative content of religion are inappropriate to its infinitude. This infinitude itself is an abstraction to which other finite entities are absolutely firmly opposed. [For example, with respect to] the Trinity, number is a wholly inessential relation, [and the fact is] that three is not one.¹⁸² The finite, the human [can]not [in this fashion] coalesce with the divine. The metaphysics of understanding, [this] natural theology, [has nothing at all of the speculative content of religion within it, and for this reason can]not [have [truth either].] [30b]

This finitizing and defining of the absolute, the mystical, in terms of relationships of finitude has been characterized as making them comprehensible, and the prejudice has crept in that the religious ceases to be religious when it is rendered comprehensible. [This view has been prevalent] especially in modern times: Jacobi.¹⁸³ All proofs mean advancing from one finite thing to another. Reflection starts out from finite qualities and does not get beyond them: correct! [It] advances along the thread of identity but does not make the transition into its negation. However, reason, the concept, does this. (Reflection) does not posit the finitude, the determinacy of content, with which it starts, as negative, [and thus] it necessarily extends finitude as such into the absolute: Spinozism.¹⁸⁴

good what persons do is their *own* activity, their *own* obligation, then it is easy to display the contradiction in the notion that what belongs absolutely to my own freedom is supposed to have come upon me from elsewhere in a natural fashion, unconsciously and externally.

182. *W₂ reads:* It is much the same when the understanding directs itself to the representational image of the Trinity. Also in this representation the inner thought-relationship is grasped in the mode of externality, for number is thought in the abstract quality of externality. But here understanding holds fast *only* to the externality, keeps to numeration, and finds each of the three to be externally complete in relation to the others. If now this quality of number is made the foundation of the relationship, then indeed it is utterly contradictory that those entities which are completely external in relation to each other should yet at the same time be one.

183. [Ed.] See the reference to Jacobi in 1824 *Intro.*, n. 51; also Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, p. 225 (*Werke* 4/1:223).

184. [Ed.] Because of the antithesis between Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza and that of Jacobi, it is not immediately clear why Hegel mentions Spinozism in

Philosophy is antithetical to three things: (α) remaining embedded in *sensibility*; (β) adhering to the forms of *representation*, which are construed as content-categories; | (γ) *reflection*, whether positive ((building the positive truth of religion upon external proofs and grounds) or negative—hypocrisy: acknowledgement of the entire range of thought and its objectivity—inasmuch as nothing is to count for me as valid and true—as that which is to count for me as true, coupled with pious submission and immersion in the system of doctrine.¹⁸⁵

Conceptual knowledge: (α) [is] opposed to *sensibility*, particularity, subjectivity, not to a world view in its determinacy. <[It is opposed to its] form and one aspect of [its] content, but only the form of representation [is] opposed.> (αα) [It has] no necessary content. (ββ) [Its] particular inclination [is] not absolutely effaced. Beautiful, pure, loving religious souls grasp in their intensity the equally intensive totality and relate everything to God in simple,

this context. Jacobi accused Spinoza of extending the finite into the absolute (Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 407–409 [*Werke* 4/2:135–140]), an interpretation of Spinoza that Hegel already rejected in *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 104 ff. (GW 4:352 ff.). Later Hegel offered as a substitute for this criticism the claim that Spinoza merely cast everything into the abyss of the one substance. Hegel's objection is not, as one might assume from the text, that Spinoza "extended" (*hineinkontinuuiert*) the finite into the absolute, but rather that Spinoza neglected to allow the finite initially to come forth from the absolute through the self-determination of the absolute. Therefore the return of the finite into the absolute would be a mere immersion of determinate qualities in the abyss of the absolute substance, which, since it is not a mode of self-exposition of the absolute, would be consummated merely by means of external reflection. See esp. Hegel's *Science of Logic*, pp. 536 ff. (GW 11:376 ff.).

185. Ms. canceled:

Part II

Concept of Religion as a Whole Grasped in Its Determinate Aspects

Forms of Consciousness of the Absolute Idea

[Ed.] Hegel here makes a premature transition to the second main division of the lectures, which he cancels in order to add the next two paragraphs. Then at the top of the next Ms. sheet (31a) he writes a new heading: "Part II: Determinate Religion (Finite Religion)." His earlier subtitle, "Forms of Consciousness of the Absolute Idea," reflects the perspective of the *Phenomenology* and suggests that the whole of the second part is intended as a phenomenology of religion, i.e., of the various forms of consciousness assumed by the absolute idea as it emerges in and advances through the history of religion.

abstract fashion: (enthusiasm, fanaticism.) But firm ethical categories, the unfolding of a *universum*, [an ethical world, are lacking]. (β) [It is] opposed to *reflection*, [which is] equally abstract, but [is also] cold understanding, devoid of content. (γ) [It is opposed to] *representation*, [which] lacks necessity and freedom and the correspondence of content and form.

⟨The distinction of religion from philosophy and art itself first appears in the absolute religion, [where] religion consummates itself in its *determinacy*. Determinacy is content.⟩¹⁸⁶

186. [Ed.] The absolute religion represents the *consummation* of the determinacy of the concept of religion, not the negation of determinacy. In it the concept of religion becomes fully and finally objective to itself, and in this objectivity or determinacy the concept—namely, the concept of the unity of finite and infinite, of consciousness and God—is actualized. Hence this determinacy is the true content, and in the absolute religion form and content perfectly correspond. Moreover, the distinction of religion from art and philosophy that *we* are able to grasp at the outset *itself* first appears historically in the religion that consummates all religions. In the Christian religion, representation rises above artistic intuition (as in Greek religion) and distinguishes itself in principle from reflective philosophy (as in Roman religion). As such it is identical in content with speculative philosophy.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION THE LECTURES OF 1824

We begin with religion; that is the object of our concern. In considering it we can adopt two paths—the *empirical* approach or the *speculative*. We have a general impression of religion; we know what it is. The empirical approach is to consider it thus, to consider what characteristics this empirical impression or representation has. The other approach is the speculative. Whenever we proceed empirically, we take something immediately from the representation and consider what is characteristic of it. With the speculative approach it is likewise the case that we begin here—not at the absolute beginning but with what is wholly concrete, with what belongs to the final stage.¹ We begin with religion, and since this means that we are beginning at the end, we have the whole remaining body of science as a presupposition. I shall first take up the empirical side, the representation of religion that people nowadays adhere to on the whole, and from which we pass over to the speculative side only subsequently. The characteristics of empirical representation are important to us, and we shall make use of them in our speculative treatment.

Since we are here dealing with religion, we do not make an abstract beginning; rather what we begin with here is already presupposed within the scope of science. This presupposition has two aspects: the immediate beginning in the empirical mode, and the scientific beginning with nothing else but what we [can] refer to in the sciences that have necessarily preceded our science of religion

1. *Thus K; P reads:* to the region of the highest

and have as their result what is now to be treated. We shall use both approaches, not just the scientific but the empirical as well, because the prevalent views that purport to be philosophical in the general culture of our time are contained in the empirical standpoint. We encounter these views at this point, and we can at this point come to terms with, and get clear about, the prevalent expressions. | What this side empirically gives us is in any case the obvious characteristics that pertain to the abstractly subjective mode of religion generally. This standpoint, however, is nothing but hollow, empty subjectivity, the form of finite subjectivity; it is indeed also one moment in the higher standpoint, in the idea of absolute spirit, but it is merely the formal side.

A. EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION²

Inasmuch as we have decided that we want to proceed empirically, we may be unsure what we shall find on this path, the path of experience and observation. We may have great hopes of finding the essential, inner substance, but we may know at the same time what the limit in fact is upon what we can hope to find, what can come before us upon this empirical path. We know, to be precise, that God does not offer himself for observation, that he cannot be perceived through the external experience of the senses as a given thing or object, but also that he cannot be found in inward experience, as experience of ourselves. Outside there is the natural world; inwardly there is our world, where *we* are. What we find in this inner experience is therefore our subjectivity, our finite sub-

2. [Ed.] No section headings are found in the transcripts by G and P. Ho formulates his own headings in the margin. Our editorial headings are based in part on those in D, which are as follows:

- A. Empirical Consideration of the Divine
 - a. Immediate Knowledge of God
 - b. Basis of This Knowledge in Feeling
 - c. [Its Basis] in Further [i.e., More Determinate] Consciousness, as the Infinite Opposed to the Finite
- B. Speculative Consideration of the Divine

jective activity apart from God. In this perspective, God is neither within us nor outside us. Inwardly we have ourselves and not God. We could still say also that we want to observe our religious *elevation* above ourselves, to observe ourselves in our elevation above our relationship as finite [beings], the relationship through which we are finite and exist over against something other. In this religious fulfillment we are no longer separated from nature or from God of whom we are still unaware. We are related to God therein in an affirmative way, and we should therefore find this content, God, in ourselves. The subject throws itself into this infinite content. But if we are of the opinion that we are finding God here, if we think to find God in this way, we must bear in mind that precisely in this devotion, in this relationless relating, where the separation has fallen away, the object of observation vanishes for us at this standpoint. Devotion *could* be a [kind of] cognition or comprehension, but precisely this mode of elevation is excluded inasmuch as we are only supposed to observe immediately, | or perceive. We confine ourselves to this empirical standpoint, to the renouncing of all argumentation, because reason is not deemed to know anything of God. Thus this mode of elevation falls away.

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Religious elevation could of course be our object as a *feeling*, but if we direct our observation upon it, and are minded to find God therein, we must note that feeling is always just feeling. There are any number of feelings of the most various kinds, each with characteristics of its own, and what we should learn by observation of religious feeling is not feeling as such but religious feeling in its determinate [form]. Feeling with *this* determination means nothing else than feeling that has a certain content. I have a feeling of hardness, that is, I feel something hard, it becomes at the same time an object for me, it becomes a content. To think in a determinate fashion means to think a content—and this content is the determinacy. Here the content is to be the divine spirit, but spirit is not an immediate subject [as feeling is], and it is not to be observed in this way. From the standpoint of observation, we find at most the defining character of finite subjectivity.

Three determining characteristics are found in this way by the empirical approach.

1. We have an *immediate knowledge* of God. God is not to be *conceived*: there is no question of argumentative reasoning about God; that is excluded because we never wanted to follow the route of rational cognition. Thus the conscious knowing is not in this case a *thinking* consciousness; and consequently we [merely] know that the object is God.

2. We must ask for a *basis* for this knowledge. Our knowledge is purely inward, and so the representation of God is also something subjective. Hence we ask for a ground for this knowledge, or we seek the locus of the divine being, as it were, and we say: "God is, his being is in feeling." In this way *feeling* achieves the status of a ground, and God's being is given to us in *feeling*.

3. We have immediate knowledge of God, and God is in feeling. The third characteristic is that these two [moments] are *mutually determined*: God is not I, but the other of the I; and the knowing subject is in itself the negative, i.e., it is the finite, while God is the nonnegative, what is higher, the infinite in every respect.

168 In general, these propositions—[namely,] that we *know* God, that we know God *immediately*, that we have a *feeling* of God, and that we define | our relationship by saying that *we are the finite and he is the infinite*—these propositions are perfectly correct, and none of them should be denied; but at the same time they are so trivial that it is not worth our trouble talking about them here. They are propositions that every child has already learned from his very first instruction. If the science of religion is limited to these propositions it is not worth having, and one cannot see why there is any such thing as theology.³

3. [Ed.] Despite his remark that it is "not worth our trouble talking about [these propositions] here," Hegel does just that at length in the remainder of Sec. A. This shows that the first main section of the 1824 *Concept* is totally dominated by a continuing polemic against the "theology of our time" with which the *Introduction* has also been concerned, especially the theology of feeling or subjectivity. This is why the 1824 *Concept* does not conform to the outline surveyed at the end of the *Introduction*. It is only in the third part of Sec. B that Hegel arrives at the development of the concept of religion from the speculative point of view in the strict sense. It is clear that Hegel is preoccupied with the problem of subjectivism in modern theology to a greater extent in the 1824 lectures than in any of the others. The materials for Sec. A—the discussion of immediate knowledge, feeling, the more

1. Immediate Knowledge

We have immediate knowledge that there is a God; we know immediately that he is. That is quite correct, we may say, and our representation must conform to this. This proposition has at first sight a quite innocent sense; but it also takes on another sense that is not innocent, namely, that this so-called immediate knowledge is the *only* knowledge of God. To this extent modern theology is as much opposed to revealed religion as it is to rational cognition, which likewise denies the proposition. For it is asserted by modern theology that this immediate knowledge is the only knowledge, as opposed to conceptual cognition. Jacobi⁴ was the first to bring up this immediate knowledge some thirty or forty years ago. He said: "We do not know that we have bodies, or that there is an external [world] around us, through argumentative reasoning, or through a process of proof, through reasoned cognition, but we believe it immediately." This immediate knowledge Jacobi called *faith*: we believe that there is an external world around us, and we believe that there is a God, insofar as we have immediate knowledge [of it and] of him; we believe in freedom insofar as we have immediate knowledge that we are free.

Let us consider more closely what is true in this viewpoint. We know that God is and we know this immediately. What do we mean by "knowing" [*Wissen*] here? This knowing is something different from cognizing. We have also the expression "certain" [*gewiss*], and we contrast [this sort of] knowing with truth. I "know" something—but it is still not yet true on that account. "Knowing" expresses the subjective mode in which something is for me, or is in

determinate form of consciousness, the relationship of finite and infinite—are to some extent drawn from Sec. B.3 of the Ms. ("The Religious Relationship as the Unity of Absolute Universality and Absolute Singularity"), but they are greatly expanded and revised, and appear here in essentially new form. In the 1827 lectures, Hegel further revised this material and incorporated it into his analysis of the forms of religious consciousness or knowledge of God. In the latter lectures, these ostensibly empirical materials are brought into a speculative context.

4. [Ed.] On Jacobi's designation of immediate knowledge as a form of revelation, see above, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27. On immediate knowledge as distinguished from intuition, see below, 1827 *Concept*, n. 49.

169 my consciousness, in such a way that it has the character of a being. In the feverish representations of fantasy I do not, strictly speaking, *know*, although I have representations. My “knowing” is my *subjective certainty* that what I know *is*. Its being and my | being are identical, and that the object is, is for me “certain”; we say, “It is as certain as I am”—that is, the being of the object is at the same time my being. What is certain for me is in my being; I distinguish the content, but its being and mine are not divided. “The truth” reminds us that certainty and objectivity can in principle split asunder. I say, “This is, it is for me,” but real objectivity [*das Objektive*] can be distinguished from this being that the object has in me.

“Knowing” thus consists generally in the fact that the object, the other, is, and its being is tied up with my being. I know *that* it is, and I can also know *what* it is. That something is I may know from immediate intuition or as the result of reflection. But when I say “I *know* it,” I know only its being, ~and this being is immediately tied up with my own. The rest is made up of more specific characteristics or qualities that come into play⁵ in such a way that they are. The word “knowing” is also used to mean “having a representation”—“I have acquaintance with or a representation [of X]”—but it is always implied that the content *is*. “Knowing” is in this case being abstractly related [to the object]. ~Cognition is already a richer mode of knowing.⁶ We speak of cognition when we know something universal about a universal, and at the same time we grasp this universal in its particular determinations. We are cognizant of nature or of spirit, but we do not say we are cognizant of this house; we are not “cognizant” of single objects but of universal objects. “Nature” and “spirit” are universal terms, while “house” is particular; and we are cognizant of the rich content of the former according to their necessary relation to one another.

On closer inspection, however, this knowing, or consciousness, turns out to be quite abstract, the (for us abstract) activity of the

5. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* This being is admittedly not empty being; I also know its more specific characteristics or qualities, but of them too only

6. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* [It is] an immediate relation, while the expression “truth” calls to mind a disjoining of certainty and objectivity, followed by their mediation.

I. I know that it is. If I | am thus informed, I know about its being. So this knowing is just this: that some content is. It is the abstract relation of the I to the object, but under the determinate category of being. Let the content be what it may, so long as I know it, I know that it is so. Knowing and consciousness are one and the same, except that consciousness is at the same time a more specific definition of the object. To have "information" [*Kenntnis*] or "intuition" [*Anschauung*] or "cognition" [*Erkennen*] already indicates a fuller determination, not merely the abstract category of "knowing" [*Wissen*], which is the simple, abstract activity of the I.⁷ In other words, immediate knowing is in fact nothing but thinking viewed in an entirely abstract manner, as mediating motion. "Thinking" [*Denken*] is also, of course, the self-identical activity of the I, this pure side of indeterminacy. But thinking in general is immediate knowing.

More precisely, thinking, as thinking—i.e., where the object or content also has the character of an abstract—is the activity of the abstract, the activity of the universal. This thinking is involved in everything.⁸ If I sense or intuit [something], this is the pure activity too, but I only call my relation [to the object] "thinking" inasmuch as the content of my consciousness has the character of an abstract or universal.

The "knowing" involved now is not the immediate knowledge of a bodily object but of God. We can take that for granted. God is the completely universal object, not some particularity or other but the highest personality, the most universal personality itself, singularity in its absolute universality. Immediate knowledge of God is immediate knowledge of an object that is supposed to have strictly the character of the universal, so that only the product is immediate; this [process] is *thinking*. Immediate knowledge of God is thinking about God, since thinking is the activity for which the universal is.

7. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (Var) reads (2d sentence similar in Ho):* whereas consciousness properly contains further determinations of content and distinguishes these from itself as object. So knowing is simply the fact that some content is found; it is accordingly the abstract relation of the I to the object, whatever the content may be.

8. *W (HgG) adds:* however concrete an attitude one adopts.

171 God has still no content at this point, no further significance; he is only nothing sensible, just a universal; thus we know that he does not live within the sphere of immediate intuition. This immediate knowledge of God is purely and simply thinking, it is the universal as active; and thinking, inasmuch as it is active and relates itself in an unmediated way, thinks what it thinks as universal altogether. Thinking is a mediating movement insofar as it passes through different determinations. In drawing conclusions one starts from particular, distinct materials and determinations and transforms them into something universal: this is mediating thought, but the merely universal, the universal without any determination, is its immediate product. Pure thought is the content that is thinking itself; it relates itself thus immediately [to itself].⁹ The immediacy is precisely the same as when I ask, "What does the feeling feel? What does the intuition intuit?" It feels what is felt, it intuits what is intuited: these are all empty tautologies; and it is the tautology that makes the relationship an immediate one.

Thus my "knowing" God means no more than that I think God. All the rest has now to be added on. This product or content of thought also *is*, it is an actual being; God is not merely thought of—he *is*, he is not merely the category of the universal. About this determinate category we have already made comments; and the next step is to render an account of this experience of consciousness¹⁰ on the basis of the concept to see how far the universal achieves the status of being inasmuch as I immediately know that God is. That "God" has a further meaning will be shown later on. [For the present] an account has to be rendered of how consciousness gets to the point of saying about this object that "it *is*," and of the extent to which this "is" is contained for us in this abstract thinking.

9. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Thinking is first consummated in truth as a mediating movement insofar as it starts from what is other, permeates it, and in this movement transforms it into something universal. But here thinking has for its object the merely universal, the indeterminately universal, i.e., a determination, a content, that it itself is, in which it is *unmediated*, in other words abstractly present to itself. It is the light that illuminates but itself has no other content than light itself.

10. *Thus P; G reads:* observation

For our assistance we must take from logic [the concept of] “being.”¹¹ “Being” is universality taken in its most empty, abstract sense. “It is”—this is a completely abstract, simple determination. That “being is”—or universality as abstract universality—expresses this pure connection with self, without any relation outward or inward. The universal | is essentially identity with itself, and this is also being, [for] being is simple [*einfach*]. But if I say “the universal,” this determination of the universal contains a relationship to the particular and to the singular. I can represent this particularity to myself as outside of the universal or more truthfully as inside it. The [concrete] universal is also this connection with itself, this pervasiveness into the particular. But being sets aside all relation, every determination that is concrete; it is without further reflection, without connection to other. Being is thus contained in the [abstract] universal, and if I say “the universal is,” I express at the same time its arid, pure, abstract relation to itself, this barren immediacy that being is. The [concrete] universal is not something immediate in this sense—[i.e., that] it is not to be a [mere] individual or a [mere] particular, but will rather be universality through and through—this [concrete] opening up toward the particular is not the abstract or immediate.¹² On the contrary, the abstract or immediate, this sterile connection with itself, is expressed in being, in this immediacy. So if I say, “This object is,” I am expressing the acme of barren abstraction. This is the emptiest, the poorest determination of being, and it is immediate. “This is our consciousness of how these two determinations are bound together. The universal makes its separations ideal, it sublates them; [when it is] perfect absence of distinction without any connection, then we have “being.” This object of immediate knowing, of pure knowing, of pure thinking,

11. [Ed.] Since “being” (*Sein*), according to Hegel, is the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate category of logic (*Science of Logic*, p. 82 [GW 11:43–44]), “to be” (the verb *sein*) means simply *to be possible* or *to be self-identical* in simple immediacy with self. “Being” is not yet “determinate being” or “being-there,” which is *actual existence* and for which Hegel uses the term *Dasein* (*Logic*, pp. 109 ff. [GW 11:59 ff.]). On the translation of these terms, see the Editorial Introduction.

12. [Ed.] The distinction between the abstract and the concrete universal is not explicitly stated in the preceding sentences, but we believe it is what Hegel *meant*, and the distinction helps to make sense of an otherwise very difficult passage.

determines itself through the universal; and the fact *that* it is contains in a manner that is not yet expressed *what* it is for itself, as distinct from me, [namely] that it connects itself with itself. [This is a type of] thinking [that involves] my having an object, or, generally speaking, an other.¹³

173 This, then, is the sense of this immediate knowing. With it we are in the realm of abstract logic, and it is always so when we think we have our feet on the most concrete ground, because we find ourselves on the ground of immediate consciousness. Instead, this concrete consciousness is the very poorest in thoughts precisely because it is the most immediate consciousness, and the determinations that it contains are the emptiest | and the most barren ones. To believe that immediate knowledge is outside the realm of thought is the height of ignorance; we struggle with distinctions of this kind, and at close quarters they vanish into identity.¹⁴

And if, while maintaining this standpoint, we reflect more carefully upon how what I thus know in this immediate consciousness is distinguished from anything else that I know [in this way], the distinction quickly blurs. What do I know? I know as yet nothing except that the universal is. The further content that God has we shall discuss later; the standpoint of the immediate consciousness offers no more than this. "That one can know nothing at all of God is an empty standpoint."¹⁵ But [from this standpoint] God is also an object of my consciousness. I know about him, I distinguish God from myself: he is an other over against me, and I over against him.

If we compare other objects according to what we know of them, we know as much as this about all of them, but we also know more. They exist and are an other than we, they are for themselves; thus they are a universal and at the same time not a universal, a universal and at the same time a particular; they have some determinate content or other. The determination of universality is still

13. *Thus P; G reads:* Knowing is thinking; this is the universal, and it contains the determination of the abstract universal, the immediacy of being.

14. *Thus also W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* Even with the pitifully little that immediate knowing has to offer by way of determination, religion belongs to thought.

15. *Ho reads:* That God cannot be cognized is the standpoint of the Enlightenment, and this coincides with the immediate knowledge of God.

only matter and content. For example, I say of the wall, "The wall is, it is a thing." Here I have what I have in my immediate knowledge of God. The wall is a thing; thing is a universal: this much I know of God, too, so that God has also been said to be *ens*, that is, abstract *ens*.¹⁶ We have said, "God is in immediate knowledge." We are, too, and this immediacy of being attaches no less to God, this simple connection of the same with itself. All other concrete, empirical things are too, they are self-identical with themselves. Abstractly speaking, this is their being qua being. This being they have in common with me: I am; this object | also is. But because it is the object of my knowing, it is so constituted that I can strip it of its being. I know it, I represent it to myself, believe in it, but "being believed" is a form of being in my consciousness only. At this point, therefore, universality and this determination of immediacy split apart—and they *must* split. The reflection that the two aspects are separable must arise: that this is an object for me is separable from its being; for we are two, and if we are two, we must also be distinct (else we would be one). If one and the same characteristic belongs to both, they are not distinguished; in other words, some determining characteristic must be attached to one that does not belong to the other. "Being" is a characteristic of this kind. I am, so the other, the object, is not. I take being on myself, on my side; I do not doubt of my existence, with the result that, in the case of the other, existence falls away. Thus if I posit a distinction, I take the distinction upon myself too. I do not doubt that I am, for it is just I who am this immediate connection with myself, so being is simply within me. I cannot abstract from my being, for thinking is the activity of the universal,¹⁷ or simple connection with self. There is being even in the very process of abstracting, so being falls away from the other object. (Admittedly, I

16. *Ho reads*: But there is nothing emptier than the *ens*, in contrast with which the other *entia* show themselves to be far more filled.

[*Ed.*] See above, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 9.

17. *Ho reads*: If we now consider this being more closely, it is such that the I, in depriving the object of this being, transfers it to itself; for inasmuch as it knows only the being of the object, so that the object is only this known being, it lacks being in and for itself and acquires it only in consciousness. The object is known

can take my own life, but that is the freedom to abstract from my existence.) When I say "I am," the "I" already contains the "am."

175 In demonstrating how God, as the object, is in being, once one has taken being upon oneself¹⁸ it must be demonstrated that God | is in my being—and so¹⁹ the requirement comes to be stated thus: that the empirical state should be shown in which this object, God, is in my very being in such a way that we are not two but one. We are asked to point to an observable state where the distinction falls away, where God is in this being that remains with me while I am—to a mode of being, therefore, in which what I previously called object, God, is undividedly one within me as a being. This "region" [in] which God is in [my] being is now what we call *feeling*, and this is the second point we have to consider.

2. Feeling²⁰

Well, then, people speak of religious feeling and say that our faith in God is given to us in feeling. There is this secret, inmost basis upon which the certainty that God is rests for us. About "certainty" we have already spoken. This certainty is that two kinds of being are posited in reflection as one form of being. Being is the abstract

only as known being, not as what has being in and for itself. Only the I is, not the object. I can doubt everything except my own being. For the I is what doubts, is doubt itself. If doubt becomes the object of doubt, if what doubts doubts the doubt, the doubt disappears. The I is an immediate connection with itself; in it is being. I can abstract from everything other than from thinking, from myself, for what abstracts is itself thinking.

[Ed.] According to the *Ho* version, Hegel adopted here the Cartesian argument. Cf. René Descartes, *Discourse on Method* (1637), part 4; and *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641), Meditations 1, 2.

18. *Ho* reads: If the I has appropriated being to itself so that it falls away from the object, then, for the object to be expressed as having being, it must be possible to adduce a ground. The I and being are inseparable.

19. *Ho* adds: since we are at the standpoint of empiricism,

20. [Ed.] In the 1824 and 1827 lectures, Hegel normally uses the term "feeling" (*Gefühl*) rather than "sensibility" or "sensation" (*Empfindung*) as he did in the 1821 Ms. The reason is undoubtedly that Friedrich Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube*, first published in 1821–22, introduced the term "feeling" as a major theological category and made it a subject of controversy. See above, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52.

connection with self. There are now two beings, but they are only one being, and this being is likewise my being: this is what is "certain"—a characteristic about which we have reflected. When it is endowed with any concrete content, this certainty is what we

While *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* are closely related, there is a subtle distinction between them, as Hegel himself noted. "Sensibility" points to "sensations" (*Empfindungen*), which are single and transient modifications of the soul, and which are received in a mode of immediacy, received as they are found (*finden*). "Feeling" by contrast points to the activity of the self, which integrates these sensations in a "reflected totality." Feeling represents a higher activity of self-consciousness than sensibility; it no longer strictly speaking belongs to the realm of sense, although it acts upon sensations; it belongs rather to the realm of ideality, of subjectivity. Thus when Schleiermacher introduced *Gefühl* into theological discussion, Hegel realized that he could no longer treat what was being referred to merely as *Empfindung*. Whether Hegel does justice to Schleiermacher's conception of feeling, especially the "feeling of absolute dependence," is another matter (see below, n. 37).

Hegel's own version of the distinction between *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* is established in two important sections of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), which we quote fully below:

"§ 402. Sensations, just because they are immediate and are found as existing, are single and transient characteristics, alterations in the substantiality of the soul, posited in its being-for-self, with which that substance is one. But this being-for-self is not merely a formal moment of sensation [alone]; the soul is implicitly a reflected totality of sensations—it senses *within itself* the total substantiality of what it is implicitly—it is a soul that feels.

In the usage of ordinary language, "sensibility" and "feeling" are not clearly distinguished. Still we do not speak of the "sensation" but of the "feeling" of right, of self. "Sensitivity" (*Empfindsamkeit*) is connected with sensibility. We may therefore say that "sensibility" emphasizes more the side of passivity, of finding (*Finden*), i.e., the immediacy of mode in feeling, while "feeling" at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves (*die Selbstischkeit*) who feel.

§ 403. The feeling individual is the simple ideality, the subjectivity of sensation. What it has to do, therefore, is to raise its substantiality, its merely implicit content, to the character of subjectivity, to take possession of it, to realize its mastery over its own. As feeling, the soul is no longer a mere nature, but an inward individuality. The individuality which in the merely substantial totality was only a formal being-for-self has to be liberated and made independent."

It is puzzling that in the following pages Hegel sometimes seems to blur this distinction and to describe *Gefühl* rather as though it were *Empfindung*. In order to sharpen his polemic against the theology of feeling, he seems to downplay the extent to which feeling is an act of consciousness and not merely a sensation. For example, in the strict sense it would seem that animals have only sensations, not feelings.

call "feeling," and a feeling of this kind is offered as the ground of our faith in, and knowledge of, God. So let us express what is in our feeling. We say, "We know about something, and this is God." In this way feeling acquires the status of ground. The form of "knowledge" is the first thing—we and the object—and with this form enters the difference between us and the object, as well as the reflection that the being is my being, that it belongs to me insofar as I am. And there, then, is the need that, in this being that I take to myself, the object also is, God is. This is now the feeling, the locus, where my being and the being of my object exist as one. Here my being and that [of the object] are posited as one. Feeling is the locus where, so to speak, the two beings have come together into one. The being of God, as something strictly certain, as bound up with my being, [is] therefore a being for which the separability of being falls away.

We must now consider the general nature of feeling, so far as it is appropriate at this point. "I feel something hard." When I say this in this way, there is first the "I" and second the "something," making two. That is the expression of reflection. The common element is the "hardness." There is hardness in my feeling, and the object also is hard. This commonality exists in feeling: the object impinges upon me and I am filled with its determinate character. There the distinction "I and the object" is [found]. If I say, "I and the object," both are [there] on their own account; it is only in *feeling* that the twofold mode of being disappears and the determinacy of the object becomes mine.²¹ To the extent that the other remains independent, it is not felt, not tasted. "Light is a manifestation in sensation qua light. Light is this ideal being that immediately separates me and the object from each other."²²

This is the *formal* type or mode of feeling, [namely] that the object's being is in mine and forms a unity with mine. Let us now consider, second, the *content* of feeling from the empirical stand-

21. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: so much so that initially there is no longer any reflection vis-à-vis the object.

22. *Ho* reads: Vision on the other hand is the ideal sense, leaving the object free, in fact casting it immediately out from itself and so leading feeling over into consciousness.

point.²³ We note that it can have the greatest variety of content. We have feelings of right and wrong, of God, of color; my feeling is envy or hatred, hostility or joy. The content may be sharply contrasting—the basest as well as the highest and noblest things have their place in it. It is a universal experience—we can call upon this as a determinate mode of experience too—that feeling is completely contingent in content: it may be the most genuine thing, or it may be the worst of all. Thus if God is in our feeling, God has | in that respect no advantage over what is worst.²⁴ And with this is bound up the fact that everything that is also enters our feeling according to its content—not merely the [truly] real, the actual, what has being in fact [*in der Tat Seiendes*], but also the invention, the out-and-out lie, the imaginary. The content is of the most opposite kinds: everything good and everything evil, everything actual and everything that is not, is included in our feeling—all the images that I can fashion of objects or of myself. Even the unworthiest can arouse my enthusiastic response. I have hopes—that is, feelings or wishes. Hope is a feeling in which, just as in fear, are future events—things that do not exist immediately, though perhaps they will one day, or perhaps they never will. I can also be enthusiastic about the past, or again about what has never been nor ever will be. I can rejoice in hate or in friendship; it is present only in my representational image, and [the object] may be mere imagination and fabrication. I can imagine I am a noble, outstanding person, capable of sacrificing everything for the right or for my opinions; I can imagine I have accomplished or contributed much—but the question remains whether this is true.²⁵ Whether my feeling is of the genuine kind, whether it is good, depends on its content. That this content is found in feeling does not matter, for the very worst things

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23. W_1 (HgG/Var?) adds: Feeling as such is still this lack of determinateness. With feeling we are at once reminded of its determinacy, of what kind it is. It is this that appears as content.

24. *Ho* adds: and the choicest bloom sprouts on the same soil alongside the rankest weed. The fact that there is a content in feeling thus affords no assurance of the excellence of the content itself.

25. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: or whether in fact I act as nobly and am truly as virtuous as I imagine myself to be.

are there too. Whether the content exists does not depend on whether it is in the feeling either, for imaginary things that have never existed, and never will exist, are found there too. Hence feeling is a form for every possible content, and by being felt the content gains no determinate status—the form [of feeling] is capable of any content.²⁶ It is a form in which the content is posited as something completely contingent. This or that content can be posited at my pleasure or caprice, or through nature. In feeling I am at my most dependent; the content is completely contingent for me. Caprice or pleasure is [a kind of] contingency too, so that in feeling the content has the form, the character, of a contingent
 178 content; i.e., this content is not | determined in and for itself, it is not posited by the universal, by the concept. This contingent content is therefore in “its essence the particular, the limited.”²⁷ It does not matter that the content of my feeling is what it is; it could just as well be something else, but it always takes the form of a contingent particular. So if God’s being is attested in our feeling, it is there in the form of complete contingency, as being, in principle, a particular content, one that takes no precedence over any other content, for the status of being a feeling can belong to the other just as easily as to it. We call this contingency of the content in our being “subjectivity,” but it is so in the worst sense. For personality, the highest intensity of “spirit,”²⁸ is also subjectivity, but in a freer form; in the present context subjectivity is synonymous with contingency. It is only subjective, it is only something particular, which can be either this way or that, i.e., it is something contingent.

It should also be recalled at this point that people frequently invoke their feelings when they run out of rational grounds. We must leave those who do so alone since they are withdrawing back into their own particularity; the appeal to one’s own feelings breaks off the commonality between us. In the field of thought or of the concept, by contrast, we meet one another on the soil of the universal, of rationality; there we have the nature of the thing in

26. W_2 (Var) reads: which affects its being-in-and-for-self.

27. Thus W (HgG); G reads: the essence of the particular, the limited.

28. *Ho* reads: spirit within itself, spirit determining itself,

question before us. We can talk about it with one another; we can come to an understanding about it; we submit ourselves to the thing itself. The thing by which we want to orient ourselves is thus a third element that we have in common, namely the objective; once we pass over to feeling, we lose this common ground and draw back into the sphere of our contingency.²⁹

Moreover, feeling is what human beings have in common with the animals; it is the animal, sensuous form. So when the realm of right, | or ethical life, or God is pointed to in feeling, this is the very worst way in which such a content can be posited or demonstrated. *God is essentially in thought*. The suspicion that God is only for thought, through thought, and in thought must at once arise because only human beings, not animals, have religion, and humanity distinguishes itself from the animals by thought.

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Everything in the human mind that is based on thought or reason can be transposed into the form of feeling. Therefore God, whose region is the intellectual world, along with right, freedom, ethics, and so forth—all this has its root in the higher destination by virtue of which human beings are not animals but human, *spirit*. But all this that pertains to higher determinations can also be transposed into the form of feeling. Feeling, however, is only a form for this content, which belongs to quite a different field. We do indeed have feelings of right, freedom, ethics, and we have religious feelings, but feeling is the worst form in which content of this kind is posited.

Feeling is thus *infinitely* differentiated, for it arises only in contingent fashion. Feelings can be of the right kind if the content is true, but that it is true does not stem from feeling. An educated person can have a true feeling of right, duty, ethics, God—our feeling in these areas can be wholly right—but this is not the merit of feeling; it is because the whole formation of our thought and representational ideas is right, because the culture we see all around us, the culture we perceive outwardly in others, is just, and because

29. W (Var) adds (*similar in Ho*): merely noting how the thing is met with on this occasion. W₂ (*MiscP*) adds: In this sphere we each make the thing *our* thing, *our* particular concern; and if someone tells us, “You should feel thus and so,” we are at liberty to reply, “I just don’t feel that way, I’m not made like this”—for such a demand refers only to our contingent being, which can be this way or that.

our representation of it has been truly made. Thus we are deceived when we ascribe the ethical or the good in the ordinary person to the credit of feeling.

It must be added, however, that not only can every content be in feeling, but also the true content *must* be in our feeling. It is quite right to say, as we do, that we must have God in our hearts, have ethical principles at heart. But heart means more than feeling, for feeling is only momentary, ephemeral, and feeling is the extreme form of contingency. By contrast, whenever I say, "I have God in my heart, or have the right in my heart," the feeling of this content is expressed as a continuing, fixed mode of my existence. The heart is what I am, | not merely what I am at this instant, but what I am in general in this respect if it really is my basic principle. The form of feeling as universal denotes basic principles or habits of my being, the settled pattern of my way of acting.

If it is in *this* sense that one says, "God, right, ethics, should also be in my feeling, in my heart," what one is thereby expressing is that this same content should not merely be represented by me but should be inseparable from me, identical with me. As an actual human, I should have these characteristics, they should be integral to my character; the general tenor of my activity should be thus, and it is essential in this sense that all true content should be in the feeling or in the heart. In this sense religion must be brought into the heart, ethical truth must be brought into the heart; and this is the sense in which individuals should be rightly educated in the religious and the ethical sphere—they must become identified with the content. But the fact that the content is located in feeling does not make it true, or self-sufficing, or good or inwardly excellent; it does not make it true in the sense of *actuality*. Feeling is the locus of subjective, contingent being. It is the task of individuals to give their feelings a true content of the kind we have discussed, so that this content becomes part and parcel of their being. If individuals are going to be good, the content itself must be good; feeling, in and for itself, does not make it good.⁻³⁰

30. W (HgG/1831?) reads: But a theology that only describes feelings gets no further than empiricism, history [*Historie*], and their contingencies; it is not yet dealing with thoughts, which have a content.

Even if we have now said that feeling is the locus in which God's being can be pointed out immediately, we have not met with being or God—our object—there in the way we wanted to, i.e., not as being that is free in and for itself. God is, and he is independently in and for himself, he is free. But this independence, that God is according to this definition free being, is not to be found in feeling; nor do we find any content as a content that is in and for itself in feeling, for the content of feeling can be any and every particular content equally well. The bad person can posit a bad content in himself, a nullity. Then the content need not be good in and for itself. | If feelings are to be genuine and authentic in their nature, their content must be genuine and authentic, but it is not the feeling that makes it so.

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Feeling is thus the lowest form. In recent times people no longer speak of the heart but of conviction. The expression "heart" refers to my immediate character in a more unconscious mode; "acting according to conviction," on the other hand, implies that the content is mine, and that it is a power that governs me. It is my power, and I belong to it as well; it is an indwelling that progresses more through thought and insight.³¹ If I act from conviction, then I act just as intensively; I act with my will, and recognize that this content is my own, as much as when I say, "I act from the heart." The only difference is that when the content is mine in thought, this thought-content is in me as thinker. This is just as strong as when the content is in my heart.

Such is the nature of feeling as the basis, and the characteristics that pertain to it. It is important to see how content is related to form in feeling. We like to speak of our feelings because in them we have our particularity before us. Those who live in the real world, be it practical affairs or scientific inquiry, and who act according to right and justice, law and righteousness, forget themselves in what they are doing and have no feelings in regard to it (feelings are a self-remembrance). They are concerned with their own particularity as little as possible. Those who are vain and self-

31. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (Var) reads:* But this power governs me in the mode of inwardness, being mediated rather through thought and insight. *Ho reads:* The indwelling of the content in conviction is mediated more through thought and insight.

indulgent, on the other hand,³² willingly invoke their own feelings, their particularity, they want to enjoy it; and this direction of self-indulgence does not issue in true dealings and objective thought. Whoever is only concerned with feelings is on the one hand not to
 182 be trusted and on the other not yet mature.³³ |

We must therefore now look for another basis, as long as we are proceeding from an empirical standpoint. Neither in immediate knowledge nor in feeling have we encountered the free absolute independence of God. We have not found God either according to his independent being or as a content that is not contingent but is in and for itself. So we still have to observe the immediate consciousness to see how this content figures therein as an object.

It is this imperfection that compels us to go further, to see in what further mode of consciousness we can find something that corresponds better to this religious representation [of God]. We are looking for a region of consciousness in which the being of the object comes forth as objective being, as the proper being of what subsists in and for itself, distinct from us; and where, in addition, the determination of content is not merely contingent but is present in the form of absolute determinateness.

When we look around to see in what form of consciousness this is to be found, a more determinate form of consciousness emerges. We are not tied to the two forms of immediate knowing and religious feeling but can pass over to a more determinate form of
 183 consciousness and at the same time still not | transcend our standpoint, namely, the empirical standpoint of simple observing that we have adopted.³⁴

32. W (HgG) adds: to whom nothing is dearer and more precious than themselves and who have no desire beyond their own self-enjoyment,

33. W (HgG) adds: but is a beginner in regard to knowing, acting, etc.

34. Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads: In regard to the determinateness of the I, which constitutes the content of feeling, we have already seen, however, that it is distinct not only from the pure I but also from feeling in its own movement, so that the I finds itself determined in antithesis to itself. This distinction is now to be posited in such a way that the activity of the I enters into play, casting aside its determinateness as not belonging to it, setting it apart and objectifying it. We also saw that in feeling the I is implicitly externalized in relation to itself, and in the universality it contains it has implicitly the negation of its particular empirical existence. Inas-

3. Consciousness in More Determinate Form³⁵

Thus we are here discussing a more precisely determined consciousness, in which the two elements posited in reciprocal opposition acquire firmer characteristics whereby they are distinguished from one another. We must now see whether these characteristics correspond in principle to our representation of religion; we must grasp more precisely what representation means in general. We have such a representation, and we want to see how it is determined in us. We want to grasp the consciousness in which what we are

much as the I now sets its determinateness aside from itself, it externalizes itself, sublates its immediacy, and enters the sphere of the universal.

However, the determinateness of spirit, the object, is initially posited simply as *external*, in the completely objective determination of temporal and spatial externality, and the consciousness that posits spirit in this externality and relates itself to it is accordingly *intuition*, which we have here to consider in its consummation as artistic intuition.

[Ed.] The second paragraph shows traces of editorial revision.

35. [Ed.] In the outline of the empirical approach at the beginning of Sec. A, Hegel states that "the third characteristic is that these two [moments, the immediate knowledge of God and the being of God in feeling,] are *mutually determined*: God is not I, but the other of the I; and the knowing subject is in itself the negative, . . . the finite, while God is . . . the infinite." This is what Hegel begins to discuss under the theme, "Consciousness in More Determinate Form"—that is, what gives religious consciousness its determinacy is the awareness of the antithesis between myself as a finite, feeling, particular, limited subject and God as the infinite, independent, universal, unlimited object. It is the interaction of these elements that constitutes the religious relationship (see *Ms. Concept*, Sec. B.3) and religious representation (see 1827 *Concept*, Sec. B.3). While mentioning the term "representation" in the first paragraph, Hegel does not develop it here and it is not the theme of this section. Rather in the present section Hegel focuses on the antithesis between the two elements—myself and the object—and on alternations in my finitude between being merely negative or finite and being affirmative, existing solely for myself. From the point of view of empirical observation, these initially appear to be the only options: either God remains what is totally other and beyond, the negation of my finitude, of which I can have no cognitive knowledge; or finitude itself is what is exhaustively real and good, existing solely for itself. A higher form of consciousness is achieved when the relationship between finite and infinite is no longer viewed as purely antithetical and mutually negating. This is what is taken up in the next section, but the stages of the analysis are not clearly delineated. Throughout, Hegel is attempting to show that the religious relationship cannot adequately be brought into view from the purely empirical perspective and that a transition to a speculative grasp of religion is therefore required. Prior to that transition, the subject matter of religion cannot be properly addressed.

looking for is to be found, and in which we can obtain what we are looking for, i.e., a determinate representation of what we call "religion" dissected into its moments.

(1) If we consider determinate consciousness, we find this distinction, or antithesis, in it, that I comprehend myself as finite vis-à-vis the object. Consciousness means in general [that] I am not what the object is, and the object is not what I am. Each is the other of the other, but in a determinate fashion. Each is only the negative. We find that we are determined as the negative for ourselves, not merely in relation; we find we are determined as the finite.

184 ³⁶We are finite. This is the more fixed determination, and it seems | that there is nothing further to be said about it; everywhere we find an end, and the end of one is where another begins. Already the very fact that we have an object makes us finite. Where the object begins, that is the end of me. We know ourselves to be finite

36. *Precedes in W₂ (MiscP)*: However, in fact it is thought alone that is responsible for the elevation and movement of the objective content. I myself as thinking am this passing over, this spiritual movement, and we now have to consider thinking as constituting this movement. In the first place, however, it is empirical observation and reflection.

b. Mediated Knowledge as Observation and Reflection.

This standpoint, which in general is characteristic of our time, proceeds according to empirical psychology, accepts what is present in ordinary consciousness and how it is present, observes appearances, and removes from the latter whatever elements of the infinite are in them.

From this standpoint religion is the human consciousness of something higher, otherworldly, having being above and beyond. In other words consciousness senses itself to be dependent and finite; in this sensing, it is consciousness to the extent that it presupposes an other on which it depends and which it acknowledges as *essence* because it itself is defined as the *negative*, the finite.

If we begin by considering them in their general form, this observation and this reflection take shape as follows.

Precedes in W₁ (Ed): We are now approaching the result of our investigation. We have grasped the [sort of] thinking in which will be found, and wherein we shall attain what we seek, the specific thought of religion. But thinking itself, as we have just seen it in the form of knowing or proving, has various stages. Here again we initially start from the observation of consciousness [*continuing with Ho*:] in order to see how the content, God, takes shape in it.

W continues with a sentence from Ho: In consciousness, to the extent that I know an object and am reflected into myself vis-à-vis the object, [I] know the object as the other of myself, and myself as limited by it and finite.

on many planes. We are finite in a physical sense. The life of the living is this finite life. As part of life we are externally dependent on the other, we have needs and so forth—what everyone needs for his existence—and we are conscious of this limit. We feel ourselves to be dependent, as having an animal existence. This is what we have in common with the animals, which also feel their limit. Plants and minerals are finite, too, but they have no feeling of their limits. It is the superiority of what is living to feel its limit; and still more it is the superiority of what is spiritual to *know* its limit. The animal feels its limit—it is fearful, hungry, thirsty, and so forth. There is a breach in its feeling of self-reliance; there is a negation in it, and the feeling of this negation is present. The animal feels pain and is afraid; it takes fright when it is hunted and comes to a wall; there it feels its limit. If we say that religion rests on this feeling of dependence,³⁷ then animals would have to have religion, too, for they feel this dependence. The limit, however, only exists for me inasmuch as I pass beyond it; in feeling, in being conscious

37. [Ed.] A reference to the proposition of Friedrich Schleiermacher in *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 9: "The common element in all pious excitations, and therefore the essence of piety, is this: that we are conscious of ourselves as utterly dependent, that is, we feel ourselves dependent on God." In § 9.3, Schleiermacher writes: "We shall presuppose as undeniable the fact that pious feeling in all its various forms can be described as a pure feeling of dependence and never as a relationship of reciprocity." In the 2d ed., Schleiermacher revised this paragraph extensively. The proposition statement now reads (§ 4): "The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words, the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being utterly dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God." He added the crucial statement contained in § 4.4 (lacking in the 1st ed.): "As regards the identification of utter dependence with 'relation to God' in our proposition: this is to be understood in the sense that the *Whence* of our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by the word 'God,' and that this is for us the really original signification of that word." He also added a note to § 4: "For the word *schlechthinig* ['utter,' 'absolute'], which occurs frequently in the following exposition, I am indebted to Professor Delbrück. [See Ferdinand Delbrück, *Erörterungen einiger Hauptstücke in Dr. Friedrich Schleiermachers christliche Glaubenslehre* (Bonn, 1827).] I was unwilling to venture upon its use, and I am not aware that it has occurred anywhere else. But now that he has given it to me, I find it very convenient to follow his lead in using it." While Schleiermacher did use the adverb *schlechthin* in the proposition statement of the earlier § 9, this appears to be its *only* occurrence, and the adjective *schlechthinig* is not found at all in the first edition, which commonly

185 of the limit, the passing beyond it is implied. (The mineral is limited for us, not for itself.) This feeling is a comparison of one's nature and of one's existence at this moment generally, and the two | do not correspond. The animal is alive. What is living, in general, is what makes this comparison of existence and nature and finds they do not fit; and so far as its existence does not measure up to its nature, the living thing feels need, pain, or negative being.

Like a human being, an animal, qua subject, is essentially negative unity with itself, identity with itself as such; and it has the certainty³⁸ or awareness of its need, its self-relation. This self-

refers merely to our "feeling dependent on God" or the "pure [*rein*] feeling of dependence," or occasionally, the "feeling of absolute [*absolut*] dependence."

Now it is clear that, in the first edition as well as the second, Schleiermacher intended to distinguish between *religious* feeling and the feelings of reciprocity that we experience in relation to finite objects. But he did not *thematize* this so sharply by consistently designating the former as the "feeling of utter (or *absolute*) dependence," and by indicating that it entails an actual "relation to God." Thus it is plausible that Hegel, who knew only the first edition, would not have recognized the differentiation that Schleiermacher *intended* to express, but did not *clearly* express until 1830 (undoubtedly in response to just the sort of criticism advanced by Hegel). It is clear to us that, from Schleiermacher's point of view, no animal could have a feeling of *utter* dependence, i.e., a consciousness of being related to the ultimate Whence and Whither of existence, and that the "feeling of utter dependence" is not a sensible, empirical intuition at all but is closer to that "intellectual intuition" which Hegel once termed "speculation." Indeed it is the precognitive condition of possibility for cognizing anything whatsoever. But what is clear to us was not necessarily clear to Hegel; and, given the less rigorous conceptuality of the first edition of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, he cannot be accused of deliberately misrepresenting Schleiermacher, although he may not have made a special effort to understand him. While there are significant and irreducible differences between them, there is a sense in which these two great figures are like ships passing at night, never really establishing contact. See, e.g., the *locus classicus* of Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher, the Preface to H. W. F. Hinrichs' *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1822), pp. xviii–xix (*Werke* 18:16), translated by Merold Westphal as an Appendix to *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. Frederick G. Weiss (1974), pp. 238–239. For a detailed analysis of the two editions of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, see Richard Crouter, "Rhetoric and Substance in Schleiermacher's Revision of *The Christian Faith* (1821–1822)," *The Journal of Religion* 60 (July 1980), 285–306; see also Richard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-sided Debate," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (March 1980), 19–43.

38. *Ho reads*: For us a stone is limited, for itself it is not so. We are beyond its level of determinateness since it is immediately identical with what it is; what con-

relation is contradicted by the feeling of a negation in it, and the self feels itself as the power against this negation which appears as a need, and as an external object whereby this need can be satisfied. The self satisfies its need, supersedes the limit that is posited generally in the need. Thus among the animals, too, it is the case that the limit is only present to the extent that they pass beyond it. Only because the animal has a feeling of self does it have a need. An animal has needs, but these are at the same time drives to transcend this negation of the self. All drives are just this, that a negation is posited in the living thing, a negation that contradicts the self, for the self is the affirmative. This affirmation of itself restores the self again. If, then, the animal feels itself to be finite, if it feels its limit, this merely means that it is living, by having a drive.³⁹ By superseding the limit, it achieves reconciliation with itself and with the world once more; it is returned to its satisfied, satiated self-feeling. This necessity within it appears at the same time as an object outside it, which it brings within its power and so restores itself.

Consequently we feel ourselves to be finite: "I am finite." Notice that the limit of finitude is only ever present for us (as it is for the animal) through the comparison with the affirmative | in opposition to the limit. Only so far as we are beyond it do we feel it. Thus it is as finite that we are limited. At this level of consciousness no such patently abstract rejection as this occurs, but we hang onto the fact that I am finite. In this consciousness I am finite: the object is my nonbeing, the other-than-I that is different from me. This implies that it is posited as infinite, and qua infinite distinct from the finite me. The object is what is beyond the limit, but it is defined as an other than I. I feel only my limit, I know my boundary because I am unlimited, because I have a consciousness, an immediate con-

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stitutes its determinate being does not exist for it as a nonbeing. An animal's awareness of limits consists in its comparing its universality with its existence at a given moment. For an animal as such is, as a living being, universal vis-à-vis itself and feels its limitation as negated universality, as need. The human being, as a subject, is also negative unity with itself and has the certainty of unity with itself,

39. W (HgG) reads: In human beings as in animals all drives are thus an affirmation of one's self, and in this way animals take up a position against the negation within them. What is living exists only

sciousness. Here what is beyond the limit is something other than I; and I am defined only as finite.

(2) The next point is that both sides are mutually related, and we have to see how this relation is determined. It is a completely simple relation.

The infinite as my object is the nonfinite, the nonparticular, the unlimited, the universal generally. The finite is posited in relation to the infinite as the negative or the dependent, that which evaporates in relationship to the infinite. The infinite is posited as the substantial, the not-dependent; the finite [as] what has no subsistence, or [rather] has its subsistence only through its relationship to the infinite. In their being brought together a unity arises through the sublation of one side, namely of the finite, which cannot hold out against the infinite. Expressed as feeling, this relationship—[namely,] that over against me, the finite, there is another, and that [over against] the universal and infinite I therefore am only the negative—this relationship is the feeling of fear or dependence. This is the relationship between them, but there is also another characteristic within their relation—namely, that I, on the one hand, define myself as the finite, the merely negative, but on the other hand I do not perish in the relation; both sides subsist, and they do not arrive at this unity. “I am”—[this is] as such the standpoint of consciousness. I subsist; I am thus also the affirmative, that which is on its own account and subsists. On the one hand I know myself to be of no account, and on the other hand to be the affirmative, to be what counts, so that that infinite lets me survive too, does [not] demonstrate itself to be power in me. We can call this the goodness of the infinite, just as the sublation of the finite can be called its justice, according to which the finite must be manifested as finite.

Now one may say that, if we go this far,⁴⁰ this is all of the content of religion. We can go still further and observe that God can be known cognitively; but it is as though an arbitrary halt is called here—or, because we want to behave only as observers, we

40. *Ho reads:* This is the more determinate form of consciousness, beyond which observation does not reach. Therefore it is also said:

must abide by this definition of consciousness.⁴¹ God means here just the infinite, he is defined here only as that, as the other of the finite, as its beyond. To the extent that God is, I am not; to the extent that God touches me, the finite disappears. In this way God is defined by an antithesis that seems to be absolute. Inasmuch as the finite is defined simply as the other of the infinite, it is said that the finite cannot cognize or attain to the infinite, cannot grasp or conceive it. God is a beyond, we cannot lay hold of him. As we said, it is still possible to go beyond this standpoint, but we are told that it contains all we need of religion—that we have in it all that we need to know of God and religion, and that whatever goes beyond this originates in evil. We could observe that we can have cognitive awareness of God and find an affirmative connection with his essence, that we know of the abundance of his life and spiritual being; but this, it is said, would be evil in origin because it goes beyond the standpoint that has been firmly established.

If one has taken up the standpoint of empirical understanding, of observation, one cannot truly go any further; for observing implies holding the content [of what one is observing] before one—as an external object, as something beyond.⁴² If I now go further and seek to view consciousness from a spiritually higher standpoint, I find that I am no longer observing. I forget myself in plunging into the object. I immerse myself in it as I seek to cognize and to conceive God. I surrender my particularity in it, and if I do this I am no longer in the relationship which, as an empirical consciousness, I wanted to maintain. What I observe is the relationship of consciousness, and [as] we observe, we take upon ourselves a relationship to what we observe. If the relationship is altered, if God is no longer a beyond for me, then I no longer remain a pure

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41. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) adds: Observing cannot extend beyond the subject because it deliberately confines itself to an empirical approach, to what is immediately present or given, and God is not something that can be observed. Here consequently our object can only be what is within us as such and what we are as finite beings.

42. Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (Var) reads: but this external or limited [object] is the finite, which is external vis-à-vis an other, and this other is, as the infinite, what lies beyond it.

observer, I become interwoven with the thing instead. That is this standpoint, and, as we have already said, so far as one wishes to observe one must remain at this standpoint.⁴³ Thus, to be more precise, it is fundamental that I remain at the level of the finitude of the subject, which counts here as what is ultimate or supreme, what cannot be moved or altered but is hard as iron and simply stands fast. Over and against this finite subject there is an other, in which it has its terminus. This other, which is called God, is a beyond, nothing else for us but what, in the feeling of our finitude, we yearn for, this and nothing more; for we are fixed in our finitude absolutely. The reflection that we have passed beyond the limit also has a place here to the extent that we have a longing for this other, a striving after it, but this surpassing of the limit, this longing, is only something attempted, a mere longing that cannot attain what it seeks. To attain the object, to have cognition of it, would involve surrendering my finitude, renouncing it; but this finitude is ultimate, it is not to be surrendered, ~so that reaching to something beyond it is only a striving full of [helpless] longing.⁴⁴

This whole standpoint must now be examined more closely to see what constitutes its general character and to assess what is essential to it.

189 We have seen that there is an *alternation* of determinations present in this standpoint, determinations of my finitude, | my relativity; over against me stands the nonfinite, the infinite, but as a beyond. Here I am defined as just the finite, as the essentially negative, but this alternates with the definition of me as affirmative, as existing. Both definitions are only forms of one and the same definition. We will see later that the two coincide in one; the *main* element is my *absoluteness* in this my finitude. The *first* determination contains my *finitude*—and just because I am finite, it contains the passing beyond to something higher. But, what is involved in the relationship of consciousness is that I am defined as the negative of this [higher] object—with the result that it is an other opposed to me, and hence remains beyond my reach. It is an other which is not

43. W (HgG) *adds*: And the wisdom of our time reaches no further.

44. W₂ (Var) *reads*: and in it we are at an end, satisfied and reconciled with it.

definable by me, so far as the definition is supposed to convey an objective sense. This beyond has no content. All that is present is my reaching out in a general direction, a reaching into the distance. I stay here on this side, reaching into the distance, striving and longing for something beyond. The second point is that this orientation toward a beyond, this longing, is entirely my longing, my doing, my orientation, my emotion. If I use the predicates "all-bountiful" or "almighty" to define this beyond, they have meaning only within me, only a subjective meaning, and not an objective one.⁴⁵ It is my absolute, fixed finitude itself that prevents me from attaining the beyond: to surrender my finitude and to attain the beyond are one and the same; and my interest in maintaining myself in the finite, and in not attaining the beyond, are also one. This points clearly to the third feature of the definition as a whole, namely, that it is the definition of a negative—that I am finite and that the other is defined as negative. Both of these definitions, the representations of my finitude and of a beyond, belong to me myself, they fall entirely within me, they simply remain with me. The recognition of a beyond is my drive, my striving, and willing.

Thus there is present a splitting within myself. On the one hand there is in me the determination that I am the negative; | while on the other hand, the negative is also defined as other over against me. This second determination belongs to me likewise. There are distinct orientations within me, one toward myself, and one directed outward, which falls within me also just as much. My orientation to the beyond and my finitude are both determining characteristics of me. I remain confined within myself in both of them. The split is posited within me in such a way that both sides of it belong to me in fact.

The *second* determination of this standpoint is my *affirmation*, not my finitude. I *am* in principle—I am affirmative. This fact that "I am" differs from the previous determination, according to which I am finite. If this is expressed more concretely in the context of an imperative, "should," then I am in principle, I am immediately, what I should be. Thus if we express this "I am" by means of

45. W₂ (Var) adds (*similar in Ho*): and pertain exclusively to this my reaching.

“should,” it means, so it is said, “I am good *by nature*,” i.e., I *am* in principle, and so far as I am, I am good, I am immediately good, I am originally good, I am this affirmation: goodness is primitive. In this respect all that is needed is to keep me so. Admittedly there is in me also a possibility of being tempted by another, of sins, errors, and so on; but this is at once defined as something that comes later, as an external accident, as something contingent. To say “I am what I ought to be” would express my finitude. “I am”—here I am related to myself, this is an affirmation; I am as I should be. The negative is the failing, the lack, the sinfulness, and so forth. This, however, does not lie at my root but is a contingent complication. This is the first basic characteristic from the side of my affirmation.

The second point in this affirmative view is that I can also relate myself to something external: the good can be obscured. In connection with this liability to error and these external orientations, my affirmation also becomes, therefore, a mediating affirmation—i.e., an affirmation that reestablishes itself out of the singularizing that has taken place. Thus it is an affirmation that reestablishes itself out of what is unreconciled, and turns back upon itself, mediated through the sublation of my faultiness, which in itself is only contingent. In this way my nature is reconciled with itself again. The good in my nature has reverted to parity with itself, and this reconciliation does not touch what is within; it does not eliminate anything internal, | but only removes what is external, only remakes what is original.

This is what is involved in this second [affirmative] determination. If we compare the way in which it has thus resulted in the affirmative determination that I remain constant within it, the same position is at once established that we recognized at the first [negative] standpoint. I am, my [self-]affirmation is what persists; it may, indeed, become entangled with something else and be thereby superficially disturbed, but it remains self-contained; in other words, I remain what I am, an orientation to the beyond, and this is only *my* orientation and longing. So my affirmative character stands triumphant over all. I remain what I am.

This is to say at the same time that the world is reconciled solely

with itself. I as individual am good; if I fall into error, I have thereby merely passed over to something accidental; to restore my original affirmation I need only discard that accidental something and I am reconciled with myself. When it is said, "God has reconciled the world," what is involved on this view is only *my* reconciliation; it is only my affirmative character that is to be restored. Spirit, the inward element, does not come into the transaction, it remains out of play. It is the originally good, and the negative is not included within the nature of spirit itself.

In the traditional theology the images of eternal damnation occurred. This presupposed the unqualified freedom of the will. According to this image, what I am does not depend on my nature; it depends on my self-conscious will and on that alone. It is the will that makes me guilty. It is not my nature, then, not the original nature at least, that is good; I cannot ascribe to myself any goodness without my will. According to this view goodness pertains solely to my self-conscious spirit. But in the view we are considering, only the original goodness [of nature] is assumed, and its being affected by another is sublated in such a way that the restoration of what was there originally results. If we consider this reconciling mediation more closely, it consists merely in the conscious knowledge that I am originally, by nature, good.⁴⁶ I may do what I will, | but I retain my nature, i.e., the conviction, the opinion about myself that I am good. My nature is good, and all that can be added to this is my knowing it to be so, the belief and the conviction within me that I am good.

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This is the abstract definition. If we developed it further, all contemporary views would fall within it. In recent times all good is supposed to rest on my conviction. For example, I hold something to be what is right. My ethical character and my worth reside in this conviction, as a conviction, in this knowledge of the right; and what is good rests once more only on the original good that I am.

46. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) adds: [this reconciliation] is accordingly a vain, empty seesaw system. [For at one moment] I swing myself, so to speak, in the direction of longing and reaching for the beyond, or of acknowledging my past faults, [at another] this longing and emotion, which ensue solely in me, cause me to swing back to myself, so as to make me immediately present to myself.

My nature is good in principle; what is added is the knowledge that I am good. This constitutes the good, and constitutes my adherence to the good. Only the knowledge that I am good makes me good, makes my goodness. My conviction that I know that I am good suffices for my [salvation], and this rests on the fact that I am good from the start, and I know it. My longing for a beyond, my bestirring myself, belongs to me, remains within me. I am only the affirmative in general. When I make errors or commit sins it only touches my nature superficially, since in principle I cannot commit an error if I know I am good. My knowing makes me good. My longing, my striving, this elevation of mine, is the main thing. All of our contemporary views,⁴⁷ from the Kantian philosophy⁴⁸ onward, are embraced within this standpoint. I have developed the position abstractly. From Kant onward all [religious] faith has fallen within the view that I am the affirmative, the substantial, the essential, that which stands higher than all these determinations.

This is the standpoint of subjective consciousness, which remains as thus determined. It progressively develops the antitheses that are endemic to consciousness, but which persist in it, and which it holds in its power because it is the affirmative. |

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4. The Relationship of the Finite and the Infinite⁴⁹

We now have to consider in more detail what *finitude* is in general, where it occurs, and what the genuine relationship of the *finite* to

47. [Ed.] Hegel's criticism of the view that human goodness is based on conviction (*Überzeugung*) is directed against Fichte, as the *History of Philosophy* shows, 3:504 (*Werke* 15:640). See Fichte, *Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre* (Jena and Leipzig, 1798), pp. 211–213 (*Gesamtausgabe* 5:152–153, 158). The widespread contemporary view that humanity is good by nature can readily be traced to Rousseau, especially to his *Emile*. For it was expressly in opposition to the Rousseauian acceptance of the goodness of human nature that Kant asserted the radical evil of human nature. See Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), trans. T. M. Greene & H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960), pp. 27 ff. (Kant, *Werke* 6:32 ff.). Kant held that an original kernel of goodness could be reawakened through adherence to the moral law (*ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. [*Werke* 6:45 ff.]), but this would be accomplished only through a *revolution* in human conviction, not through gradual reform as Hegel here represents it.

48. *Ho adds*: which first established belief in the good,

49. [Ed.] This section continues the discussion of the preceding one, advancing to an analysis of three forms of the relationship between the finite and the infinite.

the *infinite* is—for the consciousness that remains subjective falls categorically within the finite in general. We want first to discuss finitude in the popular sense, or what we have in mind when we say that being is finite; then we shall consider the nature of finitude in the general sense, and [finally] its true sublation.

When we talk of human being as finite, there are three forms to be considered in which finitude appears: first, the finitude of the *senses* generally, second, finitude in *reflection*, and third, the form of finitude as it is [found] *in spirit* and *for spirit*.

(1) When we say, “human being is finite,” this means that I as a human being am in relation with an other; there is present an other, a negative of myself with whom I have ties, and this bond with an other constitutes my finitude or a dependency on my part; we are mutually exclusive and behave as independent vis-à-vis one another. This constitutes an exclusion. As a being that has sense-awareness I am exclusive and excluded in this way; all living things are exclusive and excluded thus—they are singular. When I hear or see, I have before me only singular [things]; in my practical desires I am likewise concerned only with singular [things]; the objects of my satisfaction are these same singular [things]. This is the standpoint of natural being, of natural existence generally; within the sphere of this natural existence I have a multitude of relationships, there is a manifold of external being, in my sensations. I have many kinds of need, many distinct types of relationship,

These correspond to three forms in which finitude itself appears, since finitude is defined differently according to the ways in which its limit or “other” appears over against it. In the first two forms of finitude—those of the senses and of reflection—the infinite is itself defined finitely, as that which mirrors the finite and is limited by it, a mere “duplicate” of the finite. Here finitude and subjectivity continue to prevail. The true relationship of finite and infinite comes into view only from the standpoint of reason: the infinite is now conceived as that which “overreaches” the finite, encompasses it as an essential moment, and transcends or sublates it. This is the infinitude of *spirit*, which is an “affirmative infinitude,” as distinguished from the affirmative *finitude* of the self and the *negative* infinitude of the “beyond.” It is affirmative precisely as the negation of negation, as the positing of finitude and the overcoming of it. Here the perspective shifts from the finite subject (or consciousness) to the infinite self-mediation of spirit. There is no way of “passing over” from the finite to the true infinite unless the infinite itself constitutes this passage: but that is the speculative insight. For the logical foundations of this discussion, see Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, pp. 137 ff. (GW 11:78 ff.).

manifold practical or theoretical relationships to what is outside me. All of these needs are limited in respect of their content; they are dependent, or finite. The sublation of the finite falls already within this finitude; every impulse that is satisfied is finite, insofar as it is subjective; but, being satisfied, it sublates this relation to its other, this finitude. Every satisfaction is a sublation of the finite and a return to | self. On the other hand, this satisfaction remains a finite satisfaction, for the satisfied impulse reawakes. Thus the satisfaction remains just as finite as the need; it has, as such, a lack—and in this aspect it is finite. Considered from the formal side, however, the fact that the need is satisfied is a sublation of its finitude. Satisfaction of the appetite is the sublating of the separation between me and my object—it is a sublating of finitude, though only in a formal fashion.

Our sentient consciousness, too, insofar as it has to do with singular [things], belongs to natural finitude. The finite is defined as the negative, and it must manifest this character. The universal manifestation [of it] is death—the finite perishes. This is the renunciation of finitude. The finite will not last; it is not what abides—instead there is posited here really and in actuality what it intrinsically is. The sentient vitality of the single being has its terminus in death. As singular, our single sensations are transient; one sensation drags away another, one impulse, one desire, drives out another. This whole realm of the senses posits itself as what it really is, in its demise. This is where finitude ceases and is escaped from. The escape from this finitude in consciousness, however, is not just what is called death; the escape from this finitude is *thought* generally—it is already present in representation so far as thinking is active in that.

(2) As we raise ourselves, at this point, out of immediate consciousness to the standpoint of *reflection*, we have to deal with a mode of finitude that enters into a determinate antithesis with infinity. This is the second form in which finitude makes its entrance.

This antithesis takes various forms, so our question is: “What are the determinate modes of this antithesis? Is there an escape from finitude at this level?” To put the question another way, “Does reflection actually manifest and posit finitude as intrinsically noth-

ing, i.e., does reflection go as far as what we call nature?" Nature is mortal; can reflection cope with that, too? Can it cause what is mortal to die? Or is the nothing immortal for it? Because the finite is nothing, ought we to let it vanish?—for | what nature can do, surely infinite spirit must be able to do, and more. 195

The standpoint of reflection, however, is the level at which the finite maintains itself, the level at which the antithesis of finitude and infinity is perennial; the very connecting of the two is the standpoint of reflection, and the two together make up the antithesis.

If we consider the first antithesis of finite and infinite in reflection, finitude is a diverse manifold of external [elements], and this manifold of many [elements] is the bounded, over against which the unbounded defines itself as the "allness" of the many. This form of finitude, with its antithesis, occurs in a more concrete shape in our consciousness thus: in our representational imagining, we know a crowd of things, or we have infinitely many bits of information; and similarly in our volition we have a crowd of objects, particular goals, drives, inclinations, and so forth. Here again there is the same antithesis: that this manifold, this plurality, is not enough [by itself], but has a [necessary] relation to "allness." The multiplicity, the present mass of information, the manifold of which I am aware, is compared with unity in "allness," and the demand comes that our information should be made complete, that it should be increased to "allness"; we require the consciousness that this multiplicity has been exhausted, and that "allness" or completeness of information has been reached.⁵⁰ Similarly, in matters of practical

50. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* but always only of singular [things]. As volitional, spirit is determined according to private purposes and interests. But in both respects—as representational and as volitional—spirit comports itself as exclusive particularity and is thus connected to other independent things. Here too the antithesis comes into play in that spirit compares the singularity attaching to its existence with its singularity defined and represented as universal. I compare the wealth of knowledge I possess with the whole mass of information I represent; I find that my actuality does not correspond to the universality that has been represented, and I demand that the actual manifold be further developed, completed, made exhaustive, and brought to universality [*similar in G*: and I demand . . . universality].

conduct, we can set our sights on a perfect completeness of impulse and an "allness" of satisfaction, | which we then call "blessedness." 196 The one totality is called universality of knowledge, the other is a totality of possession and satisfaction, of appetite and enjoyment. These are the primitive forms of finite and infinite; in this infinity there is an enduring finitude. It is conceded that there are no limits to information, but we will see presently that we are finitely acquainted with them.⁵¹ It is thinkable enough, for example, that natural science should know all forms of animal life, but not in their most detailed characteristics. It is the same with the satisfaction of drives: [perfect satisfaction] is similarly an ideal, and for that reason it is not reached.⁵² This finitude endures, and it does so because it contains something false.⁵³ On the one hand it is a multiplicity of information, a multiplicity of drives, a multiplicity of satisfaction; on the other hand it is allness, perfection, unity, a being grasped altogether in one whole. Something of this kind, however, is not a true [concept] precisely because one side is a manifold, a multiplicity, while the other is a unity. The multiplicity would have to relinquish part of its character in order to be subsumed under unity. The goal, the ideal, is set up in such a way as to be unattainable; and it is unattainable precisely because it is inherently something untrue, a unity of many which is supposed to remain a manifold of isolated elements at the same time. This finitude is now sublated in the concept in principle; the more de- 197 terminate account of this process is that of conceptual cognition.⁵⁴ |

51. *Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* But the totality is here thought of only as "manyness" and "allness," and so remains opposed to finitude, which cannot possess everything. The I is another such mutually exclusive element, so that the "many" operates in such a way as simply to exclude other sorts of manyness, while the "all" is merely an abstraction from the "many" that remains external. And so it is found that there are no limits to information, interstellar flight knows no bounds, and

52. *Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* human beings can attain many interests and purposes but not all, not blessedness itself; "allness" is an unattainable ideal [*last three words in G*].

53. *Thus P, D; G reads:* because it is something true. *Ho reads:* because the infinite that stands over against it is itself finite, a finite that is posited as its other.

54. *Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads:* Moreover the purpose and the ideal, which one does not attain, is itself essentially finite. It is just for this reason that I must not attain it, for if I did so I would still only be attaining something finite.

The second form of the antithesis of finite to infinite is the one that is [found] in reflection as such. The first form of the antithesis in reflection is separateness as against unity—here finitude is posited not merely as a predicate but on its own account. The multitude exists on its own account; in contrast, if I posit the finite as such, I bring it into relation with the infinite. This, then, is the essential antithesis, that one is determined as the other of the other, the one being defined as positive, the other as negative.

If we consider the nature of this antithesis abstractly, then we have, on one side, the finite and the infinite. We must now ask whether this antithesis has truth, that is, whether the two sides fall apart and subsist apart from one another. In this regard it has already been said that if we posit the finite as finite we have already passed beyond it. The definition of the finite contains its terminus, and it has that terminus in something else. In the barrier we have a boundary, and this is the very fact that we have passed beyond it. It is no longer the affirmative; no sooner are we at the barrier than we are projected beyond it.⁵⁵

The finite relates itself to the infinite—the other is the infinite—and the two are mutually exclusive. If we consider them more carefully, we can equate the finite with the limited and its limit with the infinite.

In the first form [of finitude] one particular limits an other; here the finite has a limit in the infinite. If the finite is limited by the infinite and stands on one side, then the infinite itself is also something limited; it has its limit in the finite; it is what the finite is not, it has something over against it, and it has its limit and boundary in that. Accordingly the infinite is something limited and bound; they are connected to each other. Thus instead of the highest we have a finite: we do not have what we want, but rather in this infinite we have only something finite. This infinite is itself only something finite. Or if we say, on the other hand, that the infinite is not limited by the finite, then the finite is also not limited by the infinite. But if it is not limited, then it is no different from the

55. [Ed.] On the concept of the “barrier” or “boundary” (*Schranke*), see *Science of Logic*, pp. 131 ff. (GW 11:73 ff.).

infinite, but flows together with it; it is identical with it in infinity just as it was previously in finitude. | This, then, is the abstract nature of this antithesis generally, an antithesis of which the abstract negative resolution has been indicated. We must bear this in mind, for to hold fast to it is of the utmost importance in regard to all forms of reflective consciousness and of philosophy. ~In fact the antithesis or the distinction disappears when we consider it; there is no distinction. If we now consider this disappearance of the antithesis in concrete consciousness, we find here the position that we already had before us previously;⁵⁶ we can recall it to mind at this point, and repeat briefly with reference to the concrete form of consciousness what we have already said.

The finite and the infinite: they are each of them this antithesis.⁵⁷ The finite grasped more concretely is directly "I," and the infinite is what lies beyond this finite, the negative of it. Now the finite is itself the negative; and the negative of negation is the affirmative. Affirmation falls on the side of the infinite, this subsisting affirmation, this being for self; it is what lies beyond the I, beyond my self-consciousness, beyond my consciousness as capacity and will. You will have noticed that I have just now defined the beyond as the affirmative; but this is opposed to the I which we have previously defined⁵⁸ as the affirmative: I am my self-relation, my identity with myself. I am good, I am good by nature, I am the unmediated affirmation, I am at one with myself.

The further point to be noted is that in the face of higher reflection both of these distinctions disappear. The two sides show themselves to be equally finite, in that they limit one another; or if, contrariwise, no limit is present, then the two sides are also immediately identical.

For us they are moments; and they vanish when we treat them as such. While consciousness has this antithesis before it, they are

56. [Ed.] See above, p. 282.

57. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* It is precisely in their being absolutely opposed to one another that the antithesis itself disappears. The two sides of the relationship disappear into empty moments, and what is and remains is their unity, wherein they are sublated.

58. [Ed.] See above, pp. 285 ff.

for us distinct. If consciousness defines itself as finite in this way, and says in all humility, "I am the finite, and the infinite lies beyond," | then this I makes in its humility the very same reflection that we have already made: that that infinite is only something evanescent, not something that has being in and for itself, but merely a thought posited by me. It is I who produce that beyond; the finite and the infinite are equally my product, and I stand above both of them, both disappear in me. I am lord and master of this definition: I bring it forth. They vanish in and through me—and thus the second position is established: that I am the affirmation which at first I placed outside in a beyond; the infinite first comes into being through me. I am the negation of negation, it is I in whom the antithesis disappears; I am the reflection that brings them both to naught. 199

Let us pause here and try to see what happens to the finite ~—whether it actually, really, gets free of its finitude and obtains its right.⁵⁹ It *seems* to be the case here that reflection earnestly seeks to get rid of its nothingness, but that is exactly what does not happen here. This allowing the finite to vanish, this renunciation of nothingness—the refraining from positing it *actually*—is mere show. What happens, instead, is that the finite maintains itself—that I, the finite, this self-consciousness, hold fast to myself, I do not surrender my nothingness, but precisely in this my nothingness I make myself into the infinite, the effective and active infinite.⁶⁰ In other words, this is the highest standpoint of the subjectivity that holds fast to itself; it is the finitude that persists and makes itself into the infinite in its persisting—the infinite subjectivity that despises all content and is done with it. | This subjectivity itself, this acme of 200

59. *Thus G; P reads:* because it is nothingness; that it *is* nothingness is not just a manner of speaking—for it *really* is nothing. *Ho reads:*—whether it obtains what is its right, namely to be sublated and so achieve infinity, or whether it fails to cast off its finitude and only obtains the form of the infinite by virtue of the fact that the infinite is a finite over against it, so that the finite as finite with the infinite as finite is in unity with itself.

60. *Ho adds:* What we have then is that the finite I, inasmuch as it is the positing of an infinite beyond itself, has posited the infinite itself as a finite; because it has the infinite as finite, it is therefore identical with itself as equally finite, and, as *identical* with the infinite, sees itself *as* the infinite.

finitude, maintains itself still; all content has been evaporated from it and made into mere vanity; but there remains this vanity itself, which does not vanish but still maintains itself. This acme of finitude, therefore, is what has the semblance of renouncing the finite, but still maintains finitude as such even in the renunciation. More precisely, it is thereby abstract self-consciousness, pure thought as the absolute power of negativity. This standpoint that has to dissolve, and has dissolved, all determinations—the self, the I, that has arrived at absolute identity—is of the highest importance. It is this power of negativity which still maintains itself as the I, which only maintains itself by giving up all finitude, yet still retains (just [as] its own self) this finitude, and expresses it as infinity, as the sole affirmative. So what this subjectivity lacks is precisely objectivity. In a genuine renunciation the crucial point is whether this I, this acme of finitude, still has a content, an object. It lies in the objective character of consciousness that the I as *this one* asserts its particular independence. [That is where] this standpoint fails, and [it is] the only mode or fashion in which finitude can be renounced.

201 The standpoint we have been considering is reflection in its consummation, abstract subjectivity. I am the determining [factor] | in which all content, everything objective, is only in ideal form, as something posited by me. Second, this I—before which everything else vanishes, through which alone everything is and has validity—exists as this single individual, as the unmediated self. I am, and this my being is the immediate self. These two determinations are what we have at this standpoint. Here all objective content vanishes; only what is posited by me has validity. I am the *abstraction*, and since only the content posited by me is valid, the content is a contingent one, a content of feeling, opinion, caprice; it is good to the extent that I am convinced of it; and the fact that it⁶¹ is good

61. *Similar (with interpolations from Ho) in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads: [I am] the absolute idealizer, that for which all distinction, determination, and content is sublated and is only as posited by the idealizing. I and I alone am what determines, and I am this as this singular being, as the unmediated self, as I who am immediate.*

In all content I am immediate reference to self, that is, I am *being*, and this I am as singularity, as the self-relatedness of negativity. What is posited by me is posited

depends solely on my conviction and my recognition. Thus I am here what is affirmative, positive, and real. Initially, this standpoint purports to be that of humility, "laying no claim to have any cognition of God because God and his characteristics lie beyond it. Thus there is humility in its definition of itself as the least; but the humility contradicts itself, for it consists in excluding what is true from itself, and positing itself in this world as the affirmative. Only I am everything affirmative."⁶² This I is the only affirmative, the uniquely essential, that is, this finite I is the infinite affirmative. The infinite, expressed as what lies beyond, is something posited only by me. This affirmative belongs only to me. The unity of finite and infinite is contained in this determination, but "it is a unity in which | the finite—this finite I—has not been submerged but has become what is firm, absolute, sempiternal."⁶³ 202

as distinct from me—the negative, and thus as negated, as only posited. I am, accordingly, immediate negativity. Thus I—this exclusive I prior to any mediation, i.e., in my feelings and opinions, in the caprice and contingency of my sentient and volitional life—am the *affirmative*, am good. All objective content, law, truth, duty, disappears for me, I recognize nothing, nothing objective, no truth; God, the infinite, is for me something beyond, remote from me. I alone am the positive, and no content is valid in and for itself; it is no longer in any sense affirmative in itself but only to the extent that I posit it. The true and the good are only what I am convinced of, and that something

62. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* and this its humility consists in the fact that the I excludes from itself and renounces the infinite, the knowledge and cognition of God, and defines itself as finite over against the infinite. But this humility thereby contradicts itself, is rather arrogance, for in this way I exclude from myself the true, so that in this world I, as this particular person, am alone the affirmative, that which has being on its own account, over against which everything else disappears. True humility rather renounces itself, renounces my particularity as the affirmative, and recognizes as the affirmative only the true and what has being-in-and-for-itself. By contrast, this false humility, while recognizing the finite as the negative and limited, at the same time makes it the sole affirmative, the infinite and absolute.

63. *Ho reads:* the fact that this unity is posited by the finite I means that it itself becomes *finite* unity. And this version of the standpoint, carrying to the ultimate extreme the finite subjectivity that posits itself as the absolute, is what makes it difficult to comprehend this standpoint. The I feigns humility, whereas in fact it is so proud it all too easily turns to vanity and nothingness. *W₂ (MiscP) interpolates into the preceding text from Ho:* On the other hand, since knowledge of something higher falls away and all that is left is subjective emotion and pleasure, single individuals are bound by nothing objectively common, and, given the arbitrary diversity of their feeling, are opposed to one another in hostility, hatred, and mutual contempt.

The first difficulty with this standpoint is that it is abstract in this way. What emerges is that this finite [self] posits itself as the uniquely affirmative, the uniquely essential. The second difficulty is that of the philosophical concept. This standpoint borders on the philosophical one, because it is the highest standpoint in reflection. It contains intuitions and expressions that, superficially regarded, seem to be the very same expressions and definitions as those of speculative philosophy. It involves [for instance] *this* ideality, *this* negativity, and subjectivity as a negativity of everything determinate. Considered on its own account, this is an essential, genuine moment, the moment of freedom, an essential moment of the idea. Moreover, this standpoint also contains the unity of finite and infinite; and it can and must be said of the idea that it is the unity of the finite and infinite. In spite of this, however, what seems to be as close as can be, is the furthest away.⁶⁴ This ideality, this fire in which all determinations are consumed, is at this standpoint still unconsummated negativity: I as this one, without mediation, am the unique reality; all other determinations are posited ideally and turn to ashes, and only I, this one, maintain myself. [There is] just this certitude of myself, this certainty that all determinations are posited only through me, that they are valid or invalid only on my account. To this extent, ideality is not carried through [to its conclusion], and this last acme of finitude still contains what must be negated: that I as this one, in my immediate being, or particularity, do not have truth or reality. The unity of finite and infinite is also
203 | posited in reflection: I, the finite, | am the infinite, the negative of all content. Everything is comprehended, everything is limited, everything *is*, only insofar as it is posited by me, or is a negative for me.⁶⁵ This unity of the finite and infinite is itself a definition of

64. *Ho adds*: And the reason is that speculative philosophy is subjectivity that develops all objectivity out of itself. As form it thus transforms itself into content and for the first time becomes true form by reason of its true content. On the other hand, from the present standpoint this subjectivity and infinity are only pure form, devoid of content.

65. *Ho adds*: But I myself am still only positive, since it is after all only by negation that anything becomes affirmative. This standpoint is self-contradictory: it erects ideality as principle, yet what brings ideality about is itself not ideal.

the idea; but here this unity is still formulated one-sidedly, in that the unity is still in the category of the finite. Or, there is the proposition: "I, this finite one, am the infinite." The singularity of my immediate being, my immediate I-hood, must still be separated from this affirmation, from this infinite [being]. What makes this distinction is reflection itself, which⁶⁶ here attains to unity, but to a unity that is merely finite.⁶⁷ This is what is lacking in this standpoint: the antitheses in it can only be judged if they are referred back to these last thoughts.⁶⁸

It is the standpoint of our time, and through it philosophy enters into a relationship peculiar [to this age]. If we consider the difference between this standpoint and the religious standpoint of tradition, we notice that the traditional religious consciousness (i.e., consciousness that | adopted the standpoint of truth, that of its own worth) had a content that was in and for itself fixed, a content that described the nature of God. The first commandment was to be cognizant of God;⁶⁹ and what he is has been vouchsafed to humankind in the content of the creed. Blessedness or damnation, or absolute worth or worthlessness, was bound up with accepting the truth of this content which expressed the nature of God.⁷⁰ Now-

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66. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: here, however, neglects its task of separating and distinguishing, and

67. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) adds: It here neglects to separate the immediate singularity of the I, of this particular one, from the infinite and affirmative; and instead of submerging the (of itself foundationless) singular in universality and comprehending the affirmation in its absolute universality, wherein it comprises the singular within itself, it grasps singularity itself immediately as the universal.

68. *Ho reads*: however, in such a way that the infinite is the positing of itself as the finite while the finite is the finite of itself, namely, this sublatedness, the negation of its negation, and consequently the infinite. But this infinite is only as the positing of itself within itself as the finite, and the sublating of this finitude as such. From this subjective standpoint, however, infinity is one-sided in being posited by the finite itself, thus displaying itself as finite and only becoming infinite by virtue of the fact that in the infinite posited as finite, the finite I is identical with itself and thus infinite. In this way this infinity is itself the finite, and, to the extent that the finite does not become the infinite by a process of self-sublation, one-sided.

69. *Ho adds*: to worship him in spirit and in truth.

[Ed.] Cf. John 4:23–24.

70. *Ho adds*: In the same way right and duty were a divine commandment, an objective content.

adays, on the contrary, the highest [achievement] is to have no cognition of God, have no knowledge of truth at all, so that we no longer know what right and duty are. In this standpoint it also follows explicitly that I am naturally good, i.e., it is not through my own freedom, not through myself or by my own will that I am good.⁷¹ The standpoint opposed to this has it, on the contrary, that it is only through my freedom, only through my spiritual activity that I am good. It is not originally, not by nature, that I am good, but only through the work of my freedom; my goodness must come forth in my consciousness, it belongs to my spiritual world. This view could be confused with the representation of the grace of God. But my being open to grace as consciousness is strictly a function of my will. The other view [i.e., the standpoint of our age] holds to the goodness of nature, and what is good, then, is my caprice, for every content is posited by me.

205 In view of this monstrous antithesis in the view of the religious person, we see that we must of necessity face up to a revolution that has occurred in Christendom.⁷² The religious consciousness contains the root of everything through which humanity has its truth, the root of all duty for it; all other rights and duties depend on the form of this inmost root. Just what counts as truth for spirit at its root is the foundation of all actuality.⁷³ | Looking more closely at what has emerged from this standpoint, what we have seen is that at this standpoint of consciousness no religion is properly speaking possible. For it is I, as this single individual, who am the affirmative—that is [what] this standpoint [says]—but the idea that has being in and for itself ought to be in religion simply in and for itself; it ought not be posited by me as this single one, i.e., by me in my particularity. What has thus emerged is a determination, or form, of the highest import. Thus there can here be no religion.⁷⁴

71. W_2 (Var) adds: rather I am good to the extent that I *lack* consciousness.

72. W reads: recognize *instead of*: must face up to W_2 (MiscP/Var?) adds: A completely different self-consciousness in regard to the true has come upon the scene.

73. *Ho* adds: However, this inmost root only has truth if it is the form for the objective content.

74. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: any more than at the standpoint of sentient consciousness.

It may still be noted that from this standpoint philosophy is likewise something particular: it is [merely] a general cultivation of consciousness. Philosophy [so it is said] is a concern, a way of looking at things, that lies outside of the [religious] community, a concern that has its particular place. Likewise, according to the contemporary view, philosophy of religion is not something that has a significance, an actual import, for the [religious] community, but stands in opposition to it and must expect to meet with hostility from it.

~(3) So far as the *higher* standpoint is concerned, it is the third standpoint or relationship—[the relationship] of the finite to the infinite in *reason*. The first was the *natural* relationship, the second that which obtains in *reflection*, the third, now, that which obtains in *reason*.⁷⁵

We shall first consider this third standpoint or relationship as it is related to the view we have just been studying or in connection with the form of reflection at its highest extreme. By its very nature the transition from this extreme to the higher standpoint must be properly dialectical, must be made dialectically. But this is a matter for logic.⁷⁶ We shall here proceed by presenting this standpoint in a concrete manner; and with respect to the necessity of the transition, we shall at the same time invoke only the consequence | that is properly involved in this standpoint. It claims: “This finitude—I as finite am a nullity that must be given up.” ~This we grant, but it is not to be given up in such a way that I, as this one, this unmediated singularity, at the same time persist, and persist in such a way that just this I becomes the affirmative (as is asserted by the standpoint of reflection). But precisely the standpoint is indicated in which the surrender does in fact happen: that I do not [persist] as this one, as an immediate singular individual, nor yet as affir-

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75. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: If the first relationship of finite to infinite was the *natural* and *untrue*, inasmuch as the manifold plurality of particularity was adhered to over against universality; and if we further regard as the second relationship that obtaining in *reflection*, where finitude lies in the wholly consummate abstraction of pure thinking, which does not actually comprehend itself as universal, but remains as the I, as this single one—we have now to consider this relationship as it reveals itself in *reason*.

76. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 137 ff. (GW 11:78 ff.).

mative, nor as the infinite.⁷⁷ A standpoint must be pointed out wherein the I in this singularity *has* renounced and *does* renounce itself. This higher renunciation takes place at the higher standpoint.

I must be the particular subjectivity that has indeed been sublated; hence I must recognize something *objective*, which is actual being in and for itself, which does indeed count as true for me, which is recognized as the affirmative posited for me; something in which I am negated as this I, but in which at the same time I am contained as free and by which my freedom is maintained.⁷⁸ This implies that I am determined and maintained as universal, and I only count for myself as universal generally. But this is now none other than the standpoint of *thinking reason* [*denkende Vernunft*] generally, and *religion itself* is this activity, it is thinking reason in its activity. *Philosophy* also is thinking reason, the only difference being that in philosophy the activity that constitutes religion appears simultaneously in the form of *thought* [*Denken*], whereas religion,⁷⁹ being thinking reason in naive form, so to speak, abides rather in the mode of *representation* [*Vorstellung*]. |

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From this standpoint we have now to examine the universal categories in their universality more closely, the pure categories of thought.

To begin with, then, we have seen that, in recognizing an object, an objective [element] in general, subjectivity surrenders its sin-

77. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: But this sublation cannot be said to have been achieved if this immediate singularity at the same time remains, and remains in such a way that only this I becomes the affirmative, as is asserted by the standpoint of reflection. The finite that inflates itself to the infinite is only abstract identity, inwardly empty, the highest form of untruth—all that is false and evil.

78. *Thus also* W_1 ; *precedes in* W_2 (*MiscP*): The freedom of reflection is such as not to allow anything to originate within itself, but since it must allow such origination, it proceeds, when it posits anything, without law and order, i.e., it does not allow anything *objective* to originate. If something objective is actually to be recognized,

79. *Ho reads*: the activity of thinking reason. To posit oneself in one's singularity as the universal, and then, transcending oneself in one's singularity, to produce one's *true* self as the universal—this is religion, with the distinction vis-à-vis philosophy that philosophy is reason in the mediated form of thought [*Gedanke*], whereas art portrays reason immediately in time and space, in stone and sound, while religion internalizes this externality, and

gularity, its reflectedness-into-self. This object must not be anything sensible; with objects of sense I know that there is for me the thing that subsists—but my freedom is not still there in it. The untruth of the sentient consciousness is something that must here be presupposed.⁸⁰ The next point is that this objective [element] is [known] as affirmative, and has the character of a universal; in my recognition of an object, a universal, I do renounce my finitude, I renounce myself as this one. The universal counts for me as essence; there would be no such thing if I were preserved as this one. This [recognition] is already present in the immediate knowledge of God too. In the immediate knowledge of God there is this too: that I know of the objective universal that is in and for self, but at that stage this is only an immediate knowledge or [practical] behavior. If reflection ~does not yet~⁸¹ come on the scene, ~then this universal, this object constituted by the universal, is itself only something subjective; and all these determinations~⁸² remain and are enclosed in reflection.

The ultimate [form of] reflection, then, is only a development of the highest determination of this reflection—that these characteristics are enclosed solely in the subjective consciousness, and that this subjective consciousness has not yet renounced itself in the mode of its immediate particularity. It follows, therefore, that these points are not yet sufficient ~—the basis is more concretely in something objective and universal—and that this determination [of reflection] is still insufficient.⁸³ Rather | what is entailed is that the objective abstract universal also has a content and determinations in it. Only thus is it for the first time present for me as actual being in and for itself. If it is empty, the determinateness is only conjectured; the conjecture is mine, and I remain the source of all content,

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80. [Ed.] Hegel alludes here especially to his critique of sense certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, chap. 1, pp. 58–66 (GW 9:63–70).

81. Thus Ho, W; G, D read: does still

82. Ho reads: then this object exists and, to the extent that the objectivity having being in and for itself is lacking, retains subjectivity only in the knowing of the I. Subjectivity thus came to be vested in feeling. For all the determinations we had previously

83. Ho reads: —the object, as the universal as such, is still insufficient.

all activity, all vitality, ~and all determination."⁸⁴ I have only a dead, empty God, a so-called absolute essence, and it is because of this emptiness of the objective that this representation becomes purely subjective, does not attain to true objectivity. ~Cognition contains more precisely the moment in which the object is determined for me, or is rendered something more determinate within itself and on its own account.

The universal must therefore be utterly affirmative and must be determined within itself; it must have all content within itself.⁸⁵ It is not merely for philosophy that the object is full of content. This is a feature shared by philosophy and religion. A distinction in their viewpoints is still not present at this stage. The question of how the subject is determined within the universal is linked with this. The subject is within the universal precisely in its relation to this universal object, which it recognizes as *being*, defined as nothing other than *thinking*, the activity of the universal; or, it has a universal, the universal generally, as its object, and this universal is supposed here to be the strictly absolute universal. The relation to an object of this kind is for that reason the thinking activity of the subject. The universal is the essence for the subject, it is the actual being. Thought is not merely subjective but also objective.

When I reflect upon the sensory object, I am both myself and the object. I am distinguished from the object. My thoughts are still subjective just because they are still thoughts about the matter [*die Sache*]. But when I am in control of these thoughts about the matter, and have thoughts about it, my connection to the matter as a particular is removed—[the connection that makes] the thoughts merely subjective—and I comport myself objectively. Just because the universal has for me the determination of being true, 209 [in that recognition] I have | renounced myself as this one according to my particularity.⁸⁶ This renunciation, and my thinking that the

84. W_2 (Var) reads: and to me alone belongs the function of determining, of objectifying.

85. W_2 (MiscP) reads: At this latter standpoint only certainty occurs, not truth, and I can still remain determined wholly as this single one, something finite. Objectivity is then only show.

86. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: and I am the universal.

universal, the affirmative, the substantial, is my object, are one and the same. I renounce my particularity here—actually and really.⁸⁷

It may be noted that it is an essential characteristic of thought that it is a mediating activity, mediated universality; but at the same time it is the negative of affirmation. It is the negating of the particular, the negation of negation, and thereby, affirmation: *the absolute negativity is affirmation*. Thought is mediation through the sublation of mediation. Universality, substance, are affirmations of this kind; they are only through the negation of negation. The mode of immediacy is contained in thought too, just exactly immediate knowledge as negation, but not only that. Thus, the expression occurs: “We have immediate knowledge of God.” [But] thinking is pure activity and is only what negates the impure and immediate. If it is empirically the case that we have immediate knowledge of God, then it must be remembered that I need do nothing whatever except direct my thoughts on him. This universal object is thus immediately before me: I need no proofs, there are no middle steps to go through. This immediacy in the empirical subject is itself in part the result of many mediations; and in part it is itself just one aspect of this activity. A difficult piano piece can be played with ease once it has been gone through often, many individual times. It is played with immediate activity—but this immediate activity is the result of many individual mediating actions. In the same way, for example, once Columbus discovered America, many others followed after him.

This kind of immediacy is the result of many previous individual mediations, deliberations, and actions, but the nature of such an action, which appears as immediate, is different from its appearance. What it is in itself can be a mediation. Thus the nature of thought lies in this likeness with itself, | this pure self-transparency of the activity, which, however, simply *is*, i.e., it is in itself the negation of the negative.⁸⁸ 210

87. W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: Truthful acknowledgment of finitude, real humility, is to live and operate in objectivity.

88. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (*Var*) adds: and it is the result that makes itself the immediate, that appears as the immediate.

In this connection with the object I am therefore determined as a thinking being, and not merely in philosophy but also in affirmative religion generally: in devotion—which stems from thinking⁸⁹—God is present for me. This moment of devotion, this thinking of the substance, of the universal, is then one way in which what and how I am is determined. I exist as a pure thinker. The second point is that in this devotion, in this connection with the universal substance, I reflect back upon myself. I distinguish myself both from this object and from this pure thinking attitude of mine. This sacrifice of what is mine in my thought is the distinguishing of what is mine from this attitude.⁹⁰ How am I initially determined in this respect? The answer lies immediately in what was just said. Namely, I am determined here as finite, but in a genuine fashion; I am finite as distinct from this object, I am the particular over against the universal, what is accidental to this substance. But I am determined as a moment, as something distinct; thus I am defined simultaneously [as something] that does not have being for itself, but which *really* has renounced itself, and knows itself as finite. For this universal object has the content within itself—it is not the hollow or empty universal, but rather the inwardly self-moving substance. Hence it is the absolute fulfillment: all content, all determination, all particularity belong to it.⁹¹ Thus I am in the same case; my intuiting of myself as finite is my knowing about myself that I am a moment in this life, a moment that has its subsistence | as this particular being only in this substance.⁹² In this way I am

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89. [Ed.] The noun *Andacht* (“devotion”) is related to *gedacht*, the past participle of the verb *denken* (“to think”). On the relation of *Andacht* and *Denken*, see *Ms. Concept*, n. 66.

90. *Ho reads*: for I have to surrender myself; therein lies my consciousness of myself, and to the extent that I am merely devout, sublating myself vis-à-vis God, I exist at the same time merely as a reflection from God into me. Consciousness of myself is thus preserved in devotion.

91. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (Var/MiscP?) reads*: [with the result] that the universal object is now implicitly thought and has the content within itself. It is inwardly moving substance, and, as the inner process in which it generates its content, it is not empty but absolute fulfillment. All particularity belongs to it; as universal it overreaches me.

92. *Thus also W₁; W₂ (Var/MiscP?) adds*: and in its essential moments.

now *actually* posited as finite. And thereby I sublate myself, I do not maintain myself as something immediate, something affirmative. The universal is, and I only have my subsistence in it, I am only a moment of it. I can only posit myself as renouncing myself. ~Abstractly speaking, therefore, this is the concrete, true relationship of the subjective I in religion, in which God, the absolute in principle, is the affirmative.⁹³

In reflection the finite and the infinite only stand opposed in such a way that the finite is duplicated. This is the abstract relationship of finite to infinite, which we have just considered more concretely as the relationship of the subjective I to the universal. The first finite was the sensory finite, the second was the finite in reflection, and the third was the inseparability of the two, the finite contained within the infinite itself. The true determination of the finite in its relation to the infinite is the immediate unity of both. I am only an essential moment of the infinite, which is contained within the infinite itself. The infinite is grasped as affirmation. This absolute negativity, the unity, this affirmation, is an abstract, free power, which, however, is a mediation in itself. This ~unity⁹⁴ of the infinite is in itself no truth; on the contrary, the infinite seeks self-diremption in order to be only the affirmative as negation of negation. Therein it is, first, affirmation, then, second, the differentiating of the negative; thus that first affirmation is also still a particular, a negative. It is the standpoint of the finite; this is where the finite has its place. Third, affirmation takes its place beside the particular, and it is only at this stage that we have truth. The standpoint of the finite is so far from true that it must first sublate itself, and this negating [of itself] is the primary truth. | The finite is therefore an essential moment of the infinite in the nature of God; and it may consequently be said that God is the very being who finitizes himself, who posits determinations within himself. ~God creates a world, that is, he

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93. W_2 (HgG) reads: We have so far been considering the I's relationship to the universal substance in concrete fashion; thus it still remains for us to consider the abstract relationship of the finite to the infinite in general.

94. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (Var/MiscP?) reads: simple unity, identity, and abstract affirmation

wills a world, he thinks a world, and determines himself—outside him[self] there is nothing to determine; that is, he determines himself, he posits for himself an other over against himself so that there is God and there is the world—they are two. In this relationship God himself is held fast as the finite over against another finite, but the truth is that this world is only an appearance in which he possesses himself. Without the moment of finitude there is no life, no subjectivity, no living God. God creates, he is active: therein lies the distinguishing, and with distinction the moment of finitude is posited. This subsistence of the finite, however, must be sublated once more. On this view there are two kinds of infinity, the true infinite, and the merely bad infinite of the understanding. Thus the finite is a moment of the divine life, and one sees what is involved in trying to express a true content in propositions.⁹⁵

213 Propositional forms are no longer valid here.⁹⁶ “God is infinite,” or “Spirit is infinite,” and “I am | finite”—these are false, defective expressions.⁹⁷ The last two are forms that are not concordant with what the idea is, or with the nature of the matter. The finite is not actual being, it is not something subsistent; similarly the infinite is

95. *Ho reads*: This might initially strike us as ungodly, but it is also to be found in the commonest representations of God, for we are accustomed to regarding him as creator of the world. God creates the world out of nothing; i.e., outside the world there is nothing sensible, nothing external, for the world is externality itself. Only God is, but God [is] only by virtue of his being mediated with himself. God wills the finite, posits it as his other and so himself becomes an other of himself, a finite, for he is confronted by an other. But this other being is the contradiction of what he is. It is of God, for it is *his* other, and is therefore determined as the other of God. It is the other and the not-other, it dissolves itself, it is not itself but an other, it is its own ruination. But other-being vis-à-vis God has in consequence disappeared, and God recognizes himself therein, by reason of which he maintains himself as what he has made of himself by his own effort. God is this inward movement, and only by virtue of so being is he a living God. However, the subsistence of finitude must accordingly not be adhered to, but also sublated: God *is* movement toward the finite, and, by sublating the finite, movement toward himself.

96. [Ed.] On the inability of the proposition to grasp truth, see *Science of Logic*, p. 90 (GW 11:49).

97. *Ho adds*: For God is likewise the finite and I am likewise the infinite; God returns to himself in the I as what sublates itself as finite, and he *is* God only as this return. Without the world God is not God.

not fixed. These definitions do not express the nature of spirit; they must rather be grasped only as moments of the process.⁹⁸

The finite is a moment of the infinite. These abstractions were especially prevalent in antiquity, being the offspring of the beginning of reflective abstract thought. "In due course Plato⁹⁹ equated the infinite with the bad and the determinate with the higher, and he defined the idea as the balancing of both, containing the boundary as bounded within itself."¹⁰⁰ The truth is the unity of the infinite in which the finite is contained.

With this insight, then—the more precise treatment [of which] belongs to logic—one sees what the situation is respecting determinations and propositions of this kind. The result is that we must emancipate ourselves from the bogey of the antithesis between finite and infinite. Against the posture of knowing God, even against the posture "of wanting to know God,"¹⁰¹ this bogey is let loose: that it is presumptuous "for the finite to want to grasp the infinite."¹⁰² This presumption attends not only upon philosophy but upon any religious attitude which has a content that describes the nature of God. | From this standpoint it matters little whether I cognize something about the nature of God through the thoughtful concept of him, or hold it to be true on the basis of authority¹⁰³ and of revelation. This distinction has no significance here, for the bogey of presumption is raised as much against one as against the other—

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98. W_2 (MiscP) adds (following on a sentence from Ho): The "is," which is regarded in such propositions as a hard-and-fast element, has, when grasped in its truth, no other meaning than those of "activity," "vitality," and "spirituality." Nor are predicates sufficient for the definition [of the idea], at least not one-sided and purely transitory ones. Rather what is true and is the idea, is solely as movement.

99. [Ed.] See Plato *Philebus* 24a–26d.

100. Thus *G* with *D*; *P* reads: —for example, Plato's contention [that] the infinite is nothing, just as the finite is nothing if its determination is external to it, and that these are vacuous abstractions of the understanding. *Ho* reads: thus Plato explained the πέρας, the inwardly self-limiting limit, as higher than the unlimited.

101. W_1 reads: of knowing God, W_2 (Var/MiscP?) reads: of wanting to know God and to have a positive relation with him,

102. W_2 (MiscP/Var?) reads: and we are warned against this presumptuousness in a highly unctuous, edifying manner, and with irksome humility.

103. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP/Var?) adds: or with the heart, by inner illumination, or by any other means,

wanting to cognize God, to grasp the infinite through the finite. What a bogey! As if it were presumption to want to know the affirmative nature of God. "We must decisively throw off this bogey through insight into what the real situation is regarding definitions of this kind, and regarding this antithesis of finitude and infinity."¹⁰⁴

The other form that runs counter to the affirmative knowledge of God is subjective untruth,¹⁰⁵ which maintains the finite for itself, confessing its vanity, yet still retaining this acknowledged vanity and making it the absolute.¹⁰⁶

This vanity of self-preserving subjectivity, this I, we cast away from us when we sink ourselves in the content, in the matter at hand, and recognize ourselves in it, since we are then in earnest about this vanity; we renounce it in the cognition and recognition of the being that is in and for itself. This is a consequence of our activity.¹⁰⁷ |

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5. Transition to the Speculative Concept¹⁰⁸

"We have now attempted to arrive at religion by the path of observation, and so we have come to the consciousness of the antith-

104. *Ho reads*: Unless we throw off this bogey we sink into vanity, for we posit the divine as powerlessness, unable to come to itself, while we hold fast to our own subjectivity and secure [*Ho actually reads*: deny] from this the powerlessness of cognition.

105. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (*Var/MiscP?*) *adds*: deceit,

106. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (*Var/MiscP?*) *adds*: and so abstains from cognition and from objective religion and religiosity (i.e., religion having a content), eliminating or suppressing it.

107. W_2 (*HgG*) *adds*: in science.

108. [*Ed.*] The third form of the relationship of the finite and the infinite—the relationship grasped from the standpoint of reason or the self-mediation of spirit—cannot, in the final analysis, be brought into view by empirical observation, which is limited to the sphere of finitude because it can only observe relationships among externals. Thus observation cannot obtain genuinely cognitive knowledge of God, the absolute, truth. It knows the infinite only as the "beyond" of reflection and is conscious, therefore, only of the *opposition* between finite and infinite: either the finite cancels out the infinite in its own self-affirmation, or the infinite negates the finite as that which is totally other and unknowable. The actual relationship between God and humanity that obtains in religion has not been (and cannot be) brought into view empirically. Awareness of the limits of observation entails, then, an advance to the speculative concept, which is the only ground or soil (*Boden*) on which religion can be at home. Thus in the final analysis there are not two equally valid approaches to religion, but only one.

esis of the finite and the infinite, and to the standpoint where consciousness is ultimate, so that the finite *this* maintains itself and makes itself into the one and only affirmative.

The observer finds this standpoint and sticks to it. Then he says¹⁰⁹ that there is only a relationship of this kind to be found, and it is therefore impossible to know anything about the absolute, or God, or the truth. This “impossibility” is based on the fact that no such entity is perceived in the observing consciousness. We should notice here that “possibility” and “impossibility” are taken in a determinate sense;¹¹⁰ a definition of this kind concerns the inner core, or concept, of an object, what the object is in itself generally. So if anything is to be said about possibility or impossibility, it must be decided by the nature of the concept in question. From the point of view of the observing consciousness, however, there can be no discussion of the inner core or of the concept, for from this standpoint consciousness renounces any cognizance of what pertains to the inner core; it has before it only what falls within external consciousness as such. But possibility and impossibility do not fall within this sphere. More exactly, this standpoint pretends that the observing consciousness will in the end be found to be that from which the concept arises. The possible will be just what arises from experience,¹¹¹ while what runs counter to experience will be the impossible.

In reference to this point it must be said that observation arbitrarily limits itself to the sphere of finite consciousness; | there are in fact other spheres that can be observed—not just this one, whose content is merely finite versus finite. Consciousness remains free to make other observations in another sphere, in which the affirmative relationship of consciousness to what has being in-and-for-itself is

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109. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: The negative relationship of consciousness to the absolute is justified by reference to observation. Only the finite exists for consciousness, we are told, while the infinite is merely lacking in all determination (hence, as we have seen, [it is] in itself only subjective), and consciousness has only a negative relationship to it. Because of this, it is said

110. [*Ed.*] On the conceptual definition of possibility and impossibility, see Hegel's modal theory in *Science of Logic*, pp. 542 ff. (GW 11:381 ff.).

111. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP/Var?*) reads: that what *is*, i.e., what impinges on this perceiving consciousness, is what yields the criterion of possibility and consequently the concept of possibility,

contained. Hence it is capricious to stick at the point where one can observe only that in virtue of which the finite is set against the finite, so that this posited infinite is in fact nothing but a finite and subjective [entity]. To be precise, religious consciousness can be observed—[either] in the form of naive religiosity or devotion, or in that of religious cognition—and this yields a different result from that reached at the standpoint of finite consciousness. The observation can be conducted upon others or upon the very ones who wish only to occupy the standpoint of finite consciousness. If cognition is limited to this standpoint,¹¹² it may well be that religious sensibility,¹¹³ the heart, devotion, is more affirmative than consciousness in itself. There may be more in the heart than in the consciousness insofar as consciousness is a determinate, cognizant, and observing consciousness. The two can be distinguished—this possibility must be conceded. This is the standpoint of cognition, and I must here weigh my consciousness against what I am in and for myself as spirit.

All that I know, all that affects my consciousness, is contained in me myself. So when this possibility is conceded, it must be noted that the conviction that spirit has only a negative relationship to the content, to God, vitiates sensibility and ruins devotion. The conviction of consciousness that it has only a negative relationship to God ruins religious sensibility itself. For *thinking* is the source, the very ground upon which God, or the universal in general, *is*: the universal is in thought, *only* in thought, and for thought. This thinking, spirit in its freedom, supplies the content of truth, the concrete deity, and delivers it to sensibility; its content is what sustains sensibility in regard to religiosity. | If we hold firmly in our thinking consciousness that there is no affirmative relationship to God, then all content goes out of sensibility. Its very stuff is taken from it. If the thinking sphere empties itself, then sensibility too is without content, in the same way that I cannot use my eyes without

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112. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads:* the observing subject may observe these higher forms of consciousness in others or in itself. For given the perversity of this standpoint,

113. [Ed.] Here and for the next few paragraphs Hegel lapses back into the language of *Empfindung* rather than *Gefühl*. (See above, n. 20.)

a light source. If light is taken away in the physical realm, I cannot have the sensation of seeing. Similarly, I can have no religious sensation if this content is not present in the territory of religion. If the content is denied in this realm, and banished from it, then there is present no longer that which yields the characteristic of sensibility. Hence, if it may on the one hand be granted that there can be more in devotion than there is in the religious consciousness, this [extra element] could be observed; on the other hand, it is caprice or ineptitude that what is present either in one's own consciousness or in that of others should not be observed. In point of fact, however, this caprice or ineptitude does not come on the scene for the first time at this juncture, but rather when the decision is taken *merely* to observe. This limits observation to the sphere of finitude, for observing means being related to something external, something that is to be and to remain external for me. But it is only externally posited. That which is external to itself is the finite. If I adopt the standpoint of pure observation, then *ipso facto* I have something before me—that is itself an external object, existing on its own account; in other words, it is the finite in general. The external [thing] is not just external to me, but to itself; it is the finite.¹¹⁴ I can observe thinking, even speculative thinking, or religion or philosophy—but thinking *is* only for the thinker himself. Similarly, if I want to observe piety, that too is present only for the pious; just as thinking is only for the thinker, so religion is only for the religious, that is, for those who actually are what at the same time they observe. In the case we have here the observer is not by any means *merely* observing; rather he is outside the object in a relationship such that what is observed is not simply something external, | and the observer is not simply an observer, nor merely in a negative relationship to the object observed.

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It follows, then, that in order to find the ground of religion we must abandon the abstract relationship of observation; we must renounce this empirical standpoint for the very reason that it is only this standpoint of observation. It is therefore the case that the determinations of reflection, of the finite, posit the determinations

114. *W₂ (HgG) reads*: that is worthy of this standpoint and accords with it.

of the infinite. But the infinite is itself posited only as negative. Reflection does, to be sure, go so far as to require that the finite should be posited as finite, but we have shown¹¹⁵ that this demand must be made only in reference to the affirmative.

"With this we make the transition to the treatment of the speculative concept of religion."¹¹⁶

B. THE SPECULATIVE CONCEPT OF RELIGION¹¹⁷

1. Definition of the Concept of Religion

We will now consider the speculative concept of religion, the only ground (it has already defined itself) on which religion can be at

115. [Ed.] Hegel apparently alludes here not to a specific passage but to the preceding discussion of the relationship of finitude and infinitude first in reflection and then in reason (only the latter being able to grasp the infinite as truly affirmative).

116. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP/Ed?*) reads: However, once the finite and the standpoint of reflection have been sublated, we have arrived at the standpoint of infinite observation and the speculative concept, i.e., the sphere in which the true concept of religion will disclose itself to us.

117. [Ed.] The first two sections of the second main part of the 1824 *Concept* are transitional in character and draw together materials from Secs. B.2 and C of the 1821 Ms. Hegel begins by introducing a definition of the concept of religion from the speculative point of view: religion is not merely the *consciousness* of the absolute (the "affirmative" relationship of finite consciousness to the infinite), but also the *self-consciousness of absolute spirit*, mediated in and through finite consciousness. Thus on the highest plane, religion is not merely a human but a divine affair, and it is the divine process or movement that makes the religious relationship possible. However, philosophy requires that the *necessity* of this concept of religion be *demonstrated*, not merely presupposed. Hegel turns to this task in the second section (having made a premature beginning part way into the first section), by means of a brief "phenomenological" description of the rise of nature and finite spirit to the absolute, the articulation of which is the task of the whole of philosophy after the logic and prior to the philosophy of religion. (Hegel does not use the term "phenomenology" here, but the reference to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the parallel passages of the Ms. shows that this is what is intended.) Once this phenomenology has reached its goal, it discovers that its result is its real presupposition, namely, that absolute spirit "is the first and alone true," the real foundation of the rise of consciousness to it. This is the speculative insight, and phenomenology, like empirical observation, ends by passing into speculation. However, phenomenology has been able to go much further than empirical observation: it is able actually to trace the *rise* of consciousness to the absolute, which could never be observed empirically.

home. Its basic defining character, as we have seen, is just the affirmative relation of consciousness, which exists only as the negation of negation, or as the self-sublating of the determinate [moment] of the antithesis—and hence the self-sublating of just those determinations that reflection takes to be independent, hard and fast. To this degree the ground of religion is what is called the *rational* [sphere], and more precisely the *speculative* [sphere]. But religion is not therefore something abstract, as thus defined, not just an affirmative relation of consciousness to the universal in general. Religion is not just this abstract determination. | If it were merely an abstract determination of this sort, all further content would lie outside it, or, if we posited this abstraction in the field of the actual as well, there would still have to be some other actuality alongside this abstraction and outside religion.

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For the affirmative relation to the universal, to what is true, is the relation to right, to ethics, to something true, to the true generally. The standpoint of religion, then, is in principle precisely the affirmative relation of consciousness, consciousness generally; it is [the affirmation] that the truth with which consciousness is actively related embraces all content within-itself. Hence this relation of consciousness to this truth is itself the highest level of consciousness, its absolute standpoint.

¹¹⁸What we have just said we could let stand as the concept of religion in general. But in philosophy it is necessary to demonstrate the *necessity* of this standpoint, the *genesis* of the concept that is advanced here as a definition; or we must indicate precisely the

The 1827 lectures begin only with the third section of the second part of the 1824 *Concept*—the development (or “realization”) of the speculative concept of religion in terms of its logical moments. The whole preceding interplay of observation, phenomenological description, and speculation is in 1827 absorbed into the logically articulated structure, which defines the moments of the concept of religion—universality, particularity, subjectivity—in a strictly rational sense. The 1827 *Concept* begins, structurally speaking, where the 1824 version ends.

118. [Ed.] The next five paragraphs initiate in a preliminary (or premature) way the discussion of the *necessity* of the concept of religion as thus defined. But Hegel then abruptly returns to the problem of definition and further advances it significantly (with the paragraph beginning, “If the concept of religion is to be further elucidated . . .”) before getting into the matter of necessity. These five paragraphs would make better sense if transposed to the beginning of Sec. 2.

place where the necessity of this standpoint, of this content, which is spoken of as religion, resides.

We could, for example, establish some [principle] regarding religion and prove that this is the situation in our representation of it; but there are other representations of religion, and in principle our representation cannot be the criterion of what is in and for itself true. What we have to do, then, is to give some account of the necessity of the content, and to show that the content is necessary in itself and in principle; once this is done we can say in more detail, "This content is religion"; and we need not worry whether others find another content, or other determinations, in their representation of it. That will not matter to what we are discussing then, for we are concerned with content, and disagreement could only be about whether something pertaining to the representation is religion or not. The content, however, is valid in and for itself if its necessity is firmly established. To say, "This is religion," is just one type of arbitrariness.

First, then, we must give an account of what "necessity," and "showing the necessity of something," means. There is a content of which we say, "This is religion." As regards necessity, we know this much, that if the necessity of something is to be demonstrated, one has to start from *something else*, | from which, by virtue of its nature, one arrives at a certain content, and that which follows [from what] one began with is termed "necessary."

But it is clear that if we want to start with religion, this other content lies behind us. Moreover, if we view necessity in this way, it includes the definite moment of mediation, so that the content, which is thereby defined, which we call religion, appears as mediated or as resulting from something else; but this definition, being one-sided, appears to be inappropriate if religion is to be the highest level, if it is intrinsically the first standpoint, which is not posited through [the mediation of] another, but must be posited purely and simply through itself. In this way we become involved through this "other side" in an inadequacy; but this inadequacy, this process according to which necessity has the appearance of something mediated through something else, is sublated as soon as we consider true necessity. Or [in other words], it is a feature of rational necessity

that it cancels this [mere] show and lifts itself up to the affirmative.

In this respect three stages in the process must be kept in mind: (1) necessity is a process in which what is called religion is in the situation of deriving its content from something other and of being posited; (2) the stage where the one-sidedness of this relationship, this mode of necessity (that even religion is the sort of thing that emerges from something else) is shown to be self-sublating, with the result that what we have defined as necessity (a positing emanating from another) is a process contained within religion itself; (3) the determinations of these forms within religion itself are to be noted.

If the concept of religion is to be further elucidated, an additional prior remark is called for.¹¹⁹ Since, as we have said, the necessity of religion occurs within religion itself, it is also the case that the concept of religion will be generated within religion itself; and the syllogistic outcome of religion, the true religion, is the one which produces the consciousness of itself, the one which has for its object what religion is. |

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The concept of religion must be expressed. Religion is a consciousness of the absolutely universal object. If, however, we have so far used the term "consciousness," this word expresses only the side of the appearance of spirit. Insofar as I have a consciousness, I am actively related to an object. I am thus defined as relationship; but it is the essence of spirit not to be *merely* in relationship, not to be a connecting of two sides. Consciousness encompasses [only] the finite. Here I am the knower, the subject, which is implicitly spirit; the other side, the object, remains standing independently over there. Spirit is not merely in the relational mode, and does not merely have the form of consciousness. It is precisely in abstracting from this relationship that we can speak of spirit, and consciousness is then encompassed as a moment within the being of spirit. So it is in speaking of *spirit* that we intend to use the term "spirit" instead of "consciousness"; thus in using it we have an affirmative rela-

119. [Ed.] The text adds: "namely, that this concept of religion itself, however—" Hegel breaks off and begins the sentence again. The original sentence would have continued with the words: "will be generated within . . ."

222 tionship of *spirit to absolute spirit*. Where we have spoken in this way, we have in mind the relationship of spirit [to spirit] as such. But this is not merely a [separable] connection between [finite] spirit and absolute | spirit; rather it is what is essential, it is inner connectedness. Absolute spirit is itself that which connects itself with what we have put on the other side to distinguish it. Thus, on a higher plane, religion is this idea, the idea of spirit that relates itself to itself, *the self-consciousness of absolute spirit*. Within this its *self-consciousness*, there falls also its *consciousness*, which was previously defined as relationship. Thus in the highest idea, religion is not the affair of the single human being; rather it is essentially the highest determination of the absolute idea itself.¹²⁰

I have now set forth the concept of religion provisionally.

In that spirit differentiates itself implicitly, the finitude of consciousness comes into play. The consciousness of spirit, for which [absolute] spirit is, is finite consciousness—but this finite consciousness is a moment of absolute spirit itself. Absolute spirit is what differentiates and determines itself, i.e., it posits itself as finite con-

120. *Ho reads*: However, spirit is not merely a knowing in which the being of the object is separated from the knowing itself; rather it is a knowing in which the object [is] the same as the knowing, and consciousness consists in knowing this identity. This identity, that knowing should be its own object for itself, is first attained in *spirit*, in *reason*, which is for itself as objective. Religion is therefore the relation of [finite] spirit to absolute spirit. But, as knowing, spirit is thus what is known or absolute spirit itself, and religion is *the self-consciousness of absolute spirit*—its relation to itself as the object of its knowing, which is *self-knowing*. Thus religion is the idea of spirit—it is subjective spirit or the knowing that has as its content the entire content of spirit, the truth of spirit, and knows itself to be this content. Subjective spirit is accordingly not separate from the object, and this object, or absolute spirit, is knowing itself, it is what knows the object of its knowing. Consciousness as such is finite consciousness, knowing something that is other than the I. Religion is also consciousness, and has therefore finite consciousness within it, though sublated as finite because absolute spirit is itself the other that it knows, and it is only by knowing itself that it becomes absolute spirit. Consequently, however, it is only mediated through consciousness or finite spirit, so that it has to *finitize* itself in order by this finitization to come to know itself. However, if the divine, in order to be spirit in this way, finitizes itself so as to become human, i.e., to become a knowing, singular, immediate consciousness, [this] is not on the other hand the affair of the single human being; rather, what is singular is precisely sublated thereby, and religion is *the self-knowing of divine spirit through the mediation of finite spirit*.

sciousness. Consequently it is not from the standpoint of finite consciousness that we consider religion. Already, even in this superficial consideration of it, the [absolute] idea is developing itself.

2. The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint

The next point [to be discussed] is the *necessity* of this standpoint. In fact absolute spirit is in its consciousness a knowing of itself: if it knows something else, then it is no longer absolute spirit. So it is this definition of which we speak. This definition is here maintained from the standpoint of religion in order that this content¹²¹ may be the absolute truth, simply the whole truth, so that this idea encompasses within it all plenitude, all the riches of thought, all the riches of known truth; it constitutes the sole substance and truth of this wealth. | Furthermore it is maintained in order that the absolute idea may alone be this truth; all things have their truth only in it, as moments of its life and activity.¹²² These assertions that this content of religion is the absolute truth—this [is] what is to be proved, what has to be demanded. This deduction lies outside our science. To prove that this content is the absolute truth means nothing other than to demonstrate its necessity. Necessity involves our starting with something else. So the procedure used in the proof of the content has as its first step the exhibiting of the content as the result of another content.

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First we must indicate where this procedure is to be found, and, second how it is structured, what it looks like. The other that is taken as a starting point is nothing else but what we call, quite generally, the *finite world*, and the *consciousness* of the finite world. This provides the general starting point from which the result is necessarily inferred. (Concerning this necessity, it will be noted later¹²³ that it is an essential moment in absolute spirit itself.) What must be shown therefore is the transition from a finite starting point to a more or less abstract, absolute content. This transition

121. W_2 (HgG) adds: which the knowledge of absolute spirit has of itself,

122. [Ed.] Beginning at this point, and continuing almost to the end of this section, W_2 offers a much-abbreviated version of the argument (see below, n. 127).

123. [Ed.] See below, p. 324.

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can be kept on an abstract plane, or developed more fully, and in such a way that the development occurs through thought, through the concept. This transition occurs in the [movement of] spirit, but it may do so abstractly or in a more developed way. The transition is more abstract when we have expressed the content of nature as the universal, | or as negation of the negative, as essentially containing this mediation within itself. In this way it is possible to make the transition from the finite to the absolute. As Vanini says, a single straw suffices to prove the existence of God.¹²⁴

But if the process is accomplished in all relevant detail by progressive development, determined by the concept, then what we have is philosophy in general, or, more specifically, the philosophy of religion; and the unmediated [starting point] is in that case *nature* in general. So we must [first] show how the *logical* [idea] unlocks itself in the resolve¹²⁵ to become nature, to pass over into nature and lose itself in this externality. The next stage in philosophy is the consideration of nature [itself], a beginning [having been] made with the logical. The treatment based on the *concept* presents itself as this movement: the indwelling concept of nature sublates the externality in which the concept exists as nature; as contradictory to the concept, this externality is dissolved and the concept takes upon itself a higher, more appropriate mode than the natural ex-

124. [Ed.] See above, *Ms. Concept*, n. 104.

125. [Ed.] We have translated *sich entschliesst* rather freely as “unlocks itself in the resolve” in order to bring out the root sense of un-locking (*ent-schliessen*) that is contained in the act of resolving upon something. In the *Heidelberg Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), § 191, Hegel refers to the *Sich-ent-schliessen der spekulativen Idee*, while in the *Science of Logic*, p. 843 (GW 12:253), it is the *Entschluss der reinen Idee*, the “resolve of the pure idea.” Hegel begins here a compact summary of the major transitions of his philosophical system: the self-resolution of the *logical idea* to go forth into nature, into the externality of the natural world; the concentration of *nature* into its center (the concept) so that it may pass over into spirit (finite consciousness); the rise of *spirit* from its natural origins through various determinate phases of consciousness until it attains its home in the absolute. The task of philosophy is to demonstrate the *necessity* of these transitions. It does this by means of a description of the way in which things progressively present themselves as phenomena to consciousness, and the method is therefore (in the Hegelian sense) phenomenological. In fact what is offered here is a summary of the leitmotivs of both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the second and third parts of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* as they bear upon and found the philosophy of religion.

ternality in which it has reality as nature. The treatment of nature exhibits its progression as a sequence of steps or moments, and thus shows how the concept, which exists in nature only implicitly, breaks through its “rind” and comes forth to make its appearance, until it gets to the point of being explicit, of appearing as it is. Or, what comes to the same thing, nature recollects itself; it is its destination [that it should] go back into its center, or that the center should emerge into external existence. What results is *spirit* in general. *The necessity of nature is to posit spirit as its truth*, that spirit is its truth. In nature the concept is lost in externality. Nature is the eternal emergence and dissolution of this externality. Nature has the implicit destination of becoming spirit.

Spirit generally—the truth of nature—that is what spirit is. Spirit in its immediacy is finite, natural spirit; it has potentialities, that is, it is initially no more than the abstract concept of itself. It is the abstract identity of its concept and its appearance. Nature is implicitly idea; thus it is for us when we contemplate it in thought. Those two aspects, its being as idea for us, and as idea in itself, fall apart in nature; in spirit there is this identity, this being *for* itself what it is *in* itself. [There is the potential] that it might be, like nature, idea implicitly; but [there is also the fact] that what it is in itself also appears to it, i.e., the idea exists in its appearance. | The consideration of finite spirit, then, has as its result the idea of absolute spirit.

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Thus it is through this process [*Gang*] of the cognizing concept that the content of which we have spoken, absolute spirit conscious of itself, is exhibited as necessary, as the truth of all things, as the absolute truth into which, precisely through itself, all this other content returns. Philosophy, then, is the methodical proof that this content is what is genuine, that it is the absolute truth. This is the process that lies before [i.e., precedes] our science; so we have to presuppose this result here. If we did not presuppose it, we would have to expound philosophy as a whole. This is the only way in which the demonstration can be carried out, the proof that this content is the absolute truth.

The second point to remark upon about this process is that it is still one-sided: it has a distorted and false character, namely, the determination that we begin with something else, either with the

logically abstract or with concrete being, with nature, finite being. Because we begin from something else of this kind, this very content does not appear as absolute but as a *result*. The process seems to have this distorted aspect implicit in it, but *absolute truth cannot be a result; it is what is purely and simply first, unique*. It is what takes up simply everything into itself—the absolute plenitude in which everything is but a moment. In this connection it should be noted that, even though the process appears initially as a mediating process, nevertheless it is in this result itself that the one-sidedness is abolished: the result casts off its position as result and develops a *counterthrust*, so to speak, against this movement.¹²⁶ To be more precise, the process is so defined that even this starting point, the first [moment] from which we begin—whether it be the logical abstraction of being or the finite world, the [moment] which appears to be immediate, and therefore to be something that is not posited—is itself posited in the result *as* something posited and no longer as something immediate; it is reduced from an immediate to a posited [status], so that absolute spirit is what is true, rather [than that first moment].

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In this final result, then, *absolute spirit*, conscious of itself, *is the first and alone true*. But there is also this in it: the fact that nature, the finite world, is posited, that it is something posited, is therefore one moment in this spirit, in this content itself. It is not only | consistent with the method (or the external modality of our proceeding) that this immediacy, nature, appears as something posited, and that the immediate sublates itself in this way; but also this pertains essentially to the result itself, it belongs to its content. [This content is] the positing of [a moment] such that it [first] appears as something immediate and second retains this quality of being posited, of sublating itself and of going back to its truth.

Thus, therefore, what we have posited, this process of necessity,

126. [Ed.] Cf. the reference to a stream flowing in opposite directions in the special materials relating to the 1821 lectures (*Ms. Concept*, n. 115), which makes the same point metaphorically. This “counterthrust” might be described as a “speculative reversal,” in which what emerges as the *result* of philosophical demonstration, namely, absolute spirit, proves also to be the *foundation*, the speculative premise of the whole phenomenological process of the rise of consciousness out of nature and of its being drawn toward its telos.

is the first moment. But the other moment, the positing of something immediate, is equally a determination in the absolute content itself. Together they make up a single movement, a mediating [process] which comes together with itself; together these two moments make up the activity of God within himself. It is from this standpoint that the first process comes before us, but also the second moment that appears as immediate—a nature, a finite world is posited. This happens within the idea, as the activity and movement of the idea itself. This is nothing else but [what is meant by] the popular statement that “God creates the world.” In other words, God posits the world as something that is other, distinct from him (hence something naturally posited); [yet] the world is [also] what continues to belong to God and to be posited by him, so that it has the movement of betaking itself back to him.”¹²⁷

What we have said so far, then about this process¹²⁸ is in the first place that it shows itself as a process outside religion; but that, second, this process is a moment within religion itself. Inside religion, however, it has a shape and form different from what it had in that first mode, wherein it is, so to speak, merely innocent with respect to God. Here God is strictly the first [moment].¹²⁹ And this

127. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* The proof of necessity, namely, that this content of religion is the absolute truth, already lies behind us and our science inasmuch as this proof starts from the immediate and shows the content to be the result of another content. In adducing this proof at the appropriate point above, we already saw how the one-sidedness of this process—that the content does not appear as absolute but as result—is self-sublating. For precisely the first [moment]—either the logical abstraction of being or the finite world—this first, immediate [moment], which appears without being posited, *is* posited in the result itself as something posited, not as something immediate; it is reduced from an immediate to a posited [status] in such a way that absolute spirit is rather the true, the positing of the idea, as well as the positing of nature and finite spirit. Or [we can say that] *absolute, self-conscious spirit is the first and alone true*, in which the finite world, which is thus something posited, exists as a moment.

[Ed.] Instead of following the 1824 lectures at this point (beginning at n. 122), W₂ gives a much-abbreviated version from *MiscP*, and refers editorially (“In adducing this proof at the appropriate point above, . . .”) to its own version of the proof of the necessity of the religious standpoint (*Werke* 11:102–112), which is drawn from the *Ms.* (Sec. C) and *Hn* or *MiscP* rather than 1824.

128. [Ed.] See above, p. 317.

129. *Thus also W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* and that process is the internal activity and movement of the idea of absolute spirit.

is just what is implied in the idea of absolute spirit. We have to consider these moments as they are conceived in relation to this idea. Spirit is *for itself*, that is, it makes itself the object, it is what subsists on its own account over against the concept; it is what we call generally the world, or nature. This diremption constitutes the first moment. The second one is that this object returns to its source,¹³⁰ and this | movement constitutes the divine life as a whole. Thus spirit as absolute is initially what shows itself, what appears to itself, it is a being-for-self that has being on its own account. That is why it is first what appears. But appearance as such is what nature is; spirit is not only what appears, what has being, for us; it is what-has-being-for-itself, what-appears-to-itself, and with that, consciousness as such is posited. So what we initially regard as necessary is [present] as a moment within spirit itself. We have that necessity in its very essence within religion too—not as an immediate existence but essentially as an appearing of the idea, not as the being but as the appearance of the divine. This then is the relationship of *necessity* to our content, and it is this relationship of necessity to it that supplies our content with its *definition*, or yields the concept of what our object is.

With respect to that object, we could now say that we have established the *concept* of it, and that we are in a position to pass on to its *exposition*. It is to be noted that the exposition of this concept is nothing other than that *the concept develops itself into the idea*, and that we *contemplate* this *realization of the concept as the idea*.

3. The Realization of the Concept of Religion¹³¹

The concept of religion that we have given is still highly abstract at this point, still confined to very general terms. It might be de-

130. Thus also $W_1; W_2$ (Var) adds: to which it continues to belong and to which it must betake itself back,

131. [Ed.] The connections in the argument up to this point and beyond are important. The demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint has brought us back to the speculative definition of the concept of religion and completes it, since what emerged as the result of demonstration proves also to be the speculative premise, namely, that "absolute, self-conscious spirit is the first and alone true, in

manded that we should set it forth in a more concrete form; but the more concrete mode of the concept is in fact a producing, a bringing forth, of the concept *through itself*. As a concept it is abstract; but it is the concept itself that makes itself concrete, consummating itself as a totality, so that this concept itself comes to be the object. The simple concept that we have established is *the self-consciousness of absolute spirit*, its self-consciousness of being *for itself* as spirit. *For itself* it is spirit: this is the respect in which there lies a distinction in its being, and this [distinction] is the moment of *natural life* in general. In common speech this means that God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual; but the spirit is at the same time *lord* over nature, so that the natural and the spiritual are not | of equal weight in this unity—which indeed is such that the unity is spirit itself. Spirit is not some *tertium quid* wherein the two are neutralized; rather the absence of difference between them is itself spirit. Spirit is spirit and nature. It is on the one hand one side of the union, and on the other hand what also *overreaches* the other side; hence it is the unity of itself and an other. Consequently, our further exposition will be nothing but the laying out of the further concrete determinations of spirit.

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The concept of God, then, is the concept of the idea. This content

which the finite world . . . exists as a moment" (see n. 127). Our preliminary definition of the concept of religion as "the self-consciousness of absolute spirit" (p. 318) having thus been verified by the demonstration of its necessity, we are now ready to pass on to the exposition of this concept. The exposition, however, is not something *we* achieve; rather we "contemplate" the concept as it "develops itself into the idea" or "realizes" itself as the idea. If the concept is absolute spirit in its self-mediation, then we can expect that it will develop or realize itself in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reaffirmation (or return to self). These moments correspond to the logic of the concept itself (universality, particularity, individuality) (*Science of Logic*, pp. 600 ff. [GW 12:32 ff.]) and are definitive of the moments of religion (the abstract concept of God, religious consciousness or representation, and religious cultus). The concept of God does not remain a purely logical concept; it becomes an actual, existent concept or "idea" by positing a real, external world with which it enters into relationship. This is intrinsic to and constitutive of the very essence of God, and likewise the religious relationship in its theoretical and practical forms is intrinsic to religion. It is just this relationship that could not adequately be brought into view from the empirical perspective, but may now, finally, be properly considered.

must develop itself as idea; and the exposition of the philosophy of religion displays nothing but this development of the concept of the idea. The more detailed moments of it display for us at the same time the more detailed subdivisions or forms in which religion has to be considered; this characterization of the development of the idea is what supplies the pattern of the general sections into which our exposition breaks up.

We have defined the idea as the absolute unity of the spiritual and the natural, and the spiritual as the substantial, so that the "other" is only something posited by spirit and sustained within it. This idea comprises the following moments:

- (1) the *substantial*, absolute, subjective *unity* of both moments:¹³² the idea in its self-equivalent affirmation;¹³³
- (2) the *differentiation* itself, the being for one and for an other—these two moments [as distinct];
- (3) the self-positing of what is differentiated in this *absolute affirmation*.¹³⁴

132. *Ho adds*: God and his other, God without consciousness, unconscious being-in-and-for-self,

133. [Ed.] The "idea in its self-equivalent affirmation" is the logical idea as the unity of nature and spirit, that which mediates between them as the universal principle of both—the so-called "logical mediation," the first of the three mediations that make up the whole system of philosophy (*Encyclopedia* [1830], § 187). As logical idea, God is absolute, universal substance, not yet outwardly differentiated, inwardly self-related but not yet entering into real relationship with the world; he has not yet "appeared." This is the "abstract concept" of God that is present in different forms in all religions, and it constitutes the first moment of the concept of religion. But in the 1824 lectures Hegel does not consider it further because here he is focusing on the religious *relationship*, and relationship presupposes differentiation. The first two moments together—the substantial, unitary God and differentiated human consciousness—constitute the "theoretical" religious relationship; while the third moment, the affirmative overcoming of the difference, constitutes the second, "practical" relationship. In the 1827 lectures, the exposition is structured according to the three moments, not the two relationships. Further clarification of how the three moments become two relationships is provided by the passage from W_2 in n. 136.

134. *Similar in W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads*: within spirit itself, so that it now posits itself as having being for this [other] that is distinguished from it, and which it has itself posited. (c) Inasmuch as this distinguishing is itself posited within that unity of affirmation [the first moment], it becomes the negation of negation, affirmation as infinite, as *absolute being-for-self*.

The first two moments are those of the concept, the ways in which the connection of the spiritual and the natural are contained in the concept. Further, they are not merely moments of the concept, but are themselves the two sides of the differentiation—what is then termed the second moment. |

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This second moment is what, in [the realm of] spirit, is *consciousness*. Consciousness is a positing of two that are supposed to be distinct, but this is nothing else than what has been stated, namely this differentiation of the moments themselves. This differentiation takes on the character of a relationship, and in this way the two moments constitute the content of the two sides of the relationship. In consciousness one side is the solid, substantial unity of the idea—God as having being, the God that has being as a self-relating unity. The other side of the distinction is the act of differentiating itself, which is consciousness, the side for which the other, the solid unity, exists; this side consequently takes on the character of being finite. God is thereby determined as an object, as appearance, as having being and appearing for consciousness. He does not merely have being, but inasmuch as he has being *for an other*, he is appearing. God is not to be grasped as [a being] that is enclosed within itself and that does not appear, [but rather] as *spirit*. A God who is not appearing is an abstraction. The essential moment is self-differentiation; and precisely thereby an other is posited.¹³⁵ This differentiation, or the aspect of consciousness, has to be grasped in a reversion to the *absolute affirmation*—an appearing which elevates itself just as eternally to the truth of appearance. As we have said, the differentiation contains both | moments, the substantial unity and the differentiation. Accordingly, that substantial unity is [only] one aspect of the relationship, for God is only as spirit: he is essentially for an other and to appear to his other. The return of the differentiated to the absolute affirmation constitutes the third moment. It is these three moments that must be accounted the reality of the concept.

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These two aspects are also to be defined thus: the first, the unity,

135. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* But as spiritual unity he is essentially determined in his substantiality not merely as appearing but as appearing to self, i.e., appearing to the other in such a way that he therein appears to self.

is the *theoretical* aspect, the mode of God's *appearance*, the mode of *representation* of what has being, the objective, the representation of divine appearance and divine being. The second is the *practical* aspect, the activity of *sublating the rupture*, the aspect of form, the form of *freedom*, which is what *subjectivity* is as such; here, then, what we have to consider is subjectivity, self-consciousness in motion, in its characteristic activity and behavior. The first aspect is that of the *representation* of God, and the second that of the *cultus*. The two are connected; the definition that pertains to God pertains also to consciousness in its connection with the cultus.¹³⁶

*a. The Theoretical Relationship: The Representation of God*¹³⁷

The first [aspect] is the *representation* of God. Here we are considering, not God in general, but God in his representation. God appears, then, but he does not merely appear in general—he is essentially this, to appear to himself. For God is spirit in principle, [so] the divine appearance is at the same time reflection into self.

136. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Even if we have initially distinguished the substantial unity from the act of distinguishing itself and then defined the return of the second moment into the first as the *third* moment, the content of the relationship is such that these two ways of defining it must now themselves be taken as only *one* side of the relationship, so that they together constitute only one of its determinate elements, and the second moment then becomes what previously appeared as the third. It is these two determinations that, in accord with the concept, make up what must be accounted the *reality* of the idea: the one as the relationship into which the concept dirempts itself, [i.e.,] *consciousness*, or God's appearing; and the other as the self-sublating of this merely relative, still antithetical relation. In the first relationship, finite consciousness is [merely] one side, and the way in which its finitude is determined is the way in which it reveals to us how its *object* is determined for it. The manner of divine appearance belongs here, i.e., representation or the *theoretical* side. In the other relationship, however—the *practical* one, or the activity whereby the *rupture* is sublated—it is in consciousness [itself] that the activity appears. The form of *freedom*, *subjectivity* as such, therefore, belongs on this side, and it is here that *self-consciousness* is considered in motion. This is appearance in the mode of *cultus*.

137. [Ed.] The larger portion of this section is devoted not to representation per se as a mode of religious consciousness or knowledge (as in the 1827 lectures), but to a survey of different modalities of the "appearance" of God in the history of religion, from nature religion to the absolute religion. God "appears" not as absolute substance but as an object of representation. Hegel offers here the beginnings of a survey of the development of the concept of religion through its history as treated in the second and third parts of the lectures, a survey which is continued

Hence God's appearing is more precisely defined thus: that he appears to himself, that his appearing is an appearing to himself; thus God is an object, indeed he is an object in the sense that he is an object for himself. The second point is that God appears to himself in the way in which he is in and for himself. These two specifications are in this respect fundamental. |

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To provide a more concrete determination of this in detail, the first [moment] is *appearance in general*, abstract appearing generally. This is *natural life*, or nature in general. Appearing is being for an other, an externality, being differentiated one for an other; initially, therefore, it is unmediated appearing for the other, not yet reflected being for the other. This is its logical definition, but it has to be taken in its concrete significance—and that is natural life generally. What is for an other is in a sensory mode; even thought, where it is not to remain something purely subjective but is to be for an other who is an independent thinker, needs a sensory medium, speech, gesture, a sensible sign that has to stand in for it.¹³⁸

But, second, God is essentially an appearing *to himself*, so that the [divine] object is no longer characterized merely as a natural essence, as a natural element generally, but as appearing to itself at the same time, as consciousness, spirituality.¹³⁹ This is a more

in greater detail in the next section in the form of a phenomenology of the cultus. These surveys appear to be a considerable expansion of materials from Sec. A of the Ms., while in the 1827 lectures they are revised and placed at the end of the *Introduction*, where they more properly belong. The 1824 lectures are oriented more to a treatment of the development or realization of the concept than to its logical moments. The brief discussion of representation at the end of the section follows upon a consideration of the distinction between religion and philosophy, which in turn has been adopted from Sec. D of the Ms. Thus the transitional character of the 1824 lectures remains evident throughout.

138. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Thought that is to be posited for another thought and that has being as distinguished from it, i.e., as an independent subject over against it, is only communicable for this other thought through the sensory medium of the sign or of speaking, or through some other form of corporeal mediation.

139. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* But inasmuch as God is essentially only by appearing to himself, this abstract relationship of human beings to nature does not belong to religion; in religion the natural is only a moment of the divine, and, since it exists for religious consciousness, it must therefore at the same time have the character of spirituality.

or less formal definition. Initially it is wholly formal. Of no religion can it be said that its adherents simply worshiped nature—the sun, the sea, etc. In their worship, it was not any longer a prosaic sea as it is for us. In that they pray to them, these natural images are divine and God is [there] for them. These are still natural objects, to be sure, but in virtue of their being also the objects of religion, they are represented in a spiritual fashion as well. The study of the sun, moon, stars, and so forth falls outside religion; but it is well known that this distinguishing of a merely natural world, this so-called prosaic view of nature, nature as it is for the understanding consciousness, is a later separation; the presence of this separation belongs with | a reflection into self that goes much deeper. When we speak of the unity of nature with the spiritual by the standards of our usual training, we think as though spirit were united with nature only by dint of phantasy; their separation is the starting point, and this presupposes a higher freedom of reflection.

Both of these moments are [found] initially in the appearance of God. The first mode of appearance is that of natural life, which has the subjectivity of consciousness, of spirit in general, as its foundation and focus. "We now have to see what the relation of these two determinations to one another is."¹⁴⁰

It must be noted that in himself God is spirit, i.e., he is spirit first for us—this is our concept of him. The other thing is that he should be *posited* as spirit. This involves the equivalence of his determinateness, the side of reality in the idea, with his concept. What is here termed determinateness is what we have regarded as natural life. This mode of appearance constitutes the determinateness of the concept of God. The important point, now, is to see the relationship of this reality to the divine concept, to see whether [absolute] spirit is for itself *as* spirit, i.e., [whether it is not only] the concept [but] also reality as this spirit.

"Another point to be noted is that natural life generally, natural being, or the unmediated natural essence, is also this first level of

140. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* These two determinations have thus not yet entered in a reflected manner into relationship. For this to occur is the second [mode of appearance].

determinateness | in another fashion. Determinacy does not need 233
 to be this natural state. It can, in other words, also be a reflected
 determinateness (which may, however, be at the same time so con-
 stituted that it is not yet the fully determined, concrete determi-
 nateness that expresses the concept of spirit). This determinateness
 of reflection is certainly no such externality as the natural essence.
 No. Along with reflection there enters the need that the determinacy
 should have an equivalence with the concept, though initially it is
 no more than an abstract equality. Reflection has before it the
 concept: the general need of the concept. Reflection simplifies the
 infinite diversity of the external world, brings it into the realm of
 the concept, but only within its frontier; this thinking, although it
 has universality, the realm of the concept, as its principle, makes
 the universal itself into a mere determinacy, because it just gets
 stuck in abstraction. Or [it] amounts to identity, unity. For example,
 the Brahṃā of India is a divine concept of this kind; it is a supreme
 being, but one that merely thinks itself, or is merely at home with
 itself, outside which all other content and configuration still lies.
 This content and shaping is the countless legion of Indian divinities.
 The God of Judaism, too, is the jealous God who tolerates no other
 gods beside him; but this uniqueness is itself still abstract oneness,
 not yet the determinacy, the reality, that corresponds to the concept
 of spirit (which is utterly and inwardly concrete). He is a deter-
 mination, an abstraction, God *in* the spirit but not yet God *as* spirit.
 The Jewish God [is], just like Brahṃā, imageless and supersensible,
 but a supersensible that is a mere abstraction of thought, which
 does not yet have within it the plenitude that makes it spirit.

The second determinacy is that of thought, of reflection. But
 since thought remains so abstract, this abstract identity, | although 234
 it is pure and simple, is insensible. Nevertheless it is here only a
 determinacy over against the concept of spirit.¹⁴¹ Thus these two
 forms of determinateness are in general the main ones, that is, those

141. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* What we see initially, however, is that
 the natural state is what here constitutes the determinateness of the concept of God,
 or the side of reality in the idea. Thus the emergence of spirituality, of subjectivity,
 from natural life first appears only as a battle between the two sides, which are still
 locked in conflict with one another. Thus this stage of determinate religion too does

that must initially appear to us as the modes of spirit's reality. As modes of determinateness they do not match the concept of spirit; they are finitudes. Also this infinity, that there is a God, is only just abstract affirmation. "The determinacies do not correspond to the concept;"¹⁴² in other words, these religions are thus not yet the authentic religion, not yet the idea of God in his truth, for the absolute content of spirit is lacking in them. The authentic idea is that the content should be the genuine content of spirit—the concept in principle, which *is* its content.

Authentic religion corresponds to its content; in it we have the ultimate summit where the content raises itself up to itself, where spirit appears as it is in and for itself, and the *content* accords with the *concept* of spirit. In this authentic mode, God is manifest to himself or quite generally has become manifest, for there is no longer anything hidden in him. His appearance is equivalent to his being. God is still not manifest as long as the mode of this appearing is unequal to the concept of God. His content is still shut up, unfulfilled.

Here, then, we have the consummate religion, in regard to which it should be noted that this content itself, this determinacy, the reality, this mode of appearing that constitutes the content of God

not advance beyond the sphere of natural life and together with the preceding stage forms the stage of natural religion in general.

3. Still within the succession of determinate religions, the movement of spirit endeavors to match the determinateness to the concept, but this determinateness appears here still as abstract, or the concept still appears as finite. These [successive] attempts, in which the principle of the preceding stages, namely *essence*, endeavors to win through to infinite inwardness, are: (1) Jewish religion, (2) Greek religion, (3) Roman religion. The Jewish God is a uniqueness that as such remains an abstract oneness and is not yet concrete within itself. While such a God is, to be sure, God *in* the spirit, he is not yet God *as* spirit; he is something supersensible, an abstraction of thought, which does not yet have within it the plenitude that makes it spirit. The freedom toward which the concept seeks to develop in Greek religion still lives under the scepter of the necessity of essence. And in the form in which it appears in Roman religion, seeking to gain its independence, the concept is still limited, since it is referred to an externality standing over against it, in which it is only to be objective, and so takes the form of external purposiveness.

142. *Similar in* W_1 ; W_2 (*Var*) reads: It no more corresponds to this totality than its antithesis does;

(God according to his concept or his essence), is a purely spiritual content, which can, however, still be in the mode of natural being, but always in this mode of representation—not a sensuous but a spiritual natural being. Regarding the distinction from what has gone before, therefore, it is to be noted that in this religion the reality is equal to the concept, the content displays the nature of spirit; and natural life, the mode of sensory representation, is only the form, which no longer affects the content. This is the point of distinction between religion and philosophy. Philosophy may appear opposed to religion, i.e., it happens in philosophy that the configurations, the modes of appearance and forms of relationship that are present in religion, in which religion has its consciousness—that these forms | are replaced by others. So, insofar as these forms are deemed essential in positive religion, philosophy seems to be at war with religion. Where reflection, finite understanding, has become involved, and faith is no longer simple and naive, it is these forms which have been mainly emphasized. Religion then becomes something wooden and dead; this is the old dogma of theology, the orthodoxy [of the old days]. They said then that dogma must be accepted, but the spirit had vanished from it because what is only form was seen as essential, and then understanding made a game of it. This [play of understanding] became the Enlightenment, [whose goal it was] to attack these forms, to show what was unsatisfactory in them and gain mastery over them.

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It is the distinctive task of philosophy to transmute the *content* that is in the representation of religion into the form of thought; the content [itself] cannot be distinguished. Religion is the self-consciousness of absolute spirit: there are not two kinds of self-consciousness—not both a conceptualizing self-consciousness and a representing self-consciousness, which could be distinguished according to their content. There can only be a diversity in form, or a distinction between *representation* and *thought*, and we can presuppose a more detailed acquaintance with that.¹⁴³

It must be borne in mind that representation has a more or less

143. [Ed.] Hegel refers here to his Heidelberg *Encyclopedia* (1817), esp. §§ 385–386.

external, sentient mode of configuration or form of externality. Representation stands between an immediately sentient sensibility and thought properly speaking. Representation has already brought the sensible into the inner dimension; the content is of a sensible kind, but thought has already ventured into it, although it has not yet fully penetrated or dominated the content. Thus representation readily seizes on figurative expressions, analogies, and indeterminate forms. "Begetting," "the Son," etc., are [figurative] representations of this kind, which are derived from the web of connections belonging to the natural living state, [while] "creation" is an *indeterminate* representation, expressing in a general fashion the speculative connectedness of God and the world.

236 A second point is that the [logical] coherence between elements of content appears in representation as sequential. This coherence does not appear in its necessity, which | can be apprehended as such only through the concept; hence in religion it is narrated that "such and such has happened"; and what has happened, which is an essential part of the content of the life of God, then appears, figuratively, as a natural occurrence, something that happened in time, and the next moment of the determinate content seems then to follow after it. But the concept is the "in-itself" of this coherence, the inner dimension of the web.

Thus the coherence between general principles and particular events is not contained within religion. Religion includes faith in [divine] providence; but the believer can say, "The ways of providence are unfathomable; the path of an individual's fate, or that of the great world-process, are past our finding out." This is a surrendering of all the connectedness that faith gains from providence, according to which the connection of events is rationally determined. The development of the world-process in respect of the particular remains "infinite," and is not posited. The idea that there is a rational connection of this kind is maintained, but it is not demonstrated.

There is also a third type of connection in the representation of religion that is taken as more external—or one could say its necessity is not gone into very closely. This is what is called the verification of a content in religion. The connection of this content

with me, with my knowing, can be represented as follows: I am convinced, I believe in the content, and this conviction rests on these or those witnesses, external circumstances, miracles, and so forth.

As for the pattern of connection between the subjective consciousness and the objective content, we have to consider this in the context of the reality of the concept. We have called the second [aspect] of representation the *cultus*. This is the relationship of subjective consciousness to the object, which is God—more precisely, it is the *practical* relationship of self-consciousness to this object. For representation is also my relation to an object as it has being *for me*, so that we can also speak here of *faith*.

More precisely, the *cultus* is the practical relationship of the subject to the object, insofar as the distinction and rupture between them ought to be sublated—the rupture that can appear to be in the first type of relationship [the theoretical]. | What we have to consider here is the aspect of freedom, or subjectivity, as opposed to the first aspect, which is that of being. Thus we can say that the first aspect is God in his being, while the second is the subject in its being, i.e., in its subjective being. We have already called the first aspect *representation*; but we have to take note that it can be designated equally essentially as the aspect of God in his *being*. For God *is*, God is there, i.e., he is strictly related to consciousness. [If] God is determined, he is not yet the true God; where he is no longer determined, no longer limited in his existence, or in his appearance, he is *spirit*, because he appears to himself as he is in and for himself. God's being, therefore, involves his being related to consciousness; only as an abstract God does he have being for consciousness as something beyond, something other. Since he now is in his appearance *as he is*, [namely] spirit or absolute spirit, and since he thus is as he is, he is in and for himself. His appearing includes consciousness, essentially self-consciousness.¹⁴⁴ In other words, we must not separate this at all: God is essentially consciousness, essentially self-consciousness. The determination of consciousness in

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144. W (HgG) *adds*: for all consciousness is self-consciousness.

general is thus also comprehended in the first [aspect], and what we have called "the representation of God" can just as well be called "the being of God."¹⁴⁵

*b. The Practical Relationship: The Cultus*¹⁴⁶

The second aspect is the cultus, which seems initially to pertain to subjective self-consciousness, or to consciousness generally as such, to knowledge. The cultus makes its appearance as the practical relationship, and in its being-for-itself it is precisely the [self-]awareness of spirituality. The cultic aspect [of religion] is precisely spirituality as spirituality, and it is to be regarded as [self-]knowing spirituality.

The first [element] that emerges in this relationship is what we call *faith*. In regard to it, we should notice that in the first instance

145. [Ed.] This paragraph helps to explain why the 1824 *Concept* lacks a separate treatment of the "abstract concept of God," God in his being apart from the relationship to consciousness. For it is here stated that "God's being . . . involves his being related to consciousness." While not abandoning this position later, Hegel recognized that all religions do have such abstract concepts of God, although not much can be said about God as absolute, unitary substance except that he *is*. Thus in his treatment of the determinate religions already in the 1824 lectures, Hegel includes a discussion of each religion's abstract concept of God in which he considers the form of the proof of the existence of God implicit in the faith of the religion under consideration. Accordingly, a tension exists at this point between the structure of Parts I and II in 1824, a tension resolved in 1827.

146. [Ed.] This section is something of a potpourri of topics, and Hegel has not yet arrived at a systematic analysis of the main structural features of the cultus as in 1827. He begins with "faith" as the characteristic epistemological activity of the cultus, expanding brief remarks found in Sec. D of the Ms. The primary concern is with the verification or attestation of faith—whether it is verified by appeal to the external authority of history and miracle, or by the inner witness of the spirit. In the 1827 lectures, while faith in general is considered as a form of "immediate knowledge," the matter of the verification of faith is reserved to Part III. Hegel turns next to a defense of speculative theology against the charge of "pantheism." The topic does not fit well here; it clearly had become a controversial issue in 1824, and Hegel sought to deal with it in whatever context presented itself. In 1827 it was transferred to the first section, the abstract concept of God. Finally Hegel launches into a rather detailed consideration of the concept of the cultus in its determinate aspects, offering in the process a kind of phenomenology of religion (from nature religion to the Christian religion) in terms of the way in which various aspects of cultic activity come to the fore. This completes the survey of the ensuing parts of the lectures (see n. 137).

what seems to be crucial is the ground of faith—the question *why*, the reason for believing something. | Now the content of faith can be given this form of mediation: faith is a mediation; it is knowledge of God, knowledge of the abstract idea, and according to its definition, this knowledge is in principle thought; thought is a process, a movement, a [mode of] vitality; there is always mediation in it. We have said¹⁴⁷ that it is the standpoint of freedom. It is an inherent feature of freedom¹⁴⁸ that it is not what we have just called substantial, solid unity, it is not representation. No. In freedom I exist as this [singular] agency; the infinite inward negation is [implicit] in my affirmation. Wanting to give this mediation generally the form of an external mediation (as the ground of faith) is a distortion of the form. This mediation to the effect that the ground of my faith is something external is false. My faith may come to me through instruction, miracles, by force of authority, and so on. Thus these things can be the ground of faith as subjective faith. But in this verification the formulation of the content as the “ground” of my faith is just what is wrong. If it is a matter of faith, this externality, this separation of the ground from myself, must fall away. I appropriate in faith that which is the ground of faith so that it ceases to be something other for me. Authentic faith can be defined as the witness of my spirit, the witness of spirit concerning the spirit,¹⁴⁹ which implies that there is no place in it for any other external content. Spirit witnesses only concerning spirit, not about external things. Finite things have their mediation only through external grounds. The authentic ground of faith is itself, the witness of spirit concerning spirit; and the witness of spirit is certainly something inwardly alive—this inward mediation. Cognition is the exposition [of this witness]; it is essential to hold fast to this. The

147. [Ed.] See Hegel's characterization of the practical relationship as the standpoint of freedom, above, pp. 328, 335.

148. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: which is the inner determination of faith,

149. [Ed.] Cf. Rom. 8:16: “It is the Spirit [of God] bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God.” In Pauline theology, as in the New Testament generally, it is the Spirit of God that bears witness, not our spirit, which appears to be Hegel's intention in defining faith as “the witness of [my] spirit concerning the [absolute] spirit.” Of course Hegel also recognizes that it is absolute spirit which is really witnessing in our witness concerning it.

verification [of faith] *can* appear in this external, formal way, but this external formality must [eventually] fall away.

Thus it can be that faith in a specific religion starts from such testimonies, from miracles; the appearance of the divine occurs in a finite content. Christ himself spoke out, however, against miracles, reproaching the Jews | for demanding miracles from him, and telling his disciples, “The Spirit will lead you into truth.”¹⁵⁰

With respect to the verification of faith, then, there are external modes and stories that provide a starting point for what turns into faith. Belief in these external modes is also called faith, but it is still formal. This belief may be what faith begins from, but authentic faith must then take its place—the faith which is the witness of spirit concerning spirit. If this distinction is not made, then people are expected to believe things which those who stand at a certain level of culture no longer *can* believe. For example, they are supposed to believe in miracles, and this is supposed to be a ground for the highest faith, faith in Christ. It may be a means for it, but this belief is also always required on its own account, as belief in a content of this kind. The belief in miracles, however, is faith demanded for a content that is ~contingent,¹⁵¹ and hence it is not true faith, for true faith has no contingent content. This is especially noteworthy with respect to the Enlightenment, which took “faith” in this sense, and stuck to this sense, and proved its mastery over this mode of faith. If orthodoxy demands faith of this kind, it is powerless to maintain it once people view things in a certain way, for it is just a formal belief, a faith in a content that is not by nature divine, nor the spirit, nor any moment of the spirit. This is especially to be noted in regard to miracles. For example, Christ healed a withered hand¹⁵² and at the wedding in Cana [he changed water into wine].¹⁵³ Whether the guests at the marriage of Cana received more wine or not does not matter in the slightest; that is a wholly

150. [Ed.] The quotation is from John 16:13, but it is in the Synoptic Gospels (Mark 8:11–13 and parallels) that Christ “reproached the Jews for demanding miracles of him”—i.e., the controversy over seeking a sign.

151. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) reads: finite and contingent

152. [Ed.] See Mark 3:1–5 and parallels.

153. [Ed.] See John 2:1–11.

insignificant content, and it is no less a matter of contingency whether the man with the withered hand was healed. One ought not to begrudge a man an undamaged hand, but that occurrence carries no special weight, for millions of people go about with withered or crippled limbs, and no one heals *them*. We are told other stories—for example, in the Old Testament, that in the exodus from Egypt the doors of the Jewish houses were marked with red | that the angel of the Lord might spare those within.¹⁵⁴ If, indeed, it is the angel of the Lord who smites the firstborn, ought he not to have recognized the Jews even without this sign? When [belief in] a content of this kind is demanded, that is no witness of the spirit; Voltaire's bitterest attacks are directed against the demand for this sort of belief. He says, among other things, that it would have been better if God had taught the Jews about immortality of the soul rather than teaching them how to go to the privy (*aller à la selle*).¹⁵⁵ This is to make latrines part of the content of faith. This is an unspiritual content, and, though there may perhaps be a place for it in these circumstances, [there is] an enormous contrast between God and it. When God speaks, what he says is spiritual, for spirit reveals itself only to spirit.

In recent times, importance has been attached by theologians, in their exegesis of the divinity of Christ, to the question how many codices a particular disputed passage occurs in—that is what his divinity rests on! Thus, there is a passage in the first Epistle of Timothy that according to the Greek text reads, “God, blessed forever.” But an old fragment of parchment found in Oxford reads, “Christ, blessed forever.” “God” is, of course, written with the Greek letter θ , and so the question is whether the little stroke really is in the center of the θ ; if it is not there the meaning is “Christ.” One codex has the little stroke; another does not. Now, however,

154. [Ed.] See Exod. 12:12–13, 23. Contrary to Hegel's version, it is the Lord himself, not the angel of the Lord, who requires the sign, although according to v. 23 at least, it is the angel (“the destroyer”) who does the slaying.

155. [Ed.] See Deut. 23:12–14. Voltaire's attack is found in his *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke* (*Œuvres complètes* [1784], 33:18), and *La Bible enfin expliquée* (London, 1776), p. 209 (*Œuvres complètes* 34:173).

it has been ascertained that the stroke shows through from the other side, and so on.¹⁵⁶

If the critique of our knowledge of God's nature rests on little strokes like this, these are testimonies that are no witness of the spirit. The content of religion is the eternal nature of God, not such contingent externalities!

When Mendelssohn was urged to change over from Jerusalem to the Christian religion,¹⁵⁷ he replied that his religion did not bid him to believe in eternal truths, but only in certain laws, ways of acting, and ceremonial prescriptions; he deemed it an advantage of Jewish religion that it did not impose eternal truths on its adherents.

156. [Ed.] Hegel has conflated two biblical passages, 1 Tim. 3:16 and Rom 9:5 (since G and P agree at this point, the conflation must be traced to Hegel himself). In 1 Tim. 3:16 the question is whether the subject of the phrase "... was manifested in the flesh" is ὅς (the relative pronoun "who") or θεός ("God"). Since θεός was sometimes abbreviated θς, if the stroke inside theta were to be dropped, it could be read as ὅς. However, even if one reads ὅς, the antecedent of the pronoun is clearly God, and there is no possible confusion between "God" and "Christ" in this passage; nor does the phrase "... blessed forever" occur in it. The variation between "God, blessed forever" and "Christ, blessed forever" is found rather in Rom. 9:5, where the reading depends on punctuation and sentence division, not on the variation between ὅς and θεός. According to the most reliable codices, the passage should be punctuated so as to read: "... and of their [the Israelites'] race, according to the flesh, is the Christ. God who is over all be blessed forever, amen." But according to the Oxford fragment and other manuscripts, the punctuation varies so as to read: "... and of their race, according to the flesh, is the Christ, who is God over all, blessed forever, amen." On the basis of the Oxford codex, then, the passage can be construed as a proof of the divinity of Christ. But this reading is based, not on the substitution of ος ("who," i.e., "Christ") for θεός, as Hegel implies, but on the location of commas and periods. A further indication of Hegel's exegetical imprecision is that when in the 1821 Ms. he makes reference to this passage by way of criticizing the reliance on "externalities" as a proof of faith, he does so by quoting apparently from memory the Greek words θεὸς ἀγαπητός ("God the beloved"), instead of θεὸς εὐλογητός ("God the blessed"). The latter is the expression found in Rom. 9:5, whereas the former occurs nowhere in the New Testament.

157. [Ed.] The phrase "When Mendelssohn ... Christian religion" is found only in G and must be an error. Hegel is not using "Jerusalem" as a reference to the Jewish religion but is referring to Mendelssohn's book *Jerusalem*, in which the author responds to objections against Judaism brought by an anonymous opponent. See Moses Mendelssohn, *Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum* (Berlin, 1783), 2:30–44, 48–57. A similar theme is found in Mendelssohn's controversy with Jacobi; see Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 91–92, 217 (in Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:115–116, 211–212).

Reason was greatly enhanced as a result, and the remainder had been ordained by God. These eternal truths were the laws of nature, mathematical truths, and so forth.

We must grant, to be sure, that these laws are eternal, but they are of | very limited content; they contain nothing of the eternal spirit in and for itself. Religion, on the other hand, must contain nothing but religion, and as such it contains only eternal truths about the nature of spirit. This is its definition; all that other [content] concerns the external modes of divine service—and to the extent that the commandments of God are concerned with moral actions, here again the main thing is the spiritual element, the disposition. However, if they are carried to an extreme, these commandments are highly inflexible and may become irreligious.¹⁵⁸ The faith that is to be held must have a religious, spiritual content. (How faith [can come about] by persuasion, punishment, threats, or miracles [is] another aspect [of the question].)

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We have now defined faith¹⁵⁹ in this regard as the *concept* of the cultus, as its inner kernel, or as the first moment that presents itself for consideration in the cultus.¹⁶⁰ *Faith is the witness of spirit* |

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158. Thus also W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: and refer to a limited content.

159. W (HgG) adds: —and the verification [of faith], as mediation—

160. W (MiscP?) reads (parallel in main text follows): Faith belongs to this practical relationship on its subjective side, to the knowing subject, inasmuch as, in faith, self-consciousness does not know its object merely as theoretical but is *certain* of it—indeed, is certain of it as what has being absolutely and alone is true. In this certainty it has relinquished its being-for-self, which should be the truth in regard to its formal knowledge of itself. Since faith must be defined as the witness of spirit concerning absolute spirit, or as a certainty of truth, this relationship, in regard to the distinction between object and subject, contains a mediation—but within itself—for in faith, as here defined, external mediation and all particular forms of it have already disappeared. This mediation consequently belongs to the nature of spirit in and for itself, and is spirit's substantive unity with itself, which essentially is also infinite form. Expressed in more concrete terms, faith's certainty of truth, or this union of the absolute content with knowing, is the absolute divine nexus itself, according to which the knowing subject, self-consciousness, to the extent that it knows the true content as free, as divesting itself of all the peculiarities of its particular content, knows *itself*, but only its *essence*. In this free, absolute certainty of itself it has itself the certainty of truth; as knowing, it has an *object*, and this object, as essence, is the *absolute* object. At the same time it is no alien, other, otherworldly object of consciousness but its in-itself, its essence, for as absolutely

concerning absolute spirit. It is the certainty of the truth of the divine intrinsic connectedness of spirit within itself and in its community; it is the community's knowledge that this is its essence. This is the substantial unity of spirit with itself. It is not the abstract unity, but the unity that is essentially infinite form, knowledge self-contained. More precisely, there is contained in it, therefore, first of all subjective self-consciousness, though this is now only subjective in a formal way. | For the self-consciousness that already has the knowledge of the absolute content, and is the certainty of it, is free. In other words, it discards its particularity, the inflexibility of

certain it is identical with this certainty. This content is the *in-itself* of self-consciousness, and this determination is *for us*. To the extent that it is only being-in-itself it has objectivity for self-consciousness, or constitutes the side of its *consciousness*. This is the innermost, abstract kernel of personality; and personality can only be grasped speculatively as this unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, of knowing and its essence, of infinite form and absolute content. And this unity occurs simply and solely as the knowledge of this unity in objective fashion, knowing it as the essence that is *my* essence.

In this exposition what counts is each moment taken singly, and at the same time the way they are essentially united, so much so that if only one of them is focused on, with abstraction of the other, or even if they are focused on more fully, but without attention to their identity, this concept can easily seem to revert to the one-sided forms of reflection considered earlier and be confused with them. This happens all the more readily because these forms of reflection are nothing other than the moments of the concept here expounded, apprehended singly and in one-sided fashion; analysis of this distinction will serve to elucidate further both the genuine concept and these prior forms of reflection.

If therefore it has been shown that truth itself is contained in the certainty of spiritual, pure self-consciousness, and that the two are indissolubly identical, this way of defining truth can easily seem the same as the representation of the immediate knowledge of God, in which—as immediate—God's being is as certain to me as I am, as is my certainty of myself. Such an assertion, however, would essentially imply a persistent adherence to the immediacy of knowing as such without having the insight that all knowing, as such, is inward mediation—an immediate affirmation, which is such simply and solely as the negation of negation. It would imply further that the immediacy of the knowing subject does not disappear, but that the latter persists in its finite being-for-itself, so that it too remains devoid of spirit, as does its object; and it is only the speculative nature of the two moments and of the spiritual substance that is neither grasped nor expressed.

[*Ed.*] The source of this passage is probably *MiscP* because of its close thematic agreement with the 1824 lectures. Otherwise it would have to be assigned to 1831 because of its occurrence in W_1 as well as W_2 .

its being-for-itself, which shuts itself off in its singularity from its object. Thus it has knowledge of the essence of the object, and this is the witness it gives to its object, "[namely,] that it is the truth. It has herein the certitude of truth."¹⁶¹ As knowledge, self-consciousness has an object; as the essence, this object is the absolute object. For self-consciousness, insofar as it is free (i.e., insofar as it has freed itself from its object through its exclusion of it), this is nothing else than the witness of spirit. Spirit is only known to self-consciousness in its freedom; hence, to the extent that this knowledge is free knowledge, we have the unity of self-consciousness, and the absolute content is the substantial unity, so that singular individuality is strictly sublated. This unity, which is expressed as the witness of spirit concerning its essence, the witness of spirit concerning absolute spirit, is the unity of pure self-consciousness and of consciousness. Or it is the infinite form of knowledge as such and of the absolute content. The unity of the two is the absolute content, which is the form of self, i.e., it is knowledge of itself, and hence defines itself as universal as opposed to singular, so that the latter exists simply and solely as semblance. This unity, then, is what lies at the basis of faith. This is what is innermost, what is at the heart of speculation, the deepest point which in this regard must come to speech. It is a point that can only be apprehended speculatively. If it is not so apprehended, then misunderstandings can arise—and it may seem as if these lead to forms [of reflective thought] that we have already dealt with earlier.¹⁶²

We have spoken of immediate knowledge and said that God is known in such a way, and that cognition of God is an immediate certitude that I have of him in myself. This view differs from what we have just said (concerning the conviction of spirit about the spirit) because it stops at the immediacy of knowledge as such and lacks the insight that all knowing is inward self-mediation, | an affirmative immediacy, to be sure, but one that is a negation of negation, which occurs only when self-consciousness is no longer

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161. *Ho reads*: which witness is at the same time the production of absolute spirit itself, which also for the first time produces itself therein *as* absolute spirit.

162. [Ed.] See above, pp. 262 ff.

immediate self-consciousness but directly submerges its immediacy, its being-for-itself, in the thing [apprehended or known].¹⁶³ In devotion one forgets oneself as an individual; one is filled with the object of devotion, one surrenders one's heart. One is at home with oneself, one is knowledge, but one does not maintain oneself as an immediate being; one enters into this devotion only insofar as one has elevated oneself to universal knowledge.¹⁶³ If we thus | take

163. *W (MiscP?) reads (parallel in main text follows):* Further development of the unsublated immediacy then yields the infinitude of the vain subject in its vanity. This acme of vanity persists; and if this is at the same time the unity of self-certainty with the content, then this unity is one in which vanity as such is defined as the true, the absolute. Subjectivity, on the contrary, is determined to be true subjectivity to the extent that it is a free knowledge, liberated both from immediacy and from that being-for-self which maintains itself and reflects itself back into self, in opposition to substance—i.e., insofar as it is this negative unity of infinite form with substance, as against its particular characteristic property.

The concept here adduced may also remind us of another view, bringing to mind the fact that even some theologians flatly accuse this concept of *pantheism*. For there are also theologians who, even if in other respects they believe they have departed very far from it, are often so tightly confined to the beaten track of our common contemporary reflective culture that unless they see God referred to in such a way that he is defined as something absolutely otherworldly, their thought is incapable of going any further than to comprehend such an affirmative relation merely as a commonplace, abstract identity. They are incapable of cognizing God as spirit: spirit is an empty representation, meaning no more than rigid, abstract substance. Pantheism sees and knows God in the sun, in stones, trees, animals, only to the extent that sun, trees, and animals *as such* do not pass beyond the limits of this immediate, natural existence. The sun, the air, etc., are in fact also universal matter; indeed, plants and animals are life, and if no higher definition of God is known than that of universal being, universal life, universal substance, and the like, then such existents contain this so-called divine essence, contain it as a universal devoid of spirit. In the same way, if the single self-consciousness is defined as a natural and simple *thing*—this being the way in which the soul is usually understood—it also pertains to the pantheistic view to regard the soul as a divine existent; but in the same way too, if self-consciousness is taken, not as a natural thing, but as something *immediately* actual, so that it is true as knowing in immediate fashion (in the same way as it thinks solely in terms of its original determinacy), if it is taken in this sense for a divine actuality, then here again it still falls within this pantheistic view. And this representation cannot do other than define the single self-conscious being in these terms. *I am*, *I am* a thinking [being]; that way of representing the matter grasps this form of immediate being as what constitutes the ultimate definition and abiding shape of a thinking being. If this is also termed spirit, the word remains meaningless, for the *I* that merely has being, the knowing that is merely immediate—regardless of *what* it knows in immediate fashion, even God—is only spirit devoid of spirit, and no more.

the *immediacy* of knowledge as our starting point, and ascribe this knowledge to the subject, it follows that the individual adheres obstinately to this finite being-for-self and remains this acme of vanity. This | immediate subject as such is taken for the affirmative, although the affirmative can [actually] only be taken as what is forgetting itself, giving itself up, in its object, as what is fulfilled by its object, so that this affirmation, which appears as immediate, only falls within this content. 246

It is from this way of comprehending spirit as something devoid of spirit that the two assertions derive that human beings can only know God in immediate fashion and that they are originally, naturally good. Or conversely, if these two assertions are made, it follows that spirit is taken as the I that has being, and the latter is taken as the ultimate, true definition of self-consciousness, and as itself constituting absolute, eternal being. Spirit only becomes spirit as concrete freedom when it dissolves its natural or immediate being in its universality, or more precisely in its essence as its object, when it submerges the natural singularity that defines itself as finite in the [genuine] *matter* [*Sache*], i.e., in the absolute content that defines itself as object. If, in regard to the immediacy that is to be given up, we think only of corporeal immediacy, then its surrender takes the form, in part, of natural death—through which human beings can be united with God—but, in part also, of *thinking*, which abstracts from the life of the senses and sensible representations and constitutes a return to the free region of the supersensible. But if it here remains merely present to self as *abstract* thinking, it retains the reflected vanity of simple, unmediated being-for-self, the inflexible oneness of the I that [merely] has being, whose attitude is to *exclude* its essence and negate it within itself. Of such an I it is rightly said that God would not be in it nor it in God, and that it has to do with God only in external fashion. Thus it would be a pantheistic view, unworthy of God, if this I were taken as an actual existence of God, since, abstractly at least, God must be defined as purely universal essence.

But this pantheistic view is utterly different from the relationship self-consciousness has to God as to spirit, in that, in its comportment toward God, self-consciousness is itself spirit, and by giving up the exclusive characteristic it has as an immediate oneness it enters into an affirmative relation, a spiritually living relationship, to God. If theologians see pantheism in this relationship, and consequently even count spirit among the all—the all things among which indeed they reckon the soul and the I that is reflected into its being-for-self, and which they then are justified in excluding from God in respect of their individual actuality in which they are finite—and if they know spirit only as negation of God, then they are forgetting not only the doctrine that human beings were created in the image of God, but especially the doctrine of the grace of God, of justification through Christ, and, most emphatically, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which leads the community into all truth and is eternally alive in its community.

[Ed.] The source of this passage is probably *MiscP* because of its close thematic agreement with the 1824 lectures. Otherwise it would have to be assigned to 1831 because of its occurrence in W_1 as well as W_2 .

On a view of this kind one might come up with the accusation that any such philosophically speculative view is *pantheistic* in nature. It has been a common opinion in recent times that this kind of philosophical identity is pantheism.

Pantheism means in principle nothing other than that all things generally, such as the sea, the stars, the trees, springs, lakes, etc., are taken as divine just as they immediately are, so that the divinity has this existence and is actualized in it as God in actuality. Thus it is certainly pantheism when I—the subject in its immediacy, the subject as this one thing, as exclusively one in this being-for-self—am characterized as divine. But here we have the consciousness that this content, this substance or God, this absolute universal, is to be posited, viewed, apprehended in a form that is purely and simply finite and does not correspond to this [divine] content. Animals and plants are life, the sun is the universal moment of manifestation—all such definitions are finitudes not appropriate to the content. The I, too, as this particular [one], this immediacy, or as the inflexible being-for-itself, is the acme of the form that remains finite, and still clings to its own being-for-self. This is therefore a finitude that is not yet true form. This I that has being on its own account, the self in the certainty of itself, or in the consciousness | of its abstract freedom, is itself only a point, a rigid unit that excludes [all else], and keeps at arm's length the infinite content within which it preserves itself. The I is thus finitude concentrated in an abstract point. Once more, then, this is a form that is not in accordance with the content, whereas pure knowledge, the pure self-consciousness, which is no longer a self-consciousness of itself as this [single one], is infinite form, the knowing that is unlimited, universality self-contained, appropriate to its content. This is the very opposite of that pantheism. It is the divine spirit that is for itself within itself.

Consistently with this view, if the finite I is retained in its immediacy, there results the form according to which God becomes immediately known to human beings, that human beings are immediately good, that they are good by nature just as they naturally are, i.e., that each single [person] is as such an affirmative [reality]. But the individual is affirmative only as pure knowledge, knowledge that has consumed its object, has submerged its own particular

thisness in it, its natural state. The teachers of the Christian church declare that by giving up this natural state—if this surrender is grasped in a natural manner in the form of natural death—human beings can be united with God. Related to this view, moreover, are the church doctrines about the grace of God and how it operates in the human heart, about how a Holy Spirit is active in the community, leading the members of the community into truth, about its justification of humanity, and so on.¹⁶⁴ If we comprehend all this in the concept, in thought, without changing the content, then the characteristics that we have just adduced in abstract fashion are involved in it. Such doctrines are just speculative throughout, and any theologians incapable of acceding to their concept¹⁶⁴ should leave them alone. Theology is not just religious piety as such in the form of religious content, but rather the *comprehension* of religious content; and those theologians who confess their inability to comprehend it should at least not presume to pass judgment on comprehension, or at least not seek to condemn it with expressions such as pantheism or the like. 248

Earlier theologians saw to the very bottom of this depth, especially Catholic theologians; for in the Protestant Church, philosophy and this kind of scientific approach have been left entirely to one side.¹⁶⁵ Meister Eckhart,¹⁶⁶ a Dominican monk of the fourteenth century, says in the course of one of his sermons on the inner life, “The eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see him; my eye and his eye are one and the same. In righteousness I am weighed in God and he in me. If God did not exist nor would

164. *W* (*HgG*) reads: the concept of such doctrines, concerning as they do the innermost depths of the divine essence,

165. *Ho* reads: whereas present-day Protestants merely have criticism and history.

166. *Ho* adds: (according to Baader),

[*Ed.*] On his return from St. Petersburg, F. X. von Baader stayed in Berlin from December 1823 to May 1824 and met with Hegel several times. On one of these occasions, according to his own later testimony, he acquainted Hegel with the work of Eckhart. See F. X. von Baader, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 15, ed. Franz Hoffmann (Leipzig, 1857), p. 159. However, according to the testimony of Rosenkranz, Hegel was already familiar with Eckhart, having read and copied some passages as early as 1794.

I; if I did not exist nor would he. But there is no need to know this, for there are things that are easily misunderstood (and that can be grasped only in the concept).¹⁶⁷

Thus the cultus in general is faith and the witness of spirit concerning its essence, concerning the spirit that has being in and for itself. We have remarked¹⁶⁸ that the cultus belongs to the practical side, the side on which form is in the spirit and by virtue of which God is spirit, precisely the knowledge through which this moment enters [our awareness]. The first feature of faith is that this singular self-consciousness renounces its singularity and becomes a witness of this kind. More specifically, the cultus is the activity of producing and of being conscious of this unity and of its enjoyment, so that what is implicit in faith is accomplished, is felt and enjoyed. As far as self-consciousness and will are concerned, the cultus is practical throughout and involves primarily the single human being. It is often said that human being is infinite in will but finite in comprehension and cognition. This is childish; it is the opposite that is more nearly true, although it, too, is one-sided. First of all as a will, human being posits itself for itself over against an other; it singles itself out as individual, has a goal, an inner project vis-à-vis the other. First as a will it is set against the other, confronts the other, and works on this other in such a way as to produce a transformation in the object. In its action, | human being always has a purpose, and the action consists in the realizing of the purpose or content, that is, to take the form of subjectivity from this content and cast it back into an objective existence.

The cultus is also a form of acting, and hence there is a goal in it; but the goal that it involves is the inwardly concrete totality of the natural and the spiritual. The object of faith is the goal of the cultus. What the cultus has to achieve is not to abstract anything from the objective, asserting itself in what is [properly] the object.

167. [Ed.] This quotation draws together material from three of Eckhart's sermons. In its complete form it is found only in G; it is lacking in P, while D and Ho give briefer versions. The formulation in G may be based on a secondary source. See Meister Eckhart, *Die deutschen Werke*, ed. J. Quint (Stuttgart, 1958 ff.), 1:201, 478 (Sermon 12); 2:252, 684, 503-504, 730 (Sermons 39, 52). The words in parentheses were probably added by Hegel.

168. [Ed.] See above, p. 335.

Its purpose is real, it is absolute reality in and for itself, though it is not straightaway that this purpose is to be brought about. Rather [the first step] that has to be accomplished in the cultus is to bring it about that the goal should be actual in me. The cultus is thus practical, in that the purpose is to be realized in me in opposition to me and my particular subjectivity, this subjectivity is the covering that must be stripped away, so that I may be filled by the spirit and this object may be in me as spiritual.

What is called the grace of God or the operation of grace presents this difficulty for reflection in its relationship to human freedom. On this side what we mean by humanity¹⁶⁹ is not at all like a stone, and the operation of grace is not merely a mechanical action working upon a passive material (as if humanity were the passive material, not involved in the action). In the cultus there is activity, certainly, but only activity that is my particular subjectivity as such, my reserve, my singular individuality on its own account. The goal, God, is to be attained by me and in me, and that toward which the action (which is my own action) tends is just this surrender of myself, with me no longer clinging possessively to the self as personal property existing on its own account. This [is] the realization [of the cultus], the practical [moment].

The standpoint of religion is this: that reconciliation is achieved in and for itself absolutely; it is accomplished in God as the absolute unity. I am to make myself such that the spirit dwells in me, | that I should be spiritual. This is opposed to the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte,¹⁷⁰ according to which the good must first be

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169. *Ho reads*: This is a two-sided action: the grace of God and human sacrifice. There is a difficulty here for representation with respect to the action of God because of human freedom. But human freedom consists precisely in the knowing and willing of God through the sublation of human knowing and willing. Hence in virtue of grace the human being is the same activity [as God].

170. [Ed.] Hegel here touches briefly on his criticism of Kant and Fichte developed more fully elsewhere—e.g., in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:461, 498 (*Werke* 15:593, 633). He criticizes, on the one hand, their view that the good remains bound to the moral activity of the individual subject, and on the other hand, their view that the good can be realized only in infinite progress. Cf. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, esp. p. 126 (Kant, *Werke* 5:122); and Fichte, *Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre)* (1794), trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (New York, 1970), esp. p. 231 (Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* 2:397). That Hegel had these particular passages in mind is shown by his *History of Philosophy* 3:498 (*Werke* 15:633).

brought about and realized within—as though it were not already there in and for itself, as though there were a world, forsaken by God, outside me, waiting for me to introduce the goal (or goodness) for the first time. The sphere of my moral activity is [actually] a limited one. In religion the good is [found] in and for itself: God is [good].¹⁷¹ The question is only about me: I have to rid myself of my subjectivity, do my share and play my part in this good, in this work, which is accomplished eternally and divinely, of itself. On this view the highest good is no mere prescription but eternal truth, divine power and truth, on which account it is the business of the singular subject to realize itself through the negation of its singularity.

The cultus thus contains a negative moment, but in such a way that it is a practical activity of the subject upon itself, [namely] to surrender and let go its subjectivity. This moment of renunciation occurs concretely in positive religion in the shape of sacrifices; admittedly the negation is more concerned with externals here, but there is an essential reference to the inner life, as the inner life comes increasingly to the fore in confession, purification, repentance, and so on.

This, then, is the concept of the cultus in general, for which the character of what we have called faith supplies the foundation.

We have next to discuss the cultus in its *determinateness*.¹⁷² For, as we have said of faith, the innermost core of the concept is the most spiritual [aspect] of it; the concept of absolute spirit itself resides in the innermost [dimension]. This content is [present] for us, initially, as the concept—this is how we have grasped it—but it is still not yet posited as such, thereby, in existence. The becoming-

171. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (Var/MiscP?) reads: and reconciliation is achieved absolutely and in and for itself; the divine unity of the spiritual and natural worlds is presupposed (and the particular self-consciousness belongs to the latter).*

172. [Ed.] The various aspects or elements of the cultus that Hegel will describe in the following pages correspond to determinate moments in the history of religion, and we shall attempt to designate the correlations in the editorial notes. It should be kept in mind, however, that Hegel is intending to offer what can best be described as a phenomenology of the cultus, not a survey of its historical development. He does, however, introduce more specific historical allusions in the extended passage contained in n. 178.

posited of the concept for self-consciousness is a further determination beyond the concept itself. The concept is the inward, substantial core, present through us and in us—in our cognitive thinking. But it is only in [our] comprehension, [our] cognition; the idea does not yet possess this shape and this content in the self-consciousness that has being as such. To begin with, the idea is | as concept, as the substance identical with the subjective self-consciousness, so that the subjective self-consciousness has its essence, its truth, in the object. In this idea the subject is essentially posited as free, but this freedom is at first only relative freedom; what is required is the subject's freedom vis-à-vis its universal essence, in such a way that it does not cut itself off from its essence, does not stand fast, or stick, at a barrier by which it is cut off from this its object, so as not to have the affirmation of its universality. The freedom of the subject consists solely in its unimpeded continuity with its essence. ~But this continuity can be a communal characteristic both in the subject and in the object. Or freedom is only this formal freedom of the subject, consisting in the fact that its consciousness accords with the concept which we have set up. ~For this concept to constitute its reality, this content must be present: absolute spirit itself, or ~¹⁷³ its absolute, perfect freedom, the consciousness of its formal, inward infinity, or of free and perfect personality.^{~174} If this self-consciousness is unmediated, however, it is in the first place only formally free, caught up in a natural determinacy, and its freedom is only formal freedom in general, not the consciousness of its infinite freedom. The second [moment is that] it remains absolute on its own account, [it is] infinite subjec-

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173. *Ho reads*: But God himself is not spirit in an unmediated fashion, nor consequently is consciousness of him immediate. So freedom itself or reconciliation is, in the cultus, initially *formal* reconciliation and freedom. For the subject to be in conformity with its concept, the latter, absolute spirit, must be an object to it as spirit, *Follows Ho in W₂ (MiscP)*: for only in this way can subjective spirit itself be free in the object, because in that absolute content it relates itself to what is its *essence*,

174. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads*: However, true faith as defined above presupposes the self-consciousness of the absolute freedom of spirit, the consciousness that, according to its basic determination, human being is in and for itself free and knows itself as infinite personality.

tivity, the subject possesses absolute, infinite value on its own account, being conscious that it is the absolute object of the infinite love of God. God is concerned about the subject—which is coherent | with the immortality of the soul, [or with the claim] that the soul is eternally in and for itself.

¹⁷⁵God is seen, in the first case, as the unity of natural and spiritual, in the second, as the absolute unity that is itself spiritual. The different moments or aspects of the cultus correspond to this difference. Thus God is characterized immediately either as an abstract entity or as a constant determinacy of nature; then he is defined as absolute infinite spirit. To the extent that God is posited with some natural determinacy, to the extent that he has a natural determinacy in his content affirmatively, he is indeed the unity of the natural determinacy with the spiritual itself; but inasmuch as this natural determinacy still subsists, the unity of the two is *ipso facto* only a natural, immediate unity itself—not a genuinely spiritual one. Among human beings the body is recognized as a positive ingredient no less than the soul;¹⁷⁶ viewed in this way, the unity of body and soul is likewise only a natural one.

Just as we said about the concept of God that it is represented with some natural determinacy or other, or with a determinacy of abstract reflection, so on the side of self-consciousness (or on the side of the cultus), too, human being is characterized by an immediate naturalness or unfreedom in freedom. Because human being is [initially] only a naturally free [being] (freedom constrained by a natural determinacy, a definition which is properly a contradiction in terms), its relation to its object, its essence, its truth, must also be a natural, immediate unity of this kind; and the basic characteristic of human faith and cultus is consequently that it is an immediate relation, a reconciledness with its object from the very outset. This is, then, one characteristic of the cultus, its general

175. *Precedes in W (Var)*: The cultus also develops in accord with the representation of God set out above. *Precedes in Ho*: In the same way that we had three ways of representing God, we will also have three ways of reconciling God and consciousness.

176. *Thus also W₁; W₂ (Var) adds*: when it is said human beings consist of body and soul;

mode in a determinate religion in which the absolute essence of God is not yet manifest; likewise human being in its freedom is not yet manifest to itself, | has not yet secured its absolute subjectivity. As a whole, this is the *serene cultus*,¹⁷⁷ which has no need that the subject should be absolutely reconciled with itself. Thus, [on the one hand,] the cultus here is already what human beings represent to themselves as the ordinary way of life, and their life is lived in this substantial unity. Ordinary human life coincides with the cultus; the two are not distinguished,¹⁷⁸ or there are only contingent dis-

177. [Ed.] In general the cultus of the religions of natural immediacy, including not only the religion of magic but also the religions of India, Persia, and Egypt.

178. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (parallel in main text follows):* At the first stage of immediate unity between finite and infinite, self-consciousness has not yet evolved into a totality, and to this extent the distinction is not taken seriously. While there must be negativity in general, it has not been *imagined* by self-consciousness itself, so that the negative is excluded from the inner relationship of subjectivity, stands over against it, and has to be shut off from the immediate unity as a realm of evil and darkness. Conflict and struggle with such a negative *can* come about, but in such a way that it is represented rather as an external war, and the hostility and its cessation do not exist as an essential moment of self-consciousness. This stage accordingly constitutes no genuine reconciliation, which presupposes the absolute rupture of mind and soul.

The essential characteristic of the cultus here is then that it does not constitute something distinctive, set apart from the rest of life, but a life lived continually in the realms of goodness and light [Persian religion]. The temporal life of need, this immediate life, is itself the cultus, and the subject has not yet distinguished its essential life from the maintenance of its temporal life and the steps it takes to ensure immediate, finite existence.

While the subject must at this level have an express consciousness of its God as such, must be raised up to the thought of absolute essence, and must worship and praise it, this is initially an abstract relationship on its own account, in which concrete life has no part. As soon as the cultic relationship assumes more concrete shape, it takes up within itself the individual's entire external actuality, and the whole span of ordinary everyday life, eating, drinking, sleeping, and all activities for the satisfaction of natural needs, are related to the cultus; and the course of all these deeds and actions forms a life of holiness.

These actions are at the same time characterized by need and externality, so that if they are elevated into that essential unity, *particular attention* must be paid to them and they must be carried out in a carefully considered, deliberate manner, to the exclusion of all arbitrariness. In this way the commonest actions of life are imbued with solemnity and dignity. The concrete existence of finite life is not yet regarded as a matter of indifference, not yet degraded by freedom to the level of externality, since inner freedom has not yet endowed itself with an independent

254 crepancies | due to caprice, etc., that have to be ironed out. Or, on
the other hand, the cultus [of these religions] is a particular con-
dition, an explicit [state of] enjoyment, an express consciousness
vis-à-vis ordinary life; and sacrifice, the negative aspect, remains a
255 merely formal sacrifice, | involving no piercing of the heart. Rather
the natural state of humanity (or the state to which it has attained
in the other aspects of life) is what it is supposed to be. It already

sphere. The actions of ordinary everyday life are accordingly referred entirely to the religious domain and are regarded as substantive. In order that these actions that we regard as contingent may be suited to the form of substantiality, they must be performed with solemnity, calm, and due regularity and order. All this is accordingly determined by universally applicable regulations, and there is no semblance of contingency since finitization has not yet broken away on its own account and endowed itself with its own sphere of action. Orientals, who stand at this level, regard neither their bodies nor finite affairs and their execution as their own but as a service to be rendered to another, to the universal, essential will; in the most trivial actions they must therefore proceed with dignity and deliberation in order that they may perform them fittingly, as befits the universal will for whom they are performed.

Such solemnity, however, is only a *form*; the content still consists in the *doing and being of the finite*, and the antithesis is thus not raised to the level of truth. Since the order governing the affairs of daily life is thus only an external form imposed on this finite content, external life—and what, for consciousness, is the absolute object—is still marked by actual diversity. Subjective existence must therefore be expressly sublated, and the manner in which this here comes about has to do with reflection on finitude and its opposition to the infinite. However, the negativity of the finite can also only come about in finite fashion. Here we have come to what is generally called *sacrifice*.

The immediate content of sacrifice is the surrender of an immediate finitude, in the sense of my testifying that this finitude ought not to be my own possession and that I do not want to keep it for myself. From the standpoint of this religious self-consciousness, sacrifice is therefore sacrifice—offering up—in the proper sense. Because the depths of mind and heart are not yet present, negativity cannot here reveal itself in an inner process. Sacrifice does not consist in a turning about of heart, mind, soul, and natural inclinations, that these should be broken. Rather what the subject is for itself, it is in immediate possession, and since in the cultus it surrenders its finitude, this is only to surrender an immediate possession and a natural existence. In this sense sacrifice is no longer to be found in a spiritual religion, and what is there called sacrifice can only be so in a figurative sense.

More specifically, sacrifice can be mere offering up of adoration and praise, whereby I bear witness that I have nothing that belongs to me but give it up in that I think myself in relationship to the absolute. The one to whom the possession is to be given up is not thereby enriched—such is not the purpose; rather the subject acquires the consciousness of separation superseded, and to this extent the subject's action is utterly *joyful* action. This is also the significance of gifts in the East in

contains unity with its absolute object. In this way sacrifice is purely the formal sacrifice of an external possession, | and the cultus on the whole, as an explicit consciousness, is then merely the organization of festivals, the conscious enjoyment of one's express unity [with one's object]. There are numerous cultic activities of this sort; this is where art enters into this sphere. | To the extent that the unity of natural and spiritual is only placed on a higher plane

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general; the king's subjects and conquered enemies bring him gifts, not so that he may become richer, for everything is in any event ascribed to him and belongs to him.

A further character which sacrifice can assume is as sacrifice of purification in regard to a specific contamination. A *sin*, properly speaking, is here not committed; the specific sacrifices of purification pertain rather to the whole sphere of finite action. They are also not repentance or punishment, nor is their purpose spiritual conversion; and they do not in any way represent some loss or damage that was incurred. This notion is not that one has done something evil and must suffer another evil in its place. To define sacrifice in any of these ways would involve the representational idea of the subject's justification, but this is a form of representation that is here still completely excluded. According to *our* standpoint such sacrifices would be regarded as a loss, in that through them some item of property is given up, but at the standpoint we are here considering this way of looking at the matter does not arise; here sacrifice is rather essentially something *symbolic*. Contamination has occurred, and must be done away with in no less immediate fashion; however, the subject cannot undo what has been done, nor repent over having done it. There must therefore be a *substitution*; something must be given up other than what was, properly speaking, involved. The value of what is sacrificed may be much less than the value of what I keep, what I have acquired. For example, the harvest I have reaped, the beast I have slaughtered—these I take into possession, and if I now have to show that I do not take these possessions seriously, this is done in a symbolic manner. It is not as if what I do ought not to happen, for these actions are necessary; all it means is that through the sacrifice this being-for-me (which is simply a form of finitization) is again sublated.

The general character of these activities relating to the service or worship of deity is what we call *ceremonial*. These ceremonies consist in what we would regard as ordinary, everyday actions, which at the same time are necessary actions, determined by ordinance. We have the right to proceed in such matters as we will or blindly to follow custom; in the same way we do not deem purification a necessity just because such actions as harvesting and slaughtering animals are necessary. Moreover, since such sacrifices and purifications involve a reference to the religious aspect, there is no distinction in regard to them that is unimportant. Thus the various foods are viewed not merely in regard to taste and health. The different ways the various elements in sacrifice and purification are combined are also relevant; the action whereby the purification of another action is effected may have no necessary relation to it, and the combination may consequently be merely contingent and

because the spiritual predominates in it, so that the natural is represented as subjugated, as idealized through the spiritual unity—to this extent self-consciousness cannot accept an immediate natural object (for instance, the sun or the sea) in the way it occurs in
 258 external existence as satisfying this requirement that the | natural only exists as the expression of the spiritual. This [spiritualized] image can only become visible through human labor, the labor of

external. This is why this kind of cultus makes a painful impression. Whatever significance lies, or has lain, in these ceremonies and combinations is a trivial, superficial significance, and inasmuch as they become a habit, such actions lose whatever little significance they may once have possessed.

At this standpoint we also encounter *punishment* in the specific sense, insofar as a deed that is opposed to a given regulation has to be annulled, and insofar as what is involved is a transgression. Punishment for such an injury is another injury, and something is relinquished—life, property, etc. But such punishment has here the sense of an utterly dry, formal punishment in the manner of civil punishment. This is not directly concerned with the amelioration of the criminal, whereas ecclesiastical repentance in our sense is a punishment whose essential purpose is to better and convert the one who is punished. At this standpoint punishment cannot have a moral or, more accurately, a religious sense. Civil laws and the laws of the state are here identical with religious laws. The law of the state is the law of freedom, presupposes human dignity and personality, and refers essentially to the will, leaving aside a sphere of free choice for decisions on contingent, indifferent matters. At this standpoint, however, this distinction is not made, and what obtains in general is a situation of sheer necessity.

From the finite mode of being and acting, which the cultus just described brings into relation to what has being in and for itself, is to be distinguished a more fully determinate mode of acting, which *conforms to a purpose*. While the performance of actions that refer immediately to our need does not occur according to a purpose but is regulated in immediate fashion, purposive or expedient action is not merely necessitous action according to habit but is determined according to *representations*. Admittedly it is still finite action insofar as it has a finite purpose; but since prominence is here given to the principle that the finite should be elevated to the infinite, the finite purposes have also to be expanded to an infinite purpose. In this way the *labor* of religion enters into play, bringing forth works of devotion that are not destined for a finite purpose but are designed to be something that is in and for itself. This labor is what the cultus itself here consists in. Its works and productions are not to be regarded as our church buildings, which are only undertaken because they are needed; rather, as a *pure bringing forth* and as *perennial*, labor here is purpose for its own sake and accordingly never comes to the end of its task.

This labor is of differing kind and differing degree—from the purely bodily movement of dance to enormous towering edifices, whose prime significance is that of monuments, the erection of which is never at an end since as soon as one generation has completed its work a start must always again be made from the beginning.

spirit; thus the field of art emerges, and the labor through which God is represented is then at the same time the sacrifice, the exertion of the particularity of self-consciousness, the disavowal of subjectivity. The subject holds fast to what has been generated within it by the substantial idea, and brings it forth into the outward range of intuition.⁷

The cultus begins as a whole from this immediate substantial unity of self-consciousness and its object. The sacrifice [here] is of

The characteristic feature of such works is not free phantasy; what is produced has rather the character of the monstrous and colossal. Production is still linked essentially to what is natural and given, and all that remains open for the builder's activity is for the dimensions to be exaggerated and the given shapes to be rendered monstrous.

All these works too still fall within the sphere of sacrifice. For, as with sacrifice, the purpose is the universal, vis-à-vis which the characteristic properties and interests of the subject must be surrendered in action. All activity involves a *giving up*—a giving up no longer of something merely external but of inner subjectivity. This giving up and sacrificing involved in activity is, as activity, at the same time objectifying—it brings something about, but not in such a way that what is produced stems solely from me; rather it comes about according to a purpose, a purpose imbued with content. Human labor, whereby the unity of finite and infinite only comes about to the extent that it is permeated by spirit and wrung out of the action of spirit, is, however, already a more profound sacrifice and an advance beyond the kind of sacrifice that originally appeared merely as the giving up of an immediate finitude. For the sacrifice involved in productive human labor is the *action of spirit*—the effort that, negating particular self-consciousness, holds fast the purpose that dwells within representationally, and brings it forth outwardly, for intuition.

[Ed.] This lengthy passage in *W₂* clearly forms a parallel to Ms. sheets 37a–38a, which describe the cultus of “immediate religion” (the religion of nature). It can belong to either *Hn* or *MiscP*. In favor of *Hn* as the source is the fact that elements from the main text and marginal additions of the Ms. could form the basis for an oral presentation of this sort in 1821. Favoring *MiscP* as the source is the fact that in this section the Ms. has not been as fully worked out as is normally the case. Not only are the left and right columns filled with marginal notes, but also the bottom half of sheet 38a contains notes in outline form. Thus it is plausible that Hegel reformulated the text on the basis of these notes, and that the new sheets were used for the treatment of the cultus in 1824. In the latter case, Hegel would have removed this theme from the treatment of the religion of nature in Part II and introduced it into the concept of the cultus in Part I, since in 1824 the various cultic forms of the nature religions were much more sharply differentiated. Hence what originally served as the entire treatment of the cultus of the religion of nature now only offers a historical preview of the various cultic forms of these religions. Because of the uncertainty in identifying the source, this passage of special material will be given once again in vol. 2 as a footnote to the Ms. at the appropriate place.

a superficial kind, it does not touch the ground of the subject, its inwardness, and what is affirmed is the enjoyment, the feast, the festivity.¹⁷⁹ At this point, however, there occurs a departure from

179. W₁ (1831) reads (parallel in main text follows, ending at n. 189): Here there is a separation of the divine and human, and the meaning of the cultus is not to enjoy this unity but to sublimate the rupture. Here too there is the precondition for reconciliation in and for itself.

This separation is of two kinds, taking place either in the *natural* realm or in the *spiritual* realm. The former is the greatest misfortune that can befall a people. Here God is the substantive power, the power over spiritual and natural alike, and if the land is oppressed by famine, military disaster, plague, and other calamities, the cultus is directed toward recovering the former good will of the gods. The separation here consists in misfortune affecting only the natural sphere, the outward condition in regard to bodily existence and so on. The presupposition here is that this natural condition is not contingent but depends on a higher power, defined as God: God has posited it, brought it about. A further characteristic is that whether an individual or a people fares well or ill is morally connected with the *will*. They have brought misfortune on their own heads by reason of their guilt. And this results in the course of nature being disturbed in a manner contrary to human purposes. What is needed is to restore the unity of the divine will with human purposes. In this way the cultus assumes the shape of propitiation, brought about through certain actions, through sacrifice and ceremonial, through repentance, showing that the person concerned is in earnest. This implies that God is the power over nature, that nature depends on a higher will. The only question that now arises is to what extent the divine will is displayed in events, how it can be recognized from such events. It is to be noted in this respect that the natural power contains within itself purposes that are alien to it as such, namely purposes of the good, which impinge on human well-being and on which it depends. We also recognize this as true; but the good is something abstract, universal, and when people speak of their good they have in mind wholly particular purposes for themselves, so that here finitude and contingency come into their rights. Piety ascends from the single individual to God, to the universal; and this is to recognize the universal, the divine majesty, above the particular. However, the next step is to apply this universal to the particular; and this is where the representation becomes defective. This relationship here finds expression. Peoples stricken by calamities look for an offense by which they were occasioned; they then seek recourse from a power that is characterized in terms of purpose. Now even if such a universal is granted, there is a contradiction in applying it to particulars.

Another kind of separation is in the *spiritual* realm, but this also fuses with the foregoing. Pure separation, on its own account, is that of the will, the subject [separated] from the divine will, the separation of good and evil. The cultus is here rooted wholly in the spiritual realm: evil as such is in the will, and good also. Here the cultus acquires another meaning, namely that human beings are simply severed from God, estranged from him; this is the unhappiness of spirit. This unhappiness is now to be sublated *by spirit, in spirit*: persons must attain to the certainty that they have been received again in favor, are well-pleasing to God, and are at one

this original | unity, so that there is no longer the same reconciled-ness or the same absence of any need for reconciliation. These departures arise partly from the caprice of the subject, from the

with God. The cultus accordingly here takes place in the spiritual realm. The sinner is only restored to union with God by casting off evil will, forsaking evil and repenting it. On the one hand it is actual sins the sinner has to repent of (what particular sins is a matter of contingency); on the other hand, in the abstraction of finitude and infinity, held rigidly apart, whatever is finite comes to be regarded as evil. This separation, regarded as originating in the human race, has to be sublated. At all events the natural will is not the will as it should be, for the will should be free, and the appetitive will is not free. Spirit is not what it ought to be "by nature," but only becomes so as the result of freedom. The way this is represented here is that the will is evil by nature. But it is only evil as long as it does not advance beyond its natural state. Right and ethics are not the natural will, for in their natural will human beings are self-seeking; they will only their singularity as such. The purpose of the cultus is to transcend evil. It is not that people should be innocent in the sense of being neither good nor evil; such natural innocence does not occur on the basis of human freedom. On the contrary they are *educated* to freedom, and freedom is only essential, only expresses its essence, when it wills the essential will, namely, the good, the right, the ethical.

Human beings must become free, i.e., acting in accord with the principles of right and ethics, and this can only come about through education. At this level of representation such education is expressed as the conquest of evil, which is to place it on the plane of consciousness, whereas education happens unconsciously. In this form of the cultus the antithesis of good and evil is transcended. Human being as natural is portrayed as evil, and this has to be overcome. Evil is the sphere of separation and estrangement, which has to be negated. This presupposes that reconciliation is implicitly accomplished, and this assurance is produced by the cultus. Reconciliation has been accomplished by God, and what human beings have to do is to *appropriate* it, make it their own.

The question now is, What must people renounce in order to make the reconciliation their own? This question is gone into more fully in the *revealed religion*. The call is to renounce one's particular will, one's appetites and natural instincts. This can be understood as meaning that the natural instincts should be not merely purified but eradicated, that the vitality of the will should be destroyed. This is quite wrong. In fact, only the impure content has to be refined; it is, on the contrary, making a false demand when renunciation is grasped in abstract fashion, as meaning that vital impulses should be inwardly annulled. What people have as their own includes their possessions, their property; together with their will, it is *theirs*. Now people could also be called upon to give up their possessions (the call for celibacy is a similar demand). Human beings also possess freedom and conscience; similarly the demand may be made of them that they give up their freedom, their will, so that they sink to the level of stupid creatures, lacking will. These are the extremes to which this demand can go. To this also belongs that I should undo what I have done and suppress the vacillating movements of ill-doing. All these singularities can also, broadly speaking, be regarded as evil. That being so, renunciation means that

260 enjoyment the individual | derives from its world, and partly from
 the power of nature and from human misery—the misery of in-
 261 dividuals, of peoples and states. These disturbances | disrupt the
 substantial unity;¹⁸⁰ they require an expiation, a more radical pro-
 cess of negation, in order to reestablish it. It may be noted in the
 second place, then, that these disruptions are random, and though
 they call for a more radical negation, this still does not affect what
 is innermost.

“In the third place, it is to be noted”¹⁸¹ that over this presupposed
 harmony, over the enjoyment of this harmony, something still
 higher, the highest, hovers, and must hover. For this original unity
 is only natural oneness, and hence it is a oneness with spirit that
 is in principle limited; it is encumbered with a natural element, it
 does not have the reality which, according to its concept, it ought
 to have. This inappropriate situation must also be present for con-
 sciousness, since consciousness is intrinsically thinking spirit in prin-

I choose to regard certain actions I have performed as not mine, that I desire to regard them as not having happened, in other words repent them. On the temporal plane they are already past beyond recall, but in my inner spirit they are still stored up; to destroy them then means to un-do them. For the spirit has the energy to modify itself inwardly, to erase all that has happened, and to destroy inwardly the maxims of its will. To the extent that it comes under my basic principle, I can relinquish an action. Renunciation here means destroying the maxim, the intention. Human beings have the certainty of being reconciled when they renounce their cleavage from God; through this renunciation they become partakers in reconciliation. As it is realized in the subject, religion brings it about that the subject achieves inner peace and acquires the consciousness of having done so. In the cultus the subject is put on an identical footing with the divine.

[Ed.] This passage from the 1831 lectures (contained in both editions of *W*; we have given the fuller version from *W*₁) is not, of course, a variant related genetically to the 1824 lectures. But, in contrast with most of the fragments from 1831 preserved in *W*, it parallels the 1824 text more closely than 1827. In both the main text and the variant, a transition takes place at this point from the religions of natural immediacy to the religions of spiritual individuality (Jewish, Greek, Roman), in which a breach has occurred between nature and spirit. The higher religions of nature, Persian and Egyptian, are transitional in character, for the breach has already emerged there but is still represented in natural images.

180. *Ho* adds: individuals for their part are not *spiritual* self-consciousness and are therefore inclination, desire, themselves [exhibiting] the same disturbance;

181. *W* (*MiscP/Ed?*) reads: In the disturbances we find at this first state, unity appears as something limited; it can be rent asunder; it is not absolute

ciple. The representation and the need for an infinite absolute unity must emerge in it—a unity that floats beyond all the satisfaction enjoyed in the feast and the festival. There must emerge an absolute unity that, however, remains merely abstract in this mode [of emergence] because the fulfilled foundation [i.e., the model for fulfillment] is that original harmony. Above this sphere, there hovers a grief that is not resolved, the consciousness of a fate, an unknown power, a necessity that is not cognitively understood, and with which no reconciliation takes place.¹⁸² This is a moment that is bound up with this definite level of self-consciousness.¹⁸³

Fourth and last, another specific aspect of the cultus must be underlined. We have said that [thus far] the practical moment in the cultus is only superficial or formal, and that where it becomes more serious, it is penance. The thought of some necessity, the impression of necessity, hangs over it. This necessity does not remain merely an image, but takes a real grip on human beings: the natural human being passes away; | death is the grip that really grips it. Fate devours it, and it is past all consolation, for even reconciliation or unity is not the reconciling of the inmost depth; natural life remains an essential component, it is not given up. The separation or rupture has not yet gone that far; there [still] remains a unity of the natural and the spiritual in which the natural was defined in affirmative terms. This final negation of death, this fate that is not objectively reconciled, must now be reshaped into an affirmation in representation by a subjective means. Thus the *manes* are the unreconciled [power] that must be reconciled; they must be avenged. This is the aspect of the cultus that still remains—the service of the dead generally, which is an essential part of the cultus.¹⁸⁴ We have now considered the principal aspects of the cultus.

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182. *Ho reads*: So the joy of this vital unity is shot through with an unresolved note of pain and sorrow; an uncomprehended fate, a compelling necessity, recognized without being cognized, hovers above the heads of gods and mortals alike.

183. [*Ed.*] The cultus of the religions of sublimity (Jewish religion) and of beauty or necessity (Greek religion).

184. [*Ed.*] Historically speaking, the veneration of the *manes*, the souls of the dead, while present in earlier forms of the cultus, reaches its culmination in Roman religion, the religion of purposiveness.

263 The second [standpoint] to be discussed, in contrast with the standpoint of the cultus [in determinate or finite religion], is that wherein the subject has inwardly attained to consciousness of its *infinity*;¹⁸⁵ at this stage religion and the cultus enter wholly into the field of *freedom*.¹⁸⁶ Precisely because humanity has attained to absolute consciousness, to the infinite perfection of the human spirit, because it has entered into itself, the highest level of rupture vis-à-vis nature in general and against human beings themselves as natural individuals has been posited. This highest rupture is what generates the field of true freedom. Here the view is that human beings are no longer naturally good; rather the natural state, the immediate life of the heart, is what must be renounced, since it is the moment of immediate naturalness that does not leave spirit free—as natural spirit, humanity is not self-positing. In this view, therefore, the natural state is not what should be but what should not be, and thereby everything that humanity | ought to be depends on its freedom, is transposed into the field of its freedom. The cultus therefore passes over essentially at this point into the field of the inner [life]. Now there is the requirement that the heart should break, i.e., that the immediate will, the natural self-consciousness, should be given up. Consistent with this determination of freedom is the corollary that spirit can and must appear now in the subject as it is authentically in and for itself, in accord with its content; and moreover, that this content is nothing otherworldly, but rather that free subjectivity has its essence before itself as its object. “The cultus at this stage is the cognition, the knowledge”¹⁸⁷ of the content that constitutes

185. *Follows in Ho*: By death the subject is sublated, fate is reconciled. This unity with what is not cognized, which here is first implicit, now becomes an object of consciousness. The subject knows itself as infinite inasmuch as it is subject; for this to come about, what was previously undisclosed has within itself the moment of singularity, which thereby acquires absolute value. But singularity only has value as this absolute and thus purely universal singularity. It is only by sublating its immediate singularity—and so producing absolute singularity within itself—that the single individual becomes what is single, and therefore inwardly free, and that this freedom, as the movement of absolute spirit, is in what is now single as a result of the sublation of what is natural and finite.

186. [Ed.] This is the cultus of the absolute religion, the Christian religion.

187. *Thus also* W_1 ; W_2 (Var) reads: the presence

absolute spirit; and it is the *intuition*, the *impression* that this history, which is the content of absolute spirit, has at the same time a side by means of which it is essentially the history of humanity, and in which human being is involved. The final [moment] of the cultus, then, is precisely that individuals work through this process on their own and so remain members of the community in which the spirit is living.¹⁸⁸⁻¹⁸⁹

In this way we have distinguished between *determinate, restricted* cultus and cultus in the element of *freedom*. Similarly, we have made this distinction in regard to the representation of God:¹⁹⁰ there is God in his *determinacy*, the way he is as an object for consciousness, the circumscribed God, and there is the *free* God, God as *spirit* in accord with his concept. These two aspects constitute the overall reality of religion: spirit in its *objectivity*, preeminently God, and then spirit in its *subjectivity*—these two aspects constitute the reality of spirit. | The two determinations that we have given correspond to one another. The one side, the subjective, corresponds to the determinacy of the [other] side, which has being [objectively]; it is thoroughgoing determinacy. Through it the whole of the idea stands on a particular level, and this interconnection constitutes the totality of spiritual self-consciousness.

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We now have to consider the reality in more detail. Its two sides are distinguished from one another in such a way that the one is only *determinate* religion, religion circumscribed. The other [is] the reality of religion so [consummated] as to correspond to the *concept* of religion, so that in this religion the *content* of religion is [present], and *absolute spirit* itself is the content that is known as object;

188. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Humanity knows itself to be essentially contained within this history, involved with it; by immersing itself in it intuitively, humanity traverses this content and process and confers on itself the certainty and enjoyment of the reconciliation contained in it.

189. *Ho reads:* This consciousness must be intuited: the eternal history of God and humanity, of God's movement toward humanity and humanity's movement toward God, presents itself, and consciousness intuits it with the consciousness of itself being part of this history. For individuals must blend into this process themselves and so be members of the universal spirit that presents itself therein.

190. [Ed.] See above, pp. 328 ff.

hence the spirit lives in its community, appears as finite, as subjective, [and the subject] itself is involved in this reality of the absolute spirit.

We thus have two modes of the reality of religion, one that does not correspond to the concept, and another that does correspond to it.

The ensuing discussion will be divided on the basis of this distinction. In Part II we shall treat *determinate religion*, while Part III is the *realization* of the concept, the authentic reality, that which is equivalent to the concept. In ordinary life we distinguish between "reality" and "idea," and so the religion treated in Part II is [also] a determinate "reality."¹⁹¹

191. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* of the absolute concept of God, who, as the absolute unity of these his two moments, is absolute spirit. The determinacy on one of these two sides corresponds to the other side. Such determinacy is thoroughgoing, universal form, in which the idea stands, and yet it is at the same time a stage in the totality of the idea's development.

As regards these stages of realization, we have already made the general distinction that, according to the one form of reality, spirit is confined to a [specific] determinacy of its being and its self-consciousness, whereas according to the other it is its absolute reality, in which it has for its object the fully developed content of the idea of spirit. This form of reality is the true religion.

On the basis of this distinction, it is determinate religion that we shall begin considering in the following section.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION THE LECTURES OF 1827

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The question with which we have to begin is: "How are we to secure a beginning?" For it is of course at least a formal requirement of all scientific knowledge, and especially of philosophy, that nothing should occur in it that has not yet been proved. At the beginning, however, we have not yet proved [anything] ~and we cannot yet appeal to anything antecedent.¹ In the superficial sense "proving" means that a content, proposition, or concept is shown to result from something prior to it. In that way we cognize its necessity. But when we are supposed to make a beginning, we do not yet have before us any result, anything mediated or posited through something else. At the beginning we are in the presence of the immediate. The other sciences have an easy time of it in their own way. In geometry, for example, we begin with the proposition: "There is a space, a point, a line, etc." There is no talk of proving, for the fact is directly conceded. In philosophy we are not allowed to make a beginning with the phrase "there is" or "there are"; for that would be the immediate.

²In the present case, however, we are not beginning philosophy afresh. The science of religion is one science within philosophy; indeed it is the *final* one. In that respect it presupposes the other philosophical disciplines and is therefore a result. In its philosophical aspect we are already dealing with a result of premises that lie

1. *Thus Hu; An reads:* but we do presuppose something.

2. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W₁):* With regard to philosophy as a whole there may be a difficulty here. Logic elucidates how such a difficulty is met.

behind us. We have only to begin from religion, and to make sure that this standpoint of religion has been proved and that we can advert from it to our own consciousness; the truth will become evident in the progression itself.³ The original content, the foundation of the philosophy of religion, is a result, namely a lemma | or subsidiary proposition to the effect that the content with which we begin is genuine content.⁴ In regard to this initial content, however, we can also appeal to the general consciousness and in that way take hold of a starting point that is "generally valid"⁵ at least empirically. Whatever is to be valid in science must be something proved; [whereas] something conceded is what is presupposed in a subjective way, so that the beginning can be made from it.

A. THE CONCEPT OF GOD⁶

The beginning of religion, more precisely its content, is the concept of religion itself, that God is the absolute truth, the truth of all things, and subjectively that religion alone is the absolutely true

3. Thus *Hu*; *L* (*Var*) reads: and that, too, ought then to occur here.

4. In *B*'s margin: 14 May 1827

5. Thus *L*; *B* reads: correct

6. [Ed.] After the preceding brief introductory remarks on the problem of securing a beginning, in which there are only faint echoes of the earlier discussion (in 1824 and especially 1821) of the need to prove the necessity of the religious standpoint (a matter briefly pursued further at the beginning of Sec. A), the 1827 lectures move immediately to an exposition of the moments of the concept of religion, which correspond to the moments of the self-explication of the concept of God as absolute idea. Since the speculative definition of religion as the self-consciousness of absolute spirit had been arrived at in 1824, in 1827 it was only necessary to spell out the logical aspects of this definition, dispensing with all preliminary matters or absorbing their contents into the speculatively structured treatment. The three moments of the concept of religion correspond to the logical moments of the concept qua concept, as is evident from the syllogism: the moments of universality, particularity, and individuality or subjectivity (cf. *Encyclopedia* [1830] §§ 183–189; *Science of Logic*, pp. 600–622, 666–681 [GW 12:32–52, 92–106]). In terms of religion these three yield the abstract concept of God, religious consciousness or the knowledge of God (the theoretical religious relationship), and the cultus (the practical relationship). This heading, like all those in the 1827 *Concept*, is editorial.

knowledge. For us who have religion, what God is, is something well-known, a content that can be presupposed in subjective consciousness. Scientifically regarded, the expression "God" is, to begin with, a general, abstract name that has not yet received any genuine import, for only the philosophy of religion is the scientific development and cognition of what God is. Only through it do we come to a cognitive awareness of what God is, for otherwise we would have no need at all for philosophy of religion. "It is said to develop this awareness in us for the first time."⁷

"Our starting point (namely, that what we generally call "God", or God in an indeterminate sense, is the truth of all things) is the result of the whole of philosophy. According to our division of it, philosophy considers first the logical domain, or pure thinking in its development, and then | nature."⁸ The third division is spirit, which as finite spirit stands in connection with nature and elevates itself to absolute spirit. The course of philosophy leads to the point that the final result of all this is God. This highest point is then the proof that God is, or in other words that this universal, which is in and for itself, embracing and containing absolutely everything, is that through which alone everything is and has subsistence—that this universal is the truth. This *One* is the result of philosophy. We make our beginning straightaway from this result of philosophy.

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This may give the distorted impression that God, so represented, becomes a *result*. But anyone acquainted with philosophical method knows that "result" has here the meaning of "being the absolute truth." This implies that just because what appears as result is the absolute truth, it ceases to be something resulting—that this very attitude, whereby what results derived from an other, is thus sublated or abolished. The proposition, "God is the absolutely true," means just as much that God is not the result, but rather that,

7. *Thus An; L (Var) reads (similar in W):* God is this representation that is so familiar to us, but a representation that is not yet developed and cognized scientifically.

8. *Thus Hu; L (Var) reads (similar in W₁):* which resolves itself upon nature, resolves itself to exist externally, as nature.

inasmuch as it is the last thing, what is absolutely true is just as much the first. But it is only the true insofar as it is not just the beginning but also the end or result, insofar as it results from itself. "In this sense the result of philosophy is here the beginning."⁹

At this point you have only my assurance that this is the result of philosophy."¹⁰ With respect to this assurance, however, we can appeal to the religious consciousness. Religious consciousness has the conviction that God is really the midpoint, the absolutely true, that from which everything proceeds and into which everything returns, that upon which everything is dependent and apart from which nothing other than it has absolute, true independence. This then is the content of the beginning.

At the same time we must notice here that, however full one's heart may be with this representation, the beginning remains scientifically abstract. In the scientific domain we are not dealing with what is in feeling, but exclusively with what is outside it—and indeed is set forth for thought—as an object for consciousness, more explicitly for the thinking consciousness, in such a way that
 268 it has attained the form of thought. | To give this fullness [of content] the form of thought or of the concept is the business of our science.

Because this beginning (as the initial content) is still abstract, this universality has, so to speak, a subjective status, as if the universal were universal in this way only for the beginning and would not remain in this universality. But the beginning of the content is to be grasped in such a way that, in all the further developments of the content, inasmuch as the universal itself will show itself to be something absolutely concrete, rich, and full of content, we never step outside this universality. The consequence is that the universality, which under one aspect we leave behind (according to its

9. Thus Hu; *L (Var)* reads (*similar in W₁*): This has also been asserted quite generally about the concept of spirit.

10. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP)* reads: With [i.e. because of] the indication of this self-justifying development within our science, we take it [only] as an assurance, to begin with, that the result of philosophy is that God is the absolutely true, the universal in and for itself, that which comprehends and contains everything and bestows subsistence on everything.

form) because it proceeds to a determinate development, to a richness of content, to greater concreteness, nevertheless maintains itself as the absolutely enduring foundation and is not simply a subjective beginning. At the beginning, God is for us inasmuch as God is the universal; in relation to the development, God is what is enclosed within itself [*das in sich Verschllossene*] or is in absolute unity with itself. If we say, "God is the [self-]enclosed," we are of course speaking with reference to a development that we anticipate. But in its reference to God himself, or to the content itself, this enclosedness (as we have labeled God's universality) is not to be grasped as an abstract universality outside which, and over against which, the particular might still be independent. "God is the enclosed." The particular seems in this definition to be distinct from this universal, but the latter is to be grasped in such a way that the development does not step forth out of the universality. Thus it is to be grasped as the absolutely full, replete universality. [To say that] God is this universal that is concrete and full within itself is [to say] that God is only *one* and not in antithesis to many [other] deities. Instead there is only the One, who is God.

The things and developments of the natural and spiritual world constitute manifold configurations, and endlessly multiform existence; they have a being differentiated in rank, force, intensity, and content. The being of all these things is not of an independent sort, however, but is quite simply something upheld and maintained, not genuine independence. If we ascribe a being to particular things, it is only a borrowed being, only the semblance of a being, not the absolutely independent being that God is.

God in his universality, this universal in which there is no limitation, finitude, or particularity, is the absolute subsistence and is so alone. Whatever subsists has its root and subsistence | only in this One. If we grasp this initial content in this way, we can express it thus: "God is the absolute substance, the only true actuality." All else that is actual is not actual on its own account, has no subsistence on its own account; the uniquely absolute actuality is God alone. Thus God is the absolute substance. I will speak at once about how this substance is related to subjectivity.

God is the absolute substance. If we cling to this declaration in its abstract form, then it is certainly Spinozism or pantheism.¹¹ But the fact that God is *substance* does not exclude *subjectivity*, for substance as such is not yet at all distinguished from subjectivity. That God is substance is part of the presupposition we have made that God is *spirit*, *absolute spirit*, eternally simple spirit, being essentially present to itself. Then this ideality or subjectivity of spirit, which is the perspicuity or ideality of every particular, is likewise this very universality, this pure relation to itself, the absolute being-

11. [Ed.] The relation of Spinozism to pantheism and the viability of these doctrines were hotly-debated issues in the *Aufklärung* and German idealism. The controversy began when the prominent eighteenth-century critic and dramatist Lessing showed sympathies with Spinoza's thought in his own rationalistic essays on philosophical and theological topics. F. H. Jacobi wrote to Moses Mendelssohn in 1783 that he had heard Lessing confess to being a Spinozist just before his death (see below, n. 31). In his *Morgenstunden* or lectures on God's existence (1785), Mendelssohn rebutted Jacobi's probably inaccurate charge and tried to draw some distinctions regarding pantheism and the teachings of Spinoza and of Lessing. The problem is complicated by the fact that the term "pantheism" appears in English deism some time after Spinoza's death, and the propriety of applying it and its associations retrospectively to Spinoza is open to question. Jacobi replied immediately to Mendelssohn in a series of letters *Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza* (1785), and the debate continued with a further published exchange between them the following year. Herder joined the fray from the literary side with his *God, Some Conversations* (1787), a dialogue presenting a Spinozistic philosophy of nature in sympathetic fashion. Jacobi remained the central figure in the "pantheism controversy" because of the argument of his *Briefe* that Spinozism is the only consistently logical system and that it is equivalent to pantheism, atheism, and fatalism. (On the interpretation of Spinozism as atheism, see below, n. 28. On the charge of fatalism, see Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, § 709; and Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:55, 59 ff., 71, 223.) Jacobi intended by his critique to discredit rationalistic philosophy in order to make room for his own "faith philosophy," a type of fideism grounded in feeling and partly based on Hamann's thought. For the philosophers of German idealism Jacobi's treatment of these issues seemed a grotesque caricature that they sometimes attacked and sometimes ridiculed. Schelling presented Spinozism appreciatively in his *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1795), which nevertheless supported Fichte's moral idealism as an equally coherent, and to Schelling preferable, rational philosophy. Hegel criticized Jacobi's "faith philosophy" in his essay, *Faith and Knowledge* (1802). Schelling made careful distinctions regarding pantheism and the God-world relation (obviously with Jacobi's polemic in mind) in his *Of Human Freedom* (1809), and brutally parodied Jacobi's attempt at an irrational "leap of faith," in an essay published in 1812 (Schelling, *Werke* 8:19-136). Hegel surely has this long-standing controversy in mind when he makes conceptual distinctions regarding pantheism and Spinozism here and elsewhere in these lectures.

with-self and abiding-with-self; it is absolute substance. At the same time, when we say "substance" there is then the distinction that that universal is not yet grasped as internally concrete. Only when grasped as concrete is it spirit; but even in its determination as internally concrete it remains this unity with itself, this one actuality that we have just now denominated as substance. A further determination is that the substantiality or unity of absolute actuality with itself is only the foundation, only one moment in the definition of God as spirit.¹² The determination, the concrete being, the unity of differentiated determinations, only arises when we proceed further. It presupposes a one and an other, though at the beginning we do not yet have differentiated determinations, a one and an other. At the beginning we have before us only the one, not the other. If we are concerned with the other, we have already gone further. So if we speak of the beginning, we have this one actuality as a relating of itself to itself and not to an other; | we do not yet have an advance, not yet concrete being. Therefore even the content exists in the form of substantiality. Even when we say "God" and "spirit," they are empty, indeterminate words or representations. It all depends on what has entered into consciousness. What enters into consciousness in the beginning is the simple, the abstract. In this initial simplicity we have God as substance, but we do not stop at that point. 270

This is the form of the content at the beginning, and this content remains the foundation. All through the development God does not step outside his unity with himself. In God's creating of the world, as tradition has it, no new principle makes an appearance, nor is something evil established, something other that would be autonomous or independent. God remains only this One; the one true actuality, the one principle, abides throughout all particularity.

12. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): Thus substance is only one determination in what we affirm about God. This statement is preliminary, in order to prevent misconceptions. The disparagement of philosophy arises especially from this quarter. It is said that philosophy must be Spinozism if it is to be consistent, and that consequently it is atheism and fatalism. What is implied in this content of the beginning is that we only have this abundance or this concrete being before us insofar as it is still wholly universal.

We express this beginning thus, as a content within us, an object for us. We have this object, and so the immediate question is: Who then are “we” who have the content within us? When we say “we,” “I,” or “spirit,” that is itself something very concrete, something manifold: I am intuiting, I see, I hear, etc. I am all of that—the feeling, intuition, sight, and hearing. Therefore the more exact meaning of our question is: Under which of those determinations is this content for our awareness? Is it representation, will, phantasy, or feeling? What is the place in which this content or this object is at home? What is the soil for this content? If we recall the usual answers, then [they are that] God is within us as believing, feeling, representing, and knowing beings. Later on¹³ we shall have to consider rather more closely these forms, capacities, and aspects of ourselves (namely feeling, representation, and faith), especially in connection with the very point under discussion here. But [at the moment] we are not casting about for just any sort of answer, and are not guided by experiences or observations to the effect that we have God in feeling, etc. To begin with, we keep to what we have before us—this One or universal, this abundance, which is the transparent aether remaining unchangeably itself.

271 If we take up this One that we have before us, and ask for which of our spiritual capacities or activities this One, this utterly universal being, *is*, then we can name, as the soil in which this content can be at home, only the activity or mode of our spirit that corresponds to it. If we now ask ourselves what we call this aspect of our consciousness | for which the universal on the whole is, whether it be determined abstractly or concretely within itself, then the answer is *thought*. For thought is alone the soil for this content, is the activity of the universal—the universal in its activity and efficacy. Or, if we speak of it as the apprehending of the universal, then it is always thought for which the universal is. The product of thought or what is engendered by means of thought is something universal, a universal content. The form—that within us which apprehends the universal—is for that very reason thought. As we said, this universal—which can be produced by thought and is for thought—

13. [Ed.] See below, pp. 387 ff.

can be wholly abstract. Then it is the immeasurable, the infinite, the sublation of all limits and all particularity, and this *negative* universal likewise has its seat only in thought.

It is a universal and ancient preconception that human beings are thinking beings, and that by thinking and thinking alone they distinguish themselves from the beasts. Animals have feelings, but only feelings. Human beings think, and they alone have religion. From this it is to be concluded that religion has its inmost seat in thought. No doubt it can subsequently be felt, "as we shall show later in our discussion."¹⁴

We also express this process thus: When human beings think of God, they elevate themselves above the sensible, the external, the singular. We say that it is an elevation to the pure, to that which is at one with itself. This elevation is a transcending of the sensible, of mere feeling, a journey into the pure region; and this region of the universal is thought. This is the content of the beginning, and in the subjective mode it is the soil for this content.¹⁵ |

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What we have before us is this single absolute. We cannot yet call this content or this determination "religion," for to the latter there belongs subjective spirit, consciousness. Thought is of course the locus of this universal, but, to begin with, this locus is absorbed in the One, the eternal, this actual being in-and-for-itself. In this genuine, absolute determination, although it is not yet developed or consummated, God remains absolute substance and does so

14. *Thus B; L (Var) reads:* but it is a faulty objection that religion and the like should be [only] a feeling, as if the content that is in one form belonged essentially to that form alone.

[Ed.] See below, pp. 390 ff.

15. *L (1827?) adds (similar in W):* The content is this absolutely undivided and continuous being, an abiding with self, the universal, and thought is the mode for which this universal is.

We have called God the universal, and there is for thought a distinction between itself and the universal, which we initially called God. This distinction belongs in the first instance to our reflection and is by no means contained explicitly in the content as yet. It is the faith of religion and the result of philosophy that God is the one true actuality and that there is no other actuality at all. From this standpoint an actuality that we call thinking has as yet no proper place. *In W₂ (Var) the final sentence reads:* In this one actuality and pure clarity, the actuality and distinction that we call thinking has as yet no place.

through all of the development. For this universal is the foundation, the beginning point, the point of departure, though at the same time it is simply the abiding unity and not a mere soil out of which the distinctions grow. Instead all distinctions remain enclosed within this universal.¹⁶ It is also not an inert, abstract universal, however, but rather the absolute womb or the infinite fountainhead out of which everything emerges, into which everything returns, and in which it is eternally maintained. This basic determination is therefore the definition of God as substance.¹⁷

Some people have wanted to designate this representation of the philosophical idea that we make for ourselves—namely, that God is this actual being, this abiding with self, the one truth, the absolute actuality—by the term *pantheism*, and the philosophy [associated with it] as *identity-philosophy*.¹⁸ Identity-philosophy is also said to be more precisely pantheism, for here everything is identity, or unity with self. This can be entirely superficial, and when speculative philosophy is said to be an identity system, “identity” is being taken in the abstract sense of the understanding. Rather than “pantheism” it could more accurately be called “the representation of substantiality,” because in it God is defined above all only as substance. The absolute subject (the spirit) also remains substance, although it is defined not only as substance | but also inwardly as subject. Those who say that speculative philosophy amounts to pantheism

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16. [Ed.] Thus in the Christian religion we arrive at the insight that this absolute substance is also internally self-differentiated: it is the immanent Trinity. God is not *sheer* substance, an undifferentiated monad, but rather an “abiding unity.” In going out from himself and entering into determinacy, God actually never leaves himself, for the distinctions are already present within God.

17. *W₂ and L add (MiscP)*: The universal therefore never steps forth out of this aether of equality with itself and of presence to itself. As this universal, God can never come to the point of being in fact along with an other whose subsistence is more than a [*L reads: more a*] play of illusion. Compared with this pure unity and clear transparency, matter is nothing impenetrable, and spirit or the I does not have the rigidity to possess true substantiality on its own account.

18. [Ed.] Schelling gave the name “identity-philosophy” to his main writings of 1801–1804. In the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* of 1801 (*Werke* 4:105–212), he elucidated his notion of the absolute identity as the prius and ground of the real and ideal realms (nature and spirit).

usually know nothing of this distinction; as always, they overlook what matters most.¹⁹

We need to make more explicit some of the characteristics of the pantheism that pious people usually reproach in philosophy.²⁰ "Pantheism" in the proper sense means that everything, the whole, the universe, this complex of everything existing, these infinitely many individual things—that all this is God. And the accusation made against philosophy is that it maintains that everything is God, "everything" meaning here this infinite multiplicity of individual things—not the universality that has being in and for itself but the individual things in their empirical existence, as they exist immediately but not in their universality. If one says, "God is everything, is this paper," and so on, then that is pantheism. When I say "genus," that is also a universality, of course, though quite a different one from when I say "totality." The genus is the universal only as the inclusion of all individual existences. Actual being, what lies at the foundation—the proper content is all individual things, [so it is said].

Now it is a wholly false contention that pantheism of this sort is effectively present in any "philosophy"²¹ whatsoever. It has never occurred to anyone to say that everything, all individual things collectively, in their individuality and contingency, are God—for example, that paper or this table is God. No one has ever held that. Still less has this been maintained in any philosophy. We will become acquainted with Oriental pantheism or genuine Spinozism later, in [treating] Oriental religion. Spinozism itself as such, and Oriental

19. Thus also *W*₁; *W*₂ (*Var*) adds: and they disparage philosophy in that they make something false out of it.

20. [Ed.] Explicit attacks on Hegel's "pantheism" began to appear in the mid-1820s. See F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), p. 231; and Anonymous [Hülsemann], *Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: Absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus* (Leipzig, 1829). The proximity in time to the Preface to the 2d ed. of the *Encyclopedia* (1827), as well as the mention of "pious people," makes it certain that Hegel is here aiming especially at the theologian Tholuck. In addition to the work mentioned above, see Tholuck's *Blüthensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik nebst einer Einleitung über Mystik überhaupt und Morgenländische insbesondere* (Berlin, 1825), pp. 33, 37.

21. Thus *B*, *Hu*, *An*; *L* and *W* read: religion

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pantheism, too, comprise the view that the divine in all things is only the universal aspect of their content, the *essence* of things, but in such a way that it is also represented as the *determinate* essence of things. For example, the Orientals state that Krishna, Vishnu, and Brahmā say regarding themselves: “I am the luster or brilliance in metals, the Ganges among rivers, the life in the living, the understanding in those who have understanding.”²² For in saying, “I am the luster in | metal, etc.,” one has thereby already superseded [the contention] that everything (metal, river, understanding) is God. Each of these (the one with understanding, the rivers, the metals) is something existing immediately. Krishna is not metal but the luster in metals. The luster is not the metal itself but the universal or substantial [aspect], separated out from the individual [aspect] but no longer the *πᾶν* or the all as the sum of individual [things]. Therefore what is expressed here is no longer what [the critics] call pantheism, for what is designated is the *essence* within such individual things. Many other features belong to individual things, such as spatiality and temporality; but here the focus is only upon the imperishable element in this individuality.²³

The usual representation of pantheism derives from the practice of focusing on the abstract unity rather than the spiritual unity, and from entirely forgetting that—in a religious representation in which only the substance or the One has the value of genuine actuality—individual things, in this very contrast with the One, have disappeared and no actuality is ascribed to them. Instead one retains this actuality of individual things. Against this the Eleatics²⁴ said, “There is only the One,” and expressly added, “and nothing is not at all.” Everything finite would be limitation or negation of

22. [Ed.] These words are spoken by the Hindu god Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu. Hegel conflates parts of three verses from the *Bhagavad-Gita* (10.36, 31, 22). The Sanskrit of Hegel’s “luster or brilliance in metals” is rendered in exceedingly diverse ways by modern translators.

23. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): But if we say, “Everything is God and God is everything,” then individuality is being taken according to all of its limitations, its finitude and transitoriness. The “life of the living” within this sphere of life is the unlimited, the universal.

24. [Ed.] Hegel refers to a statement of Parmenides (Fragment 6), transmitted by Simplicius (*in Phys.* 117.4): “That which can be spoken and thought needs must be; for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be” (G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [Cambridge, 1957], p. 270).

the One (*omnis determinatio est negatio*²⁵), but they say, “nothing, limitation, finitude, the limit and the limited, simply are not.” Thus, stopping short at this kind of philosophical definition²⁶ means that no actuality at all is ascribed to individual things, and that Spinozism is *acosmism*²⁷ rather [than pantheism]. Spinozism has also been reproached as *atheism*,²⁸ however, in Spinozism this world or this “all” simply *is not* [*ist gar nicht*]. Certainly the “all” appears, one speaks of its determinate being [*Dasein*], and our life is a being within this existence [*Existenz*]. In the philosophical sense, however, the world has in this view no actuality at all: it simply *is not*.²⁹ But | the accusers of Spinozism are unable to liberate themselves from the finite; hence they declare that for Spinozism everything is God, because it is precisely the aggregate of finitudes (the world) that has there disappeared.³⁰ If one employs the expression “all is one”³¹ and [claims] therefore that unity is the truth of multiplicity, then

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25. [Ed.] This expression (“all determination is negation”) goes back to Spinoza. See his letter No. 50 (to Jareg Jellis) in *Chief Works* 2:369–370.

26. L (Var) adds: such as that of the Eleatics or of Spinozism

27. [Ed.] Hegel may have first encountered the interpretation of Spinoza’s system as “acosmism” rather than as “pantheism” or “atheism” in Salomon Maimon’s *Lebensgeschichte* (Berlin, 1792), or in C. T. de Murr’s *Adnotationes* on Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (The Hague, 1802). This interpretation assumes that for Spinoza finite things are absorbed into the infinite and that therefore his system is one of “cosmotheism.” Hegel accepted this interpretation in contrast with Jacobi, who contended that there really is no difference between acosmism (or cosmotheism) and atheism (Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:xxxiv–xxxv). For Hegel’s view of Spinozism as acosmism, see his *History of Philosophy* 3:276, 280–282 (*Werke* 15:404, 408), and the *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 50 remark and § 573 remark.

28. [Ed.] The interpretation of Spinozism as atheism is found, among other places, in Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, § 716. But above all it was Jacobi who advanced the charge, “Spinozism is atheism” (*Briefe über Spinoza*, p. 223 [*Werke* 4/1:216, cf. pp. xxxvi–xxxvii]). On Hegel’s criticism that “the accusers of Spinozism are unable to liberate themselves from the finite” and that “hence they declare that for Spinozism everything is God,” see above, *Ms. Concept*, p. 254, incl. n. 184.

29. L (1827?) adds: No actuality is ascribed to “the all,” to these finitudes. There are finitudes, and about them it is said that they simply *are not*.

30. *Precedes* in L (1827?): There has never been a pantheism of the sort they have in mind.

31. [Ed.] Hegel alludes to the alleged deathbed confession of Lessing, as reported by Jacobi: “The orthodox conceptions of the deity are no longer for me; I cannot take pleasure in them. “Εν καὶ Πᾶν [“One and All”]! I know no other” (Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, pp. 22, 23, 62 [*Werke* 4/1:54, 55, 89]).

the “all” simply is no longer. The multiplicity vanishes, for it has its truth in the unity. But those critics cannot master the “being-vanished” of the many, or the negativity of the finite that is implied in it.

Furthermore there is the general accusation that Spinozism has the following consequence. If everything is one in the way this philosophy asserts, then it asserts with it that good is one with evil, that there is no distinction between good and evil, and therewith all religion is annulled. In this connection it is entirely correct that if “everything” actually were God, then God would be sublated. But here it is all the finite that is sublated instead. It is said that in Spinozism the distinction of good and evil has no intrinsic validity, that morality is annulled, and so it is a matter of indifference whether one is good or evil. That is no less superficial a consequence. For they indeed say that this would be an inevitable inference from this philosophy, but for charitable reasons they were not willing to draw this conclusion. It can in fact be conceded that the distinction of good and evil is sublated implicitly, that is, sublated in God as the sole true actuality. In God there is no evil. [However,] the distinction between good and evil exists only if God is also evil. But it will not be conceded that evil is something affirmative and that this affirmative element is in God. God is good and good alone. The distinction of good and evil is not present in this One, in this substance, for it first makes its entrance along with distinction in general.

276 ³²The distinction of good and evil makes its entrance together with the distinction of God from the world, in particular from human beings. With regard to the distinction of God and humanity, the basic determination in Spinozism is that human beings must have God alone as their goal. | For the distinction, i.e., for human beings, the law is the love of God,³³ that they be directed solely toward this love and not grant validity to their distinction or wish

32. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W)*: God is the One, abiding absolutely as present to self. There is no distinction within substance.

33. [Ed.] Hegel refers to Spinoza's *Ethics*, Part V, Prop. 36: “The intellectual love of the mind toward God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intel-

to persist in it, but have their orientation toward God alone. This is the most sublime morality, that evil is what is null, and human beings ought not to let this distinction, this nullity, be valid within themselves nor make it valid at all. We can will to persist in this distinction, can push it to the point of opposition to God, the universal in and for itself. In so doing we are evil. But we can also deem our distinction to be null and void, and can posit our essential being solely in God and in our orientation toward God. In so doing we are good.³⁴ This distinction is not [applicable] within God as such, within God under this definition as substance. But for human beings there is this distinction, since distinctiveness in general enters with human existence, and more specifically the distinction between good and evil.

In regard to the polemic [of the theologians] against philosophy generally, there is an unfortunate circumstance: on the one hand philosophy must become polemical, and on the other hand the objections are so shallow that philosophical instruction must begin from the primary elements. A further superficiality that is employed in the polemic against philosophy is that philosophy is said to be an identity-system. It is entirely correct that substance is this identity with itself—and so is spirit.³⁵ But to speak of identity-philosophy is to stick with abstract identity, or unity in general, and to neglect the point on which alone everything hinges, namely the inherent determination of this unity, whether it is defined as substance or as spirit. The whole of philosophy is nothing else but a “study”³⁶ of the definition of *unity*; and likewise the philosophy of religion is just a succession of unities, where the unity always [abides] but is

lectual love of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself” (*Chief Works* 2:264 f.). Cf. the corollary and note that follow in Spinoza’s text.

34. *L* (1827?) adds (first sentence similar in *W*): Thus the distinctiveness of good and evil certainly enters into Spinozism. God and the human being confront one another, and indeed do so with the specification that evil is to be deemed null and void. Therefore it is so far from being the case that morality, ethics, and the distinction between good and evil are absent from this standpoint that, on the contrary, this distinction here stands entirely in its place.

35. Thus also *W*₁; *W*₂ (*Var*) adds: Identity or unity with self is, in the end, everything.

36. Thus *B*, *An*, *W*; *L* (*Var*) reads: system

277 continually becoming more determinate. We can | make the one-sidedness of the polemic clear with an example drawn from nature. In the physical domain there are a lot of unities, such as water, into which earth is introduced. That is a unity, too, although a mixture. When I have a base and an acid, and a salt or a crystal forms from them, I also have water there. Similarly, it is present in muscle fibers and the like, although it is not visible. In this case the unity of the water with this material is again one that is quite differently determined from the unity that results if I mix water and earth. In all these things the unity of water with other substances is there, although the determinations of this unity are different in each case. If we now omit this particular determination upon which everything depends and cling to the unity abstractly, we are finally reduced to applying the poorest category, that of mixture, to all these higher configurations, to crystals, plants, living organisms, etc. The main thing is the distinction of these determinations of unity. Thus the unity of God is always unity, too, though everything turns quite strictly upon the manner in which this unity is defined. It is just this definition, however, that is overlooked by such a superficial apprehension, namely the apprehension on which everything depends.

B. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD³⁷

The first [moment] in the concept of religion is this divine universality, spirit wholly in its indeterminate universality for which there is positively no distinction. The second [moment] after this

37. In *B's* margin: 17 May 1827

[*Ed.*] *B's* notation is actually adjacent to the beginning of the second sentence below. The heading is editorial, although *An* writes: "Starting from ourselves, how do we arrive at the knowledge of God?" Into this section, which treats the various forms of the knowledge of God or of religious consciousness—namely, immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, representation, thought—Hegel incorporates much of the material from Secs. A and B.1 of the 1824 lectures, and from Secs. B and D of the 1821 *Ms.* This previously dispersed material now finds its logically appropriate place in the second moment of the concept of God, the moment of particularity or differentiation, the moment of relationship. Under the theme of "Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God" (a subcategory of "Thought"), Hegel also gathers together his treatment of the proofs of the existence of God, previously dispersed across Parts II and III and considered in conjunction with specific religions. (See below, n. 109.)

absolute foundation is distinction in general, and only with distinction does religion as such begin. |

This *distinction* is a spiritual distinction, it is consciousness. In general the spiritual, universal relationship is the knowledge of this absolute content, of this foundation. This is not the place to analyze the cognition of this absolute judgment [or primal division]. The concept judges, that is, the concept or the universal passes over into primal division, diremption, separation. Because it is one of the logical determinations and these are presupposed,³⁸ we can express it here as a fact that this absolute universality proceeds to the internal distinction of itself, it proceeds to the primal division or to the point of positing itself as determinateness.

Thus we arrive at the standpoint for which God (in this general indeterminateness) is object of consciousness. Here for the first time we have two [elements], God and the consciousness for which God is. Because we have these two, in representation we can start just as readily from one as from the other.³⁹

~Suppose that we take *God* as our point of departure.⁴⁰ Then God or spirit is this judgment [or primal division]; expressed concretely, this is the creation of the world and of the subjective spirit for which God is object. Spirit is an absolute manifesting. Its manifesting is a positing of determination and a being for an other. "Manifesting" means "creating an other," and indeed the creating of subjective spirit for which the absolute is. The making or creation of the world is God's self-manifesting, self-revealing. In a further and later definition we will have this manifestation in the higher form that what God creates God himself is, that in general it does not have the determinateness of an other, that God is manifestation of his own self, that God is for himself—the other (which has the

38. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 623 ff. (GW 12:53 ff.).

39. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* But upon this absolute foundation—we still express it primarily as fact—there now also arises distinction in general, which, as spiritual distinction, is consciousness; only with it does religion as such begin. In that the absolute universality proceeds to judgment [or primal division], i.e., proceeds to posit itself as determinateness, and in that God *is* as spirit for spirit, we thus arrive at the standpoint for which God is object of consciousness, and the initially universal and distinct thought has entered into relationship.

40. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads (similar in W₁):* We can say that the judgment [or primal division] proceeds absolutely from God.

empty semblance of [being] an other but is immediately reconciled), the Son of God or human being according to the divine image.⁴¹ Here for the first time we have consciousness, the subjectively knowing spirit for which God is object.⁴²

279 From this it follows that God can be known or cognized, for it is God's nature to reveal himself, to be manifest. Those who say that God is not revelatory⁴³ do not speak from the [standpoint of the] Christian | religion at any rate, for the Christian religion is called the revealed religion. Its content is that God is revealed to human beings, that they know what God is. Previously they did not know this; but in the Christian religion there is no longer any secret—a mystery certainly, but not in the sense that it is not known.⁴⁴ For consciousness at the level of understanding or for sensible cognition it is a secret, whereas for reason it is something manifest. When the name of God is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and Aristotle⁴⁵ that God is not jealous to the point of not communicating himself. Among the Athenians the

41. L, W₁ add (1827?): Adam Kadmon.

[Ed.] As the ontologically primordial human being of ancient and medieval Jewish mysticism and later heterodox Christian theosophy (including Jacob Boehme, whose works Hegel knew), Adam Kadmon is the first spiritual configuration to emanate from the divine light.

42. L (1827?) adds (first sentence similar in W₁): God is in being revelatory for spirit, and the self-revealing is at the same time the begetting of spirit. Creation means nothing other than that God reveals himself.

43. W₁ (1827?) adds: that we can know nothing of God

44. L (1827?) adds (similar in W₁): (All Athenians knew the Eleusinian mysteries.) A mystery is something profound, and later among the Neoplatonic philosophers it is the speculative element that expresses the immediate God.

[Ed.] Cf. Hegel, *History of Philosophy* 2:448 (*Werke* 15:72; cf. 91n.): "However, μυστηριον has not to the Alexandrians the meaning that it has to us, for to them it indicates speculative philosophy generally." Hegel sees such a connection of mystery and speculation for Proclus in particular. Here he is probably thinking as well of the existential unity for Proclus of faith in the mysteries and philosophical speculation. Cf. Marinus, *De vita Procli*; and Proclus, *Theologia Platonis*, the Introduction and especially the trinitarian teaching of Book 3, chaps. 9–14.

45. [Ed.] On the absence of jealousy on the part of divinity, see Plato *Phaedrus* 247a and *Timaeus* 29d–e, and Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 982b–983a. None of these passages, however, speaks of the divine as actively communicating itself to human beings (except for the *Timaeus*, in the specific sense of an ontological communication).

death penalty was exacted if one did not allow another person to light his lamp from one's own, for one lost nothing by doing so. In the same way God loses nothing when he communicates himself.⁴⁶ Therefore this knowledge on the part of the subject is a relationship that issues from God; and, as issuing from God, it is the absolute judgment that God *is as spirit for spirit*. Spirit is essentially a being for spirit, and spirit *is spirit* only insofar as it is *for spirit*. This is how we can represent to ourselves the relationship of consciousness to its content, when we take spirit as our point of departure.⁴⁷ |

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46. L, W₁ add (1827?): God reveals himself, or gives himself to cognition.

47. In W₁ there follows an interpolation from 1831 that, in the amplified form given below, is also contained in W₂: In the doctrine of God we have God before us as object quite simply on his own account. It is true that the relation of God to human beings is then appended. Whereas this relation did not appear to belong essentially to the doctrine [i.e., to God as object for himself] according to the usual representation in former times, modern theology by contrast treats of religion more than of God. All it requires is that human beings should have religion: that is the main thing, and it is even regarded as a matter of indifference whether or not they know anything of God. Or else it holds that this [knowledge] is only something wholly subjective, and that we have no proper knowledge of what God is. In the Middle Ages, on the other hand, God's essence was given more consideration and definition. We have to acknowledge the truth implicit in the [modern practice] of not considering God in isolation from the subjective spirit. But we do so not for the reason that God is something unknown, but only because God is essentially *spirit*, is [God] as *knowing* [spirit]. Thus there is a relation of spirit to spirit. This *relationship* of spirit to spirit lies at the basis of religion.

If we were now to be excused from beginning with the proof that God is, we still would have to prove that *religion* exists and that it is *necessary*, for philosophy does not have its object as something given.

We could indeed say that that proof is not needed, by appealing to the fact that all peoples have religion. But that is only taken for granted, and in general we do not get around [the issue] particularly well with the expression "all." For there are also peoples of whom it can scarcely be said that they have religion; their highest [being], what they in some way worship, is the sun, the moon, or whatever else is striking to them in sensible nature. There is also the phenomenon of a cultural extreme where the being of God has been denied altogether, and where it is likewise denied that religion is the most genuine expression of spirit. Indeed it has been seriously contended by this extreme that, by instilling religion in human beings, priests are only deceivers, since their intention in so doing was only to make people subservient to them.

[Ed.] The accusation of priestly deception occurs above all in the French Enlightenment. See, e.g., Boulanger (= d'Holbach), *Le christianisme dévoilé*; ou,

On the other hand, if we take the *human being* as our point of departure, in that we presuppose the subject and begin from ourselves because our immediate initial knowledge is knowledge of ourselves, and if we ask how we arrive at this | distinction or at the knowledge of an object and, to be more exact in this case, at

Examen des principes et des effets de la religion chrétienne (London, 1756), esp. chap. 15; and *Théologie portative; ou, Dictionnaire abrégé de la religion chrétienne, par l'abbé Bernier* (London, 1768), esp. entries "Sacerdote" and "Sacrilège." Hegel's acquaintance with these writings is not verified. He did at least know this accusation from Lessing's publication, *Aus den Papieren des Ungenannten* [Reimarus], Fragment 5: *Über die Auferstehungsgeschichte* (Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* 12:397–428, esp. 402).

Follows additionally in *W₁* (1831): Consequently it is by no means superfluous to exhibit the necessity of religion, and it can rightly be demanded in a scientific consideration. But we must excuse ourselves from this exhibition when we consider the means through which alone it can take place. Philosophy of religion constitutes one part of the whole of philosophy. The parts of philosophy are the links of a chain or the parts of a circle. They are developed within this context, and their necessity is presented within it. The necessity of religion must therefore follow from the whole content, so that religion stands within it as result and is to that extent mediated. This demonstration lies already behind us, for it is present in philosophy, this relationship has already been noted. When something is a result, it is mediated through another. When we have carried out the proof that God is, then God is represented as a result; this appears as nonsensical, for it is God's very nature not to be a result. It is this way with religion, too, for it is substantial knowledge; likewise this implies that religion ought not to be a result, but rather the foundation. But the more precise sense of this "being-mediated" does need to be provided here.

The procedure through which the genuineness and necessity of religion is demonstrated is briefly the following. We begin from intuitions of nature, and we know first about the sensible realm; that is natural consciousness. But spirit presents itself as the truth of nature: it is shown that nature returns into its ground, which is spirit in general. Nature is cognized as a rational system: the final peak of its rationality is that nature itself exhibits the existence of reason. The law of the vitality of things is what activates nature. But this law is only in the inner being of things; in space and time it exists only in an external manner, for nature knows nothing of the law. Spirit or the true exists in nature in an existence not conformable to itself. The genuine existence of that which is in itself is spirit; thus spirit goes forth out of nature and shows that it is the truth (i.e., the foundation) and the highest [moment] within nature. At first, spirit stands in relationship to nature as to something external, and in this mode it is finite consciousness; it knows the finite and stands over against nature as an other—for, to begin with, spirit exists as finite spirit. But the finite has no truth and passes away; finite spirit returns into its ground, for as finite it is conceived in contradiction with itself. Spirit is free; to be [present] in what is external is contradictory to its nature, for it is itself the freeing of itself from what is null

the knowledge of God,⁴⁸ then in general the answer has already been given: "It is precisely because we are thinking beings." God is the absolutely universal in-and-for-itself, and thought makes the universal in-and-for-itself into its object. This is the simple answer that contains within itself much that we are to consider later on.

1. Immediate Knowledge⁴⁹

At this point we are at the standpoint of the *consciousness* of God and hence for the first time at the standpoint of religion in general. We have now to consider this consciousness or this standpoint more closely. We begin at once by taking up the content of this relationship and describing the way in which we find it before us and what its particular forms are. These forms are partly psychological in character and fall on the side of the finite spirit. We have to take them up here inasmuch as we are dealing with religion as a wholly concrete content of science. |

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As we said, the universal is, to begin with, the consciousness of God. It is not just consciousness but, more precisely, it is certainty,

and the elevating of itself to itself (i.e., to itself in its genuineness)—and this elevation is the emergence of religion. This process, which is exhibited in its necessity, has, as its final result, religion as the freedom of spirit in its true essence. True consciousness is solely the consciousness of spirit in its freedom. In this necessary process lies the proof that religion is something genuine, and the same process immediately brings forth the concept of religion. Thus religion is given through what precedes it in science, and is therefore cognized as necessary.

48. *W₁* (1827?) *adds*: or how this primal division is to be grasped, starting from our side,

49. [*Ed.*] Hegel begins his description of the forms of religious knowledge with an analysis of "immediate knowledge" or "faith"—the certainty that God is independently of my awareness of him. He does not begin with "intuition" (*Anschauung*), as in Sec. D of the 1821 *Ms.*, because faith is something other than sensible intuition; we do not have immediate sense-experience of God, although our consciousness of God may be given expression in sensible, artistic form, as in the religion of art, in which case it takes on the form of intuition. On the other hand, faith is something less than what might be called "intellectual intuition" or the speculative "insight" into the necessity of this content (God), which comes only with mediated knowledge or cognition. Hegel also distinguishes between faith as such (the immediate certainty that God is) and its *forms* or *modalities*, namely feeling and representation, which are taken up in the following two sections. These various distinctions become clear in the course of the discussion.

too. First among its more specific aspects (and bearing upon the *subjective* side) is *faith*—i.e., certainty inasmuch as it is *feeling* and exists in feeling. Second, there is the *objective* side, the mode of the content. But the form in which God initially is for us is the mode of *representation*, and the final aspect is the form of thought as such.

First of all we have the consciousness of God in general, namely the fact that God is object for us, that we have representations of God. What we are conscious of, however, is not only that we have this object as our representation but also that it is not merely representation, that it *is*. This is certainty of God, *immediate knowledge*.

The fact that something is an object in consciousness or a representation means that this content is within me, is my own. I can have representations of wholly imaginary or fictitious objects. In this case the content is only mine, it is only in representation, and I simultaneously know that it *is not*. In dreams I am also consciousness and have objects, although [apart from me] they are not.⁵⁰

However, we take the consciousness of God to be the consciousness that God also *is*—not merely [as] my own or [as] a subject within me, but [as] independent of me and of my acts of representing and knowing. God is in and for himself: that is implied in this content itself. God is this universality having being in and for itself, outside me and independent of me, not merely having being for me. This [feature] is present in every intuition, in every consciousness, and indeed these two different determinations are combined within it [consciousness]: I have this content, it is within me; but it also is on its own account. That is *certainty in general*. God is distinct from me, is independent, absolutely in-and-for-himself, and, vis-à-vis myself, this actual being that is in-and-for-itself is at the same time my own, is in my I or self. Even as this content is independent, it is also inseparably within me.

Certainty is the immediate relation of the content and myself. If

50. L (1827?) adds: What constitutes the general character of representation is the fact that something is an object of my consciousness.

I wish to express this relation forcefully, then I say, "I know this as certainly as [I know that] I myself am." The certainty of this external being | and the certainty of myself are both one and the same certainty.⁵¹ This oneness of certainty is the inseparability of the content that is distinct from me;⁵² it is the inseparability of the two aspects that are distinguished from one another, and this undivided unity is within the certainty. Thus both an independent being, an actual being in-and-for-itself, and I as the one who knows of it, are contained within this consciousness of God. I am certain that it is; there is this one certainty, this immediate relation.

It is possible to stop with these abstract definitions; it is even asserted that we must stop with this certainty. But as a rule people straightaway make the following distinction. Something can be *certain*, but it is a different question whether it is *true*. We set certainty in opposition to truth, for in that something is certain it is not yet true.⁵³

For the time being we stick with the topic of certainty. Its universal aspect is this primal division between God and the knowing subject. Certainty is the undivided unity of these two together.

The first particular form of this certainty is that of *faith*. Faith properly has an antithesis within itself, but one that is more or less indeterminate. Faith is set in opposition to knowledge, [but] this is a vacuous antithesis because what I believe, I also know—it is a content in my consciousness. Knowledge is the universal, whereas belief is only a part of knowledge. If I believe in God, then God is in my consciousness, and I also know that God is. But by "knowledge" we ordinarily mean a mediated knowledge that cognizes and demonstrates, and that is something else again. Still, knowledge in general cannot be placed in opposition to faith in this way.

More precisely stated, a certainty is termed "*faith*" partly inasmuch as it is not immediate sensible certainty and partly inasmuch

51. *W₂ (1827?) adds:* and I would annul my own being and not know of myself were I to annul that being.

52. *W₂ (1827?) adds:* and my own self;

53. [Ed.] In another philosopher one might have expected: "not necessarily true." However, since cognition of truth is for Hegel a function of mediated knowledge, to which we have not yet come, his "not yet" is likely intentional.

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as this knowledge is also not a knowledge of the necessity of this content. In one respect immediate certainty is said to be *knowledge*. I do not need to believe what I see before me, for I know it. I do not believe that a sky is above me; I see it. On the other hand, when I have rational insight into the necessity of a thing, | then, too, I do not say "I believe." For example, it is assumed that one does not accept the Pythagorean theorem on authority but rather has gained insight into its demonstration for oneself. Thus faith [being neither of these] is a certainty that one possesses apart from immediate sensible intuition, apart from this sensible immediacy, and equally without having insight into the necessity of the content. In recent times faith has also been taken wholly in the sense of "certainty," in a sheer antithesis to insight into the necessity of a content. Jacobi⁵⁴ in particular introduced this meaning. He says that we only believe we have bodies; we don't know it. Here knowledge has the narrower meaning of "awareness of necessity." Jacobi says specifically that it is merely a belief that I see this. My intuiting and feeling, and all such sensible knowledge, is wholly immediate, unmediated—there is no ground for it.⁵⁵ Here belief in general has the meaning of "immediate certainty."

The expression "faith," however, is used chiefly for the certainty that there is a God; and it is indeed used inasmuch as we do not have insight into the necessity of this content. And to that extent we say that "faith" is something subjective, as opposed to which the knowledge of necessity is termed objective.⁵⁶ For this reason, too, we speak of "faith in God"—according to ordinary linguistic usage—because we have no immediate sensible intuition of God.

54. [Ed.] See above, 1827 *Intro.*, n. 27.

55. Thus *L*, similar in *W*; *An reads*: Jacobi says I merely believe that paper lies before me. I look there and so I see it, but I do not see the necessity.

[Ed.] In the form given by *An*, this citation is not identifiable in Jacobi's writings. When Hegel said (according to *L*) "it is merely a belief that I see this," he may have picked up or pointed to a sheet of paper. According to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel introduced a reference to paper—"paper lies here"—into a quotation from Jacobi's *Briefe über Spinoza* that makes no mention of paper (see Hegel, *Werke* 15:545 [not in the Eng. trans.]; Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:211).

56. *Precedes L* (1827?) (similar in *W*): We believe in God because we do not have insight into the necessity of this content, namely that God is and what God is.

But we do believe in God, and to that extent we have the certainty that God is. Of course we also speak here of the “*grounds of faith*.” But that surely is not to be taken literally. When I have grounds, that is to say, objective and proper grounds, then the thing is proved for me. But again the grounds themselves can be of a subjective nature, whereupon I let my knowledge pass for a proven knowledge and say “I believe.”⁵⁷ The main ground, the one ground for | faith in God is *authority*, the fact that others—those who matter to me, those whom I revere and in whom I have confidence that they know what is true—believe it, that they are in possession of this knowledge. Belief rests upon testimony and so has a ground. But the absolutely proper ground of belief, the absolute testimony to the content of a religion, is the witness of the spirit⁵⁸ and not miracle or external, historical verification.⁵⁹ The genuine content of a religion has for its verification the witness of one’s own spirit, [the witness] that this content conforms to the nature of my spirit and satisfies the needs of my spirit. My spirit knows itself, it knows its essence—that, too, is an immediate knowledge, it is the absolute verification of the eternally true, the simple and true definition of this certainty that is called faith.

This certainty (and faith with it) enters into an antithesis with thought, and with truth in general; but it is only later⁶⁰ that we have to discuss this antithesis. First we want to deal with the next two forms that emerge in the company of this certainty, namely *feeling and representation*. Feeling comes under consideration more in a subjective regard, whereas representation concerns more the objective mode of the content, i.e., how it is an object of consciousness for us—the determination of objectivity.⁶¹

57. Similar in *W*₁; follows in *W*₂ (*MiscP/Ed?*) as transition to the section on *feeling*: The first, simplest, and still most abstract form of this subjective grounding is this, that in the beginning of the I the being of the object is also contained. This grounding and this appearing of the object is given as the first and immediate grounding and appearing in feeling.

58. [Ed.] Cf. Rom. 8:16.

59. In *B*’s margin: 18 May 1827

60. [Ed.] See below, pp. 407 ff.

61. *L* (1827?) adds: To begin with, we have only to describe these two forms, and in doing so to indicate their limitedness and imperfection.

2. Feeling⁶²

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As far as the *form* of feeling is concerned, we ask first what it means to say, "I have that in my feeling" or "I have a feeling of something," e.g., of sensible or even of moral objects. We will find that possession in feeling is nothing else but the fact that a content is *my own*, and indeed is my own as this particular individual—the fact that it belongs to me and is for me, that I have and know it in its determinateness and that at the same time I know myself in this determinateness. It is the feeling of a content and | the feeling of oneself—both at once. The content is in such a way that my particularity is at the same time bound up with it.

Any content can be in feeling, just as it can be in thought generally. In feeling, however, we at no time have the content or the thing as such (for example, law or right) alone before us. Instead we know the thing in its connection with ourselves, and thereby we take pleasure in ourselves, i.e., in our own fulfillment with the thing. Feeling is for this reason such a popular theme, because when we feel [something] we are personally and subjectively involved, too, according to our particularity and personal character. In feeling we give validity to ourselves at the same time as to the thing we feel. ⁶³A [person of] "character" who has a firm purpose, and pursues this purpose throughout an entire life, can be very dispassionate about it. Such a person has only the thing, has only this purpose. "Warmth of feeling," on the other hand, signifies that at the same time I am fully with the thing in all my particularity, and that is an anthropological aspect. The particularity of our own person is its corporeality so that feeling pertains also to this corporeal side. With [aroused] feelings the blood becomes agitated and we become warm around the heart. That is the character of feeling. The whole complex of feeling is what we call "heart" or "emotional temper" [Gemüt].

62. [Ed.] Cf. below, n. 75.

63. *Precedes in L* (1827?): In our thinking we forget ourselves and possess the objective content [in thought] rather than our own self-consciousness. But along with thinking we can also have feeling, and then we concurrently involve ourselves with the content and bind ourselves to it, so that our particularity is there, too. We speak of warmth of feeling for the thing; this is not "interest" in the general sense.

It is required not only that we know God, right, and the like, that we have consciousness of and are convinced about them, but also that these things should be in our feeling, in our hearts. This is a just requirement; it signifies that these interests ought to be essentially our own—that we, as subjects, are supposed to have identified ourselves with such content. “A human being who has the right in his heart is one who is identified with the spirit. In the same way the phrase “religion of the heart”⁶⁴ expresses this identification of the | content with the subjectivity and personality of the individual. It is also part of “acting upon principles” not only that one knows the principles but also that they are in one’s heart. There can also be bound up with bare conviction the fact that other inclinations exert force against it. But if the conviction is in the heart, then the agent acts upon it; one has this disposition and acts in accordance with what (in this dispositional manner) one *is*. What one has in one’s heart belongs to the being of one’s personality, to one’s inmost being. So far as I am moral, honest, or religious, then duty, law, or religion is identified with me; my actuality is in them and they are in my actuality; they constitute my being, for that is the way I am.

We cannot say of feeling that it is good or not good, that it is correct and genuine on the one hand, or false or spurious on the other. This indeterminateness is feeling [per se]. Where there is feeling, our attention is drawn at once to the determinateness of the feeling, to what kind of feeling it is: feeling of fear or anxiety, base feelings, etc. This determinateness is what appears as its content. To the extent that we have a representation of this determinateness and are ourselves conscious of it, we have therefore an object that also appears at the same time in a subjective mode, as an object of feeling. In the case of outwardly sensible feeling its

64. Thus B, similar in Hu; L (Var) reads: As something actual, as this one, I should be determined thus throughout. This determinateness should be peculiar to my character, it should constitute the general mode of my actuality, and it is therefore essential that every genuine content should be in feeling, or in the heart. What we carry in the heart in this way is our disposition: that is how we are. For instance, to one human being right is custom and usage, and it is part of the being of this person. Feeling as a whole

determinateness is the content—for example, when we feel something hard, the determinateness of the feeling is therefore a hardness. But we also say about this hardness that there is a hard object present. The hardness therefore [both] is subjective and exists as an object. We reduplicate the feeling. “We swiftly pass over from it to consciousness,”⁶⁵ and we say at the level of consciousness that there is a hard object that has this effect upon us that we call feeling. Before we have felt it, we do not know that it is a hard object. Only after the [experience of] feeling do we assume that it is constituted thus and so.

288 But then we also have other feelings: feeling of self, feeling of God, feeling of right and of ethics. Here the very determinateness of the feeling is the content. God, or the right, is equally something subjective and something objective, | i.e., something having being in-and-for-itself, independently—in this case as the external object. When I know God in this way, and know the right, and have religious feeling, then I know this content; I know this content within myself and myself within this content. I am this content, [for] I know the unification of myself with it, and in that knowledge I at the same time have knowledge of my own particular person. [I know] that I have assimilated this content to myself and myself to it, the content that is nevertheless in and for itself—such as right, the ethical realm, and the like. When I know God and the right, then consciousness has made its entrance, and [with it] a parting or division that was not yet in feeling. In vision we not only know ourselves, but we place the object outside us and withdraw ourselves. Consciousness is the ejection of the content out of feeling; it is a kind of liberation.

If we dwell on the fact that in feeling the content is identified with us, what transpires is that we have the representation of feeling as the *source* of this content, of religious and honest feeling as the source of faith and of the knowledge of God, right, and ethical life. At the same time we represent the fact that the content is in our heart as the confirmation and justification for the claim that it is

65. *Thus An; L (Var) reads:* We make this conversion instantly in the case of the sensible content that we have in our subjective feeling, for we assume the presence of an external object that corresponds to that content,

the genuine content. "We find it in our heart"—that is the point it is important to consider, because in recent times it has been declared that we must consult the human heart in order to learn what is just and ethical. The opinion is that we discover within our hearts what God is. The heart is alleged to be the source, the root, and the justifying [factor] for this content. How are we to evaluate this opinion? "Is this religion of feeling the true religion? Is it feeling that justifies our acting in this way or that?"⁶⁶ |

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I can even grant that for me the heart is the seed, root, and source of this content, though that is not saying very much. Calling it the source amounts to saying the heart is the initial mode in which such content appears to the subject. In the first instance the human being perhaps has religious feeling, but perhaps not. To that extent the heart has, to be sure, the significance of the seed. But, just as in the case of a single vegetable seed that is the first mode of existence of a plant, feeling is also this enveloped mode. The seed with which the life of the plant begins is the first [phase] only in the empirical mode, or only in appearance; for it is just as much a product or result, the final [phase]. It is therefore a wholly relative moment of origin (as we have already seen in the case of immediate knowledge). The enveloped being of the tree's nature, this simple seed, is the product or result of the entire developed life of this tree. And in feeling, too, the entire genuine content is within our subjective actuality in this enveloped fashion. But it is something else entirely [to say] this content as such is supposed to belong to feeling as such—for example, contents such as God, right, and duty.⁶⁷ God

66. *Thus An; similar in B, Hu; L (Var) reads:* Thus the religion of feeling is in fact the genuine one. The heart is what justifies faith in this content, and action according to its specifications. *In W₂ (MiscP), two paragraphs earlier:* Indeed, it is so far from the case that we can find God solely and truly in feeling, that we must already be acquainted with this content from elsewhere if we are to be able to find it in feeling. And if it means that we have no cognition of God, and can know nothing of God, how then are we to say that God is in feeling? We must first have searched elsewhere within consciousness according to specifications of the content that is distinguished from the I; for we can identify the feeling as religious only insofar as we rediscover in it just these specifications of the content.

67. *Thus An; L (Var) reads (similar in W₁):* The most we can say is that contents such as God, the human being's relationship to God, right, duty, etc., are brought before representation [in the way they are] determined by feeling. *W₂ (Var) adds:* A content such as

is a content that is universal in and for itself; and in the same way the definitions of right and duty are a determination of the *rational will*.⁶⁸ As will, I exist in my freedom, in my universality itself, in the universality of my self-determination; and if my will is rational, then [self-]determination is a determining in general, something universal, a determining according to the pure concept. Rational will is sharply distinct from contingent willing or willing according to contingent impulses and inclinations, for it determines itself in accord with its concept, and the concept or substance of the will is pure freedom. All rational determinations of the will are developments of freedom, and the developments that issue from it are duties and are thereby rational. Determination by means of, and in accordance with, the pure concept is the constituent element that belongs to rationality. | Therefore it belongs just as essentially to thought.⁶⁹ Even in the case of God we have already drawn attention to the fact that this is a content that belongs to thought, for thought is the soil in which this content is both apprehended and engendered alike.

⁷⁰Now insofar as it is the nature of this content to be only in thought in its authentic mode, it follows that the way in which it is in feeling is an inadequate mode. The fundamental determination of feeling is the specificity or particularity of my own subjectivity. As subject, as both intelligent and willing subject, I may be convinced with such fixity that other, particular grounds avail nothing against this fixity of my conviction, or that indeed they are not present at all. If I am ethical will, then I have this very determination within me. I am it, without my conviction or my will being conjoined with a consciousness of the particularity of my person. But all the same, this content belongs to my actuality also, and then what we say is that "I have it in my heart," for this is "my heart." In other words, the content is within my own self-certainty, in my intellect

68. L, W add (1827?): I am will and not only desire, [for] I do not just have inclination. The I is the universal.

69. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): Will is rational only insofar as it is thinking. It is an erroneous representation that will and intellect are two different compartments within spirit, and that will could be rational and ethical without thought.

70. In B's margin: 21 May 1827

and will as such, or else the consciousness of the particularity of my person is conjoined with it. In this latter case it is in feeling.

Is then something true or legitimate because it is in my feeling? Is feeling the verification, or must the content be just, true, or ethical in and for itself? These days we often find the former contention advanced.⁷¹ We have means enough in our consciousness for evaluating this contention. In our consciousness we know very well that, in order to know that a content is of the right kind, we must look about for grounds of decision other than those of feeling. For it is true that every content is capable of being in feeling: religion, right, ethics, crime, passions. Each content has a place in feeling. |

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If feeling is the justifying element, then the distinction between good and evil comes to naught, for evil with all its shadings and qualifications is in feeling just as much as the good. Everything evil, all crime, base passions, hatred and wrath, it all has its root in feeling.⁷² The murderer feels that he must do what he does. Everything vile is the expression of [some] feeling. In the Bible it says that wicked thoughts of blasphemy and the like proceed from the heart.⁷³ Undoubtedly the divine or the religious is in feeling, too, but evil has its own distinctive seat in the heart. This natural particularity, the heart, is its home. But that the human being's own particularity, egotism, and selfhood as such should be legitimated is not what is good or ethical. On the contrary, that is evil. "The content"⁷⁴ must be true in and for itself if the feeling is to count as

71. *L* (1827?) *adds*: We have a feeling of God, a feeling of our dependence, and a feeling of right, too. The feeling of right is on that account a just feeling, and this content or higher element is something true just because we have this feeling. On this view the feeling is made into the criterion of what is true and ethical.

72. *L* (1827?) *adds*: The evil person, for whom at this moment this determinate purpose or this interest transcends all other determinations, is, by his feeling, lifted beyond all that is upright and ethical. It is the same way with opinion. One person opines and feels this, another that; one and the same person now this, now that.

73. [*Ed.*] Cf. Matt. 15:19.

74. *L* (1827?) *reads*: The element of selfhood is the subjective element that we call heart in general. It must, of course, be the case with respect to the good also that the content belongs to me myself, that I have my own self within it. But that is only the form for a content that comes from elsewhere. Its distinguishing or proper feature is the very fact that feeling is a form, and that what matters is the content of the feeling; this

true. For that reason it is also said that one's feelings or one's heart must be purified and cultivated; natural feelings cannot be the proper impulses to action. What this says is precisely that what is genuine is not the content of the heart as such, but instead what ought to be the heart's *goal* and *interest*—this content and these determinations should become and be what is genuinely true. But what the genuinely true is we first learn through representation and thought.

3. Representation⁷⁵

292 The form of feeling is the subjective aspect, the certainty of God. The form of representation concerns the objective aspect, the content of the certainty. The obvious question is: "What is this content?" The content is God. For human beings God is primarily in the form of representation. "[Representation is]"⁷⁶ a consciousness of something that one has before oneself as something objective.

The fact that the religious content is present primarily in the form of representation is connected with what I said earlier,⁷⁷ that religion is the consciousness of absolute truth in the way that it occurs for all human beings. Thus it is found primarily in the form of representation. Philosophy has the same content, the truth; [it is] the spirit of the world generally and not the particular spirit.

75. [Ed.] Both religious feeling (*Gefühl*) and religious representation (*Vorstellung*) are forms or modes of expression of the immediate certainty that God is. Feeling describes the subjective aspect of this certainty, namely, its connection with our own determinate, particular existence. But feeling as such can make no judgments with respect to the *content* of whatever it is that we feel. This is a matter of consciousness, in the form first of representation but ultimately of thought (*Denken*). Representation, or nonsensible intuition (see n. 76), attends consciously to the *objectivity* of what is in feeling, but it does not yet penetrate this content rationally or cognitively. It continues to view it imagistically or reflectively, in terms of the finite categories of the understanding (*Verstand*). While all these forms of the religious relationship—faith, feeling, representation, etc.—are knowledge (*Wissen*) in the broad sense, the knowledge of God does not reach its goal until it becomes thought (*Denken*) or cognition (*Erkenntnis*) in the strict sense.

76. L (1827?) reads: For "representation" we may also use the term "intuition." Thereby we are not speaking of sensible intuition; it is only that, in using the word "intuition," one always denotes

77. [Ed.] See above, 1827 *Intro.*, p. 180.

Philosophy does nothing but transform our representation into concepts. The content remains always the same. The true is not for the single spirit but for the world spirit. But for the latter, representation and concept are *one*. The difficult thing is to separate out from a content what pertains only to representation. In its paring away of what pertains to representation, philosophy is reproached for removing the content, too. | This transformation is therefore held to be a destruction. These are the moments that are to be considered more closely. But first we are to consider the characteristics possessed by representation.⁷⁸

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In the first place, sensible forms or configurations belong to representation. We can distinguish them by the fact that we call them *images* [*Bilder*]. Those sensible forms for which the principal content or the principal mode of representation is taken from immediate intuition can in general be termed images. We are directly conscious that they are only images but that they have a significance distinct from that which the image as such primitively expresses—that the image is something symbolic or allegorical and that we

78. *Thus An with Hu; W₁ (Var) reads (cf. n. 88):* Here then it is quite important in principle to be acquainted with the distinction between representation [on one side] and thought and concept [on the other]—and to know what is peculiar to representation. Philosophy is the transformation of what is found in the form of representation into the form of the concept. The content [of each] is the same and should be the same, i.e., the truth. What is true is [true] for the spirit of the world generally, for the human spirit. This content, this substantial element, cannot be one thing for spirit in its representing and another thing in its conceptualizing [activity].

But insofar as human being thinks, and finds the need to think essential, the same content that is found at first in the form of representation gets elevated into the form of thought. That is where the difficulty comes of separating, in a content, what is content as such, or thought, from what pertains to the representation as such.

The reproaches that are directed against philosophy boil down to this: that philosophy strips off the forms that pertain to representation. Ordinary thinking has no awareness of this distinction; because truth for it is conjoined with these determinations, it supposes that the content has been removed altogether. This is the general point. But it can also be the case that a philosophy has a content different from the religious content of a particular religion; this recasting or translation is usually taken to be a total alteration or destruction.

We have to consider these moments more closely—i.e., what pertains to philosophy and what pertains to the mode of representation as such.

have before us something twofold, first the immediate and then what is meant by it, its inner meaning. The latter is to be distinguished from the former, which is the external aspect. Thus there are many forms in religion about which we know that they are only metaphors. For example, if we say that God has begotten a son, we know quite well that this is only an image; representation provides us with "son" and "begetter" from a familiar relationship, which, as we well know, is not meant in its immediacy, but is supposed to signify a different relationship, which is something like this one. This sensible relationship has right within itself something corresponding for the most part to what is properly meant with regard to God.⁷⁹

So there are many representations that derive from immediate sensible intuition as well as from inner intuition. Thus we soon know that talk of God's wrath is not to be taken in the literal sense, that it is merely an analogy, a simile, an image. The same holds true for emotions of repentance, vengeance, and the like on God's part. Moreover, we also find developed allegories, for instance the stories of Prometheus, who instructs human beings, and of Pandora's box⁸⁰—these, too, are images having a nonliteral meaning. Thus we hear of a tree of the knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] of good and evil.⁸¹ When the story arrives at the eating of the fruit, it begins to become dubious whether this tree should be taken as something historical, as a properly historical tree, | and the eating as historical, too; for all talk of a tree of knowledge is so contrary [to ordinary experience] that it very soon leads to the insight that this is not a

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79. Thus also W_2 ; W_1 (1831/Var?) adds: But one who relies entirely on sense sticks with his representation and gives little thought to it, and the present-day theologies of feeling and understanding, for their part, also know how to make nothing of it; they either discard the thought-content along with the image, or they hold fast the image and let go the thought.

80. [Ed.] The myth of Pandora's box is first given by Hesiod, *Erga* 79–105 and *Theogony* 570–590. But Hegel is not referring directly to Hesiod's version, since he speaks also of Prometheus as the instructor of human beings—an expansion of the Prometheus myth that is not found in Hesiod but for the first time in the literature of the fourth century B.C.

81. [Ed.] Cf. Gen. 2:9, 16–17.

matter of any sensible fruit, and that the tree is not to be taken literally.⁸²

However, it is not merely things that are manifestly figurative that belong to the mode of representation in its sensible aspect, but also things that are to be taken as historical. Something can be expounded in a historical mode and yet we do not take that to be its serious sense; we certainly do attend to the story with our imagination, but we do not ask whether it is meant seriously. We enjoy the narratives of Jupiter and the other deities, but we do not in the main inquire further about what Homer reports of them to us, we do not take it in the way we do some other historical report. Still, there is also something historical that is a divine history—a story, indeed, that is supposed to be history in the proper sense, namely the story of Jesus. This story does not merely count as a myth, in the mode of images. Instead it involves sensible occurrences; the “nativity, passion and death”⁸³ of Christ count as something completely historical. Of course it therefore exists for representation and in the mode of representation, but it also has another, intrinsic aspect. The story of Jesus is something twofold, a divine history. Not only [is there] this outward history, which should only be taken as the ordinary story of a human being, but also it has the divine as its content: a divine happening, a divine deed, an absolutely divine action. This absolute divine action is the inward, the genuine, the substantial dimension of this history, and this is just what is the object of reason. Just as a myth has a meaning or an allegory within it, so there is this twofold character generally in every story. Undoubtedly there are myths in which the outward appearance is the predominant feature. But ordinarily a myth contains an allegory, as in the case of Plato.

Generally speaking, every history contains this external sequence of occurrences and actions; but they are occurrences with respect to a | human being, a spirit. What is more, the history of a state is the action, deed, and fate of a universal spirit, the spirit of a people.

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82. Thus also W_2 ; W_1 (Var) adds: This is the mode of representation, of the figurative.

83. Thus An; Hu reads: birth, death, passion, and resurrection

Histories of this kind already have a universal feature within them, implicitly and explicitly. If we take this superficially, we can say that from every history a moral may be extracted. The moral encapsulates at least the essential ethical powers that have contributed to the action and have brought about the event, and they are the inner or substantial element. So history certainly has this aspect of segmentation, of singularity, of extreme outward individuation; and yet the universal laws and powers of ethical life are also recognizable within it. These universal powers, however, do not exist for representation as such; for representation, history exists in the mode in which it presents itself as story, or the way in which it exists in appearance. But all the same, even for those whose thoughts and concepts have not yet attained any determinate formation, that inner power is contained in a history of this kind. They feel it, and have "an obscure"⁸⁴ consciousness of those powers. Thus the historical as such is what exists for representation, and on the other hand there are images. For ordinary consciousness, for consciousness in its ordinary formation, religion exists essentially in these modes, as a content that primarily presents itself in sensible form, as a series of actions and sensible determinations that follow one another in time and then occur side by side in space. The content is empirical, concrete, and manifold, its combination residing partly in spatial contiguity and partly in temporal succession. But at the same time this content has an inner aspect—there is spirit within it that acts upon spirit. To the spirit that is in the content the subjective spirit bears witness—initially through a dim recognition lacking the development for consciousness of this spirit that is in the content.

In the second place, however, nonsensible configurations also belong to representation. The spiritual content as it is represented in its simple mode—an action, activity, or relationship in simple form—is of this kind. For instance, the creation of the world is a representation. God himself is this [sort of] representation. God,

84. *Thus W; L reads: a thinking Hu reads: although obscurely, a*

after all, is the universal that is determined within itself in manifold ways. In the form of representation, however, God is in this simple manner in which we have God on one side | and the world on the other. Again, the world is internally this endlessly manifold complex, or the complex of this endlessly manifold finite reality. But when we say “world,” we have it in the simple mode of representation. Now we say “the world is created,” and designate thereby a kind of activity completely different from an empirical activity.⁸⁵ 296

Every spiritual content and all relationships generally—of whatever sort they may be (sovereign, court of judgment, etc.)—are representations; spirit itself is a representation. Though they do indeed proceed from thought and have their seat and soil in thought, they are all still representations on account of their form. For they are determinations that are related simply to themselves, that are in the form of independence. In saying, “God is all-wise, wholly good, righteous,” we have fixed determinations of content, each of which is simple and independent alongside the others. The means for combining the representations are [the words] “and” and “also.” On the other hand determinations such as “all-wise” and the like are concepts, too. But to the extent that they are not yet analyzed internally and their distinctions are not yet posited in the way in which they relate to one another, they belong to [the realm of] representation.⁸⁶ What we say is, “something happens,” “change occurs,” or “if it is this, it is also that, and then it is in this way.” Thus these determinations have, to begin with, the contingency that

85. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): If we employ the expression “activity from which the world arises,” it is indeed an abstraction, though one that is tailored to representation and still not a concept; for the coherence of the two sides is not posited in the form of necessity. Instead it is either expressed according to the analogy of natural life and events, or designated as the sort of coherence that is supposed on its own account to be wholly one of a kind and inconceivable.

86. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): Thus, insofar as it is not something figurative, sensible, or historical, but rather something spiritual, something thought, the content of the representing activity is taken in its abstract, simple *relation to itself*. Insofar as such content contains manifold determinations within itself in any case, the connection of this manifoldness is taken in a merely external fashion by representation, and therefore only an external identity is posited.

297 gets stripped away from them only in the form of the concept.⁸⁷ |

Because the form of feeling stands over against that of representation, and because feeling concerns the form of subjective faith whereas representation on the contrary concerns the objective aspect or the content, there arises here, too, a relationship of representation to feeling. Representation concerns the objective side of the content, whereas feeling concerns the manner in which the content exists within our specific being, or within the specificity of consciousness. It is true that religion is a matter of feeling, but it is also just as much a matter of representation. Thus the question can directly arise: "Should we begin from representation, and are religious feelings awakened and determined through it, or should we begin on the other hand from religious feeling, and do religious representations proceed from it?"

If we begin from feeling, making it the first or original factor, then we say that religious representations derive from feeling. From one point of view that is entirely correct, for the feelings contain this enveloped subjectivity. But feeling is, on its own account, so indeterminate that everything possible can be within it, and, as we have seen, feeling cannot be the justifying [criterion] for the content.

87. L (1827?) adds (similar in W_2 , though in a different sequence): The essential content stands fast by itself in the form of the *simple universality* in which it is enveloped. Its passing over through itself into another, or its identity with the other, is lacking, for it is only identical with itself. The single items lack the bond of necessity and the unity of their distinction. Hence as soon as representation makes a start at grasping an essential connection, it also lets it stand in the form of contingency, and does not advance to its genuine in-itself and to its eternal, self-permeating unity. For example, the thought of providence is in representation in this way, and it draws the movements of history together and grounds them in God's eternal decree. But this very connection is straightaway transferred into a sphere in which it is supposed to be incomprehensible and inscrutable for us. Therefore the thought of the universal does not become determinate within itself, and is no sooner expressed than it is instantly sublated again. *Precedes in W_2 (MiscP)*: Or if the representation contains relationships that are already closer to thought—for example, that God created the world—the relationship is nevertheless grasped by it in the form of contingency and externality. Thus in the representation of the creation, God remains by himself on one side and the world on the other. *Follows instead in W_1 (Ed?)*: These determinations are clearly and explicitly considered, to the extent that we pass over to a higher level and first of all take up together and compare the two sides considered previously.

In its objectivity the content appears first as representation; this is the more objective mode in which it is present within consciousness. In this connection we do not have to discuss the relationship of subject and object exhaustively. We need only to recall here in a general fashion | something that in one way we know very well, namely that whatever I hold as true, whatever ought to be valid for me, must also be in my feeling, must belong to my being and character. The highest peak of subjectivity is the certainty that I have about something. This certainty is found in feeling, although it can also be in another form. But feeling is still nothing justificatory, for everything possible is capable of being in feeling. If what is in feeling were true just for that reason, then everything would have to be true: Egyptian veneration of [the sacred bull] Apis, Hindu veneration of the cow, and so on.

In contrast, representation already contains more of the objective—that which constitutes the contents or determinacy of feeling. This content is what matters, for it must justify itself on its own account. That it should legitimate itself, or offer itself to cognition as true, therefore falls more on the side of representation.

Regarding the necessity of representation and the path through representation into the heart, we know that religious instruction begins with representation. By means of doctrine and teaching the feelings become aroused and purified; they are cultivated and brought into the heart. But this bringing of feelings into the heart essentially has the other aspect also that its original determinacy lies in the nature of spirit itself. It is still another question whether the determinacy lies implicit in one's essence, or whether one knows from it what one essentially is. Representation is necessary for it to come to feeling and to consciousness, for it to emerge into consciousness and be felt. Instruction and teaching belong to this [process of] representation, and religious formation everywhere begins from this point.

4. Thought

What now holds our closer interest is *thinking*—the stage at which what is properly objective comes under consideration. We have an immediate certainty of God; we have faith in him and feeling and

representations of him. But we also have this certainty in thought, and here we call it "conviction." Conviction involves grounds, and these grounds essentially exist only in thought. |

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a. The Relationship of Thought and Representation

We have therefore still to consider the form of thought from the side [of representation], and first of all to give an account of how thought differentiates itself from the form of representation.

As we last said above, representing holds all sensible and spiritual content in the mode in which it is taken as isolated in its determinacy. Under the sensible content we have sky, earth, stars, color, and the like, and with respect to God we have wisdom, benevolence, etc. But the general form of thought is *universality*, and universality even played a role in representation, for that has the form of universality within it, too. We take the expression "thinking" in this respect, insofar as thinking is reflective or still more is comprehending—not merely thought in a general sense, but rather insofar as it is first reflection and then concept.

The first point, therefore, is that thought dissolves this form of the simple, in which the content is found in representation, in such a way that⁸⁸ distinct determinations within this simple reality are grasped and exhibited so that it is known as something *inwardly manifold*. To inquire after the concept of a thing is to inquire after the relationship of the distinct determinations within the thing itself. We have an instance of this as soon as we ask, "What is that?" Blue, for example, is a sensible representation. If we ask, "What is blue?" it is first set before our eyes so that we may obtain the intuition. The intuition is then already contained within the representation. However, with that question we also want to know

88. Thus L , similar in W_1 ; W_2 (MiscP) reads (cf. n. 78): and that is the very reproach that is usually directed at philosophy, when one says that it does not allow the form of representation to subsist, but instead alters it or strips away the content. And because for ordinary consciousness the truth is conjoined to that form, one supposes that when the form is changed the content and the subject matter are lost, and one declares that the recasting is a destruction. When philosophy transposes what is in the form of representation into the form of the concept, there does certainly emerge the difficulty of separating, in a content, what is content as such or thought from what belongs to representation as such. But to dissolve the simple reality of the representation principally means only [that]

the concept, to know blue in its relationship to itself, in its distinct determinations, and in their unity. Thus according to Goethe's theory blue is a unity of light and darkness, and that in such a way that the darkness is the ground and the cause of opacity while the light is an illuminating element, a medium through which we see this darkness.⁸⁹ The sky is dark and dim whereas the atmosphere is bright; through this bright medium we see the blue darkness. That is the concept of blue. The representation of blue is quite simply blue; the concept of blue is first of all a representation of distinct determinations [and afterwards] a unity of them.

If we now ask, "What is God?" or "What is justice?" we still have these representations at first in the form of simplicity. But when we think them, different determinations should be given of which the unity, their sum so to speak or more exactly their identity, constitutes the object. The determinations of this unity exhaust the object. But if we say that God is just, omnipotent, wise, and gracious, we can go on in this way without ceasing. The Orientals say that God has an infinite number of names, that is, of characteristics; what God is cannot be exhaustively expressed. If we are therefore supposed to grasp God's concept, then distinct determinations have to be given and this multitude of characteristics has to be reduced to a restricted set, so that the object may be completely exhausted by means of this restricted set of distinct characteristics and their unity.

⁹⁰In representation, however, the distinct characteristics stand on their own account; they might either belong to a whole or be placed outside one another. In thought the simple character is resolved into distinct determinations, or else those determinations that lie outside one another are compared in such a way that what comes to consciousness is the contradiction of the very factors that are at

89. [Ed.] This theory, presented in his *Zur Farbenlehre* (Tübingen, 1810), pp. 57–59, is one product of Goethe's speculative studies in natural science. See Goethe, *Theory of Colours*, trans. Charles Lock Eastlake (1840; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1970), §§ 151, 155.

90. *Precedes in L* (1827?) (*similar in W*): Insofar as something is thought, it is put in relation to an other. The object is known inwardly as a relation of distinct elements to one another, or as a relation of itself to an other that we know externally to it.

301 the same time supposed to constitute a unity. If they are mutually contradictory, it does not seem that they could belong to *one* content. The consciousness of this contradiction and its resolution belongs to thought. When we say that God is both gracious and just, we require no deliberation to come to the conclusion that benevolence contradicts justice. It is the same when we say that God is | omnipotent and wise, the power in the face of which everything disappears or does not exist—this negation of everything determinate is a contradiction of the wisdom that wills something determinate, the wisdom that has a goal and is the limitation of the indeterminacy that omnipotence is. It is this way with many things. In representation everything has its place peacefully alongside everything else: the human being is free and also dependent; there is good in the world and there is evil as well. In thought, on the contrary, these things are drawn into mutual connection, and thus contradiction becomes visible.

The precise category that enters in along with thought is *necessity*. In representation there is a space. Thought demands to know the necessity of it. In representation there is [the content] “God is.” Thought requires to know why it is necessary that God is. This necessity lies in the fact that in thought the object is taken not as having being, not just in its simple determinacy, its pure relation to itself, but essentially in relation to an other, so that it is essentially a relation of distinct elements. We call something “necessary” when, if one [element] exists, the other is thereby posited. The first only exists determinately insofar as the second exists, and vice versa. For representation the finite is “what is.” But for thought the finite is at once just that sort of thing which does not exist on its own account, but instead requires something else for its own being and exists by means of an other. For thought generally, and more precisely for comprehension, there is nothing immediate. Immediacy is the principal category of representation, where the content is known in its simple relation to itself. For thought there is nothing immediate but only the sort of thing in which mediation is essential.⁹¹

91. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): Such are the abstract, universal characteristics, the abstract distinction between religious representing and thinking.

b. *The Relationship of Immediate and Mediated Knowledge*

If we relate this [distinction] to our field [of interest], then all the forms that we have [considered thus far] belong to the side of representation. The more precise question with reference to our object here is whether knowledge of God, i.e., religion, is | an immediate or a mediated knowledge. Mediated knowledge emerges more nearly in the form of the so-called proofs for God's existence [*Dasein*].

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God is. "We spoke of this statement in connection with immediate knowledge."⁹² But because we have now passed over to the determination of thought and so to that of necessity, a knowledge of necessity or of mediation enters in, a knowledge that requires mediation in any case, and includes it. This knowledge comes in as opposed to immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, and the like. "Thus it is in this respect that we have to address this issue."⁹³

It is a very widespread view or tenet that knowledge of God is found only in an immediate mode; the question about this seems in contemporary culture to be the most interesting one. We say that it is so, that it is a fact of our consciousness,⁹⁴ that religion or the knowledge of God is only faith. Mediated knowledge is ruled out; it corrupts the certainty and security of faith as well as its content.⁹⁵

We may remark here in advance that thought, i.e., concrete thought, is a mediated knowledge. Mediated knowledge is knowl-

92. Thus B; L (1827?) reads (similar in W₁): Until now we have spoken of this statement (which we took at first as fact) only as of a form of the knowledge of God, which we have so far only described [by saying]: religion is knowledge of God and knowledge that God is.

93. Thus B; W₂ (Var) reads: and it is to be considered initially in terms of this antithesis.

94. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): We have a representation of God and in addition the certainty that the representation is not just within us subjectively but also exists. It is said

[Ed.] The reference to "facts (*Tatsachen*) of consciousness" is found initially in Fichte; see his *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung*, 2d ed. (Königsberg, 1793), p. 15 (*Gesamtausgabe* 1:140). But since Fichte later criticized the mere appeal to such facts, it is possible that Hegel's criticism is directed not against Fichte but rather against similar phrases in Jacobi (see above, Ms. Intro., n. 15) and his disciples. See esp. K. Köppen, *Ueber Offenbarung, in Beziehung auf Kantische und Fichtische Philosophie*, 2d ed. (Lübeck and Leipzig, 1802), pp. 17, 115 ff.

95. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): Here we have the antithesis of immediate and mediated knowledge.

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edge of necessity regarding the content. But immediacy and mediation of knowledge, the one as well as the other, are both equally one-sided abstractions. We do not here assume or hold the opinion that correctness or truth should be attributed to either of them by itself in isolation. We shall see subsequently that true thought or comprehension unites both of them within itself and does not exclude either. To mediated knowledge belongs conclusion from one thing to another, dependence, conditionality of one | determination upon another, i.e., the form of reflection. Immediate knowledge removes all distinctions, these modes of coherence, and has just one simple thing, just one coherence, namely the subjective form or the knowing [itself], and so the determinacy of the "it is." It is therefore the coherence of myself with being. To the extent that I assuredly know that God is, the knowledge is my own being, is the coherence of myself with this content. As certainly as I am, so certainly God is, too.⁹⁶

In considering immediate knowledge in a more explicit and specific way, we do not want to begin with speculative considerations; at first we only want to take up the issue itself in an *empirical* fashion. That means we must place ourselves at the standpoint of immediate knowledge. "Immediate knowledge is empirical knowledge."⁹⁷ I find the representation of God within myself; that is an empirical [datum]. The standpoint requires that one should not go beyond this empirical knowledge, for only what is found within consciousness is supposed to have validity. I should not inquire why the knowledge of God is found within me. I do not ask why I find it or in what way it is necessary, for that would lead [me] to cognition. And the assertion is that cognition is the very evil that has to be kept at a distance. What accordingly presents itself is the empirical question of whether there is an immediate knowledge.

We deny that there is because, as we have already shown, there

96. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): My being and the being of God are one nexus, and being is the connection. This being is something simple and at the same time something twofold. In immediate knowledge this nexus is wholly simple, for all modes of relationship are wiped out.

97. W (Var) reads: In general this is what we call empirical knowledge: that I know just this, that it is an actual fact of consciousness.

is no mediated or immediate knowledge in isolation. ⁹⁸The object is mediated knowledge, to which the knowledge of necessity belongs. What is necessary has a cause; it must be, and there is essentially something other as well through which it exists. Inasmuch as this other exists, the first itself exists; here we have a nexus of distinct things. Now the mediation can be merely finite and can be grasped in a merely finite manner. The effect, for example, is taken to be something that is on one side, and the cause as something that is on the other. | The finite is something that is dependent upon something else.⁹⁹ In contrast, the higher mediation, the mediation of the concept or of reason, is the concept's mediation with itself. This cohering of two things belongs to the mediation of reason; it is a coherence such that the one [term] exists only insofar as the other exists.

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Now when we claim to have immediacy of knowledge, mediation is excluded. Whatever else immediacy involves, this is the first thing to be said. We speak of an "immediate existence." But even though we empirically relate ourselves [to the world] only in external fashion, there is still nothing at all that is immediate. There is nothing to which only the determination of immediacy is applicable to the exclusion of mediation; instead what is immediate is likewise mediated, and immediacy itself is essentially mediated. It is the nature of finite existences to be mediated. It is the nature of every thing, of every individual, to be mediated. Every thing such as a star or an animal is created or generated, it exists. If we say of a human being that he is a father, then the son is mediated and the father appears as the immediate; but in that he is begetter, he himself is also something begotten. In the same way every living thing, in that it is a begetter, is defined as something origivative and immediate; but nevertheless it is itself something begotten and therefore mediated.

98. In B's margin: 25 May 1827

99. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): and does not exist in and for itself; something else pertains to its existence. Human beings are physically dependent and so have need of external nature, of external objects. We posit these things through ourselves, though they appear to have being independently of us, and we can prolong our lives only so long as they exist and are utilizable.

Immediacy means being in general; being, or this abstract relation to self, is immediate to the extent that we remove relationship. But if we posit being as one side of a relationship, then it is something mediated. Thus the cause is cause only to the extent that it has an effect, and therefore the cause is mediated, too. Hence when we define an existence as such, which is one of the sides within a relationship, as the effect, then what is relationless, namely the cause, is recognized as the sort of thing that is mediated. Everything that is immediate is also mediated. This is a most paltry and trivial insight, had by everyone—that everything which exists *is*, to be sure, but only is as something mediated (first of all the finite, for we are not yet speaking of mediation with self). But it *is mediated*, is relative, is essentially a relationship; some other is necessary to its being, | to its immediacy. To that extent it is mediated. The logical is the dialectical—where being, considered as such on its own account, turns out to be the untrue, even turns out to be nothing; and the next determination, the truth of being, is becoming. Becoming is a simple representation relating itself to itself, something wholly immediate, although it contains within itself the two determinations, being and nonbeing. What becomes already is, although in another sense it is not but only comes to be for the first time. Thus becoming is mediated, although it is also immediate insofar as it is a simple thought. Only book-learning wrestles with immediacy. It is an inferior understanding which believes that there, in immediacy, one has something independent as opposed to something mediated.

It is the same with immediate knowledge, a particular mode or type of immediacy. For there is no immediate knowledge. We distinguish an immediate knowledge from a mediated knowledge. Immediate knowledge is knowledge in which we do not have any consciousness of mediation; but mediated it is. We have feeling, and that seems to be immediate; we have intuition, and it appears under the form of immediacy.¹⁰⁰ If we consider an intuition, then

100. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): But if we are dealing with thought-determinations, then we must not stop at this point in the way it initially occurs to us; we must rather ask whether in fact this is the case.

first I am the knowing or intuiting, and second I know an other, an object—"I have knowledge only by means of the object."¹⁰¹ I am mediated in sensation, and only through the object, through the determinacy of my sensing.¹⁰² Knowing is quite simple; but I must know *something*, for if I am only knowing, then I know nothing at all. Similarly, I must see *something*, for if I am pure vision, then I see nothing at all. Therefore the universal or knowing, a subjective element, belongs together, in the second place, with an object, something determinate. There is a subjective element and a content in all knowledge. It is essentially a relation | of distinct things to one another, and this essentially contains a mediation. With immediate knowledge, therefore, it is the case that there is no such thing. If someone tells us that immediate knowledge is the true knowledge, then we must first see what this brings to mind—and it is evident that immediate knowledge is an empty abstraction, pure knowing.¹⁰³

But it is more specifically the case in regard to religious knowledge that it is essentially a mediated knowledge. In whatever possible religion we may find ourselves, we know that we have been educated within this religion and have received instruction in it. This instruction and education provide me with a knowledge that is mediated through doctrine. Moreover, if we speak of positive religion, then the religion is revealed, and indeed revealed in a manner that is external to the individual. So faith in this religion is essentially mediated through revelation. In rejecting mediation, therefore, one manifestly rejects along with it whatever the revealed element is in a positive religion¹⁰⁴—one rejects instruction, educa-

101. Thus B, similar in Hu; L (1827?) reads (similar in W): or, if it is taken not as something objective but as something subjective instead, a determinateness.

102. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): There is always a content present to which two aspects belong.

103. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): This pure knowing can be termed immediate, for it is simple. But if knowledge is actual, then both knower and known are present, and hence relationship and mediation, too. But it is not permissible to consider knowledge as real and genuine just because it is mediated; knowledge that is *only* mediated is likewise an empty abstraction.

104. [Ed.] This stress on the importance of the "positive" (historically mediated) dimension of religion is characteristic of the 1827 lectures. It is introduced again at the beginning of Part III.

tion, etc.¹⁰⁵ We can, to be sure, draw this distinction here and consider revelation or education as an external condition by means of which religion can indeed be implanted within me, but which I have transcended if I have faith. In that case the education is behind me, just as the revelation is also a thing of the past for us. Religion exists only within self-consciousness; outside that it exists nowhere. We might now discuss how far it is justifiable to abstract from such mediation. Even if we regard the mediation as a thing of the past, the kind of determinations we have just now called external conditions must still always belong to the actuality of religion nonetheless, and hence they are essential and not contingent.

307 But if we now look back to the other, inward, aspect and abstract from, or forget, the fact that faith or conviction is something mediated, | we are in the position of considering the inward aspect by itself. The assertion of immediate knowledge bears especially upon this point. "We know God immediately; this knowledge is a revelation within us." That is an important principle to which we must essentially hold fast. It implies that neither positive revelation nor education can¹⁰⁶ bring about religion in such a way that religion would be something effected from outside, something mechanically produced and placed within human beings. Knowledge of religion is certainly necessary, for that mediation belongs to it. It must not be considered as something mechanical, however, but as a *stimulation* [*Erregung*] instead. Plato's ancient saying is apropos here: that we learn nothing, but only recollect something that we originally bear within ourselves.¹⁰⁷ Taken in an external and nonphilosophical way, this means that we recollect a content that we have known in a previous state [i.e., before this present life began]. That

105. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): These circumstances of doctrine and revelation are not contingent or accidental, but essential. They do, of course, concern an external relationship, but not one that is unimportant just for the reason that it is external.

106. Thus B; L reads: positive revelation alone cannot Hu reads: neither revelation nor education can An reads: instruction cannot W (Var) reads: positive revelation cannot thus

107. [Ed.] See Plato *Meno* 81c–d.

is its mythical presentation. But its implication is that religion, right, ethics, and everything spiritual in human beings, is merely aroused [*erregt*]. We are implicitly spirit, for the truth lies within us and the spiritual content within us must be brought into consciousness.

Spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. It involves the important specification that religion is not mechanically introduced into human beings but lies within them, in their reason and freedom generally. When we abstract from the condition of being aroused, and consider what this knowledge is and how this religious feeling and self-revelation in the spirit is constituted, then, like all knowledge, it is immediacy, to be sure; but it is an immediacy that equally well contains mediation within itself. The immediacy of knowledge by no means excludes mediation.

As an example we can further cite the fact that something can seem wholly immediate, yet be the result of mediation. What we actually know we have immediately before us—say a mathematical result. It was arrived at by many intermediate steps, though it finally appears as something that one knows immediately. It is the same with drawing or with performing music, each being a result of practice or something mediated | by an endless number of actions. 308 This is true of every skill and so on.¹⁰⁸ But when we consider *religious* knowledge more specifically, then it is indeed an immediate knowledge. When I represent God to myself, then I have God immediately before me. Yet mediation is also contained in this simple, immediate relation. First, I am the knower, and second, there is an object, which is God. My knowing God is in general a relationship, and therefore is something mediated. I am a knower and a religious believer only through the mediation of this content, through this object. We cannot point to anything at all that does not contain mediation within itself.

108. *L* (1827?) adds: Thus immediate knowledge proves to be a result. This is a simple psychological consideration that we do not remember in the context of that view.

*c. Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God*¹⁰⁹

If we thus consider religious knowledge more closely, it proves to be not only this simple connection of myself with my object, but is something inwardly much more concrete instead. This total simplicity, this knowledge of God, is inwardly a movement; more precisely, it is an *elevation to God*. We express religion essentially as an elevation, a passing over from one content to another. It is the finite content from which we pass over to God, from which we relate ourselves to the absolute, infinite content and pass over to it.

The characteristic nature of mediating is what is determinately expressed in the passing over. This passage is of a double kind. First it is a passing over from finite things, from the things of the world or from the finitude of consciousness and from this finitude in general that we call “we”—or, as this particular subject, “I”—to the infinite, to this infinite being more precisely defined as God. The other kind of passing over has abstract aspects that relate to a more profound and more abstract antithesis.¹¹⁰ Here the one aspect is defined as God or the infinite in general as it is known by us (therefore as a subjective content), and the other aspect, to which we pass over, is determinacy as something objective in principle

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109. [Ed.] If the *being* of God is what is at stake in the various forms of the knowledge of God, and if the task of thought, as the highest form of knowledge, is to demonstrate the necessity of what is known in the mode of immediacy and representation at earlier stages, then it is not surprising that the primary task of thought with reference to God is to demonstrate the necessity of God’s “existence” (*Dasein*), although in the strict sense, from Hegel’s point of view, God cannot be said to “exist” (see below, n. 111). Such demonstration constitutes the cognitive dimension of the “elevation to God,” which Hegel characterizes in 1821 as intrinsic to the religious relationship when viewed speculatively (cf. Ms. Sec. B.3). Religion is no mere passive receptivity but an active passing over to the infinite, a passage that occurs above all by means of thought.

This section is exceptionally long because Hegel gathers into it his version of the proofs, which in the earlier lectures were considered in relation to the concept of God in the specific religions—the cosmological proof being implicit in the religions of nature, beauty, and sublimity; the teleological proof, in the religion of purposiveness; and the ontological proof, in the revelatory religion. This gathering has the advantage of logical, speculative precision, but it loses the phenomenological matrix in which the proofs were first considered.

110. *Thus L, W; Hu reads:* to more profound and more abstract laws.

or as actual being. In the former passage the common element is *being*, for this content common to both sides is posited as *finite* and *infinite* [respectively]. We can represent being to ourselves as a straight line that is determined on one side as *finite*. The passage occurs from this side to the other or *infinite side*. Being remains common to both sides. The passing over is simply the fact that the *finite* disappears. In the second passage the common element is the *infinite*, which is posited in the form of the subjective and the objective. These are the forms that were formerly called the *proofs of God's existence*.¹¹¹

¹¹²Knowledge of God is in principle mediation, because here there

111. [Ed.] That is, the cosmological and teleological proofs in the first case, and the ontological proof in the second. Here and elsewhere in this section, in deference to the tradition, Hegel uses the expression *Dasein Gottes*, although in the strict sense God cannot be said to "exist" or have "determinate being." (The literal sense of *Dasein* is "there-being"; in the *Logic*, pp. 109 ff. [GW 11:59 ff.], Hegel defines it as "determinate being" [*bestimmtes Sein*]. Our translation of *Dasein* as "existence" blurs whatever distinction Hegel may have intended between it and the term foreign to German, *Existenz*, which he also sometimes uses.) God "is" (*ist*), he "has being" (*seiend*) in and for himself, absolutely, or is utterly "actual being" (*das Seiende*); but only finite being "exists" (*existiert*) or has being in a determinate, limited, worldly sense (*Dasein*). When the tradition speaks of the "existence of God" (*Dasein Gottes*), it does so representationally or figuratively; but conceptually it is more appropriate to speak of the "being of God" (*Sein Gottes*), and the distortion of speaking of God's "existence" must be removed from the proofs if they are to be grasped rationally. (See the third paragraph below and n. 132 below. See also the Editorial Introduction.) God as the universal does, to be sure, have existence (*Existenz*), says Hegel (see below, p. 433), but we normally understand this representationally as finite existence (i.e., as *Dasein*), whereas we must be clear that God's *Existenz* is infinite and that therefore he is *subject* but not something *subjective*. (Here the distinction between *Existenz* and *Dasein* is important.) It is another matter, though, if one wishes to argue that concrete, determinate existence *also* belongs to or is included within the concept of the absolute: in order to be itself, the absolute becomes something other than itself, positing an actual finite world in which it determines and particularizes itself and from which it returns to itself "spiritualized" or "existentialized," as it were, because it encompasses finitude within itself (although as negated, sublated). In this sense reference to the "existence" (*Dasein*) of God may not be entirely inappropriate, but it is properly grasped only from the point of view of the religion of incarnation, the Christian religion, and is an aspect of the ontological proof, which is associated with this religion (see below, pp. 436 ff.).

112. In B's margin: 28 May 1827 *Precedes in L* (1827?) (*similar in W*): The relationship of knowing God has therefore now to be considered within itself. Knowing is relationship, and is mediated within itself either through another or inwardly.

obtains a relation between myself and an object, God, who is something other than I am. Where a relation of distinct things is present, and one of them is essentially related to the other, the relation is called mediation. One is this and the other is something else, so that they are distinct from one another; they are not immediately identical, not one and the same. God and I are distinct from one another. If both were one, then there would be an immediate self-relation, one without mediation and without relation, i.e., a unity without distinction. In that the two are distinct, each one is not what the other is. But if they are nevertheless connected, or have identity at the same time in their distinctiveness, then this identity itself is distinct from their distinct being; it is something different from both of them because otherwise they would not be distinct.¹¹³

The mediation accordingly is in a third [term] over against these two distinct sides, and is itself a third that brings them together and in which they are mediated and are identical. Here we have the familiar relationship of the syllogism, in which there are two distinct [terms] and a unity in which both of them are posited as one through a third. Hence it is not only obvious but inherent in the matter itself that, whenever we speak of knowing God, | our
 310 discourse at once takes the form of a *syllogism*.¹¹⁴ For this reason the form of the knowledge of God occurs more specifically in the form of the *proofs of God's existence*. The knowledge of God is presented in this way as a mediated knowledge, for what is abstractly just One is what is unmediated. The proofs present the knowledge of God because this knowledge contains mediation within itself, and the mediation is religion itself, or the knowledge of God;¹¹⁵ and this mediated knowledge, the explication of the proofs of God's existence, is the explication of religion itself.

113. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): Both are distinct, for their unity is not they themselves. That in which they are one is that in which they are not distinct. But they are distinct. Therefore their unity is distinct from their distinctness.

114. W (Var) adds: Both are distinct, and there is a unity in which both are posited in one through a third [term]: that is the syllogism. Hence we have to discuss more precisely the nature of the knowledge of God, which is mediated essentially within itself.

115. An adds: the cultus being [for now] excluded from it;

Still, this form of proof does, to be sure, involve some distortion, and it is in order to exhibit this distortion that this knowledge is itself looked at as a series of proofs. This distortion has been the target of [philosophical] criticism; but the one-sided moment of the form that this knowledge has does not bring the whole matter to naught. On the contrary, our task is to restore the proofs of God's existence to a position of honor by stripping away that distortion. When we hear the expression "proofs of God's existence," it brings in straightaway the possibility that some distortion is involved in it. There is talk of God and his "existence" [*Dasein*]; "existence" is determinate, finite being—and *Existenz*, too, is used in a determinate sense. But God's being is in no way a limited being. It would be better to say, "God and his being, his actuality or objectivity." The demonstration has the aim of showing us the coherence between the two determinations [God and being] because they are distinct, not because they are immediately one. Everything is immediate in its relation to itself, God as God, being as being. What is demonstrated is that these initially distinct things also cohere together and are identical—though they do not have an abstract identity, which would be sameness and hence immediacy.

To show coherence means in general to prove. The coherence can be of different kinds, and the proof leaves this difference undefined. For instance, there is a coherence that is *wholly external* or mechanical. We see that a roof is necessary to the walls, because the house has this characteristic protection against weather and the like. The purpose is | what links the walls with the roof, and we can therefore say it is proved that a house must have a roof. This is no doubt [logically] coherent, but we are aware at the same time that the coherence of the walls with the roof does not affect the being of these objects. Or again, the fact that wood and tile make up a roof does not concern their being, and is for them a merely external nexus.¹¹⁶ But there are also [types of] coherence that are *involved in the thing* or the content itself. This is the case, for

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116. *Follows in W (Var)*: What is involved here in "proving" is the showing of a coherence between determinations of a kind for which the nexus itself is external.

instance, with geometrical figures. "The three angles in a triangle add up to two right angles."¹¹⁷ That is a necessity of the thing itself, whereas beams and stones are what they are even without being joined together. In the triangle the connection is not of the kind where the coherence is external; in this case, rather the one [term] cannot be without the other, for the second is directly posited along with the first. But the proof that we give for this, or the kind of insight [we have] into this necessity, is distinct from the coherence that the determinations have within the thing itself. The procedure that we follow in demonstration is not a process of the thing itself—it is something other than what is involved in the nature of the thing. We draw auxiliary lines. But it would not occur to anyone to say that, in order to have three angles equal in magnitude to two right angles, a triangle should adopt the procedure of extending one of its sides, and that only by that means would it arrive at this determination. That, by contrast, is the path of our insight; the mediation through which we pass and the mediation in the thing itself are separate from one another. Construction and proof serve only as an aid to our subjective cognition; they do not constitute the objective mode by which the thing attained this relationship through mediation. It is indeed a subjective necessity, but not the coherence or mediation within the object itself.

312 With regard to the knowledge of God, to the internal coherence of God's determinations and the coherence of our knowledge of God and of God's determinations, this type of demonstration is directly unsatisfactory | on its own account. In this procedure of subjective necessity we start from certain initial definitions that are already familiar to us. There are assumptions or initial conditions, for example that the triangle or the right angle is given. Definite [logical] connections are presupposed, and we then show in proofs of this kind that if there is one determination then the other is, too. That is, we make the result dependent on given specifications al-

117. Thus Hu, similar in An; L (1827?) adds (similar in W): In the case of the right triangle there is also present the determinate relationship of the square on the hypotenuse to the squares on the shorter sides.

ready present. What we arrive at is represented as something dependent upon assumptions.¹¹⁸

In the application of this model [*Vorstellung*] of demonstration to the formulation [*Vorstellung*] of proofs of God's existence, what appears at once is the inappropriateness of wishing to exhibit a coherence of this kind in the case of God. This appears particularly in the first procedure, which we called the elevation of the finite to God, so that (if we embrace the process within the form of the proof) we have a relationship in which the finite is the foundation from which the being of God is demonstrated. In this [logical] nexus the being of God appears as a consequence, as dependent upon the being of the finite. This is the distortion, that this progression that we call "proving" is unsuited to what we represent to ourselves under [the name] "God"—for God is, of course, precisely the non-derivative, he is utterly actual being in and for itself. But if we now suppose that, by pointing this out, we have shown this procedure as a whole is vacuous, then this, too, is a one-sided view—and one that directly contradicts the universal consciousness of humankind. For what this nexus contains when we strip away that *form* of demonstration is the elevation to God, and the proofs are nothing more than a description of the self-elevation to God. It is because of the Kantian critique of reason that these proofs of God's existence have been discarded, consigned so to speak to the rubbish heap.¹¹⁹

¹²⁰Human beings consider the world and, because they are thinking and rational beings (since they find no satisfaction in the contingency of things), they elevate themselves from the finite to absolute necessity. | They say that, because the finite is something contingent, there must be something necessary in and for itself which is the

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118. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): As sheer demonstration for understanding, the geometrical proof is undoubtedly the most perfect example. It is the demonstration for understanding that is carried through most consistently, so that one thing is in fact exhibited as dependent upon an other.

119. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 611–658.

120. *Precedes In L* (1827?): We will take into account later what is false and what is omitted in this description.

ground of this contingency.¹²¹ Human beings will always go through this concrete procedure so long as they have religion, and will conclude that, because there are in the world living things, each of which organizes itself internally for the sake of its vitality as such and is this sort of harmony of its different parts, and because all these living things in like manner need external objects, such as air and the like, which are independent of them and which, without being posited by them, harmonize with them in their turn—because of this, some inner ground of these harmonies must be present. There is this one harmony in and for itself; this presupposes an activity through which it has been produced, a being that acts purposively. “This universal procedure is involved in the present demonstration of God’s existence; it is not upset by criticism of this demonstration, for it is necessary.”¹²²

¹²³Against the proofs of God’s existence it is also said that they do not lead to inner and strong conviction.¹²⁴ The proofs leave us cold, for we are dealing with objective content and can see well enough that if this is the case, then so is that, but the insight remains something external only. This is a deficiency only for subjective cognition, since what also comes into prominence is the fact that in the proof we have a cognition concerning something external. But when this procedure is said to be too objective and to produce only a cold conviction (whereas conviction must be in the heart), then the deficiency is expressed from the opposite side. What is

121. *L*, *W*₁ add (*Var*): This is the course of human reason, or of the human spirit. *W*₂ (*Var*) adds further: and this proof of the existence of God is nothing but the description of this elevation to the infinite.

122. Thus *Hu*, similar in *An*; *L* (*Var*) reads (similar in *W*): This is what we call “admiring the wisdom of God in nature,” or this marvel of the living organism and the harmony of external objects with it. Human beings raise themselves up from this harmony to the consciousness of God. We are mistaken when we suppose that, because their form is attacked, the proofs of God’s existence have become antiquated with respect to their content. But the content is, of course, not presented in its purity. *W* adds: We can even draw attention to this deficiency.

123. In *B*’s margin: 29 May 1827

124. [Ed.] Hegel apparently alludes here not to a specific work but to a complaint about the proofs heard fairly commonly at his time. See, e.g., F. Köppen, *Ueber Offenbarung, in Beziehung auf Kantische und Fichtische Philosophie*, 2d ed. (Lübeck and Leipzig, 1802), pp. 52–53, 139.

more precisely involved in this reproach is the demand that this procedure of demonstration should rather be *our own elevation*, that our spirit or heart ought to elevate itself, that we | ought not merely to behave as if we were considering a nexus of external determinations. No, the feeling and believing spirit, the spirit as a whole, ought to be elevated. Spiritual movement, the movement of our own selves and our will, ought to be there in the demonstration, too—and this is what we are missing when we say that it is an external nexus of determinations. This is the deficient feature.

There are two determinations present, which are conjoined—namely, God in general or the indeterminate representation of God, and being. These two are to be united—being is to be exhibited as the being of God, and God is to be exhibited as having being. Inasmuch as there are two determinations, so that a progression occurs, we can therefore begin from being and pass over to God, or begin from God and pass over to being. Because this procedure has been characterized as elevation, the immediate beginning is pure being, and the result is the union of both determinations as the knowledge that *God is*. When we consider this first procedure, which we have called elevation, then the form of the proof of God's existence contains the proposition: Because there is something finite, there must also (on that account) be something infinite and not bounded by an other, or an absolutely necessary essence. The finite is what is not inwardly its own ground, it is what is contingent; there must therefore be something that is not in turn grounded in an other.¹²⁵

Human beings certainly follow this procedure within their own spirit; it exhibits itself more precisely as the following mediation. We have a consciousness of the world as an aggregate of endlessly many contingent phenomena, of many singular objects that determine themselves for us as finite. When our consciousness or our thought is enveloped in the form of feeling or of devotion, then the movement of our spirit is that the finite has for it no truth but is something contingent; it is a being, to be sure, but one that in fact

125. [Ed.] Hegel orients his presentation of the cosmological proof largely toward Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 632 f.

is only a nonbeing. This nonbeing of the finite in positive form is inwardly affirmative; this affirmative nonfinite is the infinite, it is absolute being, and to begin with we have only this definition for God. Thus there is here a mediation of finite and infinite. But the essential point is that, in its departure from the finite, the mediation ~negates this finite in the elevation, does not allow it to subsist. The finite has a negative determination; the affirmative element is the
 315 infinite, absolute being.¹²⁶ |

So if we therefore consider this mediation more precisely in its moments, then distinct determinations are present, which have to be gone through: immediate existence, the existence of mundane things, and God. The point of departure is the finite; the most proximate determination is that the finite is not genuine, it has no genuine being, it is negative.¹²⁷

To begin with, therefore, we have the negative aspect, the negation of the finite, the fact that it is its inner nature to be contradiction, i.e., not to be but rather to destroy itself—it is self-sublation. In its speculative significance and form this proposition is treated in logic.¹²⁸ But we are also convinced of it per se, and can therefore address a challenge to ordinary consciousness: that finite things have the characteristic of perishing—their being is the sort that directly sublates itself. Accordingly we have at first only the negation of the finite. The second [determination] is that this negation of the finite is also affirmative. There is a spurious affirmation that consists in the repetition of the finite, in the fact that it only brings forth again the finite that was there before, with the result that one finite thing posits another, and so on unto the spu-

126. *Thus B with Hu; L (Var) reads:* does not merely negate this finite in the elevation but also allows it to subsist. The finite has indeed no truth, for in it as finite there is essentially negation. The infinite, however, is the affirmative of the finite, it is absolute being.

127. *L (1827?) adds:* The third [determination] is that this negation of the finite is itself affirmation, and is therefore infinite, absolute being.

[*Ed.*] *L* apparently construes *nächst* to mean “next” rather than “nearest” or “most proximate,” as we have done. What *L* designates as the *third* determination is identical with what is described as the *second* determination in the main text below.

128. [*Ed.*] Cf. *Science of Logic*, esp. pp. 137–138 (GW 11:78–79).

rious infinite. Heraclitus said that everything is changeable, everything flows.¹²⁹ In this there is only a progression from negation to ceaseless transformation; this affirmation would be an accumulation of nongenuine existences in which change would be the ultimate feature. This intermediate form is taken into consideration in logic; here this much can be said, that by it the finite is changed not one whit. For the finite is indeed the sort of thing that changes itself and passes over into an other, although this other is in turn something finite. Another thing becomes another thing; both are therefore the same. The one is the other, for the one is the finite and the other is the finite. In this way the other coincides with itself; it comes to itself and the negation is superseded. The passing over into an other, or this spurious affirmation, is the spurious progress of the finite; it is simply the tedious repetition of one determination; but the true affirmation is already contained within it. The finite changes itself; it appears as an other, [and so] | other comes to other. What is the case here is that both are the same. The other coincides with itself and in the other comes to itself, to its equality with itself, to its connection with itself. This is the affirmation, this is being. Genuine transition does not consist in change, in perennial alteration. Instead *the genuine other of the finite is the infinite*, and this is not bare negation of the finite but is affirmative, is being. That is the quite simple consideration involved here. This affirmative process is the process of our spirit; it brings itself about unconsciously within our spirit; but philosophy is having the consciousness of it. We bring the same thing to pass when we raise ourselves up to God. Thus the infinite itself is at first something finite or negative. The second [moment] is that it is something affirmative. There is a progression through different determinations, and it is by no means an external one but is rather necessity itself. This necessity is the deed of our spirit.

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If we compare this inner mediation with the proofs for God's existence, the distinction is as follows. In the proofs it is argued

129. [Ed.] Heraclitus's words are transmitted by Plato and Aristotle. See Plato, *Cratylus* 402a, Aristotle, *De caelo* 298a29 ff., *Metaphysics* 987a33 f. and 1078b14 f. On the "spurious infinite" (*schlechtes Unendliche*), see n. 128.

that, because the finite is, for that reason the infinite is, too. What is expressed here, therefore, is that the finite is; this is the point of departure, the foundation. From this arises the objection against these proofs that they are said to make the finite into the foundation for the being of God. The finite is an abiding point of departure, and in this procedure the being of God is mediated through the being of the finite. In our procedure, on the contrary, the conclusion is rather as follows. In the first place there is indeed the finite. But in the second place, because the finite is not, is not true in itself but is rather the contradiction that sublates itself, for *that* reason the truth of the finite is this affirmative element that is called the infinite. Here there is no relationship or mediation between two elements each of which *is* [abides]; for rather the point of departure sublates itself; there is a mediation that sublates itself, a mediation through the sublation of mediation. The infinite does not constitute merely one aspect. For the understanding there are, in the mediation, two actual beings: on this side there is a world and over yonder there is God, and the knowledge of the world is the foundation of the being of God. But through our treatment the world is relinquished as a genuine being; it is not regarded as something permanent on this side. The sole import of this procedure is that *the infinite alone is*; the finite has no genuine being, whereas God has only genuine being. ¹³⁰This is a | distinction that relies upon the most wholly refined abstractions; but they are precisely the most universal categories within our spirit. That is just what makes it important to be cognizant of the distinction, in order not to be mistaken in regard to it.

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The principal objection to this procedure rests upon the erroneous determination that the finite is and endures. This criticism is also expressed in the following way. There is no passage from the finite to the infinite, no bridge between the two. We are these limited natures [*Wesen*]; hence we cannot with our consciousness get across

130. *Precedes in L* (1827?): The first [element], which is our starting point, does not abide but rather relinquishes itself, is sublated. That is the point on which everything turns. The first [element], the starting point, sublates itself.

the abyss, we cannot grasp the infinite.¹³¹ The infinite is just infinite, and we are finite, for our knowledge, feeling, reason, and spirit are limited and persist in their limitedness. But this talk is already contradicted in what has been said. It is undoubtedly correct that we are limited; so we are not talking about the limitedness of nature but about the dependence of reason. However, it is equally correct that this finite element has no truth, and reason is precisely the insight that the finite is only a limit. But inasmuch as we know something as a limit, we are already beyond it. The animal or the stone knows nothing of its limit. In contrast, the I, as knowing or thinking in general, is limited but knows about the limit, and in this very knowledge the limit is only limit, only something negative outside us, and I am beyond it. We must not have such absurd respect in the presence of the infinite. The infinite is the wholly pure abstraction, the initial abstraction of being according to which limit is omitted—a being that relates itself to itself, the universal within which every boundary is ideal, is sublated. Therefore the finite does not endure, and inasmuch as it does not endure, there is also no longer a gulf present between finite and infinite, [they] are no longer two. Because the finite vanishes into a semblance or a shadow, it therefore also admits of no passage to infinity. The starting point is certainly the finite, but spirit does not leave it subsisting. This is the more precise development of what is called knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is this very elevation.¹³² |

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131. [Ed.] Hegel here touches on the old problem of the *finitum (non) capax infiniti*, which had become a decisive issue in his time in light of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Jacobi's insistence on the *non capax* (Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:56). See also Schelling, *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*, (1795), (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/1:308 ff., 314 ff.); and *Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre* (1796–1797) (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/1:367–368).

132. [Ed.] In the last paragraphs Hegel again touches on a theme found in the 1821 and 1824 lectures, which we have described as a “speculative reversal” in the relationship between the finite and infinite. While the finite is the starting point, it itself does not serve as the ground for passing over to the infinite, which would then appear to be a result. Rather the finite negates or sublates itself, cognizes its own nonbeing in knowing its limits, and thus also knows the infinite as not simply “one aspect” but as the whole, that which overreaches both finite and infinite, includes

¹³³At this point we can also make some historical observations. The first of the familiar proofs of the existence of God is the *cosmological*, where the starting point is the contingency of the world. Here the affirmative element is defined not merely as the infinite in general but rather—in direct antithesis to the determination of contingency—as the absolutely necessary or, represented as subject, as the absolutely necessary essence. Hence some even more specific determinations enter in, and these proofs can in principle be multiplied by the dozen; every step of the logical idea can serve this purpose, for instance [the step] from essence to the absolutely necessary essence.¹³⁴

Absolutely necessary essence, taken in the general or abstract sense, is being not as immediate but as reflected into self, as essence. We have defined essence as the nonfinite, as the negation of the negative—~a negation that we call the infinite.¹³⁵ So the transition is not made to abstract, arid being but to the being that is negation of the negation. Therein lies the distinction. This being is the dis-

negation within itself, and thus alone truly is. What appears to be the result develops a “counterthrust” and shows itself to be “the first and alone true” (cf. 1824 *Concept*, p. 322). Or, as Hegel describes it metaphorically in the 1821 lectures, the progression from finite to infinite is like “a stream flowing in opposite directions” (*Ms. Concept*, n. 115). It is by means of this insight that Hegel proposes to restore the proofs to a position of honor by divesting them of distortion—the distortion that finitude is the ground from which God’s “existence” is demonstrated. The “elevation” to God is not an autonomous self-elevation of finite spirit into what could only be a spurious infinite, but, speculatively expressed, the return of true and infinite spirit, i.e., absolute spirit, to itself.

133. [Ed.] From this point to the end of the section, both editions of the *Werke* print the 1827 text as an appendix to the “Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God” at the end of volume 2. Hegel gave these lectures in the summer of 1829 and was preparing them for publication when he died in 1831. His treatment of the proofs in the 1827 and 1831 philosophy-of-religion lectures is obviously closely related to the separate series of lectures on this topic—a topic that increasingly occupied him during his last years in Berlin. But there was no justification on the part of the editors of *W* for taking the philosophy-of-religion material out of its original context.

134. [Ed.] An exact account of a transition of this kind, i.e., from essence to the absolutely necessary essence, is not given in the *Science of Logic*. Hegel is probably thinking of the development of essence to absolute necessity (cf. esp. p. 552 [GW 11:391]).

135. *Thus B; L (Var) reads (similar in W):* a negative that we call the finite.

inction that takes itself back into simplicity. Involved within this essence is the determination of ~what is distinguished; but it is a determining of what is distinguished as it relates itself to itself, a self-determining. Negation is determination. Negation of determination is itself a determining.¹³⁶ Where there is no negation, there is also no distinction, no determination. Determination is posited together with the positing of distinction, for without that there would be only affirmation and not negation. So determining in general is involved in absolute being, or in the unity of the essence; it lies within it and is therefore self-determining.¹³⁷ Distinction does not come into it from outside, for this unrest lies within it as being itself the negation of the negation. More precisely, it determines itself as *activity*. This self-determination of the essence within itself, namely the positing of the distinction and its sublation in such a way that it is an action, | and that this self-determining remains in simple connection with itself, is inward *necessity*.¹³⁸ 319

¹³⁹The *physicotheological* or *teleological* proof is another formulation in which this same mediation is the foundation; i.e., the proof is the same with regard to its formal characteristics, but the content is more extensive. Here, too, there is finite being on one side, though it is not just abstractly defined, or defined only as being, but rather as being that has within it the more substantial determination of being something physically alive. The elaboration of this proof can be made very wide-ranging, because the more detailed determination of the living thing is apprehended to mean that there are purposes within nature and an [overall] arrangement

136. Thus B with L; W (Var) reads: the distinction—negation of the negation—but as it relates itself to itself. But such a thing is what we call self-determining. Negation is determination, and negation of the determination is itself a determining, a positing of a distinction; determination is posited right along with it.

[Ed.] See above. n. 25.

137. W (Var) adds: Thus it is determined as determination within itself.

138. L (1827?) adds (similar in W): Finite being does not remain an other, for there is no gulf between infinite and finite. Finite being is what sublates itself, so that its truth is the infinite, is actual being in and for self. Finite, contingent being is the intrinsically self-negating; but this its negation is equally the affirmative, and this affirmation is the absolutely necessary essence.

139. In B's margin: 31 May 1827

that, though suited to those purposes, is not at the same time brought forth by means of them, so that the arrangement comes forth independently on its own account. (In another definition it is also purpose, but in the sense that the [living thing] met with previously shows itself to be compatible with that purpose.)

The physicotheological mode of treatment involves the consideration of merely external purposiveness.¹⁴⁰ Hence it has come into disrepute, and deservedly so; for in that mode we are thinking of finite ends that require means, and the process of specification goes on forever. For example, human beings have needs; they require any number of things for their "animal"¹⁴¹ life. If we assume that such ends are primary and that means for their satisfaction are available, but that it is God who allows the means for these ends to arise, then any such consideration soon shows itself to be inadequate to what God is and unworthy of God. For to the extent that these ends are divided up and specialized, they become something unimportant on their own account, something for which we have no regard and which we cannot represent to ourselves as direct objects of God's will and wisdom. This attitude of mind, which thus turns into something trivial, is captured in one of Goethe's satirical epigrams, | where the creator is extolled for creating a bottle and also the cork tree in order to have a stopper for it.¹⁴²

With regard to the Kantian philosophy we should observe that in his *Critique of Judgment* Kant led thought back to the important concept (which he himself established) of *inner purposiveness*—i.e.,

140. [Ed.] Cf. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 61 ff., for the background of this discussion of purposiveness in nature. See especially §§ 63, 66, and 82 for the distinction (that Hegel draws below) between the inner purposiveness of organic beings and the merely external purposiveness of nature expressed in the notion of utility or expediency. Kant defines "physicotheology" as "the attempt on the part of reason to infer the supreme cause of nature and its attributes from the *ends* of nature—ends which can only be known empirically"; from which he distinguishes "moral theology" or "ethicotheology," which is "the attempt to infer that cause and its attributes from the moral end of rational beings in nature—an end which can be known *a priori*." See *Critique of Judgment*, § 85.

141. Thus W; L reads: moral

142. [Ed.] See the *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1797*, ed. Friedrich Schiller (Tübingen), Epigram no. 202, "Der Teleolog." Cf. Schiller, *Werke: Nationalausgabe*, vol. 1 (Weimar, 1943), p. 311, no. 15.

the concept of *organic life*.¹⁴³ This is also Aristotle's¹⁴⁴ concept of nature [according to which] every living thing is a *telos* that has its means implicit within it—i.e., its members and its organization. The operation of these members constitutes the *telos* or purpose, its organic life. This is *nonfinite* purposiveness in which end and means are not external to one another—the end brings forth the means and the means brings forth the end. The principal determination is that of organic life. The world is alive; it contains organic life and the realms of organic life. At the same time the nonliving (inorganic nature, such as sun and stars) exists in an essential relation with the living, with human beings insofar as they are living nature on the one hand, and insofar as they themselves devise particular purposes on the other. This finite purposiveness falls within human [experience].

That is the definition of organic life generally, but [in the form of] extant, worldly organic life. The latter, to be sure, [aims at] being *inward* vitality, *inward* purposiveness; but at the same time it [achieves this] in such a way that every singular living thing and its species is a very narrow sphere, a very limited nature. The proper progression, then, is from this finite organic life to absolute organic life, to *universal* purposiveness—such that this world is a *cosmos*, i.e., a system in which everything has an essential connection to everything else and nothing is isolated. The cosmos is something internally ordered in which each thing has its place, is embraced within the whole, subsists by means of the whole, and is in the same measure active and effective for the generation and life of the whole. Thus the main thing is the movement away from finite ends toward a *universal* organic life, toward the one purpose that articulates itself in particular ends—so that this particularization exists within harmony, within a reciprocal and essential relation.

143. [Ed.] The discussion in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Part II, Critique of Teleological Judgment, concerns the unique reciprocal causality between the parts and the whole that is characteristic of living things, i.e., the evidently purposive structure inherent in organic beings. To keep this feature firmly in view the biologically (though not philosophically) redundant term "organic life" is sometimes used for *Lebendigkeit*, which means literally "vitality" or "liveliness."

144. [Ed.] See Aristotle *Physics* 2.8–9, esp. 199a21–32.

God is initially defined as the absolutely necessary essence. As Kant already noted,¹⁴⁵ however, this definition is by no means sufficient for the concept of God. Certainly God alone is absolute necessity; but this definition does not exhaust the concept of God,
 321 | and the definition [in terms] of organic life or of one universal life is already as much nobler as it is more profound. Since "life" is essentially something living and subjective, this universal life is also something subjective, a soul, Noûs. Soul is thus contained within universal life; it is the determination of the one, all-disposing, governing, and organizing Noûs. This is as far as the teleological proof goes initially.

With regard to its formal aspect, we should recall the same point in the case of this proof as we did in that of the preceding one. That is to say, the transition is not in truth concluded in the following manner (as the understanding supposes): Because there are arrangements and purposes of this sort, therefore there is a wisdom coordinating and disposing all things. The transition is simultaneously an elevation that equally includes the negative moment (which is the main thing), specifically that this living thing in its immediacy, and hence these purposes as they exist in their finite organic life, are not the true. Instead their truth is really that one organic life, the one Noûs. There are not two distinct forms, for the initial starting point does not persist as the foundation or condition. Instead the untruth or negation of the initial point is contained in the passage away from it, i.e., the negation of the negative or finite aspect in it, of the particularity of life. This negation is negated, for in this elevation finite organic life disappears and, as truth, the object of consciousness is the system, the Noûs of the one organic life, the universal soul.

But here again it is the case that the [resulting] definition is still not yet adequate for the concept of God: "God is the one universal activity of life, the disposing soul bringing forth, positing, and or-

145. [Ed.] Hegel is probably alluding to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 614–615, also B 639. In these passages Kant's interest lies, of course, in the link between the concept of the absolutely necessary being and the concept of the most real being. Cf. also B 660–661. Cf. also Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 85 ff., 91 n.

ganizing a cosmos.”¹⁴⁶ The concept of God contains essentially the determination that God is *spirit*. We can make the transition, then, in such a way that this being [*Wesen*] who governs the world is a cause sundered from the world, is a wise being. But “cause” and “wisdom” are further specifications that strictly do not yet occur at this point; the highest feature that emerges from the determination of finite organic life is just the very universality of organic life, the *Noûs*. That is as far as the content involved in the starting point goes.

The third and most essential form of this transition, the one which from this point of view is absolute, has still to be considered. We noted just now | that the content of the transition is organic life; similarly in this third form the content that lies at its foundation is *spirit*. If we wanted to convey the transition in the form of an inference, we would have to say: Because there are finite spirits (i.e., the being that is the starting point here), therefore the absolute, infinite spirit is, and here we arrive at the definition of God as spirit. But this “because” or this solely affirmative relationship in turn contains a deficiency, in that finite spirits would be the foundation and God the consequence of the existence of the finite spirits—and this is the distortion again. The negative aspect of the finite spirits must be negated. For that reason the genuine form is as follows: there are finite spirits. But the finite has no truth, for the truth of finite spirit and its actuality is instead just the absolute spirit. The finite is not genuine being; it is implicitly the dialectic of self-sublating or self-negating, and its negation is affirmation as the infinite, as the universal in and for itself.¹⁴⁷ It is surprising that this transition was not specified in the proofs of God.

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146. [Ed.] It is not certain whether this formulation of the results of the physicotheology refers to Hegel’s own formulation given at the end of the second paragraph above, or to a specific text, and, if so, which one. The idea of an all-disposing *Noûs* is found since Anaxagoras, the idea of the world-soul since Plato (e.g., *Laws* 896–899). See Schelling, *Von der Weltseele* (Hamburg, 1798) (*Sämtliche Werke* 1/2:345 ff.). In terms of content, Hegel’s criticism of the proof of God in physicotheology corresponds to that given by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, § 85, which provides the occasion for his advancing to moral theology.

147. *W*₂ (*Var*) adds: This is the highest transition, for here the transition is *spirit* itself.

With reference to this relationship we could take account of what is called *pantheism*. But we have already stated¹⁴⁸ that a pantheism in the strict sense has never been propounded. "Pantheism" means "all is divine," and amounts to the notion that every thing taken singularly is God—this [snuff] box or the pinch of snuff.¹⁴⁹ What is meant by this absurd label is that God is thought of as substance, and the finite is thought of in terms of accidents of the divine substance. I said that finite organic life is not the true; rather, the truth of finite spirit is absolute spirit, so it is this negation of spirit on the one hand, while on the other hand it is absolute spirit. For Spinoza the absolute is substance, and no being is ascribed to the finite; his position is therefore monotheism and acosmism. So strictly is there only God, that there is no world at all; in this [position] the finite has no genuine actuality. Our modern babblers, however, cannot break free from the view that finite things as well as God have actual being, that they are something absolute. But as for *our* transition, we have the finite as our starting point; and it turns out to be something negative, the truth of which is the infinite, | i.e., absolute necessity or, by a more profound definition, absolute vitality, or spirit. In this [their] relation comes about as I have exhibited it, but still without any determination whether absolute spirit in its relationship to the finite has being as *substance* only or as *subject*, and whether finite spirits are effects or accidents of the infinite. This last is certainly a distinction, but it does not deserve so much fuss. The main thing is whether the absolute is defined as substance, or as subject and spirit. "Those who speak of pantheism are wanting in the simplest categories of thought."¹⁵⁰

We have set being and God in opposition. Insofar as we begin from being, then according to its initial appearance being is immediately the finite. But inasmuch as there are these determinations,

148. [Ed.] See above, p. 375.

149. [Ed.] Hegel used snuff. At this point he probably held up his snuffbox and took a pinch.

150. *Thus B; L (Var) reads:* However, that is not yet pertinent here. In our consideration of spirit we will see that subjectivity is an essential feature of spirit.

we are equally well able to begin from God and to pass over to being.¹⁵¹ When we begin from God, the starting point or God is posited in finite form, of course, because it is not yet posited as identical with being and represented as having being [absolutely]; for a God who *is not* is something finite, and not genuinely God. The finitude of this relation is that it is subjective: God [is here defined] not as *subject* but as something *subjective*. God, this universal in general, does indeed have existence [*Existenz*], but, in terms of our representation, only this finite existence. This is one-sided. We have God or this content as afflicted with the one-sidedness and finitude that is called *representation* of God. It is our interest that representation should strip away this blemish of being merely something represented and subjective, and that the definition for this content should become that of *being*.

We are to consider this second aspect of the mediation as it occurs within the finite form of the understanding as the *ontological* proof. This proof passes over from the concept of God to the being of God. The ancients, i.e., Greek philosophy, did not have this transition; even within the Christian era it was not accomplished for a long time, because it involves the most profound descent of spirit into itself. One of the greatest Scholastic philosophers, the profoundly speculative thinker Anselm of Canterbury, | grasped this representation for the first time in the following way. We have the representation of God. But God is no mere representation, for God *is*.¹⁵² How then are we to accomplish this passage, how are we to gain the insight that God is not merely something subjective within us? Or, how is the determination of being to be mediated with God? For being and God are two different things. 324

151. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): ("We are able"—though we shall see later, in [discussing] the concept of God, that then there is no talk of "being able," for God is absolute necessity.)

152. [*Ed.*] See Anselm's well-known proof in his *Proslogion*, chap. 2: "Well then, Lord, you who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may understand, as much as you see fit, that you exist as we believe you to exist, and that you are what we believe you to be. Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought. . . . For it is one thing for an object to exist in the

The Kantian critique has directed itself against this so-called "ontological" proof, too¹⁵³—and, in a manner of speaking, it emerged triumphant in its day. Right up to the present the assessment is that all these proofs for God have been refuted as empty efforts of the understanding. But just as the preceding proofs are elevations to God, or the action of spirit (more precisely the peculiar activity of thinking spirit, which humanity will not renounce), so it is with this proof. In reference to the historical aspect we saw that the ancients did not have this transition. Only when spirit has grown to its highest freedom and subjectivity does it grasp this thought of God as something subjective and arrive at this antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity.

¹⁵⁴Anselm expressed the mediation in the following way. A feature of the representation of God is that God is absolutely perfect (a very indeterminate expression).¹⁵⁵ We can say that on the whole that is quite correct. But if we hold fast to God only as a representation, then what is merely represented is something deficient and not what is most perfect. For that which is perfect is something that is not merely represented but also *is*, *actually* is. Therefore,

mind, and another thing to understand that an object actually exists. . . . And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality." Eng. trans. by M. J. Charlesworth in his *St. Anselm's Proslogion* (Oxford, 1965).

153. [Ed.] Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 620–630. Kant's criticism of course does not bear directly upon the argument in the form in which Anselm presented it.

154. *In B's margin*: 1 June 1827

155. [Ed.] In his proof, Anselm does not speak of God as "absolutely perfect" in the way that Hegel here implies. Rather he calls God "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought" (see n. 152), or (though not in the context of the proof) "that-which-is-greater-than-can-be-thought" (*Proslogion*, chap. 15). In other places he uses equivalents for "absolutely perfect," such as "supreme good" (*Proslogion*, Preface), but not as premises of the proof. Hegel's criticism of the indeterminacy of Anselm's expression adopts the criticism already advanced by Gaunilo in his *Response*.

because God is that which is perfect, God is not only a representation, for actuality and reality belong to God as well. The Kantian critique objects first to the abstract universal, namely that the concept of God is presupposed, that it is taken as point of departure, and reality (i.e., being and thought) is supposed to be deduced or “plucked” from the concept itself.¹⁵⁶

In the subsequent and more extensive elaboration of Anselm’s thought by understanding, it was said that the concept of God is that God is the quintessence of all reality, the most real essence.¹⁵⁷ Now being is also a reality; so being also belongs to God. The objection to this is | that being is no reality,¹⁵⁸ is not part of the reality, of a concept. The reality of the concept means the concept’s determinateness of content; through being, however, nothing is added to the content of the concept. If we have some content and define it, for instance that gold has a certain specific gravity, then this feature is one of its realities. To this accrues further the yellow color and the like, as other realities of the concept. Hence Kant constructed this plausible case. I represent to myself a hundred dollars.¹⁵⁹ The concept or the determinateness of content is the same

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156. [Ed.] Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 631: “To attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural procedure and a mere innovation of scholastic subtlety.” Hegel’s *herausgeklaut* (“plucked”) and Kant’s *ausklauben* are more colorful expressions, suggesting an even more high-handed procedure than Kemp Smith’s “extract,” for which there are a number of ordinary German words.

157. [Ed.] A reference to the concept of the *ens realissimum*; cf. also Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 624 ff. Hegel may be using “most real essence” as analogous to “most perfect essence” (*ens perfectissimum*), which was more predominant in the tradition to which he is referring. See Descartes, *Meditations*, chap. 3; or Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, § 6. The designation of God as *ens realissimum* as distinguished from *ens perfectissimum* is found, among other places, in Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§ 806, 810.

158. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 626: “‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves.”

159. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 627: “A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express

whether I represent the determinateness to myself or have the money in my pocket. Using the hundred-dollar example we can also restate plausibly the objection to the first Anselmian form of the argument, according to which being is supposed to follow from the concept in general, namely the objection that concept and being are distinct from one another, that each is on its own account, and that being must be introduced from without or from elsewhere because it does not lie within the concept. The concept of a hundred dollars has no bearing whatever on the existence of the money. This is therefore the criticism directed against the ontological proof; it is what has counted as valid until now. Thus the main issue is whether being lies within the concept and may be deduced from it.

To these objections there is the following rejoinder. In ordinary life we do indeed call a representation of a hundred dollars a concept. It is no concept, however, but only a content-determination of my consciousness; an abstract sensible representation such as "blue," or a determinacy of the understanding that is within my head, can of course lack being. This sort of thing, however, is not to be called a concept. We must take the concept as such, we must take the absolute concept in its consummate form or the concept in and for itself, the concept of God—and this concept contains being as a determinacy.

The concept is what is alive, is what mediates itself with itself; one of its determinations is also being. This can be shown very easily in two ways. First, as far as the concept is concerned, it is immediately this universal that determines and particularizes itself—it is this activity of dividing, of particularizing and determining itself, of positing a finitude, negating this its own finitude and being identical with itself through the negation of this finitude. This is the concept as such, the concept of God, the absolute concept;

the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept."

this is just what God is. As spirit or as love, God is this self-particularizing. God creates the world and produces his Son, posits an other to himself and in this other has himself, | is identical with himself. This is the case in the concept as such, and even more so in the idea: through the negation of the particularizing (for which particularizing the concept itself is equally the positing activity) the concept [comes] to be identical with itself or to relate itself to itself. 326

If we further inquire what being is—this attribute, determinacy, or reality that we are under such necessity to know as united with the idea of God—then we must reply as follows. “Being is nothing more than the inexpressible or the conceptless; it is not the concrete, which the concept is, but is wholly and only the abstraction of relation to self.” Whatever is, is; it relates itself to itself. We can say that it is *immediacy*. Being is the immediate as such, and conversely, the immediate is being and is in relation to self—which means that mediation is negated. This definition of “relation to self” or “immediacy” is now directly explicit in the concept in general, and in the absolute concept or in the concept of God; it is the wholly abstract and most meager definition that God is relation to self. This abstract relation to self lies directly within the concept itself, and logic begins with it.¹⁶⁰ To that extent being is different from the concept, because it is not the entire concept but is only one of its determinations, only this simplicity of the concept (the fact that it is by itself, or is identity with self, relation merely to self). This is the simple insight, that being is within the concept. Thoughtlessness concerning being prevails to the point that it is asserted that being is not within the concept. It is indeed different from the concept, but only as a determination of the concept. Thus this determination is immediately within the concept. “Concept” must not be exchanged for “representation” as we do in ordinary life.

¹⁶¹The other [way of proving that the concept of God involves

160. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: One must directly have this simple insight.

161. *Precedes in L (1827?) (similar in W)*: Being is therefore this determination found within the concept, but different from the concept because the concept is the whole, whereas being is only one determination.

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being] would be as follows. We have said that the concept contains this determination in itself; it is *one* of the concept's determinations. But being is also different from the concept because the concept is the totality. Insofar as they differ, mediation also belongs to their union, | for they are not immediately identical. All immediacy is true and actual only insofar as it is inwardly mediation, and, vice versa, all mediation is true only insofar as it is inwardly immediacy or has relation to itself. The concept is different from being, and the difference is of the kind where the concept is what sublates the difference.

The concept is this totality, the movement or process of self-objectifying. The concept merely as such, as distinct from being, is something merely subjective; that is a deficiency.¹⁶²

To grasp the movement of the concept as activity is a task that clearly belongs to logic. Still we can at least make it palpable. First we must cease thinking of the concept as such as something that we only have or form within ourselves. The concept is the purpose of an object, the soul of the living thing. What we call soul is the concept, and in spirit and consciousness the concept as such comes to existence as free concept, or in its subjectivity—as distinct from its reality in itself. The sun or an animal only *is* the concept but does not *have* the concept. The concept does not become objective for them. There is not this separation [of being and having] in the sun or in the animal; but in consciousness there is what is called the “I,” the existing concept, the concept in its subjective actuality, and I, this concept, am the subjective. But no human being is satisfied with a bare selfhood; the I is *active*, and this activity is a self-objectifying, the giving of actuality and determinate being to oneself. In its further and more concrete determination this activity of the concept (already in the animal and then also in the I or in spirit) is what we call a *drive*. Every satisfaction of a drive is for the I this

162. L (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): The concept is, however, the deepest and the highest thing; it is the nature of every concept to sublimate its deficiency, its subjectivity, this difference from being; it is itself the action of bringing itself forth as having being objectively.

process of sublating subjectivity, and thus positing its subjective or inner being as something likewise external, objective, and real; it is the process of bringing forth the unity of what is only subjective with the objective, of stripping away this one-sidedness from both of them. When I have a drive, that is a condition of deficiency, something subjective. The satisfaction of the drive procures for me my feeling of self. If I am merely in a state of longing | or striving, then I am nothing actual. The striving must come into existence. All the action in the world is a sublating of the subjective and a positing of the objective, and so is the production of the unity of both. There is nothing else of which everything is so illustrative as the sublating of the opposite, and the bringing forth of the unity of the subjective and the objective. To posit itself not only subjectively but also objectively, or even neither subjectively nor objectively—that is what the concept is. Hence on the one hand the concept has in itself this impoverished, abstract determination of being. But inasmuch as it is differentiated—and because it is living it must be differentiated—the concept is just what, as living thing, negates the subjective and posits it objectively.

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This, then, is what ought to be called the critique. Anselm's thought is thus a necessary and true thought according to its content; but, as with the preceding modes of mediation, the form of the deductive proof undoubtedly has a deficiency. It presupposes the pure concept, the concept in and for itself, the concept of God, but it also presupposes that this concept at the same time *is*, that it has being. The unity of concept and being is a presupposition, and the deficiency consists in the very fact that it is a mere presupposition, ~which is not proved but only adopted immediately.¹⁶³ If we compare this content with that of faith or immediate knowledge, what faith means is that God is a fact of our consciousness,¹⁶⁴ that I have a representation of God and the being of God is bound up with it. What is declared, therefore, is that being, too, is inseparable

163. *Thus Hu; W (Var) reads:* —the presupposition that the pure concept, the concept in and for itself, the concept of God, *is*, that it contains being, too.

164. [Ed.] See above, n. 94.

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ably conjoined with the representation of God. In the case of the concept, being is not supposed to be a mere *esse in idea* [being in thought] but also an *esse in re* [being in fact]. It is thus the same content as Anselm's presupposition. To presuppose means to accept something immediately as primary and unproved. It is the same with faith. "As the saying goes, "we know it immediately, we believe in it."¹⁶⁵ Therefore since Anselm's day we have come no further in any respect. But, as we said, the defective feature is the fact that this is a presupposition and therefore something immediate, and so one does not recognize | the necessity of this unity. The presupposition is now ubiquitous, even in Spinoza, for he defines God or the absolute cause in no other way. He says that substance is that which cannot be thought without existence [*Existenz*], the concept of which includes existence within itself¹⁶⁶—in other words, that the representation of God is immediately conjoined with the being [of God]. That is what Anselm said and what is said in the faith of the present day.

Spinoza says that substance includes being within itself. This inseparability of concept and being is only absolutely the case with God. The finitude of things consists in the fact that the concept (and the definition of the concept) and its being according to its definition are different. The finite is that which does not correspond to its concept, or rather to *the* concept.¹⁶⁷ We say that human beings are mortal. We even express that mortality as the ability of body and soul to separate, for body is finite whereas soul is the concept. Here there is separation, but only inseparability is present in the pure concept. We have said that every drive is an example of the concept that realizes itself. By the drive of spirit or of the living thing we must understand not only the formal aspect, but also

165. Thus B; W₂ (Var) reads: If we say "we believe that, we know it immediately," this unity of representation and being is expressed as a presupposition just as much as it is by Anselm.

166. [Ed.] See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. VII (*Chief Works* 2:48).

167. *Precedes in L* (1827?) (*similar in W*): We have the concept of soul. Its reality or being is corporeality. W₁ (Var) adds before this sentence: Moreover, the [following] ordinary rejoinder has been made to Anselm.

together with it the content of the drive. The satisfied drive is in any case infinite according to its form; but the drive has a content according to which it is finite and limited, and so it does not correspond to the concept, to the pure concept.¹⁶⁸ |

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C. THE CULTUS¹⁶⁹

¹⁷⁰In the second topic that we have dealt with—the *knowledge of God*—I have God as my object and am engrossed therein; the object alone is before me and is a certainty to me, and to that extent alone I know it. Of course I also know the finite from which I set out; but I have passed over from its negation to the knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of God. I have raised myself into this spiritual domain and set myself upon the spiritual soil that is God or the divine. This relationship is therefore *theoretical*; it still lacks the *practical* element, which comes to expression in the cultus.

168. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): This is the explication of the standpoint of the knowledge of the concept. What we have considered finally is the knowledge or certainty of God in general. Its principal characteristic is as follows. If we know an object, then the object is before us and we are immediately related to it. But this immediacy contains mediation—what we have called elevation to God, in that the human spirit deems the finite to be worthless. By way of this negation the human spirit raises itself up to God and joins itself together with God. This conclusion, “I know that God is,” or this simple connection, arose through that negation.

After inserting materials from 1824 and MiscP, *L* appends a passage that purports to be from the 1827 lectures: The first [moment] that we have dealt with was the realm of religion in general, and the second was the knowledge of God. The third, which we have yet to consider, is that negative moment as it occurs in religion, the moment that we call the cultus.

169. In *B*’s margin: 14 June 1827

[*Ed.*] The heading is found in *B*, *An*. In this section Hegel gathers together material found in Sec. A of the *Ms.* and Sec. B.3 of the 1824 lectures, giving it a systematic organization not hitherto achieved. The 1824 “Cultus” treats certain preliminary matters—the question of faith and its grounds, the issue of pantheism—and provides a detailed survey of the various developmental forms that cultic practice assumes in the history of religions, but it does not offer an analysis of the religious cultus in its essential forms, as the 1827 lectures do.

170. *Precedes in L* (1827?): What the cultus is we find already contained in what we have considered in the concept of religion generally.

In the theoretical relationship I am immersed in my object and know nothing of myself.¹⁷¹ But this knowledge, this connection without relationship, is not the whole of what is in fact present. I stand over against the object with which I am filled. That I am and that I have an object is a reflection upon consciousness; I consider my knowledge of the object: thus I am, and the object is. Thus, inasmuch as I have this reflection—I and the object—there are two elements, and these two are different. In intuition or in the theoretical relationship there is only one object with which I am filled; I know nothing of myself. The true, however, is the relationship of myself and this object.

At this point the practical relationship commences, in which I exist on my own account, I stand over against the object, and I now have to bring forth my own union with it. I have not only to know the object, to be filled, but to *know myself* as filled by this object, to know it as within me and likewise myself as within this object that is the truth—and so to know myself in the truth. To bring forth this unity is *action*, or the aspect of the cultus. This parting of subjectivity and objectivity has its proper beginning first in the practical relationship, in the will; | for in the theoretical domain I am filled by the object.¹⁷² Only here, in the will or in the practical domain, do I exist on my own account, am I free, and related to myself as subject; only now do I stand over against the object. To that extent, limitation first begins within the practical domain, not within the theoretical relationship. It is said that there is unlimitedness in will, that only in knowledge am I limited. But the latter can properly be said of will. In willing I exist for myself; other objects stand over against me and so they are my limit. The will has an end and moves toward this end; it is the activity of sublating this finitude, this contradiction, the fact that this object is a limit for me. In the practical determination there is finitude

171. L (1827?) adds: The conclusion of the knowledge of God is an immediate relation. It is also this way with more mundane examples. For instance, I know this paper. In this knowing I am filled by the representation of the paper and in this context know nothing of my own self.

172. L (1827?) adds: and do not posit myself over against it. To the extent that I know the object, it is and I am not.

because I exist on my own account as will or subject, and there is another object to which I am directed. Insofar as I act, I have the need to assimilate this object to myself, to sublate my finitude in relation to it, to reinstate my feeling of self. In the state of need I am limited, and the lack appears as the fact that for me the object appears as external.

In the practical domain, therefore, we have an other as object. In religion this object is God, whom we know. Inasmuch as human beings look back upon themselves, this object is an other for them, something lying beyond them. In the theoretical domain they do not reflect upon this antithesis; what is there is this immediate unity, immediate knowledge, faith. In the theoretical domain they include themselves with this object; that is how we can express theoretical consciousness according to its result or its conclusion. In the cultus, on the contrary, God is on one side, I am on the other, and the determination is *the including, within my own self, of myself with God*, the knowing of myself within God and of God within me.¹⁷³

The cultus involves giving oneself this supreme, absolute enjoyment.¹⁷⁴ There is feeling within it; I take part in it with my particular, subjective personality, | knowing myself as this individual included in and with God, knowing myself within the truth (and I have my truth only in God), i.e., joining myself as myself in God together with myself.

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The presupposition in the cultus is that the reconciliation of God with humanity is implicitly and explicitly consummated, that it is not a matter of first having to bring this reconciliation about absolutely; instead it only needs to be produced for me, the particular person, because I am actual in the practical domain as this single individual. Participation in this reconciliation that is implicitly and explicitly accomplished is the action of the cultus. Universally, this

173. *L* (1827?) adds (*similar in W*): —this concrete unity. For our consideration, theoretical consciousness, too, is concrete consciousness, but only implicitly so; that it should be concrete for the subject also is precisely the practical relationship.

174. [*Ed.*] *Genuss* is the term Hegel uses to describe the communion with deity that is at the center of all cultic activity. At root is the quite physical image of eating and drinking. It also has the connotation of “enjoyment,” “pleasure,” “gratification.”

reconciliation is accomplished; it is the foundation of all religious consciousness.

We have begun with the solid soil of religion, with this substantiality. Implied in it is [the awareness] that God alone is truth, or in a more developed form that God is gracious, has created human beings, etc. The presupposition is that God alone is true actuality, that insofar as I have actuality I have it only in God; since God alone is actuality, I should have my truth and actuality in God. That is the foundation of the cultus.

333 ¹⁷⁵Today this aspect of the cultus is more or less pushed to one side and no longer stands forth in all its importance; we talk | only of eliciting faith in God within human beings. But it is something outside of religion [altogether], if one wants to elicit it for the first time.¹⁷⁶ We will have occasion later to enlarge upon different forms of this cultus. ~In dogmatic theology the traditional chapter *de*

175. *Precedes in L* (1827?): It is presupposed either that the reconciliation is accomplished, or that it is implicitly and explicitly present from the outset. Thus among the pagans there is the consciousness of their bliss, the consciousness that divinity is near to them, that the gods are friendly to them.

Precedes in W₂ (MiscP): And so, too, if today we have only the perpetual urgency of injecting faith into human beings, and we talk only of eliciting misery within them and therewith the faith that God is, then this is not only not the cultus, but this perpetual wishing just to elicit religion for the first time is [something] outside of religion [altogether]. The cultus, on the other hand, exists within religion; and the knowledge that God is, and is [all of] actuality, is in the cultus the soil to which I have only to assimilate myself. Unhappy the age that must content itself with being forever told only that there may be a God!

Since the cultus, on the contrary, presupposes the being-in-and-for-self of the ultimate goal of the world, but on this presupposition is aligned in opposition to empirical self-consciousness and its particular interests, [*W₂* (1831) *continues (similar in W₁):*] a world of absolute finitude has not yet set up an absolute infinity over against itself. Thus, among the pagans the consciousness of their bliss prevails, the consciousness that God is near to them as the God of the people and the city, this feeling that the gods are friendly to them and grant them the enjoyment of what is best. If in this way Athena is known by the Athenians as their divine power, they know themselves thus as originally at one with it, and they know the divinity as the spiritual power of their people itself.

176. *L* (1827?) *adds*: However, the cultus exists only within religion; it is within the cultus itself that God is, and that God is the true actuality, namely this ground. What is elicited by means of the cultus is what was formerly called the *unio mystica*, this feeling, this gratification [*rejoins main text 3d sentence below*]

unione mystica deals with this cultus.¹⁷⁷ As a whole the mystical is everything speculative, or whatever is concealed from the understanding. Feeling—the gratification that I am with God in his grace and that God's spirit is alive within me, the consciousness of my union and reconciliation with God—this is the innermost feature of the cultus.

The first form of the cultus is what is called *devotion* in general. Devotion is not the mere faith that God is, but is present when the faith becomes vivid, when the subject prays and is occupied with this content not merely in objective fashion but becomes immersed therein; the essential thing here is the fire and heat of devotion. The subject takes part in this way; it is subjectivity that possesses itself therein, that prays, speaks, passes through [and beyond] representations, knows itself and the object itself, and is concerned with its elevation. Devotion is the self-moving spirit, holding to itself in this movement, for this object. This inwardness is devotion in general.¹⁷⁸

To the cultus belong, in the second place, the external forms through which the feeling of reconciliation is brought forth in an external and sensible manner, | as for instance the fact that in the *sacraments* reconciliation is brought into feeling, into the here and now of present and sensible consciousness; and [further] all the manifold actions embraced under the heading of *sacrifice*. That very negation, about which our insight (in the case of theoretical consciousness) was that the subject rises above the finite and consciousness of the finite, is now consciously accomplished in the cultus, for here the subject is concerned chiefly with itself.

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In the ardor and liveliness of devotion there is indeed a removal of representations—this energy and forcefulness of holding oneself

177. Thus Hu; L (Var) reads: In dogmatics we had a *unio mystica*. There is [now] a great aversion to the mystical.

178. Thus L; W₂ (MiscP) reads: When the subject, in the fire and the heat of devotion, becomes immersed in the object, it does indeed take part itself; the subject is the very one that possesses itself in this devout enterprise, the one that prays there, speaks, passes through [and beyond] representations, is concerned with its own elevation. But in devotion the subject does not maintain itself in its particularity, but only in its movement within the object and only as this self-moving spirit.

firmly and in active manner within the truth, in opposition to the consciousness with its former interests. Negation exists within devotion and even maintains an outward configuration by means of sacrifice. The subject renounces something or negates something in relation to itself. It has possessions and divests itself of them in order to demonstrate that it is in earnest. On the one hand this negation is accomplished in a more intensive fashion only through the sacrificing or burning of something—even through human sacrifice; on the other hand the sensible enjoyment [of the sacrifice], for instance the eating and drinking, is itself the negation of external things. Thus from this negation or from the sacrifice one advances to enjoyment, to consciousness of having posited oneself in unity with God by means of it. The sensible enjoyment is linked directly with what is higher, with consciousness of the linkage with God.

The third and highest form within the cultus is when one lays aside one's own subjectivity—not only practices renunciation in external things such as possessions, but offers one's heart or inmost self to God and senses *remorse* and *repentance* in this inmost self; then one is conscious of one's own immediate natural state (which subsists in the passions and intentions of particularity), so that one dismisses these things, purifies one's heart, and through this purification of one's heart raises oneself up to the realm of the purely spiritual. This experience of nothingness can be a bare condition or single experience, or it can be thoroughly elaborated [in one's life]. If heart and will are earnestly and thoroughly cultivated for the universal and the true, then there is present what appears as *ethical life*. To that extent ethical life is the most genuine cultus.¹⁷⁹ But consciousness of the true, of the divine, of God, must be directly bound up with it.

335 To this extent philosophy [too] is a continual cultus; it has as its object the true, and the true in its highest shape | as absolute spirit, as God. To know this true not only in its simple form as God, but also to know the rational in God's works—as produced by God and endowed with reason—that is philosophy. It is part of

179. [Ed.] See below, *Religion and State*, n. 1.

knowing the true that one should dismiss one's subjectivity, the subjective fancies of personal vanity, and concern oneself with the true purely in thought, conducting oneself solely in accordance with objective thought. This negation of one's specific subjectivity is an essential and necessary moment.¹⁸⁰ |

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180. In *W₂*, and also in shorter form in *W₁*, the following material from the 1831 lectures, which serves as a transition to the treatment of the *cultus*, is associated with text from the 1824 lectures: The "I," this empirical existence [*Existenz*] from which essence is of course still distinct, is that which is without essence.

Subjective consciousness itself, however, is a limited, determinate consciousness: i.e., particular spirit. For this particular spirit, for spirit with determinacy, truth, too, exists only in this determinate mode. The way in which subjective spirit is constituted is also the way in which there is objective truth for it.

Consciousness and knowledge themselves, however, lie within God. There is one content, and inseparable from it is the form that consists in this content being the object of consciousness. With consciousness we are in the domain of *particular spirit*, and faith adapts itself to the developmental stages of the spirit and determines itself to another content. Thus it is quite right to talk already to a child about God, its creator, and thereby the child comes to have a representation of God, of a higher being; this higher being is grasped by consciousness in the early years, although only in a limited way, and a foundation of this kind gradually develops further. The *one spirit* is in principle the substantial foundation; this is the spirit of a people in the way it is determined within the individual periods of world history—the *national spirit*. This national spirit constitutes the *substantial foundation* within the individual, for all of us are born within our own people and belong to its spirit. This spirit is what is substantial in general, and is by nature, as it were, what is identical; it is the absolute ground of faith. By this standard it is determined what counts as truth. In this way the substantial element exists for itself as against the individuals; it is their [sovereign] power in its connection with them as individuals, and within this relationship to them it is their absolute authority. As belonging to the spirit of their people, all individuals are thus born into the faith of their forefathers without either being responsible for it or deserving it, and the faith of their forefathers is something holy for them, and is their authority. This constitutes the ground of faith that is given by historical development.

There arises here the question of how a religion is grounded, i.e., in what way the substantial spirit comes to the consciousness of peoples. This is a historical matter; its beginnings are inconspicuous. Those who know how to express this spirit are the prophets and the poets. Herodotus [*Histories* 2.53] says that Homer and Hesiod made the gods of the Greeks for them. On this view Homer and Hesiod have an authority, but that is only because their declarations were in conformity with the Greek spirit. Still earlier beginnings, which were the first glimmer of the divine, preceded even these poets; for we cannot say that the cultural formation as it appears in Homer had been there from the beginning. Awe in the presence of the

337 Stated in a cursory way, religion is our relation to God. We have said that this relation is found in thinking. God is for thought because God is the universal in and for itself. The primal division [or judgment] of this implicit and explicit | universal, or the creation, is self-particularizing, the differentiating of the particular spirit over

supersensible expressed itself initially in a manner still unrefined. Fear is the beginning, and in order to banish it and to ingratiate themselves with that supersensible power, people employed magical charms and prayed in hymns. In this way consciousness developed little by little, and the few who (at that stage) know what the divine is, are the patriarchs and the priests; or there can even be a caste or a particular family marked out just for the supervision of teaching and worship. Every individual is accustomed to live within these representations and sensations, and so a spiritual contagion spreads among the people; education plays its part, so that the individuals dwell within the atmosphere of their people. Thus the children, suitably attired and adorned, go along to worship; they share in the rites or have their own role to play in them; in any event they learn the prayers and attend to the representations of the community and of the people, taking their own place within these contexts and accepting them in the same immediate way in which standardized styles of dress and the manners of everyday life are transmitted.

This is natural authority, but its power is greatest in the spiritual realm. However much pride individuals may take in their independence, they cannot fly above this spirit, for it is the substantial, it is their very own spirituality itself.

At first this authority is quite constrained and stands fast immediately in the people, without any prohibition of an opposing position. In that situation the single individuals are neither free nor unfree, for no antithesis of reflection or of subjective thought is present at all. We say "the people believed this"; but they themselves do not call it "believing," insofar as this term implies consciousness of an antithesis [to this faith].

There are, however, different forms of faith and different religions that can come into collision with one another. While this encounter *can* occur upon the soil of representation and reflection, and advocacy may be supported by reasons and proofs for the truth, it can also take the form of one people compelling others to acquiesce in its faith. In the latter case faith becomes a compulsory state authority, both within the inner life of the state itself on the one hand, and in its foreign affairs on the other. This collision has precipitated countless wars. Into this category, for instance, fall the wars of the Muslims, and the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants as well as the Inquisition; and further the battles between the devotees of Shiva and those of Vishnu, among the Indians. Such conflicts are fought for the glory of God, so that God will be acknowledged in consciousness and the truth of the people will meet with recognition. Freedom of faith in general rises up against compulsion of this kind; but this freedom can then also assume more sharply the attitude of standing above the different contents that are asserted as the truth. So, in a formal sense this is what freedom of faith as such is; while *what* is believed should remain irrelevant. This is then the formal requirement of freedom, which looks not to the truth of faith and relates only to subjective freedom; the content

against the absolute spirit. The first relationship that we considered was that of knowledge, the theoretical | relationship. The second is the practical relationship or the knowledge of this elevation (and the elevation is itself knowledge). The third moment is the knowing of this knowing. That is actual religion.¹⁸¹

may be of whatever stripe one pleases. This is where the distinction arises between the inner self or the locus of conscience in which I am by myself, and the essential content. The inner self is the holy place, the locus of my freedom, which ought to be respected; this is an essential demand that human beings make insofar as the consciousness of freedom is awakened within them. The ground here is no longer the substantial content of faith but its formal aspect.

When we consider the matter in the perspective of abstract thinking, however, freedom of faith appears at once as a contradiction in itself, for in the very act of believing one accepts something given, something already present; whereas freedom demands that this given should be posited or produced by me. But in that requirement of freedom, belief is in fact grasped as my personal faith, as my own most special and inmost certainty. My faith has its source and its locus in this certainty of my self, in my conviction, and I am free on my own account as against others, let the type of my faith itself be what it will; in other words, the definite grounds, reflections, and feelings upon which it is built are irrelevant here. Faith is of course still not free in itself in regard to the content, and it is only thought that seeks to be free with regard to the content, too.

Here then, where freedom relates also to the content, is where the breach between thought and faith arises, the breach that we see already in Greece at the time of Socrates. Thought is a new relation over against faith. The aspect of form comes into relation specifically as opposed to the substantial aspect of truth. This principle is present in the Christian religion from its outset; Christianity does, indeed, begin on the one hand from an external history that is believed; but at the same time this history has the significance of being the explication of God's nature. In accordance with the distinction that arises here at once, Christ is not only a human being who has undergone this fate, but is also the Son of God. So the *explication* of the story of Christ is its more profound aspect; this explication took place in thought and brought forth dogmatics, the church's doctrine. With it goes the requirement of inwardness or of thought. The breach between thought and faith develops further as a result. Thought knows itself to be free not only according to its form but also with regard to its content. Freedom is not, however, without authority in thought; thought has certain principles, which are of course its own and to which it reduces everything, though these principles belong to the development itself. An age has certain principles, and to that extent there is also authority present within it. The ultimate analysis, in which there are no longer any assumed principles, arrives only in the advance to philosophy.

181. *Thus L; Hu reads:* These are the three moments of the concept of religion. *An reads:* Elevation to God is knowledge; knowing of this knowing is for the first time true religion.

APPENDIXES

THE RELATIONSHIP OF
RELIGION TO THE STATE
ACCORDING TO
THE LECTURES OF 1831¹

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When this cultivation of subjectivity and this purification of the heart from its immediate natural state has been thoroughly elaborated and made an enduring condition that accords with its universal purpose, it is then consummated as the ethical realm, and by this route religion passes over into *ethics* and the *state*.

Thus arises the nexus that is also called the relationship of religion to the state. We have still to speak more fully about this.

1. The *state* is the *genuine mode of actuality*; in it the genuinely ethical will comes to actuality, and spirit lives in its genuineness. Religion is divine knowledge, the knowledge that human beings have of God and of themselves in God. This is the divine wisdom and the field of absolute truth. But there is a second wisdom, the

1. [Ed.] This material is found in both editions of *W*; our text follows *W*₂. Only the 1831 lectures contain a separate section on "The Relationship of Religion to the State" in *The Concept of Religion*, following the section on the cultus. In the earlier lectures this topic is taken up in association with the cultus of the specific religions. However, this new section might be considered an expansion of the cryptic remark found at the end of Sec. C of the 1827 *Concept*, namely, that "ethical life is the most genuine cultus" (above, p. 446). That is, when the subjective appropriation of reconciliation that occurs in the cultus takes on objective, ethical structure or substance, the true and universal actualization of divine-human reconciliation is achieved. In this sense the various forms of ethical life—the family, civil society, and ultimately the state—all represent extensions of the religious cultus and, in the earlier lectures, are treated under the general rubric of the cultus. Only in 1831 do they merit separate treatment, probably because of Hegel's interest in recent political events in France and Great Britain—notably the end of the Bourbon monarchy in the July Revolution of 1830, and the introduction of the Reform Bill into Parliament in 1831. Hegel's essay on the latter was his last published writing before his death.

wisdom of the world, and there arises a question concerning its relationship to that divine wisdom.

340 Universally speaking, religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same—they are implicitly and explicitly identical. In the patriarchal relationship and in the Jewish theocracy, the two are not yet distinguished and are still outwardly identical. However, the two are also different, and thus in due course they become strictly separated from one another; but then they are again posited as truly identical. The implicit and explicit unity is evident from what has been said; religion is knowledge of the highest truth, and this truth, defined more precisely, is *free* spirit. In religion, human beings are free before God. Because they make their will conform to the divine will, they are not opposed to the highest will but instead have themselves within it; they are free because in the cultus they have achieved the sublation of the rupture. The state is simply *freedom in the world*, in actuality. What essentially matters here is the concept of freedom that a people bears within its | self-consciousness, for the concept of freedom is realized in the state, and the consciousness of freedom, as it is implicitly, belongs essentially to this realization. Peoples who do not know that human beings are free in and for themselves live in a benighted state regarding their constitution as well as their religion. There is *one* concept of freedom in religion and state. This one concept is the highest concept that human beings have, and it is made real by them. A people that has a bad concept of God has also a bad state, bad government, and bad laws.

In its detailed elaboration, the consideration of this nexus between state and religion properly belongs to the philosophy of world history. We have to consider it here only in the determinate form in which it appears to representation and there gets itself entangled in contradictions, and how the final outcome is the antithesis of the two that shapes the interest of the modern age. Hence we consider this nexus first of all in regard to

2. *how it is represented.* Human beings have a consciousness of it, although not in the way it is the absolute nexus and is known in philosophy. Instead they know it in a general way and represent it to themselves. The representation of the nexus here expresses

itself [in the claim] that the laws, governmental authority, and political constitution originate from God: in this way these forms are authorized—and indeed authorized by the highest authority available to representation. The laws are the development of the concept of freedom, and this concept, reflecting itself in this way in existence, has as its foundation and truth the concept of freedom as it is grasped in religion. What this expresses is that these laws of ethical life and of legal right are eternal and unchangeable regulations for human conduct, that they are not arbitrary but endure as long as religion itself. We find the representation of this nexus among all peoples. It can even be expressed in the form that one is hearkening to God in obeying the laws and the governmental authority, i.e., the powers that hold the state together. This tenet is in one way correct, but is also exposed to the danger that it can be taken wholly abstractly, since it is not determined how the laws are explicated and which laws are appropriate for the basic constitution. Expressed formally, the tenet thus reads: One ought to heed the laws | whatever they may be. Ruling and legislation are in this way relegated to the arbitrariness of the government.

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This relationship has come about in Protestant states and it can occur only in such states, for in them the unity of religion and the state is present. The laws of the state have both a rational and a divine validity due to this presupposed original harmony, and religion does not have its own principles that conflict with those that are valid in the state. But through fixed adherence to the formal principle a wide scope is granted to arbitrariness, tyranny, and oppression. This was particularly evident in England (under the last Stuart kings²), when passive obedience was demanded and the tenet was accepted that the sovereign is accountable for his actions only to God. With this went the assumption that only the sovereign even knows definitely what is essential and necessary for the state; the more precise definition [of it] lies in the sovereign's will, because his will is an immediate revelation of God's will. Through its further

2. [Ed.] Charles II (1660–1685) and James II (1685–1688). Hegel may have been familiar with details from the German translation of David Hume's history of Great Britain: *Geschichte von Grossbritannien* (Frankenthal, 1788).

consequences, however, this principle developed to the point that it turned over into its opposite. For the distinction between priests and laity is not present among the Protestants, and priests are not privileged to possess divine revelation; still less is there such a privilege accruing exclusively to one lay person. Against the principle of divine authorization of the sovereign, therefore, the principle of the same authorization accruing to the laity in general was posited. Thus there arose in England a Protestant sect that asserted that the way a government must be conducted was imparted to it by revelation; following such inspiration of the Lord, they incited a revolution and beheaded their king.³ So even if it is generally established that the laws are by virtue of divine will, it is just as important to be cognizant of this divine will, and this is not the province of a specific [individual or group], but of everyone.

What the rational is, and the cognition of it, is a matter for the cultivation of thought and particularly a matter for philosophy, which can well be called worldly wisdom in this sense. It makes no difference at all what the outward appearance is in which the true laws have established their validity (i.e., whether they are wrested forcibly from the sovereign or not). The progressive cultivation of the concept of freedom, of right, and of humanity |
 342 among human beings is necessary on its own account. Thus, along with the truth that the laws are the divine will, it is particularly important that it be determined what these laws are. Principles as such are only abstract thoughts that have their truth only in their development; held fast in their abstract form, they are what is wholly untrue.

3. Finally, state and religion *can also be sundered* and have different laws. The realm of the worldly and that of the religious are different; so a distinction of principle can come in, too. Religion does not simply remain on its own proper territory but also affects the subject, furnishing it with precepts in respect to its religiosity and thereby in respect to its activity. The precepts that religion furnishes to the individual can be distinct from the basic principles of right and of ethical life that are in force in the state. This antithesis

3. [Ed.] A reference to the Independents under Cromwell and the beheading of Charles I. See Hume, *Geschichte von Grossbritannien* 16:30 ff., 246–247.

is expressed in the following form, that the religious demand pertains to holiness and that of the state to right and ethical life; on one side the vocation [*Bestimmung*] is for eternity, on the other it is for temporality and temporal well-being, which must be sacrificed for the sake of eternal salvation. In this way a religious ideal is set up, a heaven on earth, i.e., the abstraction of spirit over against the substantial [world] of actuality; renunciation of actuality is the basic vocation that emerges, and with it conflict and flight. Something else that is supposed to be more exalted is set in opposition to the substantial foundation, to what is genuine.

The first ethical realm within substantial actuality is that of *marriage*. The love that God is exists within actuality as conjugal love. As the initial appearance of substantial will within existent actuality, this love has a natural aspect, although it is also an ethical duty. Set up over against this duty is renunciation or *celibacy* as something sacred.

In the second place, human beings as single individuals have to *contend with natural necessity*; for each of us it is an ethical law to make ourselves independent [of this necessity] by means of our activity and understanding, for in the natural mode human beings are dependent in many respects. By our spirit and rectitude we are obliged to earn our own livelihood and so to free ourselves from that natural necessity; | that is what human integrity consists in. A religious duty that has been set in opposition to this worldly obligation requires that human beings ought not to be active in this way, ought not to trouble themselves with such concerns. The whole sphere of commerce, i.e., every activity that relates to acquisition, industry, and the like, is therewith rejected, for human beings ought not to have anything to do with such aims; in this instance, however, necessity itself is more rational than are such religious views. On the one hand human activity is represented as something profane, while on the other it is demanded of people that, if they have possessions, they should not only refrain from increasing them through their activity but should give them away to the poor and particularly to the church—that is, to those who do nothing, who do not labor. Thus what is highly esteemed in life as integrity is hereby rejected as profane.

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In the third place, the highest ethical life in the state rests upon the activation of rational, universal will; for in the state the subject has its *freedom*, which is brought to full reality therein. Against this a religious duty is set up, according to which freedom is not allowed to be the final goal for human beings; instead one ought to subject oneself to a strict *obedience* and to persevere in having no will of one's own. Going even further, one ought to be selfless even in one's own conscience and belief—in one's deepest inwardness one ought to engage in self-renunciation and cast one's own self away.

When religion places an embargo upon human activity in this way, it can impose upon us specific precepts that are opposed to worldly rationality. The worldly wisdom that recognizes the true in actuality has come forward against it; within the consciousness of spirit the principles of its own freedom have awakened, and there the claims of freedom have entered into conflict with the religious principles that demand this renunciation. In Catholic states religion and state thus stand opposed to one another once subjective freedom establishes itself in human beings.

344 In this antithesis religion expresses itself only in a negative fashion and requires of human beings that they renounce all freedom. More precisely, this antithesis is that in their actual consciousness human beings are in general intrinsically devoid of rights, that religion recognizes no absolute rights within the field of actual ethical life. This is the monstrous distinction that has thereby arisen in the modern world, so that the question of principle is whether human freedom ought to be recognized as something true in and for itself, or whether it can be repudiated by religion.

It has already been stated that there can be a harmony of religion and state. In Protestant states this is generally the case in principle (although [only] in an abstract fashion); for Protestantism requires that human beings should believe only what they know—that their conscience, being something sacred, ought to be inviolable. Human beings are not passive within divine grace; they participate in it essentially with their subjective freedom, and in their knowing, willing, and believing, the moment of subjective freedom is expressly required. In states with a different religion it can on the contrary be the case that the two sides are not in harmony, that

religion is distinct from the principle of the state. We observe this situation over a wide area, with a religion that does not recognize the principle of freedom on the one hand, and a political constitution that makes the principle of freedom into its foundation on the other. The saying that human beings are by their very nature free is a principle of infinite worth. But if we stick with this abstraction alone, no organic political constitution can emerge, for that requires an articulation in which duties and rights are delimited. That abstraction leaves no scope for the inequality that has to come in if a [social] organism, and with it genuine [social] vitality, is to come about.⁴

Principles of this sort are true but cannot be adopted in their abstract form. The knowledge that the human being is free by nature, i.e., according to the concept, belongs to the modern era. But whether or not we stick with the abstraction, it can happen that these principles are opposed by the religion that does not recognize them but considers them to be devoid of right, and regards only arbitrariness as legitimate. Therefore a *struggle* necessarily arises, which cannot be adjudicated in a genuine way. Religion demands the sublation of willing, [whereas] the worldly principle in contrast makes willing fundamental. When those religious principles are implemented, the only possible outcome is for governments to proceed by force and to suppress the opposing religion, or to treat those who belong to it as sectarians. Religion (as a church) can indeed be prudent and outwardly compliant, but then inconsistency enters | into the spirit [of its members]. The world holds fast to a specific religion, while at the same time adhering to [political] principles opposed to it; insofar as we put these principles into effect, while still wanting to belong to that religion, there is a great inconsistency. For example the French, who adhere to the

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4. [Ed.] Hegel here seems to construe a social organism on the model of a natural organism, whose vitality results from the interplay of unequal parts with distinct functions. It is true that, while the "kingdom of freedom" (the humanly constituted world) transcends in principle the "kingdom of nature," the latter remains present in the former in sublated form; for in becoming social beings we do not cease to be natural beings. But Hegel's social organism is more complex than this, since it embraces both a political constitution (which differentiates functions, so that some must give orders to others) and a religious community (which ought to embody the values of freedom, equality, and mutuality).

principle of worldly freedom, have thus in fact ceased to belong to the Catholic religion, for this religion can yield on no point but consistently requires unconditional subordination to the church in all things. In this way religion and state stand in contradiction to one another. So religion is left on one side, and is supposed to shift for itself; it counts only as an individual matter, about which the state need not trouble itself—and it is then said, furthermore, that religion is to have no involvement in the political constitution.

To posit those principles of freedom is to assert that they are true because they cohere with the innermost self-consciousness of human beings. But if in fact it is reason that discovers these principles, then, to the extent that they are genuine and do not remain formal, it has their verification only in virtue of the fact that it traces them back to the cognition of absolute truth—and this cognition is only the object of philosophy. But this cognition must be carried out fully and must go right back to the ultimate analysis, for if cognition is not consummated within itself, it is then exposed to the one-sidedness of formalism; but if it does go right to the ultimate ground, it arrives at what is recognized as the highest, or as God. So we can say, to be sure, that the political constitution ought to stay on one side and religion on the other; but in this there is the danger that our [political] principles remain afflicted with one-sidedness. Thus at the present time we see the world imbued with the principle of freedom, and this very principle is referred particularly to the political constitution. These principles are correct, but when they are afflicted with formalism they are prejudices, because cognition has not gone as far as the ultimate ground; there alone is to be found their reconciliation with what is strictly substantial.

Now the other point that needs to be considered regarding this separation is the following: if the principles of actual freedom are now made foundational, and develop into a system of right, then given, positive laws originate from it, and these receive the general form of juridical laws referring to individuals. The task of upholding the legislation is committed to the courts; | whoever violates the law is brought before the court, and the existence of the whole is posited quite generally in this juridical form. Over against it, then, stands the conviction [*Gesinnung*] or inwardness that is the very

soil of religion. Thus there are two contrapuntal aspects belonging to actuality—the positive legislation, and the conviction with regard to it.

With reference to the constitution, there are here two systems. One is the modern system in which the defining conditions of freedom and its entire structure are maintained in a formal way, without regard for the conviction [of the people]. The other system is that of conviction—the Greek principle in general, which we find developed particularly in Plato's *Republic*.⁵ A small number of social classes constitutes the foundation for it, and the whole otherwise depends upon the education and cultivation that are supposed to lead on to science and philosophy. Philosophy ought to be the ruling principle, and through it human beings are supposed to be guided to ethical life; all social classes are supposed to share in the virtue of σωφροσύνη [prudent self-control].

The two elements, conviction and the formal constitution, are inseparable and mutually indispensable. But in modern times there has come to prominence the one-sided view according to which the constitution is supposed to be self-sustaining on the one hand, while conviction, religion, and conscience should on the other hand be set aside as matters of indifference because it is of no concern to the political constitution what conviction and religion individuals commit themselves to. Just how one-sided this situation is, is evident from the fact that the laws are administered by judges, and everything depends upon their rectitude as well as upon their insight, for it is not the law that rules but human beings who are to make it rule. Making law effective is something concrete, and human will and insight must do their part toward that end. For that reason also, the subject's intelligence must frequently make the decision because, although the civil laws determine what is required in great detail, they still cannot touch upon each particular case. But conviction by itself is likewise one-sided, a deficiency from which Plato's *Republic* suffers. Nowadays we do not want to trust anything to insight but want to know everything in accord with positive laws instead, for we have experienced a striking example of this one-

5. [Ed.] See Plato, *Republic*: on social classes, 369b ff.; on education, 376e ff.; on philosophy as the ruling principle, 473c-d, 502c ff.

sidedness in the most recent contemporary history. We have seen a religious conviction at the helm of the French government,⁶ of the sort that held the state | to be in principle something devoid of rights and that advanced in a hostile manner against actuality, against right and ethical life. The latest revolution⁷ was the consequence of a religious conscience that contradicted the principles of the political constitution, and yet according to that very constitution it is not supposed to matter what religion the individual professes. This conflict is still very far from being resolved.

Conviction does not necessarily take the form of religion; it can in large measure remain in an undefined condition. But in what we refer to as "the people" the ultimate truth does not have the form of thoughts and principles, for what is to count as right for the people can only be so esteemed to the extent that it is something determinate and particular. For the people this determinate character of right and ethical life has its ultimate verification only in the form of an extant religion. When the latter does not cohere with the principles of freedom, then there is always a split present and an unresolved rupture, a hostile relationship, which is just what ought not to obtain in the state. Under Robespierre the Terror⁸ ruled in France, directed, of course, against those who did not share in the conviction of freedom because they had become suspect, i.e., their political conviction was suspect. In the same way the ministry of Charles X⁹ came under suspicion. According to the formal structure of the constitution the monarch was not answerable to anybody; but this formal principle did not prevail, and the dynasty was cast down from the throne. This shows that in the formally developed constitution the ultimate sheet-anchor is still conviction, which was set to one side in the constitution, and which now, with contempt for all forms, enforces its own validity. This contradiction, and the prevalent unawareness of it, are what our age is suffering from.

6. [Ed.] A reference to the reign of the last Bourbon, Charles X (1824–1830), especially to the ministry of Polignac (1829–30).

7. [Ed.] The July Revolution of 1830.

8. [Ed.] The Reign of Terror, 2 June 1793 to 27 July 1794.

9. [Ed.] A reference to Polignac's ministry, which was destroyed in the July Revolution.

EXCERPTS FROM
A TRANSCRIPT OF
THE LECTURES OF 1831

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by

David Friedrich Strauss¹

INTRODUCTION²

The introduction will treat the relationship of philosophy to the principles of religion. Our representation of religion is that in religion we withdraw from temporality, that religion is the highest satisfaction and self-purpose. Religion is the consciousness of truth, the enjoyment of blessedness; as activity it is the glorification of God. Religion is the *point d'honneur* of all peoples.

In making this religion the object of philosophical treatment, we are concerning ourselves with eternal truth. Philosophy is no less

1. [Ed.] On the source and background of Strauss's excerpts, see the Editorial Introduction. It should be kept in mind that the structure and contents of the 1831 lectures correspond generally to those of 1827 since in 1831 Hegel lectured from a transcript of the 1827 lectures, in which his mature treatment of the subject had been achieved. However, if Strauss's excerpts are reliable, there are in fact significant differences between the two lecture series, and these will be noted in the ensuing editorial annotations.

2. [Ed.] In 1831, the lengthy discussion of the relationship of the philosophy of religion to "the needs of our time" in Sec. 2 of the 1827 *Introduction* appears to be reduced to an analysis of themes common to rationalistic and supernaturalistic theology. Philosophy is opposed to both types of theology, although it agrees to the now-popular coupling of God-consciousness and self-consciousness (an allusion to Schleiermacher?), with the proviso that feeling does not of itself verify faith. The greater part of the 1831 *Introduction* appears to be given over to the "division of the subject," where significant differences emerge in the organization of *Determinate Religion* (see n. 3). However, this emphasis may be attributable to Strauss rather than to Hegel.

a service of God than religion itself, as subjective spirit's immersion in absolute spirit—but in distinctive fashion. It is now customary to oppose faith and knowledge, theology and philosophy. There are in theology two directions, the enlightened, rationalistic and the supernaturalistic, believing in revelation. As regards the *content* of religion, the two directions agree in relegating the basic dogmas, e.g. of the Trinity, to the background, with the possible exception of the person of Christ. Philosophy has accordingly free rein here; indeed it is now philosophy that protects the dogmas of church doctrine from the theologians. As regards the *form*, faith and piety now insist that the consciousness of God should be coupled in immediate fashion with self-consciousness in the spirit. And this is favorable to philosophy—namely, the stipulation that whatever claims to be truth must substantiate itself in spirit itself. The error is merely that the only verification called for in this regard is the immediate verification of feeling, while the mediated verification of philosophy is despised as purely finite.

352 In the Christian religion the religious content is expanded, but in the form of representation, whereas philosophy translates this form into the form of knowledge. |

The *division of the subject* is as follows. It can be formulated in purely formal [logical] fashion; we consider (1) the concept of religion; (2) its primal division, i.e., the concept as it differentiates and thus posits itself in a limited manner; (3) the conclusion, i.e., the return of the concept from its limitedness to itself. However, this is also the objective development of the content. For (1) the concept of religion is the spirit that is *for* spirit. (2) But spirit is also primal division; the concept is differentiated from itself as object, is not yet adequate to itself. Here we are in the presence of limitedness, finitude, relationship, and here it is that the finite religions belong. (3) Finally the conclusion is where spirit closes with its object within itself, where the concept has become adequate to itself; this is the revelatory religion.

I. In regard to the *Concept of Religion*, therefore:

(1) It is necessary to define its *abstract concept*, namely, that religion is spirit's knowledge of itself, but in [terms of] the distinction between infinite and finite spirit.

(2) The *forms* in which this self-knowledge on the part of spirit appears as religion are *feeling* and *representation*.

(3) The individual consciousness, which in religion casts off its finitude, is also present as the consciousness of all within the *community* and is manifest in the *cultus*.

(4) It is also possible to attach to this an inquiry into the relation of religion to human *life in the world*.

II. *Determinate Religion*: The concept, the in-itself, must realize itself, and in this process its determinations separate out; but at the same time nothing emerges that was not implicitly contained in the concept of religion. However, in the course of this development, until such time as it has attained the goal, only individual moments of the concept enter upon the scene; the concept is not yet an object for itself; this latter is the sphere of the ethnic religions.

(1) The first religion is *immediate* religion, where spirit also already knows itself as essence, but does not yet distinguish itself from universal spirit as empirical.

(2) Individual consciousness and essence split apart, and essence comes to be known as *power* over the finite spirit. This power is initially (a) *substance*, in which finite things disappear. Inasmuch as there is here an ascent from the contingency of finite things to God, this is the stage corresponding to the cosmological proof. (b) However, substance acquires the determination of *causality*, in which finite things do not disappear but exist as posited by substance and as subservient to it; substance is accordingly the *Lord*. To these two forms belong the Oriental religions. 353

(3) God is known, third, in the religion of *beauty* and *purposiveness* as he who operates harmoniously, according to purposes. This is the standpoint of the teleological proof. God has a reality, and this is wholly determined by the concept or the purpose; here we have beauty, an immediate, natural reconciliation of spirit.³

3. [Ed.] In the 1831 lectures, the arrangement of *Determinate Religion* is once again thoroughly revised. The religions of substance include ancient Chinese religion (now removed from the category of immediate religion or magic), as well as Hinduism and Buddhism; while the religions of causality include Persian, Jewish, Syrian, and Egyptian religion. These latter are considered transitional forms to the religion of freedom, namely Greek religion, from which, finally, Roman religion is to be

III. The *revelatory* religion is reconciliation accomplished within spirit itself, consciousness of the entire, fully developed concept of spirit, in which there is no longer anything obscure or inadequate.

PART I. CONCEPT OF RELIGION

Chapter 1. General Concept⁴

In the philosophy of religion we presuppose the existence of God, yet philosophy is not supposed to accept as valid any mere pre-supposition. This is why natural theology took as its starting point proofs of the existence of God, and it seems as if this should be our starting point too. However, we do not, like natural theology, here consider God by himself but in conjunction with the knowledge of God in religion; so all we need to prove is that religion exists. However, this proof is not executed within the philosophy of religion but in the preceding branches of philosophy, which adduce religion as a necessary result. Admittedly God and religion, as the substantive element in human spirit, are in this respect first and foremost and not a result; by terming them a result we mean only that they are mediated | and mediate themselves, but in such a way that the mediation sublates itself in *absolute* mediation. Mediation and immediacy are abstract forms, which only have truth when they are united. The truth of nature is spirit, and the truth of spirit is to free itself from its natural existence and to be and know itself in *absolute* spirit. This is what religion is, and the concept of religion is thus a *necessary* concept.

distinguished as the religion of external purposiveness. Thus in the last lecture series, Hegel interprets Judaism in the context of the other Oriental religions rather than in relation to Greek religion, as in the earlier lectures, and there appears generally to be an upgrading of the significance of the Oriental religions, which are no longer treated under the general category of the religion of nature, but rather under the categories of the cleavage of consciousness and power. For details, see the Strauss excerpts in volume 2.

4. [Ed.] The basic organization of *The Concept of Religion* in the 1831 lectures is similar to that of 1827, but the location of specific themes differs in interesting ways, according to Strauss at least. For example, the lengthy discussion of pantheism and atheism found in the 1827 *Concept* is missing in 1831, and is replaced by a discussion of the relationship between the concept of God and the concept of religion, which in turn picks up themes from the 1824 and 1821 lectures. God is known not merely abstractly but in and through the religious relationship.

But in what does this concept consist? First, as regards the locus, the soil of religion, it is *thought*. Everyone agrees that God can only be attained by thought and that animals have no religion because they do not think. At the same time it is partly denied that thought is the soil in which religion grows. Thought is the activity of the universal and has for its content solely the universal; to this extent it is only the abstract soil of religion, for God is not merely the universal but the concrete. This will yield the concept of religion. God is not merely substance in general but self-knowing substance or *subject*. Self-knowing contains two elements, what knows and what is known, and these form a unity as well as split asunder. If we posit one who *knows himself* as distinct from one who *is*, this means that substance is mere *knowing* without at the same time *being*—and this is *finite* consciousness. *Absolute* self-consciousness is found only to the extent that it is also [finite] consciousness; it thus splits into two, on the one side the subject remaining wholly and simply present to itself, on the other also subject, but differentiated as finite. Thus God knows himself in humanity, and human beings, to the extent that they know themselves as spirit and in their truth, know themselves in God. This is the concept of religion, that God knows himself in spirit and spirit knows itself in God. Religion inheres essentially in the concept of God to the extent that God is essentially *for himself*. This is also the meaning of the expression that God is love, i.e., knowing himself in an other of himself. In the loneliness of his being-for-self he feels himself needy and negated, and this deficiency is first overcome when he knows himself in the other. This concept of God and of religion is first attained in the revelatory religion. |

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Chapter 2. The Single Forms of Religion⁵

(1) The first form of religion is *feeling*. From feeling derives all intuition, representation, etc. Feelings are affects in which the du-

5.[Ed.] It is striking that the second main section of the 1831 *Concept* is oriented not to the theme of the *knowledge* of God, as in 1827, but to “the single [or “simple” (*einfach*)] forms of religion,” namely, feeling, representation, and faith. In 1827, “faith” was the first or “immediate” form of the knowledge of God; now it is the last, replacing “thought,” which has already been treated in the preceding section on the “general concept.”

plication into the feeling subject and the object that gives rise to the feeling has not yet taken place. I feel hardness; but if I *say*, "This object is hard," this is no longer feeling but representation. It is only with consciousness that this duplication occurs. If we speak of feelings, we are saying that a content is in us as particular private subjects. Single feelings are transient; the feeling complex, what feels continuously, we call *heart*.

Thus we are told that religion is an affair of feeling, indeed of the heart. Certainly, that of which I have a mere representation or insight may remain something alien to me; but if I have these religious doctrines in my heart, then they are identical with me, then I am permanently determined in this way. To this extent it is true that religion has to be in the feeling, in the heart.

But there are an infinite number of feelings, so that the determinateness or *content* of feeling must be distinguished from feeling [as such]. However, it is customary to believe that the mere form of feeling, of having something within the heart, suffices to justify a content, or that the truth of religion consists in having it within the heart. But the heart is the source of everything and of the most diverse manner of things; evil, hatred, and so on are also to be found in feeling. Feeling also includes the kind of religious sentiment that worshiped dogs, cows, and cats. To have the form of feeling does not suffice to justify something; it depends on the content.

(2) Because human beings are not animals, they advance beyond feeling, making the content of the feeling an object standing over against them. The second form of religion is thus *representation*. In feeling I concentrate the determinateness within myself. From this I pass over to a *dividing* [*Teilen*], a primal dividing [*Urteilen*], a duplication [*Verdoppelung*] of this content. My eye feels, is affected in a particular way; I now project this affect outside myself and see before me a paper. In like manner, in religion, feeling becomes conscious representation. Representation is the mode in which religious content impinges on the universal consciousness. But it is not yet the true form of the contents; | the true form is only to be found in the concept. On the one side those who are ensnared in representation complain that when this is changed into concept the contents are lost, while on the other side the Enlight-

enment rejects not only the form of representation but also the dogma [conveyed by it]. Neither side is capable of separating the form from the contents.

(a) To representation belongs in the first place the *figurative*, in regard to which we know at once that a particular thing is not to be taken at face value but that its meaning has to be distinguished from the image it conveys; for example, “God begot a son.”

(b) However, to representation belongs not only the figurative but also the *indeterminate*, the simple, whose essence is that it has not been further analyzed; for example, “God created the world,” where “create” is the indeterminate expression for absolute bringing-forth.

(c) Representation is also characterized by the *historical* form. “God created the world, sent his son”—this is something that has *happened*. The necessary, inward connectedness of concepts becomes in representation the external connectedness of events.

(3) The third form of religion is *faith*.⁶ In religion feeling splits into representations, and these in turn reassemble in feeling, and this feeling is *devotion*. This detour that religious feeling has to make in order to be determinate (e.g., Christian) feeling is usually overlooked, yet it is certain that unless these religious representations had been brought to us through Christian instruction we would not have this Christian religious feeling either. That we in

6. [Ed.] Whereas in 1827 Hegel described feeling and representation as *forms* or *modalities* of faith, now they appear in some sense to *issue* in faith. The discussion of the grounds or reasons for faith (both external grounds and internal grounds) hearkens back to a similar theme in the 1824 cultus and to Sec. D.2 of the *Ms. Concept*. Gone is the lengthy analysis of “thought” in the 1827 lectures, especially the consideration of the proofs of the existence of God in Sec. B.4.c, which are once again returned to the various determinate religions (see above, 1827 *Concept*, nn. 109, 133), although the discussion of the relationship of immediate and mediated knowledge in Sec. B.4.b of the 1827 lectures may have some echoes here. In any event, Hegel appears to want to acknowledge the legitimacy of the category of faith more explicitly than he had hitherto done—perhaps in response to the publication in 1830–31 of the 2d edition of Schleiermacher’s *Der christliche Glaube*, with its more carefully nuanced description of religious consciousness (see above, 1824 *Concept*, n. 37). Hegel continues to insist, of course, on the cognitivity of faith, and therefore seeks to overcome the rupture between faith and thought through speculative philosophy.

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fact have any of these representations as something true and certain, this is *faith*. We first attain faith through *authority*, then also through *grounds* or *reasons* [*Gründe*], inasmuch as we engage in reasoning thought. However, these reasons [for belief] lead us back to another authority, the authority of God. But to the extent that we were not ourselves present when this divine authority was revealed (as when God gave Moses the laws, etc.), it itself in turn is grounded on the authority of the chroniclers. In order to give rise to faith, however, this murky mixture of reasons, thoughts, and authority requires the addition of a further important component, the witness of *our own spirit*. To the extent that the divine or spiritual also appears historically, it comes to us through a | medium, and all depends on the character of this medium, the question being whether the narrators had the will and capability and the right consciousness. This is by no means self-evident but necessitates cultivation of the prosaic understanding, and this only comes upon the scene at a certain stage in a people's development. With the ancients, however, this divorce had not yet taken place between prose and poetry, between understanding and phantasy. If therefore we seek to derive the divine solely from history, we fall into the shifting and vacillating that is characteristic of all history. Accordingly, religious content cannot be appropriately grounded in history, inasmuch as copious documents do not suffice as a foundation for faith. It is only through the witness of the spirit that the subject comes together with, attains, the truly spiritual and religious content of history. In the case of faith too it is in the witness of the spirit that the autonomy of the spirit resides. This witness occurs in various forms—[e.g.,] as Platonic recollection, i.e., what I receive from outside is in fact already mine. In faith three relationships are therefore to be distinguished:

(a) The relationship of *spirit to spirit*, or the convergence of what is essential in whatever is believed with the inner essence of the believer.

(b) The truth's relationship to spirit as *particular* (this people, this age, etc.) is also particular; it is present for spirit only in determinate fashion. Faith therefore is modified from one stage in the development of spirit to another. The single spirit possesses its

substance and therewith its authority in the spirit of the people; individuals are born and brought up in the faith of their parents.

(c) That a people attains to consciousness of its *substantive* spirit is what is meant by its religion being “founded,” and this is something historical. It starts from insignificant beginnings, then achieves completeness, as with the Greeks through Homer, and in some cases is also entrusted for its preservation to a distinct priestly caste. Individuals are brought up in the aura of this spirit, and the ensuing generations acquire the faith through the natural authority of those that went before. It is not possible for individuals to remove themselves from this spirit, inasmuch as it is their substantive element. But there are in fact several such religions, which enter into collision, and this has given rise to wars of religion, in that different peoples wished to uphold and extend their faith. | Such compulsion, however, is gainsaid by the demand for freedom of belief. The aim here, quite irrespective of the content of belief, is only to prevent the subject from [being compelled to] subscribe to a particular belief; what is demanded is formal freedom. And this is an essential demand, on which the human consciousness of freedom is based. However, inasmuch as freedom of belief in the fullest sense means that what is true for me is also produced by me, *thought* comes into play as something independent of faith, and the rupture between thought and faith arises. But thought too is subject to the authority of its age and presupposes its principle; it is only philosophy that sets all preconceived principles aside.

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Chapter 3. Forms of the Cultus

Certainty of faith at the level of sensibility is devotion, and devotion is the general characteristic of the cultus. In the cultus I raise myself to the consciousness of God, whereas at other times I am concerned with earthly purposes. However, the cultus does not consist in evoking a particular consciousness of God, but rather the consciousness of my having been *taken up into* God, and the enjoyment of having been thus taken up.

The cultus presupposes the certainty that reconciliation has been implicitly accomplished, i.e., that God wills the best in human beings and gives it to them for their enjoyment. In accord with different

~circumstances,⁷ this reconciliation is assumed to be a unity that either has existed from the outset or is restored, and has to be restored, following a rupture. The national spirit of each people is its protective deity, with whom it knows itself in original unity.

Now the task of the cultus is to bring forth the *consciousness*—not merely the representation but the actual enjoyment—of this unity. To this extent the cultus is festive: those engaged in it eat, drink, and dance, and enjoyment is the principal thing because their
359 cultus is essentially enjoyment. |

This enjoyment is bound up with sacrifices. This involves a negation; one gives up something and presents it to another in order to show one's devotion. But in the case of the ancients, where most of the sacrifice was consumed, it is not a renunciation, except where this giving-up benefits the subject itself. But in consuming their sacrifices the ancients were acting to the honor of God, acknowledging his power; in this feasting they impart to themselves a feeling of their union with God, and this feeling is at once supreme happiness and the highest duty.

However, this consciousness is a consciousness of union with absolute spirit as the universal spirit of a people, and in this way individual subjects become conscious of their unity with their people, knowing themselves in innermost unity with their compatriots and finding their personal enjoyment in the enjoyment of *substance*. Thus the cultus affords individuals their highest reciprocal guarantee; on it the happiness of the different peoples rests; if they neglect it, evil ensues, individuals recede into their own private consciousness, and the whole edifice falls asunder.

But the cultus also takes as its starting point the separation of the divine from the human and seeks to restore unity. Here again, however, it assumes a state of reconciledness in-and-for-itself, i.e., that God is well disposed to humankind. The separation that has to be sublated has two aspects, in the first place a *natural* separation—external misfortune, crop failure, plague, and the like—in which case substantive spirit is reconciled as the power of the nat-

7. *S originally wrote (canceled by another hand):* stages of development of the peoples

ural as well as the spiritual. Here it is also in all likelihood assumed that the misfortune is divine punishment for evildoing.⁷⁸ Then penance and expiation are performed to prove that the evildoer is in earnest about giving up his particularity. When misfortune is regarded as punishment for evil, the underlying presupposition is that the power of nature is not merely natural but that purposes of good inhere in it. The general thought is the correct, religious one that human beings' happiness and misfortune | depend on their good and evil conduct; but application to the private realm leads to misunderstandings. 360

In the second place, however, there is the purely *spiritual* separation of the subjective will from the divine will, the separation of good and evil. Here we are on a purely spiritual plane: evil is something spiritual, and the misfortune it brings with it can only be sublated in spirit, by human beings becoming conscious that their will is to be in the purpose of God, united with him. And this is achieved by doing penance, inwardly casting off and repudiating the evil will. The starting point here is the evil that lies in the nature of human beings themselves. The will, so it is argued, is free; but it is natural. And this natural will is represented as evil: human beings are evil by nature. And they are guilty if they do not pass beyond this natural willing. Now the thought is that this universal evil has to be sublated. We know this can be done through instruction. But what happens unconsciously through instruction is to come about here in the cultus in conscious, willing fashion. Human beings must negate the evil so as to become conscious, for their own person, of the reconciliation that is implicitly accomplished in God. They must renounce the particularity of willing, to which belong natural drives, inclinations, etc. The true element in this is that the content of these drives should be matched to the rational will. But viewed abstractly, what is demanded is that they should be extirpated, and the vitality of the will thereby extinguished. What human beings will, by virtue of their drives, includes property, what

8. *S originally wrote, then canceled:* In the second place, there is a *moral* separation, which human beings have merited because things go badly for them. Then it is necessary to restore the unity of the divine will with human purpose and happiness.

belongs to them specifically [*Eigentum*]; this they must be able to sacrifice, give up. Their free will is also part of their specificity [*Eigentümlichkeit*]; and they must make themselves consummate will. I must also be able to undo the evil actions I have done through penance, punishment; likewise, evil thoughts, etc., through repentance. Reconciliation is thus the assurance that if human beings renounce their cleavage from God, they are reconciled with him.

Chapter 4. The Relationship of Religion to the State⁹

361 The state is the highest and genuine mode of actuality of spirit. Among patriarchal peoples religion appears as externally identical with the state; but the two must also separate from each other as distinct. | The true condition is that religion is the foundation of the state. In religion human beings are free in [and through] God, and the various religions differ according to the degree to which this concept of the freedom of spirit has come to consciousness within them. But consciousness of its freedom is what a people realizes in its state. Peoples that have no consciousness of the freedom of spirit are slaves in regard to their political constitution and religion. The connection between religious and ethical (or political) freedom comes to consciousness for humanity in the representation that laws derive from God—a representation that is to be found among all peoples. The truth is that laws are developments of the concept of freedom, which has its truth in religion.

But with respect to religion, God demands of us duties other than the duties and laws that obtain in the state, and so much is this the case as to give rise to antithesis and contradiction. On the one hand we obey God by obeying the authorities and the laws. Initially, this is purely formal, so that it does not matter what the laws and the authorities happen to be, and all is made to depend on the caprice of the sovereign, who, so it is said, has to render

9. [Ed.] Only the 1831 lectures add a section on “The Relationship of Religion to the State” to the *Concept of Religion* following the section on the cultus (see *Religion and State*, n. 1). Strauss’s excerpts at this point may be compared with the text of the transcript of this section preserved in *W* and printed above. For historical allusions see the editorial annotations to *Religion and State*.

account to God. The presupposition here is that the sovereign, inasmuch as he comes from God, also knows what is essential in the state. This view became especially prominent in Protestant England, but then was transformed into its antithesis, namely the principle that divine authorization to rule rests with the *people*. A sect arose that maintained it had been vouchsafed to it by God how the land was to be ruled, and in consequence of this inspiration cut off the head of "Charles I."¹⁰ The truth is that while the divine will is indeed the law, to recognize it [is] no private matter but [something] universal. It is necessary to determine which laws in fact constitute divine volition.

As has been said, however, religion and state can have different laws because their ground is different, yet because at the same time their ground is the same—namely, the subject—they can indeed enter into contradiction. Religion demands holiness, whereas the state demands ethical life. Thus over against marriage, an ethical institution, the church calls for holy celibacy; instead of an honest livelihood, indolent | poverty; and instead of rational freedom, blind obedience. When religion thus calls on people to do things that run counter to the rational element in the state, rational consciousness takes up arms against them, most characteristically in the form of worldly wisdom, i.e., the recognition of what the rational element *is* in actuality and at the current moment. A religion of this kind adopts a merely negative attitude to the actual; all positive institutions of the ethical realm are then devoid of right, and human will, too, [is] not recognized as free and come of age.

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In this respect there is an enormous difference between Protestant and Catholic states. In Protestant religion human beings are recognized as free and must convince *themselves* of the truth. This form of religion is thus consistent with a liberal state. In Catholic states on the other hand the principle of religion is unfreedom, and this is contrary to liberal institutions.

It is the *concept* of humanity that makes human beings free; this is a principle of infinite worth. If, however, it is left in this abstract form, no organization of the state is permitted, for organization

10. *S reads*: Charles II.

brings about inequality, whereas abstract freedom demands equality. Foundations of this kind must therefore be developed concretely. A state that is built up in accord with [these principles], however, must enter into conflict with a religion of unfreedom, which does not recognize its free institutions. A struggle ensues, but if religion gives way, an inner untruth results—as in France. It may then be maintained that the constitution need pay no regard to religion and that the principles of the state are evident from reason [alone]; but, for the *truth* of these principles, reason has no other recourse than to refer them to the ultimate, absolute truth, which is God. If state and religion are left standing on opposite sides, the basic principles of the state are undoubtedly awry because they derive from a way of thinking that is not referred back to its ultimate ground.

363 Another antithesis between state and religion is as follows. The state is a system of laws that are executed in legal fashion, in other words in a formal, external manner. To this external mode is opposed the inner mode, which is at the same time the proper soil of religion. | Now it is the claim of the modern system to educe the whole structure constituting the various characteristics of freedom in the state in a formally juridical fashion; not so the Greek and specifically Platonic system, where everything is founded on conviction, education, and philosophy. In our times the view is prevalent that the constitution should be self-sufficient, while religion, conviction, and conscience are matters of indifference. We are told, Let law rule; but law rules through human beings, and the latter are not mere machines to be used; their insight and conscientiousness also have a role to play. On the other hand, to take conviction purely for its own sake is equally one-sided, for conviction provides us with no universal criterion for judgment as does law.

PAGINATION OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

The Ms. sheet numbers ("a" = recto, "b" = verso) are given in the text in square brackets but are reproduced here for the sake of convenience.

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THE LECTURES OF 1824

The pagination given here is that of the Griesheim transcript (volume 1). It should be recalled that, while our basic text is *G*, it has been supplemented and corrected by other 1824 transcripts, primarily *P* and *D*, which are not noted either in the text itself or in this listing.

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THE LECTURES OF 1827

The pagination given here is that of the Lasson edition (volume 1/1). When Lasson's text has been supplemented or replaced by two or more sentences from one of the extant sources (*An*, *B*, *Hu*), this is noted in the following list by the symbol "Q" (meaning *Quelle*, source). Commas indicate breaks in Lasson's text.

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
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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

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VOLUME II

DETERMINATE RELIGION

Edited by
PETER C. HODGSON

Translated by
R. F. BROWN, P. C. HODGSON, and J. M. STEWART
with the assistance of
H. S. HARRIS

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ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

- [. . .] = Editorial insertions in the text.
- < . . . > = Passages in the margins of the *Ms.*, including both passages integrated into the main text and unintegrated passages that are footnoted.
- ~ . . . ~ = Passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings. These symbols are used only in the case of textual variants, which offer a different version of the designated passage, usually from a different source, not textual additions, which occur at the point marked by the note number in the main text. Normally the variant is placed in the notes at the end of the parallel in the main text; exceptions are noted.
- = Freestanding en dash indicating a grammatical break between sentence fragments in footnoted *Ms.* marginal materials.
- ^{1 2 3} etc. = Footnotes containing (a) unintegrated marginal materials from the *Ms.*; (b) textual variants, additions, and deletions; (c) special materials from *W* and *L*, both variant readings and additions; (d) editorial annotations. The type of note is designated by an initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Notes are at the bottoms of the pages and are numbered consecutively through each text unit.

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

- [Ed.] = Editorial annotations in the footnotes; materials following this symbol are editorial.
- 34 | = Page numbers of the German edition, on the outer margins with page breaks marked by vertical slash in text. The German edition is *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, Vol. 4, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, II: Die bestimmte Religion*. Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, 1985.
- [31a] = Sheet numbers of the Ms., in the text at the point of occurrence; “a” and “b” refer to the recto and verso sides of the sheets.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

- W W₁ W₂ = *Werke*. Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. Vols. 11–12 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. 1st ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke (Berlin, 1832) (W₁); 2d ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer (Berlin, 1840) (W₂). When no subscript is used, the reference is to both editions. Part II is contained in vols. 11–12 of both editions under the title *Die bestimmte Religion*.
- L = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. Edited by Georg Lasson. 2 vols. in 4 parts. Leipzig, 1925–1929 (reprint, Hamburg, 1966). Part II is contained in vols. 1/2 and 2/1 under the titles *Die Naturreligion* and *Die Religionen der geistigen Individualität*.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

- Ms. = Hegel’s lecture manuscript of 1821
- D = Deiters transcript of the 1824 lectures
- G = Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures
- Ho = Hotho transcript of the 1824 lectures

ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

<i>K</i>	= Kehler transcript of the 1824 lectures
<i>P</i>	= Pastenaci transcript of the 1824 lectures
<i>An</i>	= Anonymous transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>B</i>	= Boerner transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>Hu</i>	= Hube transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>S</i>	= Strauss excerpts from a transcript of the 1831 lectures

SPECIAL MATERIALS IN W AND L

These are given in parentheses and identify the no-longer-extant sources of the variant readings and additions making up the special materials found in *W* and *L*. Since the source of special materials in *W* relating to the *Ms.* cannot be identified with certainty in each instance, the source designation is omitted from these passages, although the probability in most cases is that it is from *Hn*.

<i>(Hn)</i>	= Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures
<i>(MiscP)</i>	= Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand
<i>(1827?)</i>	= Unverified transcripts of the 1827 lectures
<i>(1831)</i>	= Transcripts of the 1831 lectures
<i>(HgG)</i>	= Notes by Hegel in the copy of <i>G</i> used by <i>W</i> ₁ and <i>W</i> ₂
<i>(Ed)</i>	= Editorial passages in <i>W</i> ₁ and <i>W</i> ₂
<i>(Var)</i>	= Variant readings in <i>W</i> or <i>L</i>

FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS BY HEGEL

- Werke* = *Werke*. Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. 18 vols. Berlin, 1832 ff. Some volumes issued in second editions.
- GW = *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 40 vols. projected. Hamburg, 1968 ff.
- Vorlesungen* = *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. 10 vols. Hamburg, 1983 ff. Vols. 3–5 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, edited by Walter Jaeschke.
- Berliner* = *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*. Edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1956.
- Early Theological Writings* = *Early Theological Writings*. Partial translation of H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner. Chicago, 1948.
- Encyclopedia* (1817, 1830) = *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Translated from the 3d German ed., with additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts, by W. Wallace and

A. V. Miller. 3 vols. Oxford, 1892 (reprint 1975), 1970, 1971. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. 1st ed. Heidelberg, 1817; forthcoming in GW, vol. 13. 3d ed., Berlin, 1830: *Werke*, vols. 6–7 (containing additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts); forthcoming in GW, vol. 19. 6th ed., based on the 3d ed. without additions, edited by F. Nicolini and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959. Citations given by section numbers in the 1817 and 1830 editions.

Faith and Knowledge = *Faith and Knowledge*. Translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, 1977. *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie*. Tübingen, 1802. GW, vol. 4 (edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler).

History of Philosophy = *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. London, 1892. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Edited by C. L. Michelet. 1st ed., Berlin, 1833: *Werke*, vols. 13–15. Because of variations between the two German editions, the English translation often does not correspond exactly to the cited German texts. A new German edition is being prepared by P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke: *Vorlesungen*, vols. 6–9.

Phenomenology of Spirit = *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, 1977. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bamberg and Würzburg,

1807. GW, vol. 9 (edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede).

Philosophy of World History = *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*

Sibree ed. = *The Philosophy of History*. Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by J. Sibree. Revised edition. New York, 1900.

Nisbet ed. = *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History*. Translated from Vol. 1 of *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (ed. Hoffmeister) by H. B. Nisbet, with an Introduction by Duncan Forbes. Cambridge, 1975.

Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte.

Hoffmeister ed. = Vol. 1, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*. Edited by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1955.

Lasson ed. = Vol. 2, *Die orientalische Welt*. Vol. 3, *Die griechische und die römische Welt*. Vol. 4, *Die germanische Welt*. Edited by Georg Lasson. 2d ed. Hamburg, 1923. Vols. 1–4 are paginated cumulatively. Since Vols. 2–4 have not been translated, corresponding references from the Sibree translation of the 1840 ed. are cited when possible.

Science of Logic = *Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. London, 1969. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Vol. 1, *Die objektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1812–13. GW, vol. 11 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). Vol. 2, *Die subjektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1816. GW, vol. 12 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, *Die Lehre vom Sein*. Berlin, 1832. Forthcoming

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in *GW*, vol. 20 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). The English translation uses the 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, hence there is not an exact correspondence between it and *GW*, vol. 11, Book 1.

(Frequently cited works by other authors are included in the Bibliography of Sources at the back of the volume.)

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

1. Text and Translation

Determinate Religion, Part II of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, nearly equals in size Parts I and III together, *The Concept of Religion* and *The Consummate Religion*. Hegel would scarcely have devoted so much attention to a philosophical interpretation of the history of religions had he not been persuaded that this was a topic of special importance. Yet Part II of the lectures has generally been neglected, regarded as a mere appendix to the concept of religion or prolegomenon to the Christian religion.

This neglect is attributable in part both to the length and difficulty of the material and to the unsatisfactory character of the older editions, which amalgamated quite distinct lectures into an editorially constructed scheme. The present edition for the first time separates Hegel's four series of lectures on the philosophy of religion—1821, 1824, 1827, and (in the excerpted form provided by D. F. Strauss) 1831—publishing them as independent units on the basis of a complete reediting of the available sources.¹ When the lectures are read in sequence as originally delivered, it is possible to trace Hegel's unrelenting efforts to work out an adequate philosophical conceptualization of the history of religions. As Walter Jaeschke points out in the Preface to the German edition of this volume, when the materials are studied in this way it is unmistakably clear that “nothing

1. The reasons for doing so, the sources of the lectures, and the method of editing the texts are explained in detail in the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1 of this edition, esp. pp. 8–20, 33–52. See also Vol. 3:1–2.

is more alien to Hegel's procedure than the customary picture of the pontificating philosopher who sets out to reduce the colorful array of historical actuality to pallid reason through a prefabricated net of abstract categories."

The detailed attention that Hegel devoted to precisely this part of his lectures is evidenced by the abundance of primary sources and literature he utilized. These sources are documented by the editorial annotations to this edition as well as the Bibliography of Sources for Hegel's Philosophy of Religion printed at the back of the volume. In Sec. 2 of the Introduction we provide a brief summary of the sources as they relate to specific religions. Sec. 3 offers a fairly detailed comparative analysis of the structure and development of Hegel's treatment of "Determinate Religion" in each of the lecture series. This kind of analysis is the first step in arriving at a valid critical assessment of Hegel's work. Such assessments of Part II are virtually nonexistent, and for good reason: a critical text has not been available.²

The primary translation work for this volume has been done by J. Michael Stewart, who assumed responsibility for all of the texts except the 1827 lectures, which were translated by Robert F. Brown. All translation drafts were thoroughly checked and revised by H. S. Harris and put into final form by the editor, who also prepared the English version of the annotations (with valuable assistance from Stewart) and wrote the Introduction. Walter Jaeschke contributed to the English edition in a variety of ways, and the editor continues to be deeply grateful for his collegueship. The glossary that has guided the work of the translators is printed at the back of Vol. 3, and translation principles are detailed in the Introduction to

2. An important exception is the recent essay by Walter Jaeschke, "Zur Logik der Bestimmten Religion," which is discussed at the end of this Introduction (see below, n. 45). Also noteworthy is Reinhard Heede's 1972 inaugural dissertation at the University of Münster, *Die göttliche Idee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion: Untersuchungen zum Verhältniss von Logik und Religionsphilosophie bei Hegel*. Heede was familiar to some extent with the structural and substantive differences between the several lecture series, and his section "Zur Komposition der 'Bestimmten Religion'" (pp. 147-181) is of particular interest; but unfortunately his work is not easily accessible.

Vol. 1.³ The only word that needs to be added about the translation at this point is that the title of Part II, *Die bestimmte Religion*, is translated as "Determinate Religion" rather than as "Definite Religion," which was used by Speirs-Sanderson in their translation of the second edition of the *Werke*.

2. The Sources of "Determinate Religion"

What follows is not a critical analysis of the primary sources and secondary literature used by Hegel, either in the context of his own time or in the light of the enormous progress in the history and phenomenology of religions during the past century and a half. Rather what is provided is information that will be of value to such studies when they are undertaken by those with the necessary expertise. It is primarily a classification of data from the textual annotations and bibliography of sources—data that were gathered through the extraordinary diligence and knowledgeability of the German editor, Walter Jaeschke. Very few recent critical studies are available on this subject. The major work is by Reinhard Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel* (Göttingen, 1975). While giving a valuable survey of Hegel's treatment of all the religions except primitive religion, the study is limited by the necessity of working with Lasson's edition, as well as by certain lacunae in the author's knowledge of the history of religions. Leuze cites a number of earlier studies, but they have been mostly superseded by his own work, which itself is now out of date. In preparing his annotations, Jaeschke found helpful not only Leuze's work but also the recent specialized study by Ignatius Viyagappa, S.J., *G. W. F. Hegel's Concept of Indian Philosophy* (Rome, 1980), which has not been available to the English editor.

Our Bibliography of Sources lists some 240 works upon which Hegel drew for his lectures on the philosophy of religion. This count includes only a single standard edition for each of the many classical authors upon whom he relied, so if individual classical works were included the number would increase substantially. A reasonable

3. See Vol. 1:52–58; also Vol. 3:8–9 for certain refinements.

estimate is that about two-thirds of these works were used primarily or exclusively for *Determinate Religion*; the remaining authors, mainly modern philosophers and theologians, were utilized for Parts I and III of the lectures.

Hegel knew more about the history of world religions than most of his contemporaries, but we do not know to what extent he had mastered all the available literature. Islam represented an obvious lacuna; it appears briefly in Part III as a contemporary rival to Christianity (and there are occasional references to it in Part II as well). Hegel focused his attention on the original or classical expressions of the religions, for the most part not attending to their subsequent histories or contemporary living expressions, if any. He viewed the history of religion as primarily a matter of the past, with the exception of Christianity. Much of the information he acquired was also put to good use in other lectures, such as the philosophy of world history, the philosophy of art, and the history of philosophy. More often than not he did not directly identify sources but rather alluded to them, frequently quoting from memory. Our list of identifiable sources demonstrates that he read and studied carefully works written in Latin, Greek, English, and French, as well as German.

In what follows we simply identify the major sources relating to Hegel's treatment of each of the determinate religions; complete information is provided in the Bibliography.

1. The Religion of Magic (Primitive Religion). This topic was addressed for the first time in the 1824 lectures, and Hegel's information remained quite limited. For his discussion of the Eskimos he relied on John Ross's *A Voyage of Discovery . . . for the Purpose of Exploring Baffin's Bay, and Enquiring into the Probability of a North-West Passage* (2d ed., 1819), although he also alluded to another report of a subsequent voyage by W. E. Parry. His treatment of African religion drew heavily upon Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi's *Istorica descrizione de' tre regni Congo, Matamba, et Angola situati nell'Etiopia inferiore occidentale* (1687, German translation 1694), a work which Hegel himself acknowledged to be quite out of date. It was supplemented by J. K. Tuckey's *Narrative of an Expedition to Explore the River Zaire* (1818), as well as James

Bruce's *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile* (1790, German translation 1791).

In the 1827 lectures Hegel added a reference to T. E. Bowdich's *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee* (1819), and in both 1824 and 1827 he derived some information about ancient Africa from Herodotus's *Histories*. Another general travel source was George Forster's account of travels around the world with his father, Johann Reinhold Forster, and Captain Cook (1778). There are a few allusions to Mongols, Chinese, and American Indians in the sections on the religion of magic; the sources for the first two were probably the same as for Chinese religion, but we have no information on the third.

2. Chinese Religion. The literature available at the time on Chinese life, history, and culture was quite limited, but Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of world history show that he was familiar with much of it.⁴ In the 1824 philosophy-of-religion lectures, his discussion of Chinese religion was quite brief and limited to the ancient religion of the Zhou dynasty.⁵ His sole source was the *Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les mœurs, les usages, etc. des Chinois*, published by the Jesuit missionaries of Beijing in sixteen volumes, 1776–1814. In 1827 he supplemented the *Mémoires* with reports from the *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen* (1750), and he introduced a discussion of Daoism, which evolved from the old religion, for the first time. Information on the latter was provided by Gaubil's French translation, *Le Chou-king, un des livres sacrés des Chinois* (1770), and Abel-Rémusat's *Mémoires sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu* (1823). The 1831 lectures gave a more detailed account of Daoism and also included references to Confucianism, the latter based on *Confucius Sinarum philosophus; sive, Scientia Sinensis*, edited by P. Couplet and others (1687), and Joshua Marshman's *The Works of Confucius* (1809).

4. See Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel*, pp. 17–22.

5. In accord with contemporary scholarly practice, we use the Pinyin system of romanization of Chinese characters. Hegel and his auditors employed a variety of forms, some quite fanciful, which have been standardized to the Pinyin system.

3. Buddhism. Buddhist research was just beginning in Hegel's time, and his knowledge of Buddhism was of necessity quite limited and often inaccurate.⁶ He relied heavily on reports of English travelers to the Far East, notably Francis Buchanan's essay "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas" in volume 6 of *Asiatic Researches*, but also William Jones and Samuel Turner. These were supplemented by additional reports in the *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen* (1750) and Wilhelm Harnisch's edition of *Die wichtigsten neuern Land- und Seereisen* (16 parts, 1821–1832), as well as Moyriac de Mailla's thirteen-volume *Histoire générale de la Chine* (1777–1785). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel attended more fully to the Buddhist doctrine of nirvana, basing his interpretation on information provided by volume 6 of the *Allgemeine Historie* (oriented to the Mahāyāna version). He also drew more heavily on accounts of the Tibetan lamas provided by volume 7 of the *Allgemeine Historie* and especially by Samuel Turner in *Asiatic Researches* and *Die wichtigsten Reisen*.

4. Hinduism. Systematic research on Indian history and religion was just beginning during Hegel's time. Earlier investigations had not been primarily by scholars but rather by officials associated with the Civil Service of the East India Company, who were not concerned with the ancient religious texts of Hinduism. The East India Company had a political interest in representing Indian culture and society as corrupt in order to justify its economic policies to Parliament. Hegel seemed to accept their description of conditions in India during the latter part of the eighteenth century as valid for the whole of its history. Moreover, he was suspicious of the longing of German Romanticism for a past golden age which was believed to have had its origins in India, a view expounded with great conviction by Friedrich Schlegel in his *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (1808). These factors combined to produce an unusually negative assessment of Hinduism on Hegel's part.⁷

6. See our discussion of some of his misconceptions at the beginning of our analysis of the 1824 treatment of Buddhism in Sec. 3 below.

7. See Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen*, pp. 77–81. On our translation of *die indische Religion* as "Hinduism," see 1824 lectures, n. 222.

More sources, however, were utilized by Hegel for his treatment of Hinduism than for any other Oriental religion. First there were the religious texts of Hinduism. He cited the *Institutes of Hindu Law* (the Code of Manu) in an edition published in 1794 in all of his lectures. He cited a well-known episode from the Ramāyāna—the story of Vishvamitra—in two editions, one by William Carey and Joshua Marshman in 1806, the other by Franz Bopp (the founder of the comparative grammar of the Indo-Germanic languages) in 1816. He also made use of Bopp's translations of several episodes from the Mahābhārata, as well as Bopp's *Ueber das Conjugations-system der Sanskritsprache* (1816). He referred to the Oupnek'hat, a collection of Upanishads in Persian translation, quoted by James Mill; and in 1827 he drew upon A. W. Schlegel's 1823 edition of the Bhagavad-Gītā, as well as Schlegel's *Indische Bibliothek* (1827). In the last two lectures, he utilized materials from his lengthy review of Wilhelm von Humboldt's paper, *Über die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gītā bekannte Episode des Mahā-Bhārata* (1825–1826), a review published in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (1827).

In the second place, Hegel relied on mostly unfavorable materials related to the East India Company. These included especially James Mill's *The History of British India* (1817), but also W. Ward's *History of the Hindus* (1817). J. A. Dubois's views concerning the irreformability of the Indian social system, as expressed in his *Moeurs, institutions et cérémonies des peuples de l'Inde* (1825), were referred to in the 1827 and 1831 lectures. In addition, however, Hegel had access to articles contained in *Asiatic Researches*, which had as its editorial policy the task of correcting English prejudice against India; these included materials by J. D. Paterson, Francis Wilford, William Jones, and especially H. T. Colebrooke, "On the Philosophy of the Hindus" (1824). Finally it should be noted that the first significant, comprehensive study of Indian culture by a German scholar did not appear until 1830, namely, P. von Bohlen's *Das alte Indien*. Given the current state of the sources, we cannot determine to what extent Bohlen's study may have influenced Hegel's portrayal of India in the last lectures.

5. Persian Religion (Zoroastrianism). Anquetil du Perron published the text of the Zend-Avesta in French translation in 1769–1771, and J. F. Kleuker translated this version into German in 1776–1783, adding in an appendix several treatises on different aspects of Parseeism. While the translation of a translation left much to be desired, this was Hegel's primary source for the treatment of Persian religion. He also made use of Joseph Görres's translation into German of the *Shāh-nāma*, the epic work by the medieval Muslim poet Firdawsi (1820). His major secondary sources were two works by J. G. Rhode: *Die heilige Sage und das gesammte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer, Meder und Perser oder des Zendvolks* (1820), and *Über Alter und Werth einiger morgenländischen Urkunden* (1817); he may also have relied upon A. H. L. Heeren's *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt* (1804–1805). He supplemented these with reports by the ancient historians Herodotus and Plutarch, and in 1831 with Carsten Niebuhr's *Voyage . . . en Arabie et en d'autres pays de l'orient* (1780).

6. Egyptian Religion. Egyptology as a science began with archaeological expeditions following Napoleon's excursions up the Nile, and with the chance discovery of the Rosetta stone by a French officer, on the basis of which J. F. Champollion succeeded in deciphering the hieroglyphic system in 1824.⁸ These discoveries, which were just being assimilated in Hegel's time, had little impact on his interpretation of Egyptian religion, which was based above all on the reports of several ancient historians: Herodotus, *Histories*, book 2; Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*; and Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica*. He also made use of secondary studies that interpreted the ancient sources: J. D. Guigniaut's commentary on Tacitus, *Serapis et son origine* (1828); Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie*; C. F. Dupuis's *Origine de tous les cultes, ou religion universelle* (1795); and A. H. L. Heeren's *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt* (1804–1805). Finally, a few sources provided information based on the recent discoveries: Giovanni Belzoni's *Narrative of the Opera-*

8. Ibid., pp. 128–130.

tions and Recent Discoveries within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs, and Excavations, in Egypt and Nubia (1822) (of limited value scientifically); Aloys Hirt's *Ueber die Bildung der aegyptischen Gottheiten* (1821); Brown's *Aperçu sur les hiéroglyphes d'Égypte* (1827); and the collection of the Egyptologist von Minutoli, which Hegel saw in Berlin and which was catalogued by J. Passalacqua in 1826. Most of these except for Belzoni were alluded to only in the last lectures.

7. Judaism. Hegel's interpretation of Jewish religion was based almost entirely on his own reading of the Hebrew scriptures, which in the first three lectures was limited to the "Books of Moses" (the Pentateuch), Job, and the Psalms. He had long been attracted to Job as the "philosopher of Mosaic antiquity" through the influence of his teachers in the Tübingen seminary as well as J. G. Herder's *The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry* (1787). The 1824 discussion of Job may have reflected the impact of F. W. C. Umbreit's recently published *Das Buch Hiob: Uebersetzung und Auslegung* (1824).⁹ In 1831 Hegel alluded specifically to the universalism of the "later prophets," that is, Second and Third Isaiah and Haggai, as well as to certain passages in the Psalms, although references to the implicit universalism of Israelite faith were already found in 1824. The interest in Isaiah may have reflected the view of Wilhelm Gesenius's *Commentar über den Jesaja* (1821), to which Hegel's attention was called by the so-called Halle controversy of 1830.¹⁰ The last lectures also indicated familiarity with G. P. W. Gramberg's *Kritische Geschichte der Religionsideen des alten Testaments* (1829–1830). Hegel did not engage in critical exegesis of texts, and he relied almost entirely on the translation of the Luther Bible, but he had a keen sense for fundamental themes and meanings. His own interpretation of the Old Testament evolved significantly during the eleven-year period of the lectures, as our subsequent analysis makes clear.

8. Greek Religion. Hegel had more resources at his disposal for the study of Greek religion than of any other. Not only was more known about Greece than about other ancient cultures at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but also Hegel had immersed

9. Ibid., pp. 171–173.

10. Ibid., p. 178.

himself in Greek philosophy, religion, art, and literature as a young man. He entered into the Greek world with great empathy and depth, but gradually was able to distance himself from it, recognizing both its strengths and its limits, and he was familiar with the hermeneutical issues involved in the clash between romanticist and classicist approaches to Greek culture.

Much of Hegel's interpretation of Greek religion derived from his own long-standing study of the classical authors.¹¹ Among the pre-Socratics, he was familiar with fragments from Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Xenophanes. Of the later philosophers, he relied on several of Plato's dialogues—*Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Apology*, *Timaeus*, and *Republic*—and alluded to Aristotle's discussion of the mysteries in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and of the teleological proof in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Of the great poets, he drew on Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Hesiod's *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, and Pindar's *Odes*. The tragedians were sources of particular importance for Hegel's understanding of Greek religion: Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, *Prometheus Bound*; Euripides, *Iphigenia in Aulis*, *Hippolytus* (in connection with the latter work Hegel also cited Racine's *Phèdre* and A. W. Schlegel's *Comparaison entre la Phèdre de Racine et celle d'Euripide* [1807]); Sophocles, *Antigone*, *Trachiniae*, *Oedipus Rex*, *Oedipus at Colonus*. Among the comic authors, he referred only to Aristophanes. The Greek historians provided crucial information not only on Greek culture but also on other ancient civilizations: Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*; Herodotus, *Histories*; Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica*; Pausanias, *Description of Greece*; and Xenophon, *Apology of Socrates*. Finally, Hegel was familiar with the church father Clement of Alexandria, and derived information about Greek religion from two of his writings: *Exhortation to the Heathen*, (*Protrepticus*) and *Stromata*.

As for modern authors and secondary literature, by far the most important was Georg Friedrich Creuzer, a personal friend who gave Hegel a copy of the second edition of his *Symbolik und Mythologie*

11. In the footnotes, we cite classical authors in the abbreviated form customary today. The Bibliography of Sources gives the editions of these authors probably used by Hegel.

der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen (4 vols., 1819–1821). Despite the friendship, Hegel was critical of Creuzer on certain important points, such as the distinction between “symbolic” and “classical” art, and the question whether a higher wisdom and a purer religion were taught in the mysteries. On the first matter, Hegel’s position was analogous to the one taken by Gottfried Herrmann against Creuzer in *Briefe über Homer und Hesiodus* (1818); on the second, he was also critical of Voltaire’s views as expressed in *Dictionnaire philosophique*. Yet he agreed with Creuzer’s interpretation of the origin of Apollo and other Greek deities in the older nature religion, against the position taken by K. O. Müller, *Geschichten hellenischer Stämme und Städte* (1824).¹²

Other important secondary sources included Gottfried Herrmann’s *Die Feste von Hellas* (1803); Etienne Clavier’s *Mémoire sur les oracles des anciens* (1818); C. F. Dupuis’ *Origine de tous les cultes; ou, Religion universelle* (1795); and Baron de Sainte-Croix’s *Recherches historiques et critiques sur les mystères du paganisme*, 2d ed. (1817), whose work supported Hegel’s interpretation of the mysteries. On the pre-Socratics, Hegel referred to the work of C. A. Brandis, *Xenophanis Parmenidis et Melissi doctrina* (1813); and in the last lectures he added a reference to C. A. Lobeck’s *Aglaophamus; sive, De theologiae mysticae Graecorum causis* (1829). Occasional allusions are also found to the views of Greece on the part of such authors as Schiller, Goethe, Voltaire, and d’Holbach.

9. Roman Religion. Hegel relied primarily on only one secondary source for his treatment of Roman religion, Karl Philipp Moritz’s *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (1791). While he quotes at length from Moritz’s account of Roman festivals and deities, Hegel’s interpretation of Roman religion was diametrically opposed to that of Moritz.¹³ He had long been familiar with Gibbon’s *History of the*

12. See below, *Ms.*, n. 202, and 1824 lectures, nn. 675, 678. See also Leuze’s discussion of Hegel’s relationship to Creuzer, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen*, pp. 204–208.

13. See below, *Loose Sheets*, n. 8. We discuss this matter in connection with the treatment of Roman religion in the *Ms.* See also Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen*, pp. 225–232.

Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, owning an edition published in Leipzig in 1821; and for a few details he also drew upon Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie* and *Abriss der römischen Antiquitäten* (1824).

Hegel was thoroughly acquainted with the Roman authors. In the 1821 lecture Ms., where he worked out his interpretation of Roman religion in great detail, never significantly changing it thereafter, we find references or allusions to Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae*; Plutarch, *De fortuna Romanorum*; the tragedies of Seneca (of whom he was highly critical); Dio Cassius, *Historia Romana*; Suetonius, *Divus Claudius* and *Gaius Caligula*; Tacitus, *Annals*; Livy, *Ab urbe condita*. In the 1824 lectures, references were added to Cicero's *De natura deorum* and Virgil's *Aeneid*.

3. The Structure and Development of "Determinate Religion"

This edition makes possible for the first time a comprehensive comparison of the structure of the four series of lectures Hegel presented on the philosophy of religion, as well as an analysis of the development in his conceptualization and treatment of the subject. A clear understanding of the structure and development of Part II of the lectures is of special importance for two reasons. First, the earlier editions (both the *Werke* and Lasson) gave the mistaken impression that *Determinate Religion* was divided into only two main sections, "nature religion" and "the religions of spiritual individuality," whereas it is clear that Hegel intended to give Part II a *triadic* structure. The twofold structure reflects only the lectures of 1824, and our analysis of these lectures will show that Hegel began them with the threefold structure in mind, shifting to the twofold arrangement as he went along, even though Roman religion did not properly fit under the category of "spiritual individuality." In 1827 and 1831 Hegel restored the threefold arrangement, but with significant changes introduced in the last series.

In the second place, and of greater significance, is the fact that Hegel never did arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for *Determinate Religion*. For Part III (*The Consummate Religion*) he arrived at his mature conceptualization in 1824, while for Part I (*The Concept of Religion*) he achieved it in 1827. But in the case of Part II, he intro-

duced significant structural changes in 1831, which offered a quite different context for interpreting the Oriental and Near Eastern religions (including Judaism). While we of course do not know whether Hegel would have reorganized *Determinate Religion* yet again upon a subsequent offering, it is evident that 1831 does not provide a fully satisfactory arrangement, especially with regard to Jewish and Roman religion. At the same time, one senses a growing fascination with the history of religions, and it would not be inappropriate to suggest that this topic, rather than the concept of religion or the Christian religion, was at the cutting edge of Hegel's interest when he died in the fall of 1831. His evident willingness to incorporate new data and experiment with new schemes underscores the fact that for him philosophy was a kind of "conceptual play" based on imaginative variation in order to arrive at new insights. The hermeneutical questions remained open and lively from the earliest to the latest texts contained in this volume, and it is hoped that the reader will sense and share in the excitement they convey.

For what follows, readers will be helped by referring to the table providing a comparative analysis of the structure of the text, found on pp. 88–89. Section numbers and headings in all of the documents except the *Ms.* are the work of the editors and are not attributable to Hegel himself, although frequently wording in the texts suggests the formulations used for the headings. Reference is made to the more detailed discussion of specific matters in the editorial annotations, so as to avoid repetition between the introduction and the notes.

a. Hegel's Lecture Manuscript

General Structure

In a canceled heading at the end of *The Concept of Religion* (Vol. 1: 255 n. 185), Hegel states that in Part II the concept of religion will be "grasped in its determinate aspects," and that these aspects constitute the "forms of consciousness of the absolute idea." This formulation suggests that the whole of Part II is intended as a phenomenology of religion, that is, of the various forms of consciousness assumed by the absolute idea as it emerges and advances

through the history of religions. This is a helpful way of understanding what Hegel is about in Part II: although data are drawn from the history of religions (in increasing wealth as the lectures are repeated), and although Hegel controlled a vast amount of information, what is offered is not a historical account but a philosophical description of stages of religious consciousness—a description that is at once phenomenological and speculative, phenomenological because it attends to the concrete stages of consciousness, speculative because the interpretative perspective is already that of the absolute idea.

The description is carried out through the application of two sets of analytic categories—one internal to the religions, the other relating them externally. The internal set identifies three “moments” of a religion: its abstract concept of divinity, the ways in which God is known representationally in the texts and symbols of the religion, and the practical relationship in which communion with the deity is established; or, in brief, a religion’s metaphysical concept, its concrete representation, and its cultus. It should be noted that initially Hegel envisioned only a twofold scheme, which did not distinguish between representation and cultus (see *Ms.*, n. 5), and that the triple division was apparently worked out only in the course of treating the determinate religions. This sort of analysis was applied most clearly in the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures; the last two series of lectures were not ordered by it so consistently.

The external analysis arranges *Determinate Religion* into a triad corresponding to the fundamental moments of logic, namely, being, essence, and concept (see n. 6). But in the case of the religions, these categories are applied in the mode of determinateness and finitude; hence the operative triad is one of prereflective immediacy or undifferentiated substance (the Oriental religions of nature), differentiation in the the form of particularity (Jewish religion) or necessity (Greek), and external purposiveness (Roman religion). The latter, Roman religion, represents the apotheosis of finitude and thus prepares the transition from all the finite religions to the true, infinite, consummate religion (the Christian religion). This is what justifies treating Roman religion as a separate stage of religious consciousness; it is not “higher” than what has gone before but gathers up and makes

explicit the limitations of determinate religion as such. This seems to have been suggested to Hegel in a strange way through Goethe's notion of a "philosophical" religion (see nn. 12, 13). On the one hand Roman religion is universal, related "to the whole human race," not "ethnic" or national like the preceding religions. But on the other hand it is finite, concerned with what is "around us," not above or beneath us; lacking transcendence and depth, it is utterly prosaic, preoccupied with "earthly circumstances and arrangements."

Immediate Religion

Sec. A is quite brief in the *Ms.* (a mere seven sheets) since, as we point out in n. 15, Hegel does not treat the religion of magic at all, nor does he discuss the Oriental religions separately; rather he constructs a phenomenology of religious immediacy, with brief allusions to Chinese, Hindu, Persian, and Egyptian religion (but not to Buddhism).¹⁴

The section begins with a consideration of the proof of God appropriate to immediate religion, namely, the cosmological proof. God is understood to be "simple, pure being [*Sein*]," which, according to Hegel's *Logic*, is the most indeterminate and immediate of categories.¹⁵ The "thought of universal, pure being is implicit in the many particular beings" because the latter do not have being in and for themselves, they are limited, finite, determinate. In other words, the contingency and finitude of *Dasein*—determinate or existent being—drives it to its other, its ground, *Sein*. This is a very simple proof, but, in the form we encounter it here, deficient. Pure being and finite being are sundered, and thus "the concreteness of existence,

14. Of these religions, only Egyptian religion is clearly discussed in chap. VII.A of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* under the rubric of "the artificer" (*der Werkmeister*). Hegel's reference to "God as light" (lit., "the light-essence," *das Lichtwesen*) has generally been taken as an allusion to Persian religion, but W. Jaeschke has argued that this is not the case (see below, n. 19). What Hegel means by "plant and animal" (*die Pflanze und das Tier*) is not at all clear. It is probably not a reference to Hinduism, as J. N. Findlay suggests in his commentary (*Phenomenology*, p. 579), but to the religions of Mesopotamia, or perhaps more generally to higher forms of what Hegel later defines as the "religion of magic" (see below, 1824 lectures, p. 288, where he describes how living things—plants and animals—come to serve as the objectification of divine power).

15. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 82 (GW 11:43–44).

the unity, the synthesis [of being and finitude] float away from us.” This has adverse consequences for both the infinite and the finite. Being remains abstract, infinite, empty, *actus purus*, while finitude remains unsublated, unnegated, regarded as something positive or affirmative in its limitedness. By contrast, according to Hegel, *true* being posits an other over against itself, imparts itself, overreaches the difference between infinite and finite; while what is to be affirmed about finite being is precisely its self-negation, not its positivity.

When God is taken “concretely” rather than “abstractly” at this stage of consciousness, he is identified with “immediate being just as it is, finite nature”—nature intuited (*angeschaut*), represented (*vorgestellt*) as God. This is not, however, a “prosaic intuition of abstract understanding,” which sees things as material objects, but rather an intuition of the all-encompassing universal, which inspires fear, awe, longing, devotion. Certain natural elements have traditionally offered themselves as prime representations of the universal: light, sun, heaven, water. These elements are not initially construed symbolically but are taken as “the immediately present God.” The obvious incongruity between such specific natural objects and the universal is overcome when reflective thought is able to grasp the totality of what appears—“world” or “nature”—as one, as, for example, in Spinozistic pantheism. But religious consciousness advances less rapidly; the next step comes with the recognition that the infinite, universal power which grounds all that is, is not dead matter but animate and subjective. This brings us to the stage where both animals and human beings are worshiped, not as symbols but in actuality: the Egyptian bull (Apis) and cat, the Hindu elephant and cow, the Dalai Lama and the Brāhmans.¹⁶ While this may seem degrading to us, it represents an advance in consciousness. At the same time, consciousness is aware of the limitation of worshipping God in singular, finite (albeit living) things, and thus casts itself about so as to employ *all* the beauty and wealth of nature in order to intuit the divine essence; common things are elevated, then reduced and dissolved. This occurs in the fanciful imagination of Hinduism and

16. While the Christian doctrine of incarnation may be superficially similar, in fact, according to Hegel, the Christian religion does not worship a man as God but rather the “actuality of God” *in* a man.

in the personification of nature as a whole found in the ancient Greek myths.

The section concludes with a discussion of the cultus of immediate religion, much of it still in outline form (see *Ms.* sheet 38a and nn. 45, 49). Since at this stage of immediacy the cleavage between finite and infinite has not yet come fully to consciousness, what we find is reconciliation without disunion, hence no real reconciliation or repentance, no inward evil to atone for. Cultus is not set apart but is a life lived continuously in “the kingdom of light and good”; the details of external life are habituated in accord with religious purposes; the aim of the unending labor of religious life is immersion in the universal, self-resignation, mortification, even suicide. Especially in this discussion of the cultus, Hegel has juxtaposed practices from a number of different religions, Hindu, Persian, Mesopotamian, Egyptian. Obviously this procedure was unsatisfactory, and in the next lectures, those of 1824, the entire section on immediate religion was recast and greatly expanded. But already in the *Ms.* an interpretative horizon has been established, elements of which may be glimpsed in all the later lectures.

The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty

By contrast with the brevity of Sec. A, Hegel devotes some twenty manuscript sheets and nearly a month of lecture time to the discussion of “the religion of sublimity and beauty.” Yet a structural similarity with Sec. A is retained in the sense that the two religions considered under this rubric—Jewish and Greek—are subordinated to the internal analytic categories (metaphysical concept, concrete representation, cultus) rather than being taken up in separate sections (see n. 56). What this signifies is that Hegel views Jewish and Greek religion as representing different, indeed contrasting expressions of the same stage of religious consciousness, the stage of “essence.”

Essence is a difficult category to grasp, and a detailed analysis would require attending to its treatment in the *Science of Logic*.¹⁷ For our purposes it is enough to say that essence entails a transition from the immediacy of being to differentiation in the form of “reflec-

17. *Science of Logic*, pp. 389 ff. (GW 11:233 ff.).

tion," reflection-into-self by intuiting self in what is other-than-self. Essence thus involves the sphere of ideality, of intelligibility, of thought, and hence it has "crossed the threshold of the spiritual world," having left behind the world of sensible, natural immediacy. But the ideality of essence is *concrete*: it is not abstract being-for-self but is a "showing" (*Scheinen*), a "manifesting" (*Manifestieren*) for itself and from within itself, independently. Because of this independence, it is what is "essential" as distinguished from the inessential.

In terms of religious consciousness, essence is first posited (or shows itself) as *power*—the "negativity that differentiates itself," that possesses and sublates the other, the idea of the other, in thought ("whoever *thinks* what others merely *are* is their power"). Defined as absolute and as subject, this negative power is the Lord, the One, the ruler of all. Finite self-consciousness is merely a semblance, having its being, feeling, and focus solely in this one Lord; "to be sure, it knows itself as essential (it is not annihilated as in Brahman), but at the same time it is the inessential in the essential" (n. 66). This, then, is the religion of sublimity (*Erhabenheit*) or Jewish religion—not the sublimity of the boundless, which is immediately present in finite shapes as in Oriental pantheism, but of the one Lord who utterly transcends such shapes. Essence then develops as *necessity*, which is the reality concealed beneath the show of power. Differentiation is now no longer merely a show or semblance but an essential manifestation of essence; it is in fact spiritual, but still finite and only finitely free. This is the religion of beauty, or Greek religion: beauty gives essence a positive, spiritual form, but still in the sensuous element of portrayal.

Following this introduction, Hegel turns first to the metaphysical concept of these two religions (Sec. B.a), and at this point they are still completely integrated. The metaphysical or abstract concept found in them leads immediately to the question of proofs, since the proofs merely express the content of the various definitions of God. God is no longer defined simply as pure being but as "the One" and as "necessary essence" or "necessity." Relating to the first is the proof of the oneness of God, which is based on the dialectic of the one and the many, a theme that is also present in Plato and the Neoplatonic philosophers. The problem with this proof is that it sets

up oneness in the form of a definition, whereas all we have in actual experience is the many. The second proof has to do with the argument from contingency to necessity, with respect to which Hegel adopts the Kantian critique: the argument from effect to cause is valid only in the sensible world, and it yields only finite causes. Infinite causes simply do not enter into experience. The proof, moreover, is able to provide at best only a necessary essence, not the supremely real God.

Under the second and third analytic categories, Concrete Representation and Cultus, the two religions are treated in separate subgroups, and we shall distinguish them in the subsequent analysis.

Jewish Religion

The “great thesis” of Jewish religion is that God is one God—the personal One (*der Eine*), not the neuter One (*das Eine*), not substance but subject, the infinite reflected into itself as singular and concrete universality. This God is all-powerful, and the sublimity of his power is such that it is expressed representationally (Sec. B.b.α) not by physical force but by the pure word, which is pure light: “God said, Let there be light, and there was light, . . . light that is only a breath.” By contrast, the contingency and dependence of the world is expressed in the doctrines of creation, preservation, and passing away. God’s power in relation to the world remains *undetermined*: it does not acquire a determinate content, end, or purpose, other than the exercise of power as such, and the difference between the goodness and the justice of God is annulled. God is “not yet inwardly concrete, not yet elaborated within himself,” but is merely abstract power, the being-for-self of the One.

The paradigmatic portrayal of the God of abstract power is found, according to Hegel, in the Book of Job. Hegel had been attracted to Job since his student days, through the influence of his teacher Schnurrer as well as that of J. D. Michaelis, whose translation of the Old Testament into German was published in 1769, and who regarded Job as the oldest book of the Bible, possibly written by Moses to comfort the Israelites in Egypt.¹⁸ This dating of the book, together with Job’s reputation among Enlightenment thinkers as “the

18. See 1827 lectures, n. 487. See also Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel*, p. 172.

philosopher of Mosaic antiquity," helps to account for the prominence Hegel accords it especially in the first two lecture series. Both Schnurrer and Michaelis stressed the portrayal of divine majesty in Job, and Hegel echoes the inverse of this theme, namely, that divine majesty and inscrutability demand absolute submission on the part of human beings, "fear of the Lord." To be sure, God acts to bring souls out from the pit of Sheol (Job 33:18), but this act of justice or mercy is also merely an expression of divine power. In the end, "submission [to the Lord] restores Job to his former happiness."

The Jewish cultus, in Hegel's view (see Sec. B.c.α), is a fundamental expression of the servile consciousness and of the master-servant relationship. When God is comprehended only under the abstract category of the One, and not as dialectically self-mediated, then "this human lack of freedom" is the result, and "humanity's relationship to God takes the form of a heavy yoke, of onerous service. True liberation is to be found in Christianity, in the Trinity." The condition of servitude is to have one's self-consciousness solely in the other and on behalf of the other. "Fear of the Lord is the absolute religious duty, to regard myself as nothing, to know myself only as absolutely dependent—the consciousness of the servant vis-à-vis the master." What God demands is that his people should have "the basic feeling of their dependence." Here we encounter the first of Hegel's several allusions in the *Ms.* to Schleiermacher's just-published *Glaubenslehre* (see nn. 138, 292), and it is noteworthy that he regards Schleiermacher's famous description of religious consciousness as an expression of Jewish (and later of Roman) rather than of Christian piety.

If one has one's self-consciousness only in and through absolute dependence on the Lord, then there is also a sense in which one is absolutely reestablished in relationship to the Lord—a relationship that is singular, unique, and exclusive. Hegel thinks this is the source of Jewish "obstinacy" and "particularity," the conviction that the Jewish people alone are God's people, and that he alone is their God. While in this sense Judaism is a national or ethnic religion, it is not the case that this people can lay claim to the land they inhabit; it is rather solely the gift of God, who can take it from them and restore it to them.

This portrayal of Judaism still shares the interpretative perspective of the *Early Theological Writings* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*,¹⁹ even though new categories and themes have appeared. As Leuze suggests, Hegel has placed a different valuation on essentially the same characterization of Judaism.²⁰ While the master-servant relationship was earlier viewed as a primary instance of human self-alienation (although necessary to the emergence of self-consciousness), it is now seen as implicit in the concept of God as abstract power (which also entails alienation). And a basis is laid for the quite different interpretation of Judaism that makes its appearance in the 1824 lectures (see 1824, especially nn. 510, 551). For already in the *Ms.* Hegel alludes to the fact that the power of the Lord is *wisdom*, and he recognizes that a *reconstitution* of the self in the One occurs through “fear of the Lord.”

Greek Religion

The discussion of Greek religion opens with a very difficult section on the category of “necessity” (Sec. B.b.β), the comprehension of which is assisted by some familiarity with Hegel’s treatment in the *Science of Logic*.²¹ Necessity is power that is not merely abstractly related to itself but repels itself from itself, providing a mediation

19. The place of Judaism in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has been much discussed but never satisfactorily resolved (see Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen*, pp. 166–169). It is likely that brief allusions to it are found in the section on the “unhappy consciousness”—e.g., the reference to “the alien essence” that “condemns singularity” (*Phenomenology*, p. 128 [GW 9:123])—and in the view of most interpreters that is the extent of it. But Walter Jaeschke has recently argued that Hegel’s discussion of “the light-essence” (*das Lichtwesen*) as the first form of “natural religion” (*Phenomenology*, pp. 418–420 [GW 9:370–372]) is not a reference to Persian religion, as generally thought, but to the God of Israel. He attempts to establish this by identifying numerous similarities between this brief section of the *Phenomenology* and the treatment of the idea of God in Jewish religion in the 1821 *Ms.*, where, for example, the sublimity of God is also defined in terms of the metaphor of “light”—the God who creates by the word that is pure light (“God said, Let there be light, and there was light, . . . light that is only a breath”), and who covers himself “with light as with a garment” (Ps. 104:2) (see below, *Ms.*, p. 136). See Walter Jaeschke, *Die Vernunft in der Religion: Studien zur Grundlegung der spekulativen Religionsphilosophie* (Inaugural diss., Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1985), pp. 288–295.

20. Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen*, p. 170.

21. *Science of Logic*, pp. 541–553 (GW 11:380–392).

for the diversity of determinate being. As such it is inherently blind, having not yet attained to the level of concept, purpose, determinacy, freedom, and thus it is experienced as cold, abstract, fate and as Nemesis. But necessity also entails the appearing of essence itself in a positive relation to the natural; it appears *in* the natural but not *as* the natural, and thus it requires an act of religious intuition or a work of art to raise the natural to the essential. It first appears in the natural and ethical powers, inherited from the old Greek folk religions; these powers are divine powers and as such are distinct from necessity yet at the same time have their subsistence in it (they are not immediately divine as in the nature religions). But the proper shape in which necessity appears is the human, spiritual shape. Human being is imbued "with the imprint of universality or of the simplicity of necessity"; and conversely "the external shape [of necessity] should be conceived solely in the spirit and begotten solely from it." Human products are more excellent than natural products, and, as the natural element recedes, the spiritual gods evolve out of the natural gods (e.g., Helios was once a Titan, Athena came out of Neith, n. 132). The gods made in the image of human individuality are more adequate representations than the old nature deities of the necessity that rules all that is.

The section on the cultus of Greek religion (Sec. B.c.β) opens with a subsection (α) on the stage of religious self-consciousness that expresses itself in this religion, which is now characterized as "the religion of beauty" (how beauty can be regarded as a manifestation of necessity is not at all clear). This is the stage of freedom—abstract and finite, to be sure, but freedom nonetheless—a consciousness of the implicit identity of myself and the universal, of finite and infinite. Yet the "objective essentiality" is still distinguished into two moments: absolute necessity and the spiritual, human shape. In relation to the former, the latter threatens initially to be annihilated, having no self-subsistence or self-purpose. This is not a matter of "fate" in the ordinary sense but of an orientation of self-consciousness to that which transcends its immediate singularity and gives it its "substantive aspect," namely, the ethical, the universally rational and true. Because the individual spirit is taken up into "universal substantiality," into "absolute essentiality," its eternal character emerges for

the first time in the form of the idea of the immortality of the soul. At the same time self-consciousness recovers from this immersion in the universal through its own generative relationship to the gods, who are created, so to speak, out of its own passions (see n. 150). Because of their "scattered plurality," the divinity of the gods "cannot quite be taken in earnest," and as a result self-consciousness is freed from its gods and at the same time freed *by* the gods from *abstract* necessity; hence it is both serious and not serious about the gods (see n. 165). This is what constitutes the "absolute serenity" of the religion of art—no longer tied to nature, it also advances "to the point of doing away with God or gods and looking to itself for its own security."

Finally, in the subsection on "the cultus itself" (β), Hegel deals for the first time with the concrete forms of Greek religion, alluding to specific sources. Cultus in general consists of the actions whereby one gains the consciousness of unity with the gods, the universal powers, elevating them from the level of mere enjoyment or use, as in ordinary life, to that of "theoretical objectivity," such that they may be worshiped. The powers that are worshiped are "the distinctive powers of self-consciousness itself. Athena, whom the Athenians worship, is their very own city, their spirit, their technical and artistic talent; the muse that Homer invokes is at the same time his genius." Yet the powers that are thus elevated withdraw once again from the individual, resist manipulation, so that the cultus consists in these powers being recognized and emphasized for their own sake. Thought grasps the essential element in concrete life, and is also present to itself in what it recognizes and celebrates. Sacrifice is therefore not a giving up of self but self-fulfillment, an enjoyment of the universal power. In fact, it is the singular, external, natural form of the power that is sacrificed—which is an anticipation of the artistic transfiguration of the whole of life.

The divine essences or powers are combined into a universal element or nature, which is not yet grasped as infinite subjectivity or as spirit, and which is initially expressed in the symbolic forms inherited from the earlier religions. It is present in what is raw, primitive, unbeautiful, opaque, and mysterious, as distinct from the clarity and light of higher thought and ethical life. This leads Hegel

into a discussion of the Greek mysteries and Orphic religion. Against the prevalent opinion of his time (Voltaire, Creuzer, see n. 202), Hegel argues that this more primitive form of religious consciousness did not contain higher truth or special wisdom. After all, "Socrates and Aristotle,²² the wisest of the Greeks, were not initiated." The transition from savagery to ethical life was not yet completed in Orphism. This tension is clearly present in the Delphic oracles. It is a tension between justice and beauty, between power and purpose, between inner and outer, between the old gods and the new. In this situation, great stress is placed on natural signs, including especially the hearing of the divine voice at Delphi.

Poetry and drama are later and higher expressions of the Greek cultus. Poetry, which is "thinking phantasy," intuitively brings to life the universal essences that are present everywhere in nature but especially in human shape. Homer established the divine for phantasy; but at the same time a decline in religious vitality set in. Drama, tragic and comic, portrays the actual operations and effects of the essential powers in concrete instances. It is "the highest point" of Greek religious life, and Hegel draws upon the writings of Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles, as well as of the Greek philosophers and historians, for his portrayal. While an antithesis remains between the particular gods, as particularized divine powers, and human beings, it is resolved amicably; no infinite estrangement has yet been experienced, nor universal reconciliation brought about.

This portrayal of Greek religion by no means simply repeats Hegel's presentation in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* under the rubric of "the religion of art."²³ The context and problematic have shifted, and the organization is different. The context in the *Phenomenology* is the role of religion in relation to Greek society and in particular the tension between social cohesion and individuality, whereas for the *Ms.* it is the role of religion in giving representational expres-

22. Hegel may be confusing Aristotle and Aeschylus; see n. 201.

23. See *Phenomenology of Spirit*, chap. VII.B. I am indebted at this point to the work of Daniel B. Jamros, S.J., *Religion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Study of the Text* (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1986). Christianity and Greek religion are the only religions to be treated at length in the *Phenomenology*, although, as Jamros shows, there are many allusions to other religions and stages of religious consciousness.

sion to essence in the form of *necessity* (a category lacking in the earlier treatment). The problematic of the *Phenomenology* is how art arrives at a form adequate to the expression of universal essence in individual spiritual shape, and Hegel traces this through the stages of the abstract work of art (the statue, hymn, oracle, and cultic sacrifice), the living work of art (the mysteries and athletic celebrations), and the spiritual work of art (epic poetry, tragedy, and comedy). The concern of the *Ms.* to distinguish between natural and spiritual-ethical phases of Greek religious consciousness (and to argue against Creuzer's romanticization of the earlier phase) is not present in the *Phenomenology*; and the organization of the *Ms.*'s treatment is determined by application of the analytic categories of metaphysical concept, concrete representation, and cultus. Art is no longer the central interpretative category, and in particular the *Ms.* does not repeat the extended discussion of Greek poetry and drama, which constitutes the focus of the *Phenomenology*'s presentation. Finally, whereas in the *Phenomenology* Greek religion provides the transition from "natural religion" (culminating in Egyptian religion) to Christianity, for the *Ms.* the relationships of Jewish, Greek, and Roman religion are the primary concern, and the many comparisons of Greek and Christian religious consciousness are lacking. All this is not to suggest that Hegel's basic interpretation of Greek religion has changed; it has not, although a shift is discernible away from the romantic image of Greece to a position between romanticism and classicism.²⁴ The philosophy-of-religion lectures demanded a different approach to Greek religion; the hermeneutical frame of reference was different, and new issues had arisen that needed to be addressed.

The Religion of Expediency: Roman Religion

Hegel devotes more attention to Roman religion in the *Ms.* than he does on any subsequent occasion—some fourteen manuscript sheets, or nearly half the number used for the whole of Part III, on the Christian religion. The preparatory materials for this part of the

24. See Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen*, pp. 204–207, 215. Leuze has a detailed analysis of the treatment of Greek religion in the early writings and the *Phenomenology*; see pp. 181–203.

Ms. have been preserved and are printed in the Appendix (see below, *Loose Sheets*, esp. n. 1). Hegel seems to have been preoccupied in 1821 with the decadence of the Roman religion and empire, to which he compares his own age in rather apocalyptic tones at the end of the lectures (Vol. 3:159–160). More importantly, however, he was working out for the first time his own interpretation of this religion, and especially of fundamental differences between Greek and Roman religion, as opposed to the prevailing view that the two were essentially similar. This view was expressed by Hegel's major source, Karl Philipp Moritz's *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (1791), and Hegel used the detailed information on the Roman gods and festivals provided by Moritz to refute Moritz (see nn. 254, 257, and *Loose Sheets*, n. 8). Finally, Hegel was at pains to understand the transition from Roman religion, which "closes the cycle of the finite religions," to the Christian religion. Such "paradigm shifts"²⁵ were of great importance to him, and he devoted considerable attention to them.

The section opens with an analysis of the penultimate transition—the transition from Greek (and Jewish) religion to Roman religion. Logically, this is the transition from essence to concept, and more specifically, from necessity to purpose.²⁶ Necessity, according to Hegel, has no *inner* purpose, but only the formal requirement that there be *some* content, outcome, or activity. The concept "is the truth of necessity." When we conceive, we comprehend something as one moment in a coherent pattern, a coherence that involves both differentiation and inward connectedness. We grasp or hold together (*be-greifen*) the totality. The coherence of necessity is merely that of an external cause-effect relationship, whereas the coherence of the concept is that of internal purposiveness or intentionality. With

25. This term, borrowed from Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1970), p. 150, seems to be an apt way of characterizing Hegel's understanding of "passage" or "transition" (*Übergang*), especially the basic ones. We are, however, using the term "paradigm shift" in a sense somewhat different from that in which Kuhn uses it, since in this context we mean by "paradigm" a fundamental, exemplary construal of reality, not a scientific model of interpretation.

26. See the discussion of teleology and purpose (*Zweck*) in the *Science of Logic*, pp. 734–754 (GW 12:154–172). On the translation of *Zweckmässigkeit* as both "expediency" and "purposiveness," see n. 229, and 1824 lectures, n. 466.

inwardly purposive action “nothing is produced that is not already there beforehand,” implicitly; hence purposive action is free action, action in which consciousness is at home with itself, action based on the “self-sustaining unity of the concept.” Such action presupposes a distinction between purpose and reality—that is, between end and means—but also an inner connection or coherence. In Hegel’s view, this distinction did not fully emerge in Greek religion (the gods are the powers of reality, not a purpose); in Roman religion purpose and reality stood in unresolved contradiction; while in the Christian religion the distinction has been overcome, sublated.

In other words, the purposiveness that is found in Roman religion is *finite* or *external* in character.²⁷ The purpose is realized or carried out through something that is alien to it; a means is utilized that has no intrinsic connection with the end, with the intentional act. This is the sort of relationship that is grasped by the “understanding” (*Verstand*) as opposed to the concept.

External purposiveness is at the heart of the teleological proof of the existence of God, in Hegel’s view (Sec. C.a). As Kant points out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (see nn. 241 ff.), this is a proof based on the wise, purposive, harmonious arrangement of the natural world, an arrangement so marvelous that we are compelled to seek an explanation for it outside the realm of contingency. However, the purposes and arrangements in question—such as the fact that rose bushes have thorns and cats claws, or that wood from trees is useful to shelter and warm human beings—are found in the natural world, not in the nature of God himself. For this reason they are extrinsic to God, and “God is [merely] seen as an understanding [*Verstand*], operating in nature, that orders and regulates them.” Hegel shares Kant’s critique of this proof and adds a few points of his own. The primary difficulty is that an argument from finite, contingent arrangements and purposes to a *supreme* wisdom and an *absolute* power entails a “leap” from the finite to the infinite that cannot be sustained logically and that must finally fall back on the ontological proof, which starts with the dialectics of the infinite rather

27. Hegel’s distinction between internal and external purposiveness is based primarily on Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*; see n. 237.

than with the finite. This is a leap or inference, moreover, which is based on a metaphysics of nature that understands only external, quasi-mechanical relations, as distinct from inner, vital, organic purposiveness (see n. 250). Finally, to bring in God as the explanation for such finite, contingent arrangements is to reduce the divine purpose to something extremely petty, such as providing bushes with thorns and animals with protective weaponry.

But of course this is just what the Romans have done (Sec. C.b). Their gods—and they have a veritable throng of them—are exponents that oversee, regulate, and protect the full range of human activities and purposes, especially those of a political and commercial character. This is the utterly utilitarian, practical, prosaic religion; specific human needs, such as happiness, satisfaction, self-seeking, define the content of the Roman gods. In this respect Roman religion is fundamentally different from Greek, which exists in “the realm of free beauty, joyous festival, and the enjoyment of divinity.” The Greeks worship the gods for the sake of the gods, the Romans for the sake of humanity; they have no “free intuition of objectivity,” only a practical assessment of their own subjective needs. “Their cultus consists in positing a power to help them in their need. Thus these gods have . . . a subjective root and origin, and have an existence so to speak only in worship, in the festivals.” In the case of plague, for example, the Romans invent new gods, whereas the Greeks did not use their religion in this way.

Only thinly veiled in this analysis is the suggestion that *we* are very much like the Romans. The Roman religious practices are perhaps the most uninhibited instance of the “rotten point”²⁸ of religious belief wherever it is found, the belief in the gods of accusation and protection, of punishment and reward. Such belief is incipiently atheistic since it perverts religion into an instrument of human needs and purposes rather than constituting an act of genuine worship whereby the ground of being is glorified and enjoyed.

Hegel elaborates this critique in an unusually detailed examination of the Roman cultus (Sec. C.c). The purpose of this cultus is, first and foremost, political: it serves the interests of the Roman

28. See Paul Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” in Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, *The Religious Significance of Atheism* (New York, 1969), p. 60.

Empire. The Roman deity above all others is the goddess Fortuna—not necessity, not chance, not providence, but the universal prosperity of the Imperium Romanum. Beyond this are the general human requirements and activities: harvest, fertility, crafts, trade, travel. And beneath all of this is a fundamental fear of harm and disaster. This is why Hegel asserts—in a strained allusion to Schleiermacher (see n. 292)—that Roman religion is based on a “feeling of dependence,” which, in developed form, leads to veneration of the power of evil and worship of the devil. He notes that the Romans dedicated altars to plague, fever, hunger, crop destruction, and the like, and wonders how such things could be worshiped as divine: “it is only the feeling of dependence and fear that can turn them into something objective.” Other religions (Persian, Hindu, Greek) are *free* in the presence of their God, and it is only outside religion that they are dependent. The Romans have made of religion a thing of enslavement.

Enslavement to what? To finitude and death, in the final analysis. This is evident from the Roman festivals and spectacles, which consisted of the large-scale slaughter of beasts and human beings, a slaughter that was purposeless, staged merely for the entertainment of the spectators. “For the Romans, this prosaic pattern of spiritless butchery, cold and arid, constituted the supreme event of history.” The gods warded off death as long as possible, but ultimately death prevails, and death is the one true divinity for the Romans, the final mark of finitude for the religion that venerates “unbounded finitude,” “spuriously infinite” finitude.

It is just for this reason that Roman religion constitutes the final step before the transition to the Christian religion. It is a negative step, not a positive step; finite religion cycles back upon itself, it does not evolve progressively into infinite religion. The “necessity” of Roman religion is that the *highest* form of finitude is the *worst*, issuing in the absolute *unhappiness* and grief of spirit, despite the Romans’ constant preoccupation with happiness, gratification, success. It is only when finitude has played itself out to the end, only when the Sophist slogan “man is the measure of all things” has been elevated to a world standard, that finitude can be taken up into “the infinite universality of thought” and thereby purified—only then that God and world can be reconciled through the appearance of God in the shape of a single human being. God acquires present actuality,

and the world is transfigured in its finitude. Yet the religion in which this occurred could not arise in the Greco-Roman world, since that world lacked a pure intuition of the one God, especially as a “community principle”; that is, while there may have been isolated philosophical intuitions of the One, they were incapable of taking on the concrete life of a religious community and cultus. Thus Christianity arose among the Jewish people when that people encountered the “finitude of the West” and the “age-old grief of the world.”

b. The Lectures of 1824

The three moments of *Determinate Religion*, according to the introduction to the second lecture series, are immediate, natural religion (God intuited in the *natural* unity of the spiritual and the natural), the religions of spiritual individuality (the reflection of spirit into itself out of nature, God represented as an individual subject or subjects), and the religion of finite purposiveness. While this division is not based explicitly on the dialectic of being, essence, and concept, as in the *Ms.*, it is, according to Hegel, a “necessary classification that follows objectively from the nature of spirit”—but not so necessary, one may be permitted to observe, as to prevent Hegel from altering it in the process of developing the lectures (see 1824 lectures, n. 2).

Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion

Sec. A opens with a lengthy introduction in which primarily three matters are discussed. The first of these is whether immediate religion is not only the oldest but also the truest form of religion—a religion in which spirit exists in untroubled unity with nature. This is related to certain hypotheses concerning the original condition of humanity advanced according to Hegel by Schlegel, Schelling,²⁹ and other

29. Whether Schelling ever seriously held such views, at least after 1804, is subject to question. Hegel does allude to passages that seem to support them in *On University Studies* (1803) and *The Deities of Samothrace* (1815) (see 1824 n. 27). To be sure, in the latter work, Schelling declared that the religions of Greece, Phoenicia, etc., derived from a more ancient Pelasgian religion—a primordial revelation, perhaps, but not an original monotheism in which humanity possessed and later lost an explicit, complete, and true conception of God. And in the same work he criticized the advocates of an original Hebraic monotheism.

representatives of post-Enlightenment romanticism: they supposed a condition of original perfection and attempted to demonstrate historically that the human race actually began in a state of innocence; this belief sometimes led, or was supposed to lead, to the idea that in such a golden age humanity possessed all artistic and scientific knowledge and an immediate vision of God. Hegel is sharply critical of such views. Not only are they historically naive, but also they overlook the fact that nature and spirit originally exist in a state of conflict and that any unity must be *achieved*, brought about by working through the consciousness of *rupture*. He attributes these views, which postulate a past or future paradise, to the difficulty of living in the historical present and of recognizing "the ideal in actuality." At this point, according to the Hotho transcript, Hegel introduced a famous metaphor also used in the preface to the *Philosophy of Right*: "in order to pluck reason, the rose in the cross of the present, one must take up the cross itself" (n. 45). Reason is the rose in the cross of the present because it discloses the ideal and the rational in the midst of the actual and seemingly irrational; but to "pluck" reason involves the "hard labor" of attending to what is presently given rather than looking away to past or future.

The second major topic concerns the "metaphysical concept" of God that is implicit in nature religion. Hegel opens with some observations on the concept of the "metaphysical" in general. Properly understood, it concerns the logical, rational basis for all concrete historical developments, but in natural theology it took the form of proofs for the existence of God. At the basis of all religious proofs is the fundamental religious activity of human being, which is that of "rising" from finite to infinite, from singular to universal, to being-in-and-for-self. This "elevation" or "transition" occurs when finitude becomes aware of its own nothingness, negation, and limit; in fact, the limit of the finite is precisely the infinite, and in this sense the finite already belongs to and "is" its other, the infinite. However, just because what constitutes the transition is the self-negation of the finite, a proof cannot be based on it. To posit the infinite from the finite is to assume that the finite *is* something, but it is in fact nothing in itself. The only genuine proof of the infinite is its self-proof. As Hegel puts it, the finite does not posit or pose (*setzen*)

the infinite but rather presupposes it (*voraussetzen*); that is, "it posits it in such a way that the *infinite* is rather the first, essential element." "What is meant in religion is not that the infinite *is* by virtue of the affirmative nature of the finite, its immediacy; on the contrary, religion is rather that the infinite is the finite being sublated and sublating itself." That which sublates it, the true infinite, is not an abstract "beyond," but a process of mediation that takes the finite into itself, includes being within itself. This criticism of the cosmological proof, which is considerably more developed than in the *Ms.*, reflects the distinctive way that the "speculative concept of religion" is articulated in the first part of the 1824 lectures.³⁰ It also provides the basis for a brief critical reference to pantheism, which in Hegel's view follows from universalizing the *finite* in its affirmative, positive qualities and regarding God as the universal being in all existent, determinate being. Such pantheism is found neither in nature religion nor in Spinoza, but it is characteristic of certain modern "enlightened" critics of Spinoza (see nn. 76, 80).

The last main topic to be addressed in this section is a survey of the forms of nature religion,³¹ of which there are three. Spirit initially exists in the immediate, empirical form of singular self-consciousness, which knows nothing higher than itself and exercises power over nature; but at the same time there are the beginnings of a process of the objectification of the divine object over against consciousness. This is the religion of magic, including as its highest expression the religion of ancient China (n. 99). In the second place, objectified spirit possesses being and truth within itself, becoming inwardly self-determining and self-unfolding, but at the same time the differentiated moments (finite subject, infinite object) are simply juxtaposed and separated. The first historical expression of this stage of religious

30. See Vol. 1:314–324.

31. It is preceded by a brief section on "the representation of God," which seems to be a carryover from Sec. A.b of the *Ms.* Hegel seems to have started out with the analytic categories applied generally to immediate religion in the *Ms.*—metaphysical concept, concrete representation, cultus—but soon outstripped them. In this section on representation he makes the point that although God is represented in natural objects, these are raised by phantasy to spiritual significance and are not viewed as merely natural powers. In other words, spirit is already present in nature religion; there is no such thing as *purely* natural religion.

consciousness is Buddhism, the religion of being-within-self, although in terms of the organization of the 1824 lectures Buddhism appears as the last moment of the religion of magic; in any case, the pre-eminent exemplification of this stage is Hinduism, the religion of phantasy (see nn. 99, 102). Finally, a transition occurs out of undialectical objectification to the subjectivity of spirit, and God is imagined for the first time as a free subject but still in wholly natural images, so that a "monstrous contradiction" develops between the spiritual and the natural. This is the stage of Persian and Egyptian religion (the religions of light and of the enigma, n. 104), which in the 1824 lectures are treated in two separate sections, so that the religion of magic has four subdivisions rather than three. Hegel concludes this summary by observing that, while it may be difficult for us to grasp the spiritual aspect of nature religion, we can in fact "understand it from within" or "understand our way into it" (*hineinverstehen*), since it is after all a human product, even if we cannot sense, feel, or live in it from within (see n. 107). Reason transcends the barriers that delimit sensation and feeling, and such *Hineinverstehen* is precisely Hegel's agenda throughout *Determinate Religion*.

The Religion of Magic

This section (Sec. A.1) is entirely new in 1824, and Hegel provides a more detailed treatment than in any of the subsequent lectures. He is primarily concerned with the religious practices of Africans and Eskimos, although he makes brief references to Mongols, Chinese, and American Indians; his identifiable sources are a few missionary and travel reports (see n. 108). He distinguishes two basic stages of primitive religious consciousness.

In the first of these (Sec. A.1.a), empirical, singular human self-consciousness knows nothing higher than itself; it is a consciousness that takes the form of power over nature, but it is also confronted by power, the power of the spiritual, in nature. What Hegel calls the religion of magic *exercises* this power, not as an act of fear but out of the freedom (the "unfree freedom") that knows itself as higher than natural things. This knowledge is initially unmediated; that is, it exercises *direct* mastery over nature without the use of any means

or media, and it is unaware of any object or power over against itself. Hegel thinks this most primitive kind of religion is found among the Eskimos, who, according to his sources, have no sense of a supernatural power, do not worship the sun, moon, stars, and so on, but who do have magicians ("angekoks") who exercise power over nature by means of words and gestures. Hegel also refers briefly here to certain forms of African religion, but the latter is found mainly at the second stage of religious consciousness.

In this second stage (Sec. A.1.b) a gradual process begins whereby the divine object is "objectified" over against human self-consciousness. Hegel distinguishes between two types of objectification, formal and absolute or actual (see n. 124). In the first of these, which is the subject of the present subsection, the divine power is represented in various ways as independently active over against consciousness. In the second, the divine attains an objectivity that exists in and for itself—a level that is fully realized only with the religion of being-within-self (Buddhism).

Hegel analyzes formal objectification at considerable length, offering a finely nuanced phenomenology of distinguishable stages within it. Initially he says there is a "threefold relationship between the divine object and consciousness," but in the course of exposition another stage is added that mediates between the second and third original stages. In the first stage, consciousness retains power over the object. This is very close to the most primitive form of magic ("singular self-consciousness as power over nature"), but the relationship is now mediated, and the magic is *indirect*, making use of means or media, since there now is an inchoate consciousness of a power over against the self (see n. 138). This type of magic or sorcery is found in "infinite variety," and it opens the floodgates of superstition since the basic principle of magic is that the connection between the means and the outcome cannot be known or understood. In the second stage the object becomes independent, exercising its own power, upon which human beings now find themselves dependent. It first appears as "great elemental objects" of nature, such as sun, moon, sky, sea, river, but these are not actually worshiped as divine until human beings arrive at an intuition of universality. There is little need to pay attention to them as long as they are functioning

normally, but when something disruptive or threatening occurs—earthquake, flood, drought, eclipse—it is necessary to petition them. Hence the veneration of these powers is mixed in with magic.

In the next stage, the object or independent power is found in *living* things—plants and various forms of organic life, but especially animals. While it may seem to us degrading to worship animals as gods, this is actually a higher form of religious consciousness: animal cults are found wherever humanity has risen above the purely natural but has not yet grasped *itself* in its spiritual essence. The animal is alive, but because there is something secretive, impenetrable, wondrous about its behavior, it is not surprising that human beings should have regarded animal vitality as higher than their own. But at the same time animals, like other fetishes, can be more or less arbitrarily selected or replaced depending on human needs and temperament.

The fourth stage, finally, is the one at which self-consciousness recognizes its *own* essence in the religious object, but only in the form of single human beings rather than as a universal spiritual principle. Such individuals are usually priests, shamans, or rulers, and at this stage there is as yet no distinction between individuals as such and divinity: this contingent, particular, individual *is* the god. But spirit is believed to be present in humanity, and human self-consciousness is regarded as essentially the presence of spirit. This view “is also present in the Christian religion, but in a more exalted fashion and transfigured.” The religions of spirit are found at both the lowest and the highest levels. At the lowest level, this belief often takes the form of veneration of the dead or ancestor worship. Death strips away the ephemeral element, leaving dead spirits that are able to exercise considerable power on the living. Hegel provides a detailed, gory description of how African sorcerers get the dead spirits to pass into their own bodies or exorcise them, by means of frenzied dancing and shouting, sexual orgies, human sacrifice, cannibalism, and the like—he was not one to mince the details of such practices. Cultic activities of this sort are still an attempt to exercise control over nature rather than being a “free, unforced veneration of the essentially spiritual element,” which is what cultus properly is.

Chinese Religion

In the 1824 lectures, Chinese religion is treated as part of the religion of magic (Sec. A.1.c), exemplifying the fourth and final stage of formal objectification. What leads into it is the reference at the end of the preceding subsection to the role of dead spirits as rulers over the natural realms; this context accounts for the peculiar focus Hegel brings to bear on the ancient religion of the Zhou dynasty (see n. 172). In this religion, he says, existent singular self-consciousness is still the divine power, in this case the emperor of China, who governs by means of dead spirits known as Shen. Most of this brief section is devoted to a description of the installation ceremonies for a new dynasty, in which the Shen play an important role. Hegel scarcely refers to the Zhou concept of Tian (Heaven), understood as an impersonal power that rules the world by moral force, and he does not recognize that the Chinese clearly distinguished between Tian and the emperors. On Hegel's own terms, Zhou religion is properly an instance of actual rather than formal objectification of the divine essence. For subsequent lectures this subsection is considerably revised.

The Religion of Being-Within-Itself: Buddhism

In 1824 this is the last subsection of the religion of magic (Sec. A.1.d); it is really a transitional section, since here we have clearly arrived at actual objectification of the divine object, which has its being precisely *within* itself. Buddhism occupies a key stage in Hegel's phenomenology of religious consciousness, since it constitutes the transition from magic to religion in the proper sense (see n. 183). Unfortunately, Hegel's knowledge of Buddhism was both limited and inaccurate. This was his first attempt to treat the subject, and he relied upon reports primarily by English travelers to the Far East, together with de Mailla's *Histoire générale de la Chine*. His sources were most explicit about Burmese and Tibetan Lamaism, but he did not understand the difference between it and Buddhism, nor was he familiar with the three main schools of Buddhism (Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna) (see n. 190). The view prevalent in Hegel's day placed the life of Buddha around 1000 B.C., and this early dating probably led Hegel to assume that Buddhism was an

older religion than Hinduism. Moreover, he seems to have confused the dates of Siddhartha Gautama with the introduction of Buddhism into China, which Hegel calls the religion of Fo after the Chinese name for Buddha (see n. 193). He assumes, therefore, that Buddhism/Lamaism existed well before the life of Gautama, who was one of several Buddhas.

As to the content of this religion, "genuinely objective universality" begins when consciousness comprehends essence as independent, having being-within-self (*Insichsein*); here "the place of divinity . . . emerges for the first time." The essential character of this being-within-self is "nothing else but *thought* itself," and thus human being can know it, have an affirmative relationship to it, find repose in it, allow itself to be absorbed into it. With the recognition that "essence is the eternal rest of inner contemplation," free worship is able to begin, a worship that is able to assume a "theoretical" rather than a "practical" attitude. This is a religion of tranquillity, repose, and contemplation, with "numerous monasteries and great priesthoods."

Hegel discusses only two Buddhist doctrines in any detail. The first is what he takes to be immortality of the soul, based on knowing essential being at rest with itself; but because the outward shape of the soul is a matter of indifference, and because "the inner element is not yet defined as spirit," we find a belief in the transmigration of souls, which applies to the eternal as well as to the human: Buddha and Lama exist in several shapes.³² The second doctrine is that "'nothing' is the principle, the beginning and the end of everything existing." This "is not nothing in the sense of not being, but it is what is purely identical with itself, undetermined, a substantive being; it is thus completely pure, wholly simple and undifferentiated, eternally at rest; it has neither virtue nor power nor intelligence." Whether or not this nothing is understood to be simply identical with being-within-self, which Hegel earlier describes as "nothing else but thought itself," it does seem clear that he is attempting to interpret

32. It is now generally recognized that the Western categories of "immortality of the soul" and "transmigration of the soul" are a misrepresentation of the Buddhist doctrine of "rebirth."

nirvana in Western substance categories. He also seems to confuse two ways of understanding what it means to “attain” nirvana—on the one hand the Hīnayāna stress upon freedom from all worldly miseries, as suggested by one of his sources; and on the other hand, the Mahāyānā stress upon stripping away all desire and activity in a state of union with the Buddha, as suggested by another source (see n. 216).

The Religion of Phantasy: Hinduism

Being-within-self in the mode of indeterminacy is what the Buddhists call nothingness; it is not yet truly God, because only the unity of infinite and finite is genuinely divine. The next step, therefore, is for determination to come into play, for a progressive development of the divine as content to occur, but initially only in the realm of nature, where the different aspects remain held asunder as mutually independent. This independence is intuited at a prereflective stage in a colorful variety of animal and human shapes, between which there are no essential connections, only the fleeting ones provided by phantasy. “Thus we have before us an infinitely varied world of imagination—without objective coherence, an unrestrained revel encompassing all [the divine] content.” This, says Hegel, is the Hindu religion (see n. 222); while its principal characteristics “are baroque and have often a wild and repulsive shape,” the key thing is to grasp the concept that shows itself here.

This concept is the universal substance, which appears in three elements: first, as having being within itself, reflected into self, simple power locked into itself; second, as manifestation, objectivity, fixed independence; and third, as change, becoming, passing away, not-being (the third element is not yet defined as *spirit*, which would entail return into self). Hindu mythology expresses this concept in the form of the Trimurti—the one, absolute unity of Brahman, which appears in three figures: Brahmā (the active, generative father), Vishnu (manifestation, appearance, incarnation), and Shiva (mutability, creation and destruction). Hegel follows his sources in overestimating the importance of this triadic structure for Hindu thought (see n. 238), and he is not hesitant to find in it anticipations of the Christian Trinity, although of course at a pre-spiritual

level. The fluidity in relationship between the principal figures, the introduction of other names such as Rudra, Krishna, and Mahadeva, and the multitude of Hindu sects relating to various deities, show that the conceptualization is still unrefined and unstable.

Hegel turns next to the cultus of Hinduism, which appears in three sorts of relationships between self-consciousness and Brahman. In the first place, every individual Hindu is momentarily Brahman. The implication of this is that "Brahman itself is not worshiped, and has no temple; the one God is not worshiped, no services are held in his honor, no prayers are addressed to him." It is impossible to have a relationship with Brahman because Brahman is the neuter One, not the personal One, the in-itself (*das Ansich*), not the for-itself; it is abstract and achieves subjective existence only in human self-consciousnesses. Brahman is thus to be contrasted with the personal God of Judaism and compared with the "supreme being" of the Enlightenment, which is similarly abstract, empty, unknown (see n. 271). Second, in an effort to give an endurance to Brahman that goes beyond its momentary existence in human awareness, attempts are made to become permanently one with Brahman through rigorously "austere" practices, which have the effect of achieving immobility and lifelessness. Finally there is a caste of Hindus, the Brāhmins, every member of which is immediately one with Brahman; this is a relationship stemming from birth, a natural relationship, not one based on thought, free will, or ethical life. This says a lot, in Hegel's view, about the sort of divinity represented by Brahman.

Hegel concludes that Hinduism is a religion devoid of spirit. Generally, where consciousness of the universal shines through into the particular, as it does in Hinduism, freedom of spirit also comes into being in some form, legal and ethical systems develop, and particularity is delimited by the substantive unity. The unity of Brahman is not genuinely related to the real, to living, active self-consciousness; the particular remains irrational and unfree; Brahman appears only to a few, and for the most part a multitude of particular natural objects are worshiped. Since Brahman itself is not worshiped, the cultus becomes infinite in scope, everything falls within it, the content is both insignificant and unintelligible. Rather than providing satisfaction, enjoyment, freedom, the cultus constrains and constricts,

offering at one extreme “the escape offered by abstraction,” in the middle a “crude numbing of the senses,” and at the other extreme “wild debauchery,” the “sorriest depravity.”

What accounts for this severely negative assessment? In the first place, although Hegel also drew on less prejudiced articles published in *Asiatic Researches* and had apparently studied fairly carefully the Code of Manu available in the *Institutes of Hindu Law* (1794), most of the sources available to him were prejudiced or ill informed, as indicated in Sec. 2.4 above. In the second place, we know that Hegel was suspicious of the romantic attachment to India that had been prevalent in Germany during his own formative years, as expressed especially by Friedrich Schlegel’s *Ueber die Sprache and Weisheit der Indier* (1808). It is evident that his general assessment of Hinduism, which he found confirmed in the English reports, was intended as a deliberate corrective to what he took to be uncritical enthusiasm in German intellectual circles.³³

As the conclusion to this section, Hegel offers a summary of the structure of nature religion (see n. 296) that differs from that given at the end of the introduction to Sec. A, summarized above. According to this later version, the religion of magic is merely prolegomenon, not yet properly religion. Religion properly so called begins with Buddhism (the self-*containment* of absolute being), continues with Hinduism (the self-*differentiation* of absolute being), and terminates in its natural phase with Persian religion (the *reflection back* into itself of the absolute). Egyptian religion provides the transition from natural to spiritual religion. Thus nature religion is structured into a triad, although five distinct stages are examined.

The Religion of the Good or of Light: Persian Religion

Hegel’s knowledge of the religion of ancient Persia (Zoroastrianism) was based primarily on his own study of the Zend-Avesta in the translation by Kleuker from the French edition of Anquetil du Perron, and a few secondary sources (see nn. 302, 308). Here the universal is known as “the good,” a category that signifies an *affirmative* coherence between the universal and concrete life. The

33. See Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel*, pp. 77–81, and our n. 295 to the 1824 lectures.

good is determined within itself, but it is also the substance present within things. But since the process of its self-determination is still incomplete, the good remains abstract, it has only an unmediated presence in things, and it encounters an *antithesis* that remains external to it and with which it struggles, namely, the realm of evil. Good is destined to overcome evil, “but only *destined* because the struggle has no end.” Both good and evil have natural shapes in which they appear in their universality, namely, light and darkness. Light is not simply a symbol of the substantive, ideal element but *is* this element itself; light is the essentiality of all particular things. Thus light is not merely the sun, which is just a particular natural entity; rather, light has the root of subjectivity within itself because it is the universal medium of reflection and reflexivity—but only the root, since this is still a natural medium.

“We all know,” says Hegel, “that the worship of light itself has actually existed as the Persian religion, the religion of the Parsees to this day. They revere light, not in the form of the sun—strictly and properly speaking, this is no nature worship—but light as denoting the good; and the good exists as an object, it has the sensible shape of light, a shape that corresponds to the content, which is itself still abstract.” Light (or “primal fire” as distinguished from “material fire”) assumes human shape in the figure of Ormazd, whose kingdom is the kingdom of light. This universal light is the “ideal” that is present in all things—human spirits both living and departed, animals, rivers, mountains, trees (see nn. 309–312). For Parsees who live in the kingdom of the light, life as a whole is their cultus: their religious law is to do good, live purely, be and act like light. Unlike Hinduism, this is a life-affirming, life-enhancing religion.

The Religion of the Enigma: Egyptian Religion

Hegel’s discussion of the religion of “the enigma” (see n. 314) in the 1824 lectures makes few specific references to Egyptian religion; the focus rather is on the conceptual dynamics involved in the transition from natural to spiritual religion. Hegel’s information about Egyptian religion was based primarily on reports of classical historians who had visited Egypt, notably Herodotus and Plutarch, as well as modern interpreters of these sources. During the 1820s

new information became available as a result of the decipherment of the hieroglyphic system in 1824 and archaeological expeditions, but Hegel made little use of it.

We have already encountered the category of subjectivity in the preceding religions, says Hegel, but only as individual self-determination, not as constitutive of the nature of God. Subjectivity in general is a being-within-self that both differentiates itself in relationship to an other and negates this differentiation, maintaining itself in what it has distinguished, maintaining the other as a moment of itself. In Egyptian religion we begin to see this happening: the negative moment no longer falls outside the good, as in Persian religion, nor does it simply disappear into the One, as in Hinduism. But the divine subjectivity is still affected by nature, it is not free and purely spiritual. We have, after all, "only just embarked on the transition from substantiality to subjectivity"; subjectivity is still mixed up with substantive unity and with the multiplicity of independent configurations. This stage, therefore, is "shot through with inconsistencies"; it is an "enigmatic, confused mixture" of heterogeneous elements.

Hegel attempts to establish three dimensions of the Egyptian representation of God, although it is often difficult to know precisely what he is referring to—whether to ideal distinctions or to actual aspects of Egyptian belief. First, God is "the indwelling nature, the implicit power," for which the outward shape is contingent and arbitrary; it can be either animal or human, and many forms of animal worship are found in this religion, as in Hinduism, although at a certain stage a transition is discernible from the animal shape of God to the human shape.³⁴ Second, the divine subject relates negatively to itself vis-à-vis an other, which it does not simply absorb. It acts purposively, though still finitely, in relation to the other, which includes evil as well as good—evil objectified in the figure of Typhon (n. 336). A "death" of God appears to be necessary for the concrete realization and representation of God. The moment of negation takes

34. Hegel seems to say that this transition occurs as a "third moment" (of Egyptian religion?), but the third moment in the representation of God is the one in which the evil principle is vanquished and God "reestablishes himself." Hegel refers to two different "third moments," and the structure of the argument is not clear at this point.

on the shape of death, and this is not an accidental mortality as in the case of the Lama or Buddha, but comprises an element of God's essence. Finally, God reestablishes himself, rises from the dead, and thus becomes implicitly spirit, for spirit is what "eternally reverts back into itself." But at this stage the continued mingling of nature and spirit is evidenced by the fact that "the reborn god is simultaneously represented as deceased, as the god of the underworld"; the history of the divine subject coincides with the universal history of natural objects. This history of the dying and rising God is symbolically portrayed in the Egyptian god Osiris, but it is also the history of the sun, the Nile, the waxing and waning of the year; it is the natural cycle of birth, growth, death, and rebirth.

But the natural cycle itself and natural objects are not worshiped. They become symbols of something higher through artistic representation. Art is not needed when the deity merely has a natural shape; it comes into play, and must finally work only with human shapes, when God is defined as genuinely subject. Genuine art is religious art, and Egyptian civilization was the first to achieve genuine art in the service of religion; its cultus has "the form of art." The defect in art, says Hegel, is the fact that the artifact, the god, is fashioned by human hands; hence the need felt by the Egyptians to consecrate the images, to invest divine spirit in the images by incantation. Presumably this would not be necessary when the artistic form perfectly corresponds to the divine content, *is* the content. Greek art approximates this goal more fully than any other; but when the goal itself is reached, we are beyond art and have arrived at the religion of incarnation in which God, as spirit in-and-for-self, produces *himself*, is not produced by human hands, presents himself as being for others in human shape. But Egyptian religion stands at the beginning of art, not at the end of art. It is only halfway to being spirit; in it we can witness the fascinating inversion of creative roles between nature and self-consciousness—we see the artistic shape forcing its way out of the animal and into the human in the image of the sphinx. Because of its continued intermingling of subjectivity and substantiality, because it continues both to imitate and to distort, this art does not yet have the shape of *beauty*—it is not yet fine art (*schöne Kunst*).

Hegel concludes this section with a summary of what is now designated as *four* stages of nature religion, and with a foretaste of what is entailed in completing the transition to the religions of spiritual individuality. The freedom resulting from God's free self-determination as subject becomes the basis of human ethical life; we are leaving the kingdom of nature and entering the kingdom of freedom.

The Religions of Spiritual Individuality

The basic characteristic of the new sphere (Sec. B) is spiritual subjectivity or individuality. Subjectivity is "the wholly free power of self-determination." When the power that is active in self-consciousness is *universal*, then it is what we call *wisdom*; and because it is a question of *self*-determination, this wisdom is *purposive* or intentional: it is a wise purpose and a purposive wisdom, not simply blind, purposeless power. The category of purpose is immediately involved in the concept of free subjectivity; and insofar as purposive action is determined through freedom or by the act of the subject, it "has no outcome save what is already there" within the subject implicitly. "Purposive action is wise action inasmuch as wisdom consists in acting in conformity with universal purposes that are valid in and of themselves." It is in such terms that God is now to be understood. But God is not a mere thought, idea, volition, or intention; rather he is one who appears, is a subject who acts, crosses over into existence or actuality. There must, accordingly, be a "soil" in which the divine purposes become actual and determinate. For the stage at which we have arrived, this soil is no longer nature but self-consciousness or finite spirit, that is, humanity. At this stage, however, the divine purpose is still contingent, finite, external, not truly determined by the divine concept. Therefore we have to do with religions of *finite* spirituality as distinguished from the infinite spirituality of the consummate religion.

This summary indicates that the conceptual framework for Sec. B of the 1824 lectures is quite different from that found in the *Ms.*, where the central categories are essence, power, and necessity. For the *Ms.*, the power of Jewish religion is not yet understood as wisdom (although there are hints in this direction); the necessity of Greek religion is not purposive but cold and blind (although the gods act

purposively); and the category of purpose does not emerge until the third stage of determinate religion, that of Roman expediency. This shift has an obvious impact on Hegel's assessment of Jewish and Greek religion (especially the former), but it also occasions a reorganization of the whole of the latter part of determinate religion: the second and third stages of the *Ms.* (which are still distinguished in the Introduction to Part II of 1824) are combined into a single stage, the moments of which are determined by the different ways in which divine purpose actualizes itself in relation to finite spirit. Roman religion goes from being "transitional" to being fully incorporated into the religions of spiritual individuality.

Hegel's "division of the subject" summarizes the three religions of Sec. B as follows: (1) The religion of sublimity (Jewish religion). Here we have the infinitely self-contained power of the One, who exists solely for thought, who negates whatever is natural and immediate, and who tolerates no other gods beside him. The purpose of this God is unitary and infinite, but at the same time limited to a particular people. (2) The religion of beauty (Greek religion). Here we find not one but many purposes, which no longer are exclusive but serene, tolerant, friendly. This plurality of purposes allows the means to subsist alongside it, deigns to appear in the soil of nature and finite spirit, thus gives rise to the category of beauty, since the beautiful is "a purpose in itself that is amicably disposed to immediate existence." The price that is paid for this is the disappearance of the One, the absolute subject; and the universal hovers above what is beautiful as cold necessity that is neither subject nor wise. (3) The religion of expediency (Roman religion). Here the particularity and singularity of purpose have been enlarged to universal scope, but this is merely an "empirically external" universality, not a universality of the concept. It encompasses the whole world, having as its goal cold, absolute, abstract power—world domination, world mastery.

Hegel ends the division of the subject with the intriguing proposal that these religions correspond to three of the religions of nature "in inverse order." Jewish religion corresponds to Persian: in both we find a single, particular, inward purpose, the one expressed in the natural image of light, the other in the spiritual shape of the one absolute subject. Greek religion corresponds to Hindu: both have

a plurality of purposes and subjectivities, with one abstract power over them (Brahman, necessity). And Roman religion corresponds to the religion of ancient China: the formal objectification of the divine in the singular self-consciousness of the Chinese emperor corresponds to the empirically universal purpose of Roman religion, which is the advancement of the Roman state. Whereas in the natural religions we have a gradual "withdrawal" of the natural manifold into the simple naturalness of light, in the spiritual religions we have an "unfolding" of the singular divine subject into empirical universality—but in such a way that it becomes destructive and meaningless, the power of death rather than of life. This is Hegel's way of suggesting in 1824, as he did also in the *Ms.*, that determinate or finite religion cycles back upon itself. Determinate religion is no longer composed of an inner triad (religions of nature, finite spirit, and expediency), but forms the first two parts of a larger triad (nature religion, religion of spiritual individuality, consummate religion) that culminates in Christianity. This "culmination," however, does not occur as a progressive advance, since finite religion ends in degeneracy and death, in a return to the primitive at a more developed stage of culture. The whole dialectical structure resists any monolithic, linear theory of progress. Whatever the reasons for this structural experiment, Hegel did not stick with it in the later lectures; he restored the inner triad to determinate religion—but with interesting surprises still in store.

The greater part of the introduction to the religions of spiritual individuality is taken up by a lengthy discussion of the proofs of the existence of God related to the metaphysical concepts of God found in these religions. The metaphysical concept of God in Judaism is that of unity; in Greek religion it is necessity; and in Roman religion it is purposiveness. Each of these yields a different sort of proof; the first two are versions of the cosmological proof, while the last is the teleological proof. At this point Hegel brings together and greatly expands upon his discussion in the *Ms.* of the cosmological proof as it relates to the religions of sublimity and beauty (*Ms.* Sec. B.a), and of the teleological proof as it relates to the religion of expediency (*Ms.* Sec. C.a) (see n. 409).

The proof based on divine unity utilizes the "quite impoverished categories of one and many. It is an ancient dictum, which we find

already in Greek sources, that only the One is, and not the many" (see n. 421). While this may be logically correct, the question is whether the One *is God*. The concept of God is not exhausted by the category of oneness, which is an undialectical category, lacking mediation.

The proof related to the concept of necessity is based on the well-known argument from contingency to necessity. Hegel asks whether there is any essential difference between this form of the cosmological proof and the form based on the argument from finite to infinite, which we have already encountered in the religions of nature (see n. 428). While the logical form of these proofs is quite similar, the "contingent" is a richer, more concrete category than the "finite," since it contains its own negation within itself; it is precisely what is only possible, it may exist or not exist, and therefore the *truth* of contingent existence is necessity. The necessity in question must be *inner* necessity, since external necessity is itself contingent. The argument is typically set forth in the form of a syllogism: "Contingent things presuppose an absolute, necessary cause; contingent things do exist—I am, the world is; therefore an absolutely necessary cause exists." While the major premise is logically correct (without it we would have an infinite regress), the proof is defective in that it sets up contingent things on one side and necessity on the other, and then expresses the relation between them as one of "presupposing," "entailing," and so forth. Thus it appears that contingent things condition absolute necessity: *their* existence (the minor premise) is the condition for concluding that absolute necessity also exists. But absolute necessity cannot be conditioned by or dependent on anything outside itself. The authentic form of this proof would be to start with the process of mediation intrinsic to absolute necessity, and to comprehend contingent things as moments or stages in the process, posited by the absolute precisely as contingent, as negative, as not having being in and for themselves. But this is the ontological proof, not the cosmological proof. The only genuine proof must start with the infinite rather than attempt to *establish* the infinite from the empirical existence of the finite world. This critique is quite similar to the one advanced earlier regarding the argument from finite to infinite.

The proof based on purposiveness is the teleological proof. The

purposiveness in question must be external rather than internal, since, while we do encounter internal purposiveness in organic life, such life is also dependent on external relations and means (on the distinction between external and internal purposiveness, see n. 466). Given the apparent, indeed marvelous harmony between externally related things in the world, a harmony that cannot be accounted for in terms of the things themselves, we must posit a “third thing,” a third rational, ordering, principle, which enables externally related things to serve purposively as means for each other—hence the necessity of a supreme ordering being, a supremely wise, powerful, purposive being. This is the “physicotheological proof” (n. 484), and Kant has provided the classic refutation of it in *The Critique of Pure Reason* (see nn. 487 ff.). Hegel does not simply accept the Kantian critique but reworks and expands it. His key point again is that we cannot argue from empirically observed worldly circumstances, which are necessarily relative and finite, to the absolute and infinite. We cannot argue from power to *omnipotence*, from wisdom to *omniscience*. At best, what this proof affords is a concept of *great* wisdom, power, unity, and so on. But what we want in God is *absolute* wisdom, power, unity. “From ‘great’ to ‘absolute’ we make the leap.” Moreover, observes Hegel, the worldly, human purposes in view are not only finite and contingent but also quite petty. If the aim is to stir the heart, that can be achieved by this proof—“there is nothing upon which piety cannot feed”—but to achieve cognition of *God* by means of it is another matter. Nor can a proof be based on the assumed predominance of good over evil in ethical matters, for the evidence is quite ambiguous. Finally, even if the proof should succeed, it could yield only a “power” that operates in conformity with purposes, not a personal, spiritual God. We arrive, therefore, once again at the conclusion that, while all these proofs contain valid elements, the only adequate proof is the ontological proof.

The Religion of Sublimity: Jewish Religion

Hegel’s interpretation of Judaism undergoes a striking metamorphosis in 1824. The fundamentally negative cast of the treatment just three years earlier—the *Ms.*’s stress on the abstract power of God, the indeterminacy of God’s relation to the world, the contin-

gency and dependence of the world, the servile consciousness expressed in “fear of the Lord” and in the “feeling of dependence”—is replaced by a more balanced and fully developed assessment. The introduction of the categories of wisdom and purpose, mandated by the general reconception of the religions of spiritual individuality in the 1824 lectures, has something to do with this reinterpretation, but basically it seems to be the result of a deeper and more appreciative evaluation of the literature of the Old Testament on Hegel’s part.

After a brief reference to the metaphysical concept of God in Judaism—the “infinitely important” recognition that God is simply and solely One, which is the ground of the absolute spirituality of God, “the path to truth” (Sec. B.1.a)—Hegel turns to the “divine self-determination” as expressed representationally, discovering much that he had overlooked before (Sec. B.1.b). The fundamental self-determination of God is not yet internal (for then he would be spirit) but external, the act of creation and preservation. God is not the result of the creative process—this is no theogony, an issuing-forth of the gods—but the starting point; and, as distinct from human production, this is an absolute creation, *ex nihilo*, an inner, “intuitive,” eternal activity on God’s part. God’s creation and preservation of the world show forth his goodness and justice, indicating that what is at work here is infinite, purposive wisdom, not just abstract power. Created things are regarded as prosaic, stripped of divinity, devoid of autonomy, and the externality of nature is clearly recognized. This de-divinization of nature is a necessary step toward a valid understanding of the relationship of God and world. In Jewish religion this relationship is understood essentially in terms of God’s *sublimity*. Sublimity means that God is exalted above the reality in which he appears, and that the reality itself is negated or totally subjected to God’s power. For example, God creates by means of a word, which immediately passes away; or natural media such as wind, lightning, and thunder are totally obedient to God’s bidding.

The representation of God’s purpose is both “theoretical” and “practical.” God’s theoretical purpose is that he and he alone should be recognized (not yet cognized) and glorified. His practical, worldly purpose is now an ethical (no longer a natural) purpose, having its

soil in human self-consciousness and freedom. But we are still at the stage of immediate, natural ethical life, and hence the family is the ethical form in which the divine purpose is realized—this one family, the Jewish people, to the exclusion of all others. Here we encounter the striking, “infinitely difficult” contradiction that is present in Jewish religion: on the one hand God is universal, the God of all humanity (“all peoples are called upon to recognize him and glorify his name,” Ps. 117:1–2), but on the other hand his purposes and operations are so limited as to be confined to just this one people, defined by birth and race. For this reason, in Hegel’s view, the universal content of the story of the creation and fall of humanity in Genesis 1–3 became disconnected from subsequent Jewish piety. Jewish particularity, however, is not polemical, because there is no obligation to convert other peoples to the God of Israel. While others are called upon to glorify the Lord, this is not a goal, as in Islam, which is pursued with fanaticism. Judaism has become fanatical only when attacked, only when its existence has been threatened.

The cultus of Jewish religion (Sec. B.1.c) has two closely related moments, one negative, the other affirmative. The negative aspect is fear, fear of the Lord. But—and this is where 1824 departs decisively from the Ms.—this is no earthly lord that is feared. It is rather fear of the absolute, in which everything ephemeral and contingent is given up and through which one is elevated to the level of pure thought. Hence fear of the Lord *is the beginning of wisdom*. “Wisdom” means not taking anything particular to be absolute and substantive; it means recognizing the relativity of all that is finite. Hence *this* fear of the Lord entails a fundamental liberation from all earthly forms of bondage, a letting everything go, an immersion in the Lord, “having this unity as one’s object and essence.” It is a far cry from what is termed a “feeling of dependence.” Whereas in the Ms. Judaism is viewed as an embodiment of Schleiermacher’s definition of religious piety, now it is just the reverse: Judaism is the first of the religions of freedom, and Schleiermacher’s version of religion as dependence is reserved solely for the Romans (this matter is discussed at length in n. 551).

The affirmative side of Jewish worship arises directly from what has just been said. The fear of the Lord that is the beginning of

wisdom yields an absolute trust, an infinite faith, which passes over into a distinctive kind of existence. This trust "is preserved through so many great victories, which are emphasized also in Christianity. It is this trust, this faith of Abraham's, that causes the history of this people to carry on." Such an assessment undoubtedly represents an important shift from the portrayal of Abraham and his people in *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*. But Hegel himself does not take into account the history of this people; his treatment is limited to what he regards as the oldest biblical expressions of Israelite faith. Judaism is not viewed as a living religion; for that matter, no other religions are, either, except for Christianity.

Infinite faith is also the theme of the Book of Job. Rather than interpreting Job as the portrayal of abstract divine power, as in the *Ms.*, Hegel now stresses the divine wisdom. As over against the juridical morality of Job and his comforters, which presumes that the righteous will be rewarded and the wicked punished, the wisdom of God is revealed (by the voice from the whirlwind) to be infinitely higher and incalculable. Only when Job submits to this wisdom is he restored. Thus a reconstitution of human being occurs in this absolute relation to the absolute, a theme already sounded in the *Ms.* God's *covenant* with his people is a symbol of this reconstitution. Positively the covenant gives possession (not ownership) of the land; negatively it entails service to the Lord through obedience to the law and commandments. Hegel considers only the legal, not the prophetic understanding of the covenant; in this and other respects his approach is skewed by the narrow range of biblical literature that he consults.

The Religion of Beauty: Greek Religion

The form of Hegel's treatment of Greek religion in 1824 differs as greatly from the *Ms.* as the *Ms.* itself differs from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. The material has been thoroughly reorganized, and the presentation is much clearer. The sources, however, as well as Hegel's basic interpretative perspective, remain largely unchanged (see n. 573).

The discussion of the metaphysical concept of God in Greek religion (Sec. B.2.a) is quite brief and entirely different from that

in the *Ms.* No mention is made of necessity in this connection, as would have been expected not only from the *Ms.* but also from the introductory discussion of the metaphysical concept of God at the beginning of Sec. B of 1824. Rather the basic concept is that of subjectivity or self-determining power. In Judaism this power was universal but abstract, withdrawn, and singular in purpose; now, says Hegel, it *particularizes* itself in a "circle" of gods—"the divine penetrates into the determinate relationships of the actual spirit," providing a basis for real freedom of subjectivity and a scope for real ethical life. This process involves a "downgrading" of the transcendent universality of God but an elevation of purpose in the direction of the universal.

The lengthy second section (Sec. B.2.b) discusses both the content and the shape of the representation of God in Greek religion. Under *content*, three themes are elaborated. The first is that of "particularization" (*Besonderung*), which has already been mentioned. In Greek religion, divinity determines itself, "opens itself up," makes itself available to and infuses the finite world in the form of independent deities. The materials for the representation of the gods are drawn from both natural and spiritual realms; these are the universal elements, so to speak, of physical and natural life. In the old Greek nature religion, the gods were represented as natural powers; here Hegel alludes to the theogonic myth as presented by Hesiod (see n. 589). In the classical period of Greece, however, the spiritual principle vanquished the nature religions; the old gods of nature were subjugated by the new gods of the free spirit led by Zeus. But the natural element was sublimated, not eliminated; the new gods have physical ancestors and are "intrinsically dual" in nature. The second point with regard to content is that the universal power of necessity hovers above the gods. This power is devoid of purpose and subjectivity, it is incomprehensible and abstract; and these two sides of divinity remain unmediated. Finally, says Hegel, there is a purely contingent singularization of the divine content, based not on the principle of particularization but on contingent natural aspects (such as the procreative, generative element in nature) or on the involvement of the gods in human affairs.

With regard to the configuration or *shape* of God in human consciousness, Hegel distinguishes two aspects: on the one hand, the appearance of God is represented as something God does, on the other hand as something that consciousness does. "On the speculative level, this doubled activity must appear as one activity in which the two sides coalesce; but here two activities are apparent, the one coming from one side, the other as a process of production through the activity of the other side, namely self-consciousness." While the distinction remains because the standpoint is still finite, Greek religion in its more developed phase stresses the latter, this being its unique contribution to the history of religious consciousness. The "productive activity of the finite self-consciousness" is "the aspect under which human beings make or shape their God for themselves. Herodotus states categorically: "Homer and Hesiod made the Greeks' gods for them" [see n. 621]. . . . This is where art has principally its actuality."

But a natural element remains in this shaping and appearing of God. We are not yet in the sphere where absolute spirit exists for spirit, where God is worshiped in spirit and in truth. God does not yet appear as "the presence of a singular self-consciousness, i.e., a human being." To be sure, the sensible shape in which the divine appears is the *human* shape. But it is not the figure of an empirical human being, not one that expresses "implicit actuality immediately"; rather it is an *ideal*, essentially *beautiful* shape, an artistic representation of the spiritual in the natural. In other words, the natural or sensible is "molded to fit the content it is to express," to *resemble* the divinity in outward form or action. The sensible is still "soft enough" to be so molded. It is only when God appears in and as the subjectivity of spirit qua spirit that the sensible nature shows itself to be unsuited to his shape. "Sensible nature, immediate singularity is nailed to the cross. Spirit as universal, the community, is the soil for God's appearance. The appearance is absolute, its element spirit itself" (see n. 627).³⁵

35. This has implications as well for Hegel's christology. See our discussion of the transition from the sensible to the spiritual presence of God in Christ, as portrayed by the 1824 lectures, in the editorial introduction to Vol. 3. In the 1831 lectures,

The *cultus* (Sec. B.2.c) “is the relationship through which the externality of the represented deity, its objectivity over against subjective consciousness, is sublated.” Hegel considers three aspects: the disposition of the worshipers, the character of worship, and the process of reconciliation. Regarding the first, while the divine content is recognized and honored as objective, as valid in and for itself, it is also known to be objective in the subject as well. The divine powers for the Greeks are the people’s own customs, ethical life, rights, spirit, and substance (Athena is the city and also the goddess), not an external substantiality. Thus worshipers are able to be free and serene, at home with themselves in the act of worship. But there is also a recognition that necessity has its own sphere over against humanity, encountered especially by heroes who raise themselves above custom and convention. Necessity evokes a disposition of sorrow rather than serenity—not discontent but sorrowful resignation, since there is no absolute or essential purpose in the cosmos. Regarding the aspect of worship, Hegel considers the role of sacrifice, games and festivals, and oracles. Finally, something like “reconciliation” occurs in Greek religion—an inward realization of the divine in the soul whereby its independence and estrangement are overcome. There must, first of all, be a sublation of the natural will and appetite through education and cultural formation, through a spiritual “conversion.” This is essentially the function of the Eleusinian mysteries, which represent a mythic, prerational form of enlightenment. Hegel believes that the mysteries are a carryover from the old nature religion, no longer necessary with the artistic transfiguration of experience accomplished in classical Greece. Here Hegel touches upon his disagreement with Creuzer, which is more in evidence in the *Ms.* (see nn. 675, 678). Reconciliation is also necessary with reference to misfortunes and actual human crimes. However, sacrifices to propitiate the gods or avert a natural calamity are a relic

Hegel remarks that the problem with Greek religion is not that God is represented as *too* human, but rather that God is *insufficiently* human: the human shape of God does not penetrate to the spiritual core of humanity but remains fixed in the outward sensible shape (see below, n. 43). For Christianity, Jesus as an empirical individual does not outwardly resemble God; he is no Greek god. God appears in the spiritual, ethical shape of his life rather than in his physical shape.

from the past; and in the highest form of Greek consciousness, as expressed by the tragedians, crimes are atoned for not simply through punishment, revenge, or outward purification, but through an inward cleansing. Here we find a "foreshadowing" of the Christian conception of grace.

Throughout, Hegel's interpretation can be seen as pressing Greek religion to its limits as well as insisting upon the essential change that occurs with the artistic intuition of the divine in the shape of free though still finite spirit.

The Religion of Expediency: Roman Religion

Whereas for the most part the 1824 lectures expand and revise the corresponding *Ms.* sections considerably, in the case of Roman religion the 1824 version is much briefer and follows the *Ms.* in essential details (see n. 701). Having worked out his interpretation earlier, Hegel could now condense, focusing on the key issues and not according Roman religion undue attention. The category of purposiveness and the teleological proof had already been examined in detail at the beginning of Sec. B. It is also possible that Hegel found himself short of time, having introduced a great deal of new material on natural religion at the beginning of Part II.

What is primarily different in 1824 is the treatment of the transitions. The movement from Jewish to Greek to Roman religion is now viewed as a movement from exclusive (or singular) to plural to universal (though finite and external) purposiveness, rather than as a transition from power to necessity to purpose. Or, more precisely, the necessity that is essentially purposeless in Greek religion (although the gods express a multitude of purposes) is now identified with a purpose—a purpose that is as universal as necessity itself but at the same time empirical, external, and political in character, namely, world dominion on the part of the Roman Empire. Islamic religion, we are told, also has world dominion as its purpose, but of a spiritual rather than a political character.

Hegel's discussion of the "configuration of the gods" and the cultus in the second and third subsections is taken from the *Ms.* but compressed. He refutes the general notion that the Greek and Roman deities are essentially similar; the latter are "serious" and functional

rather than serene and free. The two basic functions they serve are world dominion and the needs of everyday life. A description of the Roman deities and festivals, drawn from Moritz's *Anthousa*, leads us to wonder "how such things can be venerated as gods." New gods are introduced whenever particular needs arise—relief from plague, public sanitation, victory in battle, and so on—and thus Roman worship is "a theogony in progress." The Romans plundered the Mediterranean world, "carrying off whole shiploads of gods to Rome," where they made a pantheon in which "all the gods of all the peoples are set up side by side, so that they extinguish one another." Rather than serving as a liberation from worldly concerns, an elevation to the infinite and substantial, this religion is one of dependence, unfreedom, superstition (see n. 723). It is a religion that finally venerates above all else "death devoid of spirit," as evidenced by the Roman games and spectacles—a "murder game willed by irrational caprice."

The transition to the next stage is nuanced somewhat differently in 1824. What we find in Roman religion is an infinitization and universalization of the finite, indeed of the finite subject ("I am the absolute, self-sustaining atom"). Thus there appears in this religion for the first time an "infinitude of subjectivity"—but only in an empirical, immediate, untrue sense, which cannot be sustained. Infinite subjectivity must now be taken in a higher sense, as pertaining to the *idea*, to *absolute spirit* as it mediates itself with itself. This is the true infinite as opposed to the spurious deification of the finite ego, the most blatant form of which is worship of the Roman emperors. The stage has been set for the confrontation between Christ and Caesar.

c. The Lectures of 1827

The substance of Hegel's interpretation of the religions was established in 1824; hence it will not be necessary to provide an equally detailed synopsis of the remaining lectures. We shall focus, instead, on the shifts in emphasis, organization, and argument, and on the introduction of new materials. It should be noted, first, that our text of the 1827 lectures is only slightly more than half the length of the 1824 text, which is based on Griesheim. This can be explained by

several factors. In 1827 the summer semester was shorter by nearly four weeks than the 1824 semester,³⁶ and at least half the reduction must have been accomplished in Part II of the lectures since Parts I and III are only moderately shorter. Furthermore, in 1827 Hegel transferred the proofs of the existence of God, which made up nearly a fifth of Part II in 1824, to Part I. Finally our text for 1827 is based on Lasson, who fragmented the materials and avoided duplication between 1824 and 1827 in his editing of *Determinate Religion*. We know, therefore, that Lasson's text is incomplete, and it can be only partially supplemented by the presently available transcripts.

Hegel did not simply repeat the earlier lectures, although he was working from an edited copy of Griesheim; as always, he was seeking new formulations and experimenting with new interpretative proposals. In many respects, the argument of the 1827 lectures is presented with greater clarity and simplicity, and with more concrete references to religious practices. It builds upon and refines the speculative attainments of 1824.

The introductory summary of the three stages of determinate religion is inherited from 1824, which, as we have pointed out, initially projected a threefold division as well. Already the summary anticipates certain changes that are more fully developed in 1831 (see 1827 lectures, n. 2), but it does not anticipate the reversal in the order in which Greek and Jewish religion are actually treated in 1827 (see nn. 18, 347). The three stages are: religion as the unity of the spiritual and the natural (nature religion), the elevation of the spiritual above the natural (Jewish and Greek religion), and the religion in which purposiveness is not yet spiritual (the religion of expediency, which can also be called the religion of fate or destiny because it is devoid of spirit).

Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion

From the introduction to Sec. A in 1824, the 1827 lectures retain only the discussion of the "original condition" of humanity and the summary of the forms of nature religion.

The discussion of the first matter expands the 1824 version by introducing an exegesis of the biblical story of the fall of humanity.

36. See Vol. 1:4.

In order to support his argument that the original condition was not a state of innocence and innate wisdom, but rather one of barbarism and savagery, Hegel appeals to the “profound” story in Genesis, which shows that the cleavage or rupture of consciousness occurred at the very beginning of human history. It is by means of this cleavage that the knowledge of both good and evil first arose, a knowledge that is the condition of possibility for human freedom and maturation. “That is the genuine idea in contrast with the mere image of paradise, or this stupified innocence devoid of consciousness and will.” Hegel repeats this interpretation of the fall in Part III, which is the only context in which it is found in the *Ms.* and 1824. Since such repetition is unusual for him, he may initially not have intended to do so. In 1831 the discussion of the fall was transferred from Part III to Part II, but there it was treated in relation to Jewish religion rather than the so-called original condition.

Nature religion, says Hegel, is not religion in which natural, physical objects are taken to be God and revered as God. Rather it is the spiritual that is the object of nature religion as well, but “the spiritual [recognized] first in its immediate and natural mode,” which is the sensibly existing human being. Thus the several stages of nature religion are distinguished on the basis of how human beings represent and relate to God as infinite and essential spirit. This leads to a somewhat different phenomenology of the initial stages of religious consciousness from that found in 1824. The primary difference, at least according to this introductory summary, is that objectification of the divine object appears to occur much later, at the point of the Persian religion of light rather than the Buddhist religion of being-within-self. Yet Buddhism is now clearly recognized to be a distinct stage and not simply the highest form of the religion of magic.

The Religion of Magic

In 1824 Hegel combined a phenomenology of stages of primitive religious consciousness with specific examples of the religion of magic in the first two subsections of “The Religion of Magic.” In 1827 he separated these two elements, placing the phenomenology in the subsection we have titled “The Concept of Magic” and the discus-

sion of specific historical practices in the subsection titled "Less Developed Religions of Magic." The analysis presented in the first subsection differs considerably in content from that found in 1824. Magic involves a more or less *direct* power over nature, and is to be distinguished from the kind of *indirect* power exercised by higher culture on the basis of stepping back from an immediate relationship to the natural world, understanding it scientifically in terms of physical laws, and measuring and controlling it through technical instruments. Gone from the 1827 treatment is the phenomenology of stages of the "formal objectification of the divine object," which discovered in 1824 the beginnings of an indirect relationship to nature already at an early stage. Rather, according to 1827, all the "less developed" forms of magic involve a direct use of power in one form or another. From this is distinguished only a "more developed" form of magic—the religion of ancient China, which in 1824 was identified with the fourth and final phase of formal objectification; yet the examples of the religion of magic presented in the second subsection are identical with the 1824 materials and drawn from the same sources.

The State Religion of the Chinese Empire and the Dao

This religion is still magic, according to 1827, but it is a *developed* religion of magic. Despite this classification, Hegel's treatment in 1827 has advanced considerably beyond that found in 1824—has advanced, in fact, to the point where it is difficult to argue that we really are still at the stage of magic (see n. 96). At the outset, Hegel distinguishes among three phases of Chinese religion: the oldest is the state religion of the Chinese empire, which is the religion of heaven; the second is the religion of the Dao, or of reason; the third is Chinese Buddhism, introduced in the first century A.D. The present subsection is concerned with the first two of these religions.

As to the first, Hegel now recognizes that what we find is not simply emperor worship but a higher religious symbol, that of heaven or Tian, which represents the power of nature but as displaying also moral characteristics. It designates "wholly indeterminate and abstract universality." Because of the abstractness of Tian, it is still

the emperor who is sovereign on earth. Only the emperor is connected with Tian, and only he rules over everything earthly, including the natural powers and the departed spirits. Tian itself is empty; everything concrete derives from the emperor and his direct control: hence in Hegel's view this is still a religion of magic. Following these references to Tian, Hegel, on the basis of closer study of the Jesuit *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* as well as volume 6 of the *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen*, returns to the rites surrounding the establishment of a new dynasty, including the role of the Shen, to which he devoted exclusive attention in 1824.

Hegel's discussion of the religion of the Dao ("reason" or "the way") is based on the *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, Gaubil's French translation of the Shu-jing, and Abel-Rémusat's *Mémoire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu*. According to these sources, the Daoist sect arose in the twelfth century, a view not supported by modern scholarship (see n. 115). Hegel believes that it is a sect of masters and teachers, withdrawn from the state religion, who lived in the mountains, devoted to the study of the way and to religious exercises. Because it represents a return of consciousness to itself and the demand for the inward mediation of substantial power, Daoism constitutes a transition to the next stage of nature religion, that of being-within-self. In Daoism itself, however, the symbols remain abstractly rational ciphers—exhibiting a triadic structure, to be sure—so that vitality, consciousness, and spirituality remain attached to the immediate human being, the emperor. In this respect we are still at the stage of magic, despite the reforms introduced by Lao-zi and Confucius.

The Religion of Being-Within-Self: Buddhism

Buddhism is now considered as a distinct phase of nature religion, not as the highest form of the religion of magic, and Hegel's portrayal is more fully developed, although it is not based on new sources; rather the sources available in 1824 are utilized more fully. Scant attention is paid to historical matters, which is just as well, considering the lack of reliable information.

Hegel focuses the 1827 treatment more specifically on the Buddhist conception of ultimate reality as “nothing” or “not-being.”³⁷ This, he says, is “the absolute foundation, the indeterminate, the negated being of everything particular”; “only the nothing has genuine autonomy, for in contrast all other actuality has none.” The goal of human existence is the state of negation in this nothing, which the Buddhists call nirvana—a state of eternal tranquility, of cessation, of indifference, of purity, of freedom from worldly miseries. It may seem strange to think of God as nothing, but in fact an important dimension of the truth about God is thereby expressed. For it means that God is nothing determinate; just this absence of determinacy constitutes his infinity. When we say that God is infinite, we mean that he is the negation of everything particular. Thus to say that God is nothing does not mean that he is not, but rather that God is “the empty,” and that “this emptiness is God.”

This sympathetic attempt to grasp the meaning of Buddhist nirvana—although couched in Western ontological categories—brings Hegel to a defense of Oriental pantheism over against the attacks on pantheism to which the 1827 lectures respond at a number of points (see n. 138). For Oriental consciousness the main theme is the independence and unity of the universal, whereas for Western consciousness it is the individuality of things, especially of human beings. But there is an essential truth in the Oriental intuition of the universal—not the spurious claim that “all is God” (which would be an apotheosis of finite things) but rather the truth that “the All is God,” “the All that remains utterly one” and thus is the *negativity* of finite things (see n. 167). The “pan” of pantheism is to be taken as universality, not as totality. This is the essential truth that was grasped by Spinoza, despite the “babblers” who accuse him of atheism.

The limitation in the Oriental (and presumably also in the Spinozistic) view is that God is not merely substance, the absolutely one substance; he is also subject, the one infinite subject. Oriental

37. See n. 145. He also expands the 1824 discussion of the transmigration of souls, which is a sensible form of immortality.

consciousness recognized this only indirectly and imperfectly, by claiming that the one substance also exists in immediate sensible presence in empirical human beings. Hence we find the—to us “shocking”—view that a particular Buddha or Dalai Lama simply is God, indeed that the subjectivity and shapes of the one substance are multiple, since there are several lamas and many Buddhas. The “rational aspect” of such a view is that precisely thereby subjectivity and substance are mediated, though in a defective shape. The defectiveness is heightened for Hegel by the accounts of the Tibetan lamas provided by English travelers, especially Turner’s version (see n. 188) of how a new lama was discovered in a still-nursing child when the previous one suddenly died of smallpox.

The Hindu Religion

The substance of Hegel’s treatment of Hinduism in 1827 is quite similar to the 1824 version, even though he no longer employs the designation “the religion of phantasy” (see n. 192). The sources are also similar, though supplemented by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s paper on the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (1826), of which Hegel wrote a lengthy review in 1827 (see n. 204), as well as A. W. Schlegel’s edition of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (1823) and H. T. Colebrooke’s essay “On the Philosophy of the Hindus” (1824).

Hegel stresses once again the contrast between the one universal substance (Brahman) and its particularization in a multiplicity of finite personified powers, which are not images of a “beautiful imagination” (*schöne Phantasie*) but are merely “fanciful” or “fantastic” (*phantastisch*). In fact, the 1827 lectures are characterized by several comparisons between Hindu and Greek religion (always unfavorable to the former), which may reflect the fact that in 1824 Hegel argued that they represent corresponding stages of natural and spiritual religion, respectively. Perhaps he dropped the designation “phantasy” for Hinduism partly with the view in mind that Greek religion represents the true, the higher *Phantasie*. Hegel also provides in 1827, as he did in 1824, a detailed account of the three figures of the Trimurti—a triad that really remains external to the undifferentiated substance of Brahman; he describes the austere practices or yogi discipline through which union with Brahman is

achieved, as well as the privileged caste of Brāhmans, and the elements of immolation, superstition, lack of ethical life, unruliness, and formlessness, which he found unattractive. On the whole, however, the presentation lacks the sharply negative polemic of 1824, even though in substance it is not much changed.

The section ends with a "Transition to the Next Stage," which is new in 1827. In the next stage, which is that of Persian and Egyptian religion, the Buddhist-Hindu distinction between the abstract universal and immediate subjects reverts to a concrete, implicitly spiritual unity; and there occurs a separation of empirical self-consciousness from absolute self-consciousness, "so that here God attains proper objectivity for the first time." God no longer subsists "in an empirically human mode" but becomes "truly and intrinsically objective," is "essentially object," "altogether in opposition to human beings." These strong claims suggest that Hegel is beginning to perceive a sharper distinction between the Far Eastern and Near Eastern religions; and, as a matter of fact, in the 1831 lectures they are treated in separate stages. Persian and Egyptian religion, together with Judaism, are viewed as the first of the religions of freedom, by contrast with the cleavage of consciousness (between substance and subject) present in the religions of China and India. Anticipations of the 1831 reorganization are clearly evident in the 1827 discussion of "the religions of transition."

The Religion of Light: Persian Religion

This section is similar to the corresponding section of the 1824 lectures in content and in the sources utilized, but the organization differs slightly. In 1827 Hegel distinguished more systematically between the philosophical concept of a religion and its historical instances, presenting the two topics in this sequence. While this is similar to the abstract concept-concrete representation distinction found in the *Ms.* and 1824, the principle is modified; we see this clearly in the present section.

The next stage after the Hindu dichotomization of unitary substance and multiple powers is the "resumption" of being-in-and-for-self into itself; just because the true content has independence and objectivity, it is "the good," from which all things proceed.

Negativity, however, is not included within the good; it remains external to it. Hegel attends more specifically to this "Oriental dualism" in 1827 than in 1824, comparing it with recent philosophical trends of which he is critical. The endless conflict between good and evil suggests the Kantian-Fichtean notion that the good can be realized only in an infinite progression (n. 277); and the dualism between good and evil anticipates the contemporary reemphasis of the gulf between finite and infinite: the separated, autonomous finitude of modern rationalism is precisely what is evil (see n. 278). The reason for the dualism is that the good, the ultimate, is still conceived in naturalistic terms. In nature, relationships remain external and sensible; hence, if good is symbolized as light, its opposite is darkness, which remains external to it. But if spirit is the basis of the relationships, they are mediated internally.

As to the historical aspects of this religion, the 1827 lectures include a discussion of the Mithra cult (nn. 287, 288) and of the organization of the Persian state as compared with the kingdom of light (n. 286); otherwise the presentation is quite similar to that of 1824.

Yet another "Transition to the Next Stage" is included at this point. The transition in question is that of the resumption of the multiple into concrete unity, a unity that includes subjectivity within itself. In Persian religion this resumption remains truncated because it is external and natural; and the two sides, the substantive and the subjective, are still unmediated. The next step is that subjectivity should unify within itself the opposed elements; indeed, subjectivity is precisely a process of such unification. The negative moment, construed as natural, is death; and if there is to be a true reconciliation, death is something that God himself must undergo. Thus we come upon a religion in which God dies and rises again to life. The negation of death is really posited in God, which is fundamentally different from the many transient incarnations of Hindu mythology; yet it remains a natural negation, not a spiritually self-imposed negation, as found in the Christian Trinity. In 1827 this transition is set forth as a theoretical moment in the process of religious cognition; in 1831 Hegel finds a historical instance of it in the so-called religion of anguish, a religion in which "for the first time we have the dying of God as internal to God himself."

Egyptian Religion

As compared with 1824, the 1827 lectures provide a much more extensive discussion of the actual materials of Egyptian religion, even though Hegel is still relying primarily on classical sources and modern studies of these sources—Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie*, Dupuis's *Origine de tous les cultes*, and Hirt's *Aegyptische Gottheiten*. The recent archaeological discoveries have not yet made much of an impact.

Curiously, in 1827 Hegel almost entirely omits the conceptual elaboration (the "transition to the next stage" at the end of Persian religion may be intended to serve this role) and turns directly to the symbolic figure of Osiris. He first notes, as he did in 1824, that the negation and opposition represented by Typhon is taken into Osiris, who dies but is perpetually restored, serving as lord of the dead as well as of the living. Behind the Osiris myth is a grasping of the universal substance as subjectivity for the first time. But subjectivity is still known only in the mode of representation, and it is represented in both natural and human form. What we find in Egyptian religion is a curious passing back and forth between these forms in terms of the relationship between signifier and signified. Clearly, natural objects are now regarded as representational symbols of the universal, subjective essence; they refer not to themselves but to something other than themselves. Thus we have the sun, the Nile, the change of seasons: these all represent a cycle reverting back into itself, which is what subjectivity essentially is. On the one hand, Osiris signifies the sun; but on the other hand, the sun signifies Osiris. One is the inner element, the other the signifier by which the inner discloses itself outwardly. As we have said, the roles can reverse. "But what is in fact the inner is Osiris, subjectivity as such"; this is the direction in which Egyptian religion is moving.

Egyptian culture exhibited a tremendous impulse to express and construct outwardly this inner element. This is what gave rise to art for the first time. The testimony of the ancient historians is confirmed by the archaeological remains: the Egyptians engaged in an immense artistic labor from which there was no cessation; "the toiling spirit did not rest from making its representation visible to itself." What they produced, however, was not pure and fine art (*schöne Kunst*) but only the craving for fine art. This craving "involves the struggle

of meaning with material," the striving "to place the stamp of inner spirit on outer configuration." But in Egyptian art the two remain separate and to some degree opposed. The artistic figure (*Gestalt*) "is not yet spiritualized to clarity; what is sensible and natural has not yet been completely transfigured into the spiritual." In fact, the tendency is for the spiritual to remain *buried* within the sensible. In a striking image, Hegel says that "the pyramid is a self-sufficient crystal, in which a dead man is preserved; but in the work of art, which is reaching out for beauty, the externality of the configuration is imbued with the inner soul, with the beauty of what is within" (n. 340).

This, finally, accounts for the *enigmatic* character of Egyptian religion. The inner, spiritual meaning has not yet achieved outward clarity of expression. This is how Hegel interprets the inscription related to the goddess Neith in Sais: "No mortal has yet lifted my veil" (see n. 345). The Greeks, however, lifted the veil.

The Elevation of the Spiritual above the Natural

If the religion of nature involves the natural unity of the spiritual and the natural, then the next stage of determinate religion entails the elevation of the spiritual above the natural; this is the religion of the Greeks and the Jews (see n. 347). The universal characteristic of this second stage, says Hegel, is that of "free subjectivity." Subjectivity has now attained mastery over nature and finitude. The subject now is *spirit*, and spirit is subjective; that is, it is free spirit, spirit that is for itself. The natural and the finite are only a *sign* of spirit, only instrumental to its manifestation.

What accounts for the reversal in the order in which the two religions dealt with in this section are treated, so that now Greek religion is considered first and Jewish religion second?³⁸ It seems to be based primarily on the different ways in which the "elevation" occurs in the two religions. For Greek religion, the natural element

38. A correlative advantage of the new arrangement is that it permits a transition directly from Egyptian to Greek religion, which suits Hegel's interpretation quite conveniently. This advantage is preserved in 1831 by placing Jewish religion ahead of Egyptian rather than after Greek. This may have been a contributory factor to the reorganization.

is taken up and transfigured in free subjectivity, but it is not purified of its externality and sensibility, so that this religion is still tinged by finitude: the gods are represented by the sensibly beautiful human shape, and they are many. For Jewish religion, the sensible element is left behind; it is ruled and negated by the one God who is infinite subjectivity and subsists without shape, only for thought, the God who is sublimely free spirit in relation to the natural world. Judaism, then, is the more purely spiritual religion. In this distinction, concludes Hegel at the beginning of the section on Jewish religion, lies "the necessity of the elevation of the religion of beauty into the religion of sublimity," namely, "that the particular spiritual powers, the ethical powers, should be embraced in a spiritual unity."

In the two earlier lectures, those of 1821 and 1824, the relationship between Jewish and Greek religion was considered as mutually complementary rather than as progressive; Hegel never referred to the "elevation" of one into the other. This is evident from the organization of the *Ms.*, in which the representational and cultic forms of the two religions are subordinated to an inclusive scheme, even though the portrayal of Jewish religion is considerably less attractive there than the portrayal of Greek. The dialectical structure of the 1824 lectures resists, as previously mentioned, a linear or progressive development among the determinate religions. That Hegel should now speak of the "elevation" of the religion of beauty into the religion of sublimity seems to follow in part from his continuing and increasingly favorable reassessment of Judaism, but it may also be related to the polemical context of the 1827 lectures, namely, Hegel's defense against the charge of pantheism and atheism. Here he clearly aligns himself with Jewish monotheism.

But this "advance" from Greek to Jewish religion is not undialectical even in 1827. Judaism may not be tinged by finitude, but neither is finitude transfigured and overreached by infinitude in it. Moreover, the one universal God of Judaism is believed to be the God of a particular people. At the beginning of the section on Roman religion, Hegel refers to the "one-sidedness" of both Greek and Jewish religion, and this in fact seems closer to his actual view. It is only from particular perspectives that one appears as "higher" than the other. From the point of view of the idea of God, monotheism, and spiritual unity

and subjectivity, Judaism is higher. But from the point of view of the idea of the mediation of divinity and humanity (i.e., the incarnation), as well as of free ethical institutions, Greek religion is higher. Their respective one-sidednesses are finally overcome, not in Roman religion, which proves to be an abortive and retrograde, arbitrary and expedient, unification of the religions, but in the Christian religion (although Roman religion plays a necessary transitional role). Perhaps one element in Hegel's 1827 "reversal" is his conviction that the unity and spirituality of the God of Israel is the necessary foundation of true and consummate religion: therefore Christianity must arise among the Jewish people. Hegel knew this already in 1821, but his assessment of Judaism in the earlier lectures did not bear it out.

The Religion of Beauty, or Greek Religion

In 1827 the presentation of Greek religion is oriented to a different central question, and as a consequence the organization of the material differs somewhat; but the actual content of the treatment is quite similar to that of 1824, and no additional sources are utilized. Whereas in 1824 Hegel was concerned to show how in Greek religion divinity determines or "particularizes" itself, making itself available to and infusing the world of human spirit, in 1827 the central concern is with the "elevation" of the spiritual above the natural.

The substantial foundation of Greek religion is that of the rationality and freedom of spirit, which results in the formation of an "ethical life" (*Sittlichkeit*). Consequently the Greek divinities must be essentially ethical/spiritual powers. At the same time, these divinities have been shaped out of the old gods of the primitive Greek nature religion. Thus the "war with the Titans" is the essence of Greek religion. Hegel elaborates on this at some length, showing how the natural element is subordinated but not totally vanquished, and what we continue to find is a "mingling" of the natural with the spiritual in the Greek gods; thus Zeus is the natural firmament generally, but also the father of gods and humans and especially the political god, the god of the state. Both the oracles and the mysteries are carryovers from the old religion. The first mode of giving oracles

is by mere natural sounds; later the oracle is given in human tones but not in clear speech.

Two other aspects of the divine content—the relationship of the gods to necessity above and contingent singularization below—are taken over directly from the 1824 lectures. However, the discussion of the “shape” or configuration in which the gods appear differs somewhat in 1827. Because we are still only at the initial stage of freedom and rationality, the ethical gods must appear in an external, sensible shape. “Phantasy” (*Phantasie*) is the means of giving representational status to the divine. Phantasy, says Hegel, is the activity of shaping external or immediate being in such a way that “the external being is no longer independent but is downgraded into being just a sign of the indwelling spirit.” We have seen phantasy at work in more primitive forms in Hindu and Egyptian religion. What distinguishes the Greeks is their recognition that the human figure is the only way in which spirit can be adequately represented in natural, sensible shape. “That is why the Greeks represented the gods as human beings.” They were right in doing so, and they did so with consummate artistry, both plastic and poetic. The only problem is that the gods thus made are still finite. “This finitude of content is why they originate in a finite manner as human products. At this stage the divine is grasped neither by pure thinking nor in pure spirit.” Hegel does not go on to compare the human shape of the gods in Greek religion with the Christian idea of incarnation, as he does in 1824 and more specifically in 1831.

The treatment of the Greek cultus in 1827 is almost identical with the 1824 version and need not be summarized again.

The Religion of Sublimity, or Jewish Religion

Quite apart from the reversal of the order in which Greek and Jewish religion are treated, and the argument for the necessity of “the elevation of the religion of beauty into the religion of sublimity,” the 1827 lectures continue the trajectory of a favorable reassessment of Judaism established in 1824 and carry it further. Gone are all references to the “fear of the Lord” that is “the beginning of wisdom,” and to the “execrations” of Leviticus; Job is mentioned only briefly, and the critique of Judaism is muted. Almost the entire section is

given over to a careful analysis of the Jewish idea of God and to various aspects of the relationship of God and world. This material is already present in 1824, but it is reworked, expanded, and presented more clearly.

The great contribution of Israel to the history of religion is its comprehension of the "spiritually subjective unity" of God. This subjective unity is not mere substance but is absolute power, wisdom, and purpose, for which reason it is "holy," it merits the name "God" for the first time. It is in fact "infinite subjectivity," which is the highest philosophical concept; as such, God subsists without sensible shape, only for thought ("thinking is the essential soil for this object").

But this one God does not remain in self-enclosed, abstract identity with himself. Rather God's wisdom contains the process of "divine particularization" (a description reserved to Greek religion in 1824), that is, divine self-determining, judging, creating. This process is not yet posited *within* God concretely but remains abstract and external; it is not yet an immanent Trinity. But the act of creation is a highly important, in fact definitive, determination of the Jewish God. God *is* the creator of the world. This has implications both for the world and for God. First, the world does not emanate from God, as in Hindu and Greek cosmogonies, but is created *ex nihilo*. This means that the subjectivity of the One remains what is absolutely first and is not superseded by what has gone forth. Second, God's relations to the world—the more specific moments of divine wisdom, which are goodness and justice—are definitive of God's own being, so that we do in fact *know* God in knowing his relations. The categories of goodness and justice are now defined more fully. As good, God releases and sets free from himself the created world; only what is genuinely free can do this, can let its determinations go as free, can release them to "go their separate ways," which is the totality of the finite world. As just, God maintains the world in relation to himself, does not abandon it to radical autonomy, specifies its purpose. Third, the world is rendered profane, prosaic; nature is divested of divinity, and there is no cheap identity of finite and infinite. The manifestation of God in the world takes on the character of sublimity, which is its genuine form, or of miracle, which is specious. Finally, God's purpose is made manifest in the natural and human worlds. This

purpose is simply that the whole earth and all peoples should proclaim the glory of God. This glorification of God is the “inner aspect” of all human ethical activity. Without it, moral righteousness counts as nothing; with it, one may be confident of the fulfillment of one’s worldly existence. This is what underlies the “remarkable” faith of the Jewish people; it is the theme of the Old Testament as a whole but especially of the Book of Job. It is not finally a human quality but a dimension of the holiness of God.

At the end of this notably sympathetic phenomenology of the Jewish representation of God, Hegel mentions briefly certain “limitations.” These are principally three: the self-determining wisdom of God is not yet an inward self-development (the idea of God as “what is eternally self-developing within itself” is found only in the manifest or revelatory religion); despite the implicit universalism, the God of Judaism remains a national God, the God of a limited national family rather than of the whole human family; and the divine purposes are abstract because they are simply commandments given by God as something prescribed and immutable, rather than purposes worked out in the conflict and dialectic of historical/ethical life. These limitations appear in the Jewish cultus, about which there is virtually no discussion in the 1827 lectures—whether because Hegel did not wish to emphasize the limitations, or because he was short of time, or because Lasson’s text and the available transcripts are incomplete at this point, we do not know.

The Religion of Expediency, or Roman Religion

The treatment of Roman religion in 1827 is quite similar to that of 1824 and of comparable length; only the transitions are different.

What is still lacking is a divine purposiveness that is at once holy, universal, and concrete. The Greeks achieved concreteness in the ethical content of their gods, but lacked holiness and sacrificed universality to multiplicity. The God of Israel was one and holy, but was claimed as the God of a particular people, whose laws were abstract. Roman religion, says Hegel, is a *relative* totality, in which the Greek and Jewish religions “indeed lose their one-sidedness, but both of the principles perish conjointly, each by means of assimilation into its opposite; still, it is this very homogeneity that interests

us in them. The religion of beauty loses the concrete individuality of its gods and hence also their ethical, independent content; the gods are reduced to means. The religion of sublimity loses the orientation to the One, the eternal, the transcendent." The universal purposiveness of the Romans is flawed because it is external, empirical, finite, utilitarian. Religion, when reduced to a means to extrinsic, worldly ends, is finally destroyed. Roman religion is the religion to end all religion—a fact symbolized by collecting the gods of all the religions into a single pantheon, where they are subjected to Jupiter Capitolinus and destroy one another, a veritable *Götterdämmerung*.

The transition from this state of affairs to Christianity is difficult to reconstruct from the conclusion of the 1827 *Determinate Religion* in the form in which we have it. The 1831 variant contained in n. 544 suggests that this destruction of the sublimity and beauty, the holiness and ethical quality, the faithfulness and serene happiness of religion "produced the monstrous misery and a universal sorrow, a sorrow that served to prepare the birth pangs of the religion of truth." Hegel may have had something like that in mind in 1827. Our text says only that, when the moments which subsist in contradiction and in a spiritless way in Roman religion are unified, then we shall have advanced to the "next and final stage of religion." Presumably these moments are the authentic moments of the religions of beauty and sublimity, as well as the heritage of the religions of nature—moments that have been "homogenized" in Roman religion, not truly unified.

d. The Lectures of 1831

For the lectures of 1831, Hegel undertook a major reorganization of *Determinate Religion*. The Oriental and Near Eastern religions are no longer considered under the general category of "nature religion" but in terms of distinctive phases of the dialectics of consciousness. While this is an important gain, new and unresolved problems are created for the appropriate treatment of Jewish and Roman religion. Thus we cannot assume that the 1831 schema represents Hegel's final position; he was still in process of refining and expanding his interpretation of the history of religions when he died.

Fortunately, Strauss's excerpted version can be supplemented by a number of extensive passages from no-longer-extant transcripts

of the 1831 lectures included by the original editors in the *Werke*. These are juxtaposed to 1824 as well as to 1827 text since there are a number of places in Part II where the 1831 lectures parallel 1824 more closely than 1827 (e.g., the cosmological and teleological proofs). We have footnoted these passages in relation to 1824 and 1827 text (depending on the original *Werke* context) and have provided cross-references to them at appropriate points in the Strauss excerpts (see 1831 excerpts, n. 1). Some of them will be referred to in the following analysis. These *Werke* passages not only substantiate the accuracy of Strauss's version but also demonstrate that Hegel drew upon additional sources for his treatment of the Oriental and Near Eastern religions.

Determinate religion is still divided into three main stages (for this division see not only the excerpts but especially 1827 lectures, n. 5). In the first stage, that of natural religion, we find a relationship of immediacy between consciousness and its object, both of which are represented in natural, sensible terms. This is not a matter of sheer immediacy but rather of the *natural* unity of the spiritual and natural, a unity in which spirit knows itself as a power over nature. This is magic, which is not yet properly religious. Religion emerges with the inward cleavage or rupture (*Entzweiung*) of consciousness, such that "consciousness distinguishes its sensuous nature from what is essential, so that the natural is known only as mediated through those aspects that are essential." Consciousness knows a distinction between itself "as transitory accident" and "God as absolute power." This cleavage permits an "elevation" or exaltation of the spiritual above the natural, and Hegel now locates the beginning of this process at a much earlier point than he did in 1827; in fact, it corresponds to the "objectification of the divine object" that he identified as already occurring in the religion of magic in 1824. The second stage has its historical existence in what are now described as "the three Oriental religions of substance," namely, Chinese religion, Hinduism, and Buddhism/Lamaism (see 1827 n. 49).

The third stage entails the overcoming of the cleavage through a reconciliation of consciousness and its object at a higher, mediated level, where freedom becomes actual for the first time (both divine and human freedom). This occurs in three phases. The first phase is a transitional one in which, in reaction against the confusion of

the natural and the spiritual in the preceding stage, subjectivity seeks to establish itself in its unity and universality. This struggle had its historical existence in three transitional religions: the religion of the good (Persian and Jewish), the religion of anguish (Phoenician), and the religion of ferment (Egyptian) (see 1827 n. 266). In the second phase, the subject knows itself to be free in relation to the divine object. This is the religion of freedom proper, or Greek religion. But since the subject has not yet passed through the infinite antithesis of good and evil, and since the gods are not yet infinite spirit, the reconciliation that occurs at this stage is not complete (see 1827 n. 18). Nor is the reconciliation completed by Roman religion, which issues instead in the infinite unhappiness and anguish that serve as the birth pangs of the religion of truth. Hence the third phase of the religion of reconciliation and freedom is one in which the relative reconciliation and freedom gained through the struggle of the preceding religions is undone, and the stage is set for the transition to the consummate religion.

It is noteworthy that this schema reestablishes a more clearly logical basis for the division of *Determinate Religion*. Over against the interplay of nature and spirit, to which Roman religion was appended in one fashion or another by the lectures of 1824 and 1827, the 1831 lectures in this respect approximate the structure of the *Ms*. However, it is not the dialectic of being, essence, and concept, but rather that of immediacy, rupture, and reconciliation, that is at work here; and the third moment is no longer simply identified with Roman religion, which was clearly inadequate, but with a plurality of “religions of freedom.” These are not so much strictly logical categories as they are descriptive of the general life of the concept and of the dialectic of consciousness—a dialectic that is taken into the divine life and becomes genuinely trinitarian in the Christian religion. This is in line with one of the central theological motifs of the 1831 lectures.

Natural Religion

The discussion of nature religion (Sec. A) is much reduced in scope as compared with 1827 and 1824, being limited essentially to the religion of magic in the strict sense, that is, the belief in the direct

power over nature on the part of self-consciousness. It appears that primitive religion has been given short shrift in order to accommodate the new focus of attention on the Oriental religions. In any case, the carefully nuanced phenomenology of stages of primitive religious consciousness found in 1824 is lacking. The section begins with a look at two senses of "natural religion" that Hegel intends to reject: the religion of reason (deism) and the notion of an ideal golden age of the past (primitive religion as *true* religion). The first of these matters was hinted at in 1827 but introduced into the discussion of natural religion only in 1831, while the second has been carried over from both 1824 and 1827. The actual treatment of magic follows closely the pattern established in 1827, in terms of both concept and historical examples.

The Internal Rupture of Religious Consciousness

In the second stage of determinate religion (Sec. B), "consciousness ruptures internally, splitting into two and setting up a substantive power over against itself as the natural and contingent; as singular it relates itself to this power merely as an accident that is of no account." This power, in which everything has its subsistence, is an object of thought but is not yet known as inwardly spiritual or self-differentiated. This is the form of religion called "pantheism." A detailed summary of its moments is provided in n. 49 to the 1827 lectures.

Two topics are identified for discussion in the introduction to the section. The first is the elevation of consciousness from finite to infinite, which is the quintessential movement of spirit, and which is expressed in the various forms of the cosmological proof: the argument from finite to infinite, from the many to the One, and from contingency to necessity. In the popular form of these proofs, the negative moment is lacking; that is, the attempt is made to argue affirmatively from the finite as a positive starting point to the infinite as result. Hegel here combines the analysis and critique found in two different sections in 1824 (the introductions to Secs. A and B). The second topic is that of pantheism, which follows from the way in which substance and accidents are related in these Oriental religions. In 1824 this topic is also connected with the cosmological proof,

but in 1827 it is elaborated more fully in relation to the religion of being-within-self. Hegel makes the same point once again, namely that Oriental and Spinozistic pantheism, far from treating every finite thing as God, rather annihilates the finite in the infinite substance.

1. Chinese Religion: The Religion of Measure. Substance returned into itself from its accidents is known as “measure” (see 1831 n. 22). All of the “Oriental religions of substance” are really religions of measure, since here we do not find undialectical substance but substance mediated with itself through its accidents. Substance as measure is on the way to becoming essence and necessity. Hegel thought he had discovered a primary instance of “measure” in the categories or laws of the Dao and their signs, the Gua, based on the simple distinction between being and nonbeing, one and two, yes and no, yang and yin (see 1831 n. 24 and, for a more detailed elaboration, 1827 n. 106). Daoism and Confucianism have their roots in the ancient Chinese state religion; thus Hegel’s treatment of the latter is now removed from the category of magic and reoriented to the theme of measure. The maintenance of the measures is the responsibility of the emperor, the son of heaven (Tian), and heaven is the power over the measures. Only at the end of this section does Hegel summarize the story about the installation of a new dynasty, which, in the picture of the Shen, gives a fanciful, superstitious version of the substantial powers. This reassessment of Chinese religion is based on sources already available in 1824 and 1827 but not fully utilized then.

2. Hindu Religion: The Religion of Abstract Unity. In the lectures of 1831, the treatment of Hinduism precedes that of Buddhism for the first time—whether for historical or for schematic reasons is not certain (see 1831 n. 30). In any case, Hinduism now provides the conceptual advance to unitary substance instead of Buddhism, and it receives a much more detailed analysis in these lectures than Buddhism does. In Hinduism the multiplicity of the Chinese measures is resumed into unity, into a One that determines itself by means of thought (Brahman). But its thinking remains locked in self-containment, so that the actual elaboration of difference falls outside it in a “wild infinity” where phantasy is given free rein. Finally

the unity is taken back into itself, but in a “spiritless” fashion. Thus the unity of Brahman is “abstract.”

These three moments—the inward self-containment, the outward multiplicity, and the spiritless resumption—correspond to the three figures of the Hindu Trimurti (Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva), and the bulk of the 1831 presentation is organized according to this triad. Hegel attends in greater detail to the Hindu cosmogonies, to epics contained in the Mahābhārata, and especially to the Rāmāyana (see 1827 n. 244); but despite this attentiveness, and the more significant religiohistorical role accorded Hinduism, the interpretation is really no more favorable than in the earlier lectures. The “mismatch between content and form” accounts for the “ugliness of the mythological figures.” There is no fixed shape or determinacy in the Hindu’s infinite world of deities, powers, phenomena, incarnations. Phantasy passes back and forth between external existence and divinity; here “everything is a miracle, everything is crazy, and is not determined by a rational nexus of thought categories” (see especially 1827 n. 234).

3. Buddhism and Lamaism: The Religion of Annihilation. Whether Strauss’s very brief summary reflects the actual discussion of Buddhism/Lamaism in 1831 is impossible to say, but some confirmation is provided by the paucity of *Werke* materials on this topic attributable to 1831. The chief of these (1827 n. 139) elaborates Strauss’s cryptic remark that “these religions are very much akin to Hinduism.” The “religion of being-within-self is the concentration and tranquilization of spirit as it returns, out of the destructive disarray of Hindu religion, into itself and into essential unity.” While in Hinduism the relationship between unity and differences was one of constant alternation and progression, here “the essence is self-contained essentiality, the reflection of negativity into itself, and thus it is what rests and persists within itself.”

In Lamaism, the “universal presence of substance already gives way to the concrete presence of the individual,” that is, the individual lamas. But in Buddhism the object is a dead teacher, Buddha, and the goal is to be united with Buddha; “this annihilation is termed nirvana.” It is hard to believe that this is all Hegel had to say about

nirvana in 1831, in light of his sympathetic philosophical elaboration of it in 1827. A *Werke* fragment from 1831 may belong here (1827 n. 151), but it is not helpful. We must conclude that our sources do not permit a reconstruction of Hegel's presentation at this point.

The Religion of Freedom: Transitional Forms

In 1831 the transitional religions (Persian and Egyptian) have been transferred to the beginning of the third section (Sec. C) and have been supplemented by the inclusion of Jewish and "Phoenician" religions under the category of "transitional" as well (see 1831 n. 57). The transition in question is not only a transition from nature to spirit but also an inward self-determination and development of substance in such a way that the finite is released to exist independently but then taken back into the infinite and reconciled with it. Because substance at the same time preserves the unity it has achieved, it is defined as the good, but a good which, because exclusive and abstract, enters into conflict with evil, issuing in dualism (1827 n. 266). This dualism purportedly characterizes the first of the transitional stages, the religion of the good (Sec. C.1.a), but it properly applies to only one of the religions treated under this head, namely the Persian.

1. Persian Religion. The One as self-determining is the good, whereas sheer power is neither good nor wise. But at this transitional stage the good is still abstract, which accounts for the fact that it is represented in the physical form of light and is confronted externally by its antithesis, evil. In other words, its determination occurs solely in terms of external relations. This can be seen from the physical quality of light: in order for its manifestation to be real, it must strike upon a dark object, a solid body; nothing is made manifest by pure light. Thus this religion issues in a cosmic dualism (see 1827 n. 281). The discussion then moves to the historical religion, Parseeism, in which this form of religious consciousness emerges (see esp. 1827 n. 284). Some new details are introduced as compared with 1827 and 1824: the fact that light is not a *symbol* for the good but is wholly identical with it, the fact that the Parsees do not worship fire as such but the light that it gives forth, the connection between Ormazd, the stars, and the Amshaspands, the role

of the Amshaspands generally, and the cosmic struggle between Ormazd and Ahriman.

2. Jewish Religion.³⁹ Judaism is introduced into the discussion at this point through the category of the good—a connection that is not wholly convincing. Here, we are told, the good is “for itself” in such a way as to belong to the essence of the substance, to constitute the substance as free, personal, and subjective for the first time. The analysis then proceeds along the lines of the 1827 lectures, attending to the absolute subjectivity and unity of God, God as creator, and the relationship of creation in general and humanity in particular to the One. With reference to the second topic, 1831 draws a clear distinction between creation *ex nihilo* and a theogony of emanation. Only a free and infinite subject is able to create out of the nothing that constitutes its “negative relation to self” or “absence of all difference” by an act of “primal division” (*Urteil*). In other words, God creates out of God’s own being, rather than out of primordial matter, but not by means of emanation or issuing forth. This is what constitutes God’s eternal goodness.

It is only when the discussion arrives at the third point that the distinctive character of the 1831 treatment of Judaism emerges. The purpose of the creation, which is stripped of divinity itself, is to mirror divinity. Human beings do so in quite a different way than nature, since evil, the cleavage, is not something external—a cosmic force or enemy—but enters into the unity of spirit itself. The antithesis of good and evil is grounded neither in a cosmic dualism (the theogonic myth, exemplified for Hegel by Persian religion) nor in absolute substance (the tragic myth, as represented by the Greek theology of necessity or fate) but in the free fall of finite spirit (the Adamic myth).⁴⁰ This is the “profoundly speculative” feature of the

39. Strauss’s excerpted version of Jewish religion is the most detailed of any of the “transitional” religions, which could reflect either Strauss’s interest or the apportionment of material in the notebook he was excerpting. A number of important *Werke* passages on Judaism attributable to 1831 support and supplement Strauss’s version. We draw upon these especially in the following analysis: 1824 nn. 541, 572; 1827 nn. 457, 492.

40. We have appropriated Paul Ricoeur’s categories here (*The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan [Boston, 1967], pp. 306–346), but they fit Hegel’s analysis quite nicely.

story of the fall, which in 1831 has been transferred from Part III of the lectures, where it was earlier discussed in relation to Christianity, to Part II (see 1831 n. 64). Humanity “falls” through the acquisition of knowledge, which has within it the ambiguity both of being necessary to the emergence of consciousness and of giving rise to the cleavage between finite and infinite, creation and creator. This analysis is essentially similar to the interpretation of the fall in Part III of the 1821 Ms. (see Vol. 3:101–108).

What is more interesting for our purposes is why Hegel now attaches his exegesis of Genesis 3 to the discussion of Judaism rather than of Christianity. The external reason is the altered context for the treatment of Jewish religion, a context that raises the question of the origin of evil, its relationship to the good, and the overcoming of estrangement. But there seems also to be a deeper reason, which is related to Hegel’s general interpretation and critique of Judaism in the last lectures. Hegel argues that the “story of the fall lay fallow in Jewish religion and attained its true meaning only in the Christian religion.” To be sure, the struggle between good and evil does constitute an essential feature of Jewish religion; this is especially striking in the Psalms of David, where “anguish cries aloud from the innermost depths of the soul in the consciousness of its sinfulness, followed by the most anguished plea for forgiveness and reconciliation.” But this depth of anguish is known only as pertaining to the single individual in contingent fashion rather than as an eternal moment of spirit, and it finally remains unresolved in Judaism. A similar tension is found between the intrinsic universalism of the Jewish idea of God, as expressed especially by the later prophets (see 1831 n. 67), and the belief that Israel alone is the chosen people of God since only they recognize and worship him.

These tensions or limitations point to the fact, or perhaps are explained by the fact, that the laws of God as revealed to the Jewish people are not laws of freedom. They are not given by reason but prescribed by God—all of them, ranging from the most petty cultic regulations to the universal ethical foundations of human existence. “All law is given by the Lord, and hence it is positive commandment throughout. There is in it a formal, absolute authority. The particular

aspects of the political constitution [of Israel] are not developed out of the universal purpose at all, nor are they left to human beings to determine." The vocation of the Jewish people is to give itself up wholly to the service of the Lord, which accounts for their "admirable steadfastness," but which also means that "there is no freedom vis-à-vis this firm bond." The Lord finally does not enter into the human combat with evil but punishes evil. The finite subject engages in an unresolved struggle between good and evil, resulting in contrition and anguish, from which there is no liberation. There can be a liberation only if the struggle and anguish are taken into the divine life itself.

Hegel thus returns to critical themes first adumbrated in the 1821 Ms. but muted in later lectures. The reason for this seems in part to be the hermeneutical and political context of the 1831 lectures. We know that, as a result of recent events, in 1830–1831 Hegel had become deeply concerned once again with the question of the relationship between religion and state and especially with the task of creating and preserving free political institutions.⁴¹ Only a free religion can serve as the foundation of a free state. In this respect Judaism is found wanting. It is on the way to freedom but has not arrived at its ethical actualization. Hegel has now taken up the other perspective to which we referred in analyzing the advance from Greek to Jewish religion in 1827. From the point of view of monotheism and spiritual subjectivity, Judaism is higher; but from the point of view of divine-human mediation and free ethical institutions, Greek religion is higher. This latter perspective pervades the 1831 lectures, as the summary at the beginning of the discussion of Greek religion makes clear.

The 1831 lectures combine an emancipatory, world-transforming motif with a dialectically related one, namely, the self-mediation of the triune God, a mediation that is both internal and external, both within the divine life and at the same time constitutive of worldly

41. See Walter Jaeschke, "Hegel's Last Year in Berlin," in *Hegel's Philosophy of Action*, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1983), pp. 31–48. See also Hegel's discussion of the relationship of religion to the state at the end of Part I of the 1831 lectures (Vol. 1:451–460).

activity. In this respect, too, Judaism is found wanting. The God of Israel is not an “inwardly developing” God; God does not take the anguish of the world into and upon himself, nor is he engaged in the human sociopolitical and cultural struggle for freedom. This requires another step in religious consciousness. Just as we saw Hegel pressing Greek religion to its limits in 1824, so now we find him doing the same with Jewish religion. He does so not from an anti-Judaic perspective but for the sake of humanity. He has by now clearly established the fundamental truth and validity of the Hebraic idea of God, and thus has earned the right to press critical questions. Yet it is fair to say that he has not grasped the possibilities within Judaism on precisely these questions.

3. The Religion of Anguish. This is not “Phoenician” religion in any historical sense but a construct derived from classical mythology relating to the figure of Adonis (see 1831 n. 71). The *Werke* provides a complete text for this brief section (1824 n. 572) but faces insuperable difficulties in locating it in relation to its own structure. The symbolic representation of a god who dies and rises, who takes the struggle between good and evil into the divine process, constitutes a dialectical advance in religious consciousness, despite the purely mythological form in which it is presented.

4. Egyptian Religion: The Religion of Ferment. The term “ferment” is new in 1831—suggesting the emergence of spirit out of the fermentation of natural symbols (see 1831 n. 73)—but the description and interpretation of Egyptian religion is quite similar to what is found in 1827. Hegel does make the point that Egyptian religion and art furnish the specific transition to Greek religion, which explains why it is helpful to pass directly from one to the other without the intervention of other religions. He also refers to recent archaeological finds and the decipherment of hieroglyphic script (1827 nn. 339, 341), but these have little bearing on his interpretation. “No written documents were yet in existence among the Egyptians because spirit had not yet clarified itself,” and hence the hieroglyphs, even deciphered, “will always be hieroglyphs.” “Everything in Egypt denotes symbolically something unexpressed. The spirit of this people is the enigma. . . . It is the Greeks who make the transition from this enigma to the clear consciousness of spirit.”

The Religion of Freedom: Greek Religion and Its Fate

The summary of “the religion of freedom” at the beginning of Sec. C.2 provides a valuable insight into the leitmotiv of the 1831 lectures as a whole—the emergence of freedom out of nature, first through the cleavage of consciousness, then through the idea of God as free subject who releases the created world to exist independently of God as God’s image, then through the process of divine self-divestment and self-return, so that finitude is taken up into infinitude and reconciled with it, finally through the constitution of free ethical and political institutions based on free religion (see 1831 n. 89, 1824 n. 574).

Since free activity is activity in accordance with purposes, the foundation of free religion is the purposive activity or wisdom of God. The category of purposiveness introduces the teleological proof of the existence of God. Why the proof should be considered at just this point is not immediately clear, since purposiveness characterizes the Jewish concept of God as much as the Greek (see 1831 n. 91). Indeed, in 1824 Hegel had introduced the proof at the beginning of Sec. B, while at the same time acknowledging that the metaphysical concepts of Jewish and Greek religion (namely unity and necessity) lent themselves more to the cosmological proof, but without excluding the concept of purpose. In any case, Hegel does now tie the teleological proof specifically to the “free Hellenic spirit.” His exposition of the proof in the 1831 lectures follows the line of argument earlier developed in the *Ms.* and 1824.⁴² He starts with a summary of the classic version of the proof: “Since . . . things imply relations that they do not themselves posit, there must be an activity that posits these characteristics or purposes, which is the power of the things.” Following a rehearsal of the Kantian critique, Hegel proceeds with his own two central criticisms. (1) At best the proof arrives at a God who functions as a life principle or world soul. (2) It succeeds in demonstrating only finite purposes, not a universal or absolute purpose, which scarcely can be inferred from

42. Strauss gives a detailed summary; in addition the complete *Werke* text, appended to the *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, is printed in the Appendix (see *Teleological Proof*, n. 1).

the prosaic and ambiguous character of the finite nexus. Precisely these defects of the teleological proof are seen in the corresponding form of religion, the Greek.

Hegel's treatment of Greek religion in the last lectures (Sec. C.2.c) again varies in subtle ways from the earlier versions. The ethical category of freedom has become the more fundamental attribute; Greek art is beautiful to the extent that it matches the shape of free spirituality to which the Greeks attained (see 1831 n. 103). This shape is still finite; the Greeks attained "only to the first level of freedom," a freedom "infected" with natural being. For this reason their concept of God shares the defects of the teleological proof. God "is not yet raised to absolute infinitude" but is still finite spirit. He is made by human agency and in terms of content is anthropopathic. Accordingly, this is a "religion of humanity," of the serene enjoyment of freedom. The "human quality of the gods is what is defective, but at the same time what is attractive in Greek religion" (1827 n. 420).

Following the by now familiar argument that Greek mythology expresses the transition from natural to spiritual gods, a transition in which the natural is both left behind and contained within the new deities, Hegel returns to the theme of the finitude of the gods. They are finite not only because of their naturalness but also because "they are not yet thought, only pictured representationally, and are therefore not yet fused into a single God but are still many gods." This pictorial representation is a human activity, the gods are brought into being through the exercise of *Phantasie*, poetic imagination. In this sense, the Greek gods are "made" or "poetically created" (*gedichtet*), but they are not fictitious (*erdichtet*), because they emerge from phantasy as *essential* shapes; that is, they correspond to, they give expression to what is essential, what is necessary (see 1827 nn. 409, 412). And the Greeks found the appropriate shape by means of which to express this essence, namely the human shape. For this reason their art attained the quality of beauty, a beauty consisting in the congruence between spiritual content and sensuous form. In Hegel's view, this "ideal" beauty contrasts with the "symbolic" character of earlier art, where the outward symbol does not correspond to what is within.

If the gods are represented in human shape, then it can be said that they are “anthropopathic.” “The main defect is not that there is too much of the anthropopathic in these gods, but that there is too little” (see 1827 n. 412 for the elaboration of this point). By this Hegel means that the Greeks represented the divine in idealized, sensuous human configurations; they did not penetrate to the spiritual core of an actual, concretely existing human being. “Humanity must be grasped in the divine or in God as *this* human being”—but this human being as at the same time sublated, taken up into the infinite. Nothing of God is sensibly visible in this human being, yet God appears in the actual historical course of his life, teaching, destiny, that is to say, in the spiritual-ethical quality of his life. The Jewish prohibition against making visible images of God (since God is essentially only for thought) must be combined with the Greek emphasis on the externalization and manifestation of God in human shape. We find this combination, says Hegel, in the Christian idea of the incarnation of God in Christ. The sensible presence of God in this single, actually existing human being, while necessary, is also sublated in the spiritual presence of God in the community. The communal shape of spirit is the true and final *Gestalt* of God in history.⁴³

Above the array of finite gods hovers a single power, an abstract universality, which is fate, devoid of concept and purpose. When confronted by fate, human beings save their freedom only by a self-denying submission, so that fate conquers them externally, not internally. “The Greek spirit had still no absolute content to oppose to this external necessity.” This is reflected in the character of Greek political life. Only tragedy is able to grasp the connection between destiny and ethical justice. Destiny is revealed as true justice in the collision of ethical powers, whereby their one-sidedness is destroyed. Only Zeus is the true, but what this truth is remains incomprehensible. Hence the need for oracles and mysteries.

After a discussion of the Greek cultus, which is similar to the discussion in the earlier lectures, Hegel makes the transition from

43. Similar implications for the Christian idea of incarnation are drawn from the analysis of the Greek representation of the gods in human shape in the 1824 lectures; see above, n. 35.

Greek to Roman religion as follows. Free spirit must come to recognize that “its value no longer consists in its being merely the free spirit of the Greeks, of the citizens of this or that state, but humanity must be known freely as humanity, and God is the God of all humanity, the comprehensive, universal spirit” (1824 n. 700). This happens when *one* of the limited folk-spirits “raises itself to become the fate of all the others.” It does so through pretensions of universality, through the politics of world mastery and of oppression, so that other peoples become conscious of the weakness of their gods. “The fate that overthrew the world of the Greeks was the world of Rome.”

But this fate was in fact an advance. The way to the cleansing of spirit of its finitude was through the absolutization of finitude, with the result that the whole world of the finite gods finally collapsed. The Romans orchestrated this *Götterdämmerung*, and this was their service to the history of religion. Much that was good also perished in this collapse—the happiness, serenity, and beauty of Greek religion, the transcendence, sublimity, and holiness of the God of Israel, the vitality and diversity of the religions of other peoples. The “monstrous misery,” the “universal sorrow” thus produced by the Romans was to serve as “the birth pangs of the religion of truth” (1827 n. 544).⁴⁴

Concluding Note. The only study to date of Part II of the *Philosophy of Religion* that takes into account the separation of the lectures and the development of Hegel’s thought is Walter Jaeschke’s essay, “Zur Logik der Bestimmten Religion.”⁴⁵ Jaeschke points out that Hegel gave a rigorously logical structure only to the first lectures, those of 1821, which arranged *Determinate Religion* into a triad corresponding to the three basic categories of logic, namely, being, essence, and concept. He never provided a convincing justification for this arrangement and did not repeat it. While retaining the triadic

44. Aside from these transitional nuances, the 1831 treatment of Roman religion is virtually identical with that of the earlier lectures and need not be summarized again.

45. In *Hegels Logik der Philosophie: Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes*, ed. Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart, 1984), pp. 172–188.

division (with one exception), in the later lectures he experimented with a variety of quasi-logical structures, applied quite flexibly and openly. Hegel has frequently been criticized for imposing a dialectical, ideal-genetic method on the history of religion. But according to Jaeschke, Hegel's method was neither initially dialectical nor in any way genetic; rather it was typifying, in part typologizing. On the basis of his typification and typology of the religions, Hegel attempted a systematic, to be sure dialectical, arrangement of the types through the application of a variety of conceptual schemas. But far from imposing an abstract, preconceived, a priori structure on the history of religion, he approached this subject matter as an experimental field in which virtually nothing should not be tried, at least once. What he in fact offered, in Jaeschke's view, was less a *history* of religion than a *geography* of religion. To be sure, religion is fundamentally historical, but its historicity follows from the historicity of human spirit. Contra Hegel, argues Jaeschke, we must recognize that there is no single history of human spirit and therefore no single, unified history of religion. At best, what we can attain is a history of religions, or better, histories of religions—a diversity of histories that cannot be organized under a single, encompassing philosophical conceptuality, namely, the logic of the concept of religion itself. Hegel's claim to be able to do this was falsified by his actual achievement in the successive lectures, which should have made it clear, according to Jaeschke, that the objective of a logical construction of the history of religion could not be attained.⁴⁶ Hegel's geography of religion was in fact closer to the truth than the chimera of a universal history of religions, such as has been attempted again recently by certain theologians in the name of Hegel.

With this interpretation we are in substantial agreement. We should want to add that the relationships and points of contact among the religions remain important questions for theology and philosophy of religion, together with a clear recognition of their differences and of the relativity of perspectives. A unitary history of


46. Reinhard Heede makes a similar point, namely, that Hegel's attempt to work out a correspondence between the history of religions and the moments of logic ran into insuperable difficulties. *Die göttliche Idee und ihre Erscheinung in der Religion*, p. 177 (see above, n. 2).

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF "DETERMINATE RELIGION"

<i>Manuscript</i>	<i>1824 Lectures</i>
Introduction (31a)	Introduction
A. Immediate Religion (32a)	A. Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion
	Introduction
a. The Metaphysical Concept of God (32b) [The Cosmological Proof]	a. The Original Condition
b. Concrete Representation (34a)	b. Immediate Religion in General
c. The Side of Self-Consciousness: Subjectivity, Cultus (37a)	(α) The Metaphysical Concept of God: The Cosmological Proof
Brief Reflection on the State, Freedom, Reason (39a)	(β) The Representation of God
	(γ) The Forms of Nature Religion
	1. The Religion of Magic
	a. Singular Self-Consciousness as Power over Nature
	b. Formal Objectification of the Divine Object
	c. The Religion of Ancient China
	d. The Religion of Being-Within- Self (Buddhism, Lamaism)
	2. The Religion of Phantasy (Hinduism)
	a. The Representation of God
	b. The Cultus
	3. The Religion of the Good or of Light (Persian Religion)
	4. Transition from Nature Religion to Spiritual Religion: The Religion of the Enigma (Egyptian Religion)
	a. The Representation of God
	b. Cultus in the Form of Art
B. The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty (39a)	B. The Religions of Spiritual Individuality
	Introduction
a. Metaphysical Concept (41a) [The Cosmological Proof]	a. Division of the Subject
b. Concrete Representation, Form of the Idea (43a)	b. The Metaphysical Concept of God: Cosmological & Teleological Proofs
α. The Religion of Sublimity (43a)	c. The More Concrete Definition of God
β. The Religion of Necessity (44b)	1. The Religion of Sublimity (Jewish Religion)
c. Cultus (47a)	a. God as the One
α. The Religion of Sublimity (47a)	b. The Form of Divine Self- Determination
β. The Religion of Beauty (49a)	c. The Cultus
α. Spirit of the Cultus; Religious Self-Consciousness (49a)	2. The Religion of Beauty (Greek Religion)
β. The Cultus Itself (51a)	a. The Concept in General
	b. The Content and Shape of Divine Representation
	c. The Cultus
C. The Religion of Expediency or Understanding (59a)	3. The Religion of Expediency (Roman Religion)
a. Abstract Concept (61a) The Teleological Proof (62b)	a. The Concept of Necessity and External Purpose
b. Configuration or Representation of the Divine Essence (64b)	b. The Configuration of the Gods
c. The More Specific Nature of these Powers and Deities in General (66b)	c. The Cultus

1827 Lectures

1831 Lectures



religion, especially one that culminates in a single highest religion, is no longer acceptable. But structural analogies and fundamental thematic similarities certainly exist, which make possible an encounter and dialogue among the religions, and perhaps even mutual transformations.⁴⁷ For the sake of the future of humanity, such a dialogue, including mutual criticism and enrichment, is essential; and for the sake of such dialogue, Hegel's detailed interpretations and experiments in arrangement continue to be of singular interest. Few interpreters of religion have pressed so rigorously to uncover fundamental presuppositions and principles, similarities and differences, possibilities and limits. Hegel himself provides the clue to the deconstruction of his own logical construction of the history of religion. By following this clue, we may yet discover what hermeneutical treasures are hidden in these lectures.

47. See John B. Cobb, Jr., *Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism* (Philadelphia, 1982).

PART II
DETERMINATE RELIGION

DETERMINATE RELIGION¹

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

[31a]

[Introduction]

First² the concept of religion [has been considered], and an account [has been] given of its moments as developed, [though still only] in a preliminary way, for it is really in the consummate religion³ that the concept of religion is objective and thereby also assumes its developed [form]. In the religions that have not yet [developed] to that point, those that are still finite, the moments occur only in preliminary form. ("Consummate religion" means that the substance of religion [is its] concept, what it truly is—the true religion. "True" [means that] it corresponds to its concept, i.e., not [just] for us, but here within self-consciousness—it corresponds to self-consciousness.)

⁴[We must] now begin to consider the *development* of the concept, that is, the determinate forms in which it posits itself and

1. Ms. adds in margin: (Finite Religion)

2. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:185–256.

3. [Ed.] See Vol. 3:61–162.

4. Ms. margin: (Arrangement [of the religions] – not in the subjective sense but in the objective. Concept, nature of spirit:

Child (α) Immediate natural state, naive faith, unity [with the divine] – lacks freedom or a distinctive personality of its own.

Adolescent (β) Individuality, spiritual vitality without particular purpose. [Purposes here are] the beautiful, the great, the good universally. Whatever there is

Adult (γ) [Acts] for particular purposes

(δ) Old person

Nature of spirit in general)

through which it passes. They are nothing other than the general moments and forms of the concept itself in which the whole of the concept is displayed, and this whole appears in this determinateness, this (tone of) limitedness. In this element we have then to consider how the moments of religion are related to each other and how they are determined: (α) the determinateness of God, the metaphysical concept of God; (β) the subjectivity of self-consciousness, its religious disposition, and connected with this disposition, the meaning of its cultus by which it gives itself the certainty of identity with its essence.⁵ |

2

Religion has to pass through these determinacies in order to attain from them the nature of its concept or to objectify its concept in the form of representation. For these determinacies are the moments, the becoming of the concept, and their resolution and the return [to itself] are what constitute the concept itself. Those who [are] already familiar with the nature of the concept will understand this more precisely; those who are not will see in it an example of the absolute, immanent method of science, and will gather from it the nature of the process, the movement of the concept. It belongs to the nature of the concept, its vitality and becoming, in fact its spirituality, that it does not exist at the beginning, full-grown on its own account; [it is] not immediate. Truth is not [there] for consciousness at the beginning.

5. [Ed.] This division is incomplete since it makes no mention of what actually occurs in the text as Sec. (β), "Concrete Representation," and therefore designates "The Aspect of Self-Consciousness, Subjectivity, Cultus" as the second section (β). It is possible that Hegel initially envisioned a twofold division of religion into "the metaphysical concept" and "the aspect of self-consciousness," arriving at the triple division only in the course of actually composing the lecture manuscript. In support of this is the fact that *The Concept of Religion* in the Ms. does not yet articulate the distinction between representation and cultus as an architectonic principle. The triple division was first worked out in the treatment of the determinate religions, and was subsequently introduced into the concept of religion in the 1824 and 1827 lectures. The three moments designate the abstract concept of God (including proofs of the existence of God), the representational relationship to and knowledge of God, and the practical relationship in which communion with the deity is accomplished. These analytic categories are grounded in the logical dialectic of unity, differentiation, and return (reconciliation, reintegration), and are applied to each of the historical religions (including Christianity in 1821).

This second part [of the philosophy of religion] contains the path to the concept. [It considers] religion only in terms of the stages of this path, the limited forms—in other words, *finite* religion. Only the third [part] is the true religion. <[The second part] contains the main aspects of the history of religions.> [31b]

First a preliminary indication of the parts.⁶

⁷(a) Religion in the determinateness of immediacy or of *being* [is] religion that merely maintains itself in its substantiality. Being, abstract being, [is here] related to the finite, to determinate being. Actuality [is here] only what is vanishing and without measure. [It is] not [a matter of] abstract determinacies but [of] being in its *concrete* determination, related to what appears still as finitude over against it: Spinozistic unity,⁸ Oriental—finitude not posited as a semblance.

6. [Ed.] The following summary shows clearly that Hegel intended to structure *Determinate Religion* into a triad corresponding to the fundamental moments of *The Science of Logic*, namely, being, essence, and concept. Here, however, we are not concerned with the logic of these categories but with their *determinateness*. Hence religion in the determinateness of being, or immediacy, is the religion of nature; religion in the determinateness of essence, or necessity, is the religion of sublimity and beauty (Jewish and Greek); and religion in the determinateness of concept—i.e., the *finite* concept or *external* purposiveness—is Roman religion. Hegel played variations on this triad in the later lecture series but never fundamentally abandoned it. For example, in the 1824 lectures the transition from Jewish and Greek to Roman religion is no longer simply an advance from necessity (essence) to purpose (concept) since now purpose is a category that applies also to Jewish and Greek religion; the transition is rather from an exclusive to a plural to a universal (although still finite) purpose. In 1827, because the order of treating Jewish and Greek religion is reversed, the transition is from abstract to particular to universal purpose. In 1831 the basic triad is reconceived as unity (immediacy), rupture, and reconciliation (freedom), and the ordering of specific religions under these categories is revised. Although Roman religion appears to be the highest of the determinate religions on the basis of this triad, it is in fact in many respects the lowest. It is the *decadent* manifestation of finite religion as a whole because of its apotheosis of utterly finite and expedient ends, namely those of the Roman state, and thus it prepares for the transition from the finite to the infinite concept of religion, which appears in the Christian religion in consummate form.

7. *Ms. margin*: <(a) Immediate religion or nature religion – immediate nature – where the natural mode is, generally speaking, the predominant meaning of each – and self-consciousness [is] in service>

8. [Ed.] Hegel sees here as elsewhere a connection between a general Oriental principle of unity and Spinoza's concept of substance. See Spinoza, *Ethics* (1677), part I, esp. prop. 15: "Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be,

⁹(b) Religion in the determinateness of *essence*. [Here there is] difference, determinate differentiation, the return of self-consciousness into itself over against its object, but still as an essential, inward | coherence. (α) Essence [is still] abstract, but essentially in relation to development and difference. (β) Hence this [is] only a semblance of objective essence; but at the same time self-consciousness still [remains] in identity with its object—[this is,] however, an immediately limited determinateness—the Jewish national God ((determinateness submerging itself within itself—absolute finitude of actuality, not free from determinacy)). [(γ)] The developed concept of the essence, however, the essence in its totality, is *necessity*—a higher determination in which [is found] freedom from finitude and serenity in finitude.

¹⁰(c) Religion in the determinateness of the *concept*—but the concept that is still | *finite*, conceived in terms of antitheses; <not yet [developed] as idea, as the concept *for* the concept, the infinite

or be conceived" (*Chief Works* 2:54). In the 1827 *Concept of Religion* Hegel treats this connection in a more nuanced fashion (see Vol. 1:375 ff.).

9. *Ms. margin*: ((b) The religion of sublimity and beauty. Separation – spirituality in general. Nature as determined – posited. On the one hand, God [as] abstract essence vis-à-vis nature, on the other hand [as] a shape or moment – spiritual subject. As subject – spiritual – but as a particular individual.

(b) Spiritual individuality, particularity, freedom. The natural state [is] posited as semblance, as accident, [which] when contrasted with thought, with essence, is only the material of subjective substance, is only relative—mere corporeality, which has its meaning, its significance in the spiritual, in thought alone, as the *appearance* of spirit.

(α) Nature becomes semblance

(β) Spirit appearing only in a foreign element, not the way [it is] in and for self

(αα) Separation of the two – the natural state, external being, as opposed to a correspondingly abstract spirituality, pure thought – sublimity; nature abstract, created

(ββ) The inner unification of the two [comes] to expression as self-conscious individuality of the corporeal. God [has] manifold content in contrast with the concept; [he has] a particular character, free individuality, but [he is] not [purified] into absolute freedom, not to the absolutely free content, [he is not] purified spiritually. The [divine] content [has] limited characters and natural powers)

10. *Ms. margin*: ((c) Transition [to] expediency. [Its] content [consists in] a universal, self-determined, independent purpose and fulfilled content, of which the gods and humanity alike are servants. The gods [are] powers subservient to ends or purposes, not powers in their own right (Venus does not take offense at Hippolytus^a

concept—but [found] instead [in the form of] objectivity, externality). Therefore [it is] immediately (α) abstract within itself, or (β) determined within itself, [as] independence, yet an independence of the limited concept, which in its finite relation to externality should at the same time be objective. [This is] the totality of [its] development, the determination of purpose, the stage of external purposiveness or expediency.¹¹

[Thus the arrangement of the religions follows] from the initial determinations [of the logical idea]: being, essence, concept. [It follows] from these determinations in their totality [but] without measure.

[The determinate forms include immediacy,] necessity, and external purposiveness.

[These are the so-called] “pagan religions”; Goethe called them “ethnic.”¹² The Jewish [religion belongs] among them.

[If we want] to name [the religions] historically, [they are] (α) the Oriental, (β) the Jewish and Greek, and (γ) [the religion that] inaugurates philosophical [religion],¹³ the Roman, [with its] wholly

– the Romans appear not to have appealed to any particular gods such as Neptune when [consulting] auspices).

A purpose is a *concrete* determination; the gods are determinate, particular powers. What was previously an empty, indeterminate necessity above the gods [is now this concrete aim] – [previously there was] an accidental concurrence [between them] or one [of them] acts – in the Trojan War each [acts] contingently for himself, unconcerned about the whole)

[Ed.] ^aSee below, nn. 173, 174.

11. [Ed.] On the translation of *äusserliche Zweckmässigkeit* as “expediency,” see below, n. 229, and 1824 lectures, n. 466.

12. [Ed.] J. W. von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Travels; or, The Renunciants: A Novel*, vol. 2 of Thomas Carlyle's translation of *Wilhelm Meister* (New York, 1901), chap. 10, p. 267: “The religion which depends on reverence for what is above us, we denominate the ethnic; it is the religion of the nations [*Völker*], and the first happy deliverance from a degrading fear: all heathen religions, as we call them, are of this sort, whatsoever names they may bear.” *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* first appeared in German in 1821 (Stuttgart and Tübingen).

13. [Ed.] This reference is also clarified by the passage from *Wilhelm Meister*, p. 267. Goethe continues: “The second religion, which founds itself on reverence for what is around us, we denominate the philosophical,” while Christianity is “the third religion, grounded on reverence for what is beneath us.” Although Goethe does not have Roman religion in mind by this description, and although Hegel does not

abstract divinities—of fever, of the oven¹⁴—and infinite singularization.) [32a]

A. IMMEDIATE RELIGION¹⁵

Initially religion, the concept of religion, is still *our* thought; it exists in this medium. But if this form of thought does not exist *for itself* in reality, religion remains undeveloped and does not advance to thought, to inward reflection. The mode of its existence [in this externally reflective way] is immediacy,¹⁶ but this is not the total
 5 concept itself. The truth of religion | is that it is as the idea, its concept [is] duplicated by reflection and consciousness, [so that it is] for itself as it is in itself. But initially the concept is [not] yet *mediated*

elsewhere refer to Roman religion as “inaugurating philosophical religion,” nonetheless the Goethean typology of three religions (ethnic, philosophical, and Christian) may help to explain Hegel’s decision to treat Roman religion as a distinctive form of religion, in some sense intermediary between the preceding religions and Christianity. Roman religion, in Hegel’s view, is not an ethnic but a universal religion, although earthly and finite. In that sense it may be “philosophical,” and indeed Goethe says that the philosopher surveys his relation “to the whole human race” and “to all other earthly circumstances and arrangements.”

14. [Ed.] See below, pp. 217, 219.

15. [Ed.] The discussion of immediate religion in the *Ms.* is both brief and elusive. The brevity is due partly to the fact that “the religion of magic,” or primitive religion, is not discussed at all, and partly to the fact that Hegel was entering upon new territory, for which there was no preparation in the *Phenomenology* or the *Encyclopedia*. The elusiveness is attributable to Hegel’s decision to draw together materials from several quite different “Oriental” religions—Chinese, Buddhist, Hindu, Persian, Egyptian—and treat them under the common categories of “concrete representation” and “self-consciousness, subjectivity, cultus,” rather than separately, as he did in the later lectures. The basic interpretative scheme is present in the *Ms.*, but the content required extensive revision and expansion prior to the 1824 lectures. Parts of the *Ms.* for Secs. b and c (see especially sheets 37a–38a) are in the form of outlines, indicating that Hegel had not yet worked up these materials thoroughly.

16. *W₂ reads:* When we considered the concept of religion, this was *our* thought; it existed in the medium of our thought. It is *we* who thought the concept, and it had its reality in our thinking. Religion, however, is not only this subjective reality but is objective in and for itself. It has a mode of existence on its own account, and the first form it takes is that of immediacy, in which religion has not yet advanced inwardly to thought, to reflection. But this immediacy itself presses on to mediation because it is thought implicitly,

for itself <([as opposed to] developed life, [where] everything [is] mediated, [e.g.,] a leaf, tree, lungs, stomach, blood, nerves, etc.)). It is not there per se or as its own condition and ground but is only there immediately. Immediacy is a relation to self that is wholly unmediated, undeveloped, inwardly undifferentiated. This is only *one* moment, *one* determinacy of the concept, as that peculiarly characterizing it—or, more precisely, universality—in a word, religion in the form of *being*.

But since religion itself is only [inasmuch] as it is simultaneously *idea*, the relationship of self-consciousness to God, this differentiation [of self-consciousness and God] indeed emerges in it, but the fundamental character of this relationship is the absolute, undivided unity of both sides; and in all [of its] determinate forms this substantial, enduring unity is the essential, chief matter.

In general it is [in] the Orient [that we find this] undivided intuition, this intuition of God *in* all things without distinction; God *is* all things, ἔν καὶ πᾶν.¹⁷ The heavens, the stars, the earth, plants, animals, human beings—[all] are one heavenly kingdom, one divine life—[but] not one love [since] love [entails] differentiated entities uniting in one consciousness. [Here] God [is] not separated from the earthly and temporal, he is not actually Creator and Lord, but is himself immediately all that is—[see the] *Shāh-nāma*.¹⁸ [32b]

[We shall now consider] the moments [of immediate religion] more closely.¹⁹

17. [Ed.] Hegel alludes to the alleged deathbed confession of Lessing, as reported by Jacobi, which was taken at the time as simply a formula for pantheism: "The orthodox conceptions of the deity are no longer for me; I cannot take pleasure in them. "Ἐν καὶ πᾶν [One and All]! I know no other" (F. H. Jacobi, *Briefe über Spinoza*, 2d ed. [Breslau, 1787], pp. 22, 23, 62 [Werke 4/1:54, 55, 89]).

18. [Ed.] Hegel erroneously writes *Schahinschahnahme*, but this must be a reference to the *Shāh-nāma*, the "Book of the Kings," by the pre-Islamic poet Firdawsi. See Joseph Görres, *Das Heldenbuch von Iran aus dem Schah Nameh des Firdussi*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1820). The context of this reference indicates that Hegel apparently thought the *Shāh-nāma* contained a pure expression of Oriental pantheism—a view that does not take into account the undeniably dualistic mythology that envelops this work.

19. Ms. adds: (α) the metaphysical concept of God. Ms. canceled: (β) the relationship of self-consciousness.

a. [The Metaphysical Concept of God]²⁰

6 The abstract, metaphysical concept of God is extremely simple, indeed simplicity itself; [it is] nothing else but simple, pure | *being*. Our more profound representation of God cannot find this designation adequate.

Being—this first, pure category of thought²¹—becomes sublime²² because it is taken in its concrete determination as that in which everything finite and determinate is negated: as soon as [being] originates, it becomes, as [mentioned] above, everything. “This” and “that” are all just *one*, [there is] only one “being.” Parmenides expressed it—emphasized metaphysically on its own account—as the pure thought of being.²³ [The expression] “one” already reflects a higher level of determinacy in that “the many” is sublated,²⁴ but not in such a way as to be opposed to the many; rather the many is negated in the One, only the One exists.

²⁵This thought, this sublimity, this elevation itself brought into thought, into specific form, results from the proof, in reflective form,

20. [Ed.] This section is primarily concerned with the cosmological proof, which is further discussed in relation to the metaphysical concept of the religion of sublimity and beauty. Already in Part I of the Ms., Hegel adumbrated the cosmological proof, in terms of a demonstration of the necessity of the religious standpoint from the constitution of the finite world (see Vol. 1:110 n. 72, 221 n. 99), but did not develop it there as such, since it was his intention to take up the proofs in relation to the “abstract” or “metaphysical” concept of God as found in the various religions (see Vol. 1:110 n. 73).

21. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 82–83 (cf. GW 11:43–44).

22. Ms. margin: (Dschelaleddin Rumi, III, V. Balch, Mecca, died 1262)

[Ed.] Hegel became acquainted with Jalāl-al-Dīn Rūmī through a collection of fifty-two freely rendered poems by Friedrich Rückert, *Mawlana Dschelaleddin Rumi*, in *Taschenbuch für Damen auf das Jahr 1821* (Tübingen, 1821), pp. 211–248. The reference here is to poems III and V. The Muslim mystic Jalāl-al-Dīn Rūmī was born 30 September 1207 in Balch and died 17 December 1273 in Konya in Anatolia. Hegel’s incorrect information about the date of death derives from Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte der schönen Redekünste* (Vienna, 1818), p. 16. Hegel’s reference to Mecca is probably due to the fact that it was during his visit there that Jalāl obtained the Book of Mysteries from Sheik Attar.

23. [Ed.] See Parmenides, frag. 6 in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1983), p. 247; also Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 83 (cf. GW 11:45).

24. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 170 ff. (cf. GW 11:98–99).

25. Ms. margin: (These proofs rejected [in modern times] on account of [their] form – to be reinstated. Nothing other than the elevation of the mind; God’s activity

of the existence of God, of God in the sense of being, the One, the universal.

²⁶(αα) The reflective form [of this proof] is as follows: because (there is) this colorful world of multiplicity, multiformity, and manyness | —this infiniteness of determinate forms of being, (of determinate being in its particularity)—so [also] pure being exists, the simple, the universal.

7

The thought of universal, pure being is implicit in the many particular beings. (More exactly,) the many, the particular necessarily has an other as its ground; it does not ground itself by itself, it is not independent. For the many is a manifold, a diversity of things separated from one another, and just for this reason it is finite and delimited. In determinate being, the limit is precisely its *negation*—either directly (in which case [it] is merely being as such), or else what is limited is through an other (and is a reflective thought; [but] it does not limit itself, because to limit itself would be to posit its other). [It is] not [through—i.e., caused by—] something else that is limited, for this would be the same [problem over again], an infinite progression,²⁷ i.e., a repetition of the same thought, which does not surpass what it wants to surpass but immediately [33a] falls back into what it wants to leave behind. This other, [which is] actually an other of the many, is the One. The positive, the ground, the autonomous in all existence, is *being*.

comprehended in specific thought; whether necessary and whether for that reason correct. – [People] always act this way, reason this way, believe this way, even if, inasmuch as they grasp their argument in thought,)

26. *Ms. margin:*

((αα) The reflective form of logical connection:

The finite presupposes the infinite

Now the finite exists

Therefore the infinite exists also

The two are one being. This mediating unity is the presupposition of the infinite through the finite. “The being of the one is the being of the other” is the major term [of the syllogism]. Everything depends on this connection.

(ββ) The being of the finite is not *its* being but that of its other. The finite [is] the limited – [this involves] negation, and this [result] is the infinite, not the finite again – [for it] is always the same.

(γγ) Unity or separation of the two

The former [is] ancient, the latter modern (to hold fast to the negative)

27. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 147 ff. (cf. GW 11:82 ff.).

(ββ)²⁸ This form of a proof—that determinate being, the many, presupposes and necessarily has an other²⁹—is deficient in not advancing beyond mediation as merely a transition to an other. Hence: (α) Being itself is always defined as an other because in contrast with it the being of the many remains an independent (being). ((For this very reason) the progression appears as subjective, and being, when it is thought of in this way, appears as conditioned not in itself but in the course of our thought.) [Since] at the least [it is] essentially other, [it appears] namely as what stands over against
 8 [us]. Being is admittedly something | other than determinate being; in general (we must distinguish between [them]). But our distinction must not have the sense that being is an other in and for itself and thus also something limited. (β) But this *implies* that the limited, the many, continues to subsist in this form, and that being, or subsistence, is attributed to what is null. There are many things, manifold and limited, but they do not [exist] in and for themselves; hence they presuppose an other, which is being. (Being is the universal that is divided into two spheres: on the one side, abstract being; on the other side, being too, but with a limitation.)

(γγ) This procedure has the peculiarity [of being] a proof of the existence of God. Initially God exists subjectively, in our representation, and being is something added. But here, in this way [of arguing], we begin from finite being. Being is in this respect positive, and the other *is* only insofar as the other as finitude, as limitedness, is stripped away, or more exactly is only put at a distance, posed in opposition [to being]. It is [not] the character of being that is appended to God, but the reverse: [it is] being to which God, the character of universality, is added.

(δδ)³⁰ Apart from the fact that God has only an entirely abstract significance, the deficiency indicated by this result [33b] is that finite being is still left with its limitedness as something positive; it is the

28. *Ms. margin:* ((γγ) See below)

29. *Ms. margin:* (Reflection is holding on to the differentiated characteristics and letting them be

(α) The difference between being as abstract and finite being; the former also [is] limited)

30. *Ms. reads:* Without disregarding

not-being-in-and-for-self of this limitedness—i.e., the nonbeing of the limitation, of negativity—that drives [us] to an other. The actual advance is rather this: because the limitation on being is only negation, the truth of being is only being as such. But this being is the being of | finitude itself, its positive element. God is the being in all determinate being—and thus he is the immanent being.³¹ *9* *Considered more exactly: the being of determinate being, the positive, is God; hence [there remains] a distinction between the two abstractions—between the positive and abstract negativity.*

($\epsilon\epsilon$) Accordingly, what has happened is that being and limitedness are sundered, separated. *9* *⟨The concreteness of existence, the unity, the synthesis [of being and finitude] float away from us.⟩ ⟨The question [arises] how these severed elements coalesce in the concreteness of existence. They should be absolutely opposed to each other,⟩ with no further connection between them. We have: (α) being; (β) finitude, limitation; and if ⟨this second side⟩ [is] defined (γ) as finite being, there are two elements in it, finitude and being, and the question is then how they coalesce. ⟨The coalescence [is] external.⟩ Finitude exists neither from pure being (since the latter is *only* pure being) nor from itself; it is altogether the negative. Finite being is posited, made, created. (α) But the activity of being is pure activity, not the sort of activity that produces finitude, for finitude is just what has become separated from it. ⟨Abstract being [is] not true, not sundered; [it is] idea but immediate idea.⟩ (β) What is limited [does] not [exist] through itself—otherwise it would be eternal, eternal matter existing independently in and for itself. It is rather the opposite that has been assumed. So upon closer inspection there only [occurs] a disintegration into two abstractions. ⟨The mind does not intend and want such abstractions. The finite is something sublated: thus the negative is a semblance or show in regard to being itself and its activity. | It is not because the finite exists that infinite being exists but because the finite does *not* exist; it is the negation [of it] that is absolute being.⟩ *10**

($\zeta\zeta$) The true is the process of elevation. Finite being has its truth in being. But this being sets bounds to itself, posits an other over

31. [*Ed.*] See below, 1824 Lectures, n. 76.

against itself, imparts itself. Its imparting constitutes the positive of the other, but this other is also only a semblance. (Finite being is sublated: (α) as finite being it does not endure on its own account; (β) it does not [endure] as abstract nothingness nor God [as] infinite, empty being.) What is one-sided in this process, in this disintegration, is just the specification of the absolute only as being, i.e., abstraction.

Thus for intuition absolute being [takes the form of] concrete representation. [34a]

b. Concrete Representation³²

³³Concrete self-consciousness does not rest content with abstract being but rather takes being in its concrete determination, in its truth, i.e., in the truth that God is able to have on this level of being, the level of immediate unity. As the concrete, the idea generally, God is directly on that account the unity of infinite and finite being. The determinateness that being has, the reality within which it appears for self-consciousness, is immediate being just as it is, finite nature.

11 Nature exists, is intuited, represented, as God: Spinozism.³⁴ |

³⁵However, the intuition of nature, the consciousness of this temporal, fleeting world (for the world is fleeting, albeit also essential, for this level of consciousness) is at the same time not that prosaic intuition of abstract understanding connoted for us by the term “world,” an intuition fixated on things, aware of them only in their determinacy and finitude, but rather an intuition of the sun, (stars, river, sea, of universal objects everywhere)—a reverence for the sun, a feeling of devotion for it, consciousness of it as a universal [object],

32. Ms. reads: (β) to which is added partially in the margin: Concrete Representation followed by: (How [being] exists for an other—[whether] as determined for an other or as its absolute primal division—is an open question.)

33. Ms. margin: (The more proximate mode of connection between the two [abstract being and concrete representation]:

(α) [On the] side of finitude – in immediate fashion

Inner intuition, which has the meaning of the universal, of God)

34. Ms. margin: ((α) Intuition marked by greater singularity)

[Ed.] See Spinoza, *Ethics*, part 4, Preface: “For the eternal and infinite being, which we call God or nature, . . .” (*Chief Works* 2:188).

35. Ms. margin: (Meaning: natural power – spiritual power – abstractly good)

an indeterminate consciousness of a mighty being, a mighty, beneficent spirit, which we no longer have and scarcely are able to represent. For the sun [is for us] a globe of light or some form of matter, [and it has] laws of revolution, [which] make it rigidly determined, spatially confined to a particular path, etc.

The elevation of the mind is the expansion of individual consciousness to a universal, to something all-encompassing—devotion. In this elevation the determinate object in which consciousness glimpses the determinate mode of reality is expanded to a universal, encompassing all in *power*. For power is precisely the universal insofar as it is negative vis-à-vis otherness, and, as negative, exists in the form of something subjective that appears in a limited form. Power is the mediation of the all-inclusive universality with singularity—with the singular both as differentiated from and external to the universal, and as identical with the universal. So the object [34b] becomes something having power over nature, a natural subject generally. The indeterminacy or abstraction of this power fills the mind with fear, awe, and longing, and the spirit with the sort of ties that are to be found in this representational darkness—i.e., with links that are contingent and arbitrary. But the mind that once entertains such links, such presentiments and anxieties, is already caught up in setting its own inner [world] in motion and filling it, and in seeking to combine singularities of this kind.

It is not the creative fanciful imagination that unites finite | 12
existence and infinite meaning into one configuration and a higher individual unity, [giving the finite] a higher justification. (α)³⁶ The justification for this unification is a manifestation of far-reaching and especially of abstractly pure effect; it is light, the sun, heaven generally (among the Chinese), water, the elements, which offer themselves to devotion as the universally operative element, as the representation of the universal. But what is immediately prominent here is

(β)³⁷ Precisely the incongruence between all such immediately natural objects and the universal that is represented and intended.

36. *Ms. reads:* ($\alpha\alpha$)

37. *Ms. margin:* (See below)

Just as when Thales, for example, as a philosopher of nature, designated water as the absolute essence or principle,³⁸ self-comprehending thought cannot recognize itself in such a limited entity and transcends it.

But it is not necessary that consciousness should be confined to such a limited existence and should confine its intuition to what merely subsists in opposition to its thought. Rather [35a] thought is able to equate intuition with itself, perceiving and venerating the whole world, physical and spiritual nature in its immediate subsistence, as the *One*. This expansion does not belong to the standpoint of immediate devotion, however, but to that of a later reflection, which, having retreated from immediate intuition, no longer intuit but reflects; it no longer adheres to the immediacy and singularity of the sensible, which it represents inwardly in its totality as a world, or as nature. For what we call "world" or "nature" is not immediately intuited; it is the totality of what appears—its modes of activity and relationships—grasped as one. That is what Spinoza's nature [is, or] the matter and nature of the materialists and naturalists: a natural totality, which in its actual, intuited existence, however, is just this infinite multiplicity of changing things; and even if in its extension it is boundless, this extension is precisely the form that belongs only to representation. |

13

(γ) The immediate, more proximate intermixture of reflection.³⁹
[35b]

⟨(α)⟩ Consciousness in the determination of immediacy has the awareness of the idea in an immediate intuition of nature. The idea is itself concrete; the aspect of apparency (which is only separate from its absolute unity qua finitude) is its being for an other. A natural object of this kind is not a symbol whose signification of the infinite is distinguished from its immediate existence by thought and representation; rather the sun and similar objects are [for] self-consciousness the immediately present God.

38. [Ed.] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 983b. On the designation of water as the absolute principle, see Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:174–178 (cf. *Werke* 13:197–200).

39. [Ed.] The following bottom third of sheet 35a is blank, suggesting that Hegel may have intended to complete this point later.

<((β) Positive:) The natural objects, the elements, are, by virtue of their general abstract nature, the existences that present themselves immediately as this aspect of being for other. <((β) Negative:) But this essence is essential power—the inward negativity of the other, maintaining and animating it. Thus it is *subjectivity*, and it is necessary that consciousness should advance to natural forms that are subjective, such as animals and *a fortiori* the power of human beings, [which are] more intensive existences. <(The sun and natural objects [are] not present [to us] as subjects.) Religious intuitions of this [animate] kind are to this extent an advance, a deepening of the idea. For the idea has only the content or determination that its configuration has. This is what constitutes its determinacy, and this determinacy is here present in an immediate intuition. Egyptians [worship] Apis, Hindus the elephant [and other animals], especially the monkey and the cow; this bull, cat, or monkey [is worshiped] not as a symbol but as it is in actuality. Human [forms]: the Dalai Lama or the Hindu kings and Brāhmans simply amplified into God. In this connection the Christian religion might occur to us, which does not worship God under the image of a man, but rather worships *in* this man the *actuality* of God. (α) [It must] be mentioned in the first place that by virtue of his human nature the God who is worshiped is deceased: Christ did not allow himself to be worshiped as God during his lifetime. (β) [Thus the truth is] rather that, | just as the Christian religion is the most spiritual, so a religion [that worships God in a living person] [36a] is the most spiritless, the most unspiritual, the most vulgar. To worship an animal is necessarily contemptible in our eyes, and [to worship] *this* presently extant human being is similarly degrading in the highest degree. We do not judge the sun worship of the Parsees, Medes, and Peruvians⁴⁰ to be as bad as the worship of animals or an extant human being as God. The reason why this apparent advance is a degradation, a further finitization of the absolute essence, is that, while indeed it is an advance to a determination of subjectivity, <(to concrete existence,)

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40. [Ed.] This mention of the sun worship of the Peruvians, which is not otherwise found in Hegel, could be based on Friedrich Schlegel's *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), p. 175 (cf. *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:275).

to singularity, the singularity is merely an *immediate* or *spiritless* one. The animal is simply alive; it is a quite transitory individual, with instincts, desires, vitality, and as such it is an infinitely higher entity than the sun. Its instincts interest us—this secret, purposeful activity moving outward from within, this undividedly rational [activity] that is both independent and unbounded in its desires. (This implicit potential is its idea. But the way it exists)—this immanence of soul in its actuality—is precisely the modality of absolute singularization and finitization. (This submergence in itself, this subjectivity, is a submergence into finitude, into singularity—not a submergence that is an elevation, a return [to self], ideality, but rather determined from all sides, and in this determinateness a losing of self, a consummate sensuality, finitude as such.) [It is] rather the starting point for an elevation, the demand for which resides directly in its present, but only momentarily present, finitude. It is not, therefore, what it is in itself; for just this implicit being is the universal, and what is at issue is a mode of existence that is appropriate to it: the sun [is] much more appropriate than an animal. It is the same with human being in its immediacy, the human as this immediate man—not the one who suffered, the crucified, buried, and risen one, (the Son of God raised to heaven to the right hand of the Father, | not the one baptized, etc.—but in this singular, direct mode); not, that is, the one who even in terms of his immediate existence gives the form and history of spirit—but rather humanity in its mere immediacy and finitude, abiding still in its physical nature and finitude, remaining now in the now. Consequently, it is the most enormous contrast and denigration of spirit, precisely its debasement, to view the absolute in this supremely finite way. For human finitude [is] the most obstinate [form of] being-for-self, and to the extent that it is only immediate, [it is] degraded in its antithesis to the universal. [36b] For [this is] precisely not just a naive or superficially innocent consciousness but rather a consciousness that, in its claim to be *absolute* elevation, a claim that is inherent in its intuition, remains turned against this elevation, i.e., remains in its immediacy. This is where the deepest humiliation of spirit essentially lies. This is the most abandoned of religions.

<<(β)>> But reflection, thought generally, advances to the consciousness of this contradiction, and of the mutual incongruence of the moments of its idea. [It advances] to the point of their mutual separation and the exaltation of the universal, self-subsistent [moments], not indeed into spiritual thoughts but into abstractions, in such a way as to supplement its *necessity*—the determinacy for which nothing other than immediate natural objects is available—and the inadequacy of the singular moments by allowing the imagination free rein to play over all manner of configurations and employ all the beauty and (wealth of) nature in order to intuit the [divine] essence in it; it hurls itself about in all directions and seems capable of doing justice to the infinite only by this casting around. This dissatisfied casting about is the origin of the sublime, puffing up finite configurations, thoughts, and phenomena to the point where they overreach their limit, their measure, and hover between a particular form and its dissolution. The | Oriental, Hindu images of imaginative power are precisely those that elevate the most common thing to the highest and then reduce it to the point where its direct significance disappears. It is given an infinite meaning, under which it succumbs and dissolves. Every configuration and natural human form [is] puffed up into something infinite: kings, anthropogeneses, incarnations—incarnations for ordinary, human finite being and acting. Human being [is elevated to the point where] all gods and powers, even those that appear to be autonomous on their own account, again serve it and are made subject to it. 16

<<(γ)>> Nature as a whole [is] personified: Cybele and Bacchus, reveling—the Universal Mother, eternally bringing forth. [This] ushers in another sphere. [37a]

c. The Side of Self-Consciousness: Subjectivity, Cultus

In its entirety being-for-other is this difference, which consists in the reflectedness of the idea or the self-consciousness for which the idea is there.⁴¹

41. Ms. margin: ([We must] distinguish two kinds of things: (α) being, (β) boundlessness)

⁴²The way in which this immediate idea is defined for self-consciousness has been stated:⁴³ the relationship of self-consciousness itself, immediate, substantive being in unity with its object. The cultus in its specific concept is the movement of the individual out of its separation, positing itself in identity with the absolute, giving itself the certainty of unity with the absolute—the feeling of raising itself to the love of the absolute.

⁴⁴Here, however, at this first stage of the immediate unity of the finite and the infinite, the primal division between the two

42. *Ms. margin:* ((α) Proper, immediate unity: the universal)

43. [Ed.] Probably a reference to the survey at the beginning of this part of the lectures, above, p. 94.

44. *W₂ reads, parallel in main text follows (for the identification of this text see the appended editorial note):* At the first stage of immediate unity between finite and infinite, self-consciousness has not yet evolved into a totality, and to this extent the distinction is not taken seriously. While there must *be* negativity in general, it has not been *imagined* by self-consciousness itself, so that the negative is excluded from the inner relationship of subjectivity, stands over against it, and has to be shut off from the immediate unity as a realm of evil and darkness. Conflict and struggle with such a negative *can* come about, but in such a way that it is represented rather as an external war, and the hostility and its cessation do not exist as an essential moment of self-consciousness. This stage accordingly constitutes no genuine reconciliation, which presupposes the absolute rupture of mind and soul.

The essential characteristic of the cultus here is then that it does not constitute something distinctive, set apart from the rest of life, but a life lived continually in the realms of goodness and light. The temporal life of need, this immediate life, is itself the cultus, and the subject has not yet distinguished its essential life from the maintenance of its temporal life and the steps it takes to ensure immediate, finite existence.

While the subject must at this level have an express consciousness of its God as such, must be raised up to the thought of absolute essence, and must worship and praise it, this is initially an abstract relationship on its own account, in which concrete life has no part. As soon as the cultic relationship assumes more concrete shape, it takes up within itself the individual's external actuality, and the whole span of ordinary everyday life, eating, drinking, sleeping, and all activities for the satisfaction of natural needs, are related to the cultus; and the course of all these deeds and actions forms a life of holiness.

These actions are at the same time characterized by need and externality, so that if they are elevated into that essential unity, *particular attention* must be paid to them and they must be carried out in a carefully considered, deliberate manner, to the exclusion of all arbitrariness. In this way the commonest of actions of life are imbued with solemnity and dignity. The concrete existence of finite life is not yet regarded as a matter of indifference, not yet degraded by freedom to the level of externality, since inner freedom has not yet endowed itself with an independent sphere. The actions

sides—the idea in itself and subjectivity—is still only formal, i.e., it is not | yet inwardly independent, not yet inwardly developed to the totality of the distinction, not yet taken in earnest. Over against its substance, its immediate unity, consciousness must also, to be sure, be dimly aware of the absolutely negative—(the negative [that is] not self-consciousness's own imagining)—of the kingdom of darkness, of evil, but hovering before it as something that has implicitly broken away from immediate unity (for this intuition of evil is abstract). Hence the other, the negative, hovers before it, but

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of ordinary everyday life are accordingly referred entirely to the religious domain and are regarded as substantive. In order that these actions that we regard as contingent may be suited to the form of substantiality, they must be performed with solemnity, calm, and due regularity and order. All this is accordingly determined by universally applicable regulations, and there is no semblance of contingency since finitization has not yet broken away on its own account and endowed itself with its own sphere of action. Orientals, who stand at this level, regard neither their bodies nor finite affairs and their execution as their own but as a service to be rendered to another, to the universal, essential will; in the most trivial actions they must therefore proceed with dignity and deliberation in order that they may perform them fittingly, as befits the universal will for whom they are performed.

Such solemnity, however, is only a *form*; the content still consists in the *doing and being of the finite*, and the antithesis is thus not raised to the level of truth. Since the order governing the affairs of daily life is thus only an external form imposed on this finite content, external life—and what, for consciousness, is the absolute object—is still marked by actual diversity. Subjective existence must therefore be expressly sublated, and the manner in which this here comes about has to do with reflection on finitude and its opposition to the infinite. However, the negativity of the finite can also only come about in finite fashion. Here we have come to what is generally called *sacrifice*.

The immediate content of sacrifice is the surrender of an immediate finitude, in the sense of my testifying that this finitude ought not to be my own possession and that I do not want to keep it for myself. From the standpoint of this religious self-consciousness, sacrifice is therefore sacrifice—offering up—in the proper sense. Because the depths of mind and heart are not yet present, negativity cannot here reveal itself in an inner process. Sacrifice does not consist in a turning about of heart, mind, soul, and natural inclinations, that these should be broken. Rather what the subject is for itself, it is in immediate possession, and since in the cultus it surrenders its finitude, this is only to surrender an immediate possession and a natural existence. In this sense sacrifice is no longer to be found in a spiritual religion, and what is there called sacrifice can only be so in a figurative sense.

More specifically, sacrifice can be mere offering up of adoration and praise, whereby I bear witness that I have nothing that belongs to me but give it up in that I think myself in relationship to the absolute. The one to whom the possession is to be given

because of the immediate unity it is *excluded*, it is over there—something with which one can wage an external battle as an enemy, but not an inwardly necessary battle that enters into the cultus as a moment. This separation and hostility that is evil does not occur

up is not thereby enriched—such is not the purpose; rather the subject acquires the consciousness of separation superseded, and to this extent the subject's action is utterly *joyful* action. This is also the significance of gifts in the East in general; the kings' subjects and conquered enemies bring him gifts, not so that he may become richer, for everything is in any event ascribed to him and belongs to him.

A further character which sacrifice can assume is as sacrifice of purification in regard to a specific contamination. A *sin*, properly speaking, is here not committed; the specific sacrifices of purification pertain rather to the whole sphere of finite action. They are also not repentance or punishment, nor is their purpose spiritual conversion; and they do not in any way represent some loss or damage that was incurred. This notion is not that one has done something evil and must suffer another evil in its place. To define sacrifice in any of these ways would involve the representational idea of the subject's justification, but this is a form of representation that is here still completely excluded. According to *our* standpoint such sacrifices would be regarded as a loss, in that through them some item of property is given up, but at the standpoint we are here considering this way of looking at the matter does not arise; here sacrifice is rather essentially something *symbolic*. Contamination has occurred, and must be done away with in no less immediate fashion; however, the subject cannot undo what has been done, nor repent having done it. There must therefore be a *substitution*; something must be given up other than what was, properly speaking, involved. The value of what is sacrificed may be much less than the value of what I keep, what I have acquired. For example, the harvest I have reaped, the beast I have slaughtered—these I take into possession, and if I now have to show that I do not take these possessions seriously, this is done in a symbolic manner. It is not as if what I do ought not to happen, for these actions are necessary; all it means is that through the sacrifice this being-for-me (which is simply a form of finitization) is again sublated.

The general character of these activities relating to the service or worship of deity is what we call *ceremonial*. These ceremonies consist in what we would regard as ordinary, everyday actions, which at the same time are necessary actions, determined by ordinance. We have the right to proceed in such matters as we will or blindly to follow custom; in the same way we do not deem purification a necessity just because such actions as harvesting and slaughtering animals are necessary. Moreover, since such sacrifices and purifications involve a reference to the religious aspect, there is no distinction in regard to them that is unimportant. Thus the various foods are viewed not merely in regard to taste and health. The different ways the various elements in sacrifice and purification are combined are also relevant; the action whereby the purification of another action is effected may have no necessary relation to it, and the combination may consequently be merely contingent and external. This is why this kind of cultus makes a painful impression. Whatever significance lies, or has lain, in these ceremonies and combinations is a trivial, superficial significance, and inasmuch

in the cultus, which is an original state of reconciliation without disunion, i.e., without eternal, absolute disunion. ([The struggle with evil is represented] as an external history—the age when Ahriman was mighty.) Thus, properly speaking, [there is] not a state of reconciliation since [there can be no reconciliation] without a preceding disunion, only an original life in this unity. [37b]

as they become a habit, such actions lose whatever little significance they may once have possessed.

At this standpoint we also encounter *punishment* in the specific sense, insofar as a deed that is opposed to a given regulation has to be annulled, and insofar as what is involved is a transgression. Punishment for such an injury is another injury, and something is relinquished—life, property, etc. But such punishment has here the sense of an utterly dry, formal punishment in the manner of civil punishment. This is not directly concerned with the amelioration of the criminal, whereas ecclesiastical repentance in our sense is a punishment whose essential purpose is to better and convert the one who is punished. At this standpoint punishment cannot have a moral or, more accurately, a religious sense. Civil laws and the laws of the state are here identical with religious laws. The law of the state is the law of freedom, presupposes human dignity and personality, and refers essentially to the will, leaving aside a sphere of free choice for decisions on contingent, indifferent matters. At this standpoint, however, this distinction is not made, and what obtains in general is a situation of sheer necessity.

From the finite mode of being and acting, which the cultus just described brings into relation to what has being in and for itself, is to be distinguished a more fully determinate mode of acting, which *conforms to a purpose*. While the performance of actions that refer immediately to our need does not occur according to a purpose but is regulated in immediate fashion, purposive or expedient action is not merely necessitous action according to habit but is determined according to *representations*. Admittedly it is still finite action insofar as it has a finite purpose; but since prominence is here given to the principle that the finite should be elevated to the infinite, the finite purposes have also to be expanded to an infinite purpose. In this way the *labor* of religion enters into play, bringing forth works of devotion that are not destined for a finite purpose but are designed to be something that is in and for itself. This labor is what the cultus itself here consists in. Its works and productions are not to be regarded as our church buildings, which are only undertaken because they are needed; rather, as a *pure bringing forth* and as *perennial*, labor here is purpose for its own sake and accordingly never comes to the end of its task.

This labor is of differing kind and differing degree—from the purely bodily movement of dance to enormous towering edifices, whose prime significance is that of monuments, the erection of which is never at an end since as soon as one generation has completed its work a start must always again be made from the beginning.

The characteristic feature of such works is not free phantasy; what is produced has rather the character of the monstrous and colossal. Production is still linked essentially to what is natural and given, and all that remains open for the builder's activity is for the dimensions to be exaggerated and the given shapes to be rendered monstrous.

Thus the *cultus*⁴⁵ [is] a life in the kingdom of light and good; the people are a permanent, universal priesthood, a holy people

All these works too still fall within the sphere of sacrifice. For, as with sacrifice, the purpose is the universal, vis-à-vis which the characteristic properties and interests of the subject must be surrendered in action. All activity involves a *giving up*—a giving up no longer of something merely external but of inner subjectivity. This giving up and sacrificing involved in activity is, as activity, at the same time objectifying—it brings something about, but not in such a way that what is produced stems solely from me; rather it comes about according to a purpose, a purpose imbued with content. Human labor, whereby the unity of finite and infinite only comes about to the extent that it is permeated by spirit and wrung out of the action of spirit, is, however, already a more profound sacrifice and an advance beyond the kind of sacrifice that originally appeared merely as the giving up of an immediate finitude. For the sacrifice involved in productive human labor is the *action of spirit*—the effort that, negating particular self-consciousness, holds fast the purpose that dwells within representationally, and brings it forth outwardly, for intuition.

[Ed.] This lengthy passage in *W₂* clearly forms a parallel to *Ms.* sheets 37a–38a. It can belong to either *Hn* or *MiscP*. In favor of *Hn* as the source is the fact that elements from the main text and marginal additions of the *Ms.* could form the basis for an oral presentation of this sort in 1821. Favoring *MiscP* as the source is the fact that in this section the *Ms.* has not been as fully worked out as is normally the case. Not only are the left and right columns filled with marginal notes, but also the bottom half of sheet 38a contains notes in outline form. Thus it is plausible that Hegel reformulated the text on the basis of these notes, and that the new sheets were used for the treatment of the *cultus* in 1824. In the latter case, Hegel would have removed this theme from the treatment of the religion of nature in Part II and introduced it into the concept of the *cultus* in Part I, since in 1824 the various cultic forms of the nature religions were much more sharply differentiated. Hence what served in 1821 as the entire treatment of the *cultus* of the religion of nature would in 1824 have been used only to offer a historical preview of the various cultic forms of these religions. Because of the uncertainty in identifying the source, this passage of special material is also printed in Vol. 1:353–357, as n. 178 to the 1824 *Concept of Religion*.

45. *Ms. margin*:

⟨(β) *Cultus*

- (α) Universal consciousness – an uplifting, to pray to, call upon, consciously express one's own unity [with], one's praise of the most high in comparison with oneself
- (β) [(αα)] Abstract, but a relation to actual life, actual being
 - (ββ) Actual life – actual *cultus* [is] a concrete consciousness into which the vitality of existence enters – not yet merely inward (see opposite). Attention paid to everyday routines – contempt for
- (γ) Sacrifices (α) To offer up the immediate things of natural existence, in order to sublimate the actuality of the distinction – Praise-offerings
 - (αα) In general

(Paradhāta).⁴⁶ | The cultus is only a festival, an act of praise, an explicit consciousness of life in the light, life in consummation. The temporal life of need, immediate life, is itself this cultus; but to this extent consciousness of the cultus [consists in] temporal activities—eating, drinking, sleeping, (illness,) all such routine doings or activities. (And since there is this need, this externality implicit in them, the cultus in regard to these activities is just to pay attention to them | and carry them out in a prudent, regulated, uniform way, excluding capriciousness. Pious Orientals regard their bodies, their finite concerns and the business involved, not as their own but as a service directed toward an other; they have to exercise propriety and circumspection that this service is carried out properly and in accordance with the will of the Lord—a universal will. The haste and restless activity of Europeans [is], on the whole, entirely foreign to Orientals, who comport themselves as a universal essence, not as a contingent, wholly indifferent free will. Hence [they have] general, orderly procedures, prescriptions, ceremonies, as though [they do] nothing ordinary, but the ordinary routine is something higher than substantive action—not subjective free will or fancy. [What is] important [is] their contingent, indifferent actions, [such as] eating and spitting. But (ββ) despite this, the actual diversity of

(ββ) There is an actuality of the distinction also: an impure action – not reconciliation –

(γγ) Punishment

[In the margin to the left of the above:] Aspect of offering up – sacrifice the most natural relationship – depth of soul, spirit, inwardness not yet attained – natural things – heart not antithetical

(γ) (αα) Offering of praise, of veneration; the conviction that I have nothing belonging exclusively to myself, but rather, since I view myself in my relationship with the absolute, offer it up and thus make myself conscious of the sublated separation

(ββ) [Sacrifice] of purification – [for] specific defilements)

46. [Ed.] This term, *Paradhāta* (“Peshdādian”), appears in Hegel’s German as *Pischdadier*. He understands it in the first of the senses distinguished by Kleuker in his edition of the *Zend-Avesta*, 5 vols. (Riga, 1776–1783), 3:32, i.e., not as a specific dynasty of the mythological Golden Age, but as a designation for all persons who lived under the first law, the law of Jamshid. See also Kleuker, 2:381, and the English translation in *Sacred Books of the East*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1880–1887), 1:220.

finite life, of external existence, remains. This subjective consciousness, existence [must] be expressly surrendered, annulled. [But here] corporeality, external existence [is] not yet reduced to something | indifferent, something immediate in contrast with the infinite—it is either identical [with the absolute] or unholy. [There must be] reflection on finitude and its contrast with the infinite.) Controversy and discord are only superficial impurities. The general duty [is] to keep oneself pure, and defilement is an offense. Punishment [exists] as such; it is not intended to bring about reconciliation or improvement and does not have a moral purpose. The cultus [consists in] bringing about an external purification of this sort of activity⁴⁷ based on finite need. (The prophet Zarathustra⁴⁸ restored religion to its purity, but did not make a continuous, eternal restoration through repentance and conversion a goal or duty.)

Sacrifice means the voluntary surrender of one's finite possessions, [thus] purifying oneself of finitude, a finite action, a fault; [but it does] not [mean] to repent [in order to] redeem evil through evil or forfeiture. Sacrifice is not a matter of forfeiture or damages, not a matter of reckoning, but rather getting rid of some lack, some deficiency. It [is], however, essentially symbolic. Something impure is done and [must then] be undone in a simple, (direct) fashion—not by repenting and being inwardly overwhelmed with remorse but [by giving up something else]. However, I cannot undo this thing itself, this defilement, so I must get rid of something else—make an exchange.

An essential characteristic of this cultus is the mass of ceremonies—superstition, as we rightly call it. External life, the whole range of ordinary, daily activities and needs—eating, drinking, sleeping, the going to and fro all this involves, family relationships, (buying and selling)—| [these constitute] a great sphere of activity that becomes habitual, i.e., they are undertaken intentionally,

47. *Ms. margin:* (N. Schweankommen [?] – but a gift)

48. [Ed.] Hegel here uses the rare term *Zerduscht*, a middle form between Parsee and Pahlavi, instead of the more common Greek term *Zoroaster* or the transliteration of the Zend name as *Zarathustra*. Cf. J. G. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage und das gesammte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer, Meder und Perser oder des Zendvolks* (Frankfurt am Main, 1820), p. 130. The view that Zarathustra restored religion to its purity is probably attributable to Rhode, p. 126.

circumspectly, and in conformity with a purpose, but without [38a] consciousness being any longer aware of the conformity with purpose, without any choice still occurring, and so forth—a sort of natural, instinctual activity, viewed in general as [conforming to] subordinate purposes, [subsisting on] their own account, divorced from a higher purpose. [Thus we have] two kinds of life, a religious life and an ordinary, everyday life. But in this religion the two sides [are] not present: [there is] an everyday, external common life in relation to religion, as religious activity. But the relationship [is a matter of] accidental connections, arbitrary combinations, (relating things that are contingent in themselves. [Thus we find] painfully precise distinctions, [such as] which foods [are] permitted and which [are] forbidden.) [These then] become habitual, and the little meaning [they may once have had] is completely lost.

⁴⁹*General Characteristic:* substantial unity

Particular Features:

(α) Abstract devotion – calling upon [God] only in thought, without committing the rest of life (and thought itself [is] immediately universal, infinite)

(β) Concrete devotion, cultus in the proper sense

The relationship of concrete subjectivity [is] absolutely essential, for I *am* finite; concrete existence [is] not yet indifferent, not yet degraded to externality by freedom. [This is] the actual, rigid antithesis between subsisting finitude and infinitude

(αα) Activities of daily life

(αα) [They transpire] according to prescription, but this [is] only an external form; the content is finite | 22

(ββ) Notwithstanding the prescription, a finite being and doing – defilement

(γγ) A finite production – as such, to that extent according to a purpose, not merely immediate need

(ββ) Sacrifice

(ααα) In general | 23

49. [Ed.] This outline is written across the entire width of the bottom half of sheet 38a.

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(βββ) Purification – [occurs] everywhere and generally, whenever a prescription is infringed – as [if it were] voluntary; [the violation has happened] against the will, against something established; sacrifice [is] purification from what is from the natural standpoint necessary. Violating one's will [is] distasteful, [I give up] what I would like to keep. |

(γγγ) Punishment – [mere] ceremonies, not reconciliation, when sacrifice [occurs] as forfeiture or damages. [It is] barren, formal punishment in the fashion of civil punishment, and [does] not [have] the religious significance pertaining to inner life, an ecclesiastical penitence, a call to mend one's ways, a *moral* viewpoint, a conviction of wrongdoing.

Unity of civil and state law with religious law. The former is the sphere of freedom, personality, human dignity. Free reason, the rational condition of freedom and free will [prevails] over indifferent, contingent things. This sphere [does] not yet exist for its own sake; hence there is also no rational condition of freedom, only a condition of necessity (“[these things] must not be”). The annulment [of the offense] by punishment without interiority [is] not the religious side.

(γγ) Labor – my finite being is finite activity – building temples, erecting monuments – building temples is already a more specific labor – [e.g.,] the temple of Bel.⁵⁰ |

25

50. [Ed.] The fact that Hegel here uses the term *Bel*, derived from the Greek Βῆλος, rather than *Baal*, and in the context of building temples, suggests that he is not referring to the Old Testament but to the reports of Greek historians concerning the building of the temple of the Bel Marduk (the Babylonian Zeus), which was attributed by myth to the Assyrian queen Semiramis. Cf. Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 2.9; Josephus, *Antiquities* 10.224; Herodotus, *Histories* 1.181. On the restoration of the temple under Alexander, see Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.16.

Productive activity [is] a relationship to absolute being without genuine fanciful imagination; [it is] a concrete, not a theoretical expression, such as language. [It is] finite insofar as it is activity, labor, insofar as a self-subsistent purpose is assigned to the product, a purpose for which [it] is produced. When the idea is intuited as an animal, self-consciousness is defined as active; it intuitively its essence with the characteristic of activity, but the activity is geared especially to animal desires, immediate need. [Sometimes it is] exacted labor – knowing Bel at night.⁵¹ *Labor* itself [is the essential thing], not that whatever is being built or produced should exist; [it brings] no satisfaction for itself [as] when it is finished for a purpose. But this labor is never finished ([in] Egypt every king [built] pyramids, labyrinths, etc.). For I am perennially a finite activity and therefore [must] also perennially infinitize this activity, sacrifice it, not merely negatively, but since it is productive, sacrifice only its purpose for myself. [38b] |

26

In this kind of productive activity the fanciful imagination begins to be involved, since form and configuration belong to subjectivity at work. (All activity is itself a sacrifice, the offering up of one's subjectivity. [One gives up] not an external thing but one's internal subjectivity.) The aim [is] the universal, as with sacrifice: in doing something, to give up one's distinctiveness, one's interest ([as with] dancing, wearying oneself, satisfaction [valued] for its own sake). But as activity [labor is] at the same time an objectifying, serious, nonplayful activity. Something comes into being, the purpose is full of content, is produced by me, (comes from me, not as bees or birds build nests but based on an image, [so that there is] a significant purpose). [Such activity is] not indifferent [to] being, to outward effect, [it is] not a game. Orientals are serious, respect being; thus

51. [Ed.] See the preceding note. Hegel is possibly alluding here to the report of Herodotus, *Histories* 1.181–182: no one is allowed to spend the night in the temple of Bel except a woman from Babylon chosen by the god, and it is reported by the priest of Bel “that the god enters the temple in person and takes his rest upon the bed.” Herodotus adds that “the report does not seem to me very likely.”

27 their production should be permanent and enduring. Purpose, configuration [comes] from within; [it is] a spiritual activity, but still unmeasured and monstrous. ~ |

These [are the] main features, the basic characteristics, of the cultus of nature religion.

But in the form to which it first passes—that of *boundlessness*—there is found the abstract separation of the infinite, of pure being, from the finite, and in relation to the former the finite is merely the *disappearing*. Religious intuition [is thus] a wallowing in the configurations of finitude, which are puffed up so as to equate them with the infinite but perish in it [instead]. (Here the negative relationship [is] also a major moment; the finite [appears] as evil, as negative, not on account of its will but [simply] because it exists—not because of its guilt but because it *is* so. Thus it does not lie within its will to change, to be otherwise, to mend its ways, forsaking the old. [It is] without inward totality, such as could comprehend itself as freedom, give itself inwardly concrete infinitude. Rather [it is] perplexed and unable to help itself.)

([There is here an] *absolute inconsistency*:

(α) Brahṁā [exists] (β) alongside countless other divine figures. [In terms of] his characteristics, Brahṁā can of himself be taken [as] what Jehovah [is]. But Jehovah is the one and only [God], to whom alone all worship rightly belongs. [But] Brahṁā and Parabrahmā are not worshiped at all in India.⁵² Human beings have no relationship at all to Brahṁā; and while they have a relationship to Parabrahmā, it is absolutely negative—they only perish in him.)

To posit identity for oneself with this abstract infinitude is absolute abstraction, mortification of the finite, which is comprehended only as immediate and thus only as the negative of the infinite—infinite self-torment and austerities, not repentance. Errors are turning back, falling out of unity. Therefore [one must] always begin again at the beginning; it is not a question of [undergoing] punishment and repentance but of renouncing knowledge and will, positing negatively something that holds interest for us and then giving it up. For from the beginning the principle [is] this resignation that I should want

52. [Ed.] See below, 1824 lectures, n. 263.

to give everything up. Whoever resigns everything cannot be punished. [One practices] mortification, becomes a hermit [so that one can only] see to the end of one's | nose, undertakes pilgrimages on foot, or covers long distances on one's knees. In particular, [one] commits suicide, (sacrifices oneself, not (as in human sacrifices) others)—like the countless wives [who] are nothing for themselves, [who kill themselves] near the temple or hurl themselves into the Ganges. [They] seek [death] especially in the Himalayas, in the abyss, or in the snow (Webb, also Moorcroft, the Englishman who was in the Nitee Pass before Webb—*Quart. Rev.*, no. xlv, pp. 415 ff.).⁵³ [39a] 28

(Brief Reflection on the State, Freedom, Reason)⁵⁴

It is self-evident that a European civil life based on personality, on free and absolute rights, is not to be found in such a religion. Genuinely ethical relationships—those of family, human benevolence, the obligation to recognize infinite personality and human dignity—[become impossible] with savage fancy and abominable deeds. To be sure, [this savagery] is combined with the gentleness and charm of sensuous, loving feeling and its display, with infinite resignation and its embellishment. (Love [is] most tender, sensuous, and inexhaustible in its Oriental expression. [Here one

53. [Ed.] See the anonymous review of *Sur l'elevation des montagnes de l'Inde, par Alexandre de Humboldt*, in *The Quarterly Review* (London), 22, no. 44 (1820): 415–430. The purpose of the review is to show that the meteorological data and hypotheses of Alexander von Humboldt in the work under review, and of William Moorcroft in the *Asiatic Researches* (London, 1806–1812), have to be modified in the light of the more recent investigations of Captain Webb in the Nitee Pass. In this connection the reviewer refers to the report by Moorcroft and Webb of a legend concerning a black rock on the way to the Pass, at the temple of Kedar-nath. At this rock the sins of the body may be expiated and a union with the deity accomplished by the voluntary sacrifice of life. After making expiation, the penitent must leap naked into the abyss of a snowy defile from a high precipice. Webb reports that shortly before his arrival three women, unable to discover the precipice, sought death in vain by wandering in the snow without food for three days and nights.

54. [Ed.] This is not a heading in the text of the Ms. but a line written on the upper margin of sheet 39a, intended to introduce a concluding paragraph to the section on immediate religion. It is added because Hegel considered the relationship of religion to the state to be an aspect of cultic life. It is not found as such in the later lectures because this matter is included under the discussion of the cultus of specific religions.

finds] a natural feeling for unity with others. [Where] reason and thought [are coupled with] unity, legal right and ethical life [also] exist. [But here natural feeling prevails,] imbued with all the riches, all the infinity of the phantasy of spirit, [producing] the most glorious fruits.) Under these circumstances the feeling of love, the renunciation and surrender of personality, must necessarily have the highest kind of beauty. But (α) [it remains] cut off | from freedom, right, the rule of law; and a people [is] unhappy and miserable where it is only such feeling that is exclusively cultivated, that alone possesses beauty. (β) Precisely because it lacks a basis in law, this feeling alternates with the most severe harshness. The free personality, the being-for-self that is at the same time [treated as] essential is mere savagery, forgetfulness of every firm bond, of everything that is higher than contingent, transient sensibility—[it is lacking a bond that is] firmly rooted in the will, or precisely in being-for-self.⁵⁵

B. THE RELIGION OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY⁵⁶

The determinateness of immediacy passes over into essence, into universal thought, with a conscious sublatedness of the immediate, [which] is initially characterized as something inessential, having no independence within itself.

55. *W₂ reads*: In the circumstances that properly belong to this standpoint, the gentleness and charm of the tenderest feelings and the infinite surrender of the personality must necessarily attain to the highest level of beauty, because with an irrational foundation of this kind this feeling alone is cultivated into beauty, to the exclusion of all else. But because this feeling of surrender lacks a basis in law, precisely on that account it displays an alternation with the utmost harshness, and the moment of being-for-self of the personality thus passes over into savagery, forgetful of all fixed bonds and trampling love itself under foot.

56. *Ms. margin*: (29 June 1821)

[*Ed.*] Sec. B is developed in much greater detail than Sec. A, especially those parts of it treating Greek religion, and in particular the cultus of Greek religion. (A comparison of this date with that given in n. 229 indicates that Hegel devotes nearly a month to the religion of sublimity and beauty.) Sec. B retains a structural similarity with Sec. A in the sense that the two religions discussed here—Jewish and Greek—are subordinated to the general analytic categories (metaphysical concept, concrete representation, cultus) rather than considered in autonomous units, as in the later lectures. In both, according to Hegel, “the determinateness of immediacy passes over

⁵⁷Nature religion, [which] worships the absolute in an immediate object of nature, passes, in the boundless, out of this immediate identity⁵⁸ between immediate being and essence. In the boundless all natural being (comes [into being] and) disappears;⁵⁹ puffed up to the boundless, its shape bursts. ~ At the same time this shape is not its immanent character but its natural shape, used externally and inappropriately for this purpose.⁶⁰ [39b] No matter how negatively the natural is posited in it, it is still positive in its finite being vis-à-vis the negative. Or just as everything melts away out of sight in the boundless, | so the boundless is devoid of strength—the contradiction of power and powerlessness.

30

The truth, however, is that in fact the absolute One is the truth, and finite being is what is sublated and ideal. The contradiction is sublated in the ideality of essence, in its *concrete* ideality, which

into essence.” Essence is then posited as *power*, and power is *necessity* or *fate*, the development of essence; the former is the characteristic cognition of the absolute in Jewish religion, while the latter is its cognition in Greek. It is this connection that enables Hegel to think of Jewish and Greek religion as different expressions of the same stage of religious consciousness. They are not related genetically or hierarchically, and their difference can be construed or constructed in different ways, as the 1824 and 1827 lectures demonstrate. Only in 1831 did Hegel sever the categorical connection between them.

Hegel had studied and written about both these religions since his student days. In the case of Judaism, the *Ms.* is still close to the interpretation found in the *Early Theological Writings* and the *Phenomenology*, especially the use of the concept of lordship and servanthood. Yet this relationship is no longer seen as indicative of human self-alienation, as in the early writings; rather it is implicit in the concept of God as one and all-powerful, which is the “great thesis” of Jewish religion. And the central role played earlier by Abraham is replaced by Moses and especially Job. In the 1824 and subsequent lectures, this interpretation of Judaism is changed in quite dramatic ways. In the case of Greek religion, Hegel has moved, in the *Ms.*, well beyond his earlier romantic attachment to the gods of Greece, he sees clearly both the depths and the limits of this religion, and he works out a definition of the “classical” influenced (both positively and negatively) by C. F. Creuzer’s important work, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–1821). For further details see the Editorial Introduction.

57. *Precedes in W₂*: It is true that the inappropriateness of the immediately external for what is inward was already demonstrated in nature religion.

58. *W₂ adds*: between the natural and the absolute and

59. *W₂ adds*: and begins to become the universal on its own account;

60. *W₂ reads*: at the same time infinitude is not yet an immanent characteristic and is still exhibited in external, inappropriate fashion by natural forms.

means that essence is not abstract being-for-self but is a *showing* [*Scheinen*] on its own account.

⟨(a)⟩ In this way it is posited as *power*,⁶¹ the absolute negativity that has implicit being, the negativity that differentiates itself.⁶² The powerful is that which possesses the soul, the idea of the other; the other simply *is*, it is [there] in its immediacy. (Whoever *thinks* what others merely *are* is their power.)

Logically, the advance from being to essence [is as follows].⁶³ What being was at first [only] in itself, [or] for us, it is now for self-consciousness; self-consciousness does not intuit [just] one essence—one higher essence—but *essence* itself as the true, i.e., the universal as absolute power.⁶⁴ Essence finds satisfaction within itself: it is inward totality, but not yet totality for itself; in order to be, it does not have to test itself in natural objects but has its determinateness within itself; its reality is the totality of its show [*Schein*].

31 Essence is little enough. But those people who have attained the level of self-consciousness where they know and revere essence⁶⁵ have thereby passed over into the sphere of ideality, the realm of the soul; [they have] crossed the threshold of the spiritual world, torn the bands of sentient intuition and unthinking error from their brow, begotten and laid hold on thought, the intelligible sphere; they have won a firm basis within themselves. [40a] They have given what they worship a foundation] so that it is now firmly anchored on its own account; it is something inward that *shows*, that manifests itself, but only *as manifesting*—it does not fall back to the level of sensory being and seek its own determinate being there. Manifestation is the *determinate being* of essence, but as of what is within, subsisting and abiding [as] the inward element.

Being necessarily defined as *subject*, as the negative relating to itself, this negative power is *the Lord*, the ruler of all. ⟨[This is a]

61. [Ed.] Essence posited as power is the religion of sublimity, or Jewish religion.

62. W₂ adds: but in such a way that the distinctions are sublated, and are only semblance.

63. [Ed.] See above, n. 6.

64. W₂ adds: since all other determining characteristics are sublated in it.

65. W₂ reads: Those peoples whose self-consciousness has attained the level of knowing subjectivity as the ideality of the natural

pictorial image; as form *finite* lordship [is] not substantive but external lordship, so that there is no independent side to it. The view of matter as abstract and eternal reduced this power to a purely external relation of form; but all that is implicit in the power itself is the abstract moment that appears as matter in opposition to form only in its externality, but which on its own account is just one moment of the totality of show.

~ But the religion of power contains even self-consciousness within itself only as *show*—it is admittedly self-consciousness for that for which it manifests itself, (i.e., in such a way that [it] has a positive relationship to it: being reflected into self is repulsion without mediation, so that self-consciousness here begins to be on its own account, to be valid, but it [is] initially abstract reflection). It is infinitely fragmented, unfree, without inward breadth or scope, a constricted heart and spirit; its feeling [is] just | to feel the Lord; its determinate being [is just] happiness within this narrow confinement. [It is] obstinacy—(abstract subjectivity, like essence [itself],) [having] attained differentiation, but only in a captive manner, not unrestrainedly or freely. Self-consciousness is concentrated exclusively into this one [fixed] point, the One [Lord]. [Its aim is] not annihilation as with the Hindus. Essence is what shows, [but] self-consciousness is the inessential in the essential; reality [is] this externality.⁶⁶

32

~ Necessity or fate [is] the development of essence, the shattering of its [outward] show or semblance [to reveal] the form of independent realities, (although [such realities are] implicitly [identical]).

66. *W₂ reads:* Since the absolute is thus defined as the One [Lord] and as power, self-consciousness is merely a semblance of self-consciousness. It is admittedly something for which the absolute manifests itself and to which it has a positive relationship; for the reflection of power into itself is repulsion without mediation, and this is self-consciousness. Thus personality, self-consciousness, begins here to be valid, but is still characterized only abstractly, so that according to its concrete content it knows itself only as semblance. It is unfree, without inner breadth or scope for action; heart and spirit are constricted, its sole feeling is to feel the Lord, its determinate being and happiness lie exclusively within these narrow confines. Even if difference emerges as a result, it is still in bondage; it has not really broken away, has not been given free rein. Self-consciousness is concentrated exclusively into this one [fixed] point; to be sure, it knows itself as essential (it is not annihilated as in Brahman), but at the same time it is the inessential in the essential.

[Here we find] serenity: [one is] released from bondage [and attains] individuality; (spirit [can] spread itself inwardly, [can] develop in such a way as to raise itself from its inessential determinate being to the shape [of divinity]).

⟨(b) Power is *necessity, fate*.⁶⁷ This is where the different configurations [of spirit], the differing shapes [in which spirit is represented], emerge as essential. [But the differing shapes are] implicitly identical, so the shape or configuration is at the same time not a serious matter vis-à-vis self-consciousness. There is serenity [side by side with] the notion of fate.⟩⁶⁸

33 ⁶⁹The absolute as necessity⁷⁰ [is] not abstract unity or being. Nor [is] distinction only show or semblance, but essential manifestation—spirit in itself, yet as necessity on its own account, stemming from spirit. [40b] (αα) This configuration or mode of being corresponds to spirit, | expresses its reality, [is] spiritual in form. (ββ) Yet [it is] still finite, still something *made*, not the reality of spirit in and for itself. The spiritual does not [here] lie on the side of reality as such, even though [reality is] a portrayal of spirit, a show whose sole meaning resides in the spiritual but that still preserves for itself a side that is not spiritual, a side that is immediate; and this is accordingly only a *posited* spirituality. But it still contains this moment of finitude because the development still has the character

67. [Ed.] Power as necessity or fate is the religion of beauty or Greek religion.

68. *W₂ reads:* Necessity is, to be sure, that development of essence which lets its [outward] show or semblance be shattered [to reveal] the form of independent realities, and the moments of such show reveal themselves as different shapes. But these moments are implicitly identical, and are not therefore to be taken seriously. All that needs to be taken seriously is fate, the inner identity of the differences.

69. *Ms. canceled:* (α) Metaphysical concept

Ms. margin: ⟨(β) Concrete representation – particularity – configuration (γ) Cultus⟩

[Ed.] The first line was written in the main text as a heading but then was canceled when an additional page of introductory comments was added prior to beginning the discussion of the “metaphysical concept” on sheet 41a. The canceled heading and the adjoining marginal points provide a brief outline of the whole of “The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty.” Here the distinction between representation and cultus is articulated (cf. n. 5 above).

70. *Ms. margin:* ⟨Necessity: (α) Implicit distinction. – Inner [element] and appearance as its immanent appearance. – In this way *shape* – only as semblance or show. – (β) External medium. (γ) *Its* appearance. Contradiction: serenity – . . . [illegible, on frayed lower margin]⟩

of necessity, i.e., [it is] implicitly the idea, [or] a unity of the differentiated elements, but at the same time the elements are still posited as distinct configurations, not yet in their universal, absolutely all-encompassing being-for-self, (i.e., they are not yet posited in themselves, [with] the universal in them, but the universal is above and beyond, as fate). In other words [this is] not yet the free concept, which achieves its reality only in its wholly and completely distinctive element.

These two religions, of *essence* and of *necessity*, have accordingly been designated the religions of *sublimity* and of *beauty*. The sublimity here is not that of the boundless, which in order to attain determinate shape can avail itself only of what is immediately present (individuals, animals, and so forth, and their grotesque distortions); rather it is the sublimity that has done with these existences and modes of existence, pronouncing them to be mere show,⁷¹ the essence being their Lord and master, (the sublimity that is not driven to distort these existences in order to make them more fitting to it—on the contrary [the transition from it to] beauty [is] the free birth of the concept). The religion of beauty gives essence a *positive* form, yet one deriving from spirit—a form that has merely spiritual significance | but is at the same time still burdened with externality, still stands in the sensuous element of portrayal, the element of the natural appetites and passions. It is not in itself absolute spiritual unity. [41a]

34

a. Metaphysical Concept⁷²

This [has] already [been] considered and needs no lengthy discussion. (αα) [We are dealing first with] *essence*, but [construed] as power, as subjective unity with itself, the One; and then (ββ) as purely

71. *W₂ reads*: The sublime is moreover not the boundless, which in order to attain determinate shape can only avail itself of what is immediately present and the grotesque distortions to which it is subjected in order to make it suited to what is within. On the contrary, sublimity has [here] done with immediate existence and its modes, and is no longer driven to have recourse to them in order to portray itself, but pronounces them to be [mere] show.

72. [Ed.] One of the peculiarities of the *Ms.* is that it considers the cosmological proof twice, in relation both to immediate religion and to Jewish and Greek religion. The proofs, says Hegel, merely express the content of the different definitions of God. God is no longer defined as simple, pure being but as the One (Jewish religion) and

self-determined, not immediate determinations as [is the case with] power, but where the concept of power is posited as determined in and for itself: *necessity*.⁷³

Two principal characteristics pertain to this sphere.

- 35 (α)⁷⁴The progression from being to essence has been noted: | (αα) essence, (ββ) *ens* reflected into self, thing, *individuum*, universal *ens*, [God] as the One [*der Eine*].

as necessary essence or necessity (Greek); hence we no longer have a proof based on the relationship of finite to infinite being, but on that of the many to the One, and of contingency to necessity. These are all seen as forms of the cosmological proof, whereas in the 1824 lectures Hegel regarded the proof associated with Jewish and Greek (as well as Roman) religion to be the teleological proof.

73. *Ms. margin*: ((α) One [God])

74. *Ms. margin*: ((α) Meaning of the proposition "God is one." [Previously we had] "that which is one," τὸ ἓν, which [applies also] to the manifold variety of determinate finite being—[here] being [is] the One. In this way [we] abstract from the multitude of finite things, but this very negation [is] the determination of being itself. [In this way we arrive at] essence, relationship.

(β) Meaning [of the proposition] "God is one." "One" is the definition of [God's] essence. Its meaning is not [that of a] proof of the existence of God but of the fact that he is one.

[It is] not [a matter of] God's being because "one" [refers to] form, not content, not substrate as such. "God is only one" is quite different from "God exists." "One" [gives] what is already universal the character of singularity, [whereas] in "God exists" [we proceed] from the singular, and indeed from the finite, to the universal)

W₂ adds: Being passes over into essence, i.e.—as reflected into self—what has often been called an *ens*, an *individuum*. When we say "God is the One," this has not the same meaning as when was said in former times, "The absolute, being, is one, τὸ ἓν." For example, Parmenides said that only being is, or only the One is.^a But this One is only the abstract infinite, not reflected into self, and is accordingly rather what is boundless and powerless. For it is the infinite only as compared with the infinite manifold of determinate being, and its subsistence necessarily depends on this relation. It is only when power is comprehended as "he who is one" that the universal is in fact posited as power. "That which is one" is the one side, and over against it stands the multiplicity of the real world [*Weltwesen*]. But "He who is one" is singularity, the universal that is reflected into itself, whose other side itself encompasses all being, in such a way that the totality of being has returned into its unity.

At this point, reflection grasps the categorial determination of God's unity or oneness and tries to prove it. But this does not yield the form of a proof of God's existence. "The One" is distinguished from the substrate, and one's sole concern is to exhibit what is meant by "being one." The reason why reflection fastens on this is that "one" in general is nothing else but reflectedness-into-self.

[*Ed.*] ^aSee above, n. 23.

As already noted,⁷⁵ [it is] a great advance [when] self-consciousness enters the realm and crosses the threshold of the intellectual world. [It crosses] the threshold, but that is all. Cognition of the unity of God [is] of infinite importance. [God is] not [characterized] as “that which is one” [*das Eine*], τὸ ἓν, for that which is one is abstract, [existing] not in the sense of the infinite reflected into itself but [as] the boundless, the impotent. It is only in “him who is one” [*der Eine*]⁷⁶ that we do not have merely impotent universality but also singularity, universality as the side of reality, as the other side of the idea, universality as the sublatedness of immediate being.

There is only one God. This way of characterizing God is initially directed only against polytheism in general, and to this extent also against the other form, which we regard as more concrete,⁷⁷ at least within itself, in regard to the concept, in regard to [its level of] determination; but this other form is itself still abstract, as *necessity*. Being thus determined in and for self [is] a mere “ought” (and therefore [gives rise to] a plurality [of gods]). That “God is one” is not the case, just as “he who is one” only *ought* to be the One who is inwardly concrete. The One [that is] not inwardly determined, [that is] necessity, “that which is one,” certainly [has] shape or configuration, [but] is not [yet] “he who is one.”⁷⁸ [41b]

There is only one God, and he is a jealous God who will have no other gods before him [cf. Exod. 20:3, 5]. [This is] the great thesis of Jewish and of Arab | religion generally ([the religion of] the Near East and Africa. These two parts of the Orient [constitute] quite different natures and worlds.[])⁷⁹

36

75. [Ed.] See above, p. 124.

76. [Ed.] The contrast is between *das Eine* (neuter) and *der Eine* (masculine), and hence between God conceived as substance and as subject.

77. *W₂ reads:* shall regard as the second form at this stage or level. We are therefore here assuming the refutation of the ensuing determination.

78. *W₂ reads:* At least this second form is more concrete within itself, in defining the concept; but as necessity, its being determined in and for self is a mere “ought,” and therefore it is plurality, it still lacks *absolute* reflectedness-into-self, the character of being *one*. Even the character of the One is, to be sure, still one-sided, since it is only abstract form for its own sake, not form developed as *content*.

79. [Ed.] Like the medieval thinkers, Hegel associated Islam with North Africa and with Oriental civilization. While he may be intending to contrast Judaism and

~(α)⁸⁰ The development of the necessity of this categorial determination, the elevation [of consciousness] to this one subject as “the One,” the proof that there is only one God—how is this to be carried out? [At the outset we have]⁸¹ the one and the many—Plato and the Neoplatonists⁸²—an abstract opposition without the definition of God as one [person] [*Einer*].⁸³

37 ⟨[There are] two kinds of relationships involving the many. The contradiction appears here immediately.⟩ (α) One against many, as opposing elements, entering into contact, into conflict. Here [we see] the appearance of the contradiction that is resolved in absolute unity—the battles of the gods, the elements, etc. This finite independence does not constitute | their truth. ⟨Admittedly, in the representation of finite things,⟩ representation seems to [impute] validity to an independent, *abstract* foundation, which merely commits its surface to the conflict, holding itself in reserve (like “force”). There are in fact various forces, but force [is] a determinateness only in the form of self-contained being. [The gods are] subjects, infinite form for itself, infinite being-for-self (not in itself); what they are—their content or power—[they are] only in antithesis. Being-reflected-into-self [is] just what is lacking in content, independence in form; ⟨[the view of] many as different⟩ [gives] finitude in content, the content being subject to the same dialectic as finite being. ⟨Confronted with a presupposition,⟩ the presupposition of *absolute power*, of the universal negativity of all that [simply] is, this plurality of formally independent [beings] directly disappears.⁸⁴

Islam in this sentence, his meaning more likely is that the Semitic-Arabic worlds are different from all the rest.

80. [Ed.] This α designates the first of two main points to be considered in this section, namely the elevation to the one personal God or the proof of the *oneness* of God. The second point is designated by the β on sheet 42a (n. 87) and concerns the proof of the *existence* of God.

81. Ms. reads: (α)

82. [Ed.] A reference to the dialectic of the one and the many in Plato, *Parmenides* 137c–166c, and in Proclus, *Elements of Theology* and *Platonic Theology* (both in Proclus, *In Platonis theologiam libri sex*, ed. A. Portus [Hamburg, 1618]). See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:435 ff. (*Werke* 15:76 ff.).

83. Ms. margin: ⟨God presupposed⟩

84. W₂ reads: The development of the necessity of this categorial determination of the One, the elevation [of consciousness] to this one subject as “the One,” proceeds

~(β) [Second, there are] the many, [seen] as merely distinct, not entering into contact—for example, the plurality of worlds, [which] do not come into conflict, so there is no contradiction, no appearance of contradiction. Representation [clings] more resolutely to this; it cannot be so easily refuted, since the presupposition contains no contradiction. [It is] in and for [itself] lame to argue that it is [42a] possible to represent [what is] to oneself [in this way]. [This view of] the many, [as] a mere empty possibility of representing, | [is] 38 nothing other than diversity, i.e., the abstract, mutually exclusive relation of the diverse [beings] to each other.

A question that necessarily arises is what the diversity [consists in]. If one is as powerful as another, this [is] no diversity, <and [these are] completely empty representations or images>. If one has more power than another, [then we have] a determinate diversity.⁸⁵ In this case one term lacks, for our reflection, whatever [pertains] to the other—but *only* for our reflection. For our reflection a stone is not as perfect as a plant, [yet] a stone lacks nothing for itself; it

as follows: being one is taken as predicate, God is presupposed as subject, and it is demonstrated that the character of plurality is contrary to the presupposition of a subject of this kind. The relationship between the many can now be viewed as their being mutually related; therefore they enter into contact, and come into conflict. But this conflict is immediately the appearance of the contradiction itself; for the different gods are supposed to maintain themselves in accordance with their quality, and this brings their finitude plainly into view. When God is presupposed as the universal, as essence, the finitude that resides in plurality is not appropriate to such a presupposition.

In the sphere of finite things we do indeed take the view that substances can be in conflict without losing their independence. It seems in that case that they merely commit their surface to the conflict and hold *themselves* in reserve. So we draw a distinction between the inner being of the subject, the substance, and its relations to others, and we treat the substance as passive, without prejudice to its other activities. This distinction, however, is unfounded. What the many are in content and in power, they are only in antithesis; being-reflected-into-self is just what is lacking in content. So if, in form, they are independent, they are nonetheless finite in content, and their content is subject to the same dialectic as finite being. Confronted with the presupposition of absolute power, of the universal negativity of all that [simply] is, the plurality of such formally finite [powers] directly disappears.

85. W_2 reads: It is a direct consequence of the presupposition of the universal that form and content cannot be separated in such a way that a quality would accrue to the one but not to the other. By their qualities the gods therefore directly annul one another.

Plurality, however, is also taken in the sense of the mere diversity that does not involve contact. For instance, we speak of a plurality of worlds, which do not enter

neither feels nor knows any lack. This kind of diversity is an image arising from our reflection.

~ Thus reflection is differentiated in regard to making *real* distinctions, is differentiated in diversity; [it is] also opposed to [its] presupposition.

(γ) In the same way [its] proof is opposed to [its] presupposition; [its] definition, however, is identical with [its] presupposition. The essence [is] all-powerful—absolute power belongs only to the One [God]. The defect in this kind of proof [is that] a presupposition [is] set up as a definition that is merely compared [with what shows up in experience].⁸⁶

(β)⁸⁷ As a proof of the existence of God [the appropriate one is the proof] (*de contingentia mundi*, i.e., [the one that depends on] external, finite necessity). From contingent being [we prove] the absolutely necessary—[this is the] cosmological proof. The finite is contingent, it does not have its ground within itself. [We are dealing with] the contingent, proceeding from one finite cause to another. [What is necessary is to] break off this series, i.e., of the finite as such. [This is] what we have previously seen: [one] finite and another finite are the same because negative. The negative of the finite [is] the infinite; and more precisely, it is necessary as *absolute*; in other words it is not necessary through another, [this is] not external necessity. | It is against such external necessity that the proof is (directed). (Infinite progression pertains to the finite sciences. To

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into conflict or contradiction with one another. Representation clings resolutely to this, opining that such a presupposition cannot be refuted since it contains no contradiction. But this is in fact one of the most common mistakes of reflection, to argue that we can imagine something to be so. We can, to be sure, imagine *anything*, and grasp it as possible; but that is beside the point. Suppose we ask wherein the diversity lies and receive the reply that one is as powerful as the other, that neither is deemed to have qualities that the other has not also; then diversity is an empty expression. Diversity must of necessity advance at once into a determinate diversity.

86. *W₂ reads:* This is how reflection argues, and its reasoning is correct, yet at the same time no less inappropriate. Essence, the universal, is presupposed as power, and the question arises whether the predicate of “the One” pertains to it. However, the characterization or categorial determination of oneness coincides already with the presupposition, for absolute power is immediately implied in the determination of singularity or oneness. The proof is therefore quite correct, but superfluous, and involves disregarding the fact that absolute power itself is already present in the determination of “the One.”

87. *Ms. reads:* (b)

break off this progression, to move by transcendence to the infinite lies within the finite itself, as that which is the negative of itself. This [true] infinite [is] universal. Infinite progression is not the positing of the negativity of the finite but the finite itself, or only the abstractly negative (and therefore ever anew the positive finite).) The presupposition [is] contingent being, i.e., not [a mode of being] that can just as well be one way as another (Epicurean chance) but that which is deemed to have a ground, i.e., is absolutely [42b] determined by something else, and does not have its ground within itself. But the other likewise [has its ground] in an other. The other that has its ground in itself and is the ground of an other [is the infinite]—(here [we are] thinking more specifically of finitude, and [of contingent] being).

This is a necessary, universal mode of thought.

As we remarked previously, all that [is] amiss [with this proof] is the form of reflection, concluding from one mode of being to another mode of being, as if both were being in like measure. On the one hand [there is] an external, subjective advance in our reflection, from one mode of being to another; but inasmuch as this is a subjective advance, what happens is rather that we annul the character of being we assigned to the contingent, we retract this our first viewpoint, that of superficial intuition, and we no longer envisage two modes of being, but a semblance or show, and its true being that is necessary in and for itself. But on the other hand this second mode of being appears to be conditioned by the first, which contradicts the content [of the proof] itself. It is necessary [that there should be] (α) cause or ground *and* what is grounded, consequent, posited; but (β) [there is] only one necessary [mode of being], i.e., this distinction, this relationship [is] likewise annulled. [We are here speaking of] necessity in the world, (α) not the necessity of the world, i.e., it is not the world as such that is necessary. But (β) the necessity is not the world itself, which [is] only the ideal [content]. The necessity is in and for itself; it is not another being, precisely because actuality does not pertain to the world. |

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Kant⁸⁸ in particular has revealed a nest of dialectical subtleties in

88. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1930), esp. ¶ 637, also ¶ 632, ¶ 633–634, B 638–639.

this proof, and has triumphed over it. [There are] two sides [to his attack]:

(α) It is only in the world of the senses that one can conclude from a contingent [event] to a cause, not in the transcendent, intelligible world. [He is] correct, [to the extent that cause is comprehended] as finite cause [and inference made] from [one] being to another, equally finite. Infinite cause, however, does not reside in appearance. [43a]

(β) [The proof yields] merely a necessary essence, not yet by any means the supremely real (which is what we are concerned with, viz., the concept of God). (αα) The “supremely real” essence [is just] the former metaphysical definition, which cannot in fact be so very relevant to our purposes. (ββ) Anyway [the objection is] justified; God is here characterized no further than as necessity or the necessary essence.

[As] indicated previously,⁸⁹ the various proofs of God’s existence [are to be seen] solely as relating to the various ways of defining God; the proofs express the content of these different definitions.

When we reflect on the difference [between] “there is one God” and “God is the necessary essence, necessity,” [which is] here this process itself, [we see that] becoming is *implicitly* reflection into self, subjectivity; but [it is] not *posited* as this reflection into self, as subjectivity, it is not *free* necessity. [His being] “the One” [is] subjectivity, reflection into self, the category of freedom, but without *inner* content, determination, or purpose. [It is] a *necessary* determination, but without freedom; necessity is a passing over, but a passing over that does not yet involve the explicit maintenance of self—it is not freedom.

b. Concrete Representation, Form of the Idea

α. [*The Religion of Sublimity*]

[Initial Version]⁹⁰

In the religion of sublimity the form, determinacy, reality of the idea is already contemplated, power as lordship of “the One.” In

89. [Ed.] See above, pp. 100 ff.

90. [Ed.] Beginning here, several passages are given in both an “initial version” and a “later version.” The initial versions are found on the inner halves of the sheets,

the same way that in being the determinacy of immediacy meant that the reality of being lay in an immediate object of nature,⁹¹ | here too the same determinacy of the concept applies, and this also constitutes the determinacy of reality, what prevents it from being other than what it is. But in "lordship" the whole picture is already given (lordship over all), for the determinacy is in fact abstract negativity; [43b] there is no distinction, [God is] plenitude, so the mode of reality is not differentiated [from the concept], [so that it has] a positive configuration of its own; this is the religion of *thought*. (The configuration of power is merely the negative as directed against the other, against immediate being.) 41

The relation to the other—nature, the world—is for this very reason only the negative relationship of power and lordship. More specifically, lordship contains the moments of creation and preservation, and also the decay of worldly (things). For representation these moments exist as differentiated in time⁹²—a world in general, whose content arises from its intuition, for the world does not exist as a purpose; or it is to the representation—to the primary act of dividing on the part of the subject—that this differentiation belongs. For in the concept this One is the absolute power, the world's truth, the positive and negative sides, the separation of being and nonbeing. But⁹³ precisely herein lies the more determinate differentiation of the moments of thought, for power is distinct from coming to be and passing away; [it is] a property. The moments [are]: (α) that of the

front and back, and were obviously composed first, while the later versions are found on the outer halves or outer margins. These are, however, more than marginal notations or additions to the main text; they are alternative versions of it. Two of the three sets of parallels are found in the sections treating Jewish religion. One might hypothesize that they represent revisions to the *Ms.* in preparation for the 1824 lectures, but in fact they clearly reflect the distinctive interpretative emphases of the 1821 rather than the 1824 lectures. They must, then, represent revisions to the *Ms.* prior to lecturing in 1821, and we must assume that when Hegel presented the material he drew upon both versions. This is supported by the fact that passages in the *Werke*, which most likely come from Henning's transcript of the 1821 lectures, parallel both the initial and the later versions (see, e.g., nn. 94, 95 [initial version], 100, 101 [later version]).

91. [Ed.] See above, p. 104.

92. *W₂ reads:* In the representation [the moments of] creation, preservation, and decay break up into different temporal stages.

93. *Ms. adds between the lines:* Re (β) (ββ) new manuscript

being of finite things ([God's] goodness); (β) their *finitude*, the manifestation of their nothingness ([God's] justice). ~ These determinations characterize the concept itself, (they are moments of the process inherent in power, of power as process,⁹⁴ of the process which it is as lordship). ~ The same world, as having being, is *only* goodness; it is not inherently justified but contingent. In | the goodness [there is] contained at the same time its negativity. [It has] determinate being [*Dasein*], which is however only a show or semblance. Its negativity lies in the fact that it disappears—that non-being *is* its determinate being, which is there [*da ist*] in the form of negativity.⁹⁵

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⁹⁶Sublimity is therefore portrayed and expressed in nature and the world in such a way that these [are] represented as becoming and passing away within divine power, [as its] *utterance*. (Power—this mode of utterance that contains infinite power within itself—[is] sublime. [God's] utterance [is his] speaking, thundering, breathing.) God *spake*—(his utterance, his speaking, is the simplest, lightest, easiest form of utterance—no sooner spoken than it is gone. [God said, Let there be light, and] there was light [Gen. 1:3; [it needed] only a breath and there was light, light [that is] only a breath. To sublimity [belongs all] pomp: natural things are only attributes, accidentals, its adornment, its servants and messengers.) From thy breath worlds are created; at thy rebuke they flee ((Ps. 104:28).⁹⁷ See also the verse of Psalm 104: Thou coverest thyself with light as with a garment, thou makest the winds thine angels and thy ministers a flaming fire.) The explicit force of utterance [is] slight, but the infinite power of thought gives it infinite elasticity. Sublimity [is] not the distortion of a natural shape but the shape of the God who [is] powerful in the weak. Utterance [is] itself reduced directly to something accidental, which is not a way of characterizing something

94. *W₂ reads:* But in the concept these are essentially only moments of a *single* process, namely, the process inherent in power,

95. *W₂ reads:* In [God's] *goodness* the world has being only as contingently upheld and maintained, not inwardly justified; and this at the same time involves its negativity, posited in [God's] *justice*.

96. *Ms. margin:* (Re (γ) new manuscript)

97. [*Ed.*] The allusion is to Ps. 104:29–30, 7 (not 104:28), and, in the next sentence, to Ps. 104:2, 4.

for itself, not a reality of thought, but is there only as an external mode. (The Hindu cow,⁹⁸ on the other hand, [is] grotesque with its infinite power because [it is] itself represented as subject.) Here human beings, such as Moses, [are there] *only* as organs. [43a]

[Later Version]

(α)⁹⁹ The configurations or shapes to which power gives rise are not such that the reality is its own; it is essentially a negative relatedness. And inasmuch as what is differentiated | —the negative as its other, or how it is reflected into self—appears and must appear as reality, power has also a positive relationship to it, so that the positivity of the real is not its own but only that of power, and only in this abstract perspective. Power is in fact lordship, the content being the given world or “nature”—not defined in terms of power, for power [is] the undefined. [43b]

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Power and lordship [are first] spirit, [as] the presupposition [or in] representation. ~But what matters is [not] how much is attributed to this spirit—[for example,] it has spiritual predicates such as wisdom, will, goodness, justice, mercy—but what its activity and works are. And its activity is here solely the activity of power. [It is] difficult to avoid confusion as to whether the activity of spirit displays its nature, as to whether “subject equals spirit” denotes a predicate. What matters is what spirit does and is—what pertains to its categorial determination, to reality.¹⁰⁰ ~101

[The first moment is] creation, coming to be out of nothing. Power determines itself; [it is] negative relation to itself, sublation of its

98. [Ed.] A reference not only to the veneration of the cow in general but probably also to the cow of Shubula in *Rāmāyana* 463–471; see below, 1827 lectures, n. 244 including annotation.

99. [Ed.] This α parallels the α at the beginning of the initial version, which we have incorporated into the subhead designating “the Religion of Sublimity.”

100. *W₂ reads:* But the being of the world is only the being of power; in other words, the positive actuality and independence of the world is not its own independence but the independence of power. Consequently, in regard to power the world must be pictured as something inwardly broken: on the one hand there is the multiplicity of differences, the infinite richness of existence, while on the other hand there is the substantiality of the world; however, this does not pertain to the world itself, but is the identity of essence with itself. The world does not preserve itself on its own account; on the contrary, its being-for-self is the power that preserves itself in the

abstractness, identity with self. [It is] the eternal counsel of God, his absolute will. [How are we] to conceive of [absolute] will? [For us, will is] contingent; will is doing this [rather than that]; will [involves] purposes. [We must] take as the starting point [for our conception] abstraction, emptiness, power as self-contained. |

[The second moment is] preservation. Determinate being *exists*, positively. The positive element in this other mode of being, the world, is the positive being of power. In this way the independence of the created world is sublated, its inner side [revealed]; it is inwardly separated, into its essence and its reality.

[The third moment is] the passing away of worldly things. [For there is] equally a negative relationship of power to this its positive being. Both [preservation and destruction] are one, [there is] one process: a negative self-relating, a distinguishing, the annulling of the self-identity. "This identity [involves]: (α) emptiness or nothing, and the creation of an other; (β) the subsistence of the world, and its annulment."¹⁰²

"[Thus we have:] (α) The identity of power with itself—identity as the being of things, the affirmative determination—[God's] goodness; maintenance is the goal, as stemming from the subject—"These things *shall* abide." Similarly [God's] justice [says], "They *shall* perish." [Both are] properties of one subject, purely properties, not an independent totality. [The subject is] still unmediated, still motionless, unfulfilled in its subjectivity.

differences, inasmuch as it *remains* being-for-self and so constitutes the *being* of the world. Thus the world is inwardly divided: on the one hand it is difference, lacking selfhood, lacking independence; on the other hand it is its *being*.

101. *W₂ reads*: But initially only the roots. For what matters is not how many spiritual predicates, such as wisdom, goodness, and mercy, are attributed to the one [God] but what he does and really is; what matters is his actual categorial determination and reality. A distinction has therefore to be drawn as to whether what God does expresses the spiritual mode. If God's activity is not such as to develop the nature of spirit, then the subject may well count as spirit in our picture of it, but is not yet itself truly spirit. However, the basic characteristic of activity is here initially *power*, which does not take shape in such a way that reality is its own; on the contrary, its attitude [to reality] is still essentially negative.

102. *W₂ reads*: The identity of power with itself is, on the one hand, the nothing from which the world was created and, on the other, the subsistence of the world and its annulment.

(β) Identity of power with itself—as nonbeing of worldly things (justice).¹⁰³

(γ) Justice (as with Shiva) [involves] coming to be and passing away—[it is] a negative process, not the motion of return within self, not spirit.) [44a]

But goodness and justice, ~because they contain a difference, would [on this view] become determinations of power.¹⁰⁴ However, power is itself the *undetermined*; in other words, power prevails against this difference itself—its goodness is transposed into justice and vice versa. Posited on their own account, each would exclude the other, and through the determinations that they represent power would acquire a determinate content, [it would become] power [operating] according to purposes. But the very nature of power as power is that it | simply sublates determinacy, and goodness and justice are merely the moments involved in its process. 45

This portrayal of God's power (becomes determinately concrete, it has its reality in the determinate being of the world. Wisdom [is] purely indeterminate; when opposed to power, it vanishes away. Power is what gives meaning to the world's relationships.

[What counts] vis-à-vis nature in general is essentially power as such. Apart from the one purpose [of God there is] no right that stands in and for itself in the existent world, no absolute purpose or content. The story of Job, his misfortunes and plight, stands apart from [the fate of] the people of God, who are the essential purpose. So here the reference is to God's general, broader purposes, and especially to the purpose that can appear in regard to the single individual—namely, justice as the harmony¹⁰⁵ of happiness with the individual's behavior, virtue, and piety. Virtue or piety would be a purpose in and for itself, [whereas] in fact it is only fear of the Lord, only absolute submission [to his will] that is valid—submission itself is the goal, is what counts.)

103. *W₂ reads:* This identity of power, which is also preserved in the being of things, is both their being and their nonbeing.

104. *W₂ reads:* although they contain difference, are not comprehended as a permanent determination of the [divine] power.

105. *Ms. adds:* and form

[This portrayal of God's power] is offered in the Book of Job—precisely as abstract power. Job, from being a happy man, [becomes] wretched, [but this] main content [is presented] in a very incoherent, inconsequential manner, quite incompatible with consistency of thought. At the end of the book Job praises his innocence and the change that has taken place in his circumstances through no fault of his own. [In contrast we find in] 31:2: "What would be my portion from God above, and my heritage from the Almighty on high? Does not calamity befall the unrighteous, and disaster the workers of iniquity? . . . Let me be weighed in a just balance, and let God know my integrity!"¹⁰⁶ Elihu [answers], 33:12: "Behold, in this you are not right. I will answer you. God is greater than man. Why do you contend against him?"¹⁰⁷ God acts thus to bring [souls] out from the pit [33:18], once and again—[this is] justice, directed moreover to the well-being of the individual. But [this viewpoint is] | limited, for at the close God comes onto the stage and gives expression exclusively to his power. (Providence [is] founded on power.)

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Chapter 38: "Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind: 'Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up your loins like a man, I will question you, and you shall declare to me. Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who determined its measurements—surely you know! Or who stretched the line upon it? On what were its bases sunk, or who laid its cornerstone, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? . . . Have you entered into the springs of the sea, or walked in the recesses of the deep? . . . Can you lift up your voice to the clouds, that a flood of waters may cover you? Can you send forth lightnings, that they may go and say to you, "Here we are"? . . . Who is so wise that he can number the clouds?"'¹⁰⁸ Then [comes] the excellency of the beasts, (Behemoth, Leviathan).¹⁰⁹ [44b] [But this is] merely brute power, and they that do not fear the Lord shall be counted godless. Finally Job makes answer (42:1 ff.): "I know that thou canst

106. [Ed.] Cf. Job 31:2–3, 6.

107. [Ed.] Cf. Job 33:12–13, 29–30.

108. [Ed.] Cf. Job 38:1–7, 16, 34–35, 37.

109. [Ed.] Cf. Job 40:15 ff., 41:1 ff.

do all things, and that no thought can be withheld from thee. Heedless is the man who believes to hide his counsel. Therefore I acknowledge that I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know. . . . But now my eye sees thee; therefore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes."¹¹⁰ It is this submission that restores Job to his former happiness. And as for the others, who sought to understand, to justify the ways of God, [the Lord said]: "You have not spoken of me aright, as my servant Job has. . . . Offer up a burnt offering for yourselves, and let my servant Job pray for you. . . . And the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before."¹¹¹

It is accordingly this power, this one and only [Lord], that exists invisibly, [as] God of thought, because God [as] essence has only negative relationship to reality and positive relationship only to the abstract being of power, not yet to its concrete being, because God is not [yet] further determined within himself.

β.¹¹² [*The Religion of Necessity*]

[Initial Version]

It is otherwise in the religion of necessity, where the essential shape or configuration | imparted to the concept is that of the reality of the idea. The religion of necessity becomes the religion of beauty; 47 in this way it is more concretely self-determined, but it relapses into naturalness and plurality.

[The logical] connection between the category of necessity and the configuration or shaping [is as follows]:

⟨(α)⟩ Necessity is ⟨inwardly concrete, being determined in different shapes [and so] achieving differentiated reality⟩; it is essentially a process of *appearing* in regard to necessity; it is power that is not merely abstractly related to itself but repels itself from itself. This self-repulsion provides a mediation for the diversity of determinate being. However, terms that cohere necessarily rather than freely do

110. [Ed.] Cf. Job 42:2–3, 5b–6.

111. [Ed.] Cf. Job 42:7, 8, 10.

112. Ms. reads: (b) Ms. margin canceled: ⟨Nemesis [inadvertently not canceled: Δίκη] – justice – in making equal⟩ Ms. margin: ⟨Different modes of determination – reality, representation [canceled: of necessity] of spirit⟩

not stand together in mutual confidence as identical for one another but are externally opposed in this absolute connectedness.

Necessity therefore contains (α) being for an other, as simple unmediated being—reality, determinate being [as] positive ([divine] goodness)—such and such a thing *is*.

(β) However, this being is not the being of unmediated nature, but is an appearing; in other words, there is implicit in it an inner [being] (necessity). [We have here] revelation, manifestation as the determinate being of essence: God reveals himself in nature, he is the act of creating, the power that creates. Thus we may conclude that according to its essence nature exists only in and through him, while [45a] he is and remains the abstract, all-powerful, self-sufficient essence. Concrete nature does not exist implicitly in him, he is not present in its determinate form, but has reality only in his negativity. The revelation of God in nature consists only in our recognizing his power and glory, but as the *thought* of how great and glorious [he is]; [we do] not [say], this particular splendor or glory belongs to him, but [he is] only the essence, the abstract substance of this nature (what is undetermined [in it]).

But necessity entails the appearing of essence itself in a positive relation to the natural, [i.e.,] (α) externally (the natural state, natural material); (β) nonexternally—showing and portraying essence, [essence] showing itself in it. In nature religion God, the essence, is there in an unmediated form as natural essence; natural essence, 48 natural essences, are God. But here | [the being of] essence is its having its determinate being, its reality, in an external mode, the mode of nature, but not as an immediate object of nature. Rather it is something that is only posited by what is within, it is a habitation, a direct reflection of what is within, a mirror image that has no significance or actuality by virtue of its own immediate existence. The natural mode is show, the shining [through] of essence, not immediately there but made, posited, floating out from within, produced, not self-mediated and self-sustained.

(γ) Thus the determinate being of spirit is only a product of art, comprising, on the one hand, determinate external being, not in the proper sphere of spirit, not God worshiped in spirit, but in necessity

(namely, the *natural* mode); on the other hand, not a natural object, an immediate existent, but nonetheless a posited, *external* existent, [in fact] a natural object raised to the level of the nonnatural by caprice or chance, or else a product of art. [Spirit is] still in the realm of the senses, and because of externality [there is] not yet freedom; but [there is] naturalness in the mode of freedom.

(δ) [At this stage] the idea is, for representation, universal, absolute essence, spiritual as well as natural substance; but what matters is the categorial determination that has been born from within it. [44b]

[Later Version]

(Necessity, as having universal determinacy within itself, is¹¹³ the plenitude or cornucopia of all determinations. They press forward within it, | but as a multitude, each going its own way, one beside the other, not turned back into self to produce the freedom of the concept; in representation they fall apart because [there is] not yet the freedom of the concept and essence [is] not yet [present] as spirit; only as universal spirit [is essence] for the first time the free and absolute unity. 49

(a) Necessity, absolute necessity, abstract in and for itself, disdains, in its appearing, all community, all configuration; it reigns awesomely over all, and [is seen as] cold, abstract fate. For necessity as such is inherently blind. It has not yet developed into the concept of purpose or achieved specific determinations; it contains determinacy as such within itself, but not yet freedom—it is without concept. [This is] the fate of the ancients and [yet] not, because [it is] not *only* [that].

(b) Because determinacy [lies] outside it, [as] world, yet is at the same time implicit in it, [necessity] is related to the world. This abstract relation is purely external unity, and therefore equality in general. Since it is without concept, and not further determined within itself, [it is] Nemesis, [which means] making the high and

113. Ms. adds above, in margin: (Determinacy is one's *own* determinacy, in a positive relation to)

mighty low, establishing equality, universal recompense. But it does not yet [mean] raising up what is lowly, for the lowly does not yet exist—in other words, what is lowly is in its proper state, for it is finite, has not itself any absolute, infinite value within itself. The finite is subject to chance and contingency, it is not inwardly determined as to whether it is more one way or another. But to transcend the common lot and measure of finitude is contrary to equality.¹¹⁴

50 ¹¹⁵(c) In addition, however, [we find here] various kinds of general determinateness, universal | natural and spiritual powers, [such as] rights of the family, law and government, agriculture, the universal ties and institutions of custom, civic status, virtue and the like, just as [we find] the sun etc. But as a result these general kinds of determinateness split off from necessity; in their concrete form they are distinct from it. They also split off from each other, and to a greater or lesser extent go their own ways; for there is no return into self, and it is only their ⟨foundation⟩ that is one. [45a]

(d) Determinacy [is here] (α) separated from abstract necessity, and therefore external, an appearing; but (β) at the same time

114. *W₂ reads:* This unity, as absolute necessity, encompasses universal determinacy, it is the plenitude of all determinations, but it is not inwardly developed, for instead the content is distributed in a particular way among the many gods who stem from it. It is itself empty and without content, it disdains all community, all configuration; it reigns awesomely over all, as a blind power, past all understanding or concept. It is without concept because only the concrete can be conceived, while absolute necessity is still abstract, has not yet developed into the concept of purpose or achieved specific determinations.

At this stage necessity is related essentially to the world. For determinacy is a moment of necessity itself, and the concrete world is *developed* determinacy, the realm of finitude, of determinate existence in general. Necessity has at first an abstract relation to the concrete world, and this relation is the external unity of the world, equality in general, which without further inner determination is without concept, and is [just] Nemesis. It brings the high and mighty down low and so establishes equality. But this equalizing is not to be understood as meaning that when what puts itself forward and what is on high is brought low, what is lowly is also raised up. On the contrary, the lowly is in its proper state, it is the finite, which has no particular claims, and has not yet any infinite value within itself to which it could appeal. Consequently it is not *too* lowly; but it may transcend the common lot and measure of finitude, and if it goes against equality in this way, then Nemesis puts it back where it belongs.

115. *Ms. canceled, above the line:* (c) Natural intuitions – sun, sky, earth, time, etc. – [these are] likewise positive determinacies, configurations

retained within absolute necessity in accordance with the concept of necessity and power.

(α) [There are] a multitude of universal divine powers. They are many by virtue of being determinacies, and divine inasmuch as they remain in positive relation to necessity.

(β) Conversely, therefore, the divine exists for an other; it is intuited and represented in external existence [*Dasein*]. The natural universal powers and objects *are* this reality.

But this external existence, retained within the inner self of unity as *appearance* (though not in the form of natural objects or forces), exists in our thought, as something inward. [It is] not an image of the divine, not posited of God himself as appearance. [It is] in God himself as appearance, either as subsisting positively or, as appearance, simply vanishing away, or [again] as the thought of vanishing away. Thus it does not here exist as the shape of necessity.

But the shape of necessity as such is *posited* necessity, i.e., the form of freedom. As posited necessity, [it is] no longer merely this totality in itself, but [has been brought] forth, is for an other; inasmuch as necessity is the annulling of this reality or determinacy, its unity exists on its own account. Hence posited *necessity* [is] *freedom*—i.e., being at home with oneself in [the sphere of] otherness as such. Life [is] determinacy (α) in being, (β) [but only] as resolved in universality, and consequently spiritual. | Life is the *living* thing—though still only as something immediate or natural as such; in other words, it is the necessity that exists for itself; as life, it is not the simple necessity that is complete on its own account. This [the living thing] is just the spiritual shaping [of necessity]; it is only its meaning that is the whole universal necessity, the divine. The living thing is implicitly genus, but it is not that in its determinate being. The universal becomes the characteristic of necessity just so far as it does not relapse into immediacy, into naturalness.

51

The explanation for why [things happen as they do] is to be sought in fate. But in providing the explanation, [fate] continues to be a mediation [in terms of] external necessity; the father [acted] thus—[there was] a transgression—the family is old—the inheritance has passed down—[these are] the causes, grounds, and [necessary] connection of things.) [45b]

(d) ~These forms of determinateness, the natural and ethical powers or elementary substantive natures, because they belong to what is implicitly universal, to necessity, (α) emerge outside [the sphere of] necessity, because it is not yet explicitly posited in freedom as the concept,¹¹⁶ (β) [but] at the same time, as universal powers, remain held within its unity and power.¹¹⁷ (γ) Equally, and for the same reason (the lack of freedom), they emerge in opposition to one another and are [present as] a multitude of particular powers. [They are] determinateness [that is] not [yet] returned within itself, [that is] not determined determinateness.

At this point, therefore, they are divine powers in general. Necessity is of itself nothing divine, i.e., it is not the divine. One can admittedly say, God is necessity, in other words necessity is one of his characteristics, though it is as yet unconsummated; but one cannot say, necessity is God, for necessity does not exist as idea;
52 it is [only] an abstract concept. |

But the divine character of Nemesis resides in the fact that it is related to subsistent reality, whereas ~these¹¹⁸ powers are divine inasmuch as they are in themselves *differently* determined by necessity; as a result—being both distinct from one another and held within the [grip of] necessity—they are [present] as a unity of the wholly universal and particular.

(e) However, these powers are now further determined, as follows. In their separateness from the one necessity, they are, on the one hand, external to it, and therefore unmediated objects (immediate in the bad sense), natural existents such as sun, sky, earth, sea, mountains, human beings, or kings, something that is intuited or represented; ~on the other hand, while remaining positively related to necessity, as divine beings they are at the same time sublated in it—in other words, at the same time they do not subsist in themselves

116. W_2 reads: The particular divine powers belong to what is implicitly universal, to necessity, but they emerge outside the sphere of necessity because it is not yet explicitly posited as the concept and characterized as freedom.

117. W_2 reads: The concept is not yet unveiled, and the aspect of its determinate being does not yet contain the content of necessity. But this also means that the freedom of the particular is only the semblance of freedom and that the particular powers are held within the unity and power of necessity.

118. W_2 reads: to an even greater extent these particular

[as immediate objects]. <[The natural existents] are only appearance—> they are not divine, not God or the gods in their immediacy. [46a] *That*¹¹⁹ would be a falling back into the first type of nature religion, where the inward [element], the universal, has not yet achieved the separation of the two [aspects—i.e., the natural and the divine] from each other in thought; it has not arrived at the moment of *relationship*, the moment where determinacy is what necessity essentially and simply contains within itself, the moment in which the immediate is only something posited and sublated.

But further, this immediate or external aspect, these natural objects, are not appearance in the sense that their essence, their being within necessity, [and their] positive relation to it, should only subsist as a thought in us, as when we speak of forces of nature and so forth that exist only in an immediate, external form, in single phenomena (as we call them). A phenomenon of this kind is on the one hand positive, and on the other hand either transitory or permanent—i.e., it disappears like light or abides like earth. These are natural essences, but in their universality they are present only as our thought (e.g., light [as] identity). Thus God reveals himself for us in nature, | but not for sense perception (the relation to phenomena of this kind as natural), for reflection. We can, if we choose, stand pat upon their sensuous or reflected finitude and externality. Forces are *universal* powers but not divine powers (just as God is not a force). On the one hand forces, [according to] their content, as it exists for reflection, [are] finite; on the other hand their determinate being or immediacy [occurs] only in singular, dependent, contingent modes that are determined from somewhere else as well.

53

But the natural or external implicitly has to be posited as at the same time sublated in its externality; it has to be posited in itself as *appearance*. The inward element itself has as such to become apparent in it, the universal has to exist as posited, so that externality is there and has meaning wholly and simply as this kind of externalization; it is the organ of thought, of the universal, thought as

119. *W₂ reads*: On the other hand, they also remain held by necessity, so that the natural state is sublated in them. If these powers were not still the divine essentialities according to their natural, immediate mode of *existence*, this

such exists in it. It is necessity that must appear in divine fashion, i.e., it must be there in determinate being as necessity in immediate unity with it. ([It must be] posited necessity, i.e., necessity that is there, existing as simple reflectedness-into-self.)

Posited necessity is freedom, for it is determinacy negated according to its reality, the negative present to consciousness as negative, not lost from sight (for then it *is* not); [46b] [it is] simple necessity present here in the world as something simple one can point to. (Religion is the presence of essence for self-consciousness; simple necessity (universality) is to be there for the immediate, intuiting consciousness.) In absolute necessity determinacy [is] reduced to no more than the unity of immediacy (it *is* so). Determinacy [as specific] is jettisoned [in favor of] the fixity that¹²⁰ holds fast to the empty predicate of being. But necessity that exists as determinate being is for the immediate intuition a determinate natural being which in its very determinacy takes itself back into its simplicity, and portrays this return to simplicity itself [as] a mode of determinate being which, being only in this process, exists for that very reason in freedom. 54 ([It is] determined determinacy—determinacy as | negativity, as reflected into self, submerging itself in simple necessity; [it is] self-relating determinacy—subjectivity, the power of the one.)

~ A reality of this kind, however,¹²¹ is the spiritual shape, the human shape. Only the human shape is the mode of determinate being that is free being. It is a¹²² natural mode of determinate being, something for immediate perception to see and feel, to picture to itself in an image, in images that have this kind of sensuous content; and it is simple necessity, a simple relation to self ~—it heralds thought. The eye, the face, (features,) speech—it is all just something natural, even as thinking activity. The process of transforming, dissolving, fusing each and every contact into simple identity [is] the reaction that gives notice of something determinate, which is there

120. *W₂ reads:* But in this way the determinacy, the content, is jettisoned, and the fixity and freedom of the mind that holds fast to this form of intuition consists solely in the fact that it

121. *W₂ reads:* Now the reality for this process of necessity that is there as determinate being

122. *W₂ adds:* sensuous,

in the world, and simultaneously is for that very reason¹²³ an utterance of spirit.¹²⁴

(f) This configuration [of necessity] has still to be defined in more detail. (I do not just come face to face with this simplicity or absolute reflection.) Life is | essentially just this infinitude of free being-in-the-world, and as a living thing, this subjectivity is what reacts against unmediated determinacy and posits it as identical with itself in its sensibility. But it does so in such a way that the sensation of the brute is present infinitely in a determinate content; in other words, the utterance, the determinate being of its infinitude has simply and solely ■ determinate content—the content is limited, (is absolutely formal,) [but] it is not the simple immediacy of necessity (thought) that comes into appearance. ([The animal is] wholly transposed into a state characterized only by singularity, from which it does not emerge but remains sunk in simple necessity. To eat like a beast—even here human satisfaction [is] not being simply sunk in the satisfaction of physical needs; a spiritual aspect [is] to be seen even here, [humanity] rises above it; [and the same is] even more the case in an infinity of other modes of outward expression. [They must] rest upon thought, have its form upon them, [possess] formal independence. But further, if we consider an actual human being, whether now alive or remembered in thought, such a being is one who thinks, whose mode of expression is thought, though at the same time such a being, as immediate and natural, is something fallen away

55

123. *W₂ reads:* whereby it heralds thought. Every contact, every utterance, is directly transformed, dissolved, fused into simple identity, and is for that very reason essentially

124. *W₂ adds:* This [logical] connection is not easy to grasp, that the basic determination, the conceptual aspect, is absolute necessity while the aspect of reality whereby this concept becomes *idea* is the human shape. In general, it is essential to the concept to possess reality. This determination is more specifically involved in necessity itself, since it is not abstract being, but what is determined in and for itself. Now because the determinacy is at the same time natural, external reality, it is simultaneously taken back into simple necessity, so that what is displayed in this variegated sensuous content is simple. It is only when the divine is no longer constituted by necessity but by spirit that it is intuited wholly in the element of thought. But at this stage the moment of external visibility is still present, even though simple necessity displays itself therein. It can do this only in the case of the human shape, because this is the shape of what is spiritual and only in this shape can reality be taken back for consciousness into the simplicity of necessity.

56 from universality, | [immersed] in temporal and transient life, an infinitude of singular purposes, dependent circumstances, and so on. The disharmony¹²⁵ between what humanity is in itself (implicitly) and what it is in actuality obscures its universality and freedom through a host of relationships based on need. [Human beings] lack the inner reflection of infinity; instead there is within them the showing (shining) of what is other [i.e., of nature]. [47a]

¹²⁶But that their determinate being should be imbued in all its features (or parts) with the imprint of universality, or of the simplicity of necessity,¹²⁷ that is what constitutes necessity, that the external shape should be conceived solely in the spirit and begotten solely from it;¹²⁸ it should be an ideal, a work of art, an ennobling, an erasing of what is merely natural (needs (that belong to our [natural] form)); and it should be made by human agency.

125. *W₂ reads:* But the organic life of the animal, i.e., the determinate being and utterance of its infinitude, has simply and solely a limited content, it is sunk wholly in singular states. The simplicity into which this determination is taken back is something limited and purely formal, and the content does not match this form that it has. In thinking human beings, however, the *spiritual* is expressed even in their singular states, thus showing that even in this or that limited state humans transcend their limits, they are free and at home with self. It is very easy to distinguish whether people behave in a human or an animal fashion in satisfying their needs. The human is a delicate fragrance that spreads over everything one does. Moreover the content of human life is not purely organic but includes an infinite range of higher expressions, activities, and purposes whose content itself is the infinite, the universal. Humanity is thus the absolute reflection-into-self that we have in the concept of necessity. . . .

Actual, single human beings, however, still implicitly have the aspect of immediate naturalness in their immediate mode of being; this aspect appears as something temporal and transient that has fallen away from universality. This aspect of finitude introduces a disharmony

126. *W₂ adds:* Not all features and parts of individual human beings bear the imprint of simple necessity. Empirical singularity and the expression of simple inwardness are mingled, and the freedom and universality [that constitute] the ideality of the natural are blurred by the conditions of merely natural life and by a host of relationships based on need. In regard to the aspect that an other shines through in human beings, the appearance does not correspond to the shape, i.e., to simple necessity.

127. *W₂ adds:* (what Goethe appositely termed *significance* as the character of classical works of art)

[*Ed.*] Possibly belongs to the 1824 lectures; see 1824 n. 630.

128. *W₂ adds:* brought forth under its mediation;

~What is common or base [must be] (α) [worked on till it achieves] human shape, (the shape or form of spirit;) (β) made by human agency, [for this is] more excellent than being a natural product. ([It is not] as though natural products are made by God, works of art by human agency, | and not by God. There too [i.e., 57 in the natural order, things are made] of seed, air, water, etc.)¹²⁹ A plant is just the way it ought to be—there is no sundering of its [conceptual] being from its determinate being, as there is with human beings by virtue of their freedom and caprice, and in their infinite plasticity, even with respect to their natural life. Human beings look infinitely more dissimilar to one another than roses, for example. [Roses are] organic, like animals, but [there is] not in them the mediation that lies in necessity, not the determinacy that is at once specified, mutually external, and existing in the real order [*in dem Dasein*] as universality. Fine art [produces] (a multitude of figures that are divine powers, godlike, blessed, but still definite individuals; the overwhelming elemental power of nature, the titanic element has receded to the fringes of the world).

~Real spiritual being [*geistiges Dasein*] speeds on ahead of the *consciousness* of the content—the content [is] not yet spirit. However, this real being [is] not superficial: it thinks, but it is not spirit (in itself, not spirit in its universality.)¹³⁰

(α) Spirituality [has here] the nature of the objective or divine because necessity [issues] from it into determinacy and differentiation, and [the objective or divine is] identical with itself in this determinacy

129. *W₂ reads:* This is more excellent than being a natural product. It may, of course, be said that a natural product rather is more excellent, because it is made by God, and works of art only by human agency—as though natural objects did not also owe their existence to immediately natural, finite things such as seed, air, water, and light, and as though the power of God lived only in nature and not in human activity too, in the realm of the spiritual.

130. *W₂ reads:* At this stage, where the divine still needs the sensuous for its essential portrayal, it appears as a multiplicity of gods. It is, to be sure, in this multiplicity that necessity portrays itself as simple reflection-into-self; but this simplicity is only form, for that in which it is portrayed is still immediacy, the natural sphere, not the absolute stuff of spirit. So it is not spirit as spirit that is portrayed here. Instead, real spiritual being speeds on ahead of the consciousness of the content, for the content is not yet itself spirit.

as its own otherness.¹³¹ This is not the necessity by which objects are necessary, or have necessity as their predicate, but the necessity that is itself the subject | (and the subject in its predicates is external reality). Necessity is the subject.

(β) The various gods [are at this stage still] many, because [this is] still the realm of nature, not necessity for its own sake; universals [are here] not an object for universals; [we do] not [have] the idea in the element of thought.

(γ) The meaning [is], more precisely, this differentiation. The natural element [has] retired into the background; the meaning [is] spiritual or ethical. Helios [is] a Titan, Apollo is more a knowing [God]. Zeus [is] the power of the state (Athena [comes] out of Neith¹³²). [There are still] echoes of nature: Isis [is] Cybele, Bacchus [is] wine, but [they are at the same time] mystical emanations of spirit; Ceres [is] the fruit but also the lawgiver [who gives] ethical custom, legal right, and property. [It is] the spirits of the peoples, not just of natural elements, that are intuited in them.

(δ) [They are] still images, not at the same time living, spiritual, consciousness in themselves; [they are only] displayed physically in marble, paint, or metal. [Here we have] portrayal in corporeal form, not in the absolute stuff of spirit. The spiritual, inner element [is present] only as a determinate content that is itself limited.)

c. Cultus

α. *The Religion of Sublimity*

[The cultus is] more precisely the relationship of the individual, of self-consciousness [with the divine]. It is in the first place the knowledge of one's unity with thought. [God is known as] awesome might, as Lord, but as Lord he is without passion or the like. The

131. W₂ adds: While it tends to be the case that natural products only flourish given what are for them external, contingent circumstances, and under their influence, in a work of art it is necessity that appears as the inner soul and as the concept of the outer reality.

132. [Ed.] Hegel is here apparently alluding to the implicit identification of Neith, the goddess of Sais (an ancient city of the Nile delta), with Athena by Herodotus, *Histories* 2.28, 59. Relying on this and on an anecdote recounted by Plato in *Critias* 109–112, Creuzer developed this identification more fully, *Symbolik und Mythologie*

relationship of abstract identity [is] *exclusive*: [God is] inwardly universal power, but vis-à-vis the concrete he is only negative. [God's power is] identical with the concrete, but at the same time not. [The viewpoint is] blinkered.

~[As] the relationship of self-consciousness, the cultus [is] the movement it undertakes in order to bring about identity. |

59

[Initial Version]

The basic character of this relationship is determined by the definition of God as Lord, the One, the essence, [47b] not yet inwardly concrete, not yet elaborated within himself, merely abstract power, abstract thought, the being-for-self of the One. In this relationship, therefore, self-consciousness begins to become being-for-self, though without breadth or extension, subjectivity for self without any concrete characteristics. No determinacy that in other respects appears as finite is treated as holy; God is inwardly undetermined, infinite power, Lord; there is no *tertium quid*, no determinate being, in which they [the individual worshipers and God?] might find themselves together. There is so far an immediate relation; but equally the absolute is simply and solely a beyond for self-consciousness, an absolute power.

The antitheses are united—a pure relation in pure thinking, the intuiting of “the One,” pure thinking and an abstract | return into self; [thus] being-for-self [is achieved], but in such a way that pure thinking stands over against it as absolute power.

60

Self-consciousness on its own account, distinct from its object which is pure thought and can only be grasped in thought, [is] an empty, formal self-consciousness, not inwardly determined. All real, fulfilled determining [lies] in an alien power; [apart from that there is] only this abstract being-for-self. As a result [we have] self-consciousness simultaneously in its absolute antithesis. [We have] self-consciousness, i.e., pure freedom, in absolute unfreedom, in other words the self-consciousness of the servant vis-à-vis the

2:642–643, 656, 658, suggesting that in order to understand the essential meaning of Minerva (Athena), it is necessary to go back to the Egyptian temples and the Saitic genealogy, in which Neith plays a central role. Hegel's point seems to be that the “spiritual” goddess Athena has evolved out of the nature-goddess Neith.

Lord.¹³³ (The Stoics and Skeptics [have this viewpoint], but their thinking is self-contained—that is to say, all content [becomes] true in and through my thinking, by being taken up into this objectivity. The object is for me this universal, [this] ground, as the criterion for all content. [There is] freedom as the form of the objective. [There is] something, thinking—abstract freedom [is] pure thinking, which thinks *nothing*, and the subjectivity of self-consciousness [is] precisely singularity, immediate determinacy; all content is not *thought*.)

Freedom exists only in concrete self-consciousness, i.e., my existence or objectivity [is] at the same time determined, raised to universality; thus [it becomes] my spiritual property.

~ Servitude is self-consciousness, reflection-into-self, pure freedom, but without inner content. Hence the content or determinacy is my immediate, sentient self-consciousness, the ego as *this* one. I am the purpose and content for myself as “this one”—infinitely selfish in

133. *W₂ reads:* The relationship of self-consciousness is to the *One*, so that it is initially an intuiting, a pure thinking of pure essence as pure might and absolute being, beside whom there is no other of equal rank. Now as reflection-into-self, as self-consciousness, this pure thinking is self-consciousness determined as infinite being-for-self, or freedom—but freedom without any concrete content. Thus self-consciousness is still distinct from actual consciousness; none of all the concrete determinations of spiritual and natural life, nothing from the fulfilled consciousness with its drives and impulses, or from the rich diversity of spiritual relationships, has yet been taken up into the consciousness of freedom. The reality of life still falls outside the consciousness of freedom, and freedom is not yet rational; it is still abstract, and there is still no fulfilled, *divine* consciousness.

However, since self-consciousness exists only as consciousness, but there is still no corresponding object present as object for the simplicity of thought and the determinacy of consciousness is not yet taken up [into thought], the ego is object to itself only in its abstract oneness with self, as unmediated singularity. Self-consciousness is accordingly without breadth or extension, without any concrete characteristics; God as infinite power is also inwardly undetermined, and there is no tertium quid, no determinate being, in which they [the individual worshipers and God?] might find themselves together. There is so far an immediate relation, and the antitheses—relation to the One in pure thinking and intuiting, and abstract return into self, being-for-self—are immediately united. Now since self-consciousness, as distinct from its object (which is pure thought and can only be grasped in thought), is an empty, formal self-consciousness, naked and not inwardly determined, and since, furthermore, all real, fulfilled determining belongs only to the [divine] power, in this absolute antithesis the pure freedom of self-consciousness turns into absolute unfreedom, or the self-consciousness is that of the servant vis-à-vis the Lord. Fear of the Lord is the basic characteristic of the relationship.

my immediate singularity. In this way the whole concrete content | in its empirical singularity [is] taken up into formal self-consciousness, wholly devoid of reason but clinging to this singularity—the immediate [self] as such. 61

[My] relation to the Lord [is] having my absolutely essential self-consciousness implicit in him; everything in me becomes as naught when it is set against him—only by him and through him [does it count]. At the same time [I have] reestablished *myself* absolutely [48a]; this content is for me, and I have taken it up into this intuition as the concrete element, justifying it in absolute terms through the relationship [to God]. ([We are] God's people to the exclusion of other peoples, set apart from them,¹³⁴ the *odium generis humani*,¹³⁵ on which the others—the goyim—get their own back for the heavy yoke they have to bear.) [Here we see the full] harshness of the antithesis: [on the one hand] fear of the Lord is the absolute religious duty, to regard myself as nothing, to know myself only as absolutely dependent—the consciousness of the servant vis-à-vis the master; [on the other hand] it is this fear that gives me absolute justification in my reestablishment. [47b]

[Later Version]

⟨(a) (α) [First,] as pure intuition self-consciousness is the pure thinking of pure essence (and of essence as pure might), i.e., of the

134. *W₂ reads*: For servitude is self-consciousness, reflection-into-self or freedom, but a freedom that lacks universal extension and rationality and has the immediate, sentient self-consciousness for its determinacy, for its content. The ego as *this* being in its immediate singularity is therefore purpose and content. In their relation to the Lord, servants have their absolute, essential self-consciousness; everything in them becomes as naught when it is set against him. But by so doing they are reestablished, absolutely on their own account, and their singularity, because it is taken up into this intuition as the concrete element, achieves absolute justification through this relationship. The fear wherein servants regard themselves as nothing restores their justification to them. But because the servile consciousness clings stubbornly to its singularity, because its singularity is taken up immediately into unity, such consciousness is exclusive,

135. [Ed.] Hegel is here alluding to the ancient accusation, first leveled against the Christians following the burning of Rome, that they were guilty of hatred toward the whole of the human race. See Tacitus, *Annals* 15.44. Elsewhere Tacitus directed the charge of hatred toward other peoples against the Jews (*Histories* 5.5).

One as absolute being, beside whom there is no other of equal rank who *is*, but on the contrary [*all are not*].

(β) [Second,] as reflection-into-self, as self-consciousness, this pure thinking is self-consciousness characterized by infinite being-for-self, or freedom.

(γ) However, this freedom is without any concrete content. In other words, nothing from the fulfilled consciousness, with its drives and impulses, or from the rich diversity of spiritual relationships, has yet been taken up into the consciousness of this freedom—the reality of life falls outside it. This freedom is not yet rational, it is quite abstract; there is still no fulfilled, *divine* consciousness.

62 (δ) However, since self-consciousness exists only as consciousness, but there is still no corresponding object present as object for the simplicity of thought (the determinacy of consciousness is not yet | taken up [into thought]), I am here the object for myself, i.e., I am taken up into pure self-consciousness only in my abstract oneness with self, and as having abstract objective being, or unmediated singularity.

(ε) But this taking up does not include all the reality and fulfillment of this singular consciousness (its outer and inner world). “I for myself” am completely empty and naked, and all this fulfillment belongs only to [the divine] power, i.e., my consciousness knows itself through and through as dependent, as unfree. The relationship [is that] of the servant to a Lord; the fear of the Lord is what defines it. In any religion, such as Judaism or Islam, where God is comprehended only under the abstract category of the One, this human lack of freedom is the real basis, and humanity’s relationship to God takes the form of a heavy yoke, of onerous service. True liberation is to be found in Christianity, in the Trinity.

(ζ) Through the mediation of its onerous service the consciousness regains a concrete existence; its being is wholly the gift of [the divine] power. As service rendered to this power, its service is not a mode of action that is rational on its own account; for in it self-consciousness has no inner freedom or extension. [It is a matter of] commandments as such, of orders; laws and service alike [are just] the Lord’s commands. But laws governing what is one’s *own*, i.e.,

the laws of freedom, call for reason, for one's own insight and [a system of] right.

(η) Because there is no extension [of self-consciousness], no rationality, the servile consciousness [can] never escape from its singularity, i.e., it [remains] wayward, obdurate, stiff-necked. Also it is exclusive of others: only this single, unmediated [being, i.e., Abraham] is taken up [48a] into [the divine] unity; and just because it is unmediated, the singularity is exclusive—a singularity that is natural and gains its extension through nature as a family and a people.)

(b) Such is the disposition in the cultus [at this standpoint]—the determination of self-consciousness. ([The latter is] now a consciousness or representation of its relationship [to God. This is] the mode of [its] mediation.) The detailed characteristics [are as follows].

~(α) The | self-consciousness is [that of] a people that is God's, 63
but a people accepted through a bond of covenant (a bond conditional on fear and service). In other words, the self-conscious community is no longer in original, immediate unity inwardly as in nature religion, and only outwardly having a natural object over against it as God—(a division that is quite without essence since the rind that separates the two is merely a natural representation.¹³⁶ Here, in contrast, the division enters into absolute, pure thought)—whereas [self-consciousness] (begins from) absolute reflection into itself as abstract being-for-self. (Hence there enters here the mediation between self-consciousness and its absolute essence)—but at the same time not as humankind in the sense of universality; [there is no awareness] that human beings | stand in relationship to God as 64
human beings. The relationship is a particular character, (indeed a singular character, this or that human being); on its human side one can call it *accidental*. (For the absolute power everything finite is external; the finite is not a positive determination within God

136. [Ed.] "The rind that separates the two," in the case of nature religion, is the idol that stands between the cultic community and God, whereas in the case of Judaism the division between the people and God enters into pure thought.

himself.) (As far as God is concerned, an eternal counsel [determines all].) [The people's] entrance into religious relation with God is therefore a particular mark, not one among others but an outstanding privilege of infinite significance.¹³⁷ God's people is the one that he has accepted on condition that they shall fear him, and have the basic feeling of their dependence,¹³⁸ i.e., of their servitude. [He is their] national god. [The scope of this servitude is] broadened in Islam (being cleansed of nationalism), and at a later date [there are] also Jewish proselytes [in Judaism]. In Islam it is only being a *believer* that matters. [This is] not obstinacy but *fanaticism*, because although nationality, (natural associations,) family connections, homeland, etc., remain (limited connections, stable relationships are permitted), the service of the One logically involves the unlimitedness and instability of all subsistence. (God's acceptance has occurred once and for all, and what replaces reconciliation and redemption is something that has implicitly *happened*, a choice, an election by grace involving no freedom. [We have here a] view grounded on power, a blind election, not an election made from the viewpoint of freedom.)¹³⁹

137. *Ms. margin*: ((α) This particular [people]. (β) Not the original or implicit [unity which is a matter of] God's love for humanity, but this unity is posited externally. (γ) [On] condition [of dependence and service])

138. [Ed.] Hegel alludes here for the first time in the main text of the *Ms.* to the just-published first volume of Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt* (Berlin, 1821), § 9. See below, nn. 256 and esp. 292.

139. *W₂ reads*: God's people is one that has been accepted through bond and covenant, on condition of fear and service. The self-conscious community is no longer an original, immediate unity with essence, as was the case in nature religion. The external shape of essence in nature religion is merely a natural representation, a rind, that does not truly separate the two sides of the religious relationship, i.e., it is a division that is quite without essence, just a superficial difference. Our present standpoint, on the contrary, is based on absolute reflection-into-self as abstract being-for-self, and hence there enters here the mediation of the relationship between self-consciousness and its absolute essence. However, self-consciousness is not humanity as such, in the sense of universal humanity. The religious relationship is a particularity that on its human side can be called "accidental," for everything finite is external for the absolute power, and involves no positive determination within God himself. But this particular character of the religious relationship is not one characteristic among others, but an outstanding privilege of infinite significance. What the relationship consequently means is that this people is accepted on condition that they shall have

(β) As [divine] service the cultus takes many forms, first of praise in general, and secondly of sacrifice. (The cultus [is] merely the effort to continue as well-pleasing to the Lord, in one's servitude.) Sacrifice does not simply mean (symbolically) renouncing one's finite side, [48b] maintaining one's union with the Lord, but is more precisely the recognition | of him as Lord, bearing witness to him of one's 65 fear and, by so doing, liberating and redeeming everything else [for one's use]. [The worshipers give] the tenth part of all their possessions: the firstborn of them all belongs to the Lord, or must be redeemed.¹⁴⁰ (Blood and life's increase is the Lord's; blood [is] not eaten, [but] the altar [is] sprinkled with it.¹⁴¹ There is no human lordship over nature in and for itself.) (And what [the Lord's servants] receive is the temporal possession of the [promised] land, not everlasting felicity, nothing eternal (for servants have nothing of that kind), no intuition or consciousness of the unity of one's soul—of an inward [life]—with the absolute. For they¹⁴² still have no inner space or extension, no soul of [sufficient] scope, such as would aim to find satisfaction within itself; it is the temporal [world] that is their soul's fulfillment and reality. What the individual yearns for is not reconciliation with God, not that the *soul* should be spirit objectively, that it should be satisfied as such, that it should be self-contained as idea or as its own reality (resting virtuously upon itself).

the basic feeling of their dependence, i.e., of their servitude. This relationship between infinite power and what has being-for-self is therefore not the kind that is posited in itself originally, or only through God's love for humanity; on the contrary, this unity is posited in an external way, it is founded in the *covenant*. And this acceptance of the [Jewish] people has occurred once and for all, and replaces that which is redemption and reconciliation in the consummate form of the revelatory religion.

140. *W₂ reads:* Human beings cannot regard nature as something they can use as they please, so they cannot simply lay hold on it directly but must obtain their desires through the mediation of someone or something else. Everything is the Lord's and must be redeemed from him; thus the tenth part of their possessions is set aside, and the firstborn is delivered up for ransom.

[*Ed.*] Cf. Exod. 13:2, 13; 23:16, 19.

141. [*Ed.*] Cf. Lev. 1:5, 11; 3:2.

142. *W₂ reads:* The reward for service is temporal possessions, nothing eternal, not everlasting felicity. The intuition and consciousness of the soul's unity with the absolute or of the soul's being received into the bosom of the absolute is not yet aroused. Human beings

Here there is] no *immortality*. [The individual] does not demand [immortality] for the soul: the servant [is] only a temporal being, and the servant's rewards are in time—the [promised] land.

66 The land they dwell in they have received from the Lord, not like people who inhabit the earth [because they have] taken possession of it, but as an exclusive possession, which [nonetheless] can be taken from them by others, and which they do not claim to be theirs by right, as against others. Rather it is the land that the Lord has given them—[it is not theirs by right] any more than there is any question of others having a right (in the same way as the Turks [recognize] no treaty rights, truce guarantees, or property rights as belonging to those who have submitted). [They are] <without rights> and [must] redeem [the land] continually in order to retain their share of it. | [They] took the land by force from the inhabitants of Palestine because God promised it to them. [They might say, "It is] not mine by right, therefore it does not [belong] to the others either." "Right" [means that] the ego [enjoys] extension, objectivity in [its] existence, freedom.

Hence [there is] no legal right among them, but [only] inheritance [of the share received] when the land was divided out—also no proper selling of land, merely the leasing of it; for after forty-nine years everything reverted in the jubilee year to the original family.¹⁴³

~Sacrifices [function] also as penance to expiate for transgressions and faults—and as punishment, not just for purification as such but to do hurt to an evil will, [with the] meaning of "damages." [All] sacrifice [is] external.^{~144} [49a]

β. *The Religion of Beauty*

<α. Spirit of the Cultus; Religious Self-Consciousness>

The relationship of abstract freedom, of the merely self-willed being-for-self, [to the divine] has its proximate truth in the fulfillment of this freedom, so that the object may not be in and for itself

143. [Ed.] Cf. Lev. 25.

144. *W₂ reads:* This externality of sacrifice derives from the fact that expiation is thought of as punishment, not as purification as such, but as doing hurt to the evil will, with the meaning of "damages."

something strictly otherworldly for self-consciousness, or so that this abstract certitude may be raised to an objectivity [of its own], to truth. Abstract freedom first attains to truth when I acquire a positive character in [the sphere of] being (mere subjectivity, feeling, certitude constitute untruth, and however I picture them to myself they are not); to have positive being is to have the intuition of antithesis [of self and world] as implicitly sublated and to know the essence as what is in itself concrete,¹⁴⁵ or as what has determinate being, determinacy within itself, in such a way that the determinateness belongs to its nature (not [as] power or the God of Abraham, | where [determinateness does] not [belong] to its nature as such). The determinateness is thus my determinateness, and determinacy in general is my reflection-into-self, and my distinctness is sublated by being intuited in the unity of the absolute. In this way I have a consciousness of truth in that my universal subjectivity, as particularity or differentiatedness, has come to fruition as objectivity, or subsistence within the absolute.

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The realm which self-consciousness has now entered is that of *truth*, i.e., of *rationality*, for reason [is] the implicitly subsisting objectivity of my consciousness, the fact that such objectivity subsists for me; and [it is the realm] of *freedom*, for that which differentiates or particularizes me is now itself implicitly identical with the universal. I am conscious of the unity of infinity with finitude; in other words, finitude has implicitly vanished. For finitude, [subsisting] solely in antithesis, no longer [has] any meaning in its unity with the infinite. It is itself only infinite form, and this infinite form is knowing, self-consciousness itself—the absolute known, precisely therewith, as spirit. [49b]

But we have already seen this object distinguished into two moments: absolute necessity and the spiritual, human shape. These two moments are still distinct: although determinacy has been posited within the universal, it is on the one hand abstract determinacy and, on the other, a manifold diversity given free rein and not yet taken back into unity. For this to happen would involve determinateness to [the point of] infinite antithesis being simultaneously accentuated

145. *Ms. margin*: (Spiritual religion [is] to worship God in spirit and as spirit)

ad infinitum (as in the religion of sublimity); for it is only when pushed to that extreme that the antithesis is at the same time capable of coming to unity with respect to itself. (Determinacy in its fully developed state, in the objectivity and universality that is then [present] with respect to it as such)—the whole circle of divine configurations—would itself have to be taken up into necessity, ([as] one God) in one pantheon. But the circle of gods can do this, they are worthy to do this, only if their manifoldness or diversity is universalized into simple distinction. Only then is the circle of gods commensurate with the element of necessity | and directly identical in itself. The spirits must be comprehended as *the* spirit; *the* spirit is their universal nature, which is inwardly concrete consciousness and at the same time universal, simple essence—as necessity, and then as One.

(α) In relationship to necessity, consciousness seems initially to be annihilated, to be related purely and simply to something beyond, and to find nothing here that is friendly to itself. But necessity does not take the form of one God for consciousness, which accordingly does not [subsist] for itself in this necessity.¹⁴⁶ In its relationship to him who is One, consciousness subsists for itself, seeks to subsist for itself, is preoccupied with itself. The servant has selfish ends in view in his service, in his subjection and fear, in his submissiveness to his lord. In the relationship to necessity, however, the subject is determined as not subsisting on its own account or for itself; it has surrendered itself up, retains no purpose on its own account—in fact, the worship of necessity is just what is meant by this orientation of self-consciousness, lacking all determinacy and antithesis. What tragic dramatists have nowadays accustomed us [50a] to call fate is the direct opposite of this orientation of self-consciousness. We speak of just and unjust, or merited, fate. We appeal to fate as an explanation, in other words [we see] the reasons for a situation, for what befalls individuals, i.e., their situation and circumstances (e.g., in [Schiller's] *Braut von Messina* an ancient curse upon the house¹⁴⁷), not in the actions of the | individuals themselves—on the

146. *W₂* adds: —in other words, is not a unity possessing selfhood in its immediacy.

147. [Ed.] Cf. Friedrich Schiller, *Die Braut von Messina*, vv. 1695–1969 et passim.

contrary the reasons, the ground for such a situation is an external necessity of nature that runs counter to the law of freedom and responsibility; [it is] unfreedom, and it presupposes an otherworldly ground; the ground [can be] only something otherworldly. The intuition or consciousness of necessity is rather the very opposite, namely, the [direct] transition, (mediation only as) the sublation of mediation, (argument and reflection being annulled).¹⁴⁸ We cannot speak of a *belief* in necessity, as if necessity were a matter of a nexus of causes, effects, and circumstances, as if it were present to consciousness in an objective shape. Rather, to say "It is necessary, it is the will of God," as do the Turks, is to have abandoned arguments in terms of causes and purposes—and in so doing, to have abandoned causes and purposes themselves; it is to imprison spirit in this simple abstraction. This present orientation of spirit presupposes an unconditional, abstract, and initially inward freedom, the voluntary surrender of what, as the saying goes, fate snatches away—or rather it is surrendered already. "Fate," here, is just a manner of speaking. This possibility imparts to noble, beautiful characters greatness and the peace of mind and unconstrained courage that forms a characteristic feature in the Oriental world.¹⁴⁹

(β) [Such are] the general characteristics of self-consciousness in this relationship. In the second place, however, the self-consciousness is related to God defined as a natural and ethical power, (a particular power) that is present in an external, sensibly visible spiritual shape. Just as in necessity self-consciousness surrenders its fulfillment or realization, its relation to an end, so here it recovers it: from thine

148. *W₂ reads:* Here we have an external connection between cause and effect, whereby a hereditary evil, an ancient curse that rests upon the house, etc., breaks out in the individual. In such cases the meaning of fate is that there is some ground, but at the same time it is an otherworldly one, and fate is then nothing but a nexus of causes and effects—causes which those on whom the fate falls must needs regard as finite although there is a hidden connection nonetheless between what those who suffer are on their own account and that which undeservedly befalls them.

The intuition and worship of necessity is rather the very opposite; all such mediation and all arguments about cause and effect are sublated in it.

149. *W₂ reads:* This orientation of spirit, which has [voluntarily] surrendered what, as the saying goes, fate snatches away, imparts to noble, beautiful characters greatness, peace of mind, and the unconstrained nobility that we also find in the ancients.

own passions, πάθεσι, O mortal, hast thou [50b] created the gods.¹⁵⁰
 70 It is not mere | powers of nature but the very powers and essential aspects that are proper to spirit¹⁵¹ that are here directly intuited and known as in and for themselves, known in their universality, free from appearance and contingency, intuited in their ideality. “Self-consciousness is accordingly conscious of *its* essentiality, its essence, in them: in them it is free. But (its own doing and being) are essential to it too, its genus, what it possesses and is conscious of in them, (its specific character, if you will, or particularity),¹⁵² not its singular individuality or subjectivity—as in the religion of the One, where just this immediate thereness, this natural existence of the subject, [is] the purpose or end, where individuals are not aware of their universality as essential, ~ (nor of their singularity [as essential either]);¹⁵³ the servant has selfish ends.”¹⁵⁴

On the one hand self-consciousness is hereby elevated above the

150. [Ed.] See Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Heathen* 2: “And some even of the philosophers, after the poets, make idols of forms of your passions [παθῶν], such as fear, and love, and joy, and hope” (*Ante-Nicene Fathers* [New York, 1885], 2:178).

151. *Ms. margin*: (Particular forms of essence: (αα) the particular essentiality of spirit, and hence its real, positive freedom)

152. [Ed.] The *Ms.* reads in the margin *Wohl s. Besonderheit*, which our text gives as *wohl seine Besonderheit* on the grounds that Hegel frequently began his marginal notations with capital letters. But it is also possible to read as *Wohl seiner Besonderheit* (“the well-being of its particularity”), as does the variant from *W₂* given in n. 154 (changing *seiner* to *ihrer* to agree with the feminine antecedent *Subjektivität*). But since it appears that *W₂* is here following the *Ms.* rather than *Hn*, it affords no additional information on the interpretation of the text.

153. *Ms. adds in margin*: ((αα) raised above their *immediate* singularity, which is defined [as] essential consciousness – fulfillment with *objective* power of this *substantive* kind)

W₂ reads: are raised above the concern about universality, and have their essential satisfaction in a substantive, objective power;

154. *W₂ reads*: In these powers self-consciousness has its own essential aspects as its object, and it is conscious of itself as free *in them*. But it is not the particular subjectivity that has itself as object in these essential aspects and knows the well-being of its particularity to be grounded in them (as in the religion of the One, where it is just this immediate thereness, this natural existence of the subject, that is the purpose or end, and individuals, not their universality, are what is essential, so that the servant has his selfish ends); here, on the contrary, in the divine powers self-consciousness has its genus, its universality as its object.

absolute demand for its immediate singularity; it is only the ethical,¹⁵⁵ the universally rational, or the law, that counts as essential in and for itself. The freedom of self-consciousness consists in the essentiality of its true nature, its rationality; that is the basis of right or law, of the ethical realm, | of the state in general, (of naive ethical life in general,) etc. On the other hand¹⁵⁶ the consciousness of infinite subjectivity is lacking (of humanity insofar as it is individual, or of individuals insofar as they are human beings), the consciousness that the ethical relationship and absolute right belong to humanity as such, that by virtue of being self-consciousness human beings have in this formal infinitude the right as well as the duty of the genus. Freedom or ethical life is the substantive aspect of humanity; and to know this to be so, and actually to posit their substantiality in freedom and ethical life, is what gives human beings value and dignity. But it is *formal* subjectivity, self-consciousness as such, the inwardly infinite (as opposed to merely natural, immediate) individuality which constitutes the possibility of such value, i.e., the real possibility, and which on account of this possibility itself is vested with infinite right, albeit [only] in the nature of formal right, [such as the right] of personal freedom, the right to property, etc.

The substantial ethical life [51a] does not simultaneously contain the infinite antithesis, the absolute, formal reflection of self-consciousness into itself; it does not involve morality, one's own conviction and insight.

155. Ms. margin: <(<ββ) Ideality – ethics) [For (αα) see n. 153]

156. Ms. margin: <(<ββ) Not the infinitude of formal self-consciousness, therefore (α) not morality and universal, infinite right. But the infinite being-for-self of self-consciousness [is] lacking, [so that we have] (α) slavery, (β) not a form of morality, (γ) not immortality.)

W₂ adds: Because the infinitude of formal subjectivity is not recognized in the naive ethical life [of the natural state], human beings as such are not *absolutely* valid, do not count as human in and for themselves, regardless of their inner fulfillment, place of birth, riches, poverty, community affiliation. Human freedom and the ethical realm are still *particular*, and the right of humanity is involved in contingency, so that at this stage there is essentially room for slavery. It is still a matter of chance whether one is a citizen of a particular state, whether one is free or not. Moreover, since the infinite antithesis is not yet present, and the absolute reflection of self-consciousness into itself (this culmination of subjectivity) is lacking, morality—as one's *own* conviction and insight—is not yet developed either.

72 (“Second,¹⁵⁷ inasmuch as the subject can acquire, in ethical life, an infinite value, | or inasmuch as individuality in general is taken up into universal substantiality, there emerges at this point¹⁵⁸ the representational image of the eternal character of the subjective individual spirit—the immortality of the soul. “In nature religion, [which is an] unmediated unity of natural and spiritual, there is no room for this way of viewing things, [because] spirit does not [exist] on its own account. Nor [did we] encounter it in the religion of the One,¹⁵⁹ because although spirit there [exists] on its own account, its freedom [is] abstract and unfulfilled. Hence its being is a purely natural one, not being as the determinate being of spirit within itself; it does not find satisfaction within itself, in the spiritual. [Instead we have] only the duration of the family, this natural extension and universality [of life], not the inward universality of spirit.”¹⁶⁰ But here [we have] self-consciousness inwardly fulfilled, spiritual; subjectivity [is] taken up into absolute essentiality and therefore known inwardly as idea, intuited; at this stage [we find] the representation of immortality. “[It is] more clearly defined in Socrates and Plato,¹⁶¹ [at] the time when morality [emerges]. Before that [we find it] only as a representational image that does not have absolute value in and for itself but is merely a general image, still not cognitively interpreted in the formal self-consciousness of infinitude [or as] inwardly sub-

73 sisting universality.”¹⁶² |

157. *Ms. reads:* (β)

158. *W₂ adds:* even if initially only as a weak semblance and not yet as an absolute postulate of spirit,

159. [*Ed.*] I.e., the religion of sublimity, or Jewish religion.

160. *W₂ reads:* At the stages we have considered previously, the postulate of the immortality of the soul still cannot occur (neither in nature relation nor in the religion of the One). In the former the unmediated unity of the natural and the spiritual is still the basic characteristic, and spirit does not exist on its own account. In the religion of the One, spirit exists on its own account of course, but it is still unfulfilled, its freedom is still abstract, and its being is still a natural one—the possession of a particular territory and its prosperity. But this is not being as the determinate being of spirit within itself, and the satisfaction does not lie in the spiritual. Duration is only duration of the tribe, of the family, of natural universality in general.

161. [*Ed.*] See Plato, *Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus* 245–251. On Hegel’s interpretation, see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:36–43 (*Werke* 14:206–215).

162. *W₂ reads:* However, this level of consciousness is more clearly defined when morality emerges, when self-consciousness penetrates deep within itself and reaches

Third, ~just as self-consciousness lacks this subjectivity for its part, so the objective essentiality lacks it too.) Consequently the particularizations of divine power also do not have this lofty¹⁶³ justification (or seriousness) either; for they can be justified only as moments of absolute subjectivity, as moments of *necessity* itself, or as rooted in this absolute unity that is reflected into itself. They are many different gods, and although their nature is divine their scattered plurality is at the same time a limited character, so that their divinity cannot quite be taken in earnest; and over self-consciousness and its many substantive essential aspects hovers this ultimate unity of absolute form constituted by necessity. ~As a result [self-consciousness is] freed, even in its objective behavior, from its¹⁶⁴ gods¹⁶⁵ ~[it is not confined to singular particularities—and at the same time from abstract necessity, in that abstract necessity unites the determinate with necessity].

This [is] what constitutes the absolute *serenity* of the religion of art, (not immediately [one] with nature). The extremes [are]: stern necessity, inflexibility, the finitude of indeterminate being; on the one hand there is the absolute superstition attached to natural objects—dryads, a hare that crosses one's path, everything [is taken to mean] something higher or divine; on the other hand there is the absolute presumptuousness, the finite self-consciousness inwardly advancing to the point of doing away with God or gods and looking to itself for its own security against and above everything. |

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the point where it recognizes as true, good, and right only what it finds congruent with itself and its thinking. That is why we find explicit discussion of the immortality of the soul in Socrates and Plato, whereas previously this representational image was regarded rather as merely a general one, such as did not have absolute value in and for itself.

163. *W₂ reads:* just as self-consciousness still lacks infinite subjectivity, the absolute point of unity of the concept, so its essentialities lack it too. This unity is part of what we have become familiar with as its necessity; but this necessity lies outside the range of the particular, substantive essentialities [the gods]. Like human beings as such, the particular essentialities have no absolute

164. [Ed.] Our reading assumes that the pronoun refers to "self-consciousness" (neuter) rather than "necessity" (feminine), as suggested by the *Ms.*

165. *W₂ reads:* And the result of this unity is at the same time to free self-consciousness from its gods (even in its relationship to them), so that it is serious about them, and again not serious.

β. The Cultus Itself

The spirit of this cultus should enable us to deduce its concrete actual form. But in this case what is characteristic [is] the diversity of its outward manifestations.

[(α)] The cultus [is] a serious playing and a playful seriousness, a gravity that is gay.

The focal point of this cultus is beauty. We have here entered the realm of spirit: spirit is sure of itself, it finds itself at home in all particular appearances, in all the particular powers and objects of nature and of spirit. The spiritual [is] embodied and immediately present, the corporeal is spiritualized. [51b]

(Abstract necessity will not tolerate any cultic relationship; it rejects the thought of positive, sustaining acceptance, such as sustains the individual self-consciousness in identity with itself. The intuiting or thinking of necessity is itself nothing but the orientation of spirit that submerges its particularity in the "It is so" of necessity.¹⁶⁶)

75 Self-consciousness has, however, a relationship to the wide circle of the gods, (even though [there is] something else in the background); [this relationship is] simply to pay homage to the gods, make them favorably inclined to it (τιμᾶν). They are | the natural or ethical powers that rule our lives; we find them realized in our immediate consciousness,¹⁶⁷ or they freely offer themselves in outward life for us to help ourselves to them at will (bread, crops, wine).

166. *Ms. margin:* (Relationship [to] the particular powers

(α) to the gods, meaning of this precise cultus –

(β) to their *universality* – their universal beyond – nature [as] a mystical essence – the antithesis a greater demand to render service – to put off the [old] self – on the [part of the] individual –

(γ) On the other hand – their contingency [and the] beyond – hence they [are] receivers.

Three sides or parts. [There is] no providence; God determines, he reveals, and in so doing determines. Oracles –)

[Above this marginal note:] ((β) to the universal essence, (γ) to the power of singularity. Consciousness [is] the intuition of a deeper essence in them and of a more serious relationship of individuality to them)

167. *W₂ reads:* 2. Worship or service too, as the attitude one adopts to the gods in their spiritual aspect, does not have the meaning of appropriating these powers for the first time to oneself, or for the first time becoming conscious of one's identity with them. For this identity is already present [to consciousness], and the worshipers find these powers already realized in their consciousness.

What does it mean then to gain the consciousness of identity with them? [They are] (α) delivered up to consciousness (without hindrance, insofar as they are objective); (β) directly identical with it.

(α) The gifts of nature offer themselves in friendly fashion for use.¹⁶⁸ This life, the trees, crops and springs, are there to be laid hold on, drawn upon, consumed (water yields to our touch); they fall into our lap, we eat and drink the wine; they nourish us and inspire our minds. [It is] this nourishment, of which they are an essential ingredient, [that is] their effect, not the action and reaction, the dreary, repetitious monotony of the mechanical sphere. Instead it is honored [as] something *spiritual* present in outward life, *spiritual* sustenance. We do honor to the natural powers as we eat and drink. What higher honor [can there be] for natural things than to become, to appear as, what gives strength for spiritual action? They inspire; [for instance, wine inspires, but]¹⁶⁹ it is human beings who first raise it to the level of what inspires and gives strength. Our sense of need leads us to thank the gods for relieving need in this way. (These natural objects exist without need, and therein lies their inferiority: in the absence of need they atrophy or dry up; as the gifts of nature they have us to thank for the fact that they come to something.) But in general | people do not stand in a relationship of need to the gifts of nature; need [arises] through ownership, the resolve of an infinite will,¹⁷⁰ through being alien and holding others at arm's length. By helping ourselves directly to the gifts of nature [we] enter into identity with them.

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(β) Determinate spirituality, however, be it legal right, ethical custom, law, science, wisdom, the spirit of the people, or a universal

168. *W₂ reads:* Now if the divine powers deliver themselves up as gifts of nature, and offer themselves in a friendly fashion for use, then the service [of the gods] by which the human worshippers gain the consciousness of unity with their powers has the following meaning.

169. *W₂ reads:* Wine inspires, but

170. *W₂ reads:* to this extent the relationship of need disappears. Our sense of need leads us to thank the gods for the receipt [of these gifts], and this sense presupposes a separation that it is not in human power to annul. Need proper first arises where something is owned by a will that will not give it up. But our relationship to the gifts of nature is not one of need understood in this way; on the contrary, the gifts of nature have us to thank for the fact that they come to something; without us they would atrophy, dry up, and pass uselessly away.

essence such as love (Aphrodite), is actualized in individuals (law-abiding citizens, scholars, lovers, etc.). What counts is *their* will, *their* inclination, passion, what they themselves will and do.

~Now if cultus [consists in] the actions whereby one gains the consciousness [of one's unity with the gods], then its content—this identity—is already directly present both for and in consciousness, and all that is still required to arrive at one's own sense of the cultus is) to make them favorable to one in a purely general way, by recognizing them.¹⁷¹

Religion [is] just this objectifying, just the form of consciousness. [It is] not the drawing of the [divine] thing to oneself, as something alien, such as would keep to itself and impose conditions of arduous service, requiring to be wooed from its inflexibility (the Lord, greatly to be feared). But the form it takes is the consciousness of this unity as a unity with universal powers, or the elevation of the powers from the level of enjoyment, taking enjoyment and use—one's own being, willing, and doing—back out of the immediate identity of feeling, volition, etc., imbuing them with theoretical objectivity (as compared with our representational image), and so recognizing and worshiping them as powers. This theoretical objectivity is the work of phantasy, not of abstract thought: that they have their own implicit being, embracing an abstract, universal being-in-self in opposition to humanity—for example, God as essence, and specifically as the power over nature, or natural objects in the relationship of effects, something inwardly dependent [upon him]. Theoretical objectivity, however, leaves them in their determinate | being; it raises the particular features in their determinate content from the level of dependence, and in making them independent figures on their own account it gives them at the same time universal sensibility, ideality. [52a]

As far as we are concerned, [this does] violence [to our thought]. We can, to be sure, join in the phantasy, the phantasy of ideal beauty, but we cannot take it seriously in this way. Trees, wine, springs, mountains, cities, artifacts, legal relationships, modes of life,

171. *W₂ reads:* All that therefore remains for the cultus is to recognize these powers, honor them, and so raise up identity into the form of consciousness and make it theoretical objectivity.

agriculture, or land-surveying—it is beyond us, not to raise such things to the level of an abstraction or thought, but to offer them incense, prayers, sacrifices for their own sake, to recognize them as independent powers on their own account, possessing a will of their own. We cannot attain to the full seriousness of this antithesis, which lies in the lack of absolute subjective unity: particular configurations fall outside the limits of necessity. (This [is for us] the limit, [we can] not pass beyond it and endow them with personality over against us. Infinite subjectivity consumes them, reduces them to beautiful images of phantasy.)¹⁷²

(Such veneration in the form of sacrifices, or however it may be, [is] something intermediate: the offerings are brought and consumed, and the worshiper enjoys the best share of them.)

Now the cultus of these gods cannot be called service in the proper sense of the term; it is not service to an alien, independent will the contingent resolves of which would constitute the goal to be pursued. The veneration itself provides already an anticipatory reward, or is itself the enjoyment [of the sacrifice]. It is therefore not a question of calling a power back to oneself from the other world where it resides, | and to this end putting away, in order to be acceptable to it, whatever on the subjective side of self-consciousness constitutes the separation. It is therefore not a question of doing without, of renouncing or putting away a subjective idiosyncrasy, not a matter of dread, self-torture, or self-torment. The cult of Bacchus and Ceres is the possession and enjoyment of bread and wine, the consumption of which [produces] immediate gratification. The spiritual powers are thus the distinctive powers of self-consciousness itself.

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172. *W₂ reads:* If we compare this objectivity with our viewpoint, then we too raise the universal out of our immediate consciousness and *think* it. We can also go so far as to elevate these universal powers to the ideal and endow them with a spiritual shape. But to pray or sacrifice to such images, that is the point at which we part company with this intuition [of the divine]; we cannot go so far as to ascribe to these images (for all that they are not products of the imagination but essential powers) singular independence, personality over against ourselves. Our consciousness of the infinite subjectivity as a *universal* subjectivity consumes these *particular* powers and reduces them to the level of beautiful images of phantasy, whose content and meaning we do indeed know how to appreciate but which we cannot regard as genuinely independent.

Athena, whom the Athenians worship, is their very own city, their spirit, their technical and artistic talent; the muse that Homer invokes is at the same time his genius, his power of composition; Aphrodite, worshiped as goddess, is [also] the love of the individual worshiper. In Phaedra, Hippolytus comes to grief because he worships only Diana [52b] and spurns love, which takes its revenge on him. His pathos lies in hunting, and he is ignorant of love.¹⁷³ For Racine,¹⁷⁴ in the French reworking of the legend, to give Hippolytus another object of passion is stupidity. For it is then no punishment inflicted by love as pathos that he suffers but just the ill luck that he has fallen in love with one girl and therefore pays no heed to another woman—admittedly she is his father's wife, but this ethical impediment is obscured by his love for Aricia. The cause of his downfall is thus not the injury or disregard of a universal power as such, nothing ethical, but a detail of life, a mere contingency.

It is also true, however, that the universal powers withdraw again, and recede far from the individual. The spring lets us draw from it freely, the sea lets us travel across it; but then too it is whipped up into storms, and (like the constellations) it is not only complaisant to humanity but terrible and catastrophic. The muse too is not always complaisant to the poet; she withdraws and serves him ill (though the poet invokes her only when he is writing, and his invocation, like his prize, is itself poetry). Athena herself does not keep troth; spirit, God does not keep troth. | The inhabitants of Tyre bound their Hercules with chains so that he should not leave their city—his reality, his actual existence.¹⁷⁵ Tyre fell, Athens was made subject to the Spartans, and so on. Magic offered a possible means of circumventing such alienation of their essential aspect, which

173. [Ed.] See Euripides, *Hippolytus*, esp. the dialogue between Artemis and Hippolytus, vv. 1389–1400.

174. [Ed.] Racine, *Phèdre*, esp. act 4, sc. 2 (Hippolytus to Theseus) (cf. Racine, *Œuvres complètes* [Paris, 1950], 1:786). Hegel's view accords closely with the interpretation of A. W. Schlegel, with which he was familiar, *Comparaison entre la Phèdre de Racine et celle d'Euripide* (Paris, 1807).

175. [Ed.] See Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 17.41, 46; also Plutarch, *Lives* 24 (Alexander). Hegel probably spoke mistakenly of a binding of Hercules because Hercules was the god of Tyre. Also the practice in Tyre of binding the statue of Hercules-Melkarth led Creuzer to assume a long-standing custom; see Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:178–179, 2:215 ff.

would lead to absolute scission or internal rupture, a means of combating it, an expression of the will to draw [the powers back] to oneself, as it were by violence of the spirit and of the cultus. But all such particular powers, and with them particular purposes, tended (to sink) into necessity and were in this way themselves surrendered.¹⁷⁶

The cultus accordingly consists in these universal powers being emphasized for their own sake and recognized [53a]—thought grasps the essential, substantive element in its concrete life. A meditative reflection underlines the universal powers, not remaining dully buried and distracted in the empirical singularity of life, or capable of rising out of it only to the abstract One, the infinite beyond; on the contrary, it is the sense that remains present to itself and at the same time underlines the true, the Platonic idea, in its manifold determinate being, becomes conscious of it, intuitively and portrays it to itself, and in the course of recognizing and honoring this universal, is itself present in the enjoyment. This [is] the presence of spirit in its essential aspects, and spirit [is here] conscious of them; hence this is on the one hand the thinking theoretical relationship that is worthy of the name, and on the other hand it is the joyfulness, serenity, and freedom that is sure of itself, and at home with itself, in them.

~ This cultus is consequently itself in part *poetry*, thinking phantasy, | which thinks and highlights the universal essences, setting them before itself in an intuitable, portrayable form, breathing life into them, clothing them, and raising them to autonomy.¹⁷⁷ On the one hand these powers split up *ad infinitum*; all the mountains, grottoes, springs, trees, and so on are spiritual powers that admittedly form a self-contained circle; but because they are particular, they tend toward the infinity of relations found in actuality. ~ (Every god is conceived in a broadly particularized relation: Pallas Athena as

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176. *W₂ reads:* However, such alienation of their essential aspect, leading to absolute scission or rupture of inner life, would oblige worshipers to draw the powers back to themselves, as it were by the violence of the spirit in the cultus (with the associated risk of lapsing into magic). The individual cannot enter into infinite antithesis to these particular powers, for as particular purposes they are submerged in necessity and are themselves surrendered in it.

177. *W₂ reads:* In Greek life, however, poetry, thinking phantasy, is itself the essential form of divine service.

a power armed with lightning, skill, dexterity, [goddess] of wisdom and knowledge, of the Muses and the fine arts, of spinning and technical [skills], of particular states or sections of the populace; (Hercules as abstract strength, the sun, labors, renown, and so on).¹⁷⁸ On the other hand it is in the human, sentiently spiritual shape that the ideal is to be portrayed. For these reasons the portrayal is inexhaustible, [53b] each model being continually carried further and replenished by another. For religious life itself consists in this continuous passage from empirical existence to the ideal. There is no hard-and-fast, spiritually determined body of teaching or doctrine here, no truth as such in the form of thought, (in other words, it is not faith); but the divine [is present] in this immanent, immediate connection with actuality, so that it is always *in* actuality and arises *from* actuality (which is always there in its externality); the divine is constantly raising itself and bringing itself forth anew. ~[Its] consummation [is] in art: Homer or the Jupiter of Phidias established [the divine] for phantasy. [Conversely this marks] a decline of religious vitality.¹⁷⁹ |

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(Sacrifice involves giving up, offering, depriving oneself of something, but here [the God] as a particular power is sacrificed too.) Hence sacrifice does not here have the sense of sacrificing one's inner life and its fulfillment;¹⁸⁰ on the contrary, it is rather just this fulfillment that is confirmed and itself enjoyed. To perform a sacrifice¹⁸¹ can only mean on the one hand recognition of the universal power; [it is] the theoretical surrender of a part [only], i.e., a

178. *W₂ reads:* (how many particular relations are comprehended, for instance, in Pallas!).

179. *W₂ reads:* Once this active production has been consummated through art, once phantasy has achieved its final, enduring shape so that the ideal has been established, then the decline of religious vitality is in train.

But as long as this standpoint exerts a fresh and active productive force, the highest assimilation of the divine consists in the fact that the subject makes the god present through itself, brings him into appearance in itself. This means that the conscious subjectivity of the god remains at the same time on one side, as something beyond, so that the portrayal of the divine in this way is simultaneously the recognition and veneration of its substantive essentiality.

180. *W₂ reads:* the inner life or concrete fulfillment of spirit;

181. *Ms. margin:* ([In regard to] human sacrifice [see] La Croix, *Myst.* I, p. 276 – [citing] Thucyd. I, chap. 126 – “jeune et beau Cratinus; lorsqu’Epimenide purifiait les habitants de’Attique après le massacre de Cylon et de ses partisans.”)

surrender which confers no benefit ([or] which serves no practical purpose, i.e., does not further one's ends or one's enjoyment)—a beaker or goblet of wine is poured out on the ground. But at the same time the sacrifice is itself enjoyment: the wine is drunk, the meat is eaten. (It is the natural power itself whose singular external and determinate being is sacrificed and destroyed.) Eating is sacrificing, and sacrificing is to eat [what is sacrificed] oneself. In this way a higher significance attaches to all activities of life, and [there is] this enjoyment in partaking of them, not denying oneself, not as it were asking for forgiveness for eating and drinking, but every activity, everything we enjoy in everyday life, is a sacrifice; it is not the offering up of a possession or property, but a theoretical, artistic enjoyment idealized by meaning, a form of freedom and spirituality in one's daily, immediate life, a continuous thread of poetry running through life. (Such [is] this cultus in general: ideal, artistic enjoyment, artistic activities, pomp and circumstance for the God [on the one side], and on the part of the community different forms of service, ceremonies, dances, and adornment. (α) [As regards] the *subjects*, whatever artistic principles enter into them, these adornments, dances, and contrivances include external, contingent features (e.g., the number and choice of flowers, colors, etc.), so the symbolizing comes into its own (labyrinthine dances [symbolizing] the course of the planets); [the result is] that the contingent, since it is not in itself capable of taking on spiritual shape, is raised [to a spiritual status] by | its *meaning*. But (β) as regards the portrayal of the *objective* element . . .)

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The recognition [of the gods] in the cultus, the elevation of the actual powers into phantasy, the way in which they are held fast and represented, assumes a multitude of degrees and configurations. The highest configuration, (where these powers are portrayed in a

[Ed.] Baron de Sainte-Croix, *Recherches historiques et critiques sur les mystères du paganisme*, 2d ed., rev. Silvestre de Sacy (Paris, 1817), 1:276. Sainte-Croix refers to Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 1.126, and indeed Hegel regards Thucydides as the source of information about the sacrifice of Cratinus. However, in his report of the insurrection of Cylon, Thucydides follows another tradition (see 1.126). The tradition that Cratinus and Ctesibius were sacrificed in order to absolve the inhabitants of Attica is found elsewhere, e.g., in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.110.

detailed, dynamic way,) is as they are intuited in tragedy and comedy, which portrayed the actual operation and effect of these powers in concrete instances and showed how they collided and fought with one another. The end of it all [was] their absolutely unique and equal justification, where one-sided service to just one power, which alone is held of any account, brings only misfortune. ([This is] the highest point [of Greek religious life], the drama of the life of the gods; this is the [genuinely] Greek spirit, that of later times is cultured.) [54a]

¹⁸²(β) It is, however, very closely bound up with the veneration of this multiplicity of divine¹⁸³ essences that there should also be a transition to the universality of divine power—not the universality of abstract necessity, which as something independent, standing over against one, is nothing “objective”; on the contrary, they are combined in a single concrete intuition. This absolute unity would be the infinite subjectivity of the One—an abstraction that has no place here. ([It is] not [a question of] a Lord and (negatively) the service rendered him, nor yet of any absolute, inwardly concrete subjectivity as spirit.) Instead the divine essences are combined in¹⁸⁴ a single unity that is all-embracing in concrete fashion. This
83 is universal nature in general or a totality of the divine beings, | of the gods, that has a universal significance; (even in its material aspect, this content of the sensible-spiritual world [is] combined in a unity).

This deeper element remains in the nebulous realm of the symbolic, the allegorical. Since it cannot advance to the infinite subjectivity that would be inwardly concrete as *the* spirit, the form of substantive unity involved is one that was a feature of the earlier religions instead; and it is here retained from them.¹⁸⁵ For the earlier, primitive religions are the determinate religion of nature,

182. *Ms. margin:* (23 July 1821)

183. *W₂ adds:* —but, because it is a multiplicity, limited—

184. *W₂ reads:* The limited nature of the gods itself leads directly to the attempt to rise above them and combine them in a single concrete intuition (i.e., not just in abstract necessity, for this is nothing objective). At this point the elevation into unity cannot yet be the absolute, inwardly concrete subjectivity of spirit; but equally it cannot be a relapse into the intuition of the power of the One and into negative service rendered to the Lord; the One that becomes object to self-consciousness at this standpoint is

185. *W₂ reads:* the intuition of substantive unity is something that is already present at this stage, something that has been retained from the earlier religions.

which we have already considered,¹⁸⁶ the form of Spinozism that is based on the immediate unity of the natural and the spiritual. But the earlier religions are also typified by their location; their mode of comprehension and portrayal is also limited, it is inwardly more indeterminate and general until such time as they develop; in the fixing of his location each local god has at the same time the significance of universality; and inasmuch as this universality is steadfastly maintained against the fragmentation and particularization into characters and individuals that develops in the religion of beauty, it is in the raw, the primitive, the unbeautiful, the undeveloped that the service of a deeper, inner, universal element is continued—a universal that at the same time is not abstract thought but rather preserves within itself that earlier external, contingent configuration. [54b]

¹⁸⁷Because of its simplicity and substantive intensity this older element can be termed deeper, purer, (more solid, more substantial, concrete, concentrated,) truer in meaning. But its meaning is in part shrouded on its own account in opaqueness; it has not developed to the level of thought, it lacks precisely the clarity of the particular gods, who have won for themselves the character and shape of spirit, ([where] the daylight of the spirit has already dawned). However, the service of this deeper, more universal element involves the *antithesis* between this deeper, more universal element itself and the particular, | more limited, manifest powers. It is on the one hand a return from them to the deeper, inner, and to that extent higher, (i.e., deeper truths,) (preserving the unity of nature as what is within, bringing the plurality of separate gods back into the unity of nature—Aeschylus: Proserpine, mother of Diana¹⁸⁸). But it involves also the antithesis that this deeper element is what is dull, unconscious, barbaric, and savage as opposed to clear self-

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186. [Ed.] See above, pp. 98–122.

187. *Ms. margin:* (Unity of God – immortality of the soul – torment of the damned – intuition of the purification of the soul)

188. [Ed.] The source of this report is Herodotus, *Histories* 2.156, who states that on the basis of an Egyptian legend Aeschylus (unlike any earlier Greek poet) made Artemis (Diana) the daughter of Demeter (Ceres, Isis) and Dionysus, not of Leto and Zeus, as tradition had it (Leto merely nursed and saved her); see also Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 8.37.6. J. F. Cotta also mentions a Diana as

consciousness, the serenity of the daylight, of rationality.¹⁸⁹ The intuition in this form of cultus, therefore, will be a symbolized, universal natural life and natural power, a return to the inner, solid intuition; but on the other hand it is equally the intuition of the process, of the transition from (savagery)¹⁹⁰ to legality, from barbarism to ethical life, from unconscious dullness to the self-illuminating certainty of self-consciousness. It cannot be a fully formed god nor yet an abstract doctrine that is intuited here, but [the intuition resides] essentially in the conflict between this original, primitive element in its undeveloped form and the clarity and higher levels of thought and custom, which are not just material but have been exposed to the daylight vision and form of consciousness.¹⁹¹ (The benefits conferred by Ceres and Triptolemus [were] agriculture and property, and the mysteries made it possible to envisage the miserable

supposedly the daughter of Proserpine or Persephone (traditionally also a daughter of Demeter by Zeus) on the basis of a report by Cicero, *De natura deorum* 3.58, but here there is no reference to Aeschylus. Aeschylus's tragedy, not named by Herodotus and Pausanias, has not been preserved. Herodotus's purpose here is to expose the origin of Aeschylus's theogony in an Egyptian myth; but he is also implicitly criticizing Aeschylus for having betrayed a secret of the Eleusinian mysteries, a betrayal with which Aeschylus was charged in his own time. Hegel refers to this betrayal again in a passage from the 1831 lectures in W (1824 lectures, n. 673, including annotation b). From this passage we may assume that Hegel is here following the interpretation of C. A. Lobeck; this is confirmed by the fact that the marginal passage in the Ms., which can only have been added for the last lecture series, contains a phrase ("bringing the plurality of separate gods back into the unity of nature") that clearly derives from Lobeck. Cf. Augustus Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, 2 vols. (Königsberg, 1829), 1:76–85, esp. 78. By combining the reports of Herodotus and Cicero, Hegel has confused Proserpine and Demeter.

189. Ms. margin: (a) Objective content

(α) Intuition of the universal force of nature

(β) Intuition of spirit in general – and of the process of spirit – an inwardly concrete representation – transition from the immediacy of nature to ethical life, from the sphere of the Titans to that of spirit.

These mysteries do not [come] from elsewhere, [they are] not Pelasgian or Asiatic

190. Ms. originally read: barbarism

191. W₂ adds: This representation is present already in many esoteric intuitions of mythology. For instance, the combat of the gods and the defeat of the Titans itself is the divine emergence of the spiritual through overcoming the untamed powers of nature.

barbarism in which people lived before the introduction of agriculture
| —Clement of Alexandria.¹⁹²⁾

¹⁹³~However, in this cultus the action of the *subjective side* and the processes that such action involves also acquire a more deeply determinate aspect.¹⁹⁴ <<αα>> The cultus here cannot be simply the serene enjoyment of the immediately present unity with the particular powers, πάθει; for inasmuch as the divine passes over from its particularity into universality, and indeed inasmuch as [55a] self-consciousness [is] ~free¹⁹⁵ (this it is that gives rise to the antithesis), the divine withdraws within itself and is posited as more alien, more remote. <<ββ>> Greater separation¹⁹⁶ is the starting point for uniting [*Einigung*]: <“pure” [rein] means “again one” [re-ein], united [einig] with oneself again>. The cultus is here the process whereby the soul is inwardly laid hold of; it is introduced and initiated into an essential realm that is more ~remote¹⁹⁷ and alien to it, into secrets that are not found in its ordinary life and the cultus that is rooted there. When it enters this sphere, [it is] required to lay aside its natural being and essence. So this cultus is both a purification of the soul—a series of steps leading to such purification—and a reception into the high mystical essence, or the achievement of an intuitive vision of its secrets. <<γγ>> The mysteries have ceased to be secrets for even the new initiate; they can continue to be secret only in the sense that

192. [Ed.] Hegel here emphasizes the agrarian character of the Eleusinian mysteries. Demeter (Ceres) is the goddess of grain, Triptolemus the hero of agriculture. The mention of Clement of Alexandria may be connected with the fact that in his *Exhortation to the Heathen* 2.20–21 he discusses the mysteries (see also below, p. 490). In Clement, however, the agrarian character of the mysteries recedes into the background by contrast with the myth of Demeter, which is connected with the Orphic myth and is therefore adjudged immoral. The reference to Clement in this context seems somewhat displaced and would make better sense in relation to the renewed allusion in the next paragraph to the birth of the gods out of the passions (πάθει) (see above, n. 150). However, the criterion for arranging the text requires the present location.

193. Ms. margin: (b) [Follows canceled:] Subjective Side

194. W₂ reads: It is here then that the action of the subjective side and the processes that such action involves also acquire a deeper determination of their own.

195. W₂ reads: turned back into self

196. W₂ adds: than is presupposed in the manifest cultus

197. W₂ reads: abstract

86 these intuitions and this content are not drawn into the sphere of ordinary existence and consciousness and the play that is made of it in reflection. All Athenian citizens [were] initiates. A secret is essentially something known but not by all, but here [we have] something known by all but | treated as secret, (as the Jews do not name the name of Jehovah,) i.e., it is not something to be made the subject of idle chatter or common knowledge, and bandied about in everyday consciousness, (just as in everyday life, conversely, there are things and circumstances that are known between acquaintances or generally but that are not spoken about).

87 ((88)) However, this cultus too is based on serenity. The path of purification is one that is traveled [physically]. There is no infinite pain and doubt in which abstract self-consciousness isolates itself, [relying] on abstract knowledge of itself, so that in this empty, contentless form it does no more than inwardly bestir itself, pulsating and trembling inwardly, and cannot, in this abstract certainty of itself, attain absolutely to any firm truth or objectivity or to a feeling for them. Instead, [55b] that unity is always based, and regarded as based, on the physical traveling of the road as an actually accomplished purification of the soul, an absolution; and with that originally unconscious basis it remains generally more of an external process of the soul.¹⁹⁸ Even if images that frighten or terrify, terrifying figures, and the like are used to produce deeper effects upon the mind (as are conversely, and alternating with them and [such intuitions of] the night, bright intuitions and images of splendor that are full of meaning), it is by traveling on through these intuitions and experiences that move the mind that the initiate is purified. These mystical intuitions correspond directly to the intuitions of the divine life, which is made visible in tragedy and comedy, | (wherein self-consciousness is caught up and carried along willy-nilly (performances at the Bacchic festivals or the Thesmophoria¹⁹⁹)); and the fear, the participation, the mourning,

198. *W₂* adds: as the soul does not descend into the innermost depths of negativity, as is the case where subjectivity is fully developed to its infinitude.

199. [Ed.] The source of Hegel's information about the festivals was, in addition to the ancient reports, the book by Martin Gottfried Herrmann, *Die Feste von Hellas historisch-philosophisch bearbeitet und zum erstenmal nach ihrem Sinn und Zweck*

these states that are experienced in tragedy are equally steps to purification that achieve and have achieved all that is supposed to be achieved, just as the intuition of comedy and the act of laying aside one's dignity, one's self-esteem and opinion of oneself, and even one's deeper powers—this general sacrifice of one's whole self—is the cultus in which, by this sacrifice of everything finite, the soul enjoys and maintains the indestructible certainty of itself.

⟨(εε)⟩ Lastly it is in this cultus that the soul itself is exalted into a purpose on its own account.²⁰⁰ The soul that comes to consciousness here is the more abstract, more estranged, more self-sufficient one; (it is in and for itself—its nature and vocation is to be this). The representational image of *immortality* necessarily enters on the scene at this point; the purification that it has undergone raises the soul [56a] above its temporary, ephemeral existence, and since it is now understood [*fixiert*] as free, the representation of the individual (as naturally deceased) passing over into eternal life is also bound up with this cultus; the dead receive the rights of citizenship in the more essential, ideal realm of the underworld where temporal [actuality] is reduced to the level of the world of shadows.

As regards the content of the cultus of mysteries, the evidence is very conflicting. Curiosity has been stirred to unveil what is secret, either because it is secret or in the belief that it contained a special wisdom. Any such belief [is] in and for itself stupid, if only [because] Socrates and Aristotle, the wisest of the Greeks, [were] not initiated.²⁰¹ | Socrates (is the one who propounded] a new doctrine, a new, unknown wisdom. But the generally accepted opinion that

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erläutert, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1803), as well as Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie*, vol. 3 and esp. vol. 4.

200. *Ms. canceled*: (In general, public cultus is not concerned with honoring the gods but with enjoying the divine – not here – but)

201. [Ed.] The Delphic oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of the Greeks; see Plato, *Apology* 20e–21a, and Xenophon, *Apology of Socrates* 14. That Socrates was not initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries was reported by Lucian of Samosata, *Demonax* 11. Although Hegel alludes in the other lectures to the fact that Socrates was not initiated into the mysteries, he says it only here of Aristotle. His source is not known. Possibly he is confusing Aristotle and Aeschylus; Aristotle alludes to the charge that Aeschylus was not initiated because of his having betrayed the mysteries (see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1111a8–10). On the latter point Clement of Alexandria gives a full report (*Stromata* 2.14).

the unity of God and a purer religion were taught in the mysteries (in the sense that the official religion was here known and shown to be in error) [is] absurd.²⁰² (Everything combines in the manner portrayed above.)

As we have shown, the unity of God [is] in the shape of universal natural modes pictured in a darkly obscure way; the immortality of the soul [is] not a formal doctrine or dogma. [There is] a process or transition from savagery to ethical life, from dispersion to (albeit somewhat confused) unity, from nature to spirit, from the immediate existence and consciousness of the individual to a purer consciousness and a purer state that subsists in and for itself, the state of absolute eternal life. [56b]

⌈[There is a] wholly subjective need that stems from this. Particular subjectivity [is] not rooted nor preserved in fate. In the absolute, objective purpose, subjective purposes (even if, as particular, they are brought to naught, not realized) achieve their absolute essentiality, objectivity—the good—and, subjectively, eternal happiness.

(αα) Singularity, particular subjectivity.

(ββ) Absolute objectivity—*implicit* subjectivity, felicity—eternal life, all finite purposes being subordinated and surrendered (though at the same time they can only be *means* to such felicity).

(γγ) However, this characterization [still lacks] the universal objectivity that subsists in and for itself, still lacks divine objectivity—(α) providence, wisdom, (β) Christ.

Neither the truly infinite subjectivity of the individual as vocation and purpose, nor (objectively) the characterization of God as the absolutely wise one, embracing all private powers in one purpose, one idea, holding them in subordination to the one idea and harnessing them to it, is present in this religion. |

What is present is thus only the subjective need to know that particular purposes and individual interests are realized. To judge

202. [Ed.] Hegel's criticism of the accepted opinion that a higher wisdom and a pure religion, and indeed the unity of God, were taught in the mysteries is directed against a number of widely differing authors, including Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, vol. 2 (*Œuvres complètes*, vol. 38 [1784], p. 516), and his friend Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:199–202, whom Hegel here criticizes in unusually sharp fashion ("stupid," "absurd"). See also below, 1824 lectures, nn. 675, 678.

from appearances, however, happiness and unhappiness depend on whether people do this or that, go here or there, etc.: 'it is their decision, which they know to be a merely contingent, subjective one,'²⁰³ [but they want] to make it *objective*, i.e., as a rightful decision that objectifies itself. Because it is the subjective decision that decides, *consciously* decides in this way, it is not a father-confessor relationship or a matter of awaiting orders in all one does, but only of asking oneself, Is it useful to *me* to do this or that?)

(γ) Finally the moment of this religion that was present in the *oracles* belongs to its totality as well. 'In the official cultus the concrete subjects entered into a relationship with the particular divine powers in their general essentiality, (and at the same time [these powers stood] in immediate identity with them,) whereas in the mysteries their relationship was with the *universal* divine nature, and the subjective essence, the universal inner soul of the individual, achieved its satisfaction. But behind the individual there is still | its wholly particular, individual mode of action, state, condition, and it continues to refer these to God in accordance with the *objective* category that we call divine providence insofar as it extends to individual cases—the category that is present for Christians in providence, or more precisely in the divine essence, that God became a human being, and moreover did so in the wholly actual, temporal fashion that encompasses all private singularity along with it.'²⁰⁴ The beautiful shape in which the gods were depicted in images,

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203. *W₂ reads:* it is their doing, their decision, although they also know it to be contingent

204. *W₂ reads:* 3. But however much the worshipers become aware of their immediate identity with the essential powers, appropriate divinity to themselves, and rejoice over its presence in them and theirs in it—even though they consume the natural deities and make the ethical deities visible in ethical or community life, even though they live the divine life in practice and in their festival celebrations produce the shape and appearance of divinity in their own subjectivity—however much they do all this, there is still something beyond all of it, that is (for consciousness) held back, that which is quite particular in the individual's actions, states, and conditions and the reference of these conditions to God. *Our* belief in [divine] providence, that it extends also to what is single, individual, finds its confirmation in the fact that God became a human being, and moreover did so in the actual, temporal fashion that encompasses all private singularity along with it; for in this way subjectivity received the absolute moral justification by virtue of which it is the subjectivity of *infinite* self-consciousness.

stories, and local representations does, it is true, comprise and express in an immediate way the moment of infinite singularity, of the most extreme particularity. But it is a particularity that, for one thing, constitutes a major ground of complaint against the mythology of Homer and Hesiod;²⁰⁵ and for another thing, these stories are so completely peculiar to the particular gods depicted in them that they in no way concern the other gods, or human beings—just as among humans all individuals have their own particular circumstances, actions, states and histories, which are wholly private to them. The moment of subjectivity is not present as *infinite* subjectivity. (In the first place, wisdom is lacking.) It is not spirit as such that is intuited in the objective shapes; but it is wisdom that must constitute the basic character of the divine. The divine must be comprehended as operating for a purpose, [as encompassed] in one infinite wisdom—[i.e.,] the one subjectivity that is the concept. That human affairs are ruled by the gods certainly forms part of Greek religion, but in a [57a] more general, indeterminate sense. For it is precisely the gods who *are* the powers that hold sway in all human affairs; and, of course, the gods are just. Justice is an old, titanic power; as justice it is *one* power, so it belongs to the senior among them. The beautiful gods insist on their own particular validity,²⁰⁶ and so fall into collisions, which can only be resolved in an | *equality* of honor; and just for that reason this offers no immanent solution, it does not invest wisdom with any systematic unity that Zeus [holds sway] in everything (Sophocles, *Antigone*: οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ Ζεῦς)²⁰⁷.

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(β) The divine [is] characterized as spirit ((and is gracious [to us] in sacrificing itself)), but not yet as wisdom, i.e., it is spirituality

205. [Ed.] Xenophanes, in a fragment transmitted by Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 9.193, advanced this criticism (Xenophanes, frag. 11 in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 168; the Homeric and Hesiodic gods steal, lie, commit adultery, etc.) See also Plato's criticism of Homer, *Republic* 386c–392c, 598d–607a, and Creuzer's criticism of the rambling and loquacious character of the Homeric sagas (*Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:199).

206. [Ed.] On the controversy between justice as “an old titanic power” and the new “beautiful” gods Apollo and Athena, Hegel elsewhere refers especially to Aeschylus's *Eumenides* (see below, 1824 lectures, n. 694); see also Sophocles, *Antigone* 451.

207. [Ed.] Hegel erroneously gives *Antigone* as the source of this reference; it is found, rather, at the end of Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, vv. 1277–1278 (“Yet nothing appeared that is not Zeus”).

determined in and for itself, but [only] a formal willing and knowing. All of this formal willing [of the gods], their acts and deeds, their power, [is determined] by particularity, by contingency. In the same way their knowing remains formal.

Humans could not expect these gods to be *absolutely* wise or *absolutely* true to purpose in regard to the fates of individuals; this absolute return-to-self is not posited in them. But the need to have an objective determination of their particular actions and states, of their singular fate, still remains. (α) They cannot get this from the thought of divine providence and wisdom, so as to be able to trust to it as a general rule and, for the rest, to rely on their formal knowing and willing, looking to its absolute consummation in and for itself, and finding in an eternal purpose some compensation for their unhappiness, and for the sacrifice or failure of their particular interests or purposes. (β) For this very reason it did not fall to individuals themselves to take on their own initiative the *final* decision, make the *final* act of volition—to engage in combat today, to get married or start out on one's journey today. For each one is conscious [57b] that objectivity does not reside in this personal act of will, which is purely formal; ([we are aware that there is no objective guarantee] that if carried out it would be good and right (not according to what we intended, [as the] Sophists [pointed out])). In order to²⁰⁸ supply this additional objective guarantee one would need to derive the determination [to act] from outside, from something higher than oneself—the decision would have to come from an external, determining sign. (But since the divinity that is objective in and for itself cannot be what determines [the act], | only external objectivity, the power of nature as a whole or some natural phenomenon, [can decide it²⁰⁹]. In such phenomena people find, even as they marvel, something referring to themselves, because they still have no implicitly objective point of reference in a thought [such as] force or law, the connection of cause and effect, or the idea.²¹⁰ The rational ground of this, from a formal point of view, is the feeling of (or faith in) the identity of inner and outer—and here the inner

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208. *W₂ adds*: meet the desire to fill this gap and

209. [*Ed.*] This addition is provided by *W₂*.

210. *W₂ reads*: see no implicitly objective meaning [in them] and do not see an implicitly complete system of laws in nature as a whole.

is simply human purpose and interest.²¹¹ It is inner caprice which, in order not to exist as caprice, makes itself objective—what this means here is that it makes itself into something other than itself merely outwardly, it takes a contingency, i.e., external caprice, as higher than itself, and accepts some outside stimulus in order to determine itself (just as we can draw lots or throw dice). $\langle\langle\alpha\alpha\rangle\rangle$ ²¹² The unexpected or sudden, some sensibly significant but inexplicable change—lightning from a clear sky, a bird that starts up against a wide, unbroken horizon, whatever breaks the indeterminacy that indecision is—is a summons to the inner [mind] to act on the instant, to be inwardly resolved in this contingent fashion, without any consciousness of the reason or ground. For it is just at this point that the grounds are broken off, or are missing altogether. (This wholly subjective need—the bubbling of springs, Mercury, to stop one's ears—the first sound.²¹³) (Particular, personal purposes have validity, at a lower level than fate, as it were in a naive, innocent fashion. [One must] presuppose that the gods in their essentiality are kindly disposed to these purposes. [It is necessary to] assume a coherent plan [*Zusammenhang*], and because this plan cannot just be in external nature in and for itself | (since the autonomous powers of nature such as sun or sea are not harmoniously directed toward our happiness, and what is good and useful cannot be distinguished on its own account), [the Greeks were obliged] to seek it in a voice, to let it be told them.)

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$\langle\langle\beta\beta\rangle\rangle$ The externally immediate phenomenon that best serves the purpose of determining one's action is a sound, a note ringing out or a voice, ὄμφη (which may well be the correct derivation for Delphi's epithet ὀμφαλος rather than the latter term's other meaning, "navel of the earth").²¹⁴ The Greek oracles were primarily based

211. *W₂ reads:* but the inner aspect of nature, or the universal to which it stands in relation, is not the coherence of its laws but a human purpose, a human interest.

212. *Precedes in W₂:* So in willing something, people require an external, objective confirmation in order to grasp the resolve as actual; they require to know the resolve as one that is a unity of subjective and objective, one that is confirmed and attested as true. In this respect

213. [Ed.] See second paragraph below.

214. [Ed.] See Etienne Clavier, *Mémoire sur les oracles des anciens* (Paris, 1818), pp. 72–73. After citing a number of views, Clavier gives his own interpretation, which Hegel adopts: "This place is called *Omphalos*, navel, not because it is in the midst of the earth, but because of the divine voice, *Omphē*, which has been heard there."

on such sounds and rustlings (Clavier, p. 35²¹⁵). In Dodona the future was manifested by three kinds of signs: the movement of the leaves of the sacred oak, the murmuring of the sacred spring, and a noise made by a sacred bronze cask suspended from a willow; when the wind blew, the cask was struck by a switch of bronze thongs held by the bronze figure of a child perched in an adjoining willow.²¹⁶

In Delphi too a principal role was played by the wind that issued from a cavern [58a] and by the noise it set up in the iron tripod (see Clavier²¹⁷). (The notes [were] brought together into a connected pattern, and some meaning or other [was elicited from them]. The enthusiasm of the priestess [also played a role].) [But] the inspiration the Pythia received through the cavern exhalation [was] a later arrangement and representation.²¹⁸ ([These are] very naive oracles: Αἱ τῶν δαιμόνων φωναὶ ἀναρθροὶ εἰσὶν ([this is] the motto in Goethe's *Zur Morphologie*, vol. 2; [he] indicates where he got it from²¹⁹).) Faces may [have been seen] in Trophonius's cave.²²⁰ Clavier, p. 6:²²¹ At Pharos in Achaëa, Pausanias [saw] (in the market) a statue of Mercury that was asked for advice as follows. Incense was burnt on the altar and lamps were lit, then one whispered one's question into the god's ear, then ran from the market, holding one's hands over one's ears;²²² once out of the marketplace one took them away, and the first word that one heard was the answer to one's | question. (Consulting sacrificial animals or inspecting entrails²²³

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215. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 35.

216. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 31.

217. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 73–75.

218. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 75. Cf. also the report of Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 16.26.

219. [Ed.] J. W. Goethe, *Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt, besonders zur Morphologie*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1823), back of the title page. Goethe, however, did not give the source; Dorothea Kuhn has since identified it as Nonnos, *Ad S. Gregorii orationem contra Julianum* 2.22; see Hegel, *Religionsphilosophie*, ed. K.-H. Ilting (Naples, 1978), p. 720. The marginal note in which this reference occurs obviously postdates 1821.

220. [Ed.] See Clavier, *Mémoire*, pp. 140–160, and esp. his translation on pp. 143–144 of the report by Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 9.39.

221. [Ed.] Clavier, *Mémoire*, p. 6, referring to Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 7.22.

222. Ms. margin: (For instance] Procos held [hands over ears])

223. [Ed.] See the exhaustive description of the practice of inspecting entrails in Karl Philipp Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791), pp.

[involves] a more remote connection. [It would] take us too far afield to enter into this sort of detail. [For instance,] earth tremors [were oracular signs for] the Lacedaemonians [Spartans]. If the first sacrificial animals yielded unlucky omens, further animals [were slaughtered] until favorable omens occurred. In this way the future shrouded in darkness had ultimately to accommodate itself after all to the desires of mortals (Moritz, *Anthousa*, p. 353²²⁴). [What matters is] not this reasoning—[for] the repetition is highly inconsequential—but the sense, the subjective confirmation.) In Egypt, [when consulting] Apis one offered him food in one's hand. If he took it, [that was] a good sign; from Germanicus ([Clavier,] p. 4²²⁵) he turned away, and Germanicus died soon after. On the other hand, eating birds and the like is primarily a feature of Roman superstition.

Such are the main features of the religion of beauty. All aspects of the totality are present and find satisfaction in it. But the central point is the particular, personified [*partikuläre*] form of divine power; (the god has advanced beyond both the substantive unity of the natural and the spiritual, and the abstractness of the One;) (human beings [are] free,) (and [there is] therefore an antithesis. The main feature [is], of course, the consciousness inherent in spirituality, [but there is] an antithesis (though it is only theoretical)—(α) particular gods (β) over against human beings [who are also particular]. But this antithesis is resolved amicably; and Greek religion [is] the consciousness, certainty, and enjoyment of this amicable settlement. [We do] not yet [have] infinite estrangement and universal spirit.) This [divine power] thus [appears] as human shape. It is overwhelmingly characterized by spirituality, but the universal spirit is still lacking—i.e., this spirituality taken back into the absolute unity of subjectivity.

The basic abstract category [is here] necessity. The next higher

350–353, as well as the brief history of the practice of divination or soothsaying in Etruria and Rome by Petrus Frandsen, *Haruspices* (Berlin, 1823).

224. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, p. 353 (at the end of the description of inspecting entrails).

225. [Ed.] Clavier, *Mémoire*, p. 4, referring to Pliny, *Historia naturalis* 7.71. Germanicus Caesar was a Roman general and heir apparent of his uncle, the emperor Tiberius; he died suddenly in somewhat mysterious circumstances in A.D. 19.

determining category is freedom, the concept and infinite subjectivity, but the concept as still finite—purpose, power determined by the concept, but according to a finite concept, a finite purpose. [58b] | 95

²²⁶This category [the religion of expediency] is directly contiguous to the religion of beauty. The meaning or abstract definition of the God of beauty is a quality (a power and property that are also human, immanent in humanity) and a spiritual power, inwardly determined as such, and in such a way that this determinateness exists as subjective; it is distinguished from objectivity initially in such a way that objectivity is the first kind of determinacy that is to be realized, while subjectivity exists as the formal power to posit this reality of the particular content, to make it objective for itself.

²²⁷This content is still, to begin with, determinate and finite, the concept of *formal* subjectivity. Hence the content becomes a finite, human purpose. [In the] religion of beauty [we have] determinate but free powers, [which, however,] float away; their ideal beauty, the universal [is] higher than their particular character: Mars is also willing to agree to peace. [They are] gods of phantasy, for the passing moment, and have no consistency, within themselves or on their own account. Now they come forward—Pallas, wisdom [is here]—then she returns again to Olympus. (There is a circle of twelve gods, but without [logical sequence].)

²²⁸But insofar as the basic category is purpose, determinateness is conserved; and being taken back into the infinite form, into infinite subjectivity, it is fixed.

In and for itself, however, finitude is not firmly fixed in the pure concept, the universal [concept], but only in humanity, in the spirit as finite. [The finitude is] human purposes.

Hence religion falls to the level of serving determinate purposes and interests; it stems from them and depends on them. [59a] | 96

226. *Ms. adds as a heading:* C. Religion of Expediency, or Initially of Self-Seeking, Self-Advantage

Ms. margin adjacent to the heading: ((a) [Immediate Religion] / (b) Religion of Sublimity and Beauty)

Ms. margin adjacent to this line: ((α) The concept [of] expediency)

[*Ed.*] Hegel initially started Sec. C at the top of sheet 58b, but then wrote a transitional passage and started the section again at the top of sheet 59a. We give the heading only once, in the latter location.

227. *Ms. margin:* ((β) Finite [purposes])

228. *Ms. margin:* ((γ) Human [purposes])

C. THE RELIGION OF EXPEDIENCY
OR UNDERSTANDING²²⁹

Purposive action is a distinctive feature not just of spirit but of life in general. It is the idea in action, for it is a kind of production that is no longer a transition into something else (whether that other is determined implicitly as something else, or—as in the case of necessity—implicitly determined as the same, though it is other in shape and externally). In purpose a content is there first, not dependent on the form of the transition or change, but maintaining itself therein. “[In the case of] living form, the seed [is] the plant nature, its driving power; the influence of air, water, etc., brings it forth, but what they bring forth is only its development, [and this bringing forth is only] an empty form, the transition from subjectivity to objectivity. The seed germ is the preformed shape that manifests itself. [That is] how it is in the spiritual realm too.”²³⁰

⟨(α)⟩ Of itself, purposive action stands very close to the kind of spiritual form or shape we have been considering. What matters,

229. Ms. margin: (27 July 1821)

[Ed.] The term *Zweckmässigkeit* is translated as both “expediency” and “purposiveness.” When used as a title for Roman religion, it is translated as “expediency,” but in the textual exposition it is more commonly rendered as “purposiveness” (and *zweckmässig* as “purposive”), thus preserving the affinity with “purpose” (*Zweck*). Literally, *Zweckmässigkeit* means “conformity to an end or purpose.” Hegel’s use of the term is directly influenced by Kant’s discussion of extrinsic purposiveness and natural teleology in *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford, 1952), §§ 63, 66, 79–86. Since, in the context of Hegel’s treatment of Roman religion, *Zweckmässigkeit* refers to extrinsic rather than intrinsic purposiveness, “expediency” is an appropriate translation for it. See below, 1824 lectures, n. 466.

In the Ms. (and only in the Ms.), Hegel also designates Roman religion as “the religion of the understanding” (*Verstand*). It is such because the purposes or ends in view are essentially finite (even though allegedly divine); and it is the understanding that holds fast to finite purposes, neither submerging them in necessity nor resolving them in reason. Roman religion is, therefore, a “prosaic” religion, not a religion of free phantasy, of free spirit, of beauty.

Hegel devotes more attention to the religion of expediency in the Ms. than he does on any subsequent occasion—fourteen manuscript sheets, or nearly half the number used for the Christian religion. The probable reasons for this are indicated in the Editorial Introduction.

230. *W₂ reads*: The driving power of this plant nature, which may express itself outwardly under the influence of a wide variety of conditions, is just the bringing forth of its own development, and is only the simple form of the transition from subjectivity to objectivity. It is the shape preformed in the seed germ that reveals itself in the result.

however, is the inner concept (and human beings are as well able [as other living things] to act instinctively according to habit and custom). This [instinctive, Greek] shape is the original, superficial way in which a [spiritual] nature and spiritual determinacy make their appearance, without this determinacy being yet present itself as such in the mode of the idea or of purpose—⟨[there is] still not an estrangement⟩.

⟨(β)⟩ The abstract categorial foundation of the religion of beauty was necessity and, outside necessity, the fullness of spiritual | and physical nature. Being physical, this fullness decomposes into ~[a multitude of] characteristics and qualities²³¹ and is not held within the unity of necessity, even as that unity is, by itself, devoid of content. (So these characteristics and qualities take root in themselves, and it is only their spiritual form and ideality which gives them the serenity that both lifts them above their determinacy and makes them indifferent.) In other words, necessity is only implicitly freedom; it is not yet wisdom, it has no inner purpose; in necessity we liberate ourselves only to the extent that we relinquish the content [of our purpose]. [59b] What is necessary, however, is *some* content—an encounter, a situation, an achievement, whatever it may be; provided it *exists*, its content as such can be a matter of contingency. (In the freedom of necessity the content is *relinquished*, given up as formal; now it is going to be preserved.) The content can be this purpose or another; what is necessary is the formal requirement that there should be a content; what the content is does not matter. The necessity [is] simply and solely the holding fast of this abstraction.

⟨(γ)⟩ However, necessity immerses itself in the concept. The concept, freedom, is the truth of necessity—this [is] logical. [By] conceiving in general we mean comprehending something as one moment in a coherent pattern, which as coherent [implies] differentiation and is determinate, is fulfilled or realized. Coherence in terms of cause and effect is just the coherence of necessity; it is external necessity, i.e., it is merely formal. What it lacks is that a content is posited as determined on its own account, *traversant ce changement de cause en effet sans changer*,²³² one that passes through the alternation of cause and effect without changing (not merely in itself, but as a con-

231. W₂ reads: determinate time and quality

232. [Ed.] This citation cannot be referenced.

98 tent that is posited [as unchanging]). More precisely, this comes about in that the external relationship, the variety of actual shapes [that the content assumes] is degraded to the level of medium or means. <It [is] *mediated* with itself.> A purpose needs to have means, | i.e., an external mode of effectuation that is, however, defined as subjected to the movement of the purpose, the movement by which the purpose maintains itself and sublates the transition [from cause to effect]. At the level of mechanism, cause and effect are implicitly the same content, but are posited as independent actualities that interact with one another (objectivity).

As identity with self, in opposition to the phenomenal difference between the shapes (found in actuality), this is thus a *posited* identity. So with purposive action, nothing is produced that is not already there beforehand: what is there just maintains itself. Life is a continual process of production, of bringing forth; but nothing is brought forth that is not already there. [With] individual and species it is the same. In a mechanical chain [of causes], however, something other than what is already there does emerge. Freedom therefore [is found] in concepts; necessity [is] downgraded to the form, to the transition from the subjectivity of purpose to objectivity. [60a]

²³³This is just where the difference between purpose and reality lies in the [concept of] purpose. The purpose maintains itself, it is mediated only with itself, it coincides only with itself, and it brings about its own unity—as subjective—with reality. However, it does this only through *means*, or through a process of necessity. Purpose is the power to dispose of means, the power that has at the same time an initial content determined in and for itself, a content that is both starting point and goal, the mode of necessity that has taken the external, particular content into itself and holds it fast against reality, which is defined in a negative manner, and reduced to the rank of means.

In life there is this unity of content that continually conquers reality, and through this use of violence frees itself from violence, and maintains itself; but the content is not free on its own account, not elevated into the mode of its identity in the element of thought—[i.e.,] it is not spiritual. In the ideals that are spiritually formed, there

233. Ms. adds: (β)

is the same unity, but at the same time it is present and represented as free. As beauty, that unity is higher than what is living, and its quality [may] from that point of view also [be represented] as purpose, and what it produces [as] purposive action. But its qualities are not represented in the guise of purposes. For example, it is not the *purpose* of Apollo or Pallas to produce and disseminate artifacts, science, or poetry; and Ceres and the Bacchus of the mysteries do not aim | to teach or to produce laws. They are the guardians of those things, so to speak; it is their care—μεδόνται—[to protect] a town or locality—Delphi, the island of Delos, or, [in the case of] Bacchus, Thebes. The category of purpose is very close at hand, but the separation of purpose from reality (and consequent conquest of reality) is not present here. The divine natures are precisely these powers and activities; the muses themselves *are* poetry, Athena herself *is* the life of Athens, and so on.²³⁴ [60b] [They] operate immanently in their reality, like the laws of motion in the planets (e.g., Pallas in Homer). Human beings are not means, nor do [the gods]²³⁵ stand over against one another but themselves vanish out of sight in necessity. Every so often one of them—Mars, Neptune, Pallas—steps forth under Jupiter, like honest rough yeomen under their commander; they strut about importantly, but they submit to discipline, are called to order, accept the decision, and go off home, [as] Mars [went back] to Thrace, etc.

⟨(α) Purpose [is] posited as the identity of different actualities, as a unity determined in and for itself, that maintains its own determinateness as opposed to other forms of determinateness; the law of necessity [is] the dependence of one determination on another; [but here] the extinction of determinacy in necessity is inhibited, annulled. The gods [are] the *powers*; they are not a *purpose*.⟩

⟨(β)⟩ But now that the concept is freely posited for itself, it is initially confronted by reality, which is determined as a negative opposed to it. [Later on,] in the absolute concept or the pure idea, this reality, this hostile element, melts into unity, into friendship with

234. *W₂ reads:* and the happiness and well-being of the city is not her purpose. Rather these powers

235. *W₂ reads:* Moreover, in the same way that the gods are not means at the stage [constituted by the religion] of beauty, so they do not

the concept; it takes its distinctive character back and is itself freed in that way from being only a means.

But, to begin with, the purpose itself is still immediate, formal. Its first categorial determination is that what is thus inwardly determinate should exist on its own account, initially in opposition to reality, and that it should realize itself in reality as something | that resists. In other words it is initially a finite purpose, and the relationship [of divine purpose to the world] is a relationship of the understanding, and the religion that has this kind of foundation is the *religion of the understanding*. (The transition to the category of *purpose* is extremely important; for the first time [we have here] a genuinely independent ideality.)

We have already seen²³⁶ something very near, very similar to this kind of purpose and religion in the religion of the One. (The worshipers, as God's people, are themselves only means; they are not taken up into his will, as his purpose generally or as its fulfillment, because they are human as such—i.e., [there is] nothing in any way determinate [in his will]. [This is] a religion of the understanding inasmuch as the one God is abstract, and this thought is set over against all reality; the Jewish religion [is] a religion of the most stubborn, lifeless understanding. So there [is] a purpose [in it]—the one God who maintains himself. But the purpose [is] entirely general. (α) [It is just] the glorification of God's name, (the fact that God exalts his name.) [It is] *formal*, [it possesses] no content, no idea, [it is] not determined in and for itself, [but is] only an abstract manifestation. There is also, to be sure, a determinate purpose, [but] only in the way that a servant is a purpose for his master, not a content of God himself, not *his* purpose, not a divine determinacy.) (β) [As for] God's people, the singularity of this people [is that] they are only the content of a [divine] purpose on account of their worship, and this purpose is one that is completely incomprehensible. [61a]

a. Abstract Concept

God is the essence that acts in accordance with a purpose, so he has definite purposes in the world. What God purposes and wills are

236. [Ed.] See above, pp. 127–129, 134.

finite things and states. God is what is *wise*, but not yet absolute wisdom.

This offers us a *teleological* way of regarding the world <([and a teleological] proof of God's existence)>. (In the world in general [there are] such wise orderings, such a harmony and concordance between one conditioned thing and another. | Qua finite, the living, spiritual being [has] infinitely many needs, depends in infinitely many ways on other things that are independent of it. These forms of dependence, the most manifold diversity of the qualities, presupposes that there is an equally manifold diversity in the corresponding things.) It also affords us a way of recognizing God in the wise ordering of nature, a proof of God's existence from this purposive arrangement of nature.

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Before we study this new departure, this new way of interpreting things more closely, [we should] first point out that we are later going to examine the more determinate form of religion based on finite purposiveness. But, as in the case of necessity, what has to be considered here first is this categorial determination generally, to the extent that it is a determination of the divine essence; and with respect to it we have to notice what its place is, namely, a subordinate position, under a higher concept.

The first question is, of what kind are these finite purposes? They are to be sought in the natural and spiritual world, not in the nature of God himself, because they are finite. And for this reason the definition of them lies outside God, and God is seen as an understanding, operating in nature, that orders and regulates them.

More precisely, the significance of this external purposiveness is as follows. [61b] <As we have defined it, the realization of the purpose [consists in] something else.> Purpose is the self-sustaining unity of the concept, but in finite purpose <the purposive relationship> is one of external purposiveness; the means [is] the something else in and through which the purpose is realized, something external, and unity is not immanent in it, but external.²³⁷ The teleological view of the world exhibits organic living creatures realizing themselves in the

237. [Ed.] The distinction between internal (intrinsic) and external (extrinsic) purposiveness is based primarily on Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, §§ 82, 63, 66.

natural realm as *conditioned*. They carry on their life, their concept by means of an inorganic nature, which occurs quite independently and contingently as far as they are concerned; they realize themselves uniquely in an infinitely manifold diversity, which must be matched by a nature that is no less infinitely diverse in its qualities | (—for they are needy, dependent in an infinitude of ways—) but that has on its own account no relation to their diversity. The conditions [of life are] (α) contingent objects, of themselves unrelated [to the life they condition], (β) yet [they are] necessary for an other. Thus plants need air, water, soil, etc., animals need food, a form of habitation, they relate to the air etc. in different ways. Again, animals are in themselves a manifold of organs and members; as life that is poured out into multiplicity, their needs [assume] an infinite variety of specific forms, ([and remain] in themselves contingent in regard to it. The more singularized, the more particularized the forms, species, and modes of life of animals, the more they are contingent; for the more something else is equally possible, so much the more does diversity become possible *ad infinitum*, especially of conditioned, dependent [forms].) Their external conditions too assume an infinite variety of specific forms; and the more specific they are, the more contingent they appear. A creature's relationship to the air for purposes of respiration does not appear so contingent as, for example, that a particular animal or insect should feed on only one species of plant, and that this should be there for it to feed on, or conversely that a particular organic structure should be suited to the particular elements of air and water. (The specific character of the needs themselves, e.g., the construction of cells by bees and ants, or the need to hibernate, appears as an instinct that is contingent for the physical form in which it is found—[indeed, it is] contingent in general.)

In regard to human beings the same kind of concordance can be exhibited for the infinitely detailed variety of their needs. Human intelligence has devised an infinite number of means, but these means themselves must have a specified basis—iron, a particular kind of timber, etc.—to allow of their being used as the specific means for such specific needs.

Even more infinitely manifold and contingent are the circumstances which | condition, promote, further, or develop the particular purposes that [contribute to] human well-being. ([There is] the particular spiritual vocation that one acquires) and internalizes; and in his maturation, progress, and development, everyone encounters particular circumstances, lives through a distinctive series or sequence of circumstances, which contribute the objective, realizing moment—what each has become; and the more contingent these [62a] circumstances are, the more miraculous their coincidence appears. 103

Because these coincidences are contingent, (what brings them to pass) is a *tertium quid*, quite apart from them, that links them into a chain, in such a way that certain circumstances are means in relation to the purposes [of our lives].

But the question at hand is this: among this multiplicity of vocations (and [modes of] existence), which are the purposes? (In general terms, which among the manifold existents is the means and which is the end? Purposive relation [is] not just a linkage, but a linkage in which one term is essential and the other inessential.) Purposes are the independent ideas that form a totality within themselves; the first natural purposes are living creatures. [Their purpose is] that life should be, that it should sustain and enjoy itself; the natural elements such as air, light, and water are not purposes within themselves, nor is the nature that is still inorganic even though it is individualized—[it is life that] is this self-sustaining unity [of] the concept and its process of return back into itself.

To a still greater extent, however, human beings are purpose, first as living creatures, second as thought. For [it is] precisely thought, whatever lies in it and is rooted within it, [that is] inwardly infinite purpose unto itself. [Thought can be] formal or objective too, according to the content; but the *absolute purpose* of human subjectivity is the absolute objectivity | of self-consciousness ((the infinite, ultimate, self-contained final purpose)), be it characterized as ethical perfection, a religious life or eternal life, i.e., the divine life of blessedness. 104

This is no finite purpose but the purpose of absolute spirit, that

“you must be perfect as he [your heavenly Father] is perfect” [Matt. 5:48]—for perfection is life in God, likeness to God, the mode in which God himself as spirit is realized in his community, or in subjective self-consciousness.

But at the point where we now stand, this kind of purpose is excluded because it is not yet present. Here we have only the finite purposes of nature and of human arrangements and the destinies of peoples and individuals, and these are accordingly here the field in which divine wisdom and providence are initially recognized and from which the very existence of a God is inferred. [62b]

It is a simple, natural process of thought to feel, to surmise, to recognize in this (infinitely manifold) harmony of relationships—of inorganic to organic nature and of both to human purposes—a higher, deeper principle, that of wisdom working according to a purpose.

But this implies that the concept of purpose must have emerged into human self-consciousness. In the Book of Job or the Psalms, for example, it is only the power of God that is especially singled out and lauded in natural phenomena, elementary and organic alike. This more definite awareness of purposive relations we find especially in Socrates;²³⁸ in him this concept has emerged essentially in opposition to the earlier mechanistic view. The principle that he sets against the primordial elements as causes is the *good*, i.e., what is self-appointed purpose and conforms thereto.

“What is obviously useful, does this seem to thee a work of chance, τύχης, or of an understanding, γνώμης?” ((Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, end of book I (Latin translation, p. 310; Greek, Stephanus, p. 422).²³⁹) “God has [given] human beings | eyes to see, ears to

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238. [Ed.] Hegel here briefly summarizes an important theme in his portrayal of Socrates, which is much more fully developed elsewhere; see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:411 ff., 405 ff., 385 (*Werke* 14:75 ff., 69 ff., 43). But the conception of the good as “self-appointed purpose” can scarcely be supported adequately from the sources. On p. 387 (p. 46), Hegel himself distinguishes the higher view of the good of Plato and Aristotle from that of Socrates, who accepted the good only in the particular sense of the practical.

239. [Ed.] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.4.4. This reference is not found at the “end of Book I,” since the latter has seven chapters. The edition Hegel used did not distinguish chapters, hence the rather vague reference.

hear, and so on, eyelids to close to protect the eyes when danger threatens, eyebrows so that the sweat of their brow should not run into their eyes, and so forth.”²⁴⁰ (What is petty in the teleological way of looking at things is immediately apparent here too. Even in the most limited form of life there are an infinite number of consequences and logical connections that tend to its preservation. If we make these consequences into purposes, [a matter of] utility, we are struck by the pettiness of the purposes, purposes that at the same time we are making into an aim of God. A divine aim must have an appropriate content. Thus, rosebushes and sloetrees have thorns, [whose] purpose [is] to protect them against the beasts; and the beasts [too have] their weapons. But the weapons are of no avail. All of them that are purposes [are] a means as well. But in general the contemplation of nature as living and growing, the life of the animal realm with its infinitely manifold organization and the specific ways in which it is organized so as to maintain itself, fill us with the thought of something higher altogether, something inward, not a mechanical linkage with an external cause. It is another way of thinking [that leads] to miracle; [this is] to make nothing the causal link—i.e., a linkage of this kind is natural.

This transition of thought from the purposive ordering of nature to a *cause* that operates according to purposes, in such a way as to arrive at a particular form of the moments it comprises and the way in which they are differentiated, [constitutes]

The Teleological Proof of God's Existence

(Kant, p. 650:²⁴¹ “The present world opens up to us such an immeasurable spectacle of diversity, order, purposefulness, and beauty, whether we pursue these in the infinite extent of space or in its limitless subdivision, that even with the knowledge that our weak understanding has succeeded in gaining of it, language is already at a loss to convey so many and such incomprehensibly | great wonders, numbers cannot measure them, and even our thoughts cannot circumscribe them, so that our judgment of the whole

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240. [Ed.] Ibid., 1.4.5–6 (not an exact quotation).

241. [Ed.] Slightly altered quotation from Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 650. Translation ours.

necessarily dissolves into a speechless but all the more eloquent astonishment. On all sides we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, a regular pattern of coming about and passing away; and since nothing has arrived by itself at the state in which it presently is, it always points back to something else as its cause; and this cause necessarily commits us to the same inquiry; so that the entire totality must inevitably sink into the abyss of nothingness unless we assume something outside of this sphere of infinite contingency, something that subsists on its own account, primitively and independently, which has upheld it and being the cause of its genesis has at the same time assured its permanence.”) [63a]

Kant, p. 651:²⁴² “This proof deserves at all times to be mentioned with respect. It is the *oldest* (? (No!)), the clearest, and the one best suited to the common reason of humanity. It brings the study of nature to life just as it gets its own being from that study, and continually derives new force from it.” (However, dry description does not of itself suffice. [The study of nature] derived principally from and has been stimulated by the teleological proof; natural history was not regarded as worth spending time on unless it revealed something deeper, a link with the concept. Natural history [has been] treated in a wholly teleological fashion: [there is] testaceo-theology, helmintho-theology, crustaceo-entomo-theology.) “This proof adduces purposes and intentions where our observation would not have discovered them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature through the guiding thread of a particular unity, the principle of which lies outside nature. But this knowledge reacts again upon its cause, viz., on the idea that has led to it, and strengthens the belief in a supreme originator to the level of irresistible conviction.”

P. 653:²⁴³ “The chief points of the so-called physicotheological proof are as follows:

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“(1) On all sides there are clear signs in the world of an | order in accord with a determinate intention, carried out with great wisdom, and in a whole whose content is indescribably varied, and whose scope is limitless in extent.

242. [Ed.] Exact quotations from B 651–652 except for the marginal insertions. Translation ours.

243. [Ed.] Slightly altered quotation from B 653–654. Translation ours.

"(2) ²⁴⁴This purposive ordering is quite alien to the things of the world and is attached to them only contingently; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself coincide,²⁴⁵ through means that unite together in so many ways, to form determinate end-goals had they not been quite specifically chosen and designed for the purpose, by an ordering rational principle, according to its underlying ideas.

"(3) There exists therefore a sublime and wise cause (or more than one) that must be the cause of the world not merely as an omnipotent nature working blindly, through its fecundity, but as intelligence, through freedom.

"(4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation between the different parts of the world, as members in one single edifice constructed by art—inferred with certainty as far as our observation extends, and beyond that with probability, in accordance with all the premises of analogy." [63b] |

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Kant's critique²⁴⁶ [takes the following form].

(α) [The proof concerns] "only the contingency of the form, but not of the matter, the substance in the world"—([it] extends [as far as an] architect of the world. In any case [there is] some more metaphysics [here] in that it assumes a matter independent of its

244. *Ms. margin:* (Thus [they are] independent, reciprocally indifferent existents. Their relation [to the order of nature] is not *their* mode of determinate being but an *other*—not *their* existence

[But] the ordering [itself] – sun, living creature, food

Psychological proof – see below)

[*Ed.*] See below, n. 251.

245. *Ms. margin:* (In other words, the products of nature are independent.

(α) They have a specific mode of organization, yet they are not posited as *products* (as produced by human or some other agency; owing to their wholly specific, nonindependent particularity [they occur rather] immediately as posited).

(B) [They are] logically connected with, conditioned by something else. [For example, they need] food, but [that is] not brought about by themselves, and [is] indifferent to any such relation, [just as] the sunshine or rivers [are indifferent] to our employment of them. [This has] infinitely far-reaching consequences for a higher being that is a purpose in itself, [i.e., for] humanity; it is not the sun that appoints the purpose for this higher being, or that posits this logical connection, for the determination of human activity does not lie in it. But neither is it humanity that appoints the purpose for its own concerns, and brings forth these means)

246. [*Ed.*] Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 654–655.

qualities. Matter without form [is] a non-thing. Admittedly, abstracting from all form, [I] can think of [matter as] eternal, unalterable, devoid of all determinacy: [but it] is then a product of reflection and not something that subsists ([and the same is true of] finite, active form without matter); in any event the thought [is] false—this matter [is] itself a determination of form. What is form, what are its forms? Identity [falls] under this heading. [But form] itself [is] identity. We must get beyond the separating of form and matter from each other as independently real. Here, in any event, purposes and purposiveness are determined by the purposefully operating cause—*soul*, substantiality; matter is only something external, or rather simply a determination of the form, one moment implicit in the concept.)

(β) ²⁴⁷“The argument proceeds from the order and purposiveness so universally observed in the world, as a purely contingent arrangement, to the existence of a cause proportionate to them. Expressions of ‘very great,’ ‘astounding,’ or ‘immeasurable power and excellence’ give no determinate concept at all, only a representation of relationship. Now I do not suppose that anyone would be bold enough to claim insight into the relationship between what he observes of the world’s magnitude (in extent and in content alike) and *omnipotence*, between the world order and *supreme* wisdom, or between the unity of the world and the *absolute* unity of its author. Physicotheology is therefore unable to give any determinate concept of the supreme cause of the world.” One starts from “amazement at the magnitude of the power, wisdom, etc., of the author of the world”²⁴⁸ and then, getting no further, leaps over to *infinite* wisdom and absolute reality.

([This critique is] justified. The content consists in a multitude of determinate purposes, and this does not lead to a single purpose that is determinate in and for itself, inwardly infinite, such as would not only (perhaps) contain them all within itself but to which they would be subordinate—absolute, infinite wisdom. Purposive relation | [is] infinite in form but not in content; [infinite] content [is] determinate unity maintaining itself. But even if [the purposive relation

247. [Ed.] Abbreviated and slightly altered quotation from B 655–656. Translation ours.

248. [Ed.] Cf. B 657.

is infinite in] form, > [the physicotheological proof must take] refuge elsewhere—[namely in] the ontological proof, [where] the starting point [is] the supremely real essence; [it is] the most universal content.²⁴⁹

This harmony of purposiveness (α) has nothing *true* in it, i.e., it is not the immediately sensible, external [truth], that which is external to itself—here there is only a manifold of independent, mutually indifferent purposes; (β) is not [true] for *reflection*, [i.e., not] necessity (the form of reflection is a nexus in which identity is not posited); (γ) here, however, [the harmony is] the rational nexus of the concept, or determinacy maintaining itself in being other than itself.

Here [we have been considering] the idea that subsists in and for itself, rationality, *inner purposiveness*.

(*External purposiveness* [is] the understanding in general, the identity of thought with itself, maintaining itself against reality, transforming reality and determining it in accordance with itself. Kant does not here attack this relationship as one of finitude, [involving] only a proportionate, not an infinite cause. Certainly, the purposes [are] finite, but for the purposefully working cause not to be a proportionate cause, all that is needed is to view the finite purposes as subordinate, i.e., in another frame of reference to regard them once again as means and to recognize the highest, absolute, final purpose in which everything is unified.

When we look more closely, this proof or inference is made up as follows: (α) that there is a purposive arrangement in nature is a fact; (β) it is not due to these things themselves; (γ) therefore it is due to an other.)

This cause then is something other than nature; this [inference] depends on the metaphysics of nature, as though the nature of the thing were not itself this concept, this vitality, or this spirituality, but all essential coupling of the concept and its external reality, the conditions [of its realization], lay outside the nature of the thing. (It is not at all the concept of organic nature [that we have here].)

249. [Ed.] A probable reference to Kant's claim in the passage immediately following the preceding citation that the physicotheological proof, failing in its undertaking, falls back upon the cosmological proof and ultimately upon the ontological. See B 657.

Then admittedly this connectedness, this order [is] external—merely a third existent. [64a]

110 Kant²⁵⁰ [defines] what is living as self-appointed purpose, *causa sui*, all | [its] purpose and means in itself, producing and sustaining itself. (External, inorganic nature [is] independent, as are the meager structures [of] insects or the numerous species of willows, oaks, lilies, and so on. (In theory [these forms of nature] are to be esteemed as highly; but in practice who does not kill flies or eat chicken, lamb, or beef? [If they] esteem mere life so highly, human beings will necessarily die.) As if these living creatures, because they assume the form of self-relating independence, were [really] independent of one another, and as if their nature, [the nature] of the thing, emerged from the concept producing itself within them, rather than both emerging merely as moments [of the concept].)

In spirit too the ordinary consciousness is struck by the fact that this organic, living unity is the nature of the thing. I remember hearing a lecture in which a professor of natural theology²⁵¹ gave a psychological proof of the existence [of God], as follows. There is such a great variety of human properties and powers—sensibility, understanding, reason, will, desire, instincts, [human nature is] itself so manifold. For all this to be unified, [something external is required]; it does not [lie in] the nature of their thinghood [*die Natur ihrer Sache*] to be one. [They need] a third outside [themselves] that disposes them in such a way and at the same time attunes them—a

250. [Ed.] Hegel is here attempting to modify Kant's criticism of the physicotheological proof in the *Critique of Pure Reason* by means of introducing the concept of vitality as inner, organic purposiveness, thereby bringing to the surface the externality of the coordination consisting in well-ordered world, ordering creator, and the point of view of proportionality. On the concept of inner purposiveness, see the passages referred to above, n. 237. The mention of the *causa sui* in this connection is an apparent reference to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, § 64. But Hegel does not refer to Kant's reservations about or further delimitation of the concept of a purpose of nature, § 65.

251. [Ed.] It cannot be established to whom Hegel is referring here. But the psychological proof that he describes resembles a proof found in Moses Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden; oder, Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes*, Part I (Berlin, 1786), esp. pp. 284–305: "XVI. Elucidation of the concepts of necessity, contingency, independence and dependence. Attempt at a new proof of the existence of God based on the incompleteness of self-knowledge." See also Vol. 3:353.

multitude of specifically distinct elements—in such a way that they match together in a harmony such as might be made by the strings of a well-tuned piano. The harmonic concordance of so many forces [must lie] outside them, which proves the existence of a third, namely God.

Now what is striking is that spirit is implicitly one. To be one is its nature, however diverse its forces may appear, (however ill one thinks of spirit, even if one represents [its] manifold forces and properties to oneself as independent). It is also their nature, the nature of the thing, to constitute a unity—[this unity] is fundamental [to them all].

Again, as in the case of necessity, inference [would be]:

(α) From the independence of the configurations;

(β) From what we note of their mutual relationship, the fact that they are essentially conditioned by | one another <<[there is] dependence everywhere [but] only because the understanding presupposes the independence of the related elements—[which is a] direct contradiction>>;

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(γ) [To] this unity external to them, in and for itself.

Rather is it the case that the conditionedness referred to under (β) sublates the independence [asserted in] (α), and reduces it to the level of a mere semblance or show. (But in any event [there is] a higher idea [of spirit] than this immediate perception and reflection of the understanding.)

As soon as purposiveness is [taken to be] inward, immanent, or the nature of the thing, these configurations are no longer absolutely independent. (Purposiveness alone [is] the nature of the thing: [it is] not these configurations as objects of perception and reflection; it is something other than them, i.e., than the merely sensible world; it is an intelligible world, a world of reason, whereas the sensible world is merely the phenomenal world. What reigns in this intelligible world is the concept, which—being infinitely articulated and divided—also constitutes the purposive connection of the parts; but the parts are themselves aspects of an absolute purpose, [so that] the purposiveness in them is only formal.) But formally [regarded] <—as life, or spirit in its finitude—> the configurations remain finite in content, notwithstanding their purposive character. <<(Who will

regard an insect, [let alone] human destiny, in such a way?) [What human beings] ask for is an absolute purpose in itself, not [a goal] within their own life and existence. (But this [is] a broader, higher standpoint.) [64b] |

b. Configuration or Representation of the Divine Essence²⁵²

²⁵³(The most general basic determination of what subsists in and for itself, of what is absolutely objective [*Objektive*], is for a self-consciousness, its determination as something singular, an object [*Gegenstand*—[this is] the mode of objectivity.)

⟨(α)⟩ When *we* say God is the power that works according to the purposes of wisdom, this has another sense than the one in which this definition of God is initially to be taken at the stage of conceptual development we have presently reached. To be precise, these purposes are limited, finite purposes in our sense too; but they are also purposes of wisdom, of the *one* wisdom, of what is good in and for itself, i.e., purposes that refer to one supreme final purpose. As a result, these limited purposes are simply subsumed under one final purpose; they, and the divine wisdom in them, are subordinated.

In the religion of expediency, however, the limitedness of the purposes is their basic character, and there is no higher category to which it is subordinate. So this religion is in no sense a religion of unity but of plurality: there is no unity of power or unity of wisdom, no *one* idea, that constitutes the basic definition of the divine nature.

⟨(β)⟩ The basic metaphysical definition [of the divine essence] is not as object [*Gegenstand*] in the sense of what is objective [*Objektive*] in pure thought ([i.e., it is] not for pure thought itself and in *its* element—this [is how it is] in scientific knowledge) but for representation. (Hence [we have] (α) the natural element for

252. [Ed.] *Gestaltung, Vorstellung des göttlichen Wesens*. A freer rendering of this heading might read: "Configuration of the Divine Essence, the Forms or Shapes in Which It Is Represented." *Gestaltung* is a difficult term to translate or grasp in English. It can be defined as the representation of something in the form of a *Gestalt*, a figure or shape. The connection between "configuration" and "representation" is made explicit by this heading, and it is clear on structural grounds that Hegel here intends to treat the "concrete representation" of Roman religion.

253. *Ms. adds in margin, next to the heading*: (Concrete Representation, the Form of the Idea)

sensible, external intuition; (β) [a representation] of human shape, the shape [that is] still more essential for the appearance of purposive action.) And because the basic category is that of *particularity*, the mode of reality, or the way in which the divine is objective for [65a] consciousness as subsisting in and for itself | in accordance with the idea (i.e., the *particular* mode or way), also obtains, in line with the earlier development that we have observed, in sensory representation: [there is] a throng of gods, also portrayed as present in sensible form, so that these images of gods vacillate between being merely external images for fanciful imagination and being themselves, inwardly, the immediate presence of the divine power—a vacillation that necessarily occurs everywhere to a greater or lesser degree.

⟨(γ)⟩ Thus there are in the first place the powers, gods, and images of the religion of beauty; for the finiteness of their definition [of the divine] is something common to both religions. ⟨[There is], however, an essential difference; Greek and Roman religion [are treated] habitually as one and the same,²⁵⁴ but in their genuinely spiritual character [they are] essentially different. [Greek religion is] the realm of free beauty, joyous festival, and the enjoyment of divinity. Here [we find] on the contrary a preoccupation with finite purposes, an earthbound religion of [finite purposes].⟩ And here beauty is not the defining characteristic of the form or shape in which the gods are represented; serene enjoyment is not the quintessence of their cultus, just as it is not ethical power that principally characterizes their significance.

(The powers inherent in the purposes are not unconstrained [though] determinate; they are universal elementary powers that are not free powers, and the relationship to them is not one of free theoretical intuition.)

The divine essences of this sphere are practical, not theoretical gods; they are prosaic, not poetical, although, as we shall see in a moment, this stage will be the richest in continually discovering and bringing forth new gods. In point of fact, it is then *determinate*

254. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to an interpretation set forth in the source he relied upon most heavily, Moritz's *Anthousa*. For Moritz, Roman religion, like Greek, was a religion of cheerful and fanciful imagination, whereas for Hegel it was a religion of insipid understanding.

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purposes that constitute the content of these forms or shapes. These purposes are not to be sought in physical nature, nor are they of a subhuman kind; among the many forms of existence and relationship, human existence and human relationships are the essential ones. The sun and stars and animal life [are] not ends unto themselves, whereas what is human has thought within itself; and every human final end, | no matter how inwardly insignificant it may be (to feed oneself, make life more agreeable, etc.), gives one the right to sacrifice natural things or animal life as much as one will without ado; if one is annoyed by a fly, one kills it without further ado—[yet] it is life, an organism, and can be the object of scientific observation. [65b]

And even within the gods, the purposes are not to be looked for objectively (in and for themselves) either. A purpose that is in and for itself must needs be one infinite ultimate purpose. Here [the purposes are] finite, and in the finite [world]; the finite is the root. These are *human* purposes, human requirements, either human needs or else happy (circumstances or states). To the extent that it is determinate, this religion owes its origin to requirement or need.

[There is] a distinction here from the preceding stage, where it was free, universal natural and ethical powers that constituted the object of veneration. Limited though they are, these powers [are] in and for themselves an objective content. In their contemplation the purposes of individuality are dissolved, and the individual is released from his needs and requirements. The powers themselves are free, and individuals achieve freedom in them; for this very reason they celebrate their identity with them, [the enjoyment of] their favor. They deserve such favor, for they are of themselves without resources vis-à-vis the divine powers. Purpose does not lie in their particularity—their needs and requirements, their well-being. As to whether their particular purposes succeed, they can only turn to oracles for the answer, and it is inherent in necessity that they [must] surrender them. Singular purposes acquire here the meaning of something negative, not subsistent in and for itself.

~ But at this present stage, the objective powers [are] practical deities. [It is] a practical religion, a religion of utility. It is²⁵⁵ the

255. *W reads:* But in this religion of happiness it is

self-seeking of the worshipers that intuit itself in them as power, and that seeks satisfaction in and from them (for a subjective interest). | Human self-seeking ((α) is inwardly determined, human beings in their particularity being infinite purpose for themselves; (β)) has the feeling of its dependence,²⁵⁶ precisely because it is finite, and this feeling is peculiar to it. Orientals who live in the light, Hindus who submerge their consciousness and self-consciousness in Brahman, the Greeks who surrender their particular purposes in necessity and intuit in the particular powers those that befriend, inspire, and invigorate them, those that are united with them—all live in their religion without this feeling of dependence. Instead they are free within it, they cast away—and have cast away—their dependence; ([they are] free in the presence of their God—they are within him and within him alone; outside religion [they are] dependent, but here [they have] their freedom). [66a]

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But self-seeking—need, requirement, subjective happiness and well-being that wills itself, holds fast to itself—((α) feels itself oppressed,) takes as its starting point the feeling of the dependent character of its interests; ((β) at the same time [it feels] the power [to meet its needs] as a [divine] other; for subjective need, inasmuch as it also maintains itself (or its selfishness) as an end on its own account, maintains this selfish power (not the power of the One)). The power to satisfy (or deny) these interests has a positive significance: it is of interest to subjective need in that its role is to fulfill the self's purposes. To this extent its sole importance is as a means of actualizing the worshiper's purposes. (There is cheating and hypocrisy in this humility because the worshiper's purposes are and are supposed to be the content of the power, *its* purpose.) Hence the attitude of consciousness in the religion of expediency is not theoretical; i.e., it does not consist in the free intuition of objectivity, or free veneration of the divine powers, but in *practical* self-seeking, (the quest for the fulfillment of the singularity of this life). This religion is prosaic,²⁵⁷ it is a religion of the *understanding*. For it is the understanding that holds fast to finite purposes, (to something

256. [Ed.] See below, n. 292.

257. [Ed.] For the interpretation of Roman religion as prosaic, Hegel refers in the *Loose Sheets* to Moritz (see below, *Loose Sheets*, n. 8); but see n. 254 above.

116 posited unilaterally by it, | concerning it alone,) and neither submerges these abstractions, these singular concerns, in necessity nor resolves them in reason. The shapes in which the divine is represented in this religion are not therefore works of free phantasy, of free spirit, of beauty; they are not configurations in which precisely the antithesis between a definition in terms of the understanding (in terms of [finite] purposes) and reality is wiped out.

⟨(δ)⟩ Consequently the configuration of these spirits [the forms and shapes in which they are represented] should not be considered here separately from the cultus either. For this distinction [of the divine shapes from the cultus] and the free cultus [that belongs to them as distinct] presuppose a truth that is in and for itself, a universally objective, truly divine essence, one that subsists on its own account through its content, (above and beyond particular subjective need); and the cultus [is] the process by which self-consciousness gives itself the certainty of the identity of the divine essence with itself, and enjoys and celebrates this. But here interest begins from the subjective; the worshipers' needs and requirements and the dependence that they create are what make them pious, and their cultus consists in positing a *power* to help them in their need. (Thus these gods have on their own account a subjective root and origin, and have an existence so to speak only in worship, in the festivals—the goddess Fornax, Pales (ovens, cattle fodder), etc.²⁵⁸ Even at the level of representation this hardly constitutes independent being. However,) the attempt, the hope to overcome this need through the power of these deities, the hope of obtaining satisfaction for one's requirements through their power, is only the second part of the cultus; the other, formerly objective aspect pertains to the cultus itself. [66b]

To give an example, Thucydides²⁵⁹ (B. μη: The Egyptian plague in Athens) says not a word of any particular religious institutions,

258. [Ed.] On the festival of Fornax (the Fornacalia) see Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 44–45; on the festival of Pales (the Palilia), pp. 103–107.

259. [Ed.] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 2.47. "Equally useless" against the plague "were prayers made in the temples, consultation of oracles, and so forth; indeed, in the end people were so overcome by their sufferings that they paid no further attention to such things."

feasts, or festivals [for it, whereas] in the event of plague the Romans consistently [devised new] gods, new forms of worship, ceremonies, sacrifices, lectisternia.²⁶⁰ |

So this particular area of the cultus has no distinctive, more general interest that deserves to be considered on its own account.

c. The More Specific Nature of These Powers and Deities in General²⁶¹

⟨(α)⟩²⁶²The [divine] purpose is a determinate content, but this does not mean just any content whatever; although finite and present to consciousness, the purpose must inwardly be universal in its nature (a universal need, a universal actuality). Inwardly and on its own account it must have a higher justification than just any purpose whatever.

But in the first place this purpose is *the state* generally, wherein the particular purposes of individuals are subsumed and surrendered; and secondly it is this year's harvest, [67a] ⟨not the universal powers of nature themselves, but the concrete manifestation,⟩ the prospering of whatever goes to satisfy the physical requirements of human beings and promote their progress and welfare (just as in the state they have legal protection for their property, and also the honor that custom allots to them).

²⁶³⟨In regard to the state, concrete cases, singular actual [fortunes

260. [Ed.] The lectisternia were sacrificial festivals at which a banquet was spread before images of the gods placed on couches. See Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 305, 307–309. The Ms. adds an illegible word at the end of this sentence.

261. Ms. reads: (γ) and adds in margin: ⟨Important link to the Christian religion⟩ [Ed.] This section treats in detail the cultus of the religion of expediency. The German edition changes the γ to an ■ and considers this the next point in the sequence ■ to δ above. There may be some basis for this since the discussion of the cultus already is anticipated in δ, and Hegel may not have clearly differentiated between “representation” and “cultus” in the Ms. (see above, n. 5). However, this γ (or c) inaugurates a new sequence of subsection markings, and we construe it as indicating a new phase of the discussion.

262. [Ed.] The text beginning here is transposed to this position by reference marks. In the Ms. it is preceded by the main text on sheet 66b that is given below: “(αα) In the preceding . . . happily carried out.”

263. [Ed.] The following three paragraphs, through “(a) *Fortuna*,” are transposed from the end of sheet 67a, following “inner powers,” to the present position by reference marks.

play the same role] as a prosperous harvest in regard to nature.) So this religion contains within it the more specific aspects needed to become a *political* religion. The state is a principal goal of this religion; but it is not a political religion just in the sense that, as was precisely the case at all previous levels, the people had its highest consciousness of the state and its ethical life in religion (so that veneration was due to [the gods] as free universal powers because the general institutions of the state—such as agriculture, property, and marriage—were their gift). | Instead the worship of the gods and thanksgiving is prosaically attached partly to singular determinate situations (salvation in cases of need) and actual events; and partly the religious aura in general attaches itself to all public authority, all official and state transactions. In part, however, because the operation of religion for finite purposes is itself represented in such a finite way, it is the [community's] singular decisions, undertakings, etc., in which the gods must be consulted and associated in initiating action. Superstition brings them in, in a finite mode, [67b] to give advice about everything, and since this counsel can be mediated only through human agency, this aspect of political power lies in the hands of the priests. The Romans' practice of consulting the Sibylline books, examining the flight of birds, [taking] the auspices, examining the entrails, and so on has quite a different shape and meaning from the consultations of oracles by the Greeks. The Romans had no oracles—at times they did, it is true, also consult them, but [oracles were] not a characteristic, indigenous feature in the Roman cultus.

[Let us look] briefly [at this level of cultus] in greater detail.

(a) *Fortuna*²⁶⁴ [66b]

(αα) In the preceding stage of religion the universal, hovering above the particular, [was] necessity. At the present stage, in contrast, this cannot be the case. For in necessity finite purposes are sublated, whereas here they are the determining, subsistent [factor]. However, the universal is here a consenting to particular purposes; this consent in general, i.e., as itself undetermined in principle (because it is the

264. Ms. margin: <(a) Fortuna see above>

[Ed.] This refers to the following four paragraphs on sheet 66b, which are transferred to this position by this reference.

purposes of single individuals and their generality is therefore only abstract), *is* fortune [*Glück*], Fortuna.

This Fortuna is not so different from necessity as to be chance or contingency (for then it would be necessity itself, in which *finite* purposes are only contingent); nor is it providence, the purposive disposition of human affairs in | general, but Fortuna with a definite content. Specifically it is the happiness of purpose achieved, purpose happily carried out. (This Fortuna, Fortuna Publica, is the universal prosperity that is the destiny of the Roman Empire; [this destiny is] divine—a [self-conscious] unity—Fortuna Publica. ([It is] not [the case] as Moritz says (p. 126)²⁶⁵ that out of modesty they did not attribute everything to their insuperable courage and bravery but also assigned some part to fortune—*this* modesty is religion in general. What is immodest, and impious, is that this supreme essence is not for them a universal idea but this actual concern [of theirs].) The Romans were in any event entitled to regard the extension of their hegemony, the monstrous extent of their empire, as a portent, a unique condition of the world, which transcends all measure, all individuality.

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Later on [it was] a celebrated theme, and one frequently discussed, as we learn from Ammianus Marcellinus,²⁶⁶ whether Rome's greatness was due more to Fortuna or to her valor and sagacity. But all parties [shared] both implicitly and explicitly a clear intuition of and belief in Fortuna, the greatness of the Roman Empire; no longer [was there] any other realm to stand beside it; the Persians, Parthians, Britons, Germanic tribes, Dacians did not, in the [Roman] view, stand on the same plane; disputes and wars [were] quite marginal affairs on the frontiers—just as a house stands firm on its foundations even if rain etc. [causes damage] to the tiles, [or] an extensive estate [even if] some damage is caused here and there by wolves, and so on. No power [stood] beside Rome as her equal; [no power] threatened her existence: [she was] alone and unconquerable.

265. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 126–127. The goddess of fortune, Fortuna, was worshiped under innumerable forms by the Romans, including above all Fortuna Publica since theirs (says Moritz) was the most fortunate of states.

266. [Ed.] Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae* 14.6.3. See also Plutarch, *De fortuna Romanorum* 9.1.

[The name] Fortuna Fortis is also [to be found] (p. 167).²⁶⁷ Servius Tullius, a man of the lowest estate, the son of a slave girl, erected a temple to [the goddess] Fortune; as a result he was commemorated by the common people, servants, and serving maids, who continued to rejoice at the good fortune that had befallen one of their own, so to speak.) [67a]

(ββ) Second, the realization of these concrete purposes is characteristically confronted directly with failure; and since the purposes are finite, this failure is something to be feared. Ill success, misfortune in the political or physical fields, ill growth, | sickness, and so on are just as possible as prosperity and good fortune ((in concrete terms fortune may be good or bad)). A new categorial determination enters on the scene, that of a hostile bringer of misfortune—in general, fear for one's finite purposes. In the serene religion of art this aspect is pushed into the background; the underworld powers, (which could be seen as hostile or terrible,) are the Eumenides, the kindly ones, benevolent inner powers. [67b]

²⁶⁸This essence of immediate, universal actuality is accompanied by foreshadowings—but very weakly and superficially—of the worship of a higher, inner essence, a worship²⁶⁹ of mysterious essences, something dread and indeterminate. [The Romans

267. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, p. 167. The Servius Tullius mentioned in the next sentence was, according to tradition, the founder of the cult of the goddess Fortuna; we have translated Hegel's *dem Glücke* as "to [the goddess] Fortune," since it echoes Moritz's term *Glücksgöttin*.

268. Ms. margin: (Deities without any element of phantasy)

269. Ms. margin: (Rome has a secret, mystical name—ἔρωϛ, Amor, Roma – Valentia)

[Ed.] See Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 2:1002–1003. According to Creuzer, Romulus gave his city three names: a secret, mystical name (Amor, ἔρωϛ), a priestly name (Flora or Anthusa), and a political name (Roma). The priestly name was explained by a legend: because most of the former deities did not oppose extension of the city by Tarquin, even though it meant deconsecration of their altars, soothsayers of the time felt justified in concluding that the boundaries of the city would endure forever. Thus, writes Creuzer, this city "was Flora, the flowering or flourishing, it was Valentia-Roma, the strong or vigorous." (Anthusa derives from ἄνθος, "flower," and hence is equivalent to the Latin Flora, while Valentia derives from *valeo*, "I am well.") In another work, *Abriss der römischen Antiquitäten zum Gebrauch bei Vorlesungen* (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1824), p. 13, Creuzer refers to a legend that Rome was first called Valentia.

recognized] the abstract inwardness, [e.g.,] of right. For example, [the festival] of Bona Dea ((Moritz, p. 118))²⁷⁰ [was held] at night in the presence of two vestal virgins in the house of one of the patricians; in this way Ops herself [was] sometimes [celebrated], the universal force of nature; ([this force is] Pelasgian, as in the mysteries. In other respects [the old gods are] deities of field and pasture, not elevated by the beauty of human fancy into a theoretical circle of gods.)²⁷¹ Then [there is the] *mundus patens*, lasting three days, the opening up of the underground world, whether in a cave or an underground temple [dedicated] to Pluto and Proserpine ((p. 200));²⁷² [during this festival there were] no meetings, no popular assemblies, no recruitment for the army, no public affairs were conducted, no ships left harbor, no weddings were celebrated. (Subsequently the ceremonies of Isis (which | were often proscribed), of Cybele, of the Jews and then Christianity, forced their way in, all for the same reason—the need for a religion containing something deeper, removed from common actuality. The same need [gave rise to] the Cynic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptic schools of philosophy, and later Alexandrine philosophy. So it represented a very widespread way of thinking.)

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(b) In part, the particular [divine] powers [were] a common [heritage] with the Greeks, but their primary reference and significance was directly political. They were viewed not as universal powers but as having done something particular for Rome, something political for which [the Romans] had to thank them; [they had saved it] (in an emergency) and from an emergency. For example, [there

270. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 118–119. Bona Dea (the “good goddess”) was the goddess of the fertility of fields and of the fruitfulness and chastity of women. Ops was a goddess of the harvest. The Pelasgians were one of a group of early peoples mentioned by classical writers as the pre-Hellenic inhabitants of Greece and the eastern islands of the Mediterranean.

271. *W₂ reads*: Thus the dread of something unknown, indeterminate, and unconscious was always there with the Romans—everywhere they saw something mysterious and felt a vague foreboding that impelled them to adduce something that they revered as a higher [power] without understanding it. The Greeks, in contrast, made everything clear and wove a beautiful web of inspired myth about all of their relationships.

272. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 199–201.

is the account of] Jupiter Stator (p. 168);²⁷³ [this tells of] an encounter between Romans and Sabines in which the Roman commander fell and the Romans took flight; thereupon Romulus swore to build a temple to Jupiter [if he caused] the Romans to stand fast, and thereafter he was called Jupiter Stator. (Jupiter Invictus²⁷⁴ is no arbitrary epithet for a deity, [but is used] in reference to the Roman state. Page 260²⁷⁵ [cites] Jupiter Latialis, who protects Latium, Jupiter of the alliance between Romans and Latins.) In the same way in an emergency, when the state faced destruction as a result of factional quarrels, the people sent for the original Ceres, from Enna in Sicily, and on another occasion Cybele from Pergamus.²⁷⁶ (There are more specific representations [of] other Roman [deities] too.) Juno was worshiped as Juno Moneta, her temple being the mint ((p. 129)).²⁷⁷ [68a] (Saturn's temple [was] the treasury—the exact counterpart.²⁷⁸) Minerva's festival [was inaugurated] because the flute-players and other musicians who were threatened with loss of part of their emoluments were leaving the city.²⁷⁹

By and large, [there were] a great number of such political festivities, and any emergency was the occasion for the state to institute a new religious ceremony. [These new ceremonies were] the mandatory consequence of need, not a matter of free spiritual intuition. ([They honor] powers of mere utility or harmful powers, [reverenced] prosaically. | These are not (α) friendly ethical determinations [with] a spiritual basis [that is thereby] brought nearer to us in friendly fashion; they do not give food for thought, something to interest the spirit, heart, mind, and thought. (β) There is no beauty.)

[There were festivals of] Concordia and so on—a host of patriotic

273. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 168–169.

274. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 162.

275. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 260. Latium was the name of the region around Rome.

276. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 100, 71–72. The “original Ceres” was the Greek goddess Demeter, who already was worshiped in Sicily and lower Italy, and whose cult was introduced into Rome upon the advice of the Sibylline books in 495 B.C. The Romans imported Cybele, goddess of nature, from Asia Minor in 204 B.C.

277. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 128–129.

278. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 227.

279. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 162–165. The festival in question was the lesser Quinquatrus.

festivals that were directly oriented toward state purposes, circumstances, etc.

(β) The other divine essences, ceremonies, and forms of worship related primarily to general, (physical,) human requirements and purposes, [which are] abstractly [necessary] in regard to state purposes. Of this kind was the worship accorded to Ops (Consiva (p. 203)),²⁸⁰ the consort of Saturn, a mysterious goddess who stores within herself the seeds from which all plants come, and ripens them. ([It is a matter of] utility, [of] prosaic powers)—a host of rural deities and festivals about which there is much that is (naive) and natural. The bounteous fruitfulness of nature in all its manifold aspects [gave rise to] a large number of fertility and craft festivals. Jupiter had a special altar on the Capitoline hill as Jupiter Pistor (“the baker”).²⁸¹ ([We also read in Moritz] (p. 146)²⁸² that mention should be made in this connection of the goddess Fornax, i.e., the goddess of the oven, who presided over the parching of the corn in the ovens. There were also festivals of Vesta, to ensure that the fire should serve for baking bread.) Among the main festivals were the Ambarvalia, a procession round the fields, or the Suovetaurilia (festival of swine, sheep, and bulls).²⁸³ [The same source] (p. 101)²⁸⁴ [mentions] the Fordicidia, where each curia offered up a cow in calf, as if it were [returning] tithes to the earth. (In the Palilia (p. 103)²⁸⁵ the worshipers sought to win the favor of Pales, the goddess of cattle fodder, who caused fodder for the beasts to flourish, and into whose care the herdsmen commended their beasts, that she might guard them from all harm.)²⁸⁶ The Lares and Manes were venerated as family spirits and genii of the individual respectively.²⁸⁷ | Mercury [was]

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280. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 203. In virtue of the conserving and ripening function here described, Ops, goddess of the harvest, was also known as Ops Consiva, and her festival was the Opiconsivia.

281. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 147.

282. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 146–147.

283. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 264–270.

284. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 101–103.

285. [Ed.] See above, n. 258.

286. [Ed.] This marginal notation originally occurred at the end of this paragraph, following “poor,” but was transferred to this position by reference marks.

287. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 115–118. The Lares were household gods or ancestral spirits; the Manes, spirits of the dead and gods of the lower world.

honored [at] a feast where the traders brought him sacrifices, that he might bring profit to their dealings.²⁸⁸ [Lastly there was] the Saturnalia, a festival [marked by] an intuition and feeling of natural equality and the annulling of the difference in estate between rich and poor.²⁸⁹

(γ) But here especially the harmful entered into consciousness just as the useful did in the preceding stage. There are times of prosperity, but [68b] equally there are times of disaster. In this prosaic awareness of the antithesis and of finitude, the harmful just as much as the useful takes on a fixed shape (as we remarked above). It takes the form of something fearful (the powers of evil). Fear for what is finite goes hand in hand with the finite itself. Finite situations are concrete outcomes corresponding to the purpose; in other words, what comes to pass is a purpose. (We are not here talking about powers on their own account, but about outcomes and the associations formed by reflection.)

~ Such finite purposes as the [political] fortunes and situation of the state have to be realized; the purpose has its own realization as its purpose. It is a question of succeeding and being there [*Dasein*]; but this being there is an immediate actuality, and as such (as well as by virtue of its content) it is contingent.²⁹⁰ The harmful, or disaster, takes on a fixed shape, in contrast with the useful, with prosperity. In regard to finite purposes and conditions, human beings are dependent: what they have, enjoy, possess, is a positive mode of being;²⁹¹ in the limitation or shortcoming consisting of the fact that this mode of being lies within the power of an other, in the negative of this positive being, therein lies *dependence*—and therein they *feel* it. The proper development of the feeling of dependence²⁹²

288. [Ed.] Ibid., p. 123.

289. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 220–252, esp. pp. 223–224.

290. *W₂ reads*: But when such finite purposes as the situation and circumstances of the state, and the prospering of whatever contributes to the satisfaction of human physical requirements and to the promotion of our human progress and welfare are the supreme goal, and it is a question of the succeeding and being-there [*Dasein*] of an immediate actuality, which, as such, by virtue of its content, can only be a contingent actuality, then

291. *Ms. margin*: (What I am or have, that I *am* or *possess* [positively—i.e., in law])

292. [Ed.] This is the third and most substantial allusion to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* in the main text of the *Ms.* (see above, nn. 138, 256); later allusions

leads to the veneration of the power of ill or evil, to worship of the devil. At the present stage we do not reach this abstraction of the devil, of evil and the evil one in and for himself; for the | defining mark of this stage is its concern with present and finite actualities of limited content. It is only particular kinds of harm that one is frightened of at this stage, particular evils to which one bows the knee. Inasmuch as it is a negative, this concrete outcome is a situation; it exists as a concrete negative without any inner substantive content, without inward universality. Political power, purpose, popular or scientific knowledge—and also sea or wine—are implicitly [69a] universal essences; what is finitely concrete, however, is an actuality that also passes away, a type or mode of being that can be grasped by reflection as something externally universal (—universal states grasped as [divine] powers—) such as peace, Pax, quiet, Tranquillitas, (Salus, the goddess Vacuna, leisure (p. 145)),²⁹³ which take on fixed shape because of the Romans' lack of phantasy.

Allegorical, prosaic essences of this kind, however, are primarily and essentially those which are basically characterized by a short-coming, harm, or damage. For example, the Romans dedicated altars to the plague, and also to fever, Febris, (and the goddess Angerona, care and woe (p. 253)).²⁹⁴ They venerated hunger, Fames, and Robigo, wheat rust ((p. 109)).²⁹⁵ It is hard to grasp that things of this kind were worshiped as divine. In such images every proper aspect of divinity is lost; it is only the feeling of dependence and fear that can turn them into something objective. Only the total loss of all idea, the evaporation of all truth, can hit upon such ways of

on sheets 83a and 103a are found in the margins. The present passage is anticipated by an entry in the *Loose Sheets*, connecting worship of the devil with “the feeling of dependence.” See below, *Loose Sheets*, n. 9. The content of Schleiermacher's theology is not engaged at this stage, only the slogan *Abhängigkeitsgefühl* (repeated several times in this and the next two paragraphs). The “proper development” of the feeling of dependence in the direction of the veneration of evil or worship of the devil could not have reference to Schleiermacher (since among other reasons his views on evil etc. could not have been known prior to the publication of the second volume of the *Glaubenslehre* in December 1821) but only to Roman religion.

293. [Ed.] Moritz, *Anthousa*, pp. 145–146. Vacuna, according to Moritz, is the goddess of leisure. He alludes, for his source, to Ovid; cf. the latter's *Fasti* 6.307–308.

294. [Ed.] *Ibid.*, pp. 287–288 (on consul Valerius Publicola, who erected an altar to the plague), 253–254 (on the goddess Angerona).

295. [Ed.] *Ibid.*, pp. 109–111.

125 representing divinity, and they can be comprehended only [through the recognition] that spirit has come to dwell entirely in [the realm of] the finite, (of what is immediately useful).²⁹⁶ (It is conscious only of its finitude, | i.e., of its dependence,) and has forgotten everything that is inward and more universal, [the whole realm of] thought. Its being is prosaic and circumstantial through and through; and its escape, its exaltation above circumstances is nothing but a purely formal understanding, which grasps them all, all the different modes and patterns of being, in a single image and knows no other mode of substantiality.

~I do not need to recall that this is where the roots of superstition are to be found.²⁹⁷ Generally speaking, superstition consists in treating something finite and external, some ordinary actuality just as it stands, as a *power*, a substance. Superstition stems from the oppressed state of the spirit, from a feeling of dependence in its purposes; [69b] it cannot free itself from its purposes and (as a logical consequence) defines the negative upon which they are dependent as something that is as temporal and finite as they are. In the same way magic is closely bound up with superstition: it seeks to bring a power of this kind under superstition's subjective control; and it has the capacity to do this, for the power in question is limited and finite.

((δ)) At this point I would like to say something in passing about the theatrical performances of the Romans (in their cultus). What is distinctive about performances of this kind is that they make the process of the substantive powers, the divine life in its dynamic, active aspects, visibly present before us; (they present the essence of the divine and the human in pictorial form, before our very eyes. In a religion that has no doctrine, that is not absolute spiritual content, plays [have] a significance quite different [from that which they have for us], since they are the highest form of doctrinal teaching.) In venerating and adoring the image of the deity, we have the image

296. *W₂ adds*: in the way that the Romans even regard as deities the skills that are related to their most immediate needs and their satisfaction.

297. *W₂ reads*: This is essentially superstition because the purposes and objects in question are limited and finite; but these purposes and objects, which are limited in their content, are treated as absolute.

before us in its static being; its dynamic aspect is [presented] by telling a story (the *myth*). Later on, in the Christian religion, | this aspect 126 is [conveyed] mainly by doctrine; but this teaching provides only inner, subjective representations. We have already noted that just as the representation of the deity in its static being develops into the work of art (i.e., to the mode of immediate intuition), so the representation of divine action develops into its (external) presentation in the drama, as tragedy and comedy. But this intuition of divinity was not indigenous to the Romans, it did not grow on Roman soil; and in accepting this alien importation they seized—to judge from the material that has come down to us, [i.e.,] in tragic drama [from] Seneca²⁹⁸—on what is empty, ugly, and horrible, devoid of any ethical or godly idea, while in comedy they seized on the merely farcical, in the tradition of the Late Comedy “given over entirely to private relationships,”²⁹⁹ stories [of quarrels] between fathers and sons, and especially stories about prostitutes, slaves, and slave girls.

In this immersion in finite purposes there could be no lofty intuition of the (deeper,) ethical, divine action, no theoretical intuition of divine, substantive powers. [70a]

The actions they were interested in watching as spectators, to the extent that this was a theoretical interest (i.e., when it did not concern their own practical interests), could themselves only be “actual”³⁰⁰ events, and indeed, if they were to be moved, a loathsome actuality.

“We include here dances that were full of art as well as pantomimes, (chariot races, and martial displays,) in which there is nothing spiritual and no scope for the truthful expression of spirit.”³⁰¹ | ([It is] a later, ultimate manifestation of human nature 127

298. [Ed.] The harshness of Hegel's judgment with regard to Seneca is noteworthy in view of the fact that he shared the disregard for Seneca on the part of German classicism, which can be traced back to Lessing in particular. We do not know which of Seneca's tragedies Hegel was familiar with; the two editions of Seneca that he owned contain only philosophical writings. See also 1831 excerpts at n. 129.

299. *W₂ (1831) reads:* —nothing but bawdy scenes and private relationships,

300. *W₂ reads:* external, raw

301. *W₂ (1831) reads:* In Greek drama the main thing was what was said, the actors maintained a quiet, statuesque posture, and no use was made of actual facial gestures; the effect was produced by the spiritual element in the representation. With the Romans, on the contrary, the main thing was mime, a mode of expression that is not on a par with what can be put into speech.

[to have] developed one's skill in honor of the gods, [so] that the gods may be honored for what their worshipers can do.) What is especially notable at the present stage is the combats of beasts, or rather the slaughter of beasts and especially of human beings. The spilling of rivers of real blood and battles to the death were the spectacles that the Romans loved best. What mattered on the theoretical plane was that this bloodletting was purposeless; it took place merely to entertain the spectators. And the spectators wanted to see not a spiritual history but one that was actually happening—the very one indeed that constitutes the ultimate change of fortunes, or *περιπέτεια*, in the finite sphere, namely *death*. (They wanted this external, simple story of death, without meaning, the quintessence of everything external, the arid process of a *natural* death by violence or natural means, not death produced by an ethical power.) At the festivals the emperors mounted shows at which many hundreds of wild beasts and human beings killed one another, three or four hundred lions in a day, four or five hundred elephants and bears, hundreds of tigers; crocodiles and strange exotic animals of various kinds such as buffalo and elk were brought to Rome for the purpose.³⁰² But above all, human beings were compelled to fight with the wild beasts, to be torn to pieces by them or else slay one another. Under Caius Caligula [there was] a sea battle with two fleets that sailed past him and called out, "We who are about to die salute thee, O Caesar." No quarter was granted; first they fought without doing one another any serious harm, but then soldiers compelled them to

302. [Ed.] The numbers mentioned here by Hegel are probably too high. The reports of the games found, for example, in Suetonius give lower numbers. Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* mentions a hundred lions and elephants and a rhinoceros; Hegel had long been familiar with this work and owned an edition published in Leipzig in 1821. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Sibree ed., p. 294 (Lasson ed., p. 681), Hegel also says that "hundreds of bears, lions, tigers, elephants, crocodiles, and ostriches were produced, and slaughtered for mere amusement." Hegel is apparently relying on Dio Cassius, who reports in *Historia Romana* 54.26 that, upon the occasion of the dedication of the theater of Marcellus in 13 B.C., some six hundred Libyan animals were slaughtered; at 55.10 he states that thirty-six crocodiles were slaughtered at the dedication festival for the temple of Mars; and at 59.14 that five hundred bears and several hundred other animals were slaughtered during the two-day birthday celebration of Drusilla.

fight in earnest, stabbing or drowning one another till all were dead.³⁰³ [70b]

For the Romans this prosaic pattern of spiritless butchery, cold and arid, constituted the supreme event of history,³⁰⁴ the highest manifestation of the fate which for the Greeks [had been] essentially an *ethical* transformation. To die imperturbably, | (through an irrational caprice having the force of necessity, not a natural death [through] something arbitrary, not [through] unfortunate circumstances or ethical powers either, but [where] sheer caprice [is] the supreme power (the *abstract* representation of power),) was the ultimate and unique virtue that Roman patricians could exercise, and they shared it with slaves and malefactors condemned to death.

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((ε))³⁰⁵ Lastly it is notable that the Romans worshiped their *emperors* virtually as gods, or in fact as gods. Inasmuch as the content of the divine purpose consisted for them in finite human purposes, and the power over such purposes and the directly actual external circumstances (was what made up the good fortune of the Roman Empire), the obvious next step was to worship the *present* power over such purposes, the *individual* presence of that good fortune, as a god (in whose hands it rested). (Political power [was] brought near, Fortuna Publica [was] realized in the emperor.) The emperor, this individual quite out of the ordinary, was this arbitrary power over the life and happiness of individuals and whole ~cities;³⁰⁶ his power reached much further than that of Robigo; famine and other public necessities awaited his summons—the goddess of hunger was at his call. Nor was this all. (Status, birth, nobility, riches ([being matters] of understanding) were all his making, he had the power over them.) The formal rights of property, inheritance, etc., ~developed by Roman understanding—over all these straw houses

303. [Ed.] Suetonius, *Divus Claudius* 21.44–45. Tacitus, in his report of this sea battle in *Annals* 12.56, says that there were nineteen thousand combatants, but in other respects his account differs from Hegel's.

304. *Ms. margin*: (Infinite personality and its opposite)

305. *Ms. margin*: (Emperor – divine power: (α) Happiness (β) Political festivals – (αα) Finite and hence negative states (γ) Dynamic intuitions)

306. *W₂ reads*: cities and states;

of the understanding the emperor was the overriding power;³⁰⁷ the private citizen had a pretended right, but the emperor was the reality of the right—he was the power of the state in | its actual willing and doing, (the Fortuna of the Roman Empire). To swear by his name, to bring him incense, sacrifices, women, as to a god, [implied that he was] *inter divos relatus*. ([For this to be so, it was at least] partly required that he [should be] dead.) [This can be seen in the cases of] Trajan and Titus.³⁰⁸ The form of the state, the senate, and the magistracies [were] preserved; the emperor was merely *princeps iuventutis*,³⁰⁹ or at most consul. [But there were] twenty-five consuls in a year, and Caligula made his horse consul.³¹⁰ (This made it plain what the Roman constitution [*Wesen*] had come to.) [The emperor might be] censor, aedile, tribune of the people, for several years or just for one year. But he had his soldiers and he could have anyone's head cut off or plunder everyone, just as he liked. The imperial will and the imperial guard were the goddess Fortuna; the guard could auction the empire. [They were] the Fortuna or *fatum* hovering over the life and well-being of each and every citizen.

For the Romans, sunk as they were in finitude, there was nothing higher than this individual, this power over their finite purposes. [They were] utterly at a loss: there were no principles, no institutions of the state, nothing sacred (they were prepared to set against him. The whole world from the outermost parts of Britain to the

307. *W₂ reads:* etc.—[over all this] to the development of which the Roman spirit had devoted so much energy, he was the overriding authority;

308. [*Ed.*] In the early Empire, deification of the emperor (elevation to *divus*) occurred only after death. See Tacitus, *Annals* 15.74. Hegel's qualification may stem from the fact that in the late second century the title was also applied to living emperors, e.g., Commodus. But he could also have in mind reports such as those concerning the self-deification of Caligula found in Suetonius, *Gaius Caligula* 22.

309. [*Ed.*] The title *princeps iuventutis* (the first among the youth or the knights) was originally a predicate of nobility; cf. Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 1.12.15; Cicero restricted it to particularly prominent persons. Later, in the age of the emperors, only members of the imperial household could be so designated; but the title was limited primarily to the prince or princes selected as successors to Caesar.

310. [*Ed.*] This is apparently based on a report contained in Suetonius, *Gaius Caligula* 55.555. Because of the ostentatious manner in which Caligula maintained his horse Incitatus (marble stall, private palace in which to receive invited guests, etc.), it was said that he had in mind making him consul.

Tigris and Euphrates knew of nothing and had nothing to set against him, either inwardly or outwardly, no religion or morals, no shame or awe, no help, no legal or constitutional provisions; no individual [had] rights infinitely and inwardly. If things really went too far, the emperor was murdered by conspirators, as a matter of contingency. But there was nothing to limit his evil will. [He was like] no despot of Christian times, even in Turkey, [for the despot has] something inviolable set against himself, which if he infringes he is lost.) [71a]

Thus the finite determinate purpose, together with its power, is concentrated and determined in the present, actual will of one individual human being. (Since all are in bondage to life, one person's will is in fact the power over finite purposes, over the world; the Roman emperor [is] lord of the world, as long as he has guards to be the tool of this individuality; [but he has only] to offend these guards, and he is lost. His violent power [is] the death of individuality, [since] life [is] the sum of all its finite purposes.) Divinity, the divine essence, the inward, universal element, has come forth and revealed itself in the singularity of this individual; in him it has determinate being. ([This is] a descent of the idea into the present but in such a way that the descent is the loss of its self-contained universality, the loss of its truth, its being-in-and-for-self and hence of its divinity.) Power is completely determined, as singularity, but the universal moment has escaped. What is present [is] the world of outward happiness and the power over it—a monstrous unhappiness. What is lacking is that power should be completely determined in such a way as to make it determinately determinate, [in other words] that the individual should become subjectivity, actually present, should become something inward, something inwardly substantive.

([We may here interpose] a general reflection in regard to the standpoint, the level of determinateness we are here considering. Universal power (the abstract concept) [is] really fulfilled, it contains its own content. [This is] a *determinate* content but completely *external*. Hence [divine] power [is] external, universal mastery of the world. The infinite [is] presented within the image of the finite, so that the finite is the subject of the proposition; it remains and

stands fast, and is not posited negatively in the infinite—which alone maintains itself equally in the spiritual realm.)

Finite purposes [are] developed; and for that reason there is one lord [over all] finite purposes.

³¹¹The Roman world is the most important point of transition to the Christian religion, the indispensable "link; it"³¹² is the side of the *reality* of the idea, and therefore (implicitly) of its *determinateness*, the side of the reality of the *mode* of being of the universal. As it becomes determinate, this reality, initially held in immediate unity with the universal, cuts adrift from it and emerges | on its own account as consummate externality, concrete singularity, (totality. The side of reality [is, in this way,] fully accomplished on its own account; what is necessary, this determinate determinateness, [is] utter externalization, [forming] a self-contained totality. The totality of the reality of externality [is] implicitly capable of being taken up into universality. Consummated subjectivity—i.e., the external, objective side of the idea—can be taken back into the universal, in such a way that it achieves its true character and strips off its externality. In this way the idea as such achieves its perfect determination within itself.)

This religion of external purposiveness thus closes the cycle of the finite religions. Finite religion [is] the absolute concept of God, as *concept*; [it is still requisite] that God should *be*, that the concept (the determinacy) of God should be *posited*, in other words that the concept should be what is true *for* self-consciousness, i.e., it should itself be realized *in* self-consciousness (which is its own *subjective* side, namely, reality).

³¹³Finite religion [knows] God first (α) [as] the simple universal and hence as intuited in immediate being; (β) ($\alpha\alpha$) God, this universal, [is known] as power ((the sloughing off of immediate being [gives rise to] infinite negativity)), as absolute power, and as One,

311. *Ms. margin*: (([As regards the] necessity of this moment see the following page) [*i.e.*, *Ms. sheet 71b, esp. n. 317*])

312. *W₂ reads*: link: what has developed at this stage of the religious spirit

313. *Ms. margin*: ((α) Pantheism (β) A [universal] falling apart into inwardly concrete spiritual freedom, essential but limited purpose)

as abstract subjectivity; ($\beta\beta$) this One [is known] as containing determinacy within itself, but in a vanishing fashion; [this gives rise to] necessity, and with it the subsisting determinacy as itself essential in unity with the essence. But (α) [since] the determinacy is immediate, [there is] a diversity of powers; and (β) [since] the determinateness, or reality, [is] taken up into essence, [we have] beauty. [71b] $\neg\langle\gamma\rangle$ In the final phase, | there is this finite determinateness as concrete purpose, inwardly determined and having a definite content:³¹⁴ the concrete and finite, singularity, what is inwardly manifold and external, the actual situation, determinate being, the empire—a present, far from beautiful objectivity—in other words, *ipso facto*, the consummated subjectivity [of the emperor]. 132

It is through purpose that determinacy first comes to be, first returns back into self; now it is determinacy in subjectivity—a determinate determinacy but, to begin with, a finite one—and because of its subjectivity and return [to self], [it is] unbounded (spuriously infinite) finitude.

³¹⁵The two sides of this unbounded finitude must be clearly identified and recognized.³¹⁶

$\neg\langle$ In itself \rangle ³¹⁷ [it is] (α) consummated determinacy, the concept in its determinateness returned into self, form raising itself to the level of absolute form. The concept is the universal; but then it is abstract, not posited the way it is in itself. In itself it is the universal that is restored to itself *through* particularity, | i.e., [it is universal] through the *mediation* of particularity—the mediation of determinacy 133

314. *W₂ reads*: It is this positedness that must develop on its own account into a totality too, if it is to be taken up into universality. And it is this further development of determinacy into a totality that occurred in the Roman world, for here determinacy is

315. *Ms. margin*: (Finite and infinite coupled from the start

Second stage: self-consciousness – a spiritual power is related to the subject (α) Jewish: *this* people (exclusively); (β) Greek: *many* peoples; (γ) Universal self-consciousness (self-contained person [i.e., emperor])

Spirit is only posited *as* spirit, undergoing diremption into the two sides: (α) as universality, in and for itself, (β) the side of reality or purpose (self-contained determinacy infinite on its own account))

316. *W₂ adds*: the in-itself and the empirical appearing.

317. *Ms. margin*: ((α) The *necessity* of this moment)

and emergence—and through the *sublation* of this particularity. This³¹⁸ is absolute form, truly infinite subjectivity; this is genuine reality, reality in its truth. Reality is determinate being, determinacy—reality in its infinitude is just this.

In the religion of expediency it is accordingly this infinite form that has come to the intuition of self-consciousness. What counts for self-consciousness is this [manifest] shape. Hence the shape carries this absolute moment within it, within it the absolute moment develops. This absolute form is the definition of self-consciousness itself. So it contains the determination of self-consciousness—or of spirit—for the [ultimate] definition of the idea.

Herein lies the infinite importance and necessity of Roman religion. However, (β)^{319 ~ 320} when it is comprehended in a finite mode, the highest is the *worst*. The deeper the spirit (or [communal] genius) goes, the more monstrously it errs. When superficiality errs, its errors also are superficial, of little account. Only what is intrinsically deep can just for that reason be the most evil, the worst. [72a]

The infinite reflection, infinite form without content or substantiality, ⟨simple, abstract inwardness,⟩ is boundless, unlimited finitude, limitedness that is self-absolute in its finitude. This is the reality of the Greek Sophists—“Man is the measure of all things,”³²¹ i.e., the human being with his immediate wishes, desires, purposes, interests, and feelings. In Roman religion and the Roman world we see this thought of “self” ⟨—the “person”—⟩ elevated to the valid stan-

318. *W₂ reads:* If we consider consummated determinacy as it is *in itself*, it is the absolute form of the concept, namely, the concept which in its determinateness has returned into itself. Initially the concept is only universal and abstract, and hence not yet posited the way it is in itself. What is genuine is the universal that is restored to itself through particularity, i.e., returned to itself through the mediation of particularity—the mediation of determinacy and emergence—and through the sublation of this particularity. This negation of negation

319. *Ms. margin:* ⟨(β) Thus a *person*. But in the empirical sense, as this immediate person, [the highest is] the worst)

320. *W₂ reads:* However, this absolute form is here still empirical: it is *this* person, this immediate person, and

321. [Ed.] Both Plato (*Theaetetus* 152a) and Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes* 1.32.216) report the statement of Protagoras that “man is the measure of all things.”

dard, raised to the level of being and consciousness of the world. We behold the complete (disappearance) | of all beautiful, ethical organic life (and the crumbling away into finitude of all desires, purposes, and interests—a crumbling into momentary enjoyment and pleasure, a human animal kingdom [from which] all higher³²² elements have been abstracted. Coupled with this is) the housing of the understanding in a formal system of legal right. For in the infinitude of subjectivity is the beginning of formal right; and this self-intuition of the subject in its infinity [constitutes] a lofty starting point. But [it is] a form without substantiality, without inner universality; until the content is true, it remains the formal legal right of the understanding, without reality, i.e., without a content that matches the form and sublates its one-sidedness just by matching it—(this or that possession, this or that interest, is my property). It is a crumbling away into mere finitudes—finite existences, wishes, and interests—which for that very reason are held together only by the inwardly boundless violence of the despot, the singular [will] whose instrument is the cold-blooded, spiritless death of individual citizens, the negative that is as immediate [as their wishes], brought to bear upon them and holding them in fear of him. He is the One, the actually present God—himself the singularity of the [divine] will as the power over all the other infinitely many singular [wills].

(γ) This consummation of finitude itself, (like the happiness of the emancipated slave,) is initially absolute *unhappiness*, the absolute grief of the spirit, spirit's supreme internal conflict; and the contradiction is unresolved, the antithesis is not reconciled. Absolute reflection-into-self is here universal determinateness. Spirit is thinking inasmuch as it [has] completely lost itself as externality in this reflection-into-self.³²³ [Even] as thinking, [it is] thus just this same determinateness of reflection-into-self; it withdraws back into itself, and | in its own depth, as infinite form, as thinking, universal subjectivity, it has thus set itself upon the peak as the immediate subjectivity of self-

322. *W₂ adds:* and all substantive

323. *Ms. margin:* (Real, i.e., inward, being-for-self, [i.e.,] relegating all external reality to infinite negativity, everything being consumed inwardly but preserved in God, in heaven)

consciousness. (In this abstract form it appears on the scene, as already mentioned,³²⁴ as philosophy, but more generally as the sufferings of virtue.)³²⁵ [72b]

The resolution and reconciliation of this antithesis is³²⁶ that this external finitude, the finitude that is left to its own devices, is taken up into the infinite universality of thought and thereby purified. It becomes substantive. And conversely this infinite universality of thought, which has no external existence or validity, acquires present actuality; and self-consciousness thus attains to consciousness of the actuality of the universal,³²⁷ it has the universal, the divine, as something that has come into the world [*als daseiend, als weltlich*], as present in the world—God and the world reconciled [cf. 2 Cor. 5:19].³²⁸

How the finitude that is left to its own devices is sublated in the world, passes away, is broken and resolved in universality—(this is the spectacle that) history will exhibit. The finite gods and the peoples that worship them disappear [when] their service is united and resolved in a pantheon; the difference between free citizens and slaves evaporates (into unity and equality) through the omnipotence of the emperor; and | inwardly and outwardly everything that makes for stability is destroyed. "Fortuna [is] reduced to ruins,"³²⁹ (all concern for the state, all bravery, [has] vanished—only mercenaries, barbarians, Germanic tribes are brave). The one death of finitude comes upon [the empire], ([(despite] the immense number of attempts made [to preserve it] by philosophy, religious observance, superstition, etc.).

324. [Ed.] See above, p. 97.

325. *W₂ adds:* as desiring and reaching out for help.

326. *W₂ adds:* what the whole world stands in need of, and is possible only by virtue of the fact

327. *Ms. margin:* (The purpose of [divine] power – freedom and necessity)

328. *Ms. margin:*

(α) Just one idea: this subjectivity [is] divine determinateness, within the divine nature

(β) The diremption of subjectivity itself:

(α) God as this particular process, within himself

(β) Subjectivity as the process, in regard to God, in his [singularity]

329. *W₂ reads:* since the Fortuna of the one world-empire itself also goes down to defeat,

[What is] accomplished in the Christian religion [is] the incorporation of finitude within religion—"[this is its] absolute form."³³⁰ The other side [of what history exhibits] could not develop the intuition of this unity directly within these religions themselves—it could not arise in the Greco-Roman world. For even if [it] found the principle of the unity of thought (as a positive principle) within itself, in isolated cases, in philosophy, [this principle is] $\langle\langle\alpha\rangle\rangle$ not a community principle; $\langle\beta\rangle$ not the pure intuition [of] the universal as an object of this kind (the Stoics [derived] the world from fire,³³¹ so that even among them³³² there was still this linkage with ordinary externality, \langle this friendly regard for external actuality \rangle). Instead, this union [with God] had to emerge in *one people*—the one people that had (for itself) the wholly abstract intuition of the one God, \langle involving the total casting aside of all finitude, in order that they might grasp the intuition purified within themselves \rangle . The Oriental principle of pure abstraction [had to] be combined with the finitude³³³ of the West, [so this people is] geographically in between the two regions, | in the land of Israel. It was, [as we] have said, 137 in the Jewish people that God took this [Oriental] principle upon himself as the age-old grief of the world; for here we find the religion of abstract suffering, of the *one* Lord, against whom and despite whom the actuality of life stands its ground as the infinite willfulness of self-consciousness, and all that is abstract is bound together. The age-old curse is undone, \langle it has been met by salvation, \rangle in that finitude has for its part ~validated its claim to be both positivity and *infinite finitude*.³³⁴

330. *W₂ reads*: [this is] the universal [that is present in this religion].

331. [Ed.] On Hegel's understanding of this doctrine, see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:245 ff. (*Werke* 14:438 ff.). Hegel is relying especially on Ioannes Stobaeus, *Eclogarum physicarum et ethicarum libri duo*, ed. A. H. L. Heeren, vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1792), bk. 1, p. 312. He also cites Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.136, 142, 156–157.

332. *W₂ reads*: Even if the principle of thought had already developed, the universal was not yet an object of consciousness in its purity, since even in philosophical thought the linkage with ordinary externality was evident when the Stoics derived the world from fire.

333. *W₂ adds*: and singularity

334. *W₂ reads*: raised itself to the level of positivity and *infinite finitude*, and so validated its claim in that respect.

DETERMINATE RELIGION¹ THE LECTURES OF 1824

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Introduction²

The first thing is to classify these determinate, ethnic religions;³ however, the particular forms that have to be considered under this heading only need to be defined in a general way at first.⁴

1. Thus G; the heading in P reads: Ethnic Religion or Determinate Religion The heading in D reads: Determinate or Ethnic Religions

2. [Ed.] The Introduction to the 1824 lectures contains a division of the subject similar to that found in the Ms. The division makes it clear that in 1824, as in the other lectures series, Hegel initially envisioned a threefold structure for *Determinate Religion*, namely, immediate religion or nature religion (greatly expanded in content from the Ms.), the religion of spiritual individuality (Jewish and Greek religion), and the religion of expediency (Roman religion). In the actual execution, however, Roman religion is treated quite briefly and as the third stage of the religion of spiritual individuality. It is evident that Hegel changed his plan at the beginning of Sec. B. See below, n. 386.

3. [Ed.] J. W. von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Travels*; or, *The Renunciants: A Novel*, vol. 2 of Thomas Carlyle's translation of *Wilhelm Meister* (New York, 1901), chap. 10, p. 267: "The religion which depends on reverence for what is above us, we denominate the ethnic; it is the religion of the nations [*Völker*], and the first happy deliverance from a degrading fear: all heathen religions, as we call them, are of this sort, whatsoever names they may bear." *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* first appeared in German in 1821 (Stuttgart and Tübingen).

4. The introductory section in the *Werke* includes a passage that probably stems from the introductory section to the lectures of 1831. W₁ reads: If we want to sum up what has been said so far, we can say that in Part I religion was considered only in its concept, as what it is in itself, implicitly. But what is implicit does not yet therewith exist, and to the extent that something is in itself, it is not yet actual in its truth. The realization of the concept also has to be considered. Religion exists as idea only when it also exists as consciousness of what is the concept. The reality of the concept now has the more specific meaning that the determinacies contained in the concept are now posited. However, this positing has a still more specific meaning, namely

- 140 1. The initial [form of] religion is *immediate religion, natural religion, nature religion*; it is the unity of the spiritual and the natural. | God is [always] the content,⁵ but at this stage it is God in the natural unity of the spiritual and the natural. The natural mode is what characterizes this form of religion generally; but it also has a great variety of shapes.⁶ All these shapes are together called *nature*

that religion is consciousness, knowing for knowing, spirit for spirit; the concept realizes itself, what is posited or differentiated is finite consciousness; human consciousness is the material in which the concept of God realizes itself; the concept is purpose, and the material for carrying out the purpose is human consciousness. The successive developmental stages are not yet adequate to the concept. The concept must also return to itself again through its development. Moments of the concept are evinced in the course of development itself. These moments *appear* in the finite religions. *W₂ reads:* Now in the course of development as such, inasmuch as they have not yet attained the goal, the moments of the concept are still falling apart, in such a way that the reality is not yet on a par with the concept, and these moments as they appear in history are the finite religions. *W_{1,2} read:* In order to comprehend these in their truth, one must consider them from the two sides—on the one hand, how God is known, how he is defined; on the other hand, how the subject knows itself in the process. *W₁ reads:* Both sides, the objective and the subjective, are imbued with the same determinacy. Both sides progress together in the same determinacy. *W₂ reads:* For there is one single basis for the further determining of the two sides, the objective and the subjective, and both sides are imbued with one determinacy and one determinacy alone. *W_{1,2} read:* The representation people have of God corresponds to the representation they have of themselves, of their freedom. Knowing themselves in God, they know their imperishable life in God, they know the truth of their being, so that the notion of the immortality of the soul comes on the scene at this stage *W₂ reads:* as an essential moment entering into the history of religion. *W_{1,2} read:* The notions of God and immortality are mutually related in necessary fashion. When we have true knowledge of God, we also have true knowledge of ourselves. God is at first something quite indeterminate; but in the course of development the consciousness of what God is gradually fills out, progressively loses the initial indeterminacy, *W₂ reads:* and actual self-consciousness also develops *pari passu*. The proofs of the existence of God, whose purpose is to demonstrate the necessity of rising to [the recognition of] God, also pertain to this progressive development. For the diversity of characteristics that are ascribed to God in the course of rising to this level follow from the diversity of the starting point, which in turn is rooted in the nature of the historical stage that actual self-consciousness has reached in each case. The different forms this ascending process yields will in each case give us the metaphysical spirit of the stage in question, to which the actual representation of God and the sphere of the cultus correspond.

5. *Thus P; G reads:* is everywhere,

6. *W₁ (Ed) adds:* which can be reduced essentially to three, with which we shall become more closely acquainted in a moment.

religion; we say that at this stage spirit is still identical with nature, that consciousness remains one with nature; and to that extent natural religion is the religion of unfreedom.

2. The second stage is the religion of *spiritual individuality* or *subjectivity*; it is here that the subject's spiritual being-for-self begins. The principal, or first, or determining element is thought, and the natural state is reduced to a mere semblance, something accidental over against what is substantive, related to it; the natural becomes merely material,⁷ or corporeality for the subject,⁸ or is simply what is determined by the subjective. Two forms of this religion need to be distinguished.

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Inasmuch as spiritual being-for-self is emerging, it is that which is adhered to purely for itself.⁹ There is therefore just the one eternal God, who has his being only in thought; and natural life, being generally, is only something posited, something that as such stands opposed to God, but has no substantiality over against him and has being only through the essence of thought.¹⁰

In the second form [of the religion of spiritual individuality] the natural and the spiritual are united—not, however, in the way they were in their immediate union, not like that, but in the kind of union where it is simply subjectivity that determines and combines the corporeal in union with itself, so that in this union the corporeal is only its organ, its expression, and displays itself as the appearing of the subject.

This is therefore the religion of divine appearing, of divine corporeality, materiality, and naturalness, but in such a way that this materiality is the appearing of subjectivity—in other words, that

7. Thus P; G reads: it becomes merely natural life,

8. Ho reads: natural life is merely the body of God,

9. W₁ (following Ho) reads: itself, reflectedness-into-self, as negation of the natural unity. W₂ (following Ho) reads: itself as reflectedness-into-self and as negation of the natural unity. Ho reads: itself. And indeed here for the first time we find the reflectedness-into-self of the spiritual as negation of the natural unity.

10. Ho adds (continuing from the preceding footnote), similar in W: [We find] the spiritually one, inwardly unchanging God, Jehovah, over against whom the natural, the worldly, the finite in general, is posited as something inessential, lacking substantiality. But as it is only by positing the inessential that God is the essential, this God thereby shows that it is only through it that he has being, and this inessential, this semblance or show, becomes an *appearing* of God himself.

here in this corporeality the self-appearing of subjectivity is made manifest; it appears not only for other but for itself. Natural life is thus the organ of the subject, whereby it makes itself appear. This spiritual individuality is therefore not the unlimited individuality of pure thought; it has only spiritual character. Thus on the one hand, the natural is determined as the body in regard to the spiritual realm; on the other hand, the subject is determined as finite because it employs the body in this way.

142 The first moment or form [of the religion of spiritual individuality] is the religion of sublimity, | or the Jewish religion, while the second is the religion of beauty, or the Greek religion.

3. Third, there is the religion in which the concept, or in general a content determined for itself, a concrete content, has its beginnings; this content is *purpose*, fulfilled content, it is subserved by the general powers of nature or the gods of the religion of beauty. Moreover, it is a concrete content that embraces such determinacies within itself; it is the determinant, so that the previously isolated powers are made subject to one purpose.¹¹ The mode in which the concept first appears is that of external, finite purpose, external conformity to purpose or *expediency*. Absolute conformity to purpose belongs to the idea of spirit, where the idea is its own purpose and there is no other purpose save the concept of spirit itself, namely, the infinite, absolute final purpose, the concept that realizes itself. At this stage the spiritual is indeed the purpose; this moment has within it the inwardly concrete determinations, but its inwardly concrete determination is still finite, having a particular content; it is a particular purpose, which for that very reason is not yet spirit's relatedness to itself.¹²

These [then] are the three forms [of determinate religion]:

1. Nature religion in general, to which the *Oriental* religions all belong, wholly consisting as they do in this unity of nature and spirit and the mingling of them both.

11. *Ho adds, similar in W:* But this single subject is still an other over against such divine powers; they constitute the divine content, while the singularized subject is human consciousness, finite purpose. Now the divine content serves this culminating point of subjectivity, which the subject lacked in the religion of beauty, as a means of fulfilling, of realizing, itself.

12. *Ho, W add:* What the single, individual spirit wills in the gods is only its own subjective purpose; it wills *itself*, not the absolute content.

2. The religion of the spiritual for itself, as subjectivity in general that has being abstractly on its own account, the religion of pure thought and of the spiritual corporeality that is set apart and determined in itself, namely, *Jewish* and *Greek* religion.

3. The religion of external conformity to purpose or expediency, namely, *Roman* religion, forming the transition to the absolute religion. |

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This classification must not be taken in a merely subjective way; rather it is a necessary classification that follows objectively from the nature of spirit. In the mode of existence that it assumes in religion, spirit in its naturalness is initially natural religion; the next stage is where the reflection of spirit into itself comes on the scene. Spirit becomes inwardly free, and this is the beginning of being-for-self—the subjective generally, which, however, does not yet have its freedom within itself but first emerges from the unity of nature, to which it is still related: This is the conditioned becoming-free of spirit. The third stage, then, is where spirit inwardly gets hold of itself, has the will to achieve inward self-determination, and accordingly appears in such a way that there is purpose, something that is expedient on its own account, but what is inwardly expedient is also at first still finite and limited. The last stage, then, is the absolute, where the spirit is for itself. Such are the basic characteristics that constitute the moments in the development of the concept of spirit, and are at the same time moments of the concrete concept. Spirit accordingly *is* this process.

These stages can be compared to the stages of human life. The child is still in the first, immediate unity of will and nature (both its own nature and that which surrounds it). The second stage [is] youth, this individuality, this becoming-for-self, this spirituality blossoming into life, still setting no particular purpose for itself but questing, searching this way and that, paying heed to everything that comes its way, taking heart from it. The third stage, maturity, is that of work for a particular purpose, to which adults subject themselves, to which they devote their strength. Hovering above maturity, finally, the fourth stage is old age, the age of thought, having the universal before itself as infinite purpose, recognizing this purpose—the age that has turned back from particular forms of

activity and work to the universal purpose.¹³ These characteristics are those that are logically determined by the nature of the concept. | Ultimately, in the concept, in the idea, it becomes evident that the first immediacy does not have being as immediacy but is itself only something posited: the child, for instance, is itself something produced.

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A. IMMEDIATE RELIGION, OR NATURE RELIGION¹⁴

Introduction¹⁵

Insofar as we concentrate on the *thought* that lies within nature religion, it will be evident that what has recently been called “natural religion” is the same as [what we are calling] “nature religion.”

Since we are beginning with immediate religion, we must first refer to a way of viewing the matter ~which we at once encounter.¹⁶ What I refer to is the view that immediate religion must on the one hand be the true, the most excellent, the specifically divine religion, and also that this true religion and no other must have been historically the first. According to our classification, nature religion is the lowest level, the most imperfect and thus the first, while according to this other way of viewing it, it is not only the first but the truest. As we have noted, nature religion is in fact defined as the spiritual still joined with the natural in their first undisturbed, untroubled unity. That spirit is in untroubled unity with nature—it is this deter-

13. W (*following Ho*) adds: to the absolute final end, and from the broad manifoldness of existence has drawn itself together to the infinite depth of being-within-self. *Ho* reads: Old age leaves all limitation beneath it, has before it the universal, infinite, ultimate, absolute final end. It has turned back from the particularity of the living, of [particular] purposes, has drawn itself together from the broad manifoldness of existence to the infinite depth of being-within-self.

14. [Ed.] The heading in G reads: “Immediate Religion, or Natural Religion, Nature Religion.”

15. [Ed.] The Introduction to “Immediate Religion” in 1824 incorporates elements of the discussion of the original condition of humanity from Part III of the Ms., sheets 83b–85a (see Vol. 3: 96–101), as well as of the brief general treatment of “Immediate” Religion from Part II of the Ms., sheets 32a–39a, to which it adds for the first time detailed treatments of the specific forms of the nature religions in the ensuing sections.

16. W₂ (Var) reads: which, in the light of what it understands by nature religion, makes definite claims for our attention at this point.

mination that is asserted to be the absolute, true determination, and the religion that is so defined is therefore acclaimed as divine. Spirit, so it is said, in this¹⁷ union with nature, is not yet reflected into itself, has not yet taken upon itself this separation into itself from nature; it still stands—practically speaking, or as far as the will is concerned—in the unsullied faith of innocence. For¹⁸ guilt first arises with freedom of choice, and freedom of choice consists in the fact that the passions posit themselves in their own¹⁹ freedom while the subject selects from within itself only those determinations that it has distinguished from the natural. The plant exists in this unity; its particularity, its soul lies in this unity with universal nature. The individual plant will not be untrue to its law or to its nature, but will be as it should be; its being and what it should be are not distinct. It is the case with innocence generally that the universal is not separated from what spirit is; and this separation between what [spirit] should be and its nature as such arises only with free will, which first comes into its own in the reflection of individuality into itself.²⁰

*a. The Original Condition*²¹

For this way of viewing the matter, the next step is to imagine what it is like for humanity to be in the state of innocence, [in] just this unity of the spiritual with nature; and the notion arrived at is that by this [standard of] unity in regard to the theoretical consciousness, humanity is *perfect* in this unity with nature. Human being seems here to determine itself as identical with the concept of things; it has

17. *W₂ (1831) reads:* Humanity, so it is said, had a truthful, original religion in the state of innocence, before there occurred the cleavage in its intelligence we call the fall. This is grounded a priori in the notion that God, as the absolutely good, created spirits in the likeness of himself and that this godlike creation stood in absolute harmony with him. In such harmony spirit also lived in

18. *W₂ (Var/1831?) reads:* of innocence and was absolutely good;

19. *Thus G; P reads:* the subject posits itself in its

20. *W₂ (1831) reads:* reflection; but it is precisely this reflection and separation that is originally not present, and freedom was no less identical with law and the rational will than the individual plant is identical with its nature.

21. [*Ed.*] In the *Ms.*, the idea of the “original condition” of humanity as a state of innocence was treated in Part III, at the beginning of the discussion of estrangement (sheets 83b–84a). See Vol. 3:96–97. In the present context, Hegel draws together the themes of primitive condition and primitive religion.

not yet separated its own being-for-self from that of things; it sees into the heart of things.²² It is only when the two are separated, when I am for myself and things are outside me, that things become enveloped in the bark of sense that separates me from them, and nature erects a screen before me, as it were.²³

146 In terms of this unity of the spiritual with nature, the following can therefore be said in regard to intelligence: that in such a relationship, spirit | is immediately in the concept, knowing the universal, true nature of things immediately, understanding them intuitively, precisely because its intuition is not an external one. It is a grasping of what is inward to the concept, a form of clairvoyance, comparable to the sleepwalking state, which is a return of the soul to this inner unity with its world, in such a way that "this inner world lies open to its view"²⁴ because in this clairvoyance it is liberated from the external conditions of space and time, freed from the restrictions that result when things are defined in the terms of the understanding. In this unity, spirit is therefore clairvoyant, it is a free phantasy that has nothing arbitrary about it but wherein spirit shapes for itself nature and things according to their concept, according to their truth. And inasmuch as the attitude of spirit is here one of intuition, the object of the intuition is directly determined by the "concept; it appears in its eternal beauty and transcends the conditions by which appearance is [otherwise] affected."²⁵ ²⁶ With this view of things

22. *W*₂ (1831) adds: Nature is not yet for it something negative, something obscured.

23. [Ed.] Hegel's reference to "the bark of sense" (*die sinnliche Rinde*) may be an echo of the criticisms he has elsewhere directed against the tendency of reflection to split the unity of the object into an inner nucleus or kernel and an outer bark or husk; see *Encyclopedia* (1817), § 89. In this passage he is alluding to Albrecht von Haller's poem, "Die Falschheit der menschlichen Tugenden," in *Versuch schweizerischer Gedichte*, 6th ed. (Göttingen, 1751), no. 6, p. 100. Even if Hegel misunderstood the text of this poem (cf. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, ed. Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler [Hamburg, 1959], p. 478), his criticism of the separation of kernel and husk on the part of the philosophy of reflection is not affected by this misunderstanding.

24. *W*₂ (*Var*/1831?) reads: the nature of things lay open to view for this original, intuitive understanding,

25. *Thus G; P* reads: concept, and has before it an intuition of divine life.

26. *W*₂ (1831) adds: In short, spirit had present before it, and intuited, the universal-in-the-particular in its pure configuration or shape, and also the particular,

there goes the idea that by virtue of this unity, spirit was in possession of all artistic and scientific knowledge; it is even imagined, moreover, that when humanity is in this state of general harmony, it sees this harmonic substance, the subject of this harmony, God, directly, as he is—it has before it the world *in God*, God as *concrete*, the divine life in God himself, in the totality of his organic life.²⁷

This is how primitive religion is viewed, for all that it was the unmediated form of religion, and historically the first. The attempt has been made, as we know, to substantiate this view through one aspect of the Christian religion. The Bible tells of a paradise; | and many peoples have such a paradise in the back of their minds,

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the individual, in its universality as a divine, godlike form of organic life. And since human beings grasped nature in its innermost determinacy and recognized its authentic relation to the corresponding sides of their own nature, the attitude they adopted to it was as to a well-fitting garment such as did not destroy the overall arrangement.

27. [Ed.] The acceptance of a condition of original perfection, which Hegel here criticizes, was a widely held conviction of his time. Upon advancing this criticism in Part I (the Introduction) of his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Hegel alludes specifically to F. W. J. Schelling and Friedrich Schlegel. See the reference to Schelling and to Schlegel's *Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* found in one of the auditor's transcripts (Nisbet ed., p. 132; Hoffmeister ed., p. 158), as well as the allusion to Schlegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte* 1:44 found in Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1830 (Nisbet ed., p. 231 n. 46; Hoffmeister ed., p. 159 n. f). On Schelling's acceptance of a condition of perfection, see *On University Studies* (1803), trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 83 (*Sämtliche Werke* 5:287): "I firmly believe that the earliest condition of the human race was a civilized one and that the first states, sciences, arts, and religions were founded simultaneously, or, more accurately, that they were not separated but were perfectly fused, as they will again be one day in their final form." Hegel may also have had in mind Schelling's treatise on *The Deities of Samothrace* (1815), since Schelling's belief in an original condition lies at the basis of his interpretation of the mysteries in this work. "What if already in Greek mythology (not to mention Indian and other Oriental mythologies) there emerged the remains of a knowledge, indeed even a scientific system, which goes far beyond the circle drawn by the oldest revelation known through scriptural evidences?" (trans. Robert F. Brown [Missoula, Mont., 1977], p. 25; *Sämtliche Werke* 8:362). Friedrich Creuzer agreed expressly with Schelling's interpretation in *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–1821), 2:363–377. Hegel's criticism is also directed, therefore, against Creuzer; see below, n. 678. The reference to Schlegel is to the latter's *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), esp. pp. 198, 205 (cf. *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:295–297, 303). However, Hegel's more exact description of the condition of original perfection is not traceable to Schelling and Schlegel. See further below, n. 46.

lamenting it as lost or imagining it as the goal to which they aspire and which they will eventually reach. Whether as past or as future, such a paradise is “pictured to a greater or lesser extent as having a “sensuous or, alternatively, a spiritual content.”²⁸⁻²⁹

If we are to subject this way of viewing the matter to criticism, we must first say that it is in general necessary, i.e., that its inward content is necessary. The universal element in this representation, its inner [meaning], is the divine unity in a human reflection; in other words, it is humanity that stands as subjective spirit in this unity, that is in this unity.³⁰ But there is something else here too: that this unity is represented as a state in time, a state which ought not to have been lost and which was lost only by chance—“this is something else.”³¹

This representation, then, has differed to a greater or lesser extent among different peoples. On the one hand we must give it due credit for its merits, in that it includes the necessary idea “of divine self-consciousness,”³² the untroubled consciousness of the absolute, divine essence. But on the other hand this idea is represented as *existing*, as a state which has occurred in time and is now over; and this union of consciousness with the divine essence is defined in principle as a natural | mode of being. This is in fact the crux of the matter. It is imagined, then, that the oneness of humanity with nature, and then with God, is original in the sense that this original is what comes first in existence. “Original” means on the one hand what is in the concept, the substantive, and on the other hand it has

28. Thus D; G reads: sensuous content. P reads: ethical content in regard to reason. Ho reads: sensuous or, alternatively, ethical content.

29. W (following Ho) reads: filled with ethical or unethical content, depending on the cultural level of the peoples in question. Ho reads: The pictorial images themselves are then filled, to a greater or lesser extent, with sensuous or, alternatively, ethical content, depending on the cultural level of the peoples in question.

30. W₂ (1831) adds: People thus have the impression that being-in-and-for-self is a harmony that has not yet given way to cleavage, neither the cleavage of good and evil nor the subordinate cleavage into the plurality of needs, with the violence and passion that accompany them. This unity, this resolution of contradictions, contains at all events what is genuine and authentic and is wholly consonant with the concept.

31. W (HgG) reads: This is to confuse what came first as *concept* with the *reality* of consciousness, the extent to which such reality is congruent with the concept.

32. Thus G.

the concept of what comes first in time. The view with which we are presently concerned is that this natural union of humanity with God is the true relationship in religion. At the same time we cannot but be struck by the fact that this paradise, "this saturnian age,"³³ is imagined as a lost paradise, or that what we call paradise is something already lost. This already points to the fact that, more strictly speaking, images of this kind do not contain what is truthful, for divine history is totally lacking in any past or any contingency. If the existent paradise has been lost, then, no matter how that happened, it would be a contingent, arbitrary, capricious element, something that had intruded into the divine life from the outside. "The loss of paradise is certainly important—it is an essential determination—but it"³⁴ must rather be regarded as divine necessity, and when it is so treated as contained in divine necessity, this imagined paradise sinks down to the status of one single moment in the divine totality, and to a moment that is not absolute and truthful. To define the content, the thought that is contained in this representation, more precisely: the thought is that this unity of humanity with God is, or rather has been, a natural, unmediated unity, an intuition of untroubled human beings, an intuition in which the heart of nature, and the nature of God, was laid bare before them, namely that at the center of nature and at the divine center stood *humanity*.³⁵

33. *Ho* reads: this saturnian, golden time,

[*Ed.*] See esp. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 108–119; Virgil, *Eclogues* 4, 6. The Romans' belief in a golden prehistoric age, presided over jointly by Saturn and Janus, is referred to by Karl Philipp Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791), p. 222.

34. *W₂* (1831) reads: That paradise has been lost shows us that it is not essential in absolute fashion as a state of affairs. What is genuinely divine, in accord with its [essential] determination, is never lost but is eternal and has permanent being in and for itself. The loss of paradise

35. [*Ed.*] This idea and the terms Hegel uses to express it recur repeatedly in the writings of Jacob Boehme, although he used them to express his own mystical experiences. See especially his work, *De signatura rerum*, in *Theosophia revelata* (1715) (see n. 38); see also his autobiographical account in *Theosophia revelata*, vol. 2, appendix 7. Hegel refers to both works in *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, part 4 (*Vorlesungen*, vol. 9, ed. P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke [Hamburg, 1986]), p. 79. In this passage, as well as in the third part of the philosophy-of-religion lectures of 1821 (see Vol. 3:97–98), the different conceptions of a unity of being with nature expressed by Boehme in these passages probably fuse together in Hegel's mind.

149 Humanity's unity with nature is a fine-sounding, cherished expression. Understood correctly, it means the unity | of human beings with their own nature, with the nature that is truly their nature, i.e., with freedom and spirituality; it is the reasoning knowledge of the universal in and for itself. This reasoning knowledge of human beings who are [at home] in their true nature, human freedom thus defined, is no natural, unmediated unity.

Plants are in this unbroken unity; singularity is here never anything more than this particular existing plant. The spiritual, on the other hand, is not in immediate unity with its nature, "but on the contrary"³⁶ it has to make its way across the infinite gulf that sets it apart from the natural; [unity] first comes into being as a reconciliation that is brought about; "it is not a reconciledness that is there from the outset,"³⁷ and this genuine unity is achieved only through movement, through a process, through first getting away from one's immediate existence and then returning to self. We speak of the innocence of children, and we may bewail the fact that the child loses its so-called innocence; we lament the loss of the child's loving goodness, its unity, what is called the innocence of the child. Or we speak of the innocence of simple peoples (who are, however, more uncommon than is supposed), but this innocence is not genuinely human existence. Free ethical life is not the same as the ethical life of the child, and is at a higher level than this form of innocence; it is self-conscious volition, a willing that determines its purpose for itself by thoughtful insight. In the ethical realm this is the first genuine relationship. Just by being a free will, human beings have passed beyond this state of innocence.

This way of viewing the matter raises more specifically the question what this unity precisely represents. Does it mean, for example, that according to this unity, human beings once found themselves at the center, the midpoint of nature, that they saw into its heart, that in their intuition, in their immediate consciousness,
150 the very concept of things was at the same time before | them, the substantive essence? That this conclusion is entailed by the unity of

36. *Ho* reads, similar in *W*: in order to effect the return to itself

37. Thus *G*; *P* reads: [it is] not from the outset a unity of spirit with its nature,

humanity with nature is another distorted impression of the same kind.

We can distinguish in things, on the one hand, their determinateness, their quality, their essential relationship to other things. This is their natural or finite aspect. Human beings who are in the natural state can be better acquainted with things in this aspect of their peculiarity; they can have a conscious feeling, a much more definite knowledge of their particular quality than they have in the cultivated state. This side of things was also expressed in medieval philosophy, which spoke of the *signatura rerum*,³⁸ i.e., of certain outer qualities by which the particular, peculiar nature is denoted, so that in these external qualities [of things] the particular qualities, the specific peculiarity of their nature can be delivered up and made present to sense. This can happen in human beings in the natural state; and in animals, too, this link between the external quality and their [essence] is much more marked than is the case with human beings in the cultivated state. Animals are impelled by instinct, for example, toward whatever serves for their nourishment,³⁹ and ignore everything else.⁴⁰ In the same way, when they feel sick they are drawn by instinct to specific types of herbs by which the sickness is healed. In the same way, the deadly appearance and smell of plants are a sign of their harmful character for human beings in the natural state; their natural sense is more readily attentive to poisonous plants—they are more strongly repelled by them than those who are civilized. Accordingly, the instinct of animals is, on the whole, more accurate than the natural consciousness of humans, because as consciousness evolves, this instinct is impaired. One | can say that animals or human beings in the natural state see into the heart of natural things and grasp their specific quality more correctly; this constitutes their specific mode of relation to the “other,” both to other animals and to humans. But this fact, that for *me* this specific quality is present

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38. [Ed.] Although Hegel refers to “medieval philosophy,” we may assume that he has Boehme in view; see Boehme’s *De signatura rerum* in *Theosophia revelata*, pp. 2178–2404, esp. pp. 2180–2181.

39. *Ho*, *W* add: they devour only specific things,

40. *Ho* adds, *similar in W*: They are themselves specific types of individuals, and maintain themselves only by setting up in antithesis to themselves their other—not an other in general—and sublating the antithesis.

in this way, occurs only in regard to specific qualities that are purely finite in character. "In the same way we know that sleepers or sleepwalkers"⁴¹ have this kind of natural awareness. In this case the rational consciousness has been stilled, but an inner sense or intuition has been aroused, of which it can also be said that in it human being and human knowing are much more in unity or in identity with the world and with one's [external] circumstances than in the waking state. This is why this condition is regarded as something higher than the normal condition. Only in such a state, to be sure, can there be present an awareness of things that are happening a thousand leagues away from where I am. This kind of sense or knowledge is to be found in a much higher degree among savage peoples than among those that are civilized. Such knowledge, however, is essentially limited to single events and to the destinies of single individuals; the coherence between oneself and others, between oneself and particular circumstances that belong within one's consciousness, is set vibrating and comes clearly into consciousness, but the cohering is that of "a single nature, a single subject."⁴²

152 This is not yet the real heart of things, however, for we reach this heart only with the concept, "with their universal nature."⁴³ The heart of a planet is the relationship between its distance from the sun, its | revolution, and so on; this is what is truly rational. And this heart is accessible only to someone with a scientific education, who is no longer in the natural state, whose mind is liberated from immediate intuition, from the immediate sensation of seeing, hearing, and so on, to one who has withdrawn his senses within himself and whose relationship to these objects is one of unfettered thought. This rationality and this knowledge emerge only [as] the result of the infinite mediation of thought and only come on the scene with the

41. *Ho* reads: This instinct sees only into the heart of things in their singularity; its vision does not pierce into the source of life of things in general, into their divine heart. The same relationship occurs in sleepwalkers [*im Somnambulismus*], who *W* (following *Ho* and *G*) reads: This instinct . . . occurs in sleepers, in sleepwalkers, who

42. *Ho* reads: this individual with specific events.

43. *G* reads: the universal idea. *D* reads: its universal nature. *Ho* reads: This slumber of the spirit cannot reveal to us the true heart of the world. This heart is the concept, the eternal law of things. *W* (following *G* and *Ho*) reads: the universal idea. This slumber . . . world.

last stage of human existence; the first stage of human existence is as an animal.

As for the other aspect of this way of viewing things—[the claim] that in this natural unity of humanity, this unity not yet broken by reflection, there lay also the genuine consciousness of God, that it lies in consciousness—if unity is represented as a natural, immediate unity, what we have said already applies here too. Spirit is only spirit, spirit is only *for* spirit, spirit in its truth is only for the *free* spirit; and this free spirit is the one that has learned to look beyond immediate sense-perception, the one that also looks beyond understanding, beyond the reflection based on understanding and suchlike. Or in theological terms it is the spirit that has come to the full knowledge of sin, i.e., that has penetrated to the consciousness of the infinite gulf, the rupture of the inner being, of being-for-itself, and has emerged once more from this separation into unity and reconciliation. Hence natural, immediate unity is not the true existence of the idea but rather its lowest stage, the one that is furthest removed from the truth. Such is the verdict on this type of representation.

The other point in this connection is that this view defines its ideal as something that is past and also future. That it should set up an ideal of this kind is necessary, for by so doing it expresses what genuinely is, in and for itself; but the shortcoming is that it simultaneously defines the ideal as something that will happen and that has happened. Thereby it turns the ideal into something that is not present, and immediately imparts to it the character of something finite. “[But] what is in and for itself is the infinite, while in the reflective consciousness we have before us a state of finitude.”⁴⁴ | Reflection quite rightly distinguishes the two, but the shortcoming of representation is that it adheres in principle to an *abstract* attitude, yet insists that what is in and for itself should also *appear* and be present in the world of external contingency. Reason allows chance and arbitrariness their proper sphere but knows that in this—superficially, to outward appearance, highly confused—

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44. *Ho reads, similar in W₂*: The empirical consciousness is knowing the finite; what is in and for itself is what lies within this outer shell.

world, truth is still present. Such is the case with other ideals as well; for example, the ideal of a state may be very true in itself, but one forgets that it is not realized, not present. What we represent to ourselves as the realization of an ideal is that the complex pattern of law, politics, and economics should all be in conformity with the idea; here, then, we have a field such as *cannot* in fact match the ideal but which is nonetheless present, and within which the substantive idea is nevertheless actual and present. One can grant all the evil there is in the world, but what is awry and confused in existence is a long way from constituting the entire present. This whole range of appearance is only one side and does not embrace the totality that belongs to the present as a whole. In regard to the idea of this unity, unity is defined in an abstract manner. But it is not yet recognized that the idea is present in fact because fact is regarded solely with reflective understanding. That is the difficulty that remains, to recognize the actual existence of what is substantive in the idea through this outer bark; and because it is difficult to find the ideal in actuality, it is transposed to the past or the future.⁴⁵

45. *Ho reads, similar in W:* and to enjoy it; to be sure, this also involves hard labor: in order to pluck reason, the rose in the cross of the present, one must take up the cross itself.

[Ed.] This famous metaphor also occurs in the Preface to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1821), trans. T. M. Knox (London, 1952), p. 12. Apparently it was suggested to him both by Luther's coat of arms, which had a black cross in the midst of a heart surrounded by white roses, and by the Rosicrucians (cf. Hegel, *Werke* 17:227, 403), a seventeenth-century secret society, which used as its emblem a St. Andrew's cross and four roses. Reason is the rose in the cross of the present because it discloses the ideal and the rational in the midst of the actual and the seemingly irrational. To "pluck" reason one must take up the actual, attending to what is *presently* given in the world; but because of the difficulty and pain involved in so doing, it is tempting to transpose the ideal into the past or the future. The metaphor is thus congruent with the main text as found in *G* as well as with the argument of the paragraph as a whole. It is curious that *G*, *P*, and *D* missed the metaphor. Perhaps they did not understand it and simply omitted it; or possibly *Ho* inserted it on the basis of familiarity with the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*. It is plausible, however, that Hegel's actual lecture included both the metaphor with its accompanying stress on the present, as transmitted by *Ho*, and the warning against transposing the ideal into the past or the future, as transmitted by *G*. On Hegel's use of this metaphor and its possible meanings, see Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought* (1941), trans. David E. Green (New York, 1967), pp. 13–18; and Wolf-Dieter Marsch, *Gegenwart Christi in der Gesellschaft: Eine Studie zu Hegels Dialektik* (Munich, 1965), pp. 271–274.

Attempts have also been made to demonstrate historically the view that the human race began in this way, that the human race enjoyed a state of perfection.⁴⁶ | There are numerous peoples among whom have been found relics of art, of phantasy, and sometimes also of scientific knowledge, which seem to be incompatible with their present state. From this evidence of a better mode of existence people have inferred an earlier state of perfection, a state of completely ethical life—just as, when medieval monks came up with Greek and Latin writings, one could infer that writings of this kind did not come out of their own heads but belonged to another age. Among the Hindus a wisdom and knowledge has been found which is so great that it is not consistent with their present educational and cultural level. This and many other similar circumstances have been seen⁴⁷ as traces of a better past.⁴⁸ However, this wisdom of the Hindus, of the Egyptians, and of antiquity generally, has grown steadily smaller the more we have become acquainted with it; it is still diminishing as each day passes, and the facets of which cognizance *can* be taken either can be attributed to other sources or else are of no account in themselves.⁴⁹

*b. Immediate Religion in General*⁵⁰

Let us begin now to consider nature religion, or immediate religion, in general. Its determining characteristic is the unity of the natural

46. [Ed.] See above, n. 27, and Friedrich Schlegel, *Über die neuere Geschichte: Vorlesungen gehalten zu Wien im Jahre 1810* (Vienna, 1811), p. 47 (*Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 1:7:148)—a passage to which Hegel probably also alludes in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet ed., p. 132 (Hoffmeister ed., p. 159).

47. [Ed.] See above, nn. 27, 46. In the philosophy-of-history lectures, Hegel refers critically in this connection to the Abbé Lamennais, Baron Ferdinand von Eckstein's journal *Le Catholique*, and the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith; see *Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet ed., pp. 231–232 n. 47 (Hoffmeister ed., pp. 159–160 n. g).

48. *W₂* (1831) *adds*: The writings of medieval monks, for instance, often did not, to be sure, come out of their own heads, but were the relics of a better past.

49. *W₂* (1831) *reads*: very little significance. But this whole notion of an original paradise has thus shown itself to be a poetic figment, which has as its basis the concept, but the concept taken as immediate existence instead of being primarily mediation.

50. [Ed.] This “general” discussion is based on the *Ms.*, sheets 32b–39b, but the third of the topics in the latter, the cultus of immediate religion, is replaced by a brief

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and spiritual, so that on the objective side God is posited as this unity, while the subjective side, self-consciousness, is entangled in natural determinacy. This natural element is to begin with a singular existence, not nature in general as a whole or an organic totality—these are all general conceptions not yet posited here at this initial stage; the natural is to be taken in its singularity. (Natural classes and genera belong to a higher stage of reflection and to the mediating work of thought.) It is this singular aspect of nature | (this visible sky, this sun or moon, a river, a tree, this beast or human being, and so forth), an immediate natural existence of this kind, that is appraised as God in general. What content this representation of God possesses is something we can for the time being leave undetermined here—at this initial stage there is something indeterminate, an indeterminate power generally, a presence of the spirit in phantasy and representation, which is capable of still further fulfillment. But since it is not yet the spirit in its truthfulness, this power, the categorial determinations of this spirit, are fortuitous; they become true only when the true God is in consciousness.⁵¹ This is therefore the first beginning.

In the sphere of natural religion, therefore, we shall first consider the metaphysical concept, secondly the form or shape of God, the way he is represented, and thirdly the cultus. But here the cultus will not be viewed abstractly; it is on the contrary more interesting to present the different forms of nature religion.⁵²

(α) The Metaphysical Concept of God⁵³

Under this heading there belongs the form of thought that is familiar to us as proof of the existence of God. To begin with, we

survey of the forms of immediate religion, since the 1824 lectures have incorporated the materials on the cultus into the description of the “practical relationship” at the end of Part I (see Vol. 1, 1824 *Concept*, pp. 350–364, esp. n. 178).

51. *W₂ reads:* the true God is in consciousness and posits them. *Ho reads:* they are posited by the true God, the God who is in consciousness.

52. *W₁ (Ed?) adds:* itself and spend some time considering them.

[*Ed.*] It is “more interesting” because the abstract summary of the cultus of nature religion has already been presented at the end of Part I of the 1824 lectures (see above, n. 50).

53. [*Ed.*] In this section Hegel analyzes the cosmological proof of God, based on the rise of consciousness from finite to infinite, from determinate being to ab-

must discuss the *concept* of this “metaphysical” concept and explain what is meant by it.

At this point we have [before us] a completely concrete content, and whatever might be called a metaphysico-logical concept consequently seems to lie far behind us, just because we are in the realm of the absolutely concrete. We must be more specific. The content is certainly *spirit* in general; the elaboration of what spirit is forms the entire content of the philosophy of religion. The different levels at which spirit is intellectualized give rise to the different religions. This diversity of determinacy comes about as the different levels are constituted; | it appears as the external form grounded in spirit, the differences being posited within it in a determinate form that is at the same time an altogether simple universal, logical form. The form is consequently what is abstract. But this form is not only the external shell of this determinate spirit but also, as the logical element, its innermost kernel as the determinacy of what is inward. It combines both within itself—being the innermost kernel, the determinacy of what is most inward, and at the same time the outward form: this is the nature of the concept, to be the essential and at the same time the mode of appearance, the mode of difference or of form. On the one hand this logical determinacy is concrete as spirit, and this entirety is the simple substantiality of spirit; on the other hand it is its external form, by which it is distinguished from the “other.”⁵⁴ It may seem that if another natural object is considered, it has the logical element as its inner kernel; and in the case of a concrete shape such as the finite spirit, this is in fact so. In the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, this logical form does not merit particular attention, for when we are dealing with something like nature or spirit, it is present in a finite way, and the exposition of

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solute being, as is characteristic of nature religion in general. Into it he inserts an extended discussion of pantheism in which he shows that the concept of pantheism has been widely misunderstood in the recent controversies: neither nature religion nor Spinozism is pantheistic in any meaningful sense. In the 1827 lectures the discussion of pantheism is given greater prominence by being taken into the *Concept of Religion* (see Vol. 1:346 ff., 374 ff.).

54. *Ho, W add:* That inmost determinacy, the content of each successive level according to its substantive nature, is thus at the same time the external form.

157 the logical element can be displayed as a system of syllogisms or mediations.⁵⁵ But in the field in which we are now operating, it is the logical element that has resumed its former simple shape and can therefore be more easily considered, "that strikes the attention"⁵⁶ [in such a way] that it can be the special | object of consideration. It could be presupposed in this case too; but because of the simplicity to which it has reverted, what happens is that the simple, substantive logical element is considered here on its own account, just as it is in theology, the science of God. Hence we can in the first place *presuppose* this logical element, but secondly *treat* it—by virtue of its simplicity—because it is of interest in that it was formerly discussed in natural theology and is in general a topic of theology, the intellectual science of God [*die Verstandeswissenschaft von Gott*]. Since the advent of Kantian philosophy, this metaphysical topic has been cast aside as a poor, shoddy thing, unworthy of any notice, and it accordingly deserves to have justice done to it here.

These determinations should be considered, then, as they occur in the form of proofs for God's existence. As regards the relationship between these forms, these conceptual determinacies as such, these logical, substantive determinacies of the idea, and the forms of proof for the existence of God, the following should be borne in mind. A conceptual determination, indeed any concept, is not of itself something in repose but something that moves itself; it is essentially activity, and for that reason it is mediation within self, just as thinking in general is a form of activity or inward self-mediation, so that a particular thought also involves inward self-mediation.

55. *W* (*HgG/1831?*) *adds*: Without this comprehensive discussion, conducted solely in accord with the purpose [in hand], it would be insufficient to adduce and consider the simple determinacy of concept. *W continues, following Ho*: But because in these spheres the logical categories, as substantive foundation, are obscured and do not exist as simple, intelligible entities, it is not so necessary to single them out for attention on their own account, whereas in religion, spirit accords logical elements a more prominent place. *Ho reads*: Logical categories also provide the substantive foundation for nature and finite spirit, but since at these levels they are obscured and do not exist as simple, intelligible entities, it is not so necessary to single them out for attention on their own account; whereas in religion, spirit—breaking free from its finite shapes—reverts again to its inward simplicity and in the process accords logical elements a more prominent place.

56. *P reads*: [such] that it strikes the attention *G reads*: and this furnishes an excuse if it should strike the attention

Thus, when we consider the determination of the concept, we have before us nothing but mediations; and the proofs of God are likewise nothing else but mediations; their aim is to present him by using a mediation. It is thus the same in both cases. In the proofs of God's existence, however, the shape of the mediation is as if the recourse to it were for the sake of cognition, in order that a sure insight should develop for cognition; the aim is to prove it to me, and the mediation is only a subjective interest, that of my cognizing. From what has been said previously regarding the nature of the concept, however, it is clear that the mediation is not to be understood in this subjective way—to conceive it thus is to misconceive it from the very outset—but that the mediation is equally an objective mediation of God within himself, an internal mediation of his own logic. The mediation is contained in the divine idea itself, and it is only when it is understood in this way that it becomes a necessary determination, a necessary moment. In the proofs for God's existence, therefore, we must discard the form of understanding; | they must show themselves to be a necessary moment of the concept itself, a *going forth* of mediation, an *activity* on the part of the concept itself.

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It is characteristic of the next form that we are here still completely at the first stage (what we have called the unmediated stage, the stage of the unmediated unity of the spiritual and the formal), that the spiritual is involved with a certain [degree of] immediacy. From this characteristic of immediacy it follows that we are here dealing with entirely abstract determinations, for immediate (or unmediated) and abstract mean the same. When we say "immediate," we picture to ourselves [simple] being; but in thought, too, the abstract is the immediate category, the form of thinking which has not yet deepened itself inwardly and has not thereby fulfilled itself, enriched itself, made itself concrete through further reflecting. If we have this concrete spirit as our object, but only generally, and the natural state [as] the mode of its reality, and if we divest both of them of their concrete content and keep only the abstract determination, then what we have is an abstract determination of God and the finite. These two sides now stand over against each other as infinite and finite, the one as existence [*Dasein*], the other as being [*Sein*], the one as substantial and the other as accidental, as universal and as singular. Admittedly these determinations are in some measure distinct: for

example, the singular is much more concrete than the accidental; the universal is, or is supposed to be, much more concrete than substance. However, we can here take them undeveloped, and it makes no difference in that case which form we take in order to consider them more closely; what is essential in these determinations or categories is their relationship to one another when they [are] submerged in religion.

159 ⁵⁷Humanity rises from the finite to the infinite, ~rises | above the singular and raises itself to the universal, to being-in-and-for-self.⁵⁸ Thus religion consists in this, that human beings have before them in their consciousness the nothingness of the finite, are aware of their dependence, and seek the ground of this nothingness, of this dependence—in a word, that they find no peace of mind until they set up the infinite before themselves. Even when we speak of religion in these abstract terms, we already have here the relationship of *transition* from finite to infinite. This transition, however, is not simply a factual one but is grounded in the nature of these determinations as well; that is to say, it is grounded in the concept, and it may be noted here that there is no need for us to advance beyond this definition of the transition. Considering it in more detail, it is possible to grasp it in two ways: first as a transition from the finite to the infinite as a beyond—this is a more modern relationship. But secondly it can be taken in such a way that the unity of both is maintained and the finite is preserved in the infinite. This is how it is in nature religion. “The consciousness in finite existence [*Existenz*] itself here becomes the infinite.”⁵⁹ In this singular existence, God,

57. *Precedes in W (1831)*: This relationship into which they are placed with one another is to be found in their nature as much as in religion, and must first be taken up from this side.

58. *W₂ (1831) reads*: Having the world before themselves, human beings feel in it what is inadequate (feeling also feels what is thought or what has to be thought). It does not suffice them as something ultimate, and they find the world to be an aggregate of finite things. They also know themselves to be something contingent, ephemeral; and in this feeling they rise above the singular and raise themselves to the universal, to the One that is in and for itself, an essence that is not affected by this contingency and conditionality but is simply *substance* as opposed to these accidents and the *power* by virtue of which these contingent things exist or do not exist.

59. *W (1831) reads*: In it some singular, unmediated existence, natural or spiritual, something finite, is extended infinitely beyond this its scope, and the limited intuiting of such an object constitutes at the same time knowledge of infinite being, free

he who is infinite, is present to "existence"⁶⁰ in such a way that this natural existence does not thereby vanish but is rather the mode of God's being, so that natural existence is preserved in unmediated unity with the substantive. But to define this relationship more precisely, whether the infinite is separated from the finite, or whether there is a transition from the finite | to the infinite (the equality of the two being retained, each being held fast in the other), this does not concern us.

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As regards the fact that consciousness progresses in religion from the finite to the infinite, this progress from finite to infinite is not just a factual episode in the history of religion, but is necessitated by the concept,⁶¹ and lies in the very nature of this determination. This transition is a mediation, is in fact naught but the transition of thought itself, and thought connotes nothing else but to know the infinite in the finite, the universal in the particular and singular.⁶² When we think an object, we have before our eyes its law, its essence, its universal order. It is only thinking human beings who have religion; animals have none because they do not think. The next step is to show with regard to this definition of the finite, the singular, and the accidental that it is the finite *itself* which translates or transforms itself into its other—the infinite, the universal, and so on. It cannot abide as finite, but makes itself into the infinite; in virtue of its substance it *must* revert to the infinite. To demonstrate this transition, to show that they [the determinations of the finite] are themselves this transition, this passing-over implicitly, falls wholly within the logical consideration [of the finite].⁶³ |

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substantiality. In a word, infinitude is simultaneously intuited in the finite thing—the sun, an animal, or whatever it may be—and inner, infinite unity or divine substantiality in the outward multiplicity of finite things.

60. *Thus P; G reads:* consciousness

61. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 137–154 (cf. GW 11:78–85).

62. *W (1831) adds:* Consciousness of the universal, of the infinite, is thought, i.e., inner mediation, going outside oneself, in general sublating the external, the singular. This is the nature of thought as such.

63. *W₂ (1831) adds:* The contingency of the world does not provide the sole starting point for the process of elevation, in order to arrive at the necessity of the essence that is in and for itself; we can define the world in still another fashion. Necessity is the final category in being and essence, and is therefore preceded by many other categories. The world can be a many, a manifold, in which case its truth is the One. In the same way as a transition can be made from the many to the One,

Putting the matter as concisely as possible, the finite can be defined as follows. We say, "The finite is, it *is* something, and at the same time it is something *finite*." What it is, it is through its negation, through its limit.⁶⁴ "Finite" is a qualitative determination, a *quality*, and the finite has being in such a way that [its] quality is simply a determinacy that is immediately identical with *its* being. The "something" has a quality, and [this] is immediately one with what has being, so that if the quality passes away, this "something" passes away too. We say "something red"; here red is the quality, and if this ceases to be, then it is no longer this, and if it were not a substance that can tolerate this, then the "something" would be lost too.⁶⁵ It is no different with the spirit: there are men and women of quite determinate character, and if this is lost, they cease to be. Thus the fundamental quality of Cato was to be a Roman republican; when this ceased, he ceased to be. This quality is so bound up with him that he cannot subsist without it. The firm determinateness of quality here is character. This is the general nature of the qualitative. Now the qualitative is essentially finite. The determinateness is *this*, and is not something else; it is essentially | a limit, a negation. Cato's limit was that he was a Roman republican, and his spirit, his idea

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from the finite to the infinite, *being* can provide the starting point for passing over to *essence*.

W (1831) *continues*: The transition from finite to infinite, from accidental to substantive, etc., belongs to the effective operation of thought in consciousness and is the very nature of these determinations themselves, what they in truth are. The finite is not the absolute, but it consists only in passing away and becoming the infinite; the singular consists only in reverting to the universal, the accidental only in reverting to substance. This transition is mediation to the extent that it is the movement from the initial, unmediated determinacy into its other, into the infinite, the universal; and substance as such is not something immediate but what becomes, what posits itself, through this passing over. That this is the genuine nature of these determinations themselves is demonstrated in logic, and it is essential to hold this fast in its proper sense—that it is not *we*, in merely external reflection, who pass over from one such determination to its other, but rather that they in themselves *consist* in passing over in this way. Let me say a little more about this dialectical element in regard to the determination we are here considering, namely, the finite.

64. W (following Ho) *adds*: through the beginning . . . itself. Ho *reads*: The finite *is*, but its being is finitude. In other words, what it is it is through its *end*, through the beginning, within it, of an other, which is not itself, i.e., its negative, its limits.

65. *Thus G.*

could go no further than this. This quality therefore constitutes the limit of the "something," and this we call a finite as such; its essence lies in its limit, in its negation, and this particularity, this negation, is accordingly essential only in relation to its "other." Now this "other" is not another finite, but the infinite. It is through its essence that the finite is what it is, what it should be, in such a way that its essence rather lies in its negation. Fully developed, the finite is an "other," namely, the infinite; the finite is simply this, to be the infinite.⁶⁶

The main thought is this, that the finite is something that is defined as finite, it does not have its being in itself but in an "other," and this "other" is the infinite.⁶⁷

Now this progress is necessary, it is contained in the concept: the finite is finite within itself, that is its nature. The process of elevation to God is just what we have already seen: this finite self-consciousness does not remain bound to the finite; it relinquishes the nature of the finite, jettisons it, and pictures to itself the infinite; this is what happens, so to speak, in the process of elevation to God, and this is the rational element in that process. This progression is the innermost or purely logical element. To define God in terms of infinity does not exhaust his nature, for his content is concrete. This progression, however, expresses only one side of the totality. For the finite disappears in the infinite; this is its nature, to sublate itself and to posit the infinite as its truth. This progression is only one side of the whole | movement, and the infinite that has come to be in this way is itself still only the abstract infinite.⁶⁸ As this abstraction the infinite too is, on the one hand, essentially determined at

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66. *Thus D; G reads:* is essentially the being of the infinite. *P reads:* has its truth in the infinite.

67. *W adds:* The finite consists indeed in having the infinite for its truth; what it is is not itself, but its opposite, the infinite. *Cf. Ho:* Of itself it therefore passes over into the infinite; it sublates itself, for the finite consists solely in sublating, and it posits the infinite as its truth. . . . But because of this negative side it needs, already for its being, an other, namely the finite; but in this way it is not itself the infinite but its opposite, the finite.

68. *W (following G or Ho) reads:* abstract infinite, determined in merely negative fashion as the nonfinite. *Ho reads:* abstract, what is determined in merely negative fashion as the nonfinite.

first in merely negative fashion; it has to sublate itself and determine itself *generally*, to annul its negativity and posit itself as affirmation. On the other hand it has to sublate its *abstractness*, particularizing itself and positing within itself the moment of the finite.

First the moment of the finite disappears in the infinite, and we then have only the infinite; but the finite does not have being, its being is mere show; so we have the infinite before us in merely abstract form within its own sphere, and its determination consists in sublating its own abstractness. This results from the concept of the infinite; the infinite is the negation of the negative, negation that relates to itself, i.e., it is affirmation, absolute affirmation, and at the same time being—simple relation to self is what is meant by being. In this way the second moment, the infinite, is also not merely negative, a beyond, but also affirmative, a being [i.e., God]. This also means that the infinite consists in inwardly determining itself, or validating the moment of finitude within itself (but as ideal). Hence it is the negation of negation and comprises what distinguishes the first negation from the other negation; consequently there is limit in it, and, with limit, there is the finite. If we are to define these two negations more precisely, the first is the finite and the second the infinite. This, however, is still the “bad” infinite; the infinite that is “over there” is the logical abstraction, and the genuinely infinite must be understood as the unity of both these negations. “What is noteworthy is that the infinite, being this affirmative, therefore includes being; this is here posited as result, as the simple relation to self to which the negation of negation reverts.”⁶⁹ All this makes up the concept of the infinite. This infinite needs to be essentially distinguished from the form that we discussed previously; | the infinite in immediate knowledge or as thing-in-itself in Kantian philosophy is at a low[er] level.”⁷⁰ In immediate knowledge I know God, that he is beyond, above me; here [the infinite] is no longer something otherworldly, but has its determinacy within itself.

69. W (1831) reads: It is only the two moments together that make up the nature of the infinite and its genuine identity.

70. W (1831, with G) reads: previously, the infinite in immediate knowledge or as thing-in-itself, which is the negative, indeterminate infinite, merely the nonfinite in Kantian philosophy.

In nature religion too, the infinite is not meant in this way at all, as something "over there," with the implication that a transition is made from the finite to the infinite and that the finite vanishes in the infinite. On the contrary, "natural religion"⁷¹ already contains a consciousness of the divine in general as what is universally substantive but at the same time determinate. This determinateness has the form of a natural existence. What is intuited as God in natural religion is the genuine content, the infinite, this divine substance in natural form. In natural religion the content "is thus more concretely, and hence more perfectly, genuine"⁷² than the content that is obtained in the views of immediate knowledge, "i.e., that the infinite [God] is over there, formless, simply the indeterminate."⁷³ Natural religion stands already at a higher level than this view.⁷⁴

"Another point to be noted is that in this form of thought we have spoken of the finite generally. When we | speak in this way, we take the finite as universal: the finite is everything finite. Speaking in this universal way, we say that nature religion is just this, to have the infinite before one in a finite-as-such; and if by this finitude we understand everything finite,"⁷⁵ then we should have what is called pantheism. If we imagine that the infinite is immediately contained in everything finite, that it exists as unmediated determinate being [*Dasein*], but that this determinate being does not exist in a chance manner (it is not a singular existence [*Existenz*], such as a river and so forth, but universal finitude)—if finitude in general is expressed in such a way that the divine is immediately universal in

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71. W (1831) reads: nature religion, though the way in which it defines the finite and the infinite yields a highly imperfect unity of the two,

72. Thus P; W (1831) reads: is thus more concrete, and hence more perfect, contains more truth,

73. Thus P; D reads: It is only the utterly formless, the indeterminate, that we are unable to cognize. G reads: which is unwilling to cognize God because he is indeterminate.

74. W (1831) adds: held by moderns, who in holding it still profess belief in revelatory religion.

75. W₁ (1831) reads: It can also be noted that the natural is to be taken in immediate fashion, as this or that singular (the sun, this river, etc., as contingency dictates), as it is first taken in nature religion. But if what is taken is the finite generally (everything singular, and thus in it, as it is, at the same time the universal generally), if the divine is known in each and every such present existence,

it, then we have pantheism. This pantheism is summed up in Jacobi's phrase: "God is the being (the universal) in all existent, i.e., determinate, being."⁷⁶ This determinate being contains being within itself, and this being within determinate being is God. When we speak of God in this way, that he is the being in all determinate being, this is the most inadequate of all definitions of God, the least satisfactory if he is to be spirit. If God is defined thus as being and it is said he is the being of determinate being in the singularized, finite world of the real, this denotes pantheism: Jacobi was very far from being a pantheist, but this phrase of his sums it up. There is, of course, a difference between what someone means and what he says; but science is not concerned with what someone means in his head, but with what he says.

Or again, according to Parmenides, "Being is all; only being is."⁷⁷ This appears at first to be the same as Jacobi's expression and so to be pantheism also; but it can be argued that Parmenides' thought is purer than Jacobi's expression, that the being of Parmenides is not pantheism. For he says expressly "There is only being," and all barriers, all so-called reality, all the modes of existence fall under non-being; nonbeing is not, and Parmenides is left solely with being.⁷⁸ | On the contrary, if one says "the being in all determinate being," then being counts as affirmative, and the being in this determinate being is the affirmation in finite existence. In this sense one cannot

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76. [Ed.] *Gott ist das Sein (das Allgemeine) in allem Da(= Bestimmt)sein*. Hegel is referring to Jacobi's description of Spinoza's teaching; see Jacobi, *Briefe*, p. 61: "Spinoza's God is the unadulterated principle of actuality in everything actual, of being in all existent being [*des Seins in allem Dasein*], wholly without individuality, and absolutely infinite" (F. H. Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:87; cf. 56). His criticism of Jacobi is misplaced since the phrase he cites does not represent Jacobi's viewpoint but Spinoza's, which Jacobi himself criticizes (see below, n. 80). As regards the equivalence of "existent" and "determinate" as qualifying "being" (*Dasein = Bestimmtsein*), see *Wissenschaft der Logik* (GW 11:59): "Dasein ist bestimmtes Sein." (This distinction is not found in the English translation, which is based on the 2d ed. of the German, and which in any case translates *Dasein* as "determinate being.")

W (1831) reads: "God is the being in all determinate being [*Dasein*]," and this also at all events yields spiritually rich definitions of God.

77. [Ed.] See Parmenides, frag. 6 in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1983), p. 247; also Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 83 (cf. GW 11:45).

78. W (1831) adds: In his case what is called determinate being is completely absent.

say Spinozism is pantheism, for Spinoza says, “What is, is the absolute substance”; all else are only modes to which he ascribes no affirmativeness or reality.^{79 80}

If we take the finite as thought, we mean by that everything finite, and this is pantheism. But a distinction must be drawn depending on whether, in speaking simply of the finite, we are speaking of this or that finite object or of everything. If the finite is taken as everything, this is already a movement of reflection, which passes beyond singulars; this complexifying of the finite belongs already to reflection. This is a [more] modern form of pantheism: to say “God is the being in all determinate being” is a modern way of viewing pantheism; it is a philosophical reflection. One can also say it is the pantheism of the contemporary Orient, of modern Muslims,⁸¹ who say, “Everything, just the way it is, is a whole and is God,” and the finite has being in this determinate being as universal finitude.⁸² Where | we have spoken of the finite in thought forms, this is not to be taken in the universal sense in regard to nature religion; it is not to be taken reflectively but only as referring to an unmediatedly

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79. W (1831) adds: So perhaps it cannot be said even of Spinoza’s substance that it is as precisely pantheistic as the expression quoted above, for with him singulars remain as little an affirmative as does determinate being with Parmenides; with Spinoza determinate being, distinguished from being, is only nonbeing and “is” in such a way that this nonbeing has no being at all.

80. [Ed.] Hegel erroneously regards the phrase, “the being in all determinate being,” as representing Jacobi’s position, whereas Jacobi intended it only as a description of Spinozism (see n. 76). Hegel’s error is probably related to the fact that he would not regard this formulation as an authentic statement of Spinoza’s position, since it included in his view the very affirmation of finitude that Spinoza rejected. For Hegel’s own presentation of a pantheistic affirmation of the finite, which did not, however, entail a pure equivalence of God and finite things but rather distinguished the divine in the finite, see Part I of the 1827 philosophy-of-religion lectures, Vol. 1:375–376—where, to be sure, Hegel does designate this view of the relationship of the divine and the finite as “Oriental pantheism or genuine Spinozism.” On Spinoza’s definition of “mode,” see *Ethics* (1677), pt. I, def. V: “By *mode*, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself” (*Chief Works* 2:45).

81. W (1831) adds: especially Jalāl-al-Din Rūmī, [Ed.] Hegel was acquainted with the Muslim mystic Jalāl-al-Din Rūmī (1207–1273) through a collection of poems freely translated by Friedrich Rückert, *Mawlana Dschelaleddin Rumi*, in *Taschenbuch für Damen auf das Jahr 1821* (Tübingen, 1821), pp. 211–248.

82. W (1831) adds: This pantheism is the product of reflective thinking, which extends the scope of natural things to embrace each and every thing, and in so doing

singular existence; and to this extent nature religion⁸³ is by no means pantheistic.

To revert to our consideration of this transition from the finite to the infinite, in the form in which it appears in the proofs of the existence of God, we find that it is here presented in the form of a syllogism. Among the proofs that are offered, the first is the *cosmological*. The shape in which we want to consider it here is not the same as what is called the cosmological proof in natural theology. But we then have [to] abandon considering the detailed course of this transition. By and large, the transition is the same in all of these proofs. In regard to its "categorical content"⁸⁴ the starting point of the cosmological proof is a contingent—or, as is sometimes said, "accidental"—being. It starts from the contingency of worldly things; and the subsequent determination is then in terms not merely of infinity but of necessity, of something that is in and for itself necessary. This is a much more concrete determination than that of the infinite, as we have it here; in regard to the content of the proof, in regard to its determinateness, what we are here speaking of is consequently something different.⁸⁵ |

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pictures to itself the existence of God not as genuine universality of thought but as an "allness," i.e., in all singular natural existences.

W₂ (1831) continues: One further remark in passing. Recent philosophy's definition of spirit as unity with self, the world being grasped inwardly as something ideal, is also called pantheism or, more precisely, spiritualistic pantheism. But here "unity" is comprehended in a merely one-sided way, as opposed to "creation," where God is cause and the separation occurs in such a way that the creation is autonomous over against him. But this is precisely the basic characteristic of spirit, to be this differentiating and positing of the difference. This is the creation they are so keen on retaining. Then of course there is the further aspect that the separation does not endure but is sublated, for otherwise we are in the realm of dualism and Manichaeism.

We now revert to the categorical determination that substance as universal power is singled out by thought on its own account.

However, to raise up substance in this way, to know substance as being for self, is not yet religion, since it still lacks the moment that must not be lacking in religion as the consummate idea—the moment of spirit. What gives rise to the moment of spirit being established is that substance is not yet inwardly determined as spirit, nor spirit as substance. Spirit is thus outside substance, in fact is distinct from it.

83. *W₁ (1831) adds:* as the religion of the beginning

84. *W (1831) reads:* metaphysical content

85. *Ho adds, similar in W₁:* What we have in view here cannot be the cosmological proof, which is much more concrete, if only because the one side is the contingently

If we now put the transition into the form of a syllogism, our syllogism runs as follows: "The finite presupposes the infinite; but the finite is, this particular entity exists; therefore the infinite also is."⁸⁶ If we are asked to weigh the merits of a syllogism of this kind, we must say it leaves us cold. It belongs to the understanding. "When we are discussing the religious relationship, we require something quite different from syllogisms."⁸⁷ On the one hand, this is justified, but on the other hand the rejection of syllogisms implies quite generally that we are belittling thought, as if feeling and recourse to a mental image are needed in order to convince. But the true nerve of every argument is that the thought should be truthful; only when the thought is true are one's feelings truthful too.

What is striking in this syllogism is that a finite mode of being is assumed, and this finite being is seen as that through which the infinite mode of being is grounded. A contingent, finite mode of being, which *is*, is assumed; this provides the starting point and is seen as that from which the infinite is inferred or as ground of the infinite. In general terms, this is what is unsatisfactory. The mediation is established in such a way that the consciousness of the infinite derives from the finite, so that finite being is the ground of the infinite. More specifically, it is the case that the finite is expressed as having only a positive relation to the infinite. The proposition runs: "The being of the finite is the being of the infinite." There is posited only a positive relation between finite and infinite being. This is at once seen to be disproportionate, as when we say that the finite presupposes the infinite. But the finite is what posits. It remains the affirmative; this means, however, that there is a positive relation of the finite to the infinite, and the being of the finite is what comes first, the ground of | inference, and what remains. It should also be noted that when we say the being of the finite is the being of the

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accidental and the other what is necessary in and for itself, even though the logical form of the transition is the same. *W₂ (Var)* adds: but only the logical nature of the transition enters into consideration.

86. [Ed.] On the logical basis for the relationship between finite and infinite as presented in this and the next three paragraphs, see Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 137–154 (cf. GW 11:78–85).

87. *Thus P; G* reads: From matters of religion we require something else. *Ho* reads: In the case of religion we require more. *W* reads: In religion we require something else, something more.

infinite, then it is the being of the finite, which is itself the being of the infinite, that forms the major premise. But only the major premise is thus posited; the mediation between it and the being of the infinite is not indicated: the proposition is not mediated, and that is the very opposite of what is required.

If we consider this mediation, we see that true mediation includes a further characteristic, namely that the being of the finite is not its own being but that of the "other," the infinite; in other words, what gives rise to the infinite is not the being of the finite but the nonbeing of the finite; the nonbeing of the finite is the being of the infinite. The mediation takes the form that the finite stands before us as affirmation. Looked at more closely, "the finite is what it is as negation;"⁸⁸ thus we do not have the finite as a [mode of] being, but the nonbeing of the finite. The mediation between finite and infinite thus resides rather in the negative nature of the finite. Thus the genuine moment of mediation is not expressed in the major premise as given; on the contrary, it is the nonbeing of the finite that is the being of the infinite. But because this transition is dialectical—because the speculative cannot be expressed in the form of a proposition,⁸⁹ namely that the being of the infinite is the negation of the finite, the whole nature of the finite is to pass over into the infinite—for this reason the other propositions which belong to a syllogism cannot be added. For if one says that the nature of the finite is not to be, then one cannot, in the minor premise, any longer characterize the finite as being. What is amiss in the syllogism is that the finite is expressed as affirmative and its relation to the infinite is expressed as positive, whereas it is essentially a negative relation, and this dialectical element in the finite cannot be confined within the form of a syllogism of the understanding.

88. *Ho reads*: The finite is to be τὸ τί εἶναι through negation.

[*Ed.*] On Hegel's understanding of the Aristotelian τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:141–142, 151 (*Werke* 14:323, 334). Since this concept is only marginal to Hegel's understanding of Aristotle, the variant transmitted by *Ho* is unlikely to be correct.

89. *Thus P; D reads*: The speculative also cannot be expressed in the form of a proposition *G reads*: The deficiency of the syllogistic form is that this genuine content, what belongs to the concept, cannot be expressed in the form of a syllogism

[*Ed.*] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 90 (cf. *GW* 11:49).

“The finite presupposes the infinite”; this expression also implies the following, though it is not expressly stated. The finite presupposes the infinite; so the finite posits or poses, but its posing [*Setzen*] is rather a *presupposing* [*Voraussetzen*], i.e., it posits in such a way that the *infinite* rather is the first, essential element. On closer analysis, the expression reveals the negative element of the finite and its relation to the infinite. What is meant in religion is not that the infinite *is* by virtue of the affirmative nature of the finite, its immediacy; on the contrary, religion is rather that the infinite is the finite being sublated and sublating itself. This then is the nature of this syllogism. The proof, the manner in which the finite is related to the infinite—the [entire] thought is distorted by the form of the syllogism. Religion, however, encompasses a way of thinking, a way of making this transition from finite to infinite, that is not contingent but necessary and that is conveyed by the concept of the nature of the infinite itself. What we have here *is* this way of thinking which constitutes the substance of religion; this way of thinking is not completely comprehended in the form of a syllogism.⁹⁰ |

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90. *W₂ (1831) adds*: The defect in regard to the mediation offered by this proof is that the unconditioned is expressed as conditioned by another [mode of] being. The simple determination of negation is relinquished. In genuine mediation too, a transition is made from the many to the One, and again in such a way that the One is expressed as mediated. But this defect is remedied in the genuine elevation of spirit, by saying that it is not the many that has being but the One. This negation sublates the mediating, conditional aspect, and what is in and for itself necessary is now mediated by the negation of mediation. God *creates*: here we have a relationship between two, and mediation. But what is involved is a primary division: God is no longer the opaque essence wrapped up within itself, but manifests himself, reveals himself, posits a distinction and is for an other. In its highest expression this distinction is the Son. The Son exists through the mediation of the Father and vice versa; God is only revelatory in the Son. But in this other, God is present to self, is related to self; and since this is no longer a relatedness to other, the mediation is sublated.

Thus God is what is necessary in and for itself, and this determination is the absolute foundation. If this too does not yet suffice, God must be grasped as substance.

The next point is the converse, the relationship of substance to the finite. The elevation of the finite to substance involves a mediation that was annulled, posited as null, in the result. As substance turns against the many, the finite, etc., this annulled mediation has to be taken up again, but in such a way that it is posited as null in the [further] movement of the result. In other words, it is not merely the result that has to be comprehended but the entirety involved in it and the process in which it is engaged. Now if the whole is comprehended in this fashion, what we say is that

In considering the abstract concept of nature religion we have seen that making distinctions does not give any more profound a definition of this religion, which is the unity of the infinite and finite, in such a way that it [nature religion] is itself the infinite: the finite sublates itself to the infinite and the infinite to the finite.⁹¹ Both finite and infinite are qualitative levels of determinateness, and there is no further determinateness within them. |

(β) The Representation of God⁹²

If we now proceed to consider how God is represented at this stage, let us take this in the concrete sense that this concept [of God] is *spirit*, and therefore it is the unity of the spiritual and the natural, but in such a way that these two elements—i.e., the spiritual and the natural or, more precisely, the universal spirit and the singular natural spirit—are in more concrete fashion the natural world-essence in general. Thus both sides are very concrete, but their thought content, that of spirit in particular, is still nothing else than the

the substance has accidents, the infinite multiplicity that is in regard to this substance as [modes of] being that pass away. What is, passes away. But death is no less the recommencement of life, passing away is the beginning of coming about, there is naught but passing from being into nonbeing and vice versa. This is the alternating process of accidentality, and substance is the unity of this process itself. What endures is this alternation, and this, as unity, is the substantive, necessity, which is what causes coming-about to pass over into passing away and vice versa. Substance is the absolute power of being. Being accrues to it, but it is equally the unity of the alternating process whereby being passes over into nonbeing; again, however, it is the power over passing away, in such a way that passing away itself passes away.

The deficiency in regard to substance in Eastern religions, as in regard to substance as viewed by Spinoza, resides in the categories of coming about and passing away. Substance is not grasped as what is inwardly active, as subject and as purposeful activity, is not grasped as wisdom but solely as power. It is something devoid of content; the determinate element, purpose, is not contained in it; the determinate element that brings itself forth in this coming about and passing away is not grasped. It is merely the reeling, inwardly purposeless, empty power. This is the system called pantheism. In it God is absolute power, the being in all determinate being,^a the purification of himself from determinacy and negation. That things *are*, is substance; that they are *not*, is likewise the power of substance, and this power is immanent in them in immediate fashion.

[Ed.] ^aSee n. 80.

91. *Thus G.*

92. [Ed.] This section corresponds to Sec. A, "Concrete Representation," in the Ms. The naming of it is reminiscent of the 1824 *Concept*, Sec. 3.a, "The Theoretical Relationship: The Representation of God."

abstract determinateness of the unqualified infinite; it is called spirit, it is spirit, and it has the appearance of spirit, but it is still the spirit that is spiritless, that does not yet [have spiritual content]. However richly appareled it may be, it does not yet have spiritual content as spirit within itself; rather its genuine content is at this point still the same "unqualified abstract infinitude."⁹³

Now then, since it is the *representation* of God we are talking about, since we are discussing God as objective, "the God that has being in consciousness,"⁹⁴ there are two aspects to be considered: (1) his *determinateness*; (2) his [representational] *shape*.

(1) In regard to the determinateness we have already said that this determinateness is still nothing else but *abstract* determinateness, which we have just rejected on that account.

(2) The second aspect is the shape [or way in which God is represented]; here in this field [of natural religion] generally the divine shape is defined as natural, belonging to the order of nature or immediacy. It may also be called spiritual, [God] may have a spiritual shape; or else the natural object, the immediate object, which is its configuration, the way in which God is manifested, may be raised by phantasy to the level of spiritual action or behavior, a spiritual mode and manner of manifestation, but the content does not correspond to this spiritual way of presenting it. If, for example, one | says, "The sea is a god," by this is meant something spiritual; actions can be ascribed to Oceanus; but these actions are *contingent*, still without spiritual content, inasmuch as the god is not yet further defined as spirit. His actions are not yet a content that is worthy of spirit, but are either natural events, natural effects, or, because they are represented as actions of spirit, they constitute purposes that belong to contingent spirit.

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First, then, we must consider the shape [of God], its modes, the ways in which God is represented. The inner content is in fact still spiritless. In regard to the shape, it should be noted that we have to treat it simply as a shape—that if natural objects as such, the sky, the sun, this river, the sea, are viewed as God, they are not being

93. W₁ (*following Ho*) reads: abstract infinitude, the immediate unity of the spiritual and the natural. *Ho* reads: The spirit that is here represented is still the abstract, spiritless spirit, the immediate unity of the spiritual and the natural.

94. *Thus G*; *P* reads: as the consciousness we shall encounter in the cultus,

174 regarded as if they were merely natural powers. A natural power is what is powerful vis-à-vis human beings; in their existence they are related to it only as to power; so a prime factor in the relationship is that this god allows itself to be used by human beings, or alternatively, they are afraid of it. Human beings may be afraid of the sun, of thunder and lightning, and so on, but the fear of these natural powers is not the religious aspect [of the human relation to them]. For the abode of religion is essentially in the realm of freedom, and nowhere else, and to fear God is something different from being afraid of [natural] powers or violence. "The fear that is the beginning of wisdom"⁹⁵ cannot arise in nature religion; it is the fear of human beings who have shaken inwardly in their own singularity and have as it were shaken themselves off, worked through this abstraction, | in order to *think*, as free spiritual essence. At this point, not only does the natural life begin to quake, but the spirit that rises above it forsakes it, having established itself at a higher level than that of the natural unity—this it has left behind it. Fear in this higher sense, therefore, is not to be found in nature religion, any more than it is the fear of natural powers or violence that constitutes the beginning of nature religion. This beginning occurs rather in the opposite of all that can appear as fear."⁹⁶ Hence this god, which is the unity of the spiritual and finite, is itself spirituality.

(γ) The Forms of Nature Religion⁹⁷

The first characteristic or starting-point of nature religion is that spirit initially has being in immediately singular form, and what is interesting about the ensuing process is what may be termed the

95. [Ed.] See Ps. 111:10; cf. Prov. 1:7; 9:10; Job 28:28.

96. W₂ (MiscP) reads ("to the extent . . . sorcery" probably Ed): We are told that fear is the beginning of wisdom; this fear cannot arise in immediate religion. It first enters human beings when they know themselves powerless in their singularity, when their singularity shakes within them and they have accomplished the necessary abstraction in regard to themselves in order to have being as free spirit. Once the natural element quakes in this way in human beings, they rise above it and forsake it, having attained to a higher level, and pass over to thinking, to knowing. But it is not only fear in this higher sense that is not to be found here; even the fear of natural powers, to the extent that it does occur here, is transformed, in this initial stage of nature religion, into its opposite and becomes magic, sorcery.

97. [Ed.] This heading is not in G, but it is evident that Hegel here presents the brief survey of "the different forms of nature religion" promised earlier (see above, n. 52), replacing the discussion of the cultus found in the Ms.

objectifying [*Objektivierung*] of spirit; it is partly because of this that spirit becomes objective to me, steps out over against me; it is by stepping out over against me in this way that it becomes *object* [*Objekt*] for me, and so acquires the significance of a universal spirit, of something universally substantive in general. The universality "belongs initially to [the sphere of] representation, not thought,"⁹⁸ and is therefore still superficial. Spirit in the wholly immediate mode is this singular spirit; and the interesting point, as I have said, is that spirit acquires objective character, that it steps out over against the first syllogistic conclusion.⁹⁹

The second characteristic of its objectifying is that for the objectivity to be genuine, for the spirit that is an object to me to possess truth *within itself*, it would have to have being for me as inwardly self-determining, self-differentiating, *self-unfolding*. "And this unfolding, encompassed in its negativity,"¹⁰⁰ would be the means by which spirit in its subjectivity came before me; it would appear not only to me but to itself, and it is this subjectivity of spirit that first imparts to the determinations of spirit a content worthy of spirit, a content that is itself spiritual in its nature. In nature | religion, however, this second characteristic of its objectivity does not extend thus far, but only to the point of differentiating and unfolding, and it is the determining characteristic of natural life that the two moments that differentiate themselves should stand separately next to each other. This unfolding is, on the one hand, a moment of the concept; hence it is necessary in order that the spirit may have being as spirit. But when thus juxtaposed, separate from

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98. *Ho reads, similar in W₁*: still belongs, however, to the immediate sensuousness of representation, not to [the sphere of] thought,

99. [*Ed.*] The first form of nature religion is the "religion of magic," which, in 1824 at least, includes not only primitive religion, where spirit, i.e., the divine spirits, have being in immediate, singular form, but also ancient Chinese religion and Buddhism, where we see the process of objectification beginning to work itself out. In the later lectures, Buddhism is distinguished from the religion of magic and associated with the second stage, where objectified spirit possesses truth and being within itself (see the beginning of the next paragraph). In fact, Buddhism is already considered as manifesting this characteristic in the 1824 lectures, which indicates a tension between Hegel's organization and his conception.

100. *W₁ (following Ho) reads*: And this unfolding, negating the encompassment of its differences, *Ho reads*: If the represented spirit were genuinely infinite, it would, as object, be determined as being inwardly differentiated and negating the encompassment of its differences.

each other, the moments are themselves spiritless. In nature religion it is accordingly at times confusing to find spirit unfolded; one will find moments that belong to spirit but "are at the same time spiritless, because they are juxtaposed externally in this way."¹⁰¹ For example, what in the Christian religion is called God's becoming a human being occurs in Hindu religion in the form of incarnation¹⁰²—similarly the Trinity, but however much this conjures up the cept of spirit, it is at once in this case something quite different, for the very reason that these determinations are found only disjointed, separate from each other.¹⁰³ These are the two aspects to which interest is directed.

Third, then, we have the attempt to bring these isolated moments together, and this is in fact what constitutes the transition to the religion where subjectivity of spirit begins.¹⁰⁴ In this respect the [mode of] representation found in nature religion encounters serious difficulties. It is in every way inconsistent, or a contradiction in terms—there being posited on the one hand the spiritual, what is essentially free, while on the other hand it is represented in natural determinacy, in terms of a single [natural phenomenon], with a content of fixed particularity, which is therefore entirely incongruous with spirit, since spirit is essentially free. Hence arises the monstrous "contradiction"¹⁰⁵ in nature religion. Admittedly mention has been

101. *W₁ (1831) reads:* at the same time do not belong to it, externally juxtaposed in this way.

102. [Ed.] The contrast is between *Menschwerdung Gottes* and *Inkarnation*. The former involves God's appearing or self-unfolding in a specific human being, while the latter involves the appearance of the divine in a multiplicity of finite, natural (fleshly) forms. Because Hinduism contains the notion of divine incarnations as well as the idea of the triadic self-unfolding of God (the Trimurti), it fully exemplifies the second form of nature religion.

103. *Ho adds, similar in W₁:* Thus we may find incarnations, even a triad, but not the Trinity [in Hinduism], for only absolute spirit is the power that transcends its [separate] moments.

104. [Ed.] The transitional religions are the religion of light (Parseeism or Persian religion, Zoroastrianism) and the religion of the enigma (Egyptian religion). In these religions, on the one hand God is conceived as free subject, but on the other hand he continues to be represented in essentially natural images. Hence the contradiction or inconsistency, which generates the need for transition, is at its peak in these religions.

105. *W₁ reads:* inconsistency Cf. *Ho:* Owing to its inconsistency it is extremely difficult to portray nature religion.

made of pantheism, but that was the pantheism of reflection, which gathers this finite together, encompasses it; this all-inclusive universality, however, is ■ spurious form of reflection; in nature religion | there remains always the incongruity of the [divine] shape in contrast with what ought to be the foundation, namely the spiritual.

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It is therefore difficult for us to grasp the spiritual aspect of nature religion. We are used to the distinction between the spiritual and the natural. In this connection we are wont to employ nowadays the categories of cause and effect, ground, dominion, and so on, but these are not valid here. Here the spiritual is posited in a singular mode, and its immediate unity [with the natural] is [also] posited. In speculative unity what stands over against us becomes for us the self-posited, which [in turn] perishes for us in the unity with infinitude. "Certainly we can *understand* nature religion therefore,"¹⁰⁶ but we cannot *represent* it *from within*, we cannot have the *sense* or *feeling* of it *from within*, just as we can understand a dog without being able to share its sensations. [Its] representation [of the world] would necessarily be a mode of simple sensation, of simple feeling; but our feelings and sensations [are] spiritual, rational, and therefore quite different from those of ■ dog. Even hunger, thirst, and so on are not the same in us and in dogs, precisely because we are spirit. Only spirit fully comprehends spirit, and here, where we are not dealing with free spirit, we may be able to *understand* it *from within*,¹⁰⁷ but for this reason we cannot make the content of this religion entirely our own.

106. W₂ reads (*G with Var/1831?*): Certainly we can understand or think this form of religion, since after all we still have it before us as object of our thoughts,

107. [Ed.] Hegel here establishes a significant distinction between "understanding from within" or "understanding one's way into" (*hineinverstehen*), which is possible even in the case of spiritual manifestations quite foreign to our own, and "representing," "sensing," and "feeling" "from within" or "into" (*hineinvorstellen*, *hineinempfinden*, *hineinfühlen*), which are not possible in the case of wholly alien cultures and religions. In other words, we are able to enter *rationally* or *cognitively* into radically different forms of existence (even those of animals), although we are unable to *exist* at a sensing or feeling level in these other forms. This exercise of a rational entry into quite different forms of religious consciousness is precisely what Hegel undertakes in *Determinate Religion*. The category of *Hineinverstehen* proved later to be of significance for Wilhelm Dilthey.

1. The Religion of Magic¹⁰⁸

a. *Singular Self-Consciousness as Power over Nature*

177 The first religion, the first form of nature religion, is the crudest and simplest. The question is, where should we look for the primitive locus of the presupposed spiritual element, i.e., what is the form of its existence? It must be a natural form: we must not think in this connection of natural objects, but of the first natural locus of spirituality, the one that precedes any unfolding, any type or mode of objectifying. This locus is the singular | self-consciousness itself, the empirical, contingent singular. This is to be cognized and apprehended in the way in which it is present too in the history, the determinate being, the existence, of religion. Thus it is the case that the empirical, singular self-consciousness—the human being—at first knows nothing higher than itself in its self-consciousness; and posited thus in its self-consciousness it has a relationship to nature which is as follows: because they are differentiated in this way, this singular self-consciousness takes the form of power over nature. But being natural itself, the natural singular self-consciousness is confronted by power. It is the *spiritual* that is power over nature. This is what we can call the religion of magic, the oldest, rawest, crudest form of religion. It follows from what has been said that God is necessarily spiritual, this is God's basic determination, spirituality. Spirituality is *for* self-consciousness; to the extent that it is an *object* for self-consciousness, we have a further advance, a distinction in regard to universal spirituality as such, spirituality [as such] having already

108. [Ed.] This section is new in 1824, and Hegel devotes considerable attention to it. His treatment is based on reports of missionaries and travelers, and focuses on the religion of the Eskimos, Africans, Mongols, Chinese, and American Indians. Given the unscientific character of the data with which Hegel had to work, together with his general developmental scheme (from lower to higher forms), the treatment is, by present-day standards, inadequate. But the reader should keep in mind that Hegel's objective, as he states it in the preceding paragraph, is to *understand* these religions *from within*, even if we cannot make their content entirely our own. Hegel's passion is to comprehend, to penetrate, seemingly alien materials, and his treatment evidences genuine phenomenological rigor. Any tendencies that *we* might detect to trivialize or ridicule these religions are traceable not so much to Hegel as to his sources, which he quotes at length, often verbatim. Hegel is not free of the prejudices of his time toward peoples of color, but there is also reflected in his work an obvious fascination with Oriental and African religion and culture.

been separated, within universal spirituality, from the contingent, singular spirituality of self-consciousness. But initially this separation has not yet occurred.

The very first religion, if we are willing to call it that, is when the singular self-consciousness knows itself as power over nature, and it is the exercise of this power that is called magic. This is no religion of fear, and does not begin in fear, but stems from freedom, from the unfree freedom that consists in the singular self-consciousness knowing itself as power, as higher than natural things, and this knowledge is initially *unmediated*.

This religion that is simply magic—religion in its crudest shape, in which, although it is without any mediation, there is already a beginning of empirical spirit, the spirit of the substantial (but the substantial is still completely unmediated)—this religion has been found by recent travelers, namely “Captains Ross and Parry,”¹⁰⁹ among the Eskimos (1819); with other peoples mediation has already taken place. |

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According to Captain Parry’s account,¹¹⁰ the Eskimos have no idea that any other kind of world exists; they live on the seashore among rocks, ice, and snow, off seal meat and principally birds and

109. *Ho, W read: Captain Parry* [*Ho adds: in 1818 and 1819*] and, at an earlier date, Captain Ross,

[*Ed.*] See William Edward Parry, *Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific* (London, 1821). Although a German translation was published in Jena in 1821, there is no evidence that Hegel read it; his reference to Parry could be based on the report by Captain Ross (see the next note).

110. [*Ed.*] This report is not written by Parry but by Captain Ross; Parry was an officer on the expedition of 1818. (It is possible that Hegel was also familiar with Parry’s account of a further expedition in 1819–20, on which he was captain; see the preceding note.) See John Ross, *A Voyage of Discovery, Made under the Orders of the Admiralty, in His Majesty’s Ships Isabella and Alexander, for the Purpose of Exploring Baffin’s Bay, and Enquiring into the Probability of a North-West Passage*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (London, 1819), 1:168–169, 175–178, 179–180. We know that Hegel made excerpts from this report; see Hegel, *Berliner Schriften*, p. 710. Ross concludes (p. 178): “Although we could thus obtain no proof that this people had any notions of a Supreme Being, or of a spirit, good or bad, the circumstance of their having conjurers, and the tale of their going to the moon after death, render it probable that they possess some religious ideas, however barbarous, and that the unsatisfactory information which we obtained on this head, arose chiefly from our ignorance of their language, and from the very imperfect and limited communication which we had with them.”

fish, and they do not know that nature offers anything else. These English travelers had with them an Eskimo who had spent a considerable time in England, was better educated, and acted as their interpreter. Through him they discovered that the Eskimos have not the slightest representation of spirit or of higher beings, of an invisible higher being above them, or of an essential substance as opposed to their empirical existence in general. Nor do they have any representation of the immortality of the soul or the eternal nature of spirit, or of the being-in-and-for-itself of the single spirit, nor yet of any evil spirit. And although they have a high regard for sun, moon, stars, and so on, they do not worship them—they also do not worship any image, man, beast, or the like. On the other hand, they have among them individuals whom they call “*angekoks*,” who are magicians or sorcerers. They fetched one of them, who said of himself¹¹¹ that it was within their power to raise or still the tempest, to attract whales, and so on, and that they learned this art from old *angekoks*. People are afraid of them, but there is at least one in every family. So there they were in the presence of one of these *angekoks*, who claimed to be able to make the wind get up and to attract whales. He said it was done through words and gestures. But the words (which they got him to repeat for them) were meaningless, and were not directed at any being [*Wesen*] that was supposed to act as intermediary, but directly at the natural object over which he wished to exert his power; he asked for no assistance from any being.¹¹² He was told that there is an omnipresent, all-providing, invisible being who has made everything. He was very surprised, and when he asked where it lived and was told everywhere, he was frightened and wanted to run away. When he was asked where people went to when they died, he replied they were buried: a very long time ago an old man had once said they ended up in the moon, but it was a long time since any sensible Eskimo had believed that.

These people can be regarded as standing on the lowest rung of

111. *Ho reads*: He was an old man who said

112. *Ho reads*: The sorcerer maintained he had the power through himself alone, through his magic formulas. They knew nothing of the power of some higher being, and were not able to understand what were “good” or “evil” spirits.

spiritual consciousness, but they do believe that self-consciousness is something that has power over nature.¹¹³

The Englishmen persuaded an *angekok* to cast a spell. This took the form of a dance in which he threw himself about wildly until he went into a trance and fell down exhausted, and "in this state"¹¹⁴ uttered strange words and noises.¹¹⁵

We find this religion of magic also, most notably, in Africa and among the Mongols and Chinese, but there we no longer have the completely raw, primitive shape of magic. Mediations are already coming into play, arising from the fact that the spiritual is beginning to assume an objective shape for self-consciousness.

This religion is more magic than religion. In it the relationship of the spiritual to the natural is such that the spiritual exists as the power of nature and accordingly appears in this first form as immediate self-consciousness; this is the first shape in which nature religion appears.

This religion of magic is most widespread in Africa among the Negroes; it is already referred to by Herodotus¹¹⁶ and it has also been found in recent times. At the same time there are only a few cases in which these peoples invoke their power over nature, for they need but little, their needs are few, and in assessing their situation we must leave out of account the manifold need in which we | stand, the tangled skein of means by which we seek to achieve our purposes. Their objects are, for example, that they need rain for their harvests and for their crops generally; the cultivation of their soil amounts to very little. There are illnesses they wish to avert, and in time of

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113. *W* (following *Ho*) adds: without mediation . . . divine. *Ho* reads: So this is then the lowest stage of the religious spirit, where there is no representation of any higher universality, since self-consciousness in its singularity knows itself as power over the natural realm, without mediation, without its being opposed to what is divine.

114. *Ho*, *W* read: rolling his eyes

115. [*Ed.*] The dance to which Hegel refers is not that of an *angekok* but is rather an account of entertainment among the Eskimos; see Ross, *A Voyage of Discovery*, pp. 147–149.

116. [*Ed.*] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.33. In the preceding passage Herodotus relates a report concerning a Libyan expedition to the hinterland, and he adds here that according to the report as he heard it the peoples with whom the expedition had made contact were all sorcerers.

war they also need—or think they need—power of this kind. Our information on the state of these peoples comes mainly from missionaries of bygone days, and recent reports are few and far between; one must accordingly be on one's guard against much of the earlier information, especially since the missionaries are natural enemies of the sorcerers. All the same, the general picture is amply confirmed by a multitude of reports.

Here as with other religions, the complaint about the avarice of the priests is more or less beside the point. The sacrifices and presents that are offered to the gods do for the most part go to the priests, but we can speak of priestly avarice—and commiserate with the peoples involved about this useless loss of their property—only when property itself is held of high account. The peoples of whom we are here speaking, however, set little store by their possessions, and know no better use to make of them than to give them away.

For instance, they need rain, and if there is a long period without rain, it is for the magician to summon it up. Or they are plagued by hurricanes, which the magicians have to drive away. Other peoples have other particular needs. With one tribe in the Congo this power is attributed to the king,¹¹⁷ and he then transfers it to one of his ministers, and casts spells himself only in exceptional cases.

181 More light is thrown on the character of this magic by the way in which it is performed. The magician, a prince, or minister or priest, mounts a hill, inscribes all kinds of circles or figures | in the sand and utters all kinds of incomprehensible magic words, makes signs in the direction of the sky, blows against the wind, and draws in and holds his breath. A missionary who was with the advance guard of a Portuguese army recounts¹¹⁸ that the Negroes who were their

117. *Ho reads*: This stage again assumes different forms from one people to another. Among the Eskimos there was a sorcerer in each family. In the Congo this is concentrated on the single individual as universal singularity, on the prince, who is the one and only sorcerer.

118. [Ed.] Joannes Antonius Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung der in dem unteren occidentalischen Mohrenland ligenden drey Königreichen Congo, Matamba, und Angola* (Munich, 1694), pp. 250–251. Cavazzi was a Capuchin friar on an apostolic mission to central Africa. It is not certain whether Hegel used the German translation or the Italian original, *Istorica descrizione de' tre regni Congo, Matamba, et Angola situati nell'Etiopia inferiore occidentale* (Bologna, 1687). On the one hand, there is

allies had brought along with them a magician of this kind. A hurricane made his spell-casting necessary, and despite the missionary's vehement protests the ceremony was put in hand. The sorcerer appeared in special, fantastic attire, bedecked with animal skins and birds, weapons and horns, and accompanied by a large escort. He inspected the sky and the clouds. Then he chewed a few roots, roots of tabs, murmured some barbaric words, let out a fearsome howl, and spat the tab-roots up into the sky. When the clouds came nearer all the same, he waved his arms and conjured the storm to go somewhere else. And when it stayed where it was, he flew into a rage, fired arrows at the sky, threatened that he would give it a hard time, and brandished a knife in the air. All of this has, then, the character of *determinate* consciousness of power over nature.

This magic is practically universal among Negro tribes. Very similar to these sorcerers are the Mongolian shamans, who wear fantastic clothing, hung with metal and wooden figures, make themselves besotted with intoxicating drinks, and in this state proclaim what is to happen and prophesy the future.

The main feature of this sphere of magic is direct mastery over nature through the will, the self-conscious awareness that spirit is something higher than nature. However bad such descriptions may look from one point of view, we are in any case dealing with something that is in a certain sense higher than when human beings are dependent on nature and fear it.

It should be noted here that there are Negro tribes "(including some who since the end of the sixteenth century have appeared to be the most uncivilized)"¹¹⁹ who | believe that no one dies a natural death. In the strength of their consciousness they believe that human beings are on too high a level to be killed by something unknown like the power of nature. Often, as a result, sick persons on whom

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a reference to the German edition in n. 161 below (whether by Hegel or by the editors of *W* is not certain), and it was more widely available in Germany. On the other hand, Hegel may also have had recourse to the Italian edition (here at p. 215), since his reference to "tabs-roots" (*Tabswurzeln*) in the following passage is not confirmed by the German version, which refers simply to "a certain root" (*eine gewisse Wurzel*). The Italian pagination is given in parentheses following the German.

119. Thus *D*, similarly *P*; *G* reads: (namely, the Giaki, Jaga, or Agag, as they call themselves, conquerors of the wildest, most uncivilized kind, who since 1542

magic has been used in vain are put to death by their friends. "The North American savages also had this practice of putting their parents to death when they became infirm, which clearly means that human beings should not perish through nature but that the honor should be done to them by others like themselves."¹²⁰ "Another people"¹²¹ cherish the belief that there will be general ruin if the high priest dies a natural death, so that as soon as he is sick and weak he is done to death. If nonetheless one dies through sickness, they believe another must have killed him by magic, and sorcerers have to find out who the murderer is; the sorcerer denounces someone, who is then put to death. Especially when a king dies, many people are killed, as we are told by an old-time missionary.¹²² The king's devil, so it is said, [must] be put to death, meaning, no doubt, whoever has been apportioned the blame for the king's death.¹²³

*b. Formal Objectification of the Divine Object*¹²⁴

This, then, is the first form, which cannot yet be properly called religion: for to religion belongs essentially the moment of objectivity [*Objektivität*]*—*that the spiritual power appears for the individual,

have descended several times on the coasts, carrying everything in their way) *W₂ reads*: (namely, the Galla and Gaga hordes, conquerors . . . way)

[*Ed.*] Hegel is apparently referring to the Jaga, leaders of one of the fiercest of the Bantu tribes of the Congo basin, the Bangala of Kwango, who were cannibals. See Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 212–214. In the Italian original (pp. 182–184), the name is given as *Giaghi* or *Giaki*; in the German version, as *Jagen*; in more common German transliteration, as (*D*)*schagga* = Jaga. With regard to their supposed belief that no one dies a natural death, see p. 255 (pp. 219–220). See also the 1827 lectures at n. 82.

120. *Thus G*

121. *Thus G; D reads*: In particular they

122. [*Ed.*] This account is based on Cavazzi's description of certain tribes in the Congo, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 92–94 (pp. 76–78).

123. [*Ed.*] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 144–146 (pp. 121–123). See also Hegel's account in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet ed., pp. 188–189 (Hoffmeister ed., pp. 232–233).

124. [*Ed.*] This section carries the discussion of primitive religion into a new phase. Hegel intends to distinguish formal objectification from absolute, actual, or genuine objectification, where the divine attains an objectivity that exists in and for itself. The latter is the religion of being-within-self (Buddhism, Lamaism), and it is where religion, properly speaking, begins. Formal objectification still falls within the sphere of magic; Hegel includes among its higher expressions the religion of ancient China.

for the single empirical consciousness, as something essentially universal in opposition to empirical self-consciousness, as an other, independent of it; this objectifying is an essential precondition of religion. However inadequate the representation of God may be, it means that the starting point is an *other* over against this empirical self-consciousness, an other in general.¹²⁵ |

In regard to this objectifying, the mode of it that is merely formal must be distinguished from absolute objectivity. Formal objectification is where the unqualified spiritual power (God) is represented as independently active.¹²⁶ Absolute objectification is where God is and is known to be in and for himself according to the categorical determinations that apply to spirit in and for itself.

What we have to consider here and now is only the formal mode of objectifying. It is with this mode, with the consciousness of subjective self-consciousness, with this distinction [between the single and the universal], that a relationship between the divine object and consciousness begins. This relationship is threefold in kind:

(1) The first moment is that the subjective self-consciousness, subjective spirituality, still remains the lord and master—this living power, this self-conscious might. This ideality of self-consciousness is still effectively in *command*, it retains power and authority over against the weakness of the merely formal object.

(2) The second moment, or opposite relationship, is when the subjective self-consciousness of human beings is represented as

125. *Thus P; G, W read:* Only with it does religion begin, only with it is there a God; and even with the lowest level or relationship there is at least a starting point for such objectifying. *Ho continues, similar in W:* A mountain or river is not the divine in its character of a heap of earth or body of water, but as a [mode of] the existence of God, of something essential and universal. But we do not yet find this with magic as such. What is powerful here is the singular consciousness as singular consciousness, and thus the very negation of what is universal. It is not a god in the sorcerer but the sorcerer himself who conjures and conquers nature. This is the religion of desire that is infinite for itself, and therefore of sensuous singularity that is certain of itself. But this religion already includes fear, reverence, sacrifice, and consequently the distinguishing of the single empirical consciousness from the magic-working consciousness, the empirical consciousness being the immediately singular, and the magic-working consciousness the universal. It is by this means that the religion of magic develops out of magic. And it is the distinguishing of the singular and the universal that first introduces a relationship of self-consciousness to the object.

126. *Thus P; G reads:* is made objective over against consciousness.

184 *dependent* upon this object. In this regard it should be noted that, if they are assumed to be immediate consciousness generally, human beings can only imagine themselves to be dependent in a contingent manner; only through some deviation from their ordinary existence can they come to be dependent. This is the case especially, therefore, with simple, primitive tribes or savages. Among them this dependence is somewhat less | important since what they use is naturally available, they find it in nature; what they need exists and grows for them, so they do not see themselves as being in any dependent relationship; necessity is merely contingent.¹²⁷ It is only when human beings are represented as essence that dependence comes into play; as opposed to the other, nature, they become essentially a negative and no more.

(3) ¹²⁸The next step then is that spirituality as empirical, as merely natural will, should recognize—that humanity should recognize—its own essence in religion, and that in such a way that its basic characteristic “is not”¹²⁹ that it is dependent on nature but on the contrary that in religion spirit knows itself as *free*. Although at the lowest level it is only a formal freedom that spirit knows itself to have (nature shows itself to be what is dependent on spirit), “human beings can nonetheless despise this dependence and remain content with self.”¹³⁰ It is another stage where God is said¹³¹ to “thunder with his thunderous voice and yet we know him not” [cf. Job 37:5]. God can do better than just thunder; God can reveal himself; and spirit is not to be defined in terms of natural phenomena.

This third determination of the relationship of the object to

127. *Ho adds, similar in W:* It is only when consciousness is further developed, only when human being and nature, losing their immediate validity and positivity, are represented as something evil, as something negative, that the dependence of consciousness emerges, since consciousness demonstrates itself as negative in relation to its other.

128. *Ho reads, precedes in W:* But this negativity—the fact of being negative according to its very concept—sublates itself and shows itself to be only a transitional point of consciousness.

129. *Thus G; P, D read: is*

130. *Thus G with P, D; G, W read:* human beings despise this dependence, remain content with self, abandon the natural connection. *Ho, W add:* and subject nature to their power.

131. *Ho, W add:* as in a later religion

consciousness is free veneration, the relationship in which human beings revere the power they revere as free and recognize it as essence but not as something alien. |

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If we consider objectification more closely, we are struck by two essential relationships. On the one hand, self-consciousness still maintains itself as power over the natural realm; on the other hand, in this object self-consciousness is faced not merely with natural phenomena but with the beginnings of something independent that has its own essence. Toward such an object, then, self-consciousness has the relationship of free, unforced veneration.

[1.] The first kind of objectification is formal objectification. This still falls within the sphere of magic: in it there is only the beginning of a consciousness of independent, genuinely essential objectivity—which is, however, still closed in on itself; in it there begins also the consciousness of an essential, universal power.¹³² The two [magic and religion] are in part mixed together; and it is only when free, unforced veneration or the consciousness of a free power emerges that we leave the realm of magic, though we are still in the sphere of nature religion. For magic is something that has been present among all peoples and in all periods, and religion too is seated in the representations of each people, in the popular view of things, which contains the most inconsistent notions side by side. Notions of this kind are [also] to be found in religion, but in such a manner that the higher spirit still imbues them. But once there is objectification, it is to be noted that in the higher religions some sort of mediation comes into play along with it in such a way that spirit, being the higher concept, constitutes the power over the magic or what provides mediation with it.

Self-consciousness is for itself no longer what is unmediated, what is inwardly satisfied with itself; it is essentially what seeks and has its satisfaction in an other, through the mediation of an other, by passing through an other.¹³³ In free veneration human consciousness

132. *Ho, W add:* Magic is therefore retained, but it is joined by the intuition of an independent, essential objectivity; the magic-working consciousness knows that the ultimate is not *itself* but the universal power in *things*.

133. *Ho, W add:* The infinity of desire proves a finite infinity, constricted as it is by being reflected into a higher power.

186 also closes with itself, | but there is a mediation present such that objects have being for it, its own essence, universal power, has being for it (and it is distinct from such power). It is only by sublating its particularity that it brings forth its own satisfaction in its essence, closes with itself as essence, and attains to itself in its essence ~when it surrenders its particularity; and for it to come to itself essentially in this way, it must achieve mediation through negating itself.¹³⁴

As it initially appears to us, however, mediation occurs as [if] through some other, permanently external agent. In the way that this objectification occurs in the field of magic, ~it remains the power of humanity over nature, and this is the power of a *tertium quid*.¹³⁵ Humanity does not exert power directly but indirectly, through the medium of a magical *tertium quid*. We must now consider the various elements in this mediation.

The first immediate relationship in this regard is for self-consciousness as the spiritual element to be conscious of itself as the power over natural things. These things are again themselves a power over one another. But this is already a further reflection, ~and we need not go beyond the first, immediate relationship.¹³⁶ The first universal generalization arrived at by reflection is that ~natural things¹³⁷ cohere with one another, that one can be cognized by means of the other, that one is the effect of the other, that they are essentially coherent or interrelated. This coherency of things is already a form of objectivity or a form of universality, for when taken in this way, the thing is no longer singular but goes beyond itself, makes its influence felt in an other, or vice versa; in this way the
187 thing is amplified, | through its relation to its other. In the first relationship I am the ideality of the thing, the power over it. But now, as soon as they are posited objectively, things are power over against each other; one is what *the other* posits as something ideal. If this

134. *Thus D with P; G reads:* through its own negation.

135. *G reads:* it remains the power of humanity over nature. *P reads:* it remains the power of another, and this other is the power of a *tertium quid*.

136. *G reads:* and no longer an immediate relationship. *W₂ (Var) reads:* and no longer an immediate relationship, where the ego as singular stands over against natural things.

137. *Thus G; W (following G and Ho) reads:* natural things illuminate each other, *Ho reads:* one thing illuminates the other,

relationship is included in magic, then this is the second sphere of magic, indirect magic or magic using means or media, whereas the first sphere was direct magic.¹³⁸

~ This is a mode of objectification that is merely a connection between external things, such that the subject does not assume direct power over nature, but only over the means.¹³⁹ This mediated type of magic or sorcery is found in infinite variety, at all times and among all peoples. It includes what we call "sympathetic magic," i.e., the doing of something in order to produce an effect in something quite different; the subject has the means to hand, and conjoins with the means the aim or purpose of producing a particular effect.¹⁴⁰ This change that is to be produced may of course be implicit in the nature of the means or medium, but what principally matters is the will of the subject. This relationship, this mediated magic, is extremely widespread, and it is difficult to define its limits and determine what, properly speaking, lies beyond them.

The principle of magic is that the connection between means and outcome should not be known. For example, the practice of medicine | is not taken to be magic, nor is it; but it does also frequently happen [in medical practice] that the connection between means and result is unknown,¹⁴¹ and all one can do is rely on

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138. [Ed.] In the 1827 lectures, Hegel distinguishes between the two phases of the religion of magic—singular self-consciousness as power over nature, and formal objectification of the divine object—in terms of the distinction between direct and indirect magic.

139. *Thus G.*

140. *Ho adds, similar in W:* The ego is what works magic, but it is through the thing itself that I achieve mastery over the thing. And this necessarily follows from magic or sorcery as such. For in it things show themselves as ideal. Ideality is thus a characteristic that adheres to them as things; it is an objective quality, and it is through magic-working or sorcery that it comes to consciousness and is itself posited, used. Desire seizes directly on the things in question. But now consciousness reflects back into itself and interposes between itself and the thing *the thing itself* as something destructive; in so doing it at the same time reveals itself as the cunning or strategem not to interject *itself* into things and the conflict between them.

141. *W (following Ho and G) reads:* Magic is wherever this connection is merely there, without being understood. This is also the case a hundred times over with medicaments, *G reads:* This is also the case a hundred times over with medicaments, *Ho reads:* But magic is wherever between means and result a connection is merely there, without being understood.

experience. The use of a certain means is associated with a certain change of condition. The rational situation on the other hand would be where one knows the nature of the means and infers from that the change it will bring about. But as for this perfect rationality, we know that physicians themselves do not claim to be able to deduce the result from the nature of the means employed. There is, they say, this connection, though we don't know what it is; it is merely a matter of experience. Experience itself, however, is infinitely self-contradictory. For example, Brown¹⁴² used opium, naphtha, spirits, and so on to cure illnesses that had previously been cured by means of an entirely opposite nature.¹⁴³ There is no saying where the boundary is, exactly, between what is a known and what an unknown connection. In any event, insofar as organic life is involved and living matter affects living matter (and to an even greater extent the spiritual affects the corporeal), there are connections here that cannot be denied but that must be regarded as inexplicable until such time as the deeper concept underlying this relationship is known. Already in magnetism [hypnotism], whatever would otherwise be termed a rational connection has ceased to exist; as matters are regarded in other spheres, the connection is unintelligible.

Once magic is thrown open to mediation in this way, the whole monstrous tide of what we call superstition can come flooding in. Every possibility, every single detail of existence, becomes significant; for every circumstance, each and every outcome and purpose—everything is mediated and at the same time mediating. Everything governs and is governed by everything else; what people do depends for its outcome on circumstances; and what they are, and what they

142. [Ed.] A reference to John Brown, the Edinburgh physician whose methods of treatment were much disputed at the time. Brown divided all illnesses into "sthenic" and "asthenic" (abnormally vigorous or abnormally weak vital processes), and for the treatment of the latter relied almost exclusively on the use of opium, spirits, and camphor as stimulants. See John Brown, *Elementa medicinae* (Hildburghausen, 1794), §§ 290, 298, 301, etc. (German translation, Frankfurt am Main, 1806). The reference to "naphtha" (*Naphta*), which occurs only in G's transcript, may be due to a mishearing of "camphor" (*Kampfer*). Cf. also Christoph Girtanner, *Ausführliche Darstellung des Brownischen Systems der praktischen Heilkunde*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1797–1798), esp. 2:370–385.

143. Thus G

purpose, depends on a multiplicity of circumstances. By the very fact of existing, they have being in an external world, and this is what links this infinite multiplicity of random events and circumstances together; and individuals are a power over the whole nexus only to the extent that they are a power over the singular powers | that cohere in it. Where general awareness of these connections is present in still indeterminate fashion, but the specific mode, the determinate nature of the things connected, is still unfamiliar, one is surrounded by¹⁴⁴ contingency. When, therefore, reflection enters this field of relationships, it proceeds in the belief that things act reciprocally on one another. And this is quite right, but the weakness of it is that this formulation is still abstract, and consequently it does not yet comprise the characteristic peculiarity of the things involved, their specific mode of operation, the way in which each particular thing coheres with the others. What the power is that transcends their mode of coherence or peculiarities is still unknown; and inasmuch as there is an established nexus, but its determinate character is still unknown, there is this contingency and arbitrariness in regard to the means. In one respect most people stand in this relationship [with the world]; the attitude of whole peoples is such that this way of looking at things forms their basic viewpoint, governs their aspirations, their condition, their [whole] existence.¹⁴⁵

Thus the premise of this mediated magic is correct; but the determinate aspect [of the world nexus] is unknown.¹⁴⁶ Since one's actions are based on the abstract premise, the determinate aspect is left free. This explains the infinite number of magical means. Countless peoples use magic in whatever they undertake. Some of them cast a spell when the foundations of a house are laid, so that it may be kept safe from all danger; the orientation of the house and zodiac-region of the sky are significant in this connection. Or a spell is cast when sowing to ensure a good harvest. Similarly, relationships to other people, love, hate, peace, war, battles, journeys—whatever is to be brought about is brought about by some *means*,

144. *Ho*, *W* add: absolute

145. *Thus G*

146. *Thus G*; *P* reads: things stand in mutual coherence. *D* reads: things are finite single ends—that they are attained stands in the power of another.

190 and since the link between means and effect is unknown, | any one means is as good as any other. Much understanding is not to be met with in this sphere, which is why no more can be said of it.

Ancient peoples are often said to have possessed great insight into the use of herbs, plants, and so on for treating illnesses etc. There may be a genuine connection here, but it may just as well be pure chance and caprice. The understanding becomes aware that there is a connection but the more precise definition remains hidden from it; it becomes absorbed in the means, and phantasy provides a substitute for what is lacking in the abstract premise, introducing the determinacy which as such, properly speaking, is not yet found in the things themselves.

2. The content of the first, unmediated type of magic concerned objects that have a power over singular things, and over which human beings can exert power directly. What comes next is a relationship to objects that seem to be capable rather of being viewed as independent, so that power here appears to human beings as something other, something that is no longer under their control, a power that is not free power, empirical self-consciousness. Examples of such independent, natural things are the sun, moon, sky, sea—great elemental objects that are powers which appear to confront humanity purely as independent and autonomous. Insofar as the natural consciousness is confined to this sphere, limited to the standpoint of singular desires, it does not really have any relationship to these objects as universal nature, has not yet any intuition of their universality.¹⁴⁷ [With] such things as the sun and moon, for example, their course and their effects are uniform, their mode of working is unchanging; but the attitude that the consciousness which is still at the standpoint of natural unity, for which the unchanging is of no interest, takes to such natural objects is governed solely by its contingent wishes, needs, and interests, or [it is related] to them

191 only to the extent that their | mode of operation appears as singular, as contingent. People at this standpoint are interested by sun and moon only when they are eclipsed, by the earth only when there is an earthquake; the universal does not exist for them, does not excite

147. *Ho*, *W add*: and is concerned solely and exclusively with what is singular.

their desire, is of no interest to them. A river interests them only if they want to cross it. There is no theoretical interest at this stage, but only practical behavior relative to contingent needs.

People do not venerate these objects when they become thinkers either,¹⁴⁸ because they have a higher, *spiritual* universality in view, which alone is for them what is essential, while those who are still at this initial standpoint do not venerate them because they have not yet attained consciousness of the universality that is in these objects.¹⁴⁹ In the event of exceptional phenomena such as an earthquake, an eclipse, or the flooding of a river, then they may be afraid of them and address petitions to them; only at such times do they appear to them as power. When they are behaving normally, as when the sun shines, there is no need to petition them. But these petitions also have the sense of conjuring or casting a spell; we speak of “conjuring” someone to do something. A petition is an acknowledgment that one is in the power of the other. For this reason it often goes against the grain, because it means that I acknowledge the authority of another’s arbitrary decision in regard to me. Begging in this way is therefore also a form of conjuring; one stipulates that the petition should have an effect, it is intended as the power to be exercised over the other, so that the two are intermingled—on the one hand, acknowledgment of the supremacy of the object and, on the other, consciousness of my power, by virtue of which I strive to exert supremacy over the object. Among peoples at this level we find, for example, cases where they make sacrifices to a river | if they wish to cross it; they are imperiled by it and so offer sacrifices to it; similarly to the sun if it goes into eclipse. They occupy themselves with a host of means to propitiate this power; but on the other hand, these sacrifices are magical means, powers superior to the other expressions [of the natural power], deemed capable of constraining the natural powers and bringing about what the [conjuring] subject

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148. *Ho, W add:* even when they are on a higher cultural level,

149. *Ho adds, similar in W:* At the first standpoint they have not yet attained the universality of existence, while at the second, natural existence generally is no longer of any account for them. But midway between the two relationships is the point where the natural powers come on the scene as something universal and accordingly having power vis-à-vis singular, empirical consciousness.

desires. The veneration of natural objects is thus highly ambiguous at this standpoint: it is not pure veneration, but the veneration is mixed with and subjected to magic.

This attitude can be coupled (to a greater or lesser extent) with a more universal, more essential way of representing these natural objects. What then happens is that the genie or spirit of the sun (i.e., the sun as genie), the genie of the river, of the mountain, or the like [is venerated], that veneration is accorded to this. This is a mode of veneration in which the singular aspect of the object is left behind; one grasps the object, represents it to oneself, in universal fashion and venerates it thus. But even if these genii are thus represented in universal fashion, and more precisely as a [type of] power, human beings can still harbor the consciousness of their own power over them. Their content is still only that of a natural essence; it is just the river, the mountain, the sun; it is still only a natural content, and self-consciousness can thus be aware of itself as power over this natural representation.

3. The next [mode of] objectification is where people recognize or find an independent entity, an independent power outside themselves in the living thing. Life, organic life or vitality as such, even in a tree but still more in an animal, is a higher principle than the mere nature of the sun, the river, and suchlike. Hence it has come to pass among countless peoples that animals have been worshiped. In our eyes there can be nothing more degrading than to worship animals as gods, and so in its way it is. But the fact that the beast is something living makes it a higher principle than that of the sun. The animal is a more excellent, more genuine [mode of] existence than a natural existence like the sun, and to this extent it is less degrading to worship animals as gods than the sun, rivers, stars, or suchlike. The fact that animals are living organisms | points to¹⁵⁰ an active independence of subjectivity, which is what concerns us here. ¹⁵¹Organic life is in any event the form or mode of existence that is most closely related to the spiritual. Animals are still worshiped by many peoples, especially in India and Africa, and have

150. *Thus G; P reads:* involves the recognition of

151. *Ho reads, precedes in W:* It is their self-consciousness that human beings make objective for themselves, and

been worshiped in all countries. The animal has this vitality, this passive independence, this quiet organic life which as it were holds to its course, makes its own choices; it moves as it wills, unpredictably, and there is no understanding it. There is something secret in its behavior and habits; it is alive but is not intelligible as one human being is intelligible to another. This secretness easily gives rise to wonder in human beings, so that they are all the quicker to regard this living vitality of animals as higher than their own. Even the Greeks venerated snakes, concerning which there has been this preconception from ancient times.¹⁵² On the west coast of Africa there is a snake in every house; it is left alone, and for anyone to kill it is looked upon as the greatest of crimes. On the one hand, therefore, animals are venerated; but at the same time they may remain subject to highly arbitrary decisions in regard to their veneration. Negroes make the first animal that takes their fancy into their talisman; then if things don't turn out as they wish they reject it and take another—as it were, punish it.

What is of interest, then, is to secure some [kind of] objectivity. And living things generally do furnish such an object, in which one has before oneself a [kind of] independence. This then constitutes the essence of animal cults. In organic life, free independence at least makes its appearance. Animal cults are found wherever humanity, the spiritual element, has not yet grasped | itself in its genuine essentiality; thus the vitality of humanity is only free independence.

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It is to be noted, however, that in this realm of desire, where the particular self-consciousness exists for itself as the highest, where free, universal "independence"¹⁵³ is not yet recognized, either within

152. W (following Ho) adds: that they are accounted a good omen. Ho reads: Indeed, even the Greeks still venerate snakes, or at least they are accounted a good omen. When Hector purposes to storm the walls [of Troy] (*Iliad*, bk. XII, vv. 200–210), an eagle flies over the army with a snake that it lets fall, and Homer calls the snake a "sign from aegis-brandishing Jove."

[Ed.] Homer, *Iliad* 12.195–209. If Hegel supposed that the Trojans regarded this as a good omen, as Hotho would have us believe, he was mistaken; on the contrary, they regarded it as an evil omen. Hector himself makes no attempt to deny that the incident has a threatening significance, but believes himself justified in disregarding the flight of the broad-winged birds (v. 237) owing to the counsel he had already received from Zeus.

153. Ho reads: spirituality W₂ (Var) reads: objective spirituality

or outside itself, the living [organism]—to the extent that it is recognized—is not yet given the significance that it later acquires in the image of the so-called transmigration of souls. This image is grounded on the fact that the human spirit is something that endures, something immortal, something that abides in principle. But in order to exist through time it needs some [sort of] corporeality, and inasmuch as this is no longer human existence, it needs another shape; the one that is most akin to it is the living shape, the animal. In the kind of animal cult that is coupled with the transmigration of souls, it is an important and essential moment that not merely does this [animal] possess organic life, but the idea of an indwelling spiritual element merges with this organic life so that it is properly the spiritual subject in the living animal element that becomes the object of worship. But here, in the sphere where the the immediate self-consciousness is the basic determining characteristic, it is only organic life itself that is worshiped, which is why this veneration or worship of a living thing is contingent, being directed now to one animal, now to another kind, almost every unfulfilled wish bringing a change. This is what happens among the Negroes and the Chinese: they get on well enough with what they venerate until something occurs that displeases them; then they just as readily give up what they have been venerating. At that point one thing is as good as another for the purpose, an idol one has made oneself, a mountain, a tree, and so on. What one feels the need for is to have an independent power standing objectively over against one. In the same way as children have the impulse to play and adults to adorn themselves, so here there is the impulse to be confronted by something objective;¹⁵⁴ | here too there is conscious awareness of an arbitrary bond, which can just as easily be annulled again.¹⁵⁵

This is what is meant more especially by fetishism. A fetish can be anything, a carving, piece of wood, "animal,"¹⁵⁶ river, tree, and so on, even a grasshopper or locust one has shut in a box; and there

154. W (*following Ho*) adds: as something independent and powerful; Ho reads: to be confronted by an independent power as something objective;

155. Ho adds, *similar in W*: so that the more precise determinacy of the object appears initially as of no consequence.

156. W (*Var*) reads: lion, tiger,

are fetishes for whole tribes, ethnic fetishes, and also fetishes for individuals. (Fetish and idol are the same, the word "fetish" being the corrupt form of a Portuguese word signifying an idol.) And fetishism is the arbitrary selection of this or that as an idol, followed by its no less arbitrary replacement by something else.¹⁵⁷ Negroes switch from one fetish to another at will while other peoples have permanent fetishes.¹⁵⁸ For the Egyptians, for example, once the Nile has become for them the universal, the divine, it forms their substantive power, wherein their entire existence lies. But this is somewhat different from those fetishes that have their origin in the subject's need to worship or need to engage in magic. [The idol] is at once the object of worship and the means; it is supposed to do such and such, and if that does not happen, the idol is done away with. Honor is consequently meted out according to what happens to the subject.

4. The fourth stage, that in which independent spirituality is intuited, is essentially humanity itself. In humanity something independent is intuited, something that is also spiritual. Worship accordingly has here its more essential object; and in regard to the definition of objectivity a new characteristic enters into play, namely that it is not each and every contingent consciousness that has power over nature, but that there are exclusively a few (or exclusively just this one) who are intuited and venerated as essentially spiritual independence—there is a singling out to the exclusion of the others. In this *existent* [*existierenden*] self-consciousness is to be found what has more character, more authority than others, [what is] in com-

157. [Ed.] Hegel may be referring to the Journal by Professor Smith appended to *Narrative of an Expedition to Explore the River Zaire, Usually Called the Congo, in South Africa, in 1816, under the Direction of Captain J. K. Tuckey, R.N.* (London, 1818), p. 375: "The word [fetish] is Portuguese, *feitico*, and signifies a charm, witchcraft, magic, etc." Smith goes on to say that almost anything can serve as a fetish, and that in the case of misfortune the fetish is not blamed, though he does mention a case of misfortune where a fetish that had proved impotent was replaced. We know from his correspondence (*Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler [Bloomington, 1984], p. 496 [no. 473]) that Hegel endeavored to secure a copy of this book from the Royal Library on 26 May 1824, presumably for the lectures on the philosophy of religion.

158. *Precedes in W* (following *Ho*): The fetish . . . individual. *Ho* reads: The fetish on the contrary can be changed and becomes merely a means to procure something for the individual, so that if it fails in this, it is rejected.

196 parison with them essential *will*, essential *knowing*—the *commanding* power, | as that which appears to be essentially necessary in comparison with the others, whose will and knowing are contingent and subordinate, a focal point among the many. Inasmuch as it is a *self-consciousness*, a spiritual power, that is to be intuited or recognized as *objective*, there emerges the determination that it can only be one or a few, to the exclusion of others. Therefore it is necessarily one or a few individuals who are the magicians, who constitute this power; a few only are venerated as the highest power there is. Usually they are princes, for example the emperor of China. These are the ones who have authority over human beings and also over nature, over natural things. In that it is a self-conscious being that is venerated here, a distinction is immediately made between what such an individual is as inner spirituality and what he is according to his outward existence. In the latter regard, such an individual is a human being like others, whereas the essential moment is *spirituality*, being spiritual on one's own account, in contrast with the outward, contingent mode of existence.

At this point a distinction begins to emerge; at a higher level the distinction is that which is present in those whom we call lamas. Initially the distinction is just this, that a distinction is made between, on the one hand, individuals as such and, on the other, individuals as universal powers. Where this universal, spiritual power is represented on its own account, it yields the representation of a genie or of a deity that can itself be represented in sensuous form for intuition; and the actual living individual is then the priest of such an idol. At this present stage the power of the priest often coincides with that of the god. His inwardness can be hypostatized, but as yet the power of the spiritual over existence has not been separated out, so that the spiritual power on its own account is only a superficial representation. The priest or sorcerer is the principal person, so that on the one hand both aspects [priest and god] are represented separately, but when the deity gives utterance, becomes forceful, decides, etc., he does so only as this actual human being; the actual human being is the power that attains this actuality. At times these priests also have the secular ruler set over them, in cases where priest and prince are separate persons; the human individual is on the one

hand venerated as | God, on the other obliged to do what others command. The Negroes who have magicians of this kind, who are not at the same time rulers, tie them up and beat them until they obey if they do not want to perform magic, are not in the mood for it.

Thus it is a *self-consciousness* that is venerated. The determination that *spirit* is present in humanity, and that human self-consciousness is essentially the presence of spirit—this is a conjunction we shall trace through various religions; it belongs necessarily to the first and oldest determinate religions, and we shall see that it is also present in the Christian religion, but in a more exalted fashion and transfigured.¹⁵⁹

In this—human—shape [of consciousness], there are two ways in which human beings attain objectivity. In the first they shut out or exclude what is other. The second, natural way is for them to be stripped of what is temporary and contingent; this natural way is death. Death takes from people what is temporal and ephemeral in them, but has no power over what is in and for itself. But the fact that human beings have within themselves a region that is in and for self still cannot, at the present stage, enter into consciousness; self-consciousness still does not here possess the genuine, eternal significance of its spirit. The process of stripping away involves only sensuous existence. In all other respects humanity retains here its contingent particularity, its sensuous presence; it is indeed removed to the [sphere of] representation, but that wherein it is retained is not its genuine [element]; on the contrary, what it retains in this way is the whole contingent, sensuous mode of its existence. Consequently, veneration of the dead is still something utterly weak, with contingent content; the dead are represented as a power that demands to be served, but only as a very weak power.

What is enduring in the dead, what still impinges on the senses, the immortal aspect that is at the same time still present in sensuous form, is their bones. The various peoples accordingly venerate the

159. *Ho, W add:* The Christian religion interprets and transfigures it for the first time.

[*Ed.*] Hegel here establishes an interesting connection between primitive religion and consummate religion: they are both religions of spirit, corresponding to the third moment in the dialectic of the divine life.

bones of the dead and use them for casting spells. This may remind one of sacred relics, and it is somewhat naive | of the Capuchins on the one hand to inveigh against this heathen magic and on the other hand to ascribe great power to their own relics. For example, a Capuchin friar tells how the Negroes have this superstition, that they procure bands for themselves and that whoever is bound with such bands is supposed to enjoy immunity from wild beasts. The preparation of these bands is something very complicated and magical. He had often spoken against them—in vain. Now, says this Capuchin, he was in the neighborhood of natives draped in such bands, and he often saw them torn to pieces by animals, whereas those to whom he had given relics had always remained unharmed.¹⁶⁰

The dead, then, demand veneration, and this consists simply in ensuring that they are cared for, e.g., given food and drink. Most peoples of antiquity used to put food in the graves of the dead. What is true, lasting, enduring, in the dead consequently plays a very minor part in the way death is pictured. We find also the view portrayed that the dead can reenter or be brought back into the present, sometimes freely, in the shape of a power that seeks to avenge the neglect it has suffered, sometimes conjured up by the power of the sorcerer, of actual self-consciousness, and so subject to him.

The type of cultus found in this sphere will be more clearly pictured from examples. The Capuchin friar Cavazzi,¹⁶¹ who spent a considerable time in the Congo, writes (among other things) a great deal about these sorcerers, who are called Singhili. According to him, they are highly respected and call the people, men and women, together whenever the fancy takes them. They do this from time to time, always making out that one or other of the dead drives them to it and demands it. The following also illustrates the type of cultus here involved. When the Singhili calls the inhabitants together, they must assemble, each carrying a knife, while the sorcerer himself

160. [Ed.] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 258–259 (p. 223).

161. W (HgG/Ed?) adds: (*Histor. Beschreibung d. drei Königr. Congo*, Munich, 1694),

[Ed.] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 259–264 (pp. 223–227). Cavazzi distinguishes between several different types of sorcerers with distinct functions, whereas Hegel uses “Singhili” to cover them all.

appears carried in a net, decked fantastically with flowers, gems, feathers, and so on, and with a | crowd around him engaged in singing, dancing, and rejoicing. Principally they make a fearful, barbaric, stupefying din, banging instruments and singing, which is supposed to make the dead spirit pass into the body of such a Singhili. He himself entreats the spirit to enter him; and when this happens, he slowly raises himself up and now appears like someone possessed; he tears his clothes, rolls his eyes, bites and scratches himself, mouthing what the dead man tells him and speaking in his person. Many of those standing round then ask him about their affairs. The dead man, who is thus represented as speaking, may threaten them with starvation and misery or call down tribulations on them; or he may abuse his blood relations for their ingratitude and complain of their neglect, especially in regard to food and drink, because they have not given him any human blood. The assembled company falls at the Singhili's feet. According to Cavazzi, the workings of hellish fury can be seen in him: he foams at the mouth and sets up a frightful howling; he runs about and himself calls for the blood that is still not being offered to him. Seeking blood, he runs about among the gathering with a knife, plunges it into one bystander's breast, strikes off another's head, splits open another's belly, and drinks the blood that flows out; he tears the dead bodies apart and divides up the flesh among the voracious bystanders, who eat it regardless, even though it may be that of their parents, brothers, or sisters—all is devoured. They know in advance this is how it will end, but go to the assembly nonetheless, with the greatest exultation. 199

Another way that the dead are operative is the following. The "Giaghi, or Jagga,"¹⁶² imagine that the dead wander the earth and feel hunger and thirst. If, for example, anyone is ill, or especially if he has visions or dreams, he has a sorcerer brought to him and seeks his advice. The sorcerer asks about all the circumstances, and the upshot, the answer may be that the illness and dreams are visions of one of the sick person's dead relatives who | is actually present 200

162. Thus G; W₂ (Ed) reads: *Gagas* P reads: *Zacka* Ho reads: *Jagen* [Ed.] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 257–58 (pp. 221–223). On the terminology, see above, n. 119.

here and by whom he is being persecuted, and that the sick person must go to a particular Singhili to have the dead spirit driven away. For each Singhili has his own particular business. Once agreement has been reached with the Singhili, he takes the sick person to the grave of whoever it was that appeared, or is causing the illness. Here the Singhili calls forth the dead spirit with all his might, lights incense, and addresses it; if, however, the dead spirit refuses to come forth, he abuses it, flies into a rage, and finally declares that it has passed into the Singhili's body and has revealed to him what it demands and what must happen in order to reconcile it. This is what happens if the death occurred a long time ago; for someone buried recently, the corpse is taken from the grave, its head is cut off and opened up, and some of the liquids that flow from it are then mixed with dishes which the sick person has to eat, while the remainder is made into plaster casts that are attached to the body.

Things are most difficult when the dead person has had no burial, has been eaten by a friend, foe, or wild beast. Here, again, the dead spirit is conjured up, and the Singhili then declares that it has passed into the body of a monkey, bird, rat, etc., which as a result of the Singhili's incantations is caught. Its neck is then wrung and the sick person is given it to eat, whereupon the dead spirit has lost any right to exist in any form.¹⁶³

It is evident from this that, as far as enduring existence is concerned, the spirit is assigned no absolute, free, independent power.

Death is portrayed as the stripping off of the empirical, outward existence; but the dead retain their whole contingent nature. Objectification still relates wholly to the external mode, is still wholly formal; the mode of objectifying is not yet the essential, "what is accounted as having being,"¹⁶⁴ and what survives is still the contingent nature. Even the duration thus vouchsafed to the dead is a superficial characteristic:¹⁶⁵ they remain as contingent existences in the might and power of the sorcerer's living | self-consciousness, so that he can even let them die again, for a second time.

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163. [Ed.] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, p. 258 (pp. 222–223).

164. *Thus G; D reads* what comes before consciousness,

165. *W₂ (Var) adds:* and does not transfigure them

The image of immortality is intimately bound up with that of God.¹⁶⁶ The higher the plane on which human nature is affirmed, and the more the power of spirituality is comprehended according to its genuine content, in eternal fashion, the worthier is the image of God and that of spirit, of the human individual.¹⁶⁷

Human weakness and infirmity appear no greater here than they do in Greek mythology and in Homer. In the scene where Odysseus is on the Styx,¹⁶⁸ the scene of Odysseus's necromancy, when he summons forth the dead, they come because they cannot do otherwise. He slaughters a black ram; they then thirst for its blood in order that vitality may enter them. Odysseus allows some of them to drink but holds the others back with his sword.

The sensuous view of human spirit is matched by an equally sensuous view of what power is in and for itself.

These examples also show how little value human beings as individuals have from this standpoint. That they should be struck down and eaten, this contempt or scant regard in which some humans are held by others, is also to be found among Negroes in the state of slavery, which is very widespread among them. It is not only their prisoners but also their fellow citizens who are killed in the hundreds and thousands.¹⁶⁹ As the image of immortality grows in intensity, so the value of life too is enhanced—one might suppose that it would be the other way round. If one believes one is immortal, life should necessarily be all the more a matter of indifference. | On the one hand, this is partly so; but on the other hand, the value of the living becomes that much the greater, and the individual's right to life is recognized and acknowledged only when humanity appears as inwardly free, as in and for itself. The two determinations,¹⁷⁰ that

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166. *Ho reads, similar in W:* depends invariably on the stage reached in regard to the metaphysical concept of God.

167. *W (following Ho) adds:* and of the immortality of spirit. *Ho reads:* the purer is the picture of immortality.

168. [Ed.] Homer, *Odyssey* 11.34–50.

169. *Thus P; G reads:* Captives are either enslaved or slaughtered.

[Ed.] See above, n. 123, although Cavazzi says only that the number of victims may be "as high as a hundred."

170. *Thus G; P reads:* The two determinations are representations in the spirit

of subjective, finite being-for-self and that of absolute power, what will subsequently emerge as absolute spirit, are intimately bound up together.¹⁷¹

In this immediate form of magic, where the singular self-consciousness is the universal power, where spirituality is only intuited as in the sphere of the singular self-consciousness, there can, properly speaking, be no question of cultus, as free, unforced veneration of the essentially spiritual element. At this stage, the cultus-relationship is rather the exercise of lordship over nature, the lordship exerted by a few endowed with self-consciousness over others endowed with self-consciousness; and the common cultus of those with authority and power [is the exercise of lordship] over the others who are noninitiates. The common cultus is then precisely a condition of being beside oneself, even being out of one's senses, a deadening of the senses, in which the particular consciousness, the particular will is forgotten, extinguished, and the abstract, sensuous consciousness is exalted as high as it can be. The means whereby this deadening of the senses is brought about are dance, music, shouting, eating voraciously, even sexual orgies. This is represented [as] the highest state and is the highest mode [of] what can be called cultus. [It has] abstract significance, and therefore sensuous
 203 significance too. |

This sphere of magic is present in representation as a highly extensive, organized realm, the intuition of which is not without its grandeur and majesty. All moments are present in it, but one variant that is particularly striking is where the dead, being no longer among the living, are no longer within the realm of conscious will, yet, as dead, have authority over the natural realms and particular branches

171. *W₂ (1831) adds:* For this reason too, one might suppose that because human beings, as this power, are of so great account, they should here be greatly honored and have the feeling of their worth. But on the contrary, they are here completely devoid of value, for they do not possess worth by virtue of what they are as immediate will but only inasmuch as they have knowledge of something that has being in and for itself, something substantive, and subject and conform their natural will to it. It is only by sublating their natural unruliness, and knowing that something universal, having being in and for itself, is what is true, that they achieve worth—and life itself also becomes something of value.

of the latter. It could be said that they are raised to be lords of nature, but in fact they are demoted to being merely unconscious genii of the natural.

*c. The Religion of Ancient China*¹⁷²

This way of viewing the matter can, or *could*, be found at its most fully developed in [ancient] China, being overlaid at a later stage by subsequent accretions. Let me therefore sum up the form that it took.

The content of the principle is that the existent singular self-consciousness is still the divine power. This time it is the emperor of China, the source of all laws in the present world, but also the lord of nature. He governs by means of genii, namely such of the dead as he appoints for the purpose. This emerges more clearly in

172. [Ed.] Hegel's sole source for this section consists of the memoirs written by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Jesuit missionaries in Beijing: *Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les mœurs, les usages, etc. des Chinois par les missionnaires de Pekin*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1776–1814), 15:228–241. Because of the chaotic romanization of Chinese characters in the lecture transcripts made by Hegel's students, we have used the Pinyin system, officially adopted in 1958 and now the accepted scholarly norm. The first recognizable state in China, the Shang dynasty (dating from about 1600 B.C.), was overthrown by the Western Zhou in 1122 B.C. While the Zhou assimilated many Shang ideas and customs, including their ancestor veneration and agricultural rites, they brought with them a high god, Tian (Heaven), understood as an impersonal power that ruled the world by a moral force known as Dao (the Way). They also clearly distinguished Tian and the emperor, who was the "Son of Heaven" in the sense of relationship rather than of descent: the emperor reigned because he had received the "Mandate of Heaven" as a reward for his virtue, not because he had been born into the position. (See Niels Nielsen, Norvin Hein, Frank Reynolds, et al., *Religions of the World* [New York, 1983], pp. 261–64.) Although the *Mémoires* discussed at some length the relationship of the emperor to heaven ("le Ciel"), Hegel missed the significance of it, possibly because the Chinese name was not used, possibly also because the discussion occurred in the midst of an elaborate description of the installation ceremonies for a new dynasty. Hegel merely states that the imperial constitution had to be "agreed between him [the emperor] and heaven," and he places much greater stress on the manner in which the emperor governed the world and nature through the intermediary of dead spirits known as Shen. Thus in Hegel's version, divine power was localized in the person of the emperor, who ruled by essentially magical means, and we are halfway between a formal and an actual objectification of the divine object. Interpreted in this way, the religion of the Zhou fits Hegel's schema.

connection with the installation of a new dynasty, about which the following may be said.

The Zhou dynasty seized power in 1122 B.C., a period that is already clearly defined in Chinese history. The first Zhou emperor was Wu-wang. The last emperor of the preceding dynasty, Zhou-sin, like his predecessors, had ruled badly, so that the Chinese imagined it was "the evil genii"¹⁷³ who had ruled [in his stead]. When a new dynasty comes to the throne, everything in heaven and on earth has to be renewed:¹⁷⁴ there are new laws, new music, new ceremonies, new officials, and so on; and it is not only the | officials of the actual
204 world who have to be renewed but also those who are dead.

The emperor is lord over nature, and sets all this in train. One of the main things to be seen to is that the tombs of the previous dynasty are destroyed, "and its officials dishonored."¹⁷⁵ Another factor is that the new empire includes families that supported the old dynasty, members of which had an honorable standing, held high office, especially military posts, and fought against the new dynasty, but that to injure such people would be impolitic; so a means must be found to avoid dishonoring their dead relatives. The new monarch Wu-wang did this in the following way. Once the flames in the capital (which was not yet Beijing) had been extinguished—flames which the previous ruler had caused to be lit in order to reduce to ashes the royal palace he had inhabited, with all the treasures, women, and so on that it contained—the realm and its sovereignty was made subject to the new dynasty, and the time was come for Wu-wang to enter the imperial city as emperor, present himself to the people, and issue laws to the people. He let it be known, however, that he could not do this until everything had been properly regulated between him and heaven. The imperial constitution, agreed between him and heaven, was reputedly contained in two books that had been

173. *Thus D, similarly P; G reads:* the evil genius that inhabited his body

174. *W₂ (1831) adds:* this was accomplished by the new emperor with the help of the generalissimo of his army—

175. *Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var/MiscP?) reads:* i.e., destruction of the cultus directed at the ancestors who previously had power over families and over nature. *Ho reads:* But if there are still families that supported the former dynasty, it is necessary to avoid dishonoring it, in order not to injure them.

deposited on a mountain with a venerable sage. One was said to contain the new laws that were to be promulgated, and the other the names and offices of the genii, known as Shen, who were to be the new administrators of the empire in the natural world, the invisible officials over the natural world, as the mandarins are in the world of consciousness. Wu-wang sent his general off to fetch these books from the mountain; this general was already himself a | Shen, an actual genie, having attained this level while still alive as the result of over forty years of study and exercises. Well, he came with the books, and there was a ceremony for the promulgation of the books. The emperor purified himself, fasted three days, and at sunrise on the fourth day emerged in his imperial attire, holding the book of the new laws in his hand. The book was placed on the altar and sacrifices were offered. The emperor gave thanks to heaven for imparting this book. Thereupon the laws were promulgated, "being in all cases just the old ones with slight alterations."¹⁷⁶ The important thing was the second book; it was not opened, but the general was sent with it onto another mountain (there were four mountains) in order to make it known to the Shen, the genii, and inform them of the emperor's commands.¹⁷⁷

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The old man [the sage?] called the Shen together on the mountain and summoned them to appear there—this mountain lay in the region from which the house of the new dynasty had come. The account goes on to relate what then happened. The dead had assembled,¹⁷⁸ taking their place higher or lower on the mountain side according to rank, and the general, representing the emperor, sat himself "in their midst"¹⁷⁹ on a throne that had been erected for this purpose and that was gorgeously adorned. An altar stood before this throne, which had been decorated with the eight Gua (signs of the Fo) and three kinds of sacred signs. On the table in front of it

176. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads:* and to the people's utmost surprise and satisfaction it was found that they were all the same as before. In general, when there was a change of dynasty the old laws remained in force with slight alterations.

177. *W (following Ho) adds:* It included their appointment and dismissal. *Ho reads:* in order to inform them of the book of laws, which included their appointment and dismissal.

178. *W (Ed) adds:* on the mountain

179. *Thus G; P reads:* at the center of this empire

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lay the imperial banners of the new dynasty and the scepter, the staff of authority over the Shen. Similarly, on the middle of the altar [was] the scroll of the venerable sage, giving the general authority to make the new commandments known to the Shen. The general first offered a sacrifice, | then read the scroll, which was then passed to the Shen. Those who had formerly held power were rebuked for their neglect,¹⁸⁰ declared unworthy to rule any longer, and dismissed from their office. They were told they could go wherever they chose, and even reenter human life in order to atone in this way for their errors. After their dismissal the general called on the new Shen who were to be promoted, and gave them instructions concerning their duties. He seated himself on his throne and called out those to be promoted. The first he appointed administrator over the mountain, a general of an earlier emperor, then others to be administrators of the other four mountains (which, properly speaking, are the four parts of the earth, for in the eyes of the Chinese China is the world); and these Shen are also administrators of the four seasons. A fifth genie was placed over the central mountain. A prince was then called out who had played a leading role under the last ruler of the previous dynasty; in peacetime he had been renowned for his fair dealing and in time of war he had been a great and valiant general and had done more than anyone else to prevent the new dynasty from overthrowing the old until he had finally been slain in battle. His name was called "next,"¹⁸¹ and he was given the task of inspecting all Shen assigned authority over rain, wind, thunder, and clouds. He was to be appointed to this office, and the one who was appointing him was the general of the new dynasty who had waged war on him. This prince was therefore called before the new general. He did not approach the foot of the altar until his name had been called twice and he had been shown the staff of authority, and then he advanced with a haughty bearing and remained proudly standing. The general of the new dynasty, when he saw this, addressed him as follows: "You are no longer what you were in the body among men, you are nothing but a common Shen with as yet no office; I have here a commission

180. *W₂ (Var)* adds: as being the cause of the misfortune that had occurred,

181. *Thus P; G reads:* fifth,

for you from yon venerable | sage. Honor this command, as behooves thee." At these words, the Shen fell on his knees before the altar; he was then harangued at length; after devoting himself for a long time to studies, then to weapons, and so forth, he was finally, as we have said, designated chief of all those Shen who command the rain, clouds, wind, and thunder. The general charged him to make rain in due season, to disperse the clouds when they threatened to cause flooding, to prevent the wind from becoming a tempest, and to make the thunder roll only in order to frighten the wicked and cause them to withdraw within themselves. He was given twenty-four adjutants,¹⁸² each of whom received a particular [task of] inspection that changed every fortnight, while others were given other departments. Thus we get the picture of how all these offices were distributed one after another. The Chinese have five elements; one is fire, and one Shen was made responsible for it, in relation to conflagrations; six others were placed in charge of epidemics and were given the task of ameliorating human society by purging it from time to time of an excess of population. After the general had returned to the army, he gave the book back to the emperor. It still constitutes the astrological portion of the almanac. Two almanacs or directories appear in China every year, one concerning the mandarins, the other concerning the invisible officials, the Shen; the almanac shows then which Shen is in charge on each occasion. In the event of misfortune in some locality—crop failure, conflagrations, flooding, or the like—the relevant Shen are summoned and dismissed, the images wherein they had been venerated are torn down, and new Shen are designated. Thus in China the emperor's lordship over nature is a fully organized monarchy.

*d. The Religion of Being-Within-Itself (Buddhism, Lamaism)*¹⁸³

Up to this point we have seen objectivity consisting solely in formal universality; the content is still the sensuous world of a consciousness

182. *Ho adds:* (famous officers)

183. [Ed.] On Hegel's own terms, Buddhism should not be considered under the general category of "the religion of magic," since we are no longer dealing with formal but with actual objectification of the divine object, and have arrived for the first time at religion in the proper sense as distinguished from magic. In the 1827 and 1831

that is completely raw, the purpose is desire and whatever the satisfaction of the desires requires from nature. | This formal objectivity is not yet an objectivity that exists in and for itself: it is still not a content that we can recognize as genuine, but only the power of humanity over what is natural. Religion is the unity of the finite and infinite, of concept and reality. It is these two moments we have essentially to consider in the idea, in order to see how God defines or determines himself. The finite is the immediate self-consciousness, just this human being or these human beings; with the finite we are concerned with the determinacy of the content. The other aspect, the infinite, is the general power of the spirit over the contingent, the sensuously external. Thus power is here the basic characteristic; it is power that is the infinite aspect, the essential aspect generally, power over the inessential. But the content of this power is still not essential, it is not objective in and for itself, for sensuous desires and suchlike are the content, the purpose, over which power is the master. Power as such is negativity, essentiality, but only in relation to an other, which it negates; it is negativity of the other. It is not inwardly free, it is not power over itself, but essentially power over something, so that the relation to an other is always present.

We now have to consider the next advance. *Prima facie* the advance is that the infinite aspect, the essential aspect, is comprehended in a deeper, more genuine way than heretofore—or that another spiritual moment becomes objective for consciousness, for subjective spirit, [at this stage] as compared with what we have been considering up to this point. This new determination can only mean that consciousness comprehends itself, comprehends the essence as independent, as essentiality having being within itself and relating to itself, as this reflection of negativity within itself. And it is at this point that true objective universality begins—universality that is objective in itself according to the content. Thus genuinely objec-

lectures, Buddhism is in fact distinguished from magic and given an autonomous place in the schema of nature religions. Hegel's information about Buddhism was both limited and inaccurate. On his sources and general characterization of Buddhism and Lamaism, or "the religion of Fo," see the Editorial Introduction and subsequent footnotes. Fo is the Chinese name of Buddha.

tive universality begins with being-within-self [*Insichsein*] in general; it pertains thereto that self-consciousness reflects itself into itself, or sinks itself in itself, that thought comes to itself. Thought as power exists only in relation to an other; thought must therefore grasp essentiality, which is not tied to the determinacy of volition and knowing; essentiality must be constituted as what is genuine. Here lies the distinction between the | naturally, contingently determined self-consciousness—the raw, untamed character of whatever desire comes to power—and what rests and abides within itself, namely *spirit*; and here in this being-within-self the place of divinity in general emerges for the first time.

The sphere we have previously termed magic should not, properly speaking, be termed religion. Religion begins here, for it is only at this point that the consciousness of what has being-within-self, what is at rest and abides firmly, eternally within itself, begins; for the first time we have a genuinely divine characteristic—to be free on one's own account, to be the substantive, to be the universal. Initially this characteristic or determination is still abstract,¹⁸⁴ much more is [of course] needed in order for spirit to be defined in its truth, to be cognized and known. However unsatisfactory the other characteristics may be, we have here a solid base; [it is] a genuine determination of God that constitutes the foundation. And this religion, however base and lowly it appears, is nonetheless at a higher level than the form of religion which says that we know nothing of God, for in that religion there can be no worship at all, since we can only worship what is something “for us.”¹⁸⁵ With this advance, therefore, a firm basis or determination has been won, and self-consciousness has here an affirmative relationship to this object, for the essential character [*Wesenheit*], this being-within-self, is nothing

184. *Ho adds, similar in W₁*: This characteristic or determination is, to be sure, still abstract, and the concept of spirit is still immensely far from being exhausted by it.

185. *Follows in W (HgG/1831?)*: a common example used in Latin grammar is *Is colit Deum, qui eum novit*.

[*Ed.*] The grammar to which Hegel is referring has not been identified. But the idea is expressed by Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* 95.47: *Deum colit, qui novit*.

else but *thought* itself, and this is the distinctive essentiality [*Wesentlichkeit*] of self-consciousness. Hence there is nothing unknown or otherworldly in it. It has its own essence [*Wesen*] before it,¹⁸⁶ and has an affirmative relationship to it; but it also represents this essential [*Wesenhaftigkeit*] to itself as standing over against it, for it distinguishes this being-within-self, this pure freedom, from itself, from this particular self-consciousness, which is a contingent, empirical, | manifoldly determined self-consciousness. This then is
 210 the basic determination that we have at this point.

~ The second consideration is that the infinite, being at first the sinking-within-self, the self-absorption, of thought, is therefore only abstract to begin with, but it must also be essentially determinate, for what is true is concrete. There must be determinacy, and the only question is how there can still be determinacy here.¹⁸⁷ Here we are still at the standpoint of nature religion in general, and more specifically at the stage where the form or determinateness of the spiritual is still its immediate shape, or still has the form of *this* [singular] self-consciousness.¹⁸⁸ This is still the initial or proximate form for what is objective in itself. This infinite is *self-referring*, no longer determined merely as power, the unrest of power, which operates only outward. This is the first aspect; the second is that the side of existence, the shape [assumed by spirit], is raised up to infinite form too, but this comes later and separately from the first aspect. The raising of existence to the infinite of form is spiritual knowing, free intelligence as such: this is a later stage, here the form is still immediate, consisting initially in the fact that it is a singular

186. *W* adds: inasmuch as it knows this essential character to be at the same time its own essentiality, *Cf. Ho*: This determination or characteristic can be none other than that the consciousness has inwardly grasped itself as universal essentiality in its relation to itself.

187. *W*₂ (1831) reads: Substance is universal presence, but as inwardly subsisting essentiality, it must also become known concretely in an individual concentration.

188. *W*₂ (1831) adds: By comparison with the preceding stage, therefore, the advance is from the fantastic mode of personifying, which fragments into countless hosts [of shapes], to one that is determinately circumscribed and present. A human being is worshiped, and as such is the god, who assumes individual shape and in such shape offers himself for worship. In this individual entity the substance is power, lordship, the creation and preservation of the world, of nature and all things, *absolute* power.

self-consciousness. Since the two—on the one side, the determination of the infinite, and on the other side, reality—are, as has been said, separate, here again it is necessary that this form too should thus constitute a distinctive religion, and spirit make a halt at this stage. “From this standpoint”¹⁸⁹ we have emerged from the sphere of magic, | of power, but the two things can very well continue to subsist side by side—the secular power (the emperor) and the spiritual.

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To turn to the overt historical aspect, we have now defined the religion of Fo in China; this is the religion of the Chinese, Mongols, and Tibetans, also of the Burmese and Ceylonese, except that what is in China called Fo they call Buddha. However, the two terms mean the same, and this is the religion we know under the form of Lamaism. The slight difference between the Fo religion and Lamaism is only superficial.¹⁹⁰ In the latter the side of reality or the shape [assumed by spirit] is a particular self-consciousness, an actual, living human being. There are several such chief lamas, in particular three, the Dalai Lama in northern Tibet, the Lama in southern Tibet, and then another leader of this kind out in Russian Mongolia, or Siberia, who are worshiped as gods. In contrast, Fo and Buddha are also human individuals, but they are represented as dead. Since, however, the lamas are living human individuals, it remains a matter of contingency that there may be several other lamas. Thus it is said

189. *Thus P, D; G reads:* If this standpoint is a resting-within-self,

190. [Ed.] This erroneous view derives from several of Hegel's sources. For example, the *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder, Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen* (Leipzig, 1750), 6:381, asserts that in matters of religion the lamas and Chinese “are identical, and differ only in a few superstitious practices.” See also Samuel Turner, in Wilhelm Harnisch, *Die wichtigsten neuern Land- und Seereisen*, 16 vols. (Leipzig, 1821–1832), vol. 6 (1824), p. 355: “The Tibetan worship of God is related to the same high God Buddha, or Fo, or Gautama, that is worshiped in Japan, China, Burma, and Indochina.” Likewise Amherst's “Gesandtschaftsreise nach und durch China,” in Harnisch, *Die wichtigsten Reisen*, vol. 5 (1824), p. 82: “Actually the Lama-worshippers are only a special kind of Fo-worshippers. They are related to other Fo-worshippers as Catholics are related to Protestants among Christians.” Hegel was unfamiliar with the basic differences between the three main schools of Buddhism: Hinayāna (or Theravāda), Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna (including Lamaism).

of the Buddha that he has now to be venerated in Burma as Gautama.¹⁹¹ There are, therefore, several lamas.¹⁹² Gautama is supposed to have lived some forty years before Christ.¹⁹³ He is called the redeemer of souls, so that in this religion emphasis is already falling on the soul, on the spiritual. He is represented as coming after Buddha, as an incarnation of Buddha (so that several Buddhas have also followed one another), and is now venerated accordingly.

What we have still to consider is the relationship of the other, inessential forms of self-consciousness to these, in other words the relationship involving the subjective religion of the community. This is where free worship begins; for the community has recognized that the essence is the eternal rest of inner contemplation.¹⁹⁴ This is

191. W₁ (HgG/Ed?) adds: (Godama, savior of souls)

192. [Ed.] I.e., Buddhas. Hegel's point here seems to be that just as there can be several lamas at one time, so there can be several Buddhas at different times. The major source for Hegel's information about Buddhism is Francis Buchanan, "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas," in *Asiatic Researches*, 11 vols. (London, 1806–1812), 6:249 ff. Buchanan discusses the question of the existence of several Buddhas; on this matter see also William Jones, "On the Chronology of the Hindus," in *Asiatic Researches* 2:121 ff., and Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:579.

193. [Ed.] The source of this date, which is given by G and confirmed by Ho (50 B.C.), cannot be determined. The view prevalent in Hegel's day placed the life of Buddha around 1000 B.C. See, e.g., *Allgemeine Historie* 6:382; and Friedrich Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, p. 140 (*Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:243). William Jones, "On the Chronology of the Hindus," in *Asiatic Researches* 2:121 ff. works with a series of fanciful numbers, none of which is later than 1000 B.C. Francis Buchanan, "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas," *Asiatic Researches* 6:262, questions the year 1000 as too early, but without suggesting a later date. It is not inconceivable that Hegel confused Gautama's dates with the time of the introduction of Buddhism into China, which however occurred in A.D. 67. The dates A.D. 63–65 were given in the sources available to Hegel, e.g., *Allgemeine Historie* 6:358. In the 1827 lectures Hegel dates the introduction of Buddhism as fifty years after Christ, and conceivably he confused the "before" and the "after" when dating Gautama in 1824 (especially if we follow Ho in reading "fifty years before Christ"). The generally accepted dates today for Gautama Siddhartha are ca. 563–483 B.C. In any event, Hegel assumed that Buddhism/Lamaism (the religion of being-within-self) existed well before the life of Gautama, who was one of several Buddhas, and the early dating of "Buddha"—and presumably Buddhism—prevalent at the time may have led Hegel to assume that it was an older religion than Hinduism and thus to treat it first, as he does in the 1824 and 1827 lectures (in 1831 the order is reversed). In Hegel's view the religion of Fo came later, with the introduction of Buddhism into China (see below, ■ 202), and he may or may not have thought that Gautama was associated with this event.

194. Thus P; G reads: substantial identity with self.

where the theoretical attitude begins; no longer is practical power the first moment, being in opposition to otherness, this negativity against others; and no longer the practical [need] either, whose content [is] | desire—craving and being satisfied. Here consciousness is defined by peaceful being-within-self, barbarity is softened, desire [becomes] the transcending of desire, a renunciation that entails no sacrifice. The community is characterized by a tone of quietness and repose, tranquillity and obedience, of being without desires or being above them, and the life of its members is regulated by this still, gentle mode of being.¹⁹⁵ But this cultus (for it is cultus we are here considering) is also open to the individual, who is at liberty to forgo outward, worldly life, permanently embrace this silence, and sink himself in self-contemplation, having no part in existence; and this union with theoretical substantiality is then regarded as the highest fulfillment. Tranquillity and repose are the keynote of the character of the community, and this gives rise to the establishment of numerous monasteries and great priesthoods, which pass their time in silent contemplation of the eternal, taking no part in worldly interests and concerns.¹⁹⁶

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There is a second characteristic we should notice in regard to subjective self-consciousness, which is that it is chiefly here that the doctrine of the transmigration of souls is to be found.¹⁹⁷ Those who have made the transition to the theoretical know that there is a being that is at rest within itself, something truly essential; having arrived at this intuition, they know themselves as thinking beings, they know themselves too to be *theoretical* beings—fixed, enduring, substantive; and what is termed immortality of the soul (in the broadest sense) is what now for the first time emerges. As thinking beings they have consciousness of their eternity, of their unaltering, unchanging inner being, which is thought, the consciousness of thought.

195. *Thus P; D reads:* still mode of being. *G reads:* quietude of the senses.

196. [Ed.] Hegel's picture of Buddhist monastic communities is based on Francis Buchanan, "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas," *Asiatic Researches* 6:273–280. The corresponding passages in *Allgemeine Historie* 6:358 ff. are distinctly pejorative in tone.

197. *Ho reads, precedes in W₁:* Magic-working, as the relationship of power, is essentially practical, for power occurs only as manifestation of the nullity of what it has posited as inessential.

213 But secondly, the shape of this eternal being, this eternal subjectivity is still an immediate one, because their thinking has not yet attained to the freedom of spirit and the representation of spirit. Spirit is in general that which frees itself. Here the eternal is still undetermined within itself: it is not yet spiritual, its determination is the determination of | immediacy, i.e., a bodily, sensuous shape. Moreover, this bodily shape is contingent; it may be human or animal,¹⁹⁸ for it is already a long step forward, a much higher level of determination, [to say] that the shape or configuration should also match the determinacy of the content. [Here] being-within-self, eternal being has still no content, and so affords no criterion for the shape, and there cannot therefore be any question as yet of the shape's matching the inner determinacy. There is as yet no inner determinacy. Consequently there is bound up with this level the doctrine of transmigration of souls, in other words *indifference* with regard to shape. Where the spiritual assumes a shape befitting it as a living, sensuous external existence, it can have only one shape, namely, the human, the sensuous appearance of spirit. But if the inner element is not yet defined as spirit, the shape is a matter of contingency and indifference.¹⁹⁹

Indifference with regard to the shape here extends also to the objective element, to the eternal, to God. Buddha exists in several shapes, as does Lama; as soon as one lama dies, another takes his place, so that the essence is the same in both, and death brings no interruption in regard to the substantive essence. The rest is contingent and is of infinite diversity; the [essential] determination goes no further. Thus, among the people, [be they] Mongols, Burmese, [or] Chinese, it is [a matter of] sheer caprice, adventure, etc.

It may be noted that this religion is the most widespread and that which has most adherents. Its worshipers are more numerous than those of Islam, which itself has more adherents than Christianity. As in Islam, it is an undifferentiated eternal that constitutes the basic

198. *Ho, W₁ add:* The whole world of organic life, human and animal, becomes the variegated apparel of this colorless inwardness.

199. *Ho, W add:* The eternal life of Christians is the spirit of God himself, and the spirit of God is to be self-consciousness of himself as divine spirit. But at this stage being-within-self is still lacking determinacy, is not yet spirit. It is immediate being-within-self.

intuition and determination of the inner element, and | this "determinateness is more especially that of human shape, in part living and present, in part represented as having existed previously."²⁰⁰

"We get a more precise view if we survey what is known of the essence of the religion of Fo and Buddha."²⁰¹ The Fo religion as such comes from China, and in historical fact it is somewhat later than the form in which power is the dominant element. The French missionaries cite a decree of Emperor Xian-zong²⁰² dissolving a large number of monasteries and forcing their inmates to return to the world, because these monasteries, these priests, did not cultivate the soil and paid no taxes. The emperor's decree begins as follows: "Under our three famous dynasties the Fo sect was never heard of, it has emerged only since the Han dynasty." Here we have the necessary historical progression. "We must go into this more fully in order to recognize the features of the concept in it."²⁰³

"The principal doctrine of the Fo religion is the dogma of *metempsychosis*, or transmigration of souls."²⁰⁴ This is the source and origin of the innumerable masses of idols and images that are

200. *W₂ (1831) reads*: simplicity of the principle is by itself capable of subjecting various nationalities to itself.

201. *Thus G*

202. [Ed.] The name of the emperor is given only by G, where it reads "Hia-King." Lasson gives it as "Hia-ring" and contends in a footnote (without referring to a source) that the dynastic name of this emperor was "Wu-tsung" (Wu-zong), and that the decree dated from 845, the year of one of the great persecutions of the Buddhists. However, the wording of the text as well as Hegel's reference to "the French missionaries" makes it likely that Hegel is not referring to a decree but to a petition of the Confucian scholar Han-yu in 819. The petition was concerned with the religious fanaticism shown by the Buddhists on the occasion of the ceremonial transfer of a relic (one of the Buddha's knuckles) from a pagoda to the imperial palace; the emperor, whose name was Xian-zong, was in fact well disposed toward the Buddhists, so Han-yu's action resulted only in his banishment. The incident is referred to in Joseph-Anne-Marie de Moyriac de Mailla, *Histoire générale de la Chine; ou, Annales de cet empire, traduits du texte Chinois*, 13 vols. (Paris, 1777–1785), 6:423–424, where Han-yu is said to have pointed out that a succession of earlier emperors had been long-lived and that under them the people had enjoyed unbroken peace, adding, "but at that time there was no such thing as God, and it is only under the Emperor Han-ming-ti that the doctrine of Fo spread through the empire."

203. *Thus G*

204. *W₂ (Var/1831?) reads*: The dogma of the transmigration of souls is also the point at which the simple cultus of being-within-self turns into the most manifold idolatry.

worshiped wherever the veneration of Fo holds sway. Four-footed beasts, birds, insects, and reptiles, in a word the lowliest forms of animal life, have temples and are venerated because God in his reincarnations can dwell in individuals of all kinds, and each animal body can be inhabited by the human soul.

215 The principle of the Fo religion is that “nothing” is the principle, the beginning and the end of everything existing. Our first ancestors came from nothing and to nothing | they have returned. Everything that exists differs only through form, through quality. In the same way it can be said that I, a human being, an animal, etc., can be formed from the same metal; the basic determination is one mode, and all that is needed is for it to be overlaid by various qualities. However varied people and things may be, there is thus only one principle from which they stem, in which they are, through which they subsist, and to which they revert—this one principle is the nothing, completely unqualified, simple and pure. It is not nothing in the sense of not being, but it is what is purely identical with itself, undetermined, a substantive being; it is thus completely pure, wholly simple and undifferentiated, eternally at rest; it has neither virtue nor power nor intelligence; it lacks these determinate distinctions, being quite free of determination. As for the relationship of human beings to this principle, the rule is that in order to be happy they must endeavor, by dint of continuous speculation, continuous meditation and “continuous self-conquest,”²⁰⁵ to resemble this principle, to resolve or wish for nothing, to do nothing, have no passions, no inclinations or activities. With the attainment of this state of perfect impartiality or absence of concern, there is no longer any question of virtue and vice, reward and punishment, atonement, immortality of the soul, worship, and so on. All this has passed away, and human sanctity consists in “finding union, in this silence, with God.”²⁰⁶ In this cessation of all bodily movement or animation, all movement of the soul,²⁰⁷ therein consists happiness, and once human beings have reached this level of perfection, there is no longer any

205. *Thus P, D; G reads:* self-contemplation,

206. *Thus G; P reads:* uniting oneself with this nothing, with this silence. *Ho, W add:* The clamorous voices of worldly life must be hushed; the silence of the grave is the element of sanctity and eternity.

207. *W₂ (1831) adds:* in this annihilation of self,

change, their souls have no further wanderings to fear, for they become completely identical | with the God Fo.²⁰⁸ This is to-be-within-self: this purely theoretical moment is here expressed, and has come to intuition thus among this people. This is their basic intuition, their basic consciousness.

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Bound up with this is the image of the transmigration of souls. Human beings who have not attained to "this [ultimate] happiness"²⁰⁹ in their lifetime through renunciation and self-absorption "still have this happiness *within* them, inasmuch as their spirit is this being-in-itself; but they still need *duration*—they are not [fundamentally] subject to change, but they [still] need the corporeal, and this is how the image of the transmigration of souls arises."²¹⁰ (It is said of the God Fo himself that he has changed his shape thousands and thousands of times, assuming human or animal shape.) Those who have attained this absolute repose are implicitly freed from change by death, but in order to achieve that happiness they have to migrate through a sequence of shapes. "Here magic again enters on the scene, the mediation of the human priests"²¹¹ who belong to the higher realm of the supersensible and yet at the same time have power over the configurations that humans assume; in this way the aspect of power and magic comes to be associated once more with this theoretical image. Adherents of the Fo religion are in this respect extremely superstitious. They represent to themselves that our human shape passes over into every possible shape, that of a cat, a snake, a mule.²¹² A missionary²¹³ tells the story of a | man on his deathbed who had heard of the Christian religion who summoned him and

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208. *W₂ (1831) adds:* The soul has ascended to the region of nothingness and is thus redeemed from being tied to the outward, sensuous configuration.

209. *Thus G; D reads:* this impassivity

210. *Thus G*

211. *W₂ (1831) reads:* 3. Now it is here that the side of power and magic-working links up again with this image and the religion of being-within-self ends in the wildest superstition. Because it is in fact inwardly empty, the theoretical relationship turns into the practical relationship of magic-working. The mediation of the priests enters on the scene, *G reads:* The mediation of the priests enters on the scene,

212. *Ho adds, similar in W:* So the priests, as living in the supersensible [realm], are the authorities who decree what shape or configuration the soul is to assume and can therefore save human beings from shapes that bring more misfortune.

213. [Ed.] See the account of the missionary le Conte in *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande* 6:362.

complained that a Bonze—that is, one of the priests or wise men who know what goes on in the other world—had told him that as he was currently in the emperor's service, he would remain in it after his death, his soul migrating into one of the emperor's post-horses, and that he was then to do his duty loyally, not kicking, neighing, biting, or stumbling, and being content with little fodder.

The transmigration of souls is based on the image of the being-within-self of spirit, which is raised up above change; and associated with it is magic.

The Buddhists come principally from the Kingdom of Burma, India, and Ceylon. Their God Buddha is venerated as Gautama. Here, as with Fo, what has being-within-self has a human shape, but it is that of a dead person. (This Gautama is also represented as the ninth incarnation of Vishnu by the Hindu Brāhmans, but not venerated by them.²¹⁴) Buddha is again the universal, the good; according to his present, existing shape he is Gautama, and in this shape he must now be venerated. He is depicted in the attitude of self-absorption, with head bent and arms folded over his breast. His priests are the Rahāns²¹⁵ and are described by the English as the calmest and noblest of men. They live together, but in silence, and are described as free from particular desires. The state that is represented as the human goal the Buddhists call nirvana,²¹⁶ and in describing it they explain that when we are no longer subject to the

214. [Ed.] This is apparently based on a poem by Jayadeva, cited by William Jones, "On the Chronology of the Hindus," in *Asiatic Researches* 2:121. The fact that the Buddha is on the one hand judged very unfavorably by the Brāhmans, but on the other hand is regarded as an incarnation of Vishnu, is explained by Jones on the assumption that there were two Buddhas. On Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu, see an Iranian source cited by Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:578. Creuzer refers to *Ayeen Akbery*; or, *The Institutes of the Emperor Akbar*, translated from the original Persian by Francis Gladwin (London, 1800). See also Creuzer, 1:577, 602, 619.

215. [Ed.] This is probably based on Francis Buchanan, "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas," *Asiatic Researches* 6:273–280.

216. [Ed.] See *ibid.*, p. 266: "In saying that Godama obtained Nieban [nirvana], what is understood by that word? When a person is no longer subject to any of the following miseries, namely, to weight, old age, disease, and death, then he is said to have obtained Nieban. No thing, no place, can give us an adequate idea of Nieban: we can only say, that to be free from the four above-mentioned miseries, and to obtain salvation, is Nieban." In contrast with this source, which describes nirvana in accord with Hinayāna Buddhism, Hegel generally understands it as a state of union with

ills of obesity, old age, sickness, and death, we have reached nirvana; we are then identical with God; and regarded as identical with God, we have become Buddha.

They also give a roughly similar description of the lama. Every abbot of a monastery is called lama; all the same, there are only three principal lamas in Lesser and "Greater Tibet."²¹⁷ They are honored by the Mongols | and Tibetans; the Chinese too respect the lamas. "Englishmen who have come to know the Dalai Lama—the envoy²¹⁸ saw him frequently—have the greatest respect for him."²¹⁹ His principal trait is quiet and gentleness, coupled with insight and a thoroughly noble being. The peoples likewise venerate him, "because they see him in the beautiful light of a life of pure contemplation;"²²⁰ and this is the *substantive* element, what they venerate as eternal, possessing absolute eternity. When a lama is called upon to direct his attention to human affairs, then he is solely concerned with well-doing, with dispensing comfort and help by his blessing and exercising the first of all attributes, namely, forgiveness and pity."²²¹

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This is the necessary content of the first mode of nature religion. It displays the same two moments that we have seen when we were

the Lord Buddha. This is based on a depiction oriented to Mahāyāna Buddhism, as found in another of Hegel's sources, the *Allgemeine Historie* 6:368–369, which stresses in particular the stripping away of all desire and mental and physical activity through which it is to be attained. Instead of "Nieban," which is based on the Pali form "Nibbana," we use the more familiar form of the term, "nirvana."

217. *Ho reads*: Upper Tibet and outer Siberia.

[*Ed.*] In Hegel's day the terms Greater Tibet (*Gross-Tibet*) and Lesser Tibet (*Klein-Tibet*) were used with a variety of meanings as together embracing the area we know as Tibet and Bhutan.

218. [*Ed.*] See Samuel Turner, "Copy of an Account Given by Mr. Turner, of His Interview with Teeshoo Lama," *Asiatic Researches* 1:197–205. However, the account relates to a journey to the lama of Tashilumpo, the Panchen Lama. Probably here as elsewhere (e.g., in the corresponding passage in the 1827 lectures) Hegel erroneously calls all the principal lamas Dalai Lamas.

219. *W₂ (1831) adds*: But above all the Dalai Lama is the appearance of consummate, satisfied being-within-self.

220. *Thus G; P reads*: because they say that they are immersed only in pure contemplation; *D reads*: in that they are always in a state of pure contemplation; *W₂ (1831) adds*: and the absolutely eternal is present in him;

221. *Ho reads*: The English envoy, from whom we have a description of his travels, was filled with awe in the presence of the Lama: "These peoples rest sunk in the

identifying the abstract categories. The first is constituted by power—that the spiritual self-consciousness as immediately one *is* this power—and the second is constituted by reflection into self, being-within-self. This being-within-self is the general basis of any idea of divinity. Identity with self is the basic category or determination; here for the first time we have a genuine foundation for religion, and so it is that by bringing together these two categorial determinations we make our transition to the second form of nature religion. |

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2. The Religion of Phantasy (Hinduism)²²²

The second form of nature religion can be called the nature religion of phantasy or fanciful imagination. The problem here is how to define it in more detail. First we have to consider [how] God [is represented] in it; the second point is the cultus, all that pertains to the relationship of the subjective, of the subject, the existent self-consciousness, to this God.

a. The Representation of God

The definition that we have arrived at is the first moment of truth,²²³ the basic determination, self-communion, this remaining eternally

beautiful light of pure contemplation,” he writes, and [continues]: “and if the Lama should ever direct his attention to human affairs (he rules through viziers), all that concerns him is well-doing, dispensing comfort and blessing. Thus forgiveness and pity are also his attributes.”

222. [Ed.] We have translated the German *Phantasie* by using the variant English spelling “phantasy” in order to convey the sense of visionary, fanciful imagination, as distinguished from that of an unreal mental image or illusion. “Fancy” in the sense used by S. T. Coleridge is precisely what Hegel means by *Phantasie* in this context (see Vol. 1:56), but in ordinary usage has certain connotations which make it unsuitable for our purpose; we do, however, use “fanciful imagination” as an alternative rendering of *Phantasie* in some passages. Hinduism is the “religion of phantasy” because of the way in which ultimate reality, Brahman, is fancifully represented as present in and the substantial ground of all finite, natural, worldly things. In accord with modern English usage, we translate Hegel’s *die indische Religion* as “Hinduism” or “Hindu religion.” While “the religion of India” would be possible (though cumbersome and somewhat quaint), “Indian religion” could well be confusing. Since “Hindu” and “India(n)” derive from the same root, referring to the land on the river Indus, “Hinduism” simply means “the religion of India.” On the sources and characteristics of Hegel’s treatment of Hinduism, see the Editorial Introduction and the ensuing footnotes.

223. *G adds*: in all that is termed God,

self-contained, this infinity or the absolute reflection into self that resolves all negation and differentiation, a purely theoretical attitude in which differences, relationship to other, power—all distinctions pertaining to the practical sphere—are defined as resolved in the theoretical. This being-within-self, this self-communion, is initially the undetermined, and in the same way as the god Fo is represented, it too is therefore called *nothing*, the indeterminate generally. What must now happen is that at this stage determination comes into play and develops within the form; and, as *divine* form, this form is no longer determined as power, as immediate self-consciousness, but as grounded on this *theoretical* attitude, grounded in self-containment, in the unfolding of the essence, in the emergence of a divine world generally. At this stage the essence is not yet truly God. Though its principle is being-within-self, it is still undetermined, not yet genuine; only unity with the form, this unity of infinite and finite, is what is genuinely divine. Being-within-self must develop progressively according to the concept; life must emerge, must achieve fulfillment, and there must be fulfillment to yield a *concrete* divine life. Being-within-self is the first determination, while the second is the progressive development of the divine as concrete; and this second determination, this development, still belongs in the first place to the religion of nature. For the first, immediate mode of development consists in the different moments or aspects being inwardly negated by the concept; they fall asunder, and remain held asunder as mutually independent—this is, so to | speak, the curse of nature. In this development we shall be confronted everywhere with echoes of the concept, of what is true; but these echoes, on the whole, are all the more horrifying to us because they are trapped in the mutual exclusion that is the characteristic quality of the natural state, and never escape from it.

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This then is the second determination. Divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content. We have first considered contingent objectivity as empty form, and then the objectivity of being-within-self. The determination of being-within-self, of absolute identity with self, is now complemented by that of concreteness. At this second stage, [however,] the different moments continue to be held asunder, whereas the third stage—the spiritual—is where the concrete recapitulates itself within itself, being simultaneously—according to

the concept—*posited* and *known* as something ideal. At the present stage the moments are indeed present, but as far as their necessity is concerned, they are all separate, so that the moments are viewed independently, theoretically, are removed from [the sphere of] desire and exist as independent and objective in their particularity.

Thirdly the question arises, what are the forms of this independence, the shapes that it assumes. This is the kind of world we are in too, a world of things external to each other, a world of sense; hence our external sensuous consciousness has to deal with a world of varied multiplicity, which is present [to it] and bound up [with it]. Taken altogether, there are just *these* things—this is the basic determination—we call them “things” to characterize more precisely what objectively *is*.²²⁴ We are also confronted inwardly by a multitude of powers, mental distinctions, and sensations, which the understanding again isolates from each other in the same way. Nature has set in our hearts this or that inclination or passion, this force of memory, that of judgment, and so forth. Similarly, if we pass on to characterize thinking, there too we find a host of determinations of this kind, each of which exists on its own: positive, negative, being, not-being. This is how our sensuously perceiving consciousness intuits independence, and this is the mode and pattern of independence for our understanding. After this pattern we have

221 | an intuition, a view of the world that is prosaic, however, because independence has this form of “thinghood”—of mental and other forces—and consequently *abstract* form. Inasmuch as it is present in this form, thought is here not reason but understanding.

The problem, then, is as follows. The manifold, concrete world here possesses independence. This is known theoretically here, and the question concerns the form of this independence. It cannot yet be the form of independence that *we* possess, for our prosaic mode of understanding involves more than is yet present: it involves a further advance of the cultural process through which these abstractions have become fixed. The objectivity of our consciousness is the objectivity of understanding. For us to view the world in this way is a *reflection* of the understanding and comes much later; in that

224. W₂ (Var/1831?) adds: and so distinguish it from spirit.

later guise the understanding cannot therefore occur at this stage either.

First we say that things [simply] are; second, that they are related to one another in a variety of ways, they are causally connected and depend on one another. This second moment, the moment of understanding, cannot be present at this stage. This prosaic dependence, this objective coherence, where objectivity has the sense of abstract independence, [comes later].²²⁵ In other words, independence does not yet have this form. What then are we to take as the form of independence at this stage? The only form of independence that is found here is none other than that which is "for human beings the form of a concrete independent entity,"²²⁶ and this first way in which independence appears is therefore the human way, and also an animal way; thus the two hang directly together. This is how fulfillment is present; the concrete is for the first time intuited as [actively] having being, no longer as the [passive] object of power; from the point of view of power, all this is posited as negative, or as subject to power. Only the practical has being objectively in power, not the theoretical, whereas here the theoretical is given free rein.

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"The first concrete mode of freedom is human being or the organic life of animals. Here being has the form of human configuration, and the realm of phantasy arises, where objects are represented in wholly contingent fashion as human or animal shapes, the representation being carried out in a highly extravagant manner. |

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"We have now reached the stage of the theoretical element. All

225. W (following Ho) reads: [W₁: But since it is phantasy that determines the configuration, all intelligible determinate differentiation of the moments must necessarily be at once extinguished.] It is only the understanding as pure self-conformity that comprehends objects in these categories. Because the one is, it argues, so is the other, and it pursues this chain of connection relentlessly into false infinity. Ho reads: But since it is phantasy that determines the configuration, all intelligible determinate differentiation of the moments must necessarily be at once extinguished. For it is only the understanding as pure self-conformity that comprehends objects in this category and by this means differentiates [their] determinacies; and since they possess their determinacy, their self-conformity, only through the relationship to an other, it proceeds to portray their nexus as a necessary nexus. Because the one is, it argues, so is the other, and it pursues this chain of connection relentlessly into false infinity.

226. Thus P; G reads: the form of concrete self-consciousness itself,

the characteristics or determinations that are absolutely necessary constituents of the concept, and further have being as sense-objects, are here endowed with independence; because the theoretical is the basic determination, every content is represented independently."²²⁷ But this independence or objectivity is not yet a stable category, not yet a determination in terms of forces and causes, or of the kind of objectivity to which we are accustomed as thinkers, as the result of our training in thought. Instead, independence is endowed here with the form of what is the independent element in and for representation, i.e., it has principally the human form, but also that of animals, the form of life generally. Animals have life, they have souls, and so do human beings—a *fortiori*—since they constitute the independent element vis-à-vis what is dependent. When we represent something independent to ourselves, we content ourselves with an image; and an image, an object, a basic characteristic must contain nothing heterogeneous. That is how it seems. We have an image of some sense-object, a tree, river, etc.; or else we make an image for ourselves; and for this to serve us as object we need merely to express and represent to ourselves that it *is*; it needs no other characteristics for us to characterize it as independent. But since it is then an *image* for us, "we confer independence on it by presenting it as a force."²²⁸ No matter what the content is, its independence always has for us the form of a category of the understanding. But the point is that at this stage there are no categories, and the elements that are independent as far as representation is concerned have to assume the role of categories vis-à-vis one another instead. So if the river is to be accepted as independent on its own account, or the image of the river (its sensuous intuition), the tree or the image of the tree, they must assume the form by which representation distinguishes the independent as such from other existents."²²⁹ The sun, the sea, the tree, and so forth do in fact lack independence compared with

227. *Thus G*

228. *Thus P; G reads:* we say of it that we confer independence on it, we have its force in us, as caprice.

229. *W (1831) reads:* Since it is theoretical, spirit is two-sided: it inwardly relates itself to itself, and it relates itself to things, which are for it what is universally independent. In this way things themselves break into two for it—into their immediate, external, colorful mode, and into their free, self-subsistent essence. Because this is

what is living and free, so these | forms²³⁰ are what in this sphere of theoretical independence provide the supporting basis of ~a given content or take the place of the categories in regard to it. Free human consciousness and life are what is in fact independent in the realm of things, and to that extent poetry is rational, because where a thought content is to be represented as independent, the human or animal shape represents this independence. These categories (all the moments posited by the concept, as well as the concrete things of nature generally, sun, sky, land, mountains, and so forth) obtain in this way this shape of free independence; and a second consequence of this is that all intelligible connection in this content is dissolved and destroyed. For the necessary is what is intelligible: the universal relationships of necessity constitute intelligibility—where one is posited, the other is posited also; the interdependence of things according to their quality, their essential determinacy, is what in fact constitutes intelligible coherence generally. But here everything is free and independent, so what holds sway is caprice, or whatever interests the imagination: this is the basic thought. Historical events and circumstances are in no way bound or circumscribed, every content

not yet a thing, nor the categories of the understanding, generally speaking, because it is not the kind of abstract independence that is thought, what we have is independence that has been imagined [*vorgestellt*], that is free—the imagination of human beings or at least of living beings, which can accordingly be termed the objectivity of phantasy. In order to represent to ourselves sun, sky, or tree as having being, as independent, all we need is its sensuous intuition or image, to which nothing that seems heterogeneous has to accrue. But this seeming or semblance is an illusion; if the image is represented as independent, as having being, if we accept it as such, then it has for us the determination of being, of a force, [it is] something caused, something effected, by a soul, and its independence lies in these categories. But inasmuch as independence has not yet advanced to the prose of the understanding, for which the category of force or cause is in principle what characterizes objectivity, to grasp and express that kind of independence is the poetry that makes the representation of human nature and shape—or possibly animal nature and shape, or again the human in association with the animal—the supporting basis and essence of the external world. This poetry is what is in fact rational in fanciful imagination, for it must be held firmly in mind that [even] if, as we have indicated, consciousness has not yet advanced to the category, what is independent has to be taken from the existing world, and indeed in antithesis to what is dependent, to what is represented as external; and [*W₁ reads: this alone is W₂ reads: here animal and human essence alone is*] the shape, mode, and nature of the free in the realm of things.

230. *W₂ (Var) adds: of what is independent*

225 is at the disposal of the imagination; it can put whatever it likes in association, | can adorn and embellish as it fancies, in whatever shape takes its interest, since there is no objectivity; and it is equally unrestricted in its further advance, for it can take any course it pleases.

What we call necessity rests on the intelligible coherence of the manifold content; and this coherence is what, as we have put it, transmits the particular content of particular things; it constitutes the genuine objectivity of whatever is and appears. At this stage, this objectivity is not present; the intelligible coherence is dissolved, and because this objectivity of connectedness is not present, the independence we are dealing with here is not actual; it is not the mode of objective actuality but has the character of perfect contingency, and the world and all that it contains are thereby placed in the service of the imagination. God's world is in the suzerainty of the imagination (which is an infinite manifold that keeps growing in the measure that human beings cultivate their feelings and capabilities). It is typical of this cultural or educational process that all distinctions are particularly noted and preserved, and this aspect of culture is found here in the theoretical range. Desire²³¹ has a narrower range of purpose, of interest (and what is of interest to it, it negates); what is outside its range of interest it pays no heed to, ~and consequently it remains unschooled.

226 Because of the form that independence takes, the independent categories | take on the character of contingency; and as a result, they are at once posited rather in the opposite way, as dependent instead. The content is determined, it is a particular content, and

231. *W (1831) reads:* the content. [*W*₂: The material is thus given a subjective soul, which is not, however, a category but concrete spirituality and organic life.]

The next consequence is that in the same way that objects in general and the universal categories of thought have free independence of this kind, the world's intelligible coherence is dissolved; this coherence is formed by the categories denoting [*W*₁: relationships, which, *W*₂: relationships of necessity, or by the mutual dependence of things according to their quality, their essential determinacy; all these categories,] however, are not present [at this stage], and representation is thus confronted by nature wild and unrestrained. Any flight of imagination, any interest in what happens and ensues [evokes an image]; relationships can shift free of all ties and limitations. All the splendor of nature and the imagination is at one's disposal to adorn the content, and the caprice of the imagination has entirely free rein to let itself go this way or that, passing whichever way it pleases. [*W*₂: Unschooled] appetite

it acquires the form of independence in a false, one-sided fashion; but because this determinate content is not rooted in genuine particular objectivity, it acquires the character of contingency and so loses its independence of action. It is delivered up to the imagination and stands in its service. Such is the basic characteristic of this sphere in abstract terms.

Thus we have before us an infinitely varied world of imagination—without objective coherence, an unrestrained revel encompassing all this content.²³² The only thing that brings some stability into this jumble | of accidents is the universal basic categories

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232. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* At this standpoint of the imagination, however, all distinctions are especially heeded and borne firmly in mind, and whatever is of interest to the imagination becomes free and independent and is raised to the level of a basic thought.

W (MiscP) continues: Yet it is through this imagined independence itself that, conversely, the content and configurations are no longer firmly based. Since the configurations are of determinate, finite content, their only objective basis, [their only possibility of] recall and lasting renewal, would lie in the intelligible coherence that has now disappeared, as a result of which their independence, instead of being an actuality, becomes rather perfect contingency. The world as it appears is thus placed in the service of the imagination. The divine world is a kingdom of the imagination, the infinite multiplicity of which is increased by the fact that it pertains to the sphere of a luxuriant nature, and that this principle of free imagining, divorced from appetite, of theoretically based phantasy, has indeed enriched the mind and its emotions—emotions that, incubating in this gentle warmth, are permeated in a preeminent degree by a strain of pleasant, sweet tenderness but also of feeble softness.

W₂ (1831) continues, following an insertion from the 1827 lectures: For this reason too, the form of beauty cannot yet be created at this stage, because the content, these particularizations of substance, are not yet the genuine content of spirit. Now since the limited content is the foundation and is known as spiritual, the subject, this spiritual element, is an empty form. In the religion of beauty the spiritual as such constitutes the foundation, so that the content too is spiritual content. Then the images, as sensuous material, are only an expression of the spiritual. But here the content is not of a spiritual kind.

Thus art is symbolic art, expressing characteristics to be sure, but not characteristics of the spiritual. This is the reason for the unbeautiful, demented, fantastic aspects of art that emerge here. The symbol is not pure beauty, for it involves a content other than spiritual individuality. Free subjectivity does not permeate it, nor is it essentially expressed by the shape [of the symbol]. In this fanciful imagination there is nothing firm, nothing assumes the shape of beauty, which is given only by the consciousness of freedom. What is present here is the complete dissolution of shape, the singular casting this way and that, stretching out [in all directions]. The inward element, having no stability, passes over into external existence, and the way in which the absolute is displayed in this world of the imagination is merely an infinite dissolution of the One in the many and an unrestrained revel encompassing all content.

of the concept, which are the absolute powers into which everything returns. It is these basic categories that merit our consideration.

On the one hand these categories can be recognized in the perverted, sensuous mode produced by the whims of the imagination—and when we see them thus, the imagination gets its due. But on the other hand we must grasp the way in which these basic categories have been degraded, owing to their assuming the show of indifference inherent in mutual externality and so vitiating, by their form, the externally sensuous shape. It is this form that degrades them, and because of it these essential, basic categories emerge in a way that is perfectly devoid of spirit.²³³

228 In the way we have described them, these characteristics of the divine essence, of the divine world, have their [empirical] existence in the Hindu religion. However, we must here leave aside “its innumerable, multifarious mythological events”²³⁴ and confine ourselves to the principal characteristics. It is of interest to consider these, | because they pertain to the concept; they are baroque and have often a wild and repulsive shape, having been dragged down to the level of everyday life, but it is the concept that here shows itself and exhibits its development on this theoretical soil. The first point is the *substantive* character of this process of reflection into

233. W (1831) reads: It is the system of universal basic categories as absolute powers to which everything returns and which permeates everything that alone brings thorough stability into this region of caprice, confusion, and feebleness, into this boundless splendor and softness; and it is this system—determined by the concept in and for itself—that [has] to be considered. What is of most essential interest is on the one hand to recognize these categories in the perverted, sensuous mode of arbitrary, externally determined shaping, and give its due to the essentiality underlying them, and on the other hand to note the degradation they experience, partly through their mutual indifference, partly through arbitrary human and local external sensuality, as a result of which they are relegated to the sphere of the most everyday. All passions, local features, features of individual memory, are attached to them; there is no judgment, no shame—no trace of a higher correspondence between content and form. Everyday existence as such has not disappeared but has been promoted to constitute beauty. W₂ (1831) adds: The lack of correspondence between content and form consists more precisely in the fact that the basic categories are depreciated because they seem to be on a par with mutual externality, and because they again vitiate, by their form, the externally sensuous shape.

234. G reads: this unending, multifarious mythology W (1831) reads: its multifarious, characteristically endless mythology and mythological forms

self; the second is the form, the determinations of the absolute: these are the moments that come to the fore in this religion, and because they display this character of *form* they recall the highest plane of the idea.²³⁵ It is therefore appropriate to consider them more closely.

The first element in the concept, the element of genuineness, is this universal substance, as we have seen—the eternal rest of self-containment, this essence that has its being within itself, which is the universal substance. As the universal, this substance²³⁶ is likewise the power that has being in itself. But it is not turned against something else, like appetite, but is still and invisible, being reflected into itself—and for that reason determined simply as power. This power that remains locked within itself in the form of universality must be distinguished from its manifestation, from what it posits; and it is [also] distinct from the elements that compose it. Power is the ideal element, the negative for which everything else has being only as annulled, negated. To power belongs already this self-determining, this production, the moments that come forth, but insofar as it is characterized as implicitly subsisting universal power, universal power that has being *in* itself, it is distinct from its constituent moments; and these moments accordingly appear on the one hand as independent essences and on the other hand as essences that also disappear in the One. They belong to the One of which they are only moments or elements; but as differentiated they appear on the scene independently, as perfectly independent persons, persons of the godhead, | yet at the same time persons who are the whole itself, so that the first element [i.e., universal substance] disappears in these particular shapes as [shapes of] a totality [that] needs nothing

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235. W (1831) reads: which are on the one hand baroque, wild, and horrible, repulsive, disgusting distortions, but at the same time show themselves to have as their inner source the concept, and (owing to the way in which the concept can develop in this theoretical soil) call to mind the summum of the idea, but simultaneously express the definite obscuration the idea undergoes when these basic categories are not brought back again to spiritual nature. The principal point of interest is the development, the explication of the form, as against an abstractly monotheistic religion as well as against the Greek religion—i.e., against a religion that has spiritual individuality as its principle. [W₁ adds: but through the concrete element of the individuality principle].

236. W₂ (Var) reads: this simple substance, which the Hindus call Brahman,

above it; but on the other hand they in their turn disappear in the one power. These alternations, with sometimes the One, sometimes the differentia as the complete totality—this is what constitutes the inconsistency of this sphere; but it is also the inconsistency of reason vis-à-vis the understanding.²³⁷

If we consider this further in an abstract manner, we have first the One, the universal, the absolute concept; the absolute concept is *this*, to manifest itself. Its manifestation can be called determinate being, *objectivity* in general, fixed independence, or what we call conservation in the relative sense that what now is appears as having come about previously. This is what can be termed the eternal goodness [of God], that the determinate, although it is only posited, only a semblance, still manages to *be*, is vouchsafed momentary being; it is, however, absorbed in power. It is only power that, out of its goodness, enables the determinate to subsist, although it is only something particular and finite. This manifestation, determinate being or existence in general as divine manifestation, becomes thereby itself the whole God, the totality, and finds itself opposed by that first unity, the power that has being in itself; or else the latter steps down to the level of a particular moment, so that above this absolute One another higher One (which may also be called God) must straightway be set in place. The third element then is *change* in general, becoming, justice generally—coming into being and passing away, being created and being brought to naught, the [mode of] being that consists in *not* being. These are the three basic determinations of the concept. The fact that spirit is totally lacking from this way of defining the form of the differentiae (even to the extent that it is the pure definition of the concept) is due to the third element being defined at once as becoming or change, whereas with the absolute idea the third element is defined as *spirit*, i.e., not as a transition or return into self, where | the differentiae are determined in

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237. W (following Ho and G) reads: this is the inconsistent nature of this sphere that confuses the consistent understanding but is at the same time what constitutes the conceptually consistent nature of reason as opposed to the consistency of the understanding, abstractly identical with itself. Ho reads: And this inconsistency that confuses the consistent understanding is the conceptually consistent nature of reason as opposed to the consistency of the understanding, abstractly identical with itself.

this immediate way as being and nonbeing. These are the three basic forms.

We must now recognize in regard to Hindu mythology that it does in fact contain these basic determinations of the concept, the development of the concept. This trinity is the basic form, the abstract basic form of spirit; this is what the Hindus represent as Trimurti.²³⁸ "Murti" means soul in general, every emanation of the absolute, [its] particular manifestations. So "Trimurti" means the three essences. The first One appears itself as one of three; it is then deposed, and the One that is the unity of the three is in turn represented as different from this initial One.

What comes first is Brahman, the absolute unity as neuter principle. As father, as active, as what is a particular moment among these three, the name chiefly given is Brahmā, but it also has other names, such as Parabrahmā, expressing the universal soul. Here we have then this inconsistency, grounded in reason; as soon as the One is expressed as one of three, it is particularized and something higher is needed, namely Brahman.²³⁹

The second essence is determinate being, conservation, manifestation, appearance on earth, which is then elaborated in its full entirety—the incarnation of Vishnu and so forth, whatever appears [on earth], humanity therefore in the form of particular human beings. Incarnations seemingly include princes or mighty kings who have made great conquests, but the principal intuitions of incarnation are afforded by human ideals in general—on the one hand conquests and [on the other] countless romances. Stories that for us are novels are for Hinduism incarnations. All that can be grasped as human

238. [Ed.] Hegel could draw on numerous sources of information about the Trimurti; he is also in agreement with them in overestimating its importance. The Trimurti belongs to a later, passing phase of the development of Brahmanism, represented by the second stratum of Mahābhārata, a number of Upanishads, and the Purāṇas. The relationships between Brahmā, Vishnu, Shiva, and the unity of the three are also more involved than Hegel suggests here and in the following three paragraphs. Much of his analysis is based on James Mill, *The History of British India*, 3 vols. (London, 1817), 1:215, 230 ff. Hegel's euhemeristic interpretation of the incarnations also reflects Mill's account (p. 241). It is to be noted, however, that Mill explicitly dissociated himself from the view that the Trimurti is analogous to the Christian Trinity (p. 244).

239. *Thus G*

passions is presented as incarnate in this fashion; we find there the noblest, the most beautiful, the most manifold in existence generally, but no judgment.

Third, there is the mutable, what creates and destroys. This third essence, which is implicitly according to the genuine concept the return to unity (i.e., when determined in all its concreteness it is spirit), is comprehended at this stage merely in the mode of being, as its becoming, arising, and passing away; this is Shiva, destroyer
 231 | and creator. It is these three forms therefore that stand at the apex.

These are determinations that derive from the concept. What we still have to illustrate is how they are represented more concretely, and also how consciousness relates to this objectivity—in other words, the nature of the cultus.²⁴⁰

The basic determination of the theoretical consciousness is, as has been said, the category of unity, of what is called *Brahmā*, *Bruhṃā*, and *suchlike*. I have pointed out that this unity lapses into the ambiguity that *Brahmā* is sometimes the universal, the all, at other times one particularity set against another; thus *Brahmā* makes his appearance as creator, but then he is placed in a subordinate position again, he himself speaks of something higher than himself, a universal soul. This confusion marking the Hindu presentation is notable in that this inconsistency has its ground in the very content of these determinations, in their necessary dialectic; all-ordering spirit is not yet present, so that the determinations appear first in one form, then that form must be annulled again as one-sided so that another form enters on the scene. Thus the necessity of the concept becomes apparent initially only as deviation or confusion, as something that has no internal stability within itself, and it is [only] the nature of the concept that brings a solid foundation into this confusion.

The first basic category is thus the purely and simply One, Brahman. This One appears as fixed on its own account, as the eternal in and with itself. But because this One must proceed to determination, even though its determinacy remains devoid of spirit, all of its determinations are in turn called Brahman themselves; and they *are* Brahman, they are themselves this self-contained One, One-

240. *Thus G; P reads:* There are a number of noteworthy moments or aspects.

within-itself. So they acquire the epithet of the One-in-itself; all that are posited as particular gods take it on themselves to *be* Brahman, with the result that an Englishman who has investigated most carefully the various ways in which Brahman is presented in order to determine what the term means arrives at the conclusion that it is an empty epithet of praise, because Brahman is not explicitly regarded as “this” One, but everything | applies the term Brahman to itself. 232
 (I am referring to Mill’s *History of India*.²⁴¹) On the basis of a great number of Hindu texts he shows that Brahmā is in general a meaningless epithet of praise, which is applied to a variety of gods and in no way expresses the more refined concepts of perfection and unity that we represent to ourselves,²⁴² and which do appear in other Hindu prayers.²⁴³ According to Mill, Vishnu is also called the supreme Brahman, while Krishna [too] is referred to as the great Brahman: “That is my uterus, my womb, in which I place my progeny and from which I then cause nature to issue forth in all directions.” Just for this reason the great Brahman is the procreative link in all natural configurations: “I am the father of all germination, of all that has in it an impulse to become.”²⁴⁴ Hence water is called Brahman, and the sun is Brahman. In the old Hindu Vedas, for example, the sun is especially exalted; and if one considers the prayers addressed to it in isolation, one may come to believe that the early Hindus saw Brahman merely in the form of the sun, and that their religion was thus different from that of their successors. But the air too, any movement in the atmosphere, is Brahman; the breath,

241. [Ed.] Mill, *History of British India* 1:230–231. Hegel goes on to say that, although the term “Brahmā” in no way expresses the more refined conceptions of perfection and unity, these do appear in other Hindu prayers; however, the latter point appears to be based on a misreading of Mill, who says that Brahmā is “no more indicative of refined notions of the unity, or any perfection of the Divine Nature, than other parts of their panegyric devotions.”

242. *Ho reads*: Mill (three quarto volumes on Indian history) writes: “The Hindu text that I have before me shows that Brahman applies to all gods, not to the image of one God.”

243. *Ho reads, precedes in W*: This is illusion, for Brahman is on the one hand the One, the unchanging—which, however, because it itself implies change, is also applied to the plenitude of different shapes, since this is its *own* plenitude.

244. [Ed.] For this and the preceding quotation, see Mill, *History of British India*, p. 232. The quotations are not exact.

233 understanding, happiness—all these are called Brahman.²⁴⁵ And it is more especially Shiva (or Mohadeva or Rudra) who also says of himself that he is Brahman. Shiva says of himself in the *Oupnek'hat*:²⁴⁶ "I am what is and what is not, I am all that has been, I am now and ever shall be. What is, that I am; what is not, that I am also. I am Brahmā and also Brahman, I am the first cause, the truth, I am the ox and every living thing; "before anything was, I am; I am"²⁴⁷ | past, present, and future. I am Rudra, I am all worlds,"²⁴⁸ and so on.

Thus Brahman is the One; and again, whatever exists independently and is represented as God is itself also Brahman. Hence it is said that consciousness also says to itself, "I am Brahman."²⁴⁹ There is, for example, also a prayer to speech wherein speech says of itself, "I am Brahman, the universal supreme soul."²⁵⁰ So Brahman is the One, but cannot be held fast exclusively as the One; Brahman does not have being in the way in which we say of one God, "This One is universal unity." This One here is *every* unity; here everything that is independent, identical with self, says "I am Brahman." But in the second place Brahman is chiefly represented as the creator; and we shall see the significance of Brahman more clearly (as also

245. [Ed.] The sources of these references are translations by H. T. Colebrooke contained in his articles "On the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus" and "On the Vedas, or Sacred Writings of the Hindus," *Asiatic Researches* 5:349 ff.; 8:417, 456. However, Hegel's arrangement of the material shows that he is again following Mill, *History of British India*, p. 232. In regard to the special place accorded to the sun in the Vedas, Colebrooke (*Asiatic Researches* 8:396) cites the Rig-Veda to the effect that "the great soul" is called the sun, "for he is the soul of all beings."

246. [Ed.] Hegel does, to be sure, refer here to the *Oupnek'hat*, a collection of Upanishads in Persian translation, which was translated into Latin by Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil du Perron under the title *Theologia et philosophia Indica: Oupnek'hat*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1801–1802), 2:12 ff. Since, however, there is no conclusive evidence that Hegel used this translation and his argumentation is very similar to Mill's, it may be assumed that he is using Mill's translation of the Upanishad in question, *History of British India* 1:227, although again the text as given diverges considerably from that reproduced by Mill.

247. *Ho adds*: life and death,

248. *Thus G; D reads*: Rudra is living and dead, what is and what will be, the whole world.

249. [Ed.] See Francis Wilford, "An Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West," *Asiatic Researches* 11:126.

250. [Ed.] See Colebrooke, "On the Vedas," *Asiatic Researches* 8:402–403.

the relationship between Brahman and the other gods, Vishnu and Shiva) if we examine how the creation of the world is pictured.

The creation of the world is not pictured as a definite story, the way we have it in the sacred books of Judaism. Among the Hindus everyone makes his own picture by contemplative speculation, with the result that there is no fixed pattern to be found and there are as many views of it as there are people.

²⁵¹In a "dissertation" prefaced to his translation of a history of India in Persian, Colonel Dow²⁵² offers us a translation from the Vedas containing the following account of the creation of the world. Brahmā existed from all eternity, in a form of infinite dimensions. When it pleased him to create the world, he said, "Rise up, O Brahmā!" (Thus the starting point was desire or appetite, inner will; in speaking thus, he was speaking to himself.) Immediately a spirit of the color of flame issued from his navel, having four heads and four hands.²⁵³ (This fire is again himself, --and has only itself, as immeasurable, for its object.) | Brahmā gazing round, and seeing nothing but the immeasurable image out of which he had proceeded (self-relatedness, and the creation of self-relatedness, is a fundamental category that occurs very frequently; elsewhere it is said that the world is produced by mediation, by this reposeful thought or self-relatedness), he traveled a thousand years, to endeavor to comprehend its dimensions. But after all his toil he found himself as much at a loss as before. Lost in amazement, Brahmā gave up his journey. He fell prostrate and considered what he had seen in these four quarters. The almighty, something distinct from Brahmā, so the account continues, then spoke thus to him: "Thou hast done well,

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251. *Precedes in W₂ (1831)*: Let me finally add the following illustration, in which are expressed together all those moments we have considered so far, in both their severance and their dialectic.

252. [Ed.] See Alexander Dow, *This History of Hindostan, from the Earliest Accounts to the Death of Akbar*, 2 vols. (London, 1768), 1:xlvi–xlix. Although a German translation of Dow's work was published in Leipzig in 1772–1774, Hegel appears to have used the English edition, which he gives in a reasonably accurate translation of his own until nearly the end of this paragraph. Our translation of Hegel's translation follows the English original as closely as possible. The parenthetical insertions represent Hegel's comments.

253. *Ho adds*: (also regions of the sky)

- 235 O Brahmā, for thou | canst not comprehend me. Go Brahmā, create the world, thou canst not comprehend thyself, make something comprehensible." Brahmā asked, "How am I to make a world?" The almighty answered and said, "Ask of me and power shall be given unto thee." Thereupon fire came again out of the figure of Brahmā and in his imagination he perceived the ideas of all things, as if floating before his eyes. He said, "Let all that I see become real, but how shall I preserve these things, that they be not annihilated?" In the instant a spirit of blue color issued from Brahmā's mouth, and this is himself again, Vishnu, Krishna, the preserving principle.²⁵⁴ And Brahmā commanded the spirit to create all animals, with vegetables for their subsistence. But human beings were still lacking to rule the whole. Vishnu set to work on Brahmā's command, but the human beings that he made were idiots with great bellies and no knowledge, like the beasts in the field; they had no passions and no will but to satisfy their carnal appetites.²⁵⁵ Brahmā, offended at the human beings, destroyed them, and produced four persons from his own breath. These four persons were ordered by Brahmā to rule over the creatures, but they did not want to rule over the world. They refused to do anything but to praise God, because they were created from Brahmā's breath alone, and had none of the mutable, destructible quality in them, no transient nature. Now Brahmā was angry, and his anger was a brown spirit that started from between his eyes, and sat down before him with crossed legs and arms and began to weep, asking: "Who am I and where shall be the place of my abode?" Brahmā said: "Thy name shall be Rudra (Shiva), and all nature shall be the place of thine abode; go now,
- 236 and make human beings." And he did so, | but the human beings he made were fiercer than tigers, having nothing but the destructive quality in their compositions; so they soon destroyed one another, for rage and anger were their only passion. In this story we see the three gods at work in isolation from one another, and what they

254. Thus G; P reads: This spirit received the name Krishna. D reads: this he named Vishnu. Ho reads: it was Vishnu, Krishna, he who sustains.

255. Thus P; G reads: with neither passions nor will but only carnal appetite. D reads: with neither passions nor will.

create is merely one-sided, devoid of truth. At last Brahmā, Vishnu, and Rudra joined their different powers and in this way created human beings—ten of them.²⁵⁶ In this account all the moments are necessarily expressed, with the mode of their appearance too. In the Laws [Code] of Manu a different picture of the creation of the world is given;²⁵⁷ in other words, every account gives its own particular view.

We can now let the matter rest regarding Brahmā generally, and we have also seen his connection with Rudra and Vishnu. Vishnu is, as has been said, that which incarnates itself, the essence that appears in human form, in the form of ruling princes, especially those who made revolutions, and great conquerors or lovers.

Thirdly, there is Mahadeva or Shiva, which ought, properly

256. *Ho reads*: he becomes for himself his own object and what is determinate over against his own immeasurable indeterminacy. Consequently it is also stated elsewhere that it was by meditating on himself that Brahmā created the world. Now Brahmā, the fiery spirit, looked around him and saw only the immeasurable image out of which he had proceeded. He needed a thousand years to encompass it, but after this long journey he knew as little as before. Then he fell down before the almighty, who cried, "Thou hast done well to prostrate thyself, for thou canst not comprehend me." "Speak comprehensibly," said Brahmā, "how am I to create the world?" "Ask of me," replied the almighty, "and power shall be given unto thee." And fire came out of the figure of Brahmā, whereupon [his] spirit perceived the ideas of all things as if floating before his eyes, and said, "Almighty one, let all that I see take firm shape. For how could I preserve all these images, that they be not annihilated?" A spirit of blue color issued from Brahmā's mouth; it was Vishnu, Krishna, he who preserves, and he was to cause all living things to subsist by giving them nourishment. In this way natural things were created, but there were still no human beings to rule over them. Human beings were created by Vishnu, but they were idiots, with no interest beyond the natural and wrapped up in their bellies. As such they offended Brahmā, who now caused four persons to issue from his breath; but inasmuch as these were created solely by the One, the universal being, and lacked the destructive quality, they only wished to praise him. Now Brahmā raged within himself, and the brown spirit that was his rage, springing forth from him, wept and asked, "Who am I, who am I to remain?" "Thy name shall be Rudra [*Ho reads*: Budar]," called Brahmā, "the whole world is thine, create human beings." Rudra obeyed, but his humans were like tigers, they could only destroy, and rage was their only passion. So the beings created by Vishnu merely wanted to exist; Brahmā's were pure spirits; and in contrast with this natural and spiritual positivity, Rudra's creatures could only negate, destroy. Then Brahmā joined all these qualities together and so made human beings.

257. [Ed.] See *Institutes of Hindu Law* (Calcutta, 1794), 1:5–12.

speaking, to be spirit returning into itself, but since the different moments or elements are here distinct, it is only becoming, change in general and, more precisely, life, the creative force.

In the Vedas there is no mention of Vishnu and Shiva. These are determinations that came on the scene only later.²⁵⁸ It may further be noted that the Hindus are divided into a multitude of sects under the various deities; some worship Vishnu, others Shiva, and bloody wars have been fought on this account. Even nowadays, on the occasion of the great yearly festivals where millions of people are often assembled, disputes and fighting break out over the primacy accorded to one deity or the other.²⁵⁹ The cult of Mahadeva in particular is very extensive, the cult of the vital force, this obscene cult whose symbol stands erect²⁶⁰ in most Hindu temples. The image here is that Brahmā in his first desire, his first act of volition, split into male and female, the male being Mahadeva and the female Yoni; this primal desire of Brahmā produced all the characteristics that make up the | male and the female generally.²⁶¹ This cult of the power of procreation and its symbol is the phallus cult, which has persisted in India, Egypt, and Greece. The remaining army of gods—Indra, the god of heaven, of fire, of created life, etc., including

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258. [Ed.] Hegel is probably here summarizing the impression he gained from Colebrooke's "On the Vedas," *Asiatic Researches* 8:377–497, esp. pp. 494–495, where Colebrooke argues that although the three principal manifestations of the one deity are mentioned in the Vedas, the fact that worship of the different incarnations of Vishnu is a comparatively new development supports the view that the passages in question are later accretions.

259. [Ed.] See Mill, *History of British India* 1:226. Mill's statements in regard to the disputes between the different sects are based on several other authors, in particular J. D. Paterson, "On the Origin of the Hindu Religion," *Asiatic Researches* 8:46. Hegel may also have been familiar with W. C. Seybold's *Ideen zur Theologie und Staatsverfassung des höhern Alterthums* (Tübingen, 1820), where a footnote to p. 45 states specifically that the contention for preeminence between Vishnu and Shiva "was often the cause of bloody disputes between the Hindus."

260. *Ho reads*: cult of procreation whose symbols, the male and female pudenda (Shiva and Geroni) [sic], are erected.

261. [Ed.] It is not known to which of his sources Hegel is specifically indebted for his knowledge of the cult of the *lingam* (phallic emblem) and *yoni* (female organ); several of them refer to it, always in disparaging terms. The myth of Brahmā's division into male and female is to be found in the Code of Manu; see *Institutes of Hindu Law* 5:32.

the worship of the cow, the elephant, the horse, and so on—all belong to the sphere of mere imagination and confusion, where nothing determinate can be cognized further through or on the basis of the concept, but where such living things as apes and cows are taken and raised into universal essences, raised to gods; all this typically belongs to the category of the imagination.

b. The Cultus

We have to consider, secondly, the relationship of self-consciousness to its [divine] object, i.e., the cultus. This relationship has the same basic characteristics as we have observed in the world of its gods, namely the falling apart of the different aspects or moments.²⁶² |

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1. Self-consciousness is to be considered in relation to Brahmā himself, to this basic category. In regard to this relationship there are three forms to be distinguished. First, every individual Hindu is momentarily Brahmā. Brahman is this One, the abstraction of thought, of the universal, and to the extent that people make the

262. *W₂ (1831) adds:* What corresponds to the character of the divine world is subjective religion, the self-comprehending of self-consciousness in the relationship to the world of its gods.

W (1831) continues: As the idea has developed in this world to the point where its basic categories emerge, but these are still external to one another—and the empirical world too is still external and unintelligible vis-à-vis the world of the gods and vis-à-vis itself, and so abandoned to the caprice of the imagination—consciousness too, trained to reach out in all directions, is incapable of rising to genuine subjectivity. What presides over this sphere is the pure homogeneity [*Gleichheit*] of thought, which is at the same time defined as self-contained, creative power. But this basic foundation is purely theoretical; it is still the kind of substantiality from which, to be sure, everything implicitly proceeds and in which everything is implicitly contained, but outside which all content has emerged independently and been made objective and universal, not according to its determinate existence and relatedness but by virtue of the unity [of thought]. Merely theoretical, formal thinking gets the content as it appears as contingently determined; while it can abstract from it, it cannot elevate it to form the connecting link in a system, i.e., to a regulated coexistence. In this way thought remains entirely bereft of practical significance; in other words, its categories do not acquire a universal character from effectiveness and will, and though the form develops implicitly in accord with the nature of the concept, it does not emerge as posited by the concept, contained in its unity. Hence the effectiveness of will does not attain to freedom of will, does not attain to a content determined by the unity of the concept, and so more rational, more objective, more regulated, or conforming to law. On the contrary, this unity remains power that is merely implicit, substantial, withdrawn

239 effort to attain this level, | to collect themselves inwardly, they *are* Brahman. This is a particularly noteworthy characteristic. Brahman itself is not worshiped, and has no temple; the one God is not worshiped, no services are held in his honor, no prayers are addressed

from existence—it is Brahmā, who has dismissed actuality as contingency and now leaves it to fend for itself, leaves it to its own uncontrolled caprice.

The cultus is in the first place a relationship of the self-consciousness to Brahmā, but then to the rest of this world of the gods that subsists outside him.

As regards the first relationship, that to Brahmā, this is excellent and distinctive on its own account in proportion as it keeps itself isolated from everything else that goes to make up life on the concrete, religious, and temporal planes.

Brahman is thought, human beings think, so Brahman has an existence essentially in human self-consciousness. But humanity is at this stage defined in principle as thinking; in other words, thinking as such—and in the first place as pure theory—here has universal existence, because thinking itself is defined as such, as inward power, and so includes form (form in general, i.e., abstractly) or the specification of determinate being [*Dasein*] in general.

Human beings as such are not merely thinking beings; rather at this stage they are *of and for themselves* thought [*für sich Denken*], they are conscious of themselves as pure thinking. For, as we have just said, thought here comes to existence as such, and human beings have the representation of it within them. They are of and for themselves thought, for thinking is in itself power; but power itself is the infinite, self-relating negativity that being-for-self [*Fürsichsein*] is. But being-for-self, wrapped in the universality of thought in general, raised in such universality to free homogeneity with self, is merely the *soul* of a living being. It is not self-consciousness, possessed of power, caught up in the singularity of appetite, but the *self* of consciousness, knowing itself in its universality, which—as thinking itself, inwardly representing itself—knows itself as Brahman.

W₂ continues: Or if we take as our starting point the notion that Brahman is essence or abstract unity, self-absorption, then even as this self-absorption it has its existence in the finite subject, in the particular spirit. To the idea of the true belongs the universal—substantive unity and homogeneity with self—but in such a way that this unity is not simply indeterminate, not solely substantive unity, but is determined inwardly. The determinacy of Brahman, however, is external. Thus its highest determinacy, namely consciousness, knowledge of its real existence, this subjectivity of unity, can only be the subjective consciousness as such.

W continues: This relationship should not be termed a cultus, for it does not constitute a relation to thinking substantiality as to something objective, but rather is known immediately as *my* subjectivity, as I myself. In fact it is *I* who am this pure thought, and the ego itself is indeed its expression, for the ego as such is this abstract, indeterminate self-identity within me; qua ego, I am simply thought as what is posited along with the character of subjective existence reflected into self, thought as what thinks. Likewise the converse must also be granted, that thought, as this abstract thinking, has as its existence this subjectivity immediately expressed by the ego. For genuine thinking—which is God—is not this abstract thinking or this simple sub-

to him. The English author²⁶³ of a treatise on Hindu idolatry has a great deal to say about this, for instance: If we ask a Hindu whether he reveres, prays, and sacrifices to Brahman as supreme being,²⁶⁴ he will say, "Never! We bring him no sacrifices." If we then ask him what is this silent veneration and meditation that is enjoined on you and practiced so widely, he will reply: "When I direct my prayer to any of the gods, when I²⁶⁵ seat myself on the ground, tuck in and cross my legs, fold my arms, look up to heaven, and collect my spirit and my thoughts without moving my tongue, I say within myself, I *am* Brahman, or the supreme being." |

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²⁶⁶ "If we compare this with other configurations, for example

stantiality and universality, but thinking only as the concrete, absolutely fulfilled *idea*. The thinking that is merely the in-itself [*Ansich*] of the idea is none other than abstract thinking, which has merely this finite existence, i.e., existence in the subjective self-consciousness, over against which it lacks the objectivity of concrete being-in-and-for-self; therefore it is rightly not revered by self-consciousness.

263. [Ed.] See Francis Wilford, "An Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West," *Asiatic Researches* 11:125–126.

264. W (1831) reads: whether he worships idols, he will reply without a moment's hesitation, "Yes, I worship idols." If on the other hand we ask a Hindu (learned or unlearned doesn't matter) whether he worships the supreme being, Paramisvara, G adds: whether he prays and sacrifices to it,

265. *Ho* reads: pray, when I sacrifice, then I worship a specific God. But when I

266. W (*MiscP*) reads (*parallel in main text follows*): These characteristics of Brahman seem to have so much in common with the God of other religions, with the true God himself, that it seems not without importance, on the one hand, to point out the difference that does exist, and on the other to indicate why the way of characterizing subjective existence in terms of self-consciousness that is consistent with the pure essence of Hinduism does not occur in these other ways of viewing the matter. The God of Judaism is the same, nonsensuous, one substantiality and power that is only for thought: he is himself objective thought, but not yet the inwardly concrete One that God is as spirit. The highest Hindu deity, however, is only the neuter One, not the personal One. [*W*₂: It has being only in itself, not for itself.] It is Brahman, the neuter element or the universal category: Brahman as subject, on the other hand, is from the outset one of the three persons, if one can so call them [*W*₁: or figures of the Trimurti. *W*₂: —which in truth one cannot, as they lack spiritual subjectivity as an essential basic characteristic.] It does not suffice that the Trimurti proceeds from and also returns into the neuter One; in this way Brahman is nonetheless represented only as substance, not as subject. One the other hand, the God of Judaism is the personal and exclusive One, who will have no other gods beside him. This is why he is defined not merely as the in-itself but as what has being for itself, a consuming [fire]. He is defined as a subject, posited in undeveloped form, yet genuine. To this extent his goodness and justice also remain only properties, or, as the Hebrews were

with the Jewish God, he too is the One, the universal, a completely
 241 nonsensible substantiality, which has being solely for thought, not
 for sensuous representation but | for representation only to the extent
 it partakes of thought. Here too, objectivity is defined in terms of
 242 objective thought, but this pure, self-identical substantiality is not
 yet the inwardly concrete, | which is spirit. Thus Brahman and the
 Jewish God are defined in the same way, but they also differ in that

more inclined to express themselves, "names," of God. These properties or names
 do not become particular configurations, although they also do not yet become the
 content by virtue of which the Christian unity of God is the only spiritual one.
 Consequently, the Jewish God cannot acquire the character of a subjective existence
 within self-consciousness, because he is rather a subject *in himself* and therefore does
 not need an other for [his own] subjectivity—an other in which he would for the
 first time acquire this character, but in so doing, because the subjectivity resided in
 an other, would also have only a subjective existence.

As opposed to this, what the Hindu says in and to himself, namely, "I am Brahman,"
 must essentially be recognized as identical with the subjective and objective vanity
 of the present day, with what the ego is made through the oft-mentioned assertion
 that we know nothing of God. For to say that the ego has no affirmative relation
 to God, that he is for the ego something beyond, a nothing devoid of content, means
 that only the ego of and for itself is what is affirmative for the I. It is of no help to
 say, "I recognize God as above me, outside me"—for God is a notion devoid of content,
 whose sole categorial determination, all that can be cognized or known of it, all that
 it is supposed to be for me, is limited wholly and simply to the fact that this utterly
 indeterminate being *is* and that it is the negative of me. Admittedly it is not posited
 as the negative of me in the Hindu "I am Brahman"—quite the contrary. But the
 seemingly affirmative definition of God, that he is, is of itself on the one hand only
 the perfectly empty abstraction of being, and thus only a subjective definition, one
 that exists only in my self-consciousness, and, because it does so, pertains also to
 Brahman. On the other hand, inasmuch as it was also supposed to have an objective
 meaning, this in itself—leaving aside more concrete definitions, such as that God is
 a subject in and for himself—would suffice to make it something that is known of
 God, a category of the divine. And this is already too much: being is thus *ipso facto*
 reduced to the mere "outside me," yet is also expressly supposed to mean only the
 negative of me, a negation in which all that in fact remains to me is I myself. We
 are flogging a dead horse if we seek to pass off this negative of me, what is outside
 or above me, as an objectivity that is professed or at least supposed or recognized.
 For this is merely to express a negative, and to do so explicitly, through me; but neither
 this abstract negation nor the fact that it is posited by me and that I know this negation
 (and it alone) *as* negation constitutes objectivity. Nor is it objectivity at least of form,
 even if not of content, for the form of objectivity that is devoid of content, without
 content, is an empty form, something intended in merely subjective manner. (In
 Christendom, what had merely the categorial determination of the negative used to

the Hindu God, being God from the standpoint of consciousness, is just the One, just neuter, not a personal One.²⁶⁷ *Brahmā*, defined as personal subject, is determined as one of the three persons of the Trimurti, or trinity, whereas Brahman as such—of whom the Hindu says, “I am Brahman”—is not yet defined as subject. On the other hand the God of Judaism is defined as the personal One, exclusive [of others], as subject, who will have no other gods beside him. This

be called the devil.) In this way the only affirmative element that remains is this subjectively intending ego. With a one-sided dialectic, it has in skeptical fashion emptied all content from the sensible and supersensible world and defined it as something negative for it. Since all objectivity has become vain for it, the only thing left is this positive vanity itself—the objective ego, which alone is power and essence, in which everything [*W*₁: has disappeared. *W*₂: has disappeared and all content is absorbed as finite, so that the ego is what is universal, the lord of all categories and the exclusive, affirmative point.]

The Hindu “I am Brahman” and the so-called religion, the I, of modern reflective belief, differ from each other only in the external circumstance that the former expresses the first, naive mode of comprehension, in which the pure substantiality of its thought comes about for self-consciousness in such a way that alongside its thought it also accords validity to all other content and recognizes it as objective truth. In contrast with this, the reflective belief that denies any objectivity to truth holds fast to and recognizes only solipsistic subjectivity. [*W*₂: In this fully developed type of reflection, not only all content but also the divine world is only something posited by me.]

This first relationship of the Hindu to Brahman is posited only in the single prayer, and since it is itself the *existence* of Brahman, the ephemeral aspect of this existence can immediately be seen as inadequate to the content, [*W*₁: in order to meet the demand *W*₂: which gives rise to the demand] that this existence should itself be made universal and lasting, as its content is. It is only the ephemeral aspect of time that appears as the proximate defect in that existence, for it is only that which stands in relation to that abstract universality, compares itself to it, and appears as inadequate to it. For in other respects its subjective existence, the abstract ego, is on a par with it. But to raise the single glimpse to a lasting vision means nothing other than breaking off the transition from the moment of quiet solitude to the fulfilled present of life, of one’s needs, interests, and occupations, and remaining continually in this motionless, abstract self-consciousness. And this is what many Hindus who are not Brāhmans (about whom I shall be speaking later) accomplish in themselves. They devote themselves with the most persistent assiduity to years or decades of monotonous inactivity, in which they renounce all interests and concerns of everyday life and couple with this the constraint exerted by some unnatural attitude or posture of the body—sitting continuously, walking or standing with their arms above their heads, never lying down, even to go to sleep, etc.

267. [Ed.] The German makes this distinction by means of changing the gender of *Eine*—*das Eine* (the neuter One) and *der Eine* (the personal One).

is a quite essential difference,²⁶⁸ residing solely in the free, pure, differentiating power of thought. Brahman is only the in-itself [*das Ansich*]; it does not exist as being-for-self [*das Fürsichsein*]. We have
 243 noted goodness and justice, in relation to Brahman; with a *valid* | concept, in the personal One, who is *subject*, these determinations are mere properties, or “names,” to use the expression of Jewish scholars.²⁶⁹ They do not become independent shapes on their own account ~vis-à-vis~²⁷⁰ the subjectivity of the One. In contrast with this subjectivity, Brahman is what is abstract (not subjectivity), which achieves subjective existence only in self-consciousness, in the human self-consciousness. He who is One, on the other hand, being already subject in and for himself, does not need for his own existence the subjective consciousness of another; he has being for himself, and in such a way as to exclude any other (including self-consciousness).

Second, we are now in a position to compare these characteristics with what is contained in contemporary reflective belief.²⁷¹ This present-day type of reflection holds fast to immediate knowledge, and it is characteristic of this that God is for me an unknown,

268. Ho, W₁ read: the same, as far as being what is substantial [*Substantialität zu sein*] is concerned; but the difference between them is also essential,

269. [Ed.] In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:398–399 (*Werke* 15:31), and probably also in Part III of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* 3:277 (see n. 73), Hegel refers to a passage in August Neander, *Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme* (Berlin, 1818), p. 12, where Neander describes how Philo came to regard the Logos both as the name of God and as having many names. Here and in the passage from Part III of the *Philosophy of Religion* Hegel equates properties and names of God. Philo, however, stresses on more than one occasion that while goodness and omnipotence, for instance, may be supreme forces and qualities, they are not actual names of God, who has no specific names. See Philo Judaeus, *De Cherubim* §§ 27–30; *De somniis* I §§ 228–231; *De mutatione nominum* §§ 11 ff. (*Opera omnia graece et latine* [Erlangen, 1820], 2:16–18; 5:102–104; 4:324–326). Though Hegel uses the relationship of subjectivity between the One and its properties as an argument against Hinduism, he fails to take into account that Dow (*The History of Hindostan*, p. lxxi–lxxii) and his other sources make similar statements with regard to Brahman.

270. Thus G; P reads: because of

271. Ho adds, similar in W₁: More closely related to Brahmā, on the other hand, is the God of the Enlightenment, the *être suprême*. God is the unknown, empty One, the abstraction of inwardly unmoved negativity consisting in the dissolution of all determinacy [*die Abstraktion der in sich unbewegten Negativität des Aufgelöstseins aller Bestimmtheit*].

something not known, i.e., that he has for me the character of a negative, a beyond. It may, of course, be acknowledged that he lies outside and above me, but this expresses only a negative relationship, whereby the other has being for me as a negative. Abstract being is itself the negative—for example, the *abstractum* that is Brahman; in other words, an abstract being of this kind has its existence in²⁷² self-consciousness, only in my abstracting understanding. We are flogging a dead horse if we believe we have said anything objective about God in saying God is outside and above us.²⁷³ This abstraction of the understanding is only posited by me; I am the only affirmative element that is present in such a statement, so this way of defining God coincides with the contemporary view, that I *am* the universal, the lord of all categories, since they are first posited by me, and obtain their validity through me.²⁷⁴ | This contemporary reflective stage is more sophisticated and freer than that of the Hindu, who in his silent contemplation says, “I am Brahman.” This is the naive stage of abstraction, beside which all else in this divine world is still objective, whereas in present-day reflection the world, like everything else, is only posited by me. This position or standpoint of recent philosophy has emptied the sensible and supersensible world of all content, through reflection. For Hinduism this [reflective] moment exists on its own account, and other contents exist apart from it; in the form of present-day reflection, however, all content, sensible and supersensible, is, qua finite, submerged in the One, so that it is just this one exclusive point of affirmation in which everything else affirmative has being.

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[2.] There are still two other aspects of cultus, i.e., of the relationship of self-consciousness to the One. In the cultus as described, the first relationship is posited only in the moment of individual prayer and reverence, so that Brahman exists only momentarily, and this existence does not measure up to the universality of the content. The

272. Thus P; G reads: existence, its

273. Precedes in W_1 (following Ho): This worthless residue, Ho reads: For it is flogging a dead horse to seek to assign to this worthless residue an objectivity outside what can be found in abstract thinking.

274. Thus G; P reads: and can [also] cause it to disappear. D reads: and that is posited only in self-consciousness.

demand immediately arises that this existence shall be made into a universal, just as the content is universal—it must be made to last. The momentariness is what is unsatisfactory. For the abstract ego as such is the universal, except that the ego itself is only a moment in this existence of the abstraction. So the next demand is that this *abstractum*, this ego, shall match the content, that the single glimpse shall be elevated to a lasting vision, an enduring contemplation. To achieve this, however, necessarily means breaking off the transition from the moment of quiet solitude to life, to the concrete present, to concrete self-consciousness; thus it means renouncing all that is living and all concrete relationships, both the religious relationship and the relationships between the remainder of concrete actual life and the One.²⁷⁵ |

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This is what we see among the Hindus, namely that such of them as are not Brāhmans undertake to make themselves the perfectly abstract ego—and in principle they succeed. Here [belong] the countless tales of how men settle themselves on the ground and refrain from all movement, renouncing every interest and every inclination, letting every family concern and every human contact go, and giving themselves up to silent abstraction; others come to venerate and feed them, but they remain speechless in stubborn inaction, their eyes closed or turned to the sun, so that the light blinds them. Some of them remain like this for their whole lives, others for twenty or thirty years, or for some other period with sacred significance.²⁷⁶ One of these Hindus is said by an Englishman²⁷⁷ to

275. *Ho adds, similar in W*: All concrete presence, whether it be of natural life or of spiritual life—family, state, art, and religion—is dissolved into the pure negativity of abstract selflessness.

276. [Ed.] See Mill, *History of British India* 1:271.

277. [Ed.] See Samuel Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet, Containing a Narrative of a Journey through Bootan, and Part of Tibet* (London, 1800), pp. 270–272. Turner's account was known to Hegel in the form in which it was included in Harnisch, *Die wichtigsten Reisen*, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1824), pp. 287–362; see pp. 350–352. In referring to other such austere practices that had been devised, Hegel may have been thinking of Mill, *History of British India*, pp. 269–273, and the hero Vishvamitra's repeated "austerities" (see the *W* variant, n. 279, where the English word is misspelled) and self-mortification following his defeat and humiliation by Vashishta and other gods. See also Hegel's comments on this anecdote as recounted in the *Ramayana* in his review of Wilhelm

have traveled around for ten years without ever lying down, but slept standing up,~~ then to have spent the next ten years with his hands above his head, then to have planned to swing upside down above a fire, suspended by one foot, so that his body could rotate, for three and three-quarter hours, finally to have had himself buried for three and three-quarters hours. Emerging alive from all this, he had attained the highest level—this being only one of the austere practices of this kind that have been devised. In the Hindus' view, he who achieves this sort of immobility and lifelessness is immersed in the inner [element] and enjoys continued existence as Brahman.

It should be noted that such austerities must not be regarded as penances for offenses committed; nothing is made good by them.²⁷⁸ The offender is one who has set his or her particular will up against the universal, and must then negate it. It is not penance in this sense that we have here, but austerities [*Strengigkeiten*]²⁷⁹ in order to attain the state of Brahman.²⁸⁰ |

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von Humboldt's *Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gītā bekannte Episode des Mahābhārata* (Berlin, 1826), in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1827, pp. 1455–1456, 1468 (cf. *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 115, 127).

278. W₂ (1831) adds: This renunciation or abstinence does not presuppose the consciousness of sin.

279. W (Ed?) adds: (austerities) [sic]

280. W (1831) adds: It is not a question of doing penance with the intention that thereby some crime, sin, or blasphemy should be atoned for. Such an intention presupposes a relationship between the work of human beings, their concrete being and actions, and the one God—an idea rich in content, providing human beings with a yardstick and maxim for their character and behavior, and a model to which to conform their will and their life. But the relationship to Brahman does not yet contain anything concrete, because it itself is only the abstraction of the substantive soul; all further determination and content falls outside Brahman. So a cultus, as a relationship possessing content and directing and actuating concrete human beings, does not occur in the relation to Brahman; and even if such a relationship were present, it would have to be sought in the worship of other gods. But since Brahman is represented as the solitary essence, closed in upon itself, the elevation of the singular self-consciousness, which through the above-mentioned austerities strives to perpetuate its own abstraction, is rather a flight from the concrete actuality of heart and mind and the actuality of life. In the consciousness that "I am Brahman," all virtues and vices vanish, all gods, and finally the Trimurti itself. The concrete consciousness of oneself and of the objective content that is yielded in the Christian notion of penitence, and of the conversion of the ordinary life of the senses, is not defined as something sinful and negative (as in the penitential life of Christians and Christian monks and

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Associated with this is the notion that people who in this way have achieved a permanent state of Brahman have thereby obtained, and henceforth are, the absolute power over nature.²⁸¹ It is supposed that such a one inspired fear and anxiety in the heart of Indra, God of heaven and earth, and that he ran to the great Brahman and complained | that he was threatened with destruction. In one passage of Bopp's *Chrestomathie*²⁸² the story of two giants is referred to, who beg the almighty to grant them immortality, but as they have only engaged in such exercises in order to achieve power over nature, he grants their wish only insofar as they are only to die at each other's hands. So they now exercise all power over nature. Having achieved this, they give themselves over to every imaginable pleasure. Indra takes fright at them and resorts to the usual means to divert someone from such exercises: he conjures up a beautiful woman, each of the giants wants her for his wife, and in quarreling over her they kill each other, and so nature is preserved by this expedient.

[3.] Third, a quite distinctive characteristic in respect to self-consciousness is that every member of the Brāhman caste is deemed

in the idea of conversion), but encompasses, on the other hand, as we have just indicated, the very content that is in other respects deemed holy. On the other hand, precisely the character of the religious standpoint we are considering is that all its moments or aspects fall apart, and the supreme unity is not mirrored in what makes up the content of mind and heart, the content of life.

W₂ continues: If the absolute is grasped as what is spiritually free and inwardly concrete, then self-consciousness occurs as something essential in religious consciousness only to the extent that it becomes capable of moving in inwardly concrete fashion and is represented and experienced as possessing content. But if the absolute is an abstraction such as the beyond or the supreme being, so too is self-consciousness, because it is naturally thoughtful, naturally good, what it ought to be.

281. *Ho adds:* for this abstraction is the negation of all natural life and all finitude. In Hindu poetry ten years spent in this way becomes 10,000.

[*Ed.*] Here again Hegel is referring to the account of Vishvamitra's self-mortification, which he commented on in the Humboldt review (n. 277, cf. *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 119–123), and apparently also at length in the 1831 lectures (see n. 280).

282. [*Ed.*] By "Bopp's *Chrestomathie*" Hegel here denotes an edition of various episodes in the Mahābhārata recently published (with translation and commentary) by Franz Bopp under the title *Ardschuna's Reise zu Indra's Himmel, nebst anderen Episoden des Mahā-Bhārata* (Berlin, 1824), pp. 36–45. His account, and especially the reference to "two giants," is not entirely accurate, possibly because he also has in mind another episode narrated in an earlier work by Bopp, which did deal with a giant.

to be Brahman and for all other Hindus is God. However, this particular way of seeing things is consistent with the two characteristics we have already discussed. These two aspects make up, as it were, an abstract or detached relationship of the self-consciousness to Brahman, the first being purely momentary, the second merely the escape from life, "looking away from self-consciousness, a renunciation."²⁸³ The third demand, therefore, is that the relationship to Brahman should not be merely escape, renunciation of the life principle, but that it should also be posited affirmatively. The question then is, what form must the affirmative mode of this relationship take? The only possible form is that of immediate existence. This transition is a difficult one to picture. What is merely internal, only implicit, that is what is merely external; the merely abstract assumes immediately a merely sensuous guise, it is merely sensuous externality. And since the relationship here described is the wholly abstract relationship to this wholly abstract substance, the affirmative relationship involved is likewise wholly abstract, but at the same time it is immediate. This is what secures the transition and maintains the necessity of the | determination in question; what is involved is therefore the *abstract transition*. "The relationship of the self-consciousness to Brahman appears in concrete form simply by being"²⁸⁴ an immediate, natural relationship; and hence, being a natural relationship, it is an *innate* relationship, one that stems from birth.

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Human beings are always *thinking* beings, and if we stick to this we can say it is human nature to think; thinking is a natural human quality. But that human beings are thinkers in principle is still different from the characteristic that we are here discussing, namely, the consciousness of *natural* thinking in principle as what has absolute being. What we have quite generally in this form is the consciousness of thought. I am this consciousness, I think, and thinking is here posited as absolute being. This consciousness of thought, and of my being a thinker—this it is that is here posited as existing

283. *Ho, W* read: The second is everlasting life in Brahman as the everlasting death of all individuality.

284. *Thus G; D* reads: In concrete form the transition occurs in the priest, so that the relationship of the self-consciousness to Brahman is

naturally or is asserted to be innate, and that it appears in this form rests on the ~conjoining of pure abstraction with the determinate immediacy of natural being.²⁸⁵

Inasmuch as human beings are *thinking* beings in principle, and a distinction is made between this and the *consciousness* of thought as of what is universal or has being in itself, and both thinking in principle and conscious thought are [regarded as] innate, it follows that there are in principle two classes of human beings. On the one side there are those who *merely* think, or the generality of humanity; on the other side there are those who are the *consciousness* of thinking, the *consciousness* of absolute being. These latter are the caste of Brāhmans, the born-again, those who are twice-born,²⁸⁶ once by a natural birth, and the second time as thinkers, ~so that they can be treated and addressed accordingly, as born-again. The inward
249 [element], knowledge, is for human beings²⁸⁷ | the source of their second life, the root of their genuine existence, the existence that they confer upon themselves through thought, through freedom.

Hence all Brāhmans are considered to be twice-born from the outset, and are held in the utmost veneration, compared with all other humans, who are worthless.²⁸⁸ If anyone of lower caste touches a Brāhman, he has incurred death. The Code of Manu²⁸⁹ prescribes a great variety of punishments for offenses against Brāhmans. If, for example, a Sudra (from the fourth caste) says something insulting to a Brāhman, a glowing iron rod ten inches long is forced into his mouth; and if he makes so bold as to want to instruct a Brāhman, hot oil is poured into his mouth and ears, and so forth. Brāhmans are supposed to have a secret power; it is said in the Code of Manu, "Let no king incur the wrath of a Brāhman, for if he is in a rage

285. *G* reads: entire relationship. *W*₂ (1831/MiscP?) reads: entire relationship; for even though it is a form of knowing, this consciousness must be immediate.

286. [Ed.] For the idea that Brāhmans are twice-born, see, e.g., *Institutes of Hindu Law*, pp. 39-39.

287. *Ho* reads, *similar in W*: This goes deep. For thought is here regarded as

288. *W*₂ (1831) adds: The whole life of Brāhmans expresses the existence of Brahman; their action consists in bringing Brahman forth; indeed, they have through birth the privilege of being the existence of Brahman.

289. [Ed.] See *Institutes of Hindu Law*, pp. 224, 285.

he can immediately destroy king and kingdom, with its army, strongholds, chariots, and elephants.”

The third or concrete relationship of consciousness to Brahman assumes another, distinctive shape. This Brahman, this highest consciousness of the absoluteness of thought, has being on its own account; it is cut off, does not exist as a concrete, active spirit. And hence the subject has not any living connection with this unity either; the concrete element in self-consciousness has departed from this region, the connection is broken off. In fact, this is just what constitutes the character of this religious view, wherein, it is true, the different moments or aspects are developed, but in such a way that they remain external to one another. Now inasmuch as in the subjective self-consciousness this region of the One is thus cut off, it is devoid of spirit, i.e., it exists naturally, as something innate. This innate self-consciousness is thus something natural, something particular, and distinct from universal self-consciousness; consequently, it belongs only to a few, who find themselves at this standpoint through the accident of birth. |

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“We must grasp quite definitely that this region is something devoid of spirit. This becomes clearer if we compare the Hindu religion with others where this is not the case.”²⁹⁰ Where consciousness of the universal in general, of what is essential, shines through into the particular, is active in it and delimits it, there freedom of spirit comes into being in some form; and the legal and ethical realms depend upon the particular being delimited [in this way] by the universal. In private law, for instance, the freedom of the individual is his externalization in regard to the possession of things; and this is what gives rise to private law. In this particular realm of existence I am free, the article counts as mine in particular, “[it belongs] to a free subject, and in this way particular existence is delimited by the universal; my particular existence is coherent with this universality. It is the same with family relationships. Ethical life

290. *Ho reads, similar in W:* The single individual is directly the universal, the divine. Spirit exists in this fashion, but the merely subsisting spirit is devoid of spirit. Thus the life of the individual as this single individual, and his life within universality, fall irremediably apart. *W continues:* In religions where this is not the case,

exists only where unity is what delimits the particular, and all particularity is delimited by the substantive unity.²⁹¹ To the extent that this [delimitation] is not posited, consciousness of the universal is essentially cut off, ineffective, unfree, devoid of spirit. And through this isolation [of the universal], what is highest is turned into something unfree, only born naturally.²⁹² With this third characteristic we have come closer to cultus properly speaking, where the relationship is not just posited as a flight from concrete life.

Properly speaking, cultus is the relationship of the self-consciousness to what belongs to the essence, what is in and for itself, consciousness of the One in this essence, and of one's unity with it. The second element is the relationship of the *manifold* consciousness to the—themselves manifold—[essential] objects, in other words to the numerous divinities. |

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Abstract universality, Brahman, is not worshiped, it has no temples, religious services, or altars; the unity of Brahman is not related to the real, to the self-consciousness that is living, active. Regarding the more precise relation of cultus to nature, it follows from what has been said about consciousness of the One being isolated in this way that, in the relationship to the divine,²⁹³ nothing is at this stage determined by reason; for that would mean that the particular actions, symbols, etc., are delimited by *unity*. But here the region of the particular is not defined by this unity; it has therefore the character of *irrationality* and *unfreedom* quite generally. The cultus is not a cultus of Brahman; there is only a relatedness to particular divinities—and they, being forsaken by the unity, are unrestrictedly natural beings; the most abstract elements are implicitly determined by the concept, to be sure, but the unity is only a formal, not a spiritual one,²⁹⁴ and so their significance is only in the mode of a particular material. The defining characteristic is the life force in general, that which generates and perishes, the becoming

291. *Thus G*

292. *Thus G*

293. *Thus G, P; D reads:* in regard to concrete consciousness,

294. *Thus D; G reads:* not taken back into unity in such a way that the Trimurti would become spirit,

and changing of living matter; natural objects, animals and so on, then become attached to this as objects of worship.

The cultus at this stage is a relationship to these particular entities; and because *they* are cut off in a one-sided manner, it too is a relatedness to something that is only *implicitly* essential, to what is posited merely in a natural form or mode. Religious activity generally—i.e., activity concerned with the essence, with the universal, essential aspect of life—is pictured and performed in this way; this is how it is known and done, this is the religious way to act. It has from the outset a content that is *inessential*, devoid of reason. Because these materials in general are objectively (on the one hand) the intuition of God, and subjectively (on the other hand) what it is essential to *do*, because what is of prime concern becomes inessential, the cultus becomes infinite in scope, everything falls within it, the content is of no significance. There is no rhyme or reason to it, and because | the content is natural, external, there is no internal limit to its scope. Religious actions generally—inasmuch as [they] are inwardly devoid of reason—are also determined in a manner devoid of reason, determined solely by external factors. Religious duty, i.e., what is properly essential, is something steadfast, unchanging in its form, quite removed from subjective opinion and caprice. But what it enjoins at this stage is this senseless contingency; and religious practice is merely a fact, a customary usage that cannot be understood because there is no understanding in it.

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On the contrary, what is in it is the dead hand of constraint whichever way one turns. To the extent that this is transcended, because religious practice must also necessarily bring satisfaction or enjoyment, over and above this constraint, the enjoyment happens only through a crude numbing of the senses. At one extreme there is the escape offered by abstraction, in the middle there is enslavement to sensuous activity, and at the other extreme there is wild debauchery; these are the elements of this religiosity, the sorriest depravity. To the extent that escape forms part of the cultus, the present practice is confined to execution of a purely external activity. The cultus consists of merely doing something, and this includes the most barbaric distractions, drunken orgies, sexual promiscuity, and

all kinds of ugliness. This is the necessary character of this type of cultus, which derives from the fact that consciousness of the One is *isolated* from the unity of universality, the linkage with all other concrete [realities] being interrupted, so that everything falls apart. Caprice and freedom are released in the imagination, and it is in the imagination that *poetry* has its field. Among the Hindus we find the most beautiful poetry, but always with an underlying element of utter irrationality: we are attracted by its grace and at the same time repelled by the sheer confusion and nonsense of it.²⁹⁵

If we now consider how far we have come in regard to the nature of God,²⁹⁶ God is now "the true"²⁹⁷ as opposed to multiplicity, the peaceful *being-within-self* or *self-containment* of thought, this ground of universality. In part this self-containment includes power; in part

295. [Ed.] Hegel's very negative assessment of Hinduism is partly due to his direct and indirect sources, whose reports of contemporary India were often tendentious or ingenuous. See esp. Mill, *History of British India* 1:263–282; the report by Turner mentioned in n. 277; Jean Antoine Dubois, *Moeurs, institutions et cérémonies des peuples de l'Inde*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1825; for the lectures of 1824 Hegel may have been familiar with the English translation of this work already published in 1817); and W. Ward, *A View of the History, Literature and Religion of the Hindoos; Including a Minute Description of Their Manners and Customs, and Translations from Their Principal Works*, 2 vols. (London, 1817; Hegel would have been familiar with this work at least through the excerpts from it in E. F. K. Rosenmüller, *Das alte und neue Morgenland*, 6 vols. [Leipzig, 1817–1820]). These reports, however, in all probability merely confirmed the impression Hegel had gained from studying the texts available to him, in particular the Code of Manu (in the *Institutes of Hindu Law*). His general evaluation of Hinduism must in fact be regarded as a deliberate corrective to the uncritical enthusiasm for India generally prevalent in Germany at the time, especially in romantic circles.

296. [Ed.] Hegel summarizes the discussion of nature religion up to this point and prepares the ground for the next stage. The first stage, as described here, is the religion of *being-within-self* (Buddhism); the second is the religion of phantasy (Hinduism)—the *self-differentiation* of absolute being, which previously had been *self-contained*; while the third stage, the next to come, is the religion of the good (Persian religion)—the *reflection back* into itself of what at first had merely been at rest within itself and then differentiated itself into richly variegated forms. Thus it is evident that Hegel discovers a threefold dialectic—a triad of basic forms—in the development of nature religion. Magic and the formal objectification of the divine object merely anticipate the first basic form of religion, while the religion of the enigma is transitional. The triadic structure is more clearly presented in the 1827 lectures.

297. W₁ (1831) reads: substance

power lies outside it. The second stage is the emergence out of this first abstract unity, | the unfolding of the moments making up the idea, for essence must unfold, there must be *self-differentiation* in the thinking of the absolute substance. But the shape achieved here does not get beyond this differentiation, and it is only in flight that unity is achieved. In other words, the differences, being accidental, are themselves swallowed up once more in this unity, but only in such a way as to disappear in it. The third stage, finally, is that of *reflection-into-self*,²⁹⁸ where thought contains self-determination; it does not merely contain determination within itself but *is* the process of determining itself, and the process of determining has worth and validity only to the extent that it is reflected into this unity. At this point the concept of freedom²⁹⁹ is posited generally. This self-containment, this self-determining that does not allow its determinations to escape into separated particular configurations but takes³⁰⁰ them back into itself—this is the principle of *freedom*, of the *good*. In this way God is determined as the good; “good” is not here used merely predicatively, but God *is* the good. (This is a genuine definition; the proof, i.e., the logical development, is presupposed here.)

The concept of the divine is still the *unity* of the finite and infinite at this [present] stage too. Thought that is contained within itself, pure substance, is the infinite, while the multiplicity of gods are, in accordance with the categories of thought, the finite; unity here is negative unity, the abstraction that submerges the many in this One, but the One has not achieved anything by this means, and is no more

298. W₁ (1831) reads: the reflection of multiplicity into itself,

299. W₁ (1831) adds: objectivity

300. W₁ (1831?) reads, *similar in G*: can also allow its determinations to escape into particular configurations, but remains inwardly determined and can take Cf. Ho: In this way is expressed the concept of freedom, being-within-self, which does not shut itself off abstractly, in self-communion, from all determinacy, and by the very fact of insisting on its universality makes itself something determinate—which determinacy is then for it not itself but is rather for it an other. On the contrary, it opens itself up and posits the determinacy that is implicit in it—not leaving it to subsist as an independent distinction outside itself, but taking it back into unity with itself, since it is its own.

254 fully determined than before. In other words, the finite is affirmative only in this way, outside the infinite, not within it;³⁰¹ insofar as it is affirmative, it is something irrational, a finite that is no longer held within the unity. Here we have the finite, the determinate in general, taken up | into infinitude; form matches substance; infinite form is posited as identical with internally self-determining substance. We have substantive form, not merely the form of abstract power. This mode of determination, then, is the *nature religion of the good*.

3. The Religion of the Good or of Light (Persian Religion)³⁰²

The good is that wherein concrete life also intuitively finds its affirmative roots, can become aware of itself in genuine fashion, for this unity we call the good is the process of self-determination. It is this determinacy that yields the coherence with concrete life; moreover, the coherence is affirmative, it is not a flight.³⁰³

This more intimate coherence *can* be grasped in such a way that one says things are “good by nature.” “Good” is here used in its proper sense, not by the standard of some external purpose or some external comparison. We do use “good” for what is appropriate, what is good for some end, so that the end or purpose lies outside the object in question. But what we mean by “good” here, on the contrary, is the universal, that which is directly determined within itself. In this sense the good can be predicated of particular things,

301. [Ed.] The distinction between negative and affirmative forms of finitude and infinitude is one that Hegel makes a good deal of in Part I of the 1824 lectures (see Vol. 1:278–288, 294–310).

302. [Ed.] The religion of the good or of light (*Die Religion des Guten, die Lichtreligion*) was the religion of the ancient Persians, prior to their conversion to Islam. Hegel customarily refers to it as Persian religion or Parseeism (Parsee, or Parsi, derives from the word for Persia, *Pars*), while today it is known as Zoroastrianism, after the traditional founder, Zoroaster (also known as Zarathustra). Hegel’s primary source is J. F. Kleuker’s edition of the Zend-Avesta: *Zend-Avesta, Zoroasters lebendiges Wort, worin die Lehren und Meinungen dieses Gesetzgebers von Gott, Welt, Natur, Menschen; in gleichen Ceremonien des heiligen Dienstes der Parsen usf. aufbehalten sind*, translated from the French edition of Anquetil du Perron, 5 vols. (Riga, 1776–1783). Where possible we also cite the English edition in *Sacred Books of the East* (SBE), *The Zend-Avesta*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1880–1887).

303. W_1 (1831?) adds: Its determinacy is taken up into universality. Cf. *Ho*: For the good is what determines itself in such a way that that the determinacy is as if permeated by its universality, something singular [but] conforming to the universality.

and these particular things are then good, the purpose they serve lies in themselves, they are suited not to an other but to themselves, to this purpose; they are good on their own account. The good is thus a substance that is present in them, not something otherworldly like the unity we have named Brahman; it is not merely over against them, nor merely negative in opposition to particular existence. This, then, is the general determinacy, the foundation of this religion of good.

The second point to be recognized is that the good itself is still initially abstract in principle. More exactly, it is the good in general, in other words the good is substantive unity with self, | the inward process of self-determining; but this process of determining is still undeveloped, it is itself still a universal form, still lacks the definition of the "how." The determinateness, the particular, *is* this universality; inasmuch as it is *only* the particular that is posited, what we have is again utterly universal particularity. To the extent that we do not here move beyond immediate determinacy, all that we have is the good in general. One can say that the good does not yet have within itself the independence of existence. In order to *manifest* itself, the good would have to have being for [its] other, it would have to be internally differentiated or, as in Hinduism, it would have to undergo the separating of its constituent elements or moments, which would, however, continue to subsist in the unity, yet would nonetheless be distinct within this unity.

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The first consequence is that the good has *unmediated* being in things, is their unmediated substance; and because its determinacy is still abstract, the true positing of the determinacy is its particularization, in other words merely the natural diversity of things in general.

To put the second point another way, because the good is still inwardly the substantive unity with its own determination, and the distinctions are not yet posited, the good has an *antithesis*. It is present in the particular nature of things as their substance in general, and it has its more exact determinacy in the particular substance of things. But then, second, it has at once a universal antithesis, whose particularity is opposed to it and not taken back within it. It has in [its] determinacy only the principle of reflection into self. Since

the principle is still abstract, however, the good has the development of the negative outside it. Opposed to the realm of the good there stands the realm of evil, which is engaged in struggle with it. Two principles appear: the good is the true; the evil element is then defined as evil, not as a multiplicity of gods but as essentially other, not just as distinct but as opposite, as a definite antithesis, i.e., outside the good. "Good is engaged in a struggle with evil, which it is destined to overcome, but *destined* only because the struggle knows no end."³⁰⁴ |

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Third, the good in its universality has a natural shape—the pure manifestation [of it] that is present in natural things, namely, *light*. The second point was that the substantive unity coheres with determinately existing things—the genus of determinacies. The third point [now] is that since the good itself is still abstract subjectivity, its singularity is the [external] moment of singularity—the moment or way in which it exists for others; and this moment itself still lies in [the realm of] sentient intuition, it is an external presence, which can now match the content, inasmuch as determinacy as such is taken up into the universal. As this more precise determinacy, as the intuitive mode, the mode of immediacy, its determinacy can here appear as matching the content. Brahman, for example, is merely abstract thought: intuited in a sensuous manner, perhaps only the intuition of space would correspond to it, i.e., a sensuous universality of intuition that is itself merely abstract. But at this stage the substantive element corresponds to the form, namely, the physically universal light, whose antithesis is darkness. Air, breath, spirit—these make up the category of invisibility, and are also physical properties; but this does not make them the ideal element itself, as it were universal individuality or subjectivity—this does not make them light, which manifests itself. That is what the *self*-determining moment of individuality or subjectivity consists in. Light appears as universal light in general and then as a particular, distinctive nature—the nature of particular objects, reflected into itself; it appears as the essentiality of particular things.

304. *Thus G*

Light is not to be understood here as meaning merely the sun. One can say that the sun is the most excellent light, but it is up there as a particular entity, a particular individual. The good, or light [as such], by contrast, has the root of subjectivity within itself, but still only the root; accordingly it is not posited as set apart in this individual way,³⁰⁵ and hence it is to be taken as subjectivity, as the soul of things. Sun worship goes back a very long way, and many ascribe | the proliferation of Hindu gods to the sun. But the sun is not to be confused with Brahman; it belongs to the natural world, to Indra, and in Hinduism this natural world has the form of independence. The prayers and notions of the Hindus took shape several thousand years ago; they derive from the most varied individuals, who are by no means all equally speculative, so that considerable vagueness arises. In the Vedas, for instance, there is no mention of Vishnu, but constant references are made to the sun, though in very general terms. One of the principal prayers that is encountered everywhere is addressed to the sun.³⁰⁶

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We all know that the worship of light itself has actually existed as the Persian religion, the religion of the Parsees to this day. They revere light, not in the form of the sun—strictly and properly speaking, this is no nature worship—but light as denoting the good; and the good exists as an object, it has the sensible shape of light, a shape that corresponds to the content, which is itself still abstract. Light has essentially the meaning of the good, of what is right in general; it is also called Ormazd. As Ormazd it is a human shape, but this is still something superficial—Ormazd is the universal that is imbued with subjectivity, in its external form; he is the just one, the universal light, and his kingdom is the kingdom of light. The sun and the planets are the first and principal spirits of God, a great and shining company of heaven, each protecting, doing good, and blessing us; they take turns in ruling over the world of light. Light in general is Ormazd; the whole world is Ormazd, in all its different

305. Thus G; P reads: light generally, where light is, D reads: where light is,

306. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to Colebrooke's translation of the prayer of Gayatri in "On the Vedas," *Asiatic Researches* 8:399–400. The prayer is quoted in a slightly different form in Mill's *History of British India* 1:240.

258 levels and varieties, and in this kingdom of light everything is good, and what is good is light. Everything pertains to the light; the organic life of animal nature, all that enlivens, all essence, all spirituality, all activity, the growth of finite things—all of this *is* light, it is all Ormazd. Ormazd is not merely the everyday world of sense but all good, all love, all power, spirit, soul, happiness, and blessing: all is included in him. A human being, a tree or animal that lives, rejoices in existing, is affirmative in nature, and constitutes something noble, healthy; thereby it shines forth, it emits light, and this light is the quintessence of the substantive nature of each and every thing.³⁰⁷ |

The universal light, and the light in all things, is venerated: the sun and stars are venerated as spirit. Ormazd is the universal and the first, the genius or spirit of the sun (this genius is distinct from its existence, though it is also present therein). And the other [stars] are genii who stand around his throne.³⁰⁸ So, then, this world of light, these appearances of light are venerated, and in this connection the Parsees are well served by the regions in which they live, in particular by the light that can be [obtained] from the fountains of oil found there. This light is burned on their altars; it is not so much a symbol but rather the very presence of what is excellent and good. Everything good, noble, and excellent in the world is honored, loved, prayed to in this way; for it is counted as the Son, as the begotten one of Ormazd, in whom he loves himself, in whom he is well pleased. In the same way songs of praise are addressed to all pure human spirits. These spirits are called *fravashi*, and they include embodied, still existing beings as well as departed spirits; for example,

307. [Ed.] What Hegel says of light in this and the following paragraph can also be said of the primal fire, the two being equated in the *Zend-Avesta* (whereas “material fire” is merely an image, a product of the “primal fire”). See *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 1:44–45.

308. [Ed.] Hegel’s turn of phrase echoes A. H. L. Heeren, *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1804–1805), 1:509: “Around Ormazd’s throne stand the seven Amshaspands, the princes of light, among whom he himself is the first.” In regard to Ormazd as one of the Amshaspands see also J. G. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage und das gesammte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer* (Frankfurt am Main, 1820), pp. 316–317, 365.

the Parsees pray especially to Zoroaster's spirit to watch over them.³⁰⁹ Animals are venerated too because they are imbued with life, light, and vitality. In this connection the genii or spirits, the affirmative elements in living nature, are singled out and revered, as are the ideals of particular species or types of thing, as universal subjectivities that represent divinity in finite form. As we have said, animals are venerated, but the ideal of animal life is the heavenly bull³¹⁰ (as with the Hindus a symbol of creation, standing alongside Shiva). Among the fiery elements the sun is particularly revered; and among the waters too there is an ideal of this kind,³¹¹ the stream of streams, the river from which all rivers flow, which rises on the Elburz. Elburz is the ideal among mountains, the first kernel of the whole earth, standing in a blaze of light from which proceeds all the beneficence of heaven. There is also an ideal among the trees, the *haoma*, from which flows the sap of life, or the water of immortality.³¹² Thus

309. [Ed.] The concept of the *fravashi* was known to Hegel through Kleuker's edition of the *Zend-Avesta*, and especially the editorial notes to vol. 1, pp. 12–15, although it is noteworthy that they are there described as “the first, pure copies of all future beings and creatures”; once embodied in existing beings, they act as their protective spirit, keeping soul and body from contamination and error. Prayers invoking the help of the *fravashi* and praising those of various named beings and creatures (including Zoroaster) are to be found in vol. 2, esp. pp. 246, 258 (SBE 2:180, 201).

310. [Ed.] Hegel's mention of the “heavenly bull” makes it probable that he has in mind here too the prayers of praise referred to in the previous note (*Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 2:257–258; SBE 2:200), where the creatures named include “the heavenly word, pure essences, water, earth, trees, hearths, the bull.”

311. W_1 reads: waters too there is an ideal of this kind, Elburz, W_2 reads: mountains too there is an ideal of this kind, Elburz, the mountain of mountains, Cf. *Ho*: the river of rivers flows from the Elburz; there too is the mountain of mountains.

[Ed.] Hegel's reference to worship of the sun is based on Kleuker's edition of the *Zend-Avesta* (2:104–108; cf. SBE 2:349–353), although the sun must not be equated (as the text as we have it seems to suggest) with the ideal of fire, the primary fire; see above, n. 307. The ideal of water is the river Arduisur (Ardvicura) (2:112), while Elburz (Hara berezaiti) as the mountain of mountains is stated elsewhere (3:67–73) to be the source from which it flows. The Elburz (given in Kleuker as Albordj or Albordi) is a chain of mountains south of the Caspian Sea, the highest of which is Demavend. W_1 's confusion of the mountain and the river is corrected by W_2 .

312. [Ed.] On the *haoma* tree, see *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 3:105: “Among these trees is the white, wholesome, fruitbearing *haoma* [*Hom*]; it grows at the source

259 the Parsees have present before them for their intuition a world of the good, a world of ideals that are not, however, otherworldly abstractions | but are evident and present in the actual things that exist.

All of this involves the cultus. As far as the cultic observance of those Parsees who live their lives in the kingdom of light is concerned, their life as a whole is the cultus; living is what the cultus consists in; it is not something cut off and isolated from the rest of life, as it is with the Hindus. The religious law governing the Parsees is that they should do good, be pure in thought, word, and deed, spare life and promote it, make it invigorating, fruitful, and joyful. Inwardly and outwardly they are to be like light, to act like light. As a means of promoting life, for instance, they are enjoined to plant trees and engage in agriculture, to ensure that light and fruitfulness prosper everywhere, to care for the sick, to feed the hungry, give hospitality to travelers, plant deserts and irrigate the earth, which is a subject or genius (spirit). These are the general features of their religion, and we do not need to go into it any further.³¹³

4. Transition from Nature Religion to Spiritual Religion:

The Religion of the Enigma (Egyptian Religion)³¹⁴

"This is the fourth determinate phase of nature religion, the stage where the transition from unmediated nature religion to the religion

of the Arduisur. Whoever drinks of its water (sap) becomes immortal." For further information on the significance of this tree, see our Vol. 3:106 n. 117.

313. [Ed.] The source for Hegel's description of the Parsees' cultic observances is Kleuker's edition of the Zend-Avesta, although individual references are difficult to trace because of their general character; cf. 2:114, 118 (SBE 3:390).

314. [Ed.] Initially Hegel appears to have intended only three phases or stages for nature religion (see above, nn. 99, 102, 104, 296). Since this fourth phase is a transitional one, it could be regarded as not actually destroying the triadic structure. In 1827 Hegel solved this problem by linking Persian and Egyptian religion under a common heading, but he created a new one by not subsuming Buddhism under the religion of magic. Thus in 1827 he still had four stages of nature religion. Egyptian religion was the "religion of the enigma or riddle" [*Rätsel*] in Hegel's view because everything in it symbolically denoted something that remained unexpressed, and it did so in ways that were enigmatic and obscure. The paradigmatic instance of this was the representation of divinity by that mysterious artwork known as the sphinx,

of subjectivity takes place.³¹⁵ If we consider the previous stage, the good may well be implicitly concrete. It is what is primary and self-contained; this breaks apart inwardly, and there is then the resumption of its determinations back into the self-contained unity that the good is defined as. The good is implicitly concrete, but *only* implicitly so; | its determinacy is inwardly simple, not yet existing, manifested [as] the determinate; in other words, it is still abstract subjectivity and not yet real subjectivity. The next moment, in which we can see this [reality] foreshadowed, is the fact that evil, the negative, has been taken note of outside this realm of good. This determinacy [of goodness] is posited as simple and undeveloped,³¹⁶ and the development, the distinction, consequently is not yet present in it *as* distinct. The result is that one side still lies outside the good; evil is not yet perfectly concrete internally; it is not yet real subjectivity.³¹⁷ By the standard of the concept, we are now getting closer to the realm of subjectivity—i.e., to real, actual subjectivity. But first we must define the concept more precisely.

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which was half human and half animal, and which, according to Greek mythology at least, strangled passersby who could not answer its riddles. The enigma of Egyptian religion was also evident, in Hegel's view, in its transitional character, its curious intermingling of subjectivity and substantiality. In the image of the sphinx, he says, we see the artistic shape forcing its way out of the animal form into the human; it had not yet arrived at the shape of beauty, which was the stage of Greek religion. It remained enigmatic; it had not yet entered into Greek "clarity." Hegel's source of information on Egyptian religion was primarily the classical authors who had visited Egypt, notably Herodotus and Plutarch. Modern explorations and excavations were just beginning in Hegel's time, and the hieroglyphic system was not deciphered until 1824. Hegel was familiar with G. B. Belzoni's *Narrative of the Operations and Recent Discoveries within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs, and Excavations, in Egypt and Nubia*, 3d ed., 2 vols. (London, 1822), but this work was limited and unscientific.

315. *W*₂ (1831) reads: The form of the spirit's mediation with itself in which the natural is still predominant, the form of passing over where the starting point is the other as such, i.e., nature in general, and the passing over does not yet appear as spirit's coming to itself—this is the form peculiar to the religions of the Near East. The next thing is for this passing over to appear as spirit's coming to itself, but not yet in such a way as to constitute a reconciliation; rather, the struggle and striving is the object, but as a moment in the deity itself.

316. *Ho*, *W* add: it is not valid as determinacy, but only as universality,

317. *Ho* reads, *precedes in W*: Things are only good as illuminated, only from their positive side, but not also from the side of their particularity.

a. The Representation of God

We have already encountered subjectivity elsewhere, in all shapes, as self-consciousness concretely determined at each level. It is a source of particular difficulty when we are dealing with religion that we do not have a concept or a [clearly] defined idea before us, but along with each determinate form we have at the same time the whole totality; all the determinations [of the concept] are there at once. For the content is God, the absolute totality. The matter of the determinations is never lacking, therefore, but it is presented in this concrete field. The only difference [between different stages] is whether the moments that make up the totality are superficially³¹⁸ present, or whether they already subsist in what is inward and known to be essential;³¹⁹ this is what makes the enormous difference, whether the characteristics are merely external or in the essential content. Hence we find the mode of self-consciousness in all religions to a greater or lesser degree, and further that predicates such as almighty, all-knowing, and so forth are applied to God. In regard to such content we can read very lofty and profound portrayals of God in Hindu and Chinese sources, so that religions standing on a higher level are no more advanced in this respect, ~even in regard to the shape in which self-consciousness occurs in them.³²⁰ This is what

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318. W (1831/HgG?) adds: externally

319. W (1831/MiscP?) adds: i.e., whether they occur only as superficial form and shape or are posited as categorial determination of the content, and thought accordingly;

320. W (1831/MiscP?) reads: There are so-called pure representations of God (e.g., in the case of Friedrich von Schlegel's *Weisheit der Indier*),^a which are regarded as what remains over from the perfect, original religion. *Ho* reads, continues in *W*: But in the inward element, in the concept, we get closer to actual subjectivity, for in the cultus of the religion of light we saw the singular evil [moment] already everywhere sublated. We already had subjectivity everywhere, directly as self-consciousness concretely determined. Already magic-working was the power of self-consciousness over nature. It is, to be sure, a source of particular difficulty when we are considering religion that here we are not dealing with pure thought-categories as in logic, or with categories of existence as in nature, but with such as already contain the moment of self-consciousness, of finite spirit as such, by virtue of having already passed through the [categories of] subjective and objective spirit. For religion is spirit's self-consciousness of itself, and it makes the various stages of this self-consciousness in which spirit is developed the object of consciousness. The content of this object is God, the absolute totality, so that the multiplicity of the material is never lacking.

[Ed.] ^aSee above, n. 27.

prompts people to look more closely here for the specific categories that constitute the differentia of a religion. "The tendency is to locate this differentia in the creating essence,"³²¹ which is everywhere and also nowhere, and also in whether there is one God or not. But this differentia is unreliable too, for the one God is even to be found in Hinduism, and the difference therefore resides solely in the way in which the many figures join together to make a unity. Many English authors³²² who have had experiential contact with the Hindu religion declare that the core of Hindu religion, the original Hinduism, recognized one God, whether as the sun or as Brahman, the universal soul. Predicates of the understanding, such as this, furnish no solution. Distinctions | and determinations of this kind are to be found more or less in all religions. 262

If I say of God, "He is wise or all-powerful," that is wholly correct. But these are only determinations of reflection; I do not in this way get to know his nature. Moreover, these are predicates that apply to finite natures, which are also just, powerful, wise, knowing; but when they are applied to God, they must be extended beyond all finite content through the "all"—as "power" becomes "all-powerful." And in this way they lose their specific meaning, which vanishes away out of sight, just as the Hindu gods disappear in Brahman. What is essential is the free substantive element, which is grasped and known in him as his immanent essential determinacy; and this is neither the predicates of reflection nor the external shape.³²³

Thus we have already encountered the category of *subjectivity*, or self-determination, but only in a superficial form; we have not yet encountered it as constitutive of the nature of God.³²⁴ Subjectivity in general is abstract identity with self, the being-within-self that differentiates itself, the process of this differentiation, and at the same

321. *Thus P; D reads:* They locate the differentia [in] what distinguishes the creator from the creatures, *G reads:* They look for the differentia more especially in the creative activity or essence, *Ho reads:* For example, they may be sought in what differentiates creator and creature,

322. [Ed.] See above, nn. 245, 306.

323. *W (1831/HgG?) adds:* but idea.

324. *Precedes in W (1831):* In the religion of light this category was abstract, universal personification, because the person contains the absolute moments in undeveloped form.

time what negates the self-differentiation and maintains itself in what it has thus distinguished. At the same time it maintains this other as a moment, it does not let the other escape from it but remains the power informing it. It has being in the other, but it has it on its own account, having the difference as a moment of itself.

If we consider this in relation to the next form [of religion], we find that subjectivity is in fact this self-relating negativity; and it is to be noted that the negative [moment], evil, can no longer fall outside the good but must be contained and posited within the affirmative relation to self—and to that extent it is, to be sure, no longer evil.³²⁵ This subjectivity, | therefore, is no longer what Brahman is; in Brahman these differences just disappear; or, to the extent that difference or determinacy is posited, they are independent gods, and fall outside Brahman. The main point, therefore, is that the negative, as self-affecting in this manner [*in dieser Affektion seiner selbst*], is now posited as the defining category.

It should be noted to begin with that subjectivity, and essentially universal subjectivity—that this first type of subjectivity is not perfectly free and purely spiritual subjectivity, but is affected [*affiziert*] by nature; this subjectivity is essential, universal power, but instead of being the merely implicit power that we encountered previously, it is *posited* power; and it is posited when it becomes posited as an exclusive subjectivity.

This is the difference—the difference between power in itself and power inasmuch as it is subjectivity. The latter is posited power, posited as power that exists explicitly. Power we have already met with in all of the previous shapes. As the initial basic category, it is crude power over what merely has being.³²⁶ In that case the power is also the inward element exclusively, and its differentiations

325. *Ho adds, similar in W:* So the negative [moment], evil, can now no longer fall outside the good, but the good in itself is precisely what implies evil. As a result, to be sure, evil does not remain evil, but, as evil relating to itself as evil, it sublates its evilness and constitutes itself as good. Good is the negative relation to oneself, [i.e.,] to posit evil as one's other, in the same way that evil consists in positing—i.e., sublating—the movement, one's negativeness, as the negative. The double movement is subjectivity.

326. *Thus G*

appear as independent existences outside it; they have indeed emerged from it, but insofar as they have emerged, they are independently external to it. If they were to be comprehended within it, they would be lost to sight, just as the differentiations disappear in Brahman, in this abstraction, inasmuch as the self-consciousness says, "I am Brahman." Everything that is divine or good is lost to sight in Brahman in this way. This pure abstraction cannot contain or maintain any immanent content within itself; and to the extent that the content lies outside it, it is a law unto itself, a free revelry. In relation to these particularized existences power is the operative element, the ground of their existence, but it remains merely inward, and operates merely in a universal fashion. What the universal power brings forth—to the extent that it is only implicit—is also universal; it is what we call the laws of nature. These pertain | to the implicit power, the power whose being lies in itself. This power is an implicit one, and its operation is likewise implicit; it operates unconsciously, and sun, stars, oceans, trees, rivers, human beings, animals, and so on appear as independent existences; only their inward life is determined by the power. To the extent that the power appears in this sphere, it can do so only as a power opposed to the laws of nature, so that this is the locus of miracles. There are no miracles in Hinduism, however, for in Hinduism there is in general no rational, intelligible nature; nature has no intelligible connective tissue, so that in Hinduism everything is miraculous, and therefore there can be no miracles. There can be miracles only where God is defined as a subject and operates as implicit power in the mode of subjectivity.

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This is the definition of the power whose being is in itself generally; and it is clear that it makes no difference what shape is given to it, so that it has been located in animals etc. That living matter operates as immediate power is in fact indisputable, since power as implicit, power that has its being in itself, operates only invisibly and without any show.

Real power must be distinguished from this implicit power. Real power is in the first place subjectivity, in which two principal moments should be noted.

1. First, the subject is identical with itself and at the same time posits within itself specific differing characteristics, particular deter-

minations.³²⁷ The good is the universal self-determination, so completely universal that it has the same undifferentiated scope as the universal essence; the determination is in fact not posited as a determination. Subjectivity therefore includes self-determination in such a way that the determined characteristics appear as a plurality; they have this reality vis-à-vis the concept, vis-à-vis the simple self-containment of inner subjectivity. But these characteristics are initially
 265 still included within subjectivity, they are inward determinations. |

2. The second moment is that the subject is exclusive, it relates negatively to itself, like power, but vis-à-vis an other; this other may also appear independently, but it is posited that its independence is mere show. Its being is such that its existence, its configuration, is merely a negative in relation to \neg power,³²⁸ which is consequently the dominant element. Absolute power does not dominate the other; in domination the other is merely submerged, substance is brought to naught. It is the subject that first dominates, and the particular subsists, but as posited, or as placed under law—it is obedient, it serves as a means. It is posited in this existent configuration with the character of the negative, of what is not truly independent. These are the two principal moments of this form of subjectivity.

Just how these two moments develop we have to consider further. They develop in such a way as to remain necessarily within certain limits, more especially because we have only just embarked on the transition from substantiality to subjectivity; subjectivity does not yet emerge in its freedom and truth; it is still mixed up with substantive unity—and, to an even greater extent, with the multiplicity of independent configurations. It is true on the one hand that subjectivity combines everything; but on the other hand it \neg has the other [within itself] in this way as a result, insofar as it unites these manifold determinations with subjectivity,³²⁹ and the mixture consequently still has the deficiencies of what it is still mixed up with, namely nature religion.³³⁰ This stage is therefore shot through with in-

327. *W* (1831/*HgG*?) adds: [There is] one subject of these differences, [and they are] moments of one subject.

328. *W* (1831/*HgG*?) reads: the power of subjectivity,

329. *Thus P; G* reads: still lets the other subsist, because it is still immature,

330. *Ho* adds, similar in *W*: As regards the concrete representation of this stage, or the mode and nature of the shape in which spirit has its self-consciousness of self

consistencies, and the problem for it is to purify itself into subjectivity. This is the stage of the *enigma* [*Rätsel*], the Egyptian moment, the moment of *Egyptian religion*. |

³³¹There is a special interest in the consideration of this standpoint because both "modes"³³² occur here in their principal moments; they are not yet separated, so that there is merely "confusion,"³³³ and it is only through the concept that one can discern how such a heterogeneous mixture coalesces, and which of the two [sides] the principal moments belong to.

1. At this stage, God is still the indwelling nature, the implicit power, for which the shape is therefore something contingent and arbitrary. This merely implicit power can be clothed in human or animal shape at will. Power is unconsciously active intelligence, intelligence that is not spiritual, but only concept, only idea—and not subjective idea but unconscious idea, unconscious vitality, life in general. This, however, is not subjectivity, is not *self* at all; but if life in general is also to be pictured as a shape, the easiest thing is to take something living. "Animals [are] organic life;"³³⁴ and it does not matter, it is contingent, which living thing, which animal, which man, is selected. Hence we find animal worship in Egypt in a wide variety of forms, with different animals venerated in different localities.³³⁵

2. What is more important is the second characteristic—the fact that, as has already been generally indicated, the subject is determined immanently, within itself, it has being in its reflection onto self, and

as the object of its consciousness, this stage shows itself to be the transition from the earlier shapes to the higher stage of religion. Subjectivity is not yet a subjectivity that is self-subsisting and therefore free, but is rather the midpoint between substance and free subjectivity.

331. *Precedes in W* (1831): In this ferment all moments come into view.

332. *W*₂ (*following Ho*) reads: stages, the preceding stage of nature religion and the succeeding stage of free subjectivity, *Ho* reads: This standpoint can therefore afford particular interest, because both stages, the preceding one as well as the succeeding one, occur here in intermingling contact.

333. *W* reads: an enigmatic mixture and confusion, *Ho* reads: an enigmatic, confused mixture,

334. *Thus P; G* reads: Within life in general there are living things;

335. [*Ed.*] See Herodotus, *Histories* 2.65–76. Belzoni, in his *Narrative of the Operations and Recent Discoveries* 1:261 ff., 425 ff., describes finds of buried bones and mummies of bulls, cows, and various other animals.

267 this determination is no longer just the universal good. It *is* the universal good, to be sure, but it moves beyond this—it has evil beside and set against it, in the form of Typhon.³³⁶ Moreover, real subjectivity posits differences essentially in its determinations, so that good is now posited in different forms; there is an inner | content that has specific determinations, not just a single universal definition. These different characteristics of the good ~do not yet, however, make up a totality of configurations.³³⁷ The subject is for the first time a real subject—i.e., freedom first begins—where there can be for me several different things that are defined as good, so that there is the possibility of choice. Only then does the subject rise above particular purpose; and similarly the subject becomes free from particularity when particularity is not coextensive with subjectivity itself, when [this subject] no longer *is* the universal good, [but] merely *wills* the universal good. That the good is at the same time determined and elevated to infinite wisdom is a different view. That is something else.³³⁸ At this point a plurality of goods is determined, so that subjectivity stands above them all, and whether to will one or the other good appears to be the choice of the subject. We are dealing now with the *subject* that has being only insofar as it is self-determining; it is the subject, but as such it is already posited as *resolving*, and we see appearing the category of *purpose*, or of practical action. As the substantive unity God does not engage in practical action; he creates³³⁹ or he destroys, but he does not *act*, ~just as Brahman too does not act at all [insofar as Brahman is] first [cause]. Only the incarnations act.³⁴⁰ However, it is still only limited purposes that can enter into play here at first; this is only

336. [Ed.] See Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, esp. chap. 13, where he recounts the trick employed by Typhon, with the help of seventy-two conspirators and Aso, an Ethiopian queen who was on a visit to Egypt, to foment trouble against King Osiris and Isis, his sister and consort.

337. Thus *G* with *D*; *P* reads: have been called differentiated goods.

338. [Ed.] Probably a reference to Jewish religion.

339. *W*₂ (following *Ho*) adds: is the ground of things, *Ho* reads: God as substance, on the other hand, is only the ground of things, not action.

340. *W*₂ (following *G* and *Ho*) reads: Brahman for instance does not act; independent action is either only imagined or pertains to the changing incarnations. *Ho* reads: We do not see Brahman acting. In other instances acting is imagined, or human subjects are incarnations, whose purposes are at the same time confined to a definite people, a definite locality.

the first [mode of] subjectivity, whose content cannot yet be infinite wisdom and justice, since [it] belongs to one people, one locality exclusively.

3. The third moment is that the human shape or figure here makes its appearance more clearly, so that there is a transition from the animal shape of God to the human shape.

The animal shape of God may still occur, but where real, free subjectivity enters in, it is only the human shape that corresponds to such a concept. | It is no longer merely life but free determination according to this or that purpose, so that the human shape characterizing the concept may be a particular [embodiment of] subjectivity, such as a hero, a particular king from ancient times [in] the locality of his realm or activity, or an indeterminate human figure. Ormazd, even Jamshid,³⁴¹ still have a wholly abstract figure and mode of action, that of the abstract principle of good. Here, where particular purposes enter into play as in primitive subjectivity, there is also a marked particularity attaching to the shape (which has its specific purposes, its specific places, and so forth). In this way the principal moments coalesce. In other words, the development of the determinate aspect must appear more specifically in the subject; to this extent the determinacy is *limited*, it is not determinacy in its totality. But determinacy must also appear as totality in regard to its subject; [fully] developed subjectivity must be intuited in it. However, these developed moments of subjectivity³⁴² first present themselves as a sequence, as the subject's course of life or successive states. "It is only at a later stage that the subject, as absolute spirit, succeeds in having its moments as totality itself."³⁴³ At this stage the subject is still formal, limited in its concept, and hence in its deter-

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341. [Ed.] Jamshid was the legendary ancestral king of the Parsees, identical with Yima, to whom—before Zarathustra—the law was first orally revealed. He was revered especially as the founder of culture (not just Iranian culture), but toward the end of his reign he transgressed the law. Hegel's knowledge of Jamshid was derived from Kleuker's edition of the Zend-Avesta (1:92, 3:304–309; cf. SBE 1:10–21, 3:230–239), as well as from Joseph Görres's translation of the pre-Islamic poet Firdawsi's *Shāh-nāma* (*Das Heldenbuch von Iran aus dem Schah Nameh des Firdussi*, 2 vols. [Berlin, 1820], 1:12–15).

342. W_2 (Var) adds: are not yet the totality of the shape, but Cf. Ho: Even if the entire form is there, it is not present in such a way that the moments are themselves totalities, or the totality [is] subordinated to a definition of its moments.

343. *Thus G*

minate character; and although totality does appear in it, there is still this limitation in its [mode of] appearance, that the moments have not developed beyond the level of states—i.e., determinations and the totality of these determinations, states; they are not each developed as a totality on its own account. What is intuited in the subject is not the eternal history that constitutes its nature³⁴⁴ but only the limited history of successive states. The first moment is the affirmation as such that it is *this* subject; the second is its negation, and the third is the return of its negation into self. What is of particular relevance here is the second moment. | Inasmuch as negation appears as a state in regard to the natural subject as having being, [i.e., as negation] of its outward shape, the subject's externalization is *death*, and the third moment is *resurrection*, the return to a particular [mode of] lordship. The proximate mode in which negation appears in regard to a subject qua existing in human³⁴⁵ shape, is death. Moreover, death as this negation has at this stage a further characteristic: because we are not yet dealing with eternal history, or with the subject in its totality, this death or negation directed against the singular existence appears to stem from without, it comes about through something else, through the evil principle, Typhon.

Third, negation is posited along with negation, so that death is slain and the evil principle vanquished. In the Persian religion it is not vanquished, for the good, Ormazd, remains standing opposite the evil one, Ahriman, and has not yet returned to self in this way. Here for the first time the vanquished state of the evil principle is posited.³⁴⁶ Inasmuch as God has human shape, wherever it may come from, or inasmuch as infinite form is first posited only as an external shape—*infinite*³⁴⁷ form is for the first time posited in infinite spirit, and is then for the first time equal to the substance, [while] here [the form] is still the natural mode of existence—the moment of negation shows itself in regard to this outward

344. W (1831/Ed?) reads: in such a way as to constitute its nature is not the eternal history

345. W (1831) reads: merely in natural shape in general, and also human

346. Thus G

347. W₁ (1831) reads: the genuinely infinite

shape;³⁴⁸ since the moment of negation is part of the *concept* of spirit, it also manifests itself now in its *existence*. God is here figured principally in the human shape. This human shape does also occur in the highest religion, but there it is only a moment of the form. The death of God is a historical feature of many religions: in the Syrian religion there is the death of Adonis, and similarly in Egyptian religion the death of Osiris.

This death seems at first sight to be something unworthy of the divinity. In our representational picture it is the lot of the finite | to pass away, and so far as the term “death” is used of God, it is applied to him only as a characteristic taken over from the sphere of the finite that does not befit him—God is not truthfully known in this way, and is demeaned by being defined in terms of negation. As against this assertion the first thing to be said is that God must be comprehended as the supreme being, as what is identical only with itself, and this representation of him is deemed to be the highest and most excellent one, so that spirit attains this true image of God only at the very end. If God is grasped in this way, as the essence without determinations, or as self-identical, then he is devoid of content; it is often remarked that this is the poorest way of defining God, and is in fact a very old way of representing him, only the first step towards an objective attitude. Brahman is just this abstraction without content; so is the good that is [defined as] light, which has the negative, evil, only outside itself, as darkness. But the main point is that now we have already gone beyond this abstraction, to the *concrete* representation of God; hence the moment of negation makes its entrance, in the specific form of negation, in the shape in which it means “death,” insofar as God is intuited in human shape; thus death is seen as highly estimable, not as a determination of the finite as such, but as a content of God himself, immanent in his essence itself.³⁴⁹ This is a sign that we have progressed to conscious

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348. Thus G; P, D read: and it is in regard to this outward shape that the moment of negation presents itself;

349. Ho adds, similar in W: For self-determination involves the moment of inward, not outward negativity, as is already implicit in the word “self-determination.” The death that appears here is therefore also not like the death of the Lama, of Buddha. For these are the pure substance of abstract being-within-self, to whom negativity is external, impinging on them as external power.

271 spirituality, to knowledge of the freedom that is in God. This moment of negation is an absolutely truthful aspect of God; so natural death is the distinctive, specific form in which negation appears in regard to his shape. | For the sake of the divine totality of the higher religions this moment must also be represented, be known, in regard to³⁵⁰ the divine idea, since the idea must not lack any of the moments.

Thus it is the moment of negation immanent in the essential process of manifestation of the concept of God that we here encounter. It is not a mortality like that of the Lama or Buddha. In these religions we have seen that God's essence is for the first time defined as abstract being-within-self or self-containment, as his own absolute substantiality; the Lama's moment of death is not a moment immanent in the substance but counts merely as an accidental, external form in which the deity shows itself. That this is something that happens to the deity itself, not simply to the individual entity in which it exhibits itself, does not emerge at that stage. This moment must accordingly comprise God's essence.

Linked with this is the third moment, that God reestablishes himself, he rises from the dead. Unmediated God is not God. Spirit is only what exists as inwardly free, by its own action, what posits itself. This self-contained and self-generated being involves the moment of negation. The negation of negation is the return into self, and spirit *is* what eternally reverts back into itself. For at this stage marked by the mingling [of spirit and nature]³⁵¹ the negative is represented as a manner of being that is outside the essence, as death, as evil—but an evil that is vanquished as Typhon. Spirit is what sublates negation, overcomes the death that appears as negation and the sphere of negation; by this victory the god is reestablished and, returning back constantly into himself in this way, he is spirit. A more exact definition is that the reborn god is simultaneously represented as deceased, as the god of the underworld; but it must

350. *Thus G with P; D reads:* natural death, this distinctive, specific form, must be represented, be known, in *G*, *W read:* so natural death is the distinctive, special form in which negation appears in regard to his shape. For the sake of the divine totality [*W*₁: and the higher religions, this moment must also *W*₂: the moment of his unmediated shape must also in the higher religions] be represented, be known, in regard to

351. *Thus P; G reads:* we encounter reconciliation, in such a way that

be noted that he is not only lord in the realm of Amenti³⁵² but also lord of the living, and in the former capacity he judges the dead by the standards of justice and morality. It is only in the category of subjective freedom that the *ethical* determination enters for the first time in any way; neither of them is to be found in the God of substantiality. Thus lordship here entails justice | and punishment; and the *worth* of those individuals who determine their own lives by the standards of custom and right becomes evident. That is all that need be said in this regard.

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We have now had the category of the subject that determines itself, that has rights and purposes, and further [noted] that with this objective realm the *development* of subjectivity also becomes apparent. Inasmuch as the characteristics that appear in subjectivity have now been posited as such, subjectivity is in the first instance distinct from nature, from the natural world, from individual human beings, and so on. To this extent a relationship of lordship has been grounded, but in this mingling [of nature and spirit] the subject is simultaneously represented as substance, and so has still the significance of substantiality. It is not distinguished from natural objects, but what pertains to the subject is at the same time the history of the substance. In the first instance, it is the history both of the subject and of the substance insofar as the substance is particularized. In other words, the subject is initially particular; the universal history (which is within one subject) is enacted in it, and what happens is at the same time the history of what is substantive and therefore the history of the substance. Inasmuch as substance is particularized, that subject also connotes the particularized objects, and its history is their history. Thus the history of the [divine] subject—his life, his battle against evil, his valiant deeds, his being momentarily conquered by evil—is also the universal history of natural objects.

352. [Ed.] See Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 29, where Plutarch says that the Egyptians gave this name to the underworld where souls go after death. The Greek word Ἀμένθης (*Amenthēs*) is a Hellenized form of *Hnty-imntyer* (*Chonti-amentiu*), meaning “the first of those in the West,” i.e., lord of the dead, since “the West” was represented as the place of the dead. On the belief that Osiris (with Isis) was ruler of the underworld, see Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 27. See also Herodotus, *Histories* 2.123: “According to the Egyptians, Demeter and Dionysus are rulers of the underworld” (Herodotus equates Dionysus with Osiris [2.144]).

Thus the history of God expressed in this stage, the stage that manifests itself in Egyptian religion, is, as we all know, the history of Osiris; it simultaneously connotes the history of the sun, of the Nile, and of the waxing and waning of the year. The Nile flows, then is dried up by the heat, or by Typhon; the sun, in its hostile phase, dries it up.³⁵³ The sun goes far off, its force declines, and then it is born again after its going away; this is connected with the seasons. The story of the god similarly connotes the life of plants and sowing. What is sown in the earth dies and rots, but also rises again. Thus the history of the subject is also that of the substance in nature, and so it is the history of the natural objects that concern [humanity] and vice versa. | This subjective history expressly connotes natural things.³⁵⁴ Each feature of the story here can be its meaning, or it may be the telling of the story itself. It can be said that the history of the sun or of the Nile forms the basis of the saga of the deity; but also conversely, what has been taken as [manifest] shape can also be taken as the inner [meaning], and we can say that the meaning is [either] nature [or] what is free, what is spiritual. All of these categories are here united into one³⁵⁵ because there is no mediation between subject and substance—the one is the other. Because being-for-self and being-in-self are united in this way, the object, God, is all-encompassing, and what happens to him is the universal history. To this extent all moments are united in him. But conversely, in this intermingling, where subjectivity does not yet present itself freely, the opposite is the case too: these united moments are also presented in a fragmented form as figures of a particular kind and are represented separately as independent gods on their own account. So it is with the Egyptians. Osiris is only the principal god; in later days the other gods give way to him, though in earlier days they were his peers; as soon as thought becomes involved, he emerges as the principal figure. But the moments of intelligence united in him

353. [Ed.] Here, as in the other lecture series, Hegel refers less to the dualistic, astronomical significance of the Osiris myth than to its physical connotations, with Osiris symbolizing the irrigating, fructifying principle, while Typhon represents what dries up or consumes. See Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 33.

354. Thus D; P reads: religion.

355. Thus P; G reads: entangled

are still to be found alongside him as diverse gods. And so we get a polytheism whose precise character is determined by a wide variety of circumstances—there are nature gods on the one hand, and local gods, which are totalities in themselves, on the other.

This one final point is needed to complete the subjective aspect of God. The divine shape is regarded as a totality, but the different moments also receive particular shapes of their own, and so become separate divinities. But for the totality to be complete, the principal god must be completely determined in his wholly external aspect. Hence he is outwardly a specific existence, determined in all directions. The particular god of a people or country exhibits in this external aspect his local origin and territorially limited concern. These are the principal points in this connection.

*b. Cultus in the Form of Art*³⁵⁶

But there is one other relationship to be mentioned, one of the most important. | At this stage God is first implicit power, ~and secondly a nature deity.³⁵⁷ A third relationship still to be noted is that to self-consciousness, a relationship [that] embraces the cultus generally, ~since the cultus emerges only when God is characterized as subjective.³⁵⁸ The distinctively novel relationship, however, is the standpoint of *art*, i.e., of *fine art*. This is the precise point where art must emerge in religion, and where it has a necessary role. Art, it is true, can also be mimetic, but not just mimetic. It *can* remain at that level, but then it is not *fine art*, not truly divine, not what is truly needed for religion; where it *is* that, where it *emerges* as it essentially *is*, it pertains to the very concept of God. We should

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356. [Ed.] In Egyptian religion, religious art appears for the first time, according to Hegel, and cultic activity assumes an artistic form. This is because God or the gods are represented as present in and as the work of art (the statue, icon, image, sacred figure, etc.). When the artwork has been consecrated, it becomes the bearer of divine spirit. This is a half-way spiritualization of religion, says Hegel, because the artifact has been produced by human being (subjective spirit) but is not yet the self-presentation of absolute or divine spirit. The religion of art reaches its consummation in Greek religion.

357. Thus P; G reads: possesses subjectivity.

358. Thus P with D; G reads: which has, in this mingling of the two spheres, the same content as the deity itself.

consider this connection more closely. Genuine art is religious art. This is not needed when the deity has a natural shape (for example, that of the sun, light, or a river); it is still not needed where the reality of God has human shape or the shape of a living animal; nor is it needed when the mode of manifestation is light, nor when, as with Buddha, the³⁵⁹ human shape has fallen away [i.e., he is dead] but still persists in the imagination, and hence in the way that the divine shape is imagined.³⁶⁰ In the case of Buddha, the shape is only an imaginary one.³⁶¹ The human shape, precisely in its aspect as the [actual] appearing of subjectivity, truly needs to be pictured for the first time only when God is defined as genuinely subject. The need
 275 to make the subject visible through art can arise only when | the moment of natural immediacy is overcome in the concept by the moment of freedom—or when the essence of God begins to be essentially free and self-determining, i.e., at the standpoint at which we now are. Since the mode of existent being is now determined by the inward [life], neither a purely natural shape nor a mere imitation of it will suffice any longer. Leaving aside the Jews and Islam, all nations have idols, but these do not belong to fine art; they are only³⁶² signs of the subjectivity that is merely pictured or imagined, as long as subjectivity still has no being as an immanent characteristic of the essence itself. Religious representation has an external form, and it is essential to distinguish what is merely represented from what is known as pertaining to the essence of God. That God has become man occurs in the Hindu religion too; and all the moments or aspects that are present in the ultimate, truthful religion also occur in Hinduism. In the spirit[ual sphere] the totality is always present, but the difference lies in whether the different moments or aspects are regarded as pertaining to the essence or not.

As has been said, the need to portray God through fine art arises

359. *W (Var/HgG?) reads:* it begins when, as with Buddha, the present *Cf. Ho:* it is not needed where [religion] has God in natural shape—be it sun or light or river or unmediated human shape—any more than it enters on the scene where God is represented directly as shape, as with Buddha.

360. *Thus G; P reads:* in imagining in objective form.

361. *W (Var/HgG?) reads:* e.g., in images of Buddha, [*W*₁: and in the teachings of his followers. *W*₂: but also in the teachers, his followers.]

362. *W (1831) adds:* the personification of the representational picture,

only when the sphere of natural life is left behind, and when God is deemed to have being as free subjectivity by virtue of his spiritual self-determination, so that the way in which he manifests himself and becomes apparent in his determinate being is determined from within, by the spirit, and exhibits in itself the character of a spiritual production. It is not a mere natural appearance, not a mere sign.³⁶³

In regard to the emergence of art, two points in particular should be noted: first, that God is represented in art as something that can be intuited by the senses; second, that as a work of art the deity is something produced by human hands. Everyone knows that according to our own representational picture there are two ways [of being] that do not correspond to our idea of God. | The sensible manifestation, that which can be intuited, does not correspond to our idea of God—not, at least, where it is represented as though it were the only mode; for we well know, and we should take note, that God was once sensibly visible too; but that was only for a fleeting moment.³⁶⁴ In the present case his sensible visibility is the universal mode, the only way in which God has being and is manifest for self-consciousness. The second point, that as a work of art God is produced by human agency, also does not fit our idea of God. We must now consider more fully how far both aspects are defective.

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Here, then, art emerges, and this is bound up with the fact that God is comprehended as spiritual subjectivity. The nature of spirit is to produce itself, to posit itself, to give itself the form of determinate being; and this *is* quite generally what we have in art—not just universal representation but the fact that spirit appears, manifests itself, determines itself. Moreover, the mode of its existence is posited by spirit, it is an utterance that is posited by spirit itself, not by virtue of any contingent, natural aspect but a mode that corresponds wholly to thought. That the subject posits itself, manifests itself, determines itself, that its mode of existence is one posited by spirit—this is what is present in art generally.

363. *Ho adds, similar in W:* It is accordingly only when God himself is so characterized as to posit the distinctions under which he appears out of his own inwardness that art comes on the scene as necessary for the configuration of God.

364. *Ho, W add:* Art is also not the ultimate mode of our [own] cultus. But for the stage of subjectivity that is not yet spiritualized, and that therefore is still immediate, a directly visible existence [of God] is appropriate and necessary.

Thus the sensible [mode of] determinate being, in which the deity is intuited, corresponds to the concept of the deity; it is not a sign but gives expression at every point to the fact that it is produced from within, and corresponds fully to the thought or inner concept. But the essential "point"³⁶⁵ is that this determinate being is still a mode of sensible visibility. The determination that the universal should be defined in a differentiated manner is posited simply by the concept; but that this mode in which the subject posits itself is sensory—herein lies | the defect. And this defect arises from the fact that this is primitive subjectivity, the very first mode of the free spirit; it is still at the first level of defining, so that in this freedom there is still a natural, unmediated, primitive character, i.e., the moment of naturalness, of sensibility in general—it is born of spirit, to be sure, but it is still something sensory.

The second point is that the work of art is produced by human hands. "In other words, the subject produces itself,"³⁶⁶ "but what it produces is its own definition and at the same time has differentiated being—the abstract product is only "I equals I." What is posited must also have"³⁶⁷ the character of being differentiated, but in such a way that this is only posited, i.e., it is determined by subjectivity, or in such a way that the essence of subjectivity makes its appearance only in what is initially still something external. As we have seen, this is the first level of freedom; the next step is that the configuration produced in this way by the subject is taken back into subjectivity. The first stage is the creation of the world, the second is reconciliation, that this world is reconciled in itself with what is truly first. "It is not yet the case that this [divine] shape itself transforms itself, returns to the first."³⁶⁸ The shape of being for an other is produced,

365. *W* (*Ed/HgG?*) reads: deficiency

366. *W* (*Var/HgG?*) reads: This also does not fit our idea of God. *W* continues (following *G* and *Ho*): For the subjectivity that is infinite, genuinely spiritual, that has being for itself as such [*Ho*: as subjectivity]—this subjectivity produces itself, posits itself as other, as its shape,

367. *W*₂ (*Var*) reads: and it [the shape] is free only when self-posited and self-produced. But the configuration imparted to it, which is initially still reflected back into self as "I equals I," must also have expressly

368. *W* (following *G* and *Ho*) reads: But this return does not yet occur with the subjectivity we have at this stage; as its mode of being is still implicit, the fact that

but the idea is not yet present, for that involves the other's implicitly reflecting itself back to the initial unity, it implies that determinate being is not just implicitly something ideal, but that it raises itself to ideality, that "the first unity"³⁶⁹ | is sublated, precisely *in* what 278 is externalized.

This second part of the process involved in the divine idea is not yet posited here. From another angle it seems to be the first determination, which we consider both as purpose and as existent fact. When we consider it as purpose, then the first activity of subjectivity is admittedly purposive in general, but its purpose is a limited one; [for the subject is the god of] this people, [he is] this particular purpose. For the purpose to become a universal, truly absolute purpose, there must be a return; and in like manner the naturalness in regard to the shape must be sublated, in order for the purpose to be freed from its limitation, from this moment of immediacy. Only when this second stage in the process is added on, and the naturalness, the restrictedness of the purpose is sublated, is the idea properly satisfied; only thus does the purpose become for the first time universal. Thus what is posited here is in general that spirit is still, in respect of its purpose, only halfway to being spirit; and on that account it is still one-sided, it is still a finite spirit, i.e., it is in principle just subjective spirit, subjective self-consciousness, in other words just the *shape* of God, the mode of his being-for-other. The work of art is no more than something accomplished, something posited by the one-sided, subjective spirit. That is why the work of art must be produced by human means, for this process of spirit belongs to subjective consciousness; and it is why the artistic manifestation of the divine is at this stage necessarily a *human* artifact.³⁷⁰

According to his *true* idea, as self-consciousness that is in and for itself, God himself is spirit; he produces himself also, he presents

it is a subject falls outside itself into being-for-otherness. *Ho reads*: Because the mode of being of the subjectivity we have [at this stage] is implicit, the fact that it is subjectivity falls outside itself into being-for-otherness.

369. *P reads*: the first freedom *D reads*: externalization

370. *Ho, W add*: In the religion of absolute spirit, the shape of God is not made by human spirit.

279 himself as being for other—this is what we call his “Son,” the configuration [he assumes]. In his own shape-taking, the other side of the process is at last present, when he distinguishes himself from the Son and *loves* the Son, positing himself as identical with him, but at the same time as distinct. The configuration—the aspect of determinate being—then appears as totality on its own account too, but as a configuration that is kept alive in love—here for the first time *spirit* is in and for itself.³⁷¹ | ~With art, spirit is still stuck at the halfway mark.³⁷² This defect in art, the fact that the artifact, the god, is fashioned by human hands, is also recognized in these religions where this is the highest mode of manifestation; and an effort is made to offset the deficiency—but not objectively, only in a subjective way. It is recognized that the images of the gods must be consecrated. Everywhere from the Negroes to the Greeks³⁷³ they were and are consecrated. In other words, the divine spirit is invested in the images by incantation. The ceremony comes from the consciousness or feeling of this deficiency, but the means by which it is offset is not objective, it is not contained in the idea itself, but ~is entirely subjective.³⁷⁴ The same is true of Catholic images; it is not, of course, the images that are themselves venerated; but ceremonies of reverence are carried out before them.³⁷⁵

It is for these reasons that art necessarily emerges at this point; and the moments that we have pointed out are those by virtue of which God has being for others, by virtue of which he exists as work

371. *Ho adds, similar in W:* The Son’s self-consciousness of himself is at the same time the knowledge of the Father, and in the Father the Son has knowledge of himself. But at the stage we are now considering, the determinate being [*Dasein*] of God as God is not a determinate being through him [the Son] but through what is other [*durch Anderes*].

372. *Thus G*

373. *Ho adds:* and right down to Proclus

[*Ed.*] If Hotho’s version is correct, Hegel may have been referring to the report that Proclus was comprehensively initiated into the manifold ancient mysteries. See Marinus, *De vita Procli*, in Proclus, *In Platonis theologiam libri sex* (Frankfurt am Main, 1618), b2v–c5.

374. *W (HgG/1831?) reads:* impinges on it from outside.

375. *G, W read:* Even among Catholics this kind of consecration is to be found. *W continues:* e.g., of images, relics, etc. *Cf. Ho:* The same thing also happens in the case of Catholic images.

of art. "But art does not yet emerge purely and freely as fine art."³⁷⁶ In this inversion it does make its entrance,³⁷⁷ but configurations that pertain to immediate nature and are not the creation of spirit retain just as much validity for self-consciousness—the sun, animals, and so forth remain valid shapes of God. What happens is rather that the artistic shape forces its way out of the animal, as we see in the image of the sphinx: "its body is animal, its countenance | human,"³⁷⁸ [so that it is] a mixture of the artistic and the animal shapes.³⁷⁹ The artistic shape is accordingly not yet in and for itself the shape of *beauty*, but involves a greater or lesser degree of imitation and distortion. What is universal in this sphere is the intermingling of subjectivity and substantiality.

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The next advance consists in the emergence of the free form of subjectivity, consciousness of the divine as characterized by free subjectivity, in unadulterated form on its own account, inasmuch as such emergence is possible, that is, at the first level of free spirituality. But that this first level is known solely on its own account, that the divine is defined on its own account as subjectivity—this purification of the subject from the merely natural sphere and from mere substantiality is already expressed in the stage we have been considering. The subject is exclusive; the principle of freedom or of infinite negativity inheres in the subject generally; the natural, by contrast, is [just] the contingent form. In its content the principle of subjectivity is in and for itself universal; it lets nothing subsist alongside it that is merely natural, devoid of spirit, nor yet anything that is purely substantive, inwardly devoid of form. "The principle of subjectivity will not tolerate empty, massive, indeterminate substantiality beside it, nor"³⁸⁰ the form that is not free, i.e., the form of the external natural state. This is the point of transition.

376. *G reads*: But here art is not yet free and pure. *Ho, W continue*: and is still in process of passing over to fine art.

377. [*Ed.*] *Sie tritt in dieser Verkehrung auf*. Hegel probably means the inversion of creative roles between nature and self-consciousness.

378. *Thus P; D reads*: approximating to art, to idealization

379. *Ho, W add*: A human countenance confronts us from an animal body; subjectivity is not yet translucent to itself.

380. *W₂ (Var) reads*: Subjectivity is infinite form, and as such will not tolerate beside it, any more than empty, massive, indeterminate substantiality,

281 The basic characteristic therefore is that God is known as *freely self-determining*, still, it is true, in formal fashion only at this level, but nonetheless already inwardly free. And we can recognize this emergence³⁸¹ [of free subjectivity] in particular religions, and in the peoples among whom they are found, mainly by whether the peoples in question have *universal* laws, laws of *freedom*, and whether legal right and ethical custom are the fundamental controlling categories of their way of life. For when we say that God is known as subjectivity, i.e., that he is what is self-determining, and that | the modes of his self-determination constitute the laws of freedom, in other words the categories of self-determination, or that this form of free self-determining is made the content, which in turn means³⁸² that the laws have freedom as their content—when this occurs, the natural state retires into the background and we see purposes emerging that are inwardly universal, even though they may still appear outwardly to be quite insignificant. Insofar as practical activity is ethical, it has as its principle universality, self-determination, freedom.³⁸³

With this we advance out of [the sphere of] nature religion to gods who are essentially the founders of states, of marriage, of peaceful society, the progenitors of the arts, the gods who³⁸⁴ bring forth and safeguard legal right and ethical life.³⁸⁵

Our progress to this point has been as follows. We began in the religion of magic with desire or appetite, and with the lordship and power of desire over nature, according to merely singular volition that is not determined by thought. The second stage was the theoretical definition of the independence of objectivity, in which all the different moments or aspects were left free and unconstrained,

381. *W₂ (Var)* adds: of free subjectivity

382. *W₂ (Var)* reads: then is necessarily connected with the fact

383. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?)* reads: or are not yet universal in scope, in the same way as ethical human beings may, in terms of the content of their actions generally, encompass an exceedingly small scope, and yet at the same time be inwardly ethical. *W* continues, following *Ho*: The brighter sun of the spirit causes the natural light to pale.

384. *W* (1831) adds: govern oracles and states, and

385. [Ed.] That is, the gods of Greek religion. The text contained in this paragraph and the preceding one is transposed by the *Werke* to the beginning of the next section, forming part of the “transition” to the religion of spiritual individuality.

so that they acquired independent status. The third stage is where this theoretical, independent element, this independence, is wholly abstract, and gathers up the free-ranging moments within itself again, so that conversely the practical is made theoretical; here we have the good, or self-determination in general. The fourth stage is then the intermingling of substantiality and subjectivity. |

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B. THE RELIGIONS OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY³⁸⁶

Introduction

a. *Division of the Subject*

Here in the second sphere of determinate religion we have the religion of sublimity, that of beauty, and then, as the transitional stage, the religion of singularized expediency.

If we consider this more closely in relation to how the idea of God has determined itself (i.e., to what we know of God), [we see that] the general idea of God is contained in what has gone before. [If we now ask] on the basis of what has gone before what God is, what cognitive knowledge we have of him, then the answer, according to the abstract form of the metaphysical concept, is as follows:

386. [Ed.] This heading is found in G; D reads "subjectivity" instead of "individuality." The religions of "spiritual individuality" properly include only Jewish and Greek religion, since the Roman gods are in fact not spiritual individualities or subjectivities. An inner tension occurs at this point in the organization of the 1824 lectures. At the beginning of Part II, Hegel makes it clear that the "religion of expediency" is a third, distinctive form of determinate religion; at the beginning of Sec. B, he refers to it as "transitional" between the religions of spiritual individuality and the religion of absolute spirit (Christianity); but then, when he sets forth the "division of the subject," he incorporates it as the third form of spiritual individuality. This permits him to argue that the religions of spiritual individuality correspond to three forms of nature religion "in inverse order," Jewish religion corresponding to Persian, Greek religion to Hinduism, and Roman religion to the religion of China. While an intriguing proposal, this obscures the basic threefold schema internal to *Determinate Religion*—a schema with which Hegel appears to have begun in 1824, modifying it, however, as he went along. In the modified version, Christianity (Part III of the lectures) becomes the third moment in the dialectic of the religions.

We have seen according to the abstract, relative way of defining him that God is the unity of the infinite and the finite, and the sole point of concern is to see how "determinacy, or finitude,"³⁸⁷ has been taken up into the infinite. Well then, what has happened in this regard so far? Following our definition, we say that God is the infinite generally; he is what is substantive, what is identical with self, the substantive power; and when we say this, we do not, to begin with, posit finitude as contained within it. Finitude is initially the wholly unmediated existence of the infinite, i.e., self-consciousness. The consciousness that this is what God is—infinity, the substantive power—springs from and is based upon the very fact that the truth of all finite things consists in their returning to the substantive unity, and the substantive power alone is their truth. To begin with, therefore, God is this substantive power—a definition whose utter abstractness makes it highly imperfect. The finite is a category that has to be incorporated into the infinite. So the second definition is that God is the self-contained substantive power, having being strictly on its own account as distinct from the multiplicity of the finite; this is substantiality reflected-into-itself—the fact that God is not merely substantiality in general but self-contained substantiality, which distinguishes itself from the finite. This affords a higher plane to build on; but the category of the finite | still does not have here its genuine relationship to the substantive power, such that the substantive power itself would be the infinite. This self-contained substantiality is now Brahman, and the subsistent finite is the multitude of gods. In the third stage, the finite is posited as identical with substantiality in such a way as to be equal in scope, while the pure, universal form exists as substantiality itself; this then is God as the good.

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The basic characteristic of the new sphere is *subjectivity* in general. Initially this too is still formal. We have now to see more precisely what moments it contains. Spiritual subjectivity is the wholly free power of self-determination, i.e., the self-definition that is nothing, has no content other than the concept; it contains nothing but itself.

387. *G reads*: the particularity of the finite W_2 (*Var reads*: particularity and determinacy, i.e., the finite,

This self-determining, this content, can be just as universal or as infinite as is power as such. And if we ask what we call it when universal power is active in the self-consciousness, it is what we call *wisdom*. Inasmuch as we are now at the level of spiritual subjectivity, we are at the level of self-determination, or of *purpose*; and these purposes or modes of self-determination are as universal as power. Hence a purpose of this kind is a wise purpose. The category of purpose is immediately involved in the concept of free subjectivity. Action for a purpose, expedient action, is an inner self-determination, i.e., it is determination through freedom or by the act of the subject; for there is nothing within it except the subject itself. Moreover, this self-determination is "infinite"³⁸⁸ power, and consequently it is achieved in external existence. Natural being is no longer valid in its immediacy. It belongs to power, and is for power something merely transparent, not valid. Insofar as the power externalizes itself—and it must do so, it must pass over into existence, subjectivity must endow itself with reality—this existence is no longer something independent, but is only the free self-determination of power, achieved in the process of realization, in this external existence, or in what appears as the natural state. Hence purposive action has no outcome save what is already there. The inner determination | is achieved, since what it is achieved in is natural, immediate existence. Such existence, however, is powerless against the purpose, being just the form or mode in which purpose is present outwardly, while the purpose is the inner aspect of all such immediate existence.

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At this point, therefore, we are in the sphere of subjectivity, the sphere of purpose in general; and purposive action is wise action inasmuch as wisdom consists in acting in conformity with universal purposes that are valid in and of themselves. Nor does there seem to be any other kind of purpose yet in view, for what we have here is free, self-determining subjectivity. This wisdom, however, is initially still too indeterminate.

In fact, the *general* concept here is that of subjectivity, and hence of the power that simultaneously acts in accord with purposes,

388. Thus P; D reads: unmediated

operates, presents itself. Subjectivity is active; and what is needed is that the purpose should be wise, i.e., identical with the unlimited power that determines it.

The first point to be considered, then, is the relationship of this subjectivity to what appears as nature, to natural things, or, more precisely, to what we have previously called substantiality, the power that has being only implicitly. Merely implicit power remains something natural, but subjectivity is explicit power, as distinct from implicit power and its mode of reality. This implicit power is nature, the natural world, which is now demoted for explicit power to the rank of something dependent, more precisely to that of a means. "Proper"³⁸⁹ self-subsistence is taken away from natural things: [previously] they participated directly, so to speak, in substance, but now, at the level of "subjective power,"³⁹⁰ they are downgraded to dependence, they have lost their substantive being, their being-in-themselves, and at the same time they are posited solely as negative. In this way the unity of subjective power is distinct from them, external to them, and we therefore have to comprehend them as means in relation to a purpose, or as modes that no longer have being but serve only for appearing; even if they are not defined as means, they are the soil in which things appear and are subordinated to what *does* so appear. Their role is no longer | to exhibit themselves immediately but to display something higher that is implicit in them, namely free subjectivity. This is the definition we must have in mind in regard to what is differentiated from subjectivity.

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The second point to be noted concerns a more specific definition of wisdom. As regards its purpose, wisdom is initially indeterminate. We do not yet know in what it consists, what the purposes of this power are, and have not yet got beyond this vague talk about the wisdom of God. God is wise, but what are his ways, his purposes? That is something wholly indeterminate. For us to be able to say what wisdom consists in, his purposes would have to be plain to us already in his determinacy, i.e., in his development into a pattern of distinct moments. Initially, however, we have here only purposive determination in general, i.e., indeterminate wisdom.

389. *Thus G; P reads:* Distinctive [*Canceled:* Proper]

390. *Thus G; P reads:* self-subsisting power,

Third, because God is real without qualification, we cannot rest content with this indeterminacy of his wisdom; on the contrary, his purposes also must be determinate. He is in principle one who appears, he is a subject who acts, i.e., he crosses over into existence, into actuality. Previously $\bar{\text{reality}}$ was merely immediate, for instance sun, mountain, river, etc.³⁹¹ But at this stage it is also necessary that God should *be there*, i.e., that his purpose should be $\bar{\text{an actual}}$ ³⁹² purpose, and for that very reason a determinate purpose.

In regard to the reality of the purpose, two kinds of questions arise. First, on what soil can this purpose be accomplished, where can it be present? As an inward purpose, it would be a mere thought or representation, but as $\bar{\text{absolute}}$ ³⁹³ power God is not mere thought, mere volition, intention, etc. On the contrary, he is action without any mediation. The soil on which the purpose is made real or actualized is none other than self-consciousness, | or what we call finite spirit. Purpose is determination; but at this stage we have only abstract modes of determination, not developed ones.

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Thus the soil of the divine purpose is self-consciousness or finite spirit. The second problem is that since we have only just embarked on the process of defining or characterizing wisdom, we still have no specific content for what it means to be wise; purpose is still posited in the concept of God in an ill-defined, indeterminate fashion. This is the first stage; the next stage is that the purpose must be actualized or realized. But as actual purpose it must be determinate; its determinate character, however, is not yet developed, the process of determination as such or the development has itself not yet been posited in the divine essence. The determinate character is therefore finite and external; it is a particular, contingent purpose. As an existent purpose it is not determined by the divine concept, but is determinate only so that it may be actual—i.e., it is merely contingent, a wholly limited purpose; in other words, the content of the purpose is not defined by the divine concept, it is a purpose

391. Thus G ; W_2 (following G and Ho) reads: the unity of finitude and infinitude was merely immediate; thus it was the first and best finite—sun, mountain, river, etc.—and reality was immediate. Ho reads: we had an immediate unity of finitude and infinitude; thus the actuality of God was the first and best immediate natural being.

392. Thus P ; G reads: a natural

393. Thus P ; G reads: subjective

that differs from the divine concept itself, it is not the purpose that is in and of itself divine, the purpose that, once developed, would stand on its own and would in its determinacy express the divine concept. It is accordingly a contingent purpose.

In the nature religion of Persia we encountered the good, but there the good still had the meaning of substantive, immediate identity with essence, so that all things were good and filled with light. Here, on the contrary, we are characterizing the subject, the power that stands on its own, that has being on its own account. Here purpose is distinct from concept, the determinations [of the concept] are diverse; and this diversity of the purpose is for that very reason devoid of concept, its determinacy is merely contingent, because diversity is not yet taken back into the divine concept, not yet equated with it. So here we have only purposes that are finite in content. The soil of the divine purpose is thus essentially self-consciousness, but it is finite spirit as such, in its finitude; [hence] it is contaminated with the abstract, the finite, and thus with the contingent. For the purpose is initially contingent, it does not yet match the divine concept, and finite self-consciousness is initially the plane on which it is realized.

287 Such are in general the basic characteristics of the standpoint | we are presently considering, and we must now indicate how it is to be divided for more precise consideration.

On the one side we have self-contained power and abstract wisdom, and on the other, as we have shown, contingent, finite purposes. [Then] the two are joined together; wisdom is unlimited, but for that reason indeterminate, and consequently purpose, as realized, is contingent and finite. "The division³⁹⁴ that we have to make concerns the determinate character of purpose. In other words,³⁹⁵ the main question is, what is wisdom, what is purpose ([since it is] a purpose that is not equal to the power)?

394. [Ed.] In the preceding two sentences Hegel summarizes the three religions of spiritual individuality: Jewish religion (as here described) is the religion of self-contained power and abstract wisdom; Greek religion is the religion of finite purposes; while Roman religion combines indeterminate wisdom and contingent purpose. These three are epitomized more fully in the next three paragraphs.

395. *Ho, W read:* The mediation of the two sides to form a concrete unity, in such a way that the concept of wisdom is itself the concept of its purpose, is what constitutes the transition to the higher stage.

1. First, then, we have a subjectivity of power. This pure subjectivity³⁹⁶ is not accessible to the senses. The natural, the immediate, is negated in it; it cannot be sensed, but is solely for spirit, for thought. This power that has being on its own account, is essentially One. What we have termed "reality"³⁹⁷ is purely something posited and negated; it coincides with being-for-self, there is in it no plurality, no one and the other. Thus [God] is One, simply and exclusively; he has no other beside him, he will not tolerate anything that possesses autonomy. This One it is then who is wise, and his wisdom is universal wisdom. By him is everything posited, but for him it is merely something external, accidental: this is the *sublimity* of the One, of this power and this wisdom. The second thing is that just as this power is infinitely self-contained, actualizes itself, takes on existence, infinitely, and is self-consciousness as being for an other infinitely, so its purpose too is only one. But it is³⁹⁸ a limited purpose, one that is not yet determined by wisdom and is therefore an infinitely limited purpose. The two [moments] correspond, the infinity of the power and the limitedness of the actual purpose: on the one side sublimity and | on the other side its contrary, the sublimity of the negative,³⁹⁹ which has just as much alongside it as ever, but harbors the pretension of being the one and only [God].⁴⁰⁰ This is the first form to be considered in regard to purpose.

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2. The second form is that this purpose is not just one but raises itself up above this limitedness of the one purpose. Thus there are many purposes, the infinitely limited purpose being raised up to many. Here the real purpose is the purpose that is full of content. It is no longer exclusive, but is serene and tolerant; it recognizes a multiplicity [of gods or peoples] as valid alongside it. These purposes

396. *Thus G with P and D; G reads:* We have subjectivity, we have power, and this W_1 (*Ed*) *reads:* The subjectivity that can have power W_2 (*Var*) *reads:* The subjectivity that is inwardly power

397. *Thus G; D reads:* What we have termed the natural *P reads:* What we have seen appearing W_2 (*Var*) *reads:* What we have termed reality, namely, nature,

398. W_2 (*Var*) *adds:* the very opposite of sublime, it is

399. *D adds:* sublimity and hate, *Cf. Ho:* For sublimity is only the unity of the negative, of being hated.

400. *Thus P; G reads:* infinite limitation, constraint. *Ho, W read:* The One has infinite [existence] alongside it, but harbors the pretension of being the One.

are spiritually defined; they are self-determined. There are many of these subjectivities that are valid alongside one another, many of these unities to which the manifold variety of existence in the finite world and its resources are relevant.⁴⁰¹ It is precisely thus that the friendliness of the subject with existence is established, by seeing that there are many particular purposes. This plurality of the particular does not scorn to present itself in immediate existence. Plurality, the particular subtype, simultaneously has universality within it. It is not simply exclusive like the One. Inasmuch as the purpose lets [other] particular subtypes subsist validly alongside it, it is in principle amicably disposed to particularity; the purpose itself appears in its means—as a particular purpose it lets the means subsist validly alongside itself and deigns to appear in it. This is where the category of *beauty* comes in. The beautiful is something particular; it is a purpose in itself that is amicably disposed to immediate existence; it asserts only its own validity, to be sure, but it also allows validity to the affirmation of immediate existence and makes this determinate [form] of existence into its own appearance. This signals the disappearance of the One. Power is selfless subjectivity, and subjectivity is no longer absolute power. The universal hovers above particularity
289 in lonely state as a power that is neither subject nor wise | but intrinsically indeterminate; this then is *fate*, the cold necessity lacking all determinateness that hovers above what is beautiful.

3. Third, we have a finite, particular purpose once more,⁴⁰² but one that has been enlarged to universal scope.⁴⁰³ Initially, however, the universality is empirically external; it is not the genuine universality of the concept, but a purpose⁴⁰⁴ that encompasses the world and all who dwell in it and that, being expanded to universality,

401. Thus *G* with *P* and *D*; *G* reads: to which the world of existence and its resources are relevant. *W*₂ reads: from which existence derives its resources. *Ho* reads: through which existence is what it is.

402. *W* (following *Ho*) adds: which in its particularity aspires to universality, *Ho* reads: Now the third [form], as opposed to the abstract unity and the abstract particularity of purpose, is where the particularity aspires to abstract unity, and the unity, on its side, fills itself out with particularity.

403. *W*₁ (following *Ho*, as given in preceding note) adds: and so fills itself out with particularity.

404. Thus *W* (*Ed/HgG?*)

promptly loses all determinacy and has for its goal cold, absolute, abstract power, with the result that it has on its own account no purpose at all.

In external existence these three moments are the Jewish, the Greek, and the Roman religions. Power as subjectivity defines itself as wisdom with a purpose; initially the purpose is still indeterminate; then particular purposes come into being, and the unity is distinct from them; finally, the purpose is at the same time empirically universal.

These religions correspond in inverse order to those we have already considered. The Jewish religion corresponds to the Persian, the distinguishing factor in both being that at this standpoint determinacy lies within; the essence is intrinsically, universally concrete. The determinacy is a purpose that exists on its own account.⁴⁰⁵ In the preceding religions the mode of determinacy was a natural one. In the Persian religion it was light, something that is itself universal, simple, and physical: as we left the realm of the natural behind, this was the last thing to be encompassed in a unity like that of thought; here particularity is simple—an abstract purpose or power that is just wisdom and that is all. At the second standpoint we have many particular purposes, many subjectivities, and one power over them; this corresponds to the many natural realities that we had in Hinduism, | with Brahman above them, as the thought 290 that thinks itself. At the third standpoint we have an empirically universal purpose, which is really self-contained. It is fate,⁴⁰⁶ not true subjectivity; corresponding to this we had power as the singular natural self-consciousness, an empirically universal purpose.⁴⁰⁷ The first mode of natural [spirit] is the single self-consciousness, in the natural state; the natural as single is what is present and defined [i.e., defines itself] as self-consciousness. Here, therefore, the order

405. *Thus P with G, similar in D; G reads:* lies within; the essence itself is the goal of self-determination W_2 (*Var*) *reads:* of essence, which is the goal of self-determination, lies within. Previously, however,

406. *Ho, W read:* selfless, [*W:* all-]destroying fate,

407. *Ho reads, similar in W:* Similarly, at the Chinese [standpoint] an individual presents himself to us as the unqualifiedly universal, as what determines everything, as God.

is the reverse of that found in natural religion: here the first thing is the subject, the thought that is inwardly concrete—a simple ~determinacy, which we then unfold; previously the first thing was the natural, manifold existence, which [gradually] withdrew into the simple naturalness of light.⁴⁰⁸

b. The Metaphysical Concept of God:

*Cosmological and Teleological Proofs*⁴⁰⁹

Next we have to consider the metaphysical concept of this sphere, the pure abstract thought-category upon which it is based; in doing so, however, we must abstract ~from representation. What we want to consider, therefore, is what is purely abstract, and the connection in which we have to deal with it is precisely the form in which this metaphysical concept has occurred as a proof for the existence of God.⁴¹⁰ That is how the metaphysical concept determines itself

408. *W₂ (Var) reads:* subjectivity, which then proceeds to determination within itself, whereas in nature religion the starting point was the natural, immediate self-consciousness, unity being finally achieved in the intuition of light.

409. [*Ed.*] This lengthy discussion of the proofs of the existence of God, as related to the metaphysical concepts of God found in Jewish, Greek, and Roman religion, draws together and greatly expands the *Ms.* treatment of the cosmological proofs as related to the religions of sublimity and beauty (*Ms. Sec. B.a*), and of the teleological proof as related to the religion of expediency (*Ms. Sec. C.a*). Hegel does this because Jewish, Greek, and Roman religion are now considered in a single section, and because the metaphysical concepts associated with these religions—unity, necessity, and purposiveness—are in fact interrelated. Thus these proofs cannot simply be identified with one or another of these religions. Hegel seems to distinguish three forms of the cosmological proof: the argument from finite to infinite (associated with the religions of nature [*Sec. A Intro. b.*]), the argument from the many to the one, and the argument from contingency to necessity. But he considers only one form of the teleological proof, the “physicotheological proof” (see n. 484); he does not examine the argument based on *moral* teleology, i.e., the argument that God is a necessary postulate of practical reason, which Kant regarded as the only genuine proof. The reason perhaps is that Hegel did not find this proof concretely represented in any of the religions, and was in any case unpersuaded by Kant’s reduction of religion to a category of morality. In Hegel’s view, the only genuine proof is the ontological proof, which is implicit in the Christian concept of God as absolute, self-mediating spirit. But the cosmological and teleological proofs are not simply false; they contain both valid and defective elements, which Hegel’s account is designed to elicit.

410. *Thus P; G reads:* from the representation of spirit, of universal spirit, and also from the necessity of realizing the concept, the kind of essential realization that does not pertain to representation but is necessitated by the concept. What we have here is the metaphysical concept in relation to the form of proofs of God’s existence.

now in contrast with the metaphysical concept for the foregoing sphere (which was the unity of finite and | infinite).⁴¹¹ At that stage infinity was absolute negativity, implicit power, and the thought that was the essence of the first sphere limited itself to this category of the infinity of implicit power. In that sphere the concept was for us, to be sure, the unity of the finite and infinite. But⁴¹² the essence was defined solely as the infinite; the infinite is the basis, and the finite merely accrues to it. It is for this reason, as we have seen, that the sphere was characterized in natural terms; it was the sphere of natural religion, because the form needed some natural existence for its own determinate being. For us the infinite is itself the unity of the finite and the infinite; but in religion it is only the infinite that is defined, and the finite merely accrues to it, as the natural realm. Now, however, essence is itself characterized as unity of the finite and infinite, or as *real* power, as genuine, absolute negativity. The divine essence is inwardly concrete infinity, i.e., [it subsists] as the unity of the finite and infinite.

This, then, is what we have observed in the category of wisdom;⁴¹³ wisdom is inwardly self-determining power, and this process of determining is the finite side. In this way, therefore, the divine is known not as mere infinitude but as inwardly determining [itself] as wise; it is inwardly concrete, internally infinite form; this form is the side of the implicitly finite, but in this unity of the infinite it is itself posited here as infinitude. Because the categorization in terms of pure thought accordingly belongs to the definition of the essence itself, it follows that any advance in definition no longer falls merely on the natural side but is within the essence itself. The three stages of religion we have here adduced constitute an advance within the metaphysical concept itself; they are moments in the essence, distinct shapes that the concept assumes for religious self-consciousness at this standpoint. Previously there was progress only in the outward shape; here the progress is an elaboration of the concept itself.⁴¹⁴ In consequence

411. [Ed.] See above, pp. 250–266.

412. *W₂ (Var)* adds: for this stage itself

413. [Ed.] See above, p. 386.

414. *Ho* adds, *similar in W*: It is now essence on its own account, and the distinctions are accordingly its own reflection-into-itself.

292 we have here not just one metaphysical concept | but three: the first is unity, or the One; the second is necessity; and the third is purposiveness, finite, external purposiveness.

1. First, then, there is unity, absolute power, absolute negativity, negativity that is posited as reflected into self, that has being absolutely on its own account, absolute subjectivity, in such a way that the sensible is utterly and immediately wiped out in this essence; it is power that subsists on its own, infinite negativity; it tolerates nothing sensible, for what pertains to the senses is the finite, not yet taken up and sublated in the infinite—whereas here it is sublated. This subjectivity that subsists on its own account is what we have expressed as “the One.”

2. The second concept is that of necessity. The One is just this absolute power; everything is posited in him, but negatively. This is the concept of the One. But when we speak in this way, no development is posited. The One is just the form of simplicity of that which we have observed; necessity is merely the process of the One itself, it is unity as inward motion. Therefore, it is no longer the One, but is self-contained oneness. The movement that constitutes the concept is oneness, absolute necessity.

3. The third [moment] is then purposiveness. For absolute necessity there is posited the movement that the One implicitly is, its process, and this process is the process of contingent things. If we consider what is posited and negated, they are contingent things. In necessity there is only⁴¹⁵ the coming and going of these contingent things, but it must also be posited that they have being and make their appearance quite distinct from necessity itself, distinct from this their unity, their process of necessity itself; they must⁴¹⁶ appear as subsisting, yet at the same time as belonging to the power whose control they never leave. Hence they are *means*, and unity consists in self-maintenance within this process of contingent things, self-production in these means. Unity is necessity itself, but it is posited
293 as distinct from what is in | motion within it, and at the same time

415. W_2 (Var) adds: the passing,

416. W_2 (Var) adds: at least momentarily

maintains itself therein; it has these subsisting things merely as a negative; in this way it becomes purpose in general.⁴¹⁷

When we say that these are the three metaphysical concepts pertaining to the three religions, it must not be supposed that each of them pertains only to one religion.⁴¹⁸ Each of them pertains rather to all three religions; the sole difference is “which of these characteristics of the object [of religion]”⁴¹⁹ counts as the essence, whether it be the One or necessity or power with its purposes, power conforming to a purpose, i.e., with a real purpose. The difference is then which of the three counts as essential, as the basic characteristic of the essence, in defining the religion in question.

What we now have to consider more closely is the form in which these defining marks have taken on the shape of proofs of God’s existence, in other words [how they appear] in the mode of mediation.

1. As regards the concept of *the One*, it must be noted that we are not dealing here with the proposition that God is only One. In that proposition “One” is only a predicate of God, or one of his characteristics; we have “God” as subject and “One” as predicate, but he may also have other predicates. It is in fact a simple matter to show | that he has this one predicate, a purely logical matter turning solely on the quite impoverished categories of one and

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417. *W adds*: These three moments are accordingly related as follows. *W continues, following Ho, which reads*: Since the essence is absolute negativity, it is pure identity with self, the One. Second, it is the negativity of this unity, which is, however, related to the unity and through this mutual interpenetration reveals itself as necessity. Third, the One turns back from its differentiated development as something involving relation in order to close [again] with itself; but this [regained] unity, as the collapse of form into itself, has a finite content, and as it develops this content into distinctions of form (as a totality), it yields the concept of purposiveness, but *finite* purposiveness [or expediency].

418. *W₂ (MiscP?) adds*: Where One is the essence, there is also necessity, but only implicitly, not in the determination of the One. Similarly the One determines himself according to purposes because he is wise. Necessity is also One, and expediency is also present here, though it falls outside necessity. If expediency is the basic category, then the purposes are also imbued with power, and the purpose itself is fate (*Fatum*).

419. *Thus G; P reads*: which in regard to which of these characteristics of what is objective *D reads*: in regard to which characteristic subjectivity

many.⁴²⁰ It is an ancient dictum, which we find already in Greek sources, that only the One is, and not the many;⁴²¹ and if it has to be said that where one is, there is also many, nonetheless the One is what maintains itself, what has power over the many.⁴²² That there is only one God does not belong here, for that mode of procedure does not fit into the pure speculative form. God is the subject; to demonstrate predicates of God is the concern of reflection, not of the concept; there is no philosophical cognition of God along that path. Anyway that is not the sense of this concept; the true sense—inasmuch as we are here discussing the One—is that the One *is God*, in such a way that the One exhausts the whole essence of God. It is not [just] one characteristic alongside [any] other, but properly characterizes God's essence itself. Thus it is a characteristic that fulfills the essence in the sense of absolute power as subjectivity, or as reflected into self.⁴²³ As for the form in which this concept could be portrayed as mediation, or in which it would appear as a proof of the existence of God, the situation is that this concept is not suited for the purpose. For the basis from which we are starting here in order to arrive at the characteristic "oneness" is the infinite as we have so far seen it, absolute power, absolute negativity. "The One" is only the added characteristic that this is the subject reflected into self, that which has being on its own account, in which everything sensible is sublated. It is only, as it were, within implicit being that there is movement in respect of the infinite; thus there is no mediation in the [divine] shape, as we still have to consider it here. Certainly we can say that there is a progress from the infinite to self-determined

420. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 164–169 (cf. GW 11:92–97).

421. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to Plato, *Parmenides* 159b–d, where Socrates discusses the relationship between "the One" and "the others," and finally leads his interlocutor to agree that the others are not many. "For if they were many, the One would be each of them as part of the whole. So the others, as one, are neither one nor many, neither a whole nor parts, since they in no way have anything of the One in them."

422. *Precedes in W₁ (Ed)*: To prove

423. *Ho adds, similar in W*: But speculatively "the One" is not a predicate of God as something subjective that has been [merely] hit upon; rather God is himself this movement of the subject out from itself and back to itself, its self-determination as the One, in such a way that subject and predicate are the same, each moving into the other, and that nothing remains interposed between them.

subjectivity; but the terminus a quo that is first in | this process is the infinite, and this infinite $\bar{}$ is a thought, it is absolute negativity.⁴²⁴ If we wished to consider the mediation in more detail, we would begin from a thought, namely, the concept in and for itself grasped as a thought, from which we proceeded to the other term.⁴²⁵ But at this point it is not yet the case that we have to start from the concept, for the form of mediation in which the concept is taken as starting point yields another proof of the existence of God, one proper to Christianity, not to this religion.⁴²⁶ "The One" is not yet posited as concept, does not occur for us as concept; the true or what is concretely posited within itself, as [we find it] in the Christian religion, is not yet present at this stage.

2. The second characteristic is that of *necessity*. Necessity is what is itself posited as mediation; consequently there is here a mediation for self-consciousness. Necessity is movement, or implicit process, it is the fact that the things of the world are contingent, and that this contingency implicitly sublates itself to necessity. Now, therefore, inasmuch as the absolute essence is $\bar{}$ posited and revered⁴²⁷ in a religion as necessity, this same process is present here by which necessity is constituted. It might seem as though we had already witnessed this transition in the advance from finite to infinite⁴²⁸—the truth of the finite was the infinite, [i.e., it was] the sublation of the finite in itself to the infinite; it might seem that the contingent is that same starting point and that the contingent reverts to necessity.⁴²⁹ It seems to make no essential difference whether we define the advance as from finite to infinite or from contingent to necessary. And in fact both are defined basically in the same way, $\bar{}$ but here the content is at least⁴³⁰ more concrete than it was with the earlier form

424. W_2 (Var) reads: as absolute negativity is the subject reflecting-into-self, in which every manifold is sublated.

425. W_2 (Var) adds: to being.

426. [Ed.] That is, the ontological proof; see Vol. 3:65–73, 173–184, 351–357, 360–361.

427. Thus P ; G reads: intuited, known, and revered D reads: posited

428. [Ed.] See above, pp. 254–266.

429. Precedes in W_2 (Var): In regard to the advance

430. W_2 (Var) reads: so this is on the one hand correct; on the other hand the difference is

296 of the process. The difference is as follows. | If we start from the finite, we may call it the finite, but the initial point of departure is that it is valid, that we let the finite count as subsisting. It exists, it is valid. In other words, we take the finite initially in an affirmative, positive form. Admittedly its end lies within it, but it is initially posited in the form of the affirmative, or of unmediated being. The contingent, on the other hand, is already more concrete; it may exist or it may not; the contingent is the actual that is just as well possibility, whose being has the value of nonbeing. Thus in the contingent its own negation is posited, and as the contingent both is and is nothing, it is a transition from being to nothing; "like the infinite it is intrinsically negative,"⁴³¹ but since it is also nonbeing it is also the transition from nonbeing to being. So the category of contingency is much richer and more concrete than that of the finite. When it is developed, the subjectivity of the One becomes necessity. The contingent is, it has existence, but its existence has at the same time the value of possibility. The truth of the contingent existence is necessity; this is a determinate being that is mediated with itself through its nonexistence. Actuality is this sort of determinate being, where the process is wholly self-contained and closed, a determinate being that coincides with itself through itself.⁴³²

We have to distinguish the inner form of necessity from the external form.

External necessity is properly a contingent necessity. If an effect is dependent on causes, it is necessary; when these or those particular circumstances coincide, then this or that particular outcome must follow. But in this instance the circumstances under which the outcome follows obtain immediately; and since at this standpoint immediate being counts as having only the value of possibility, the conditioning causes are indeterminate, they are such as may equally well obtain or not. Hence the necessity is relative, it relates to the initiating circumstances, which just happen to be so, immediately and contingently. This is purely external necessity, whose value is no greater than that of contingency. One can, it is true, prove that

431. *Thus G; D reads:* like the finite into the infinite,

432. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 541 ff. (GW 11:380 ff.).

under certain circumstances something necessarily occurs, but these | circumstances are always contingent, they may or may not obtain. 297
 “A tile falls off the roof and kills someone; the fact that the tile falls and someone is underneath may be the case or not, it is contingent.”⁴³³ In this external necessity it is only the result that is necessary; the circumstances, on the other hand, are contingent. The conditioning causes and the result are accordingly distinct from one another. The one is categorized as contingent, the other as necessary; this is the distinction in abstract terms, but it is also a concrete distinction; the outcome is something other than what was posited initially.⁴³⁴ Since the forms vary, the content of the two is also distinct one from the other. The tile falls in contingent fashion; the one who is hit, in all his concrete subjectivity, the death of such a one, and the falling tile are utterly heterogeneous, they differ completely in content; what occurs is something quite other than the posited result. If we treat living nature—animals, human beings, plants—in this way, under the conditions of external necessity, or as the result of earth, warmth, light, air, moisture, etc., as the product of these circumstances, we are speaking according to the relationship of external necessity. This then is external necessity, which we must distinguish from genuine or inner necessity.⁴³⁵

Inner necessity, on the contrary, means that everything “(causes, stimuli, occasions, and the result) belongs to one thing alone, to necessity;”⁴³⁶ together they constitute a unity. What happens under this necessity does not happen in such a way that from assumptions made in advance something else results. All that happens is | that 298
 what is assumed in advance itself comes about in the result, it merely coincides with itself, or finds itself; in other words the two moments—immediate existence and being posited—are posited as

433. *Thus G; P reads:* If a tile falls from the roof, it is a matter of necessity that if someone is passing at the same time he will be hit by it. He had to pass that way, and the tile necessarily had to fall.

434. *P adds:* Inner and outer are here no longer distinct from each other.

435. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 546–553 (GW 11:385–392).

436. *Thus D; G reads:* that is posited in advance as cause, stimulus, or occasion is distinct, while the result belongs to one thing alone, to necessity; *P reads:* that we distinguish as circumstances, causes, stimuli [is posited in advance], and the result alone belongs to necessity;

one moment. In external necessity there is contingency, and otherness has the character of having been posited. That which [immediately] is, is not posited, "it does not belong to this unity, it is"⁴³⁷ unmediated; "if it belonged to the unity, it "would"⁴³⁸ be posited by it."⁴³⁹ The effect is what is posited, the cause what is original. In true necessity, cause and effect form a unity: the conditions and circumstances obtain, but they do not just obtain; they are also posited through this single unity (in themselves they are in fact contingent so that they sublate themselves). The negation of their being is the unity of necessity, the unity of their process, so that their being is something implicitly negated. The result is "not merely an effect but obtains equally."⁴⁴⁰ Necessity thus consists in the conditions being posited in such a way that the circumstances that seem just to happen are actually posited by the unity; the result is also something posited, but at the same time it [is], and it is so by virtue of reflection, i.e., through the process, through the unity's being reflected within itself; this then is the *being* of the result. Thus in necessity what happens only coincides with itself. The unity dissipates itself, disperses itself in conditions and circumstances that seem to be contingent; it throws its conditions themselves carelessly about like so many insignificant pebbles, which then lie around and make their appearance directly, without arousing any suspicion. But | they are also posited, "being thus"⁴⁴¹ inwardly broken. The result is only posited; its manifestation consists in their sublating themselves, bringing forth an other, the result, which, however, only seems an other in opposition to their fragmented existence. But the content is one and the same; what they are in themselves is the result. Nothing is changed but the manner and mode of appearing. The result is the

437. *W₂ (Var) reads:* the conditions do not belong to the unity, they are

438. *G reads:* would not

439. *Ho reads, similar in W₂:* the result is only posited, but not at the same time being.

440. *W₂ reads:* then not merely a result or merely something posited; rather being equally accrues to it. *Cf. Ho:* In the same way the result is not merely something posited by its circumstances, but *is* its circumstances themselves, so that it likewise retains the moment of immediacy.

441. *Ho reads, similar in W:* they do not belong to themselves but to an other, to their result. *W₂ adds:* Thus they are

gathering in of what the circumstances contain. "Inorganic nature constitutes the conditions, and subjective form is then the result."⁴⁴² It is life that in this way throws its conditions⁴⁴³ and impulses overboard, "whereupon they no longer look like life; rather the inner element, the in-itself, appears for the first time in the result."⁴⁴⁴ Thus necessity is the process, and it involves only a distinction of form between the result and what is posited in advance.

If we now consider how, in this form, necessity has acquired the shape of proofs of the existence of God, we see, to begin with, that "necessity is a genuine concept:"⁴⁴⁵ necessity is the truth of the contingent world generally. The more detailed development [of this thesis] belongs to logic. God, the absolute, is absolute necessity; this is an essential and necessary standpoint, not yet the highest, the authentic standpoint, but a necessary stage from which the higher standpoint emerges, which is itself a condition of the higher concept;⁴⁴⁶ therefore the absolute is necessity. This form is defective. The concept of absolute necessity does not yet correspond to the idea we must have of God, which we may not, however, presuppose as a representation. The higher concept must conceive itself. So this is something subordinate, not what is authentic. This is a defect | in this proof of the existence of God. As regards the form of proof that involves absolute necessity, this is the celebrated cosmological proof, and it runs simply as follows: "Contingent things presuppose an absolute, necessary cause"; "Now contingent things do exist—I am, the world is"; the conclusion is: "Therefore an absolutely necessary cause exists."

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What is defective in this proof has already been mentioned. The major premise runs, "Contingent things presuppose an absolutely necessary cause." This proposition is in principle quite correct, and it expresses the coherence between contingency and necessity. In

442. *Thus D with P; G reads:* and its manifestation as shape.

443. *Ho, W add:* stimuli,

444. *Thus G; D reads:* but at the same time holds them fast within itself.

445. *Thus D; G reads:* the concept is a genuine one: W_2 (*Var*) *reads:* the content is the true concept:

446. W_2 *adds:* which presupposes this higher standpoint; *Cf. Ho:* This is an essential standpoint, but not yet the authentic one, which emerges from it only because it presupposes this earlier standpoint.

order to remove "all blemishes"⁴⁴⁷ from the proof it is not necessary to say, "Contingent things presuppose an absolutely necessary cause"; thus one can say that it is a relationship of the coherence of finite things⁴⁴⁸ that they presuppose the absolutely necessary.⁴⁴⁹ Then the proposition contains more specifically a contradiction directed against external necessity. Contingent things have causes, they are necessary; and what makes them externally necessary can itself only be something contingent; thus the conditions that make them necessary lead us into an infinite regress. The proposition cuts this short, and it is entirely right in that. Something that was necessary in a merely contingent fashion would not be a necessity in principle; real necessity is opposed to this proposition. The coherence⁴⁵⁰ is rightly claimed too; contingent things do presuppose absolute necessity, but the mode of coherence is incomplete: the bond is expressed as one of presupposing, entailing, and the like; this is the coherence of naive reflection. Expressed in this way, the coherence involves—upon closer scrutiny—the placing of the contingent things
 301 on one side and of necessity on the other side. | The two sides are viewed in such a way that the understanding separates them, there is a transition from one side to the other, and they are fixed, antithetical to one another.⁴⁵¹ In the minor premise this is even more clearly expressed: "Contingent things exist; therefore an absolutely necessary cause exists." Inasmuch as the coherence [of things] is so constituted that the one subsisting being conditions the other, the peculiar feature [of the argument] consequently lies in [reasoning] as though contingent things conditioned absolute necessity, and as if they were the condition for absolute necessity to exist. One thing conditions the other, and absolute necessity thus appears as presupposed, i.e., as conditioned by contingent things. This is where the proof goes astray, and this is brought into the open in the minor

447. *sonstigen Makel*. *W₂ reads*: all fault-finding [*sonstige Mäkeleien*]. Cf. *Ho*: all "blemishings" [*sonstigen Macklungen* (an invented term)].

448. *W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads*: for it is a relationship of finite things, one can say,

449. *W₂ (Var) adds*: in such a way that this is represented as subject.

450. *W₂ (Var) adds*: in general

451. *Ho adds, similar in W*: and herein lies what is false, for the fixity of being makes the contingent things a condition of the being of necessity, which consequently appears as something merely posited.

premise: "Now contingent things exist." Absolute necessity is thus made dependent, in such a way that contingent things remain outside it.

The genuinely coherent pattern is as follows: contingent things certainly are, but their being has the value of possibility only; for equally they pass away, they are only posited. They are only posited in advance by the process of unity. In other words, unity *is* the process. Their first moment is to be posited with the semblance of unmediated existence; the second moment is that these merely posited things are negated. These implicitly negative things are *posited* as negative, so that they are comprehended essentially as appearances, as no more than moments in the process. In this sense it can fairly be said that they are an essential condition of absolute necessity. All there is is the process, and it only *is* by virtue of having this characteristic—to presuppose [them]. In the finite world we do take unmediated entities of this kind as our starting point, but in the world of truth external necessity is merely this appearance, and the unmediated is merely posited. This, then, is the defect in that type of mediation, that contingent things are nonetheless posited | as having being, and are not comprehended as moments or stages in the process. At all events the thought,⁴⁵² the content, is the genuine one that the absolute must be cognized as absolute necessity.

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The third point to be noted about absolute necessity is that necessity implicitly contains freedom, since necessity too consists in coinciding with itself; it exists simply on its own account, does not depend on anything else. The way it operates is free, consisting merely in coinciding with itself in the semblance of this reciprocal indifference; its process is simply that of finding itself, coming to itself, and this is what freedom is. Implicitly necessity is free, and it is only semblance that makes the difference. We see this in the case of punishment. Someone who merits punishment can regard this punishment as an evil, or as an act of force, or an alien power, in which he does not find himself—as external necessity, something external that has its way with him, and the outcome is something

452. *Thus P with D; G reads:* the type of mediations that are regarded as proofs of the existence of God. At all events

other than what he did; the punishment of his action is a consequence, but this is something other than what he willed. If, however, he recognizes the punishment as just, then it is the consequence of his own will, and its rightness lies in his action itself. His action is the action of a rational being; it is only the rationality of his action that comes to him with the semblance of something else. Thus someone who recognizes his punishment as just suffers no force. He is responsible for his own act, he feels himself free in it. What comes to him is properly his, his right, the rationality of his action; no violence is done to him. Thus it is only implicitly that necessity contains freedom: this is an essential point—it is only formal freedom, subjective freedom; and this implies that necessity still has no inward content.

Inasmuch as necessity is simple coincidence with self in the process [of the whole], it *is* freedom. We require that necessity should involve movement, circumstances, etc.—this is its aspect of mediation; but when we say, “This is necessary,” “this” is a unity. What is necessary, *is*. “This” is the simple expression, the result, into which the process has coalesced. It is simple self-relation, the finding of self; necessity is what is most free, what is determined or limited by nothing, all kinds of mediation are once again sublated in it. Thus
 303 necessity is “the | form of mediation that surrenders itself.”⁴⁵³ To put it another way, freedom is implicitly involved in it. We might note here that the disposition to “hearken”⁴⁵⁴ to necessity that once marked the Greeks and still marks Muslims contains the disposition of freedom within itself, within the disposition of the subject, even though this does not appear to be the case; but this is only⁴⁵⁵ formal freedom, as we shall see in more detail later on.

“So far as we are concerned (since we are dealing with the concept), necessity is implicit freedom, or freedom in a formal sense. Nothing is of any account for it, it has no content; all content, everything hard and fast, vanishes before it, and the very fact that there is no content is the defect or the formal aspect in this defini-

453. *Thus G; P reads:* mediation, finding oneself, coming to oneself.

454. *Ho, W read:* submit

455. *Ho, W add:* implicit,

tion of God.⁴⁵⁶ Real necessity is freedom, necessity according to its higher concept; it *is* freedom as such, the concept as such, or, more precisely, purpose. For necessity is devoid of content, or, in other words, although a difference is contained in it, that difference is not posited. Necessity is the process that we have considered; the mere process is becoming, and this has to contain differentiations, but these distinctions are not yet posited. Thus, what is contained in necessity *is* distinction, to be sure, but the defect is that it is not yet posited. Only through mediation does necessity become the process of coalescing with self, and mediation involves the positing of differentiation generally. To begin with, necessity is still abstract self-determination, "but it must be as such; and that involves determinateness, particularization | generally. Now in the coalescence with self, this determinacy is *ipso facto* posited as coalescing with itself or as sustaining itself in the process, against the passing over of the particular into necessity."⁴⁵⁷ Determinateness has to be posited; this determinateness is the content that coincides with itself in the process of necessity, i.e., it is the self-sustaining content. The coalescence, thus defined as the content that sustains itself, is what we call purpose in general.

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Regarding the determinateness in the process of coalescence, there are two forms of it that need to be noted: (1) The "form of the content as self-sustaining, the form that"⁴⁵⁸ persists unchanged throughout the process and in the transition remains equivalent to itself; (2) The determinateness of the form, which here takes the more specific shape of the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Initially the content is subjectivity, and the process consists in this content's realizing itself in the form of objectivity. This realized

456. *Ho, W read*: No content, no intention, no determinateness is valid for necessity, and that is where it is still defective.

457. *Thus D with P; G reads*: but it must be determinateness, particularization generally; and in the coalescence with self this determinateness is *ipso facto* posited as maintaining itself against passing over in the process, it is self-sustaining in necessity. *W₂ (Var) reads*: determinateness, particularization must simply *be* generally; in order for the determinateness to be actual, the particularization and the distinction must be posited in the coalescence with self as maintaining itself against passing over in the process, as self-sustaining in necessity.

458. *W₂ (Var) reads*: determinateness exists as self-sustaining content, which

purpose is just as much purpose as it was before, but what was posited in the subject⁴⁵⁹ is at the same time objective too. These are the principal moments.

3. With this we have arrived at the category of *purposiveness*. It is in "purpose" that the determinate being of the concept as such begins—the being of the free, of what exists as free. What exists as free, i.e., what is at home with itself, what comes back to itself, what maintains itself, is the subject. The subject defines itself inwardly; on the one hand, it is the content, and in this its self-definition it is also⁴⁶⁰ free in the content; but at the same time, being at home with itself, it is free from the content. The content⁴⁶¹ is valid only to the extent that the subject allows it to be so. This is the concept in general.

305 Second, the subject also realizes the concept. Determinacy is initially simple, held within the concept, | having being in the form of being at home with self, or being self-contained.⁴⁶² Thus this subjectivity is totality, but at the same time it is one-sided, merely subjective, just one moment of the form as a whole. This is the definition [we have reached], that the content is posited only in the form of equivalence or coincidence with itself. This form of coincidence with self is the one-sided form of abstract reflection, the simple form of identity with self, and the subject is the totality of being at home with itself. In that it posits itself to be merely subjective, this contradicts the totality, and the subject is driven to sublate this form and to realize the purpose; but even when it is realized, the purpose still belongs to the subject, the subject still possesses itself in it. It is itself that it has objectified: it has released itself from simplicity, yet has maintained itself in manifoldness. This is the concept of purposiveness in general.

The second [point about purposiveness] is that the world as such is now to be regarded as conforming to purpose. We encountered

459. Thus D; G reads: the content remains what it was, but W_2 (Var) reads: the content remains what it was, it is subjective, but

460. W_2 (Var) reads: this definition is on the one hand content, and the subject is

461. Thus P; G reads: It W_2 (Var) reads: It is the subject's content, and

462. W_2 (Var) reads: in the form of being at home with self and having returned within self.

earlier the categorial determination of things as “contingent”; to view the world from a teleological standpoint “involves a higher category. We can readily agree that immediate consciousness leads us to the contingency of things, but we⁴⁶³ may hesitate whether to go further and consider things as conforming to purpose—some of them being themselves purposes and others related to these as means. We *can* maintain that there is no such thing as purpose in the world, and that what appears as purpose has only been produced mechanically by external circumstances. Purpose is something fixedly determined, and it is with purpose that *fixed* determinateness begins. The purpose maintains itself in the process; it is what marks the beginning and end of the process; hence it is the final end. It is something fixed that is exempt from the process; it is not determined by anything else, but has its ground in the subject—it is determined by the free self-determining of the subject. The antithesis [before us] therefore is whether we should remain at the standpoint where things are determined by other things, the level of their contingency, of external necessity, “[of] | what does not exist by virtue of itself, and is not fixed but only posited by something else, i.e., the standpoint of merely external necessity.”⁴⁶⁴ Both [contingency and external necessity] are alike; we have already noted earlier that external necessity is opposed to purpose, that it is being posited by something else—the concurrence of the circumstances is what brings about the result, the outcome is something that was not there before. In the case of purpose the outcome is not something other than what was already present; purpose is what perdures, what stimulates, what acts; it is the sublation of one’s subjective form and the realizing of oneself; it pertains to the subject. So these two ways of considering things, in terms of external necessity and in terms of conformity to purpose, stand opposed to each other.

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There is nothing else that properly needs to be said about this point. We have seen that external necessity reverts to absolute necessity, which is the truth of it; but absolute necessity is implicitly

463. *Thus D, P; G reads:* and in terms of its purposiveness, involves a higher category. *We W₂ (Var) reads:* and the thought of its purposiveness, involves a higher category. We may agree to the previous determination, but

464. *Thus P; W₂ (Var) reads:* or [should place ourselves] at the level of purpose.

freedom, and what is implicit must be posited. If it is posited, it becomes determinate, and its determinacy appears as "purposiveness; the genuine or higher concept [of it] is the concept of purposiveness as such."⁴⁶⁵ It must therefore be said in general that to the extent that things exist for us in the immediate consciousness (i.e., the reflected consciousness), they have to be characterized as conforming to purpose, as having purposes within themselves—in other words, the teleological is an essential way of viewing things.

But this way of viewing things at once introduces a distinction, namely that between external and internal purposiveness.⁴⁶⁶ And even an internal purpose may once more be finite in content, in which case it falls back into the relational system formed by external purposiveness or expediency.

1. External purposiveness is as follows. One way or another, a purpose is posited; this purpose is to be realized; for this to happen, inasmuch as the subject is a finite, determinate being existing immediately with its purposes, there is apart from the subject initially | the other determinant of the realization [of the goal]. On the one hand there is immediacy; thus the subject with its purposes is an immediate existence, and the side of objectification is at the same time present as something external—i.e., the realization is posited

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465. *Thus P; G reads:* subjectivity and objectivity, and so we have purpose.

[Ed.] On the concept of purposiveness, see Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 734–754 (GW 12:154–172).

466. [Ed.] External purposiveness (*äussere Zweckmässigkeit*) may be regarded as expedient purposiveness because the material used for the realization of the purpose is a mere, contingent means, external to the purpose, having "no soul of its own." It is appropriated, exploited for the sake of the purpose. When *Zweckmässigkeit* is intended in this sense, we often translate as "expediency." Roman religion, for example, is the religion of external purposiveness, hence of expediency.

In explaining the distinction between external and internal purposiveness, Hegel refers in Part I of the 1827 lectures to Kant and Aristotle (see Vol. 1:428–429). He mentions the discussion in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Part II, Critique of Teleological Judgment (see esp. §§ 63, 66, 82), which centers on the unique purposive structure characterizing in organic beings the relation between the parts and the whole. He affirms that this also corresponds to Aristotle's view of nature (see *Physics* 2.8–9), according to which every living thing is a *telos* or purpose that has its means implicit within it. As for external purposiveness, by contrast, he states in Part II of the *Ms.* that the means whereby the purpose is realized is something external, and the unity between whole and parts is no longer immanent in the purpose as it is in the case of organic living creatures.

as a material, as what is "posited from outside"⁴⁶⁷ in order that the purpose may be realized. As against the purpose this material is, to be sure, only a means. It is in the purpose that we have what stands independently on its own account, what has coalesced with itself, what sustains itself and is fixed; while that which can be otherwise—the side of reality, the material for the realization of the purpose—is what does not stand on its own, does not exist independently in opposition to the fixed purpose, and is therefore only a means, with no soul of its own and no purpose of its own within it; the purpose lies outside it and is incorporated in it only through the activity of the subject, which realizes itself in the material. Thus external purposiveness has only an external, dependent objectivity outside it, in contrast with which the subject with its purposes is what is fixed. External purposiveness consequently begins with the separation [of the objective world] from the subject. The material can offer no resistance to the subject, since it has no purpose or power of its own; [it] is only the means for the purpose that is realized in it. But by the same token the purpose that is realized in this way is itself only an outward form for this material, for the material is something immediately found there beforehand; so it is something that is not independent, yet also it is independent because it is found there beforehand. Thus the two of them, the means and the end, remain externally opposed to each other [even] when they are combined. The purpose is only the form for this material. What people bring forth in this way they call purpose; the stone and timber are means, and the realized purpose is also stone, timber, or whatever it may be, that has acquired a certain form; but in this combination the material is still something external to the purpose.

2. Inner purposiveness is that which has its means implicit in it. Thus whatever is alive is an end for itself, it maintains itself in [its own life-]process; it makes itself the end, and what | is end is here also means. What is alive is⁴⁶⁸ an articulated organism—its end is equally its means too. Inasmuch as the living subject produces itself

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467. *W₂ reads:* found there beforehand from outside and serves *Cf. Ho:* This [realization of the purpose] is accordingly found there beforehand as the external material, as what, to be sure, has no fixed validity vis-à-vis the subject (since subjectivity is at the same time totality of form), but does serve it as means.

468. *Ho, W add:* the simple inwardness that realizes itself in its members, it is

inwardly, it has the aim of containing its own means in itself. Each organ, each member or joint in the human body is an end, it exists on its own account, maintains itself; and at the same time it is the means of producing and maintaining the other organs; it consumes and is consumed, and the other parts are maintained at its expense; there is no part of the body that is not continually being consumed. It is not the material particles but the form or organ in question that remains the same, that maintains itself constantly through the process of their change. In this way what is alive is an end in itself.

3. But this end-for-itself is also involved in the relationship of external purposiveness as well. Organic life is also related to inorganic nature, it finds therein the means whereby it maintains its existence, and these means exist independently over against it. In this way inner purposiveness also has the relationship of external purposiveness. Life can assimilate the means to itself, but they are found there [in the world] beforehand, they are not posited by life itself. Life can produce its own organs but not the means.

At this point we are in the sphere of finite purposiveness; absolute purposiveness we shall encounter later.

The teleological worldview contains all these varied forms of relationship and of purpose. There are fixed ends and means, yet even that which is an end for itself is only a finite end, one that needs and depends on the availability of its means. Hence the purposiveness we are discussing is to that extent a finite one, and its finitude consists primarily in this relationship of externality. The purposes that are ends in themselves cannot be realized unless the external means are present, and then only if the means are powerless against what is purpose. The primitive truth about this relationship between end and means is universal power generally, by virtue of which things are present, can be seen, as ends-for-themselves or as means. From the standpoint of purposiveness | those⁴⁶⁹ that are ends have the power to realize themselves in the material, though they do not have the power to posit the means or material;⁴⁷⁰ but they⁴⁷¹ appear

469. *W₂ reads: the things Cf. Ho: things as ends*

470. *Thus G; D reads: posit themselves as ends for themselves;*

471. *W₂ (Var) reads: the means; the purpose and [from G: the material, both]*

to be mutually indifferent, the purpose and the materials both exist in unmediated form, the means being there beforehand, ready for the purpose.

In dealing with purposes we distinguished external purposiveness or expediency in general. As a human being I have purposes, and these purposes [are] mediated through material means. Secondly we considered inner purposiveness, which has its material in itself. What has now to be added in the third place to this relationship in order to sublate the finitude that still marks the second form is for the universal, the whole, to be defined in the terms that we established for it earlier, and which we have called inner independence. Power is what posits the end-for-itself in unity with the means.⁴⁷² What is alive has internal purposes, and means and material for its existence; it exists as the power over such means and material. Initially all this is present only in the living individual. Its organs are the means whereby it realizes itself, and it is itself the material and the means. They are permeated by the purpose, do not exist independently on their own account. A bodily organ cannot exist without the soul, without the living unity of the body to which it belongs. What appears in this way has now to be posited as universal; in other words, the means and materials that appear to be independent, to exist in a contingent fashion, vis-à-vis what is an end in itself, are [posited as being] in fact subordinated to its free power, in that they are not in themselves in relation to the purpose, while their nature *is* | to be related to it. In spite of their seemingly indifferent subsistence, they are related to their life-principle [*Seele*] in the purpose alone. Thus the universal idea is the purpose-oriented power, and it is the *universal* power that realizes itself according to purpose; in other words, insofar as there is a purpose, an end for itself, and inorganic nature outside it, this inorganic realm in fact belongs to the purpose-oriented power, so that the existent beings that appear immediately exist only for purpose. We might say that there are two

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472. Thus D with P and G; W₂ (Var) reads: Now their implicit potential is necessarily the power that posits the end, the end-for-itself, in a single unity with the means; and, in order to sublate the finitude in the relationship that we have observed up to this point, what needs to be added now is for the totality of the process to become apparent in inner purposiveness.

kinds of things in the world, those that are ends in themselves and those that appear as means; but this categorization will not hold good, for the ends in themselves can in their turn be the means in a given relation while the means can hold their ground firmly against the ends. But what conforms to purpose does not exist as power. So the second class, the class of things that seem to subsist independently, is implicitly posited, not by the power of the [finite] purpose but by a higher power that has being in itself; ~and for that reason it is subordinated to the particular power of the [finite] purpose.^{~473}

Such is the concept of the purpose-oriented power. The truth of the world *is* this purposive power; and this idea of wisdom, or of the power that is wisdom, is the truth of this world. To put it differently, the world viewed in teleological terms, or that shows itself to be effective in terms of purposes, requires a power that operates according to purposes. In other words, the absolutely universal power operates according to purposes, and since the world as such is its manifestation, the truth of the world is ~the being-in-and-for-self of the manifestation of a wise power.^{~474}

In the third place, if we consider this in the form of mediation, [i.e., if we consider] how the understanding comprehends the mediation and proves the existence of God, then there are two definite aspects that call for our attention. For in that perspective it is the *wisdom*, the wise power, | that constitutes the absolute process, ~and the process itself consists in^{~475} operating, effecting, being active. There is, first of all, this wise power; its concept is the positing of a world, an inwardly purposive world, one that has purposes within itself. Wise power is power that manifests itself, that passes over into determinate being, and what we mean by determinate being is that the diversity, the manifold character of external existence is posited. This is another point that we have already encountered;

473. *Thus G with D, P; G, W₁ read:* and for that reason they are subordinate to the [G: weaker W₁: higher] power of the purpose. W₂ (Var) *reads:* and that brings them into conformity with the purpose.

474. *Thus G; P reads:* that this truth, the category of a wise power, should be in and for itself.

475. *Thus P; G reads:* it is power, W₂ (Var) *reads:* within itself, it is power

but at this stage the distinction involves a more important, more essential level of determination. [Here] power brings forth as wisdom; and what is brought forth is the distinction between that which is an end in itself and that which is merely a means, that which only conforms to purpose, is contingent, is not purpose within itself. These two [kinds of things] exist determinately in the manifold, i.e., in the world. This is the distinction, that one is a means for the other. This is the first point about mediation; the other aspect of mediation at this standpoint is precisely that there is this distinguishing power which distinguishes purposes that are contingent and exist solely as means—that this power is what relates these two sides to each other. It maintains the purposes in precisely the sense that it determines one category to be ends and the other means.⁴⁷⁶ [It is] *power* inasmuch as it maintains these [particular] ends and the others as their means. As regards the first aspect of the mediation of what has been thus distinguished, it is what we call “creation”; creation begins from the concept. This wise power operates and distinguishes—and this is the concept of creation.

1. The first point to be noted is that this aspect of mediation does not belong to the proof of the existence of God, for it starts from the concept of wise power—from the fact that it is diremptive or, more concretely, that it is creation. However, we have not yet reached the point where the proof starts from the concept;⁴⁷⁷ [the teleological proof starts] from determinate being. The category of creation does not occur in the earlier religions. Here [in the religions of spiritual individuality] for the first time the proper concept of creation gets its place; | creation as such is not involved in the previous definitions of the divine nature. The concept was first defined as the infinite, then as power in general. In the infinite we have only the negative of the finite; similarly, in necessity finite existence simply slips away, things vanish in it, as its accidental aspect. It is said that what is, is necessary, but it is necessary here only as a result, and to the extent

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476. *W₂ (Var) reads:* determines the other as means [G: power] and is thus what maintains the purposes.

477. [Ed.] The proof that starts from the concept is the ontological proof. The teleological proof, like the cosmological, starts from determinate being (*Dasein*), but views it as having been purposively created.

that it is. With [simple] being, all that counts is being, that a particular thing is as it is,⁴⁷⁸ though it could also be otherwise; all that really then counts in regard to it is that it is. Right or wrong, fortunate or unfortunate, are all one; things are as they are, no purpose [makes them] this way or that. All that counts is this abstract, formal being-found-to-be-so, not what *is*, not the content. Thus in [simple] necessity there occurs only the formal ~affirmation that this is the situation. Nothing holds out against this necessity,⁴⁷⁹ there is nothing determinate as such, ~nothing that could be an absolute purpose.⁴⁸⁰ But at this point, when we speak of "creation," this involves the positing and being-positing of affirmative existences; this is not just the abstract affirmation that they *are*, but that their *content* is too.

It is for this reason that creation first comes upon the scene at this point. Creation is not the operation of power simply as such, but of wise power, of power as wisdom; for it is only power as wisdom that is self-determining, [so that] what appears as finite is already involved in the power itself. Because it is wise, i.e., affirmative, the determinations [of power] belong to it; in other words, the finite existences, the creatures, are genuinely affirmed. Thereby they are posited as valid—as purposes or ends, and necessity is demoted to being just a moment as against the ends. The purpose is what subsists in the power, it is what subsists against the power and by means of it; it is what holds out, that in which the process of power runs its course. Power⁴⁸¹ is at the call of | purpose; its process is to maintain and realize the purpose; the purpose stands above it, and it is posited merely as one aspect, so that only part of what is created is subject to power and appears therefore as contingent. This, then, is the concept of creation. Previously what was determinate merely came forth, it was not posited as self-determination. Power is demoted to being a moment; and one part

478. *W₂ (Var)* reads: What is, is only as result. To the extent that it is, all that counts in regard to it is *that* it is, not *how* it is—it can be this way

479. *W₂ (Var)* reads: affirmation, not the content; here there is nothing that holds out,

480. *Thus G; D* reads: and purpose requires determinateness.

481. *W₂ (Var)* reads: Necessity

of creation is thus only contingent and subject to power. Thus we have shown that this distinction itself emerges from the concept of the wise power.

2. We began with the simple concept and have progressed to this distinction. Through the concept we have in the second stage two sides, purposes on the one side, and contingent things on the other. This second stage is the mediation between them. They are the living [on one side] and the nonliving, the inorganic, on the other side. The two sides are distinct, each existing immediately on its own account, with an equal right to be there; they [simply] are, and the being of the one is no more⁴⁸² than the being of the other. These are living ends, and hence they are individuals—unmediatedly singular, rigid points, each opposed by an other, which exists on its own account and offers resistance to it. The mediation between the two sides consists in the fact that they do not both subsist for themselves in the same way: one is subjective being-for-self, while the other is only an abstract, material being-for-self, with no higher significance.⁴⁸³

This second determination, this mediation, is what is now grasped in the form of the *physicotheological proof*⁴⁸⁴ of God's existence.

Living things are in fact power, but in the first instance they are power only in regard to themselves; within its organs the living soul constitutes power, but not yet over the inorganic, which also exists. The living thing becomes on the one hand the sphere of power, but on the other hand also has [over against it] an inorganic nature; nature remains as an infinite manifold beside it. So the content is on the one hand what is still contingent; | qualitatively, living souls

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482. *W₂ (Var)* adds: justified

483. *W₂ (Var)* adds: even if they are alive.

484. [Ed.] In the *Critique of Judgment*, § 85, Kant defines "physicotheology" as "the attempt on the part of reason to infer the supreme cause of nature and its attributes from the *ends* of nature—ends which can only be known empirically." The physicotheological proof can at best arrive only at a first cause but can make no judgments as to its goodness or wisdom. Thus in Kant's view it must be supplanted by the proof based on moral teleology or "ethicotheology," which is "the attempt to infer that cause and its attributes from the moral end of rational beings in nature—an end which can be known *a priori*." The latter is the program that Kant carries out in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

are initially (or immediately)⁴⁸⁵ mutually indifferent, but they need their material, and the material has the same determinate particularity as they themselves have. And the other point is first that living things are the power over their material; this is the point upon which the understanding bases its construction of the so-called physico-theological proof.

According to this argument there are two kinds of determinate being, and they are mutually indifferent; what is needed [to overcome this indifference] is a third kind of thing. The harmony through which the purpose is realized is not one that is there in fact—what is immediately there is rather just the mutually indifferent existence of these two kinds set against each other; here this harmony⁴⁸⁶ is not a fact of immediate existence. This *tertium quid*, the implicit existence of the harmony, the concept of the wise power, is this inner element, and it is this to which the proof points after its manner. Kant examined and criticized the teleological proof with particular care, and regarded it as quite disposed of—even though he did not deal with it in a formal fashion. As he presents it, it has the following moments:⁴⁸⁷ we find in the world clear traces of wisdom, indications of a wise dispensation according to purposes. This is what a preliminary reflection on the world [shows]. The world is full of life, both spiritual life and natural vitality. These living things are organized in themselves, they are the power in regard to themselves; but already in respect of these organs the different parts can be regarded as mutually indifferent. Of course, life is the harmony of the parts, but the fact that they exist determined in this way, for this harmony, does not seem to be grounded in their determinate being. Each plant and blossom, each species of animal, has its own particular

485. Thus *P* with *D*; *G*, *W*₁ read: on the one hand [*G*: there are still (these) qualities, *W*₁: there is still (this) quality,] this initially immediate being, [as] *W*₂ (*G* with *Var*) reads: on the one hand there are still [this] quality, this initially immediate being, and living souls [as]

486. Thus *P*; *G*, *W* read: [*precedes in W*₂: there reigns here] goodness—that each kind of thing, being self-related, is indifferent to other things, that they are distinct, *W* (*Var*) adds: that they are opposed—[this]

487. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 650–657.

nature;⁴⁸⁸ plants | need a particular climate and soil, animals 315 belong to a particular genus, and so on—their natures are particular. To these particular natures belong particular means, a particular kind of material, in order that it may exist in this process, and its maintenance, its determinateness is the production of itself [from these resources]. Life only produces; but it does not pass over into the other with which it forms a process, but remains itself, continually changing and reconstructing the process. This spectacle of vitality, this concordance of the world, and of the organic and the inorganic moments in it, the conformity of existence with human purposes generally, this is what amazes human beings who begin to reflect, for what offers itself initially to their perception is independent existences, existences that exist completely on their own account but that harmonize with *their* existence. The wonderful thing is that even phenomena that appear at first sight to be completely indifferent to one another turn out to be essential to one another; and what is wonderful is the very contrary of this indifference, viz., conformity to purpose. Thus we have here a principle completely different from the principle of their immediate determinate being.

“This teleological ordering is [not] grounded in the world, and attaches to it only in contingent fashion.”⁴⁸⁹ The nature of different things could not spontaneously concur through so many [separate] existences toward just one final end; and that is why a third principle is needed, a rational, ordering principle such as the existing things themselves are not.

Things show themselves to be ends [*Zwecke*] and also means for each other [*zweckmässig für einander*]. That they are means to ends is not posited by the things themselves. Admittedly life acts in such a way as to use inorganic nature; it maintains itself by assimilating natural things, negates them and posits itself as identical with them

488. *W₂ reads*: And living things also have a relationship to the exterior, each being related to its own inorganic nature; *Ho reads*: Moreover, every living thing is oriented to the exterior, has a relationship to a specific inorganic nature peculiar to it;

489. *Thus P; G reads*: This first principle applies to them only in contingent fashion.

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while maintaining itself in them. Life is, to be sure, the activity of the subjects, who make themselves the focal point, and everything else the means. But this second determination~—that there | are things they can use—is something that lies outside them.⁴⁹⁰ That they are externally indifferent to one another in their mode of existence, this—like their existence itself—is not posited by the [subjective] purpose. So then, in the third place, this mutual indifference of things is not the genuine relationship [between them] but only a semblance. The category that defines them genuinely is the teleological one of conformity to purpose. And this implies that they are not mutually indifferent; the teleological relationship is the essential one, the one that is valid and genuine. The proof demonstrates the necessity of a supreme ordering being.⁴⁹¹

There consequently exists a wise cause which, as freedom and intelligence, is the cause of the world; and so on. Against this proof Kant argues⁴⁹² that it only shows God to be the architect of the world, not its creator. The proof concerns only the contingency of form, not the substance. For what is requisite is just this relation between objects, this quality of conformity to purpose; if the conformity is posited by a power, what is required is just this, that the objects shall be posited purposefully. This quality, says Kant, is only form, and the positing power would merely be actualizing forms, not creating the substance.⁴⁹³ As regards this criticism, the distinction is an empty one.⁴⁹⁴ If we are at the standpoint of the concept, then we must long since have left behind the distinction of form and matter,⁴⁹⁵ and ~with it any conception of a formative action of absolute power in which the form could be thought without positing

490. *Ho, W read*: lies outside them. For human beings certainly use things, assimilate them to themselves, but that there *are* such things that they can use—this is not something posited by them.

491. *Ho, W add*: But that the cause is one can be inferred from the unity of the world.

492. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 655.

493. [Ed.] *Ibid.*, B 654–655.

494. *Ho, W₂ add*: For the power cannot posit the form without positing the matter.

495. [Ed.] On Hegel's definition of the relation between the two, see *Science of Logic*, pp. 450–456 (cf. GW 11:297–302).

the matter.⁴⁹⁶ If we speak of form here, the form appears as a particular quality, but that is only a mode of form that is present here. The essence of form as it is present here, however, is the concept of the purpose that realizes itself. Form in this sense, that of being the concept, is what is genuinely substantive; it is the soul. What can then be distinguished as matter is something formal, wholly subsidiary; here the form is the concept itself.⁴⁹⁷ 317

Kant goes on to say⁴⁹⁸ that the conclusion is based on the order and purposiveness that subsists in the world at the moment and is merely observed; this is just a contingent existence. "My being is contingent, and so is that of the plants; they are not posited by me as subject. The contingent⁴⁹⁹ is observed, and in this way we are cognizant of the order and know that it is there. From this subsistent purposiveness, says Kant, the argument infers the existence of a proportionate⁵⁰⁰ cause. This is the other moment [of Kant's critique], and it contains a categorial determination that is quite correct; but it has to be pressed further.

We say that the purposive arrangement that we observe cannot simply come about [of itself]; it requires a power that operates in conformity with purposes. So the content is this cause: the wisdom of the postulated cause extends only as far as we have insight into its purposes. Observation always gives us only a relationship, and no one can argue from power to omnipotence, from wisdom and unity to omniscience and absolute unity; so the physicotheological proof affords us only a concept of great wisdom, great power, great unity, and so forth. But the content that we want is God, absolute power, absolute unity and wisdom; this does not lie within the con-

496. *Thus P, D; G reads:* one must know that absolute form is something real, that form therefore is something, [but] without matter is nothing.

497. *Thus G; P reads:* If the [opposition of] form and matter has no truth, it has [absolutely no] place here, where the form is the concept itself. *W₂ (Var) reads:* or merely a formal category in regard to the concept. *Cf. Ho:* As determinate, the qualities are merely a formal aspect, in themselves a determinateness of form.

498. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ¶ 655–656.

499. *Thus P; G reads:* Existence, to be sure, is contingent; what is, *W₂ (Var) reads:* This is, to be sure, correct in existence; the contingent

500. *W₂ reads:* a proportionate, purposive *Ho reads:* a proportionately purposive

tent of observation, however. From “great” to “absolute” we make the leap. We begin with the sense of wonder at the power before us and we never get any further. This is a wholly justified comment; the content from which we start is not the divine concept.⁵⁰¹

318 To get any further we must now consider this more precisely. The starting point is the category of conformity to purpose, taken in its empirical aspect; there are finite, contingent things, and they | also serve purposes. Well, what kind of purposiveness is this? It is *finite*. The purposes it serves are finite, particular purposes, and the purposiveness appears as contingent because the purposes themselves are contingent. This is what is wrong with this physicotheological proof, the fault we are from the outset dimly aware of, and what makes us suspicious about the whole argument. What are the purposes or ends? For instance, human beings. Human beings need food and drink; so here the ends are animals, light, air, water, edible plants, that these should be maintained. It emerges at this point that these are completely limited ends; edible plants and animals are both ends and means, for one animal is eaten by another, and that one in turn by others. The physicotheological view is apt to pass over into such petty singular details as this; for there is nothing upon which piety cannot feed. So if the aim is to stir the heart, [that] can be achieved by this view. But to achieve cognition of God by it⁵⁰² is another matter. When we speak of absolute wisdom, or of the power that operates according to its purposes, the question arises—What are those purposes? And the content of the divine activity is then constituted by the finite purposes to which we have referred, and these are only such purposes as are to be found in existence. Absolute (or higher) purposes would be ethical life, or freedom. So one has to show that the ethically good is a purpose on its own account, and further that an absolute purpose of this kind is achieved in the world.

501. [Ed.] The proof that starts with the divine concept (a concept that includes within itself being or reality) is the ontological proof. In Hegel's view it is the only adequate proof, since the “leap” of which he speaks can never be required or demonstrated rationally.

502. *W₂* adds: and speak of absolute wisdom Cf. *Ho*: But to speak of absolute wisdom and power, which [operate] according to purposes that themselves are absolute, would be another matter.

But at present we are nowhere near the stage where we can talk of the absolute purpose; here we are only in the sphere of purposive action generally, and what is present for our observation at this point are simply *finite* purposes.⁵⁰³ If we nevertheless say that the absolute purpose is good, then we must still ask, for example, What does this "good" consist in? The answer may be [that it consists in] the ethical life of individuals, | that happiness should be meted out to them according to the measure of their ethical life. But if one hazards the observation that the [absolute] purpose is that the good should be happy and the evil unhappy, then one sees that this is brutally gainsaid in the world, and one finds that there are about as many inducements to an ethical way of life as there are reasons for going astray. The good person fares ill, and the evil person prospers. In a word, as far as mere perception and observation are concerned, there is evidence of conformity to purpose, of purposive arrangement, but there is just as much evidence of the contrary, and ultimately one would have to count whether the examples of one or the other are more numerous. And it is this kind of finite content that is supposed to make up the content of the divine wisdom! 319

So the defect in this proof lies in the fact that purposiveness and wisdom are defined only in general terms, and we have to turn to the observations or perceptions in which such relative purposes exhibit themselves.⁵⁰⁴

It follows that even if the divine nature is comprehended as a power that operates in conformity with purposes, we still do not arrive at what we want when we speak of God, i.e., we do not have what we call the personality of God, or spirit. For spirit is not the only power that operates in conformity with purposes; natural vitality is also such a power. The concept of vitality is [that of] an end-for-itself, an existing purpose, involving effectual action to realize it. So there is nothing more before us here, in respect of content, than is involved in living nature and its concept.

As for the formal aspect of this transition, the form here is in general that of the syllogism of the understanding. That is to say,

503. *Ho, W read:* finite, limited purposes. The power that operates according to purpose [*W:* purposes] is only vitality, it is not yet the spirit, the personality of God.

504. *Thus G; D reads:* which evince arguments for and against it.

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there are existences that are teleologically defined, in other words purposive relationships generally; and the determinate being of the objects having the character of means and that of the ones in which the purposes lie is [reciprocally] contingent. The second point, however, is that at the same time they are not contingent in this relationship, but rather it is inherent in the concept of the purposively active power, or in the concept of vitality, that not only are the purposes posited but also the objects | that are used as means for them. That is all quite correct. But the matter can also be presented as follows: Things in the world that are purposefully ordered have for their inner essence, their implicit potential, a power that relates, posits, creates the two sides in such a way that they match each other. This is the major premise. Next it is said, "Such things exist"; here again the being of the things in question is the affirmative moment, the starting point, but the transition [to the conclusion] involves rather the moment of their nonbeing just as much [as their being]. Things that are used as means are *not* [because they are consumed]; they *are* only inasmuch as they are posited as negative in their [simple] existence; they are only contingently [there] for purpose; what is therefore required, however, is that they are not indifferent existences for [their] purpose. When we say that there are such things, the [logical] moment has to be added that their being is not their own, but is a being that has been demoted to the level of means. Similarly in regard to the purposes that stand in need of the means, when we say there are objects of this kind, objects that have a goal before them, then it is true that these objects are [there]; but inasmuch as the conclusion to be reached is the power that so disposes them, the existing purposes are posited together with the existence of their means. It is not *their* being that, as positive being, can ground the mediation or transition effected at this stage; rather it is the case that precisely in this transition their being is turned into a being-posited. "The minor premise always turns being into the mediating term."⁵⁰⁵

This then is the form of this proof in [all] its manifoldness.

The general content of this form is as follows: The world is to

505. *Thus D; Ho, W read:* But the minor premise remains fixed upon the being of things, instead of also taking into account their nonbeing.

be comprehended as a purposive world generally, a pattern of purposive relationships—about the detailed nature of the purposes we say no more. Conformity to purpose is the concept—not merely the concept that exists in finite things but the concept defined in absolute terms, the concept in its divinity, an absolute advance, a necessary [stage in the] definition of God. God's being is to be power and self-determination, and this involves self-determination according to purposes. The main defect in this teleological | proof is that it starts from perception and appearances; these give us only finite conformity to purpose, not the concept of purpose as such; but the pure purpose is just the universal and absolute purpose as such.

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*c. The More Concrete Definition of God*⁵⁰⁶

Let us now turn to the concrete, the more specific form of this religion, the concrete definition of God. The concept is that of the universal power that is purpose-oriented. But in the sphere of religion we stand immediately at a different viewpoint. The standpoint of religion is that of the consciousness—or self-consciousness—of spirit. In religious consciousness we have this concept, not as mere vitality, but as it determines itself in consciousness. So we now have religion as the consciousness of the spirit that is the universal power operating according to purposes. The object of religion includes the representation of spirit as such, but everything depends on what moment of thought or of the spirit is operative. The inner essence of this spirit is not yet spirit in-and-for-itself; the content of this representation, the way its object is defined, does not yet express the content of spirit; instead this content is here a power that operates according to purposes. The second point is that while we have characterized religion as the consciousness of spirit in general, it has here the specific character of self-consciousness; we have here divine self-consciousness in general, both objectively as a characteristic of the object and subjectively as characteristic of the finite spirit.

506. [Ed.] In this concluding introductory section, Hegel summarizes what he normally considers under the category of "concrete representation," namely the specific representational and cultic forms of a religion. He returns from the lengthy excursus on the teleological proof to the specific religions in view at this stage, namely, the Greek, Jewish, and Roman.

322 We have noted that the consciousness of spirit here determines itself as self-consciousness. This follows from what precedes; let us consider briefly how it does so. We have seen that in the concept of purpose, or in the power that is wisdom, the defining character belongs to the concept itself, i.e., determinateness is posited in its ideality. But this means that determinacy is what appears as determinate being, as being for an other. Along with consciousness there is posited distinction, initially vis-à-vis the self; determinacy is here posited as the distinction that properly belongs to the self, in other words it is the self's relationship to | itself, i.e., it is self-consciousness. Thus God is posited as self-consciousness insofar as consciousness of⁵⁰⁷ the object has its being essentially as self-consciousness. The determinate being of God for the other consciousness is thereby⁵⁰⁸ something ideal, it is spiritual, being as subjective; to put it another way, God is now essentially *for* spirit, for thought in general, for the supersensual, and the fact that he exists as spirit for spirit is at least one side of the relationship. That God is worshiped in spirit and in truth [John 4:24] *may* constitute the whole relationship, but at the very least it is to be posited as an essential character of it.

The second point to be noted in this regard [is as follows]. As we have seen, the concept must be characterized as purpose. This purpose, however, must not maintain the form of being self-contained, it must not keep to itself; instead, the shape must attain a [distinct] reality. The question now is, if wisdom is to become operative, if the purpose is to be realized, what is the soil as such in which this can occur? This soil cannot be anything save spirit itself, or more precisely humanity. Humanity is the object of purpose, of the power that defines itself and acts accordingly, the power that is wisdom. Human being—or finite self-consciousness in general—is spirit in the determinate category of finitude. To realize the purpose is to posit the concept in a manner distinct from its mode of being as absolute concept subsisting in and for itself; it is to posit it in the

507. *G reads:* [in relation] to W_2 (*Var*) *reads:* and its relation to

508. *Thus P, D; G reads:* The other—God as object for what stands over against him—is W_2 (*following Ho*) *reads:* The determinate being of God, his objectivity, the other, is *Ho reads:* So God's objectivity, or the manner in which he has being for consciousness, is

mode of finitude generally, but a mode that is at the same time spiritual. Essentially, spirit only is *for* spirit. Spirit is here defined as self-consciousness; hence the other in which it realizes itself is finite spirit; and in finite spirit it is at the same time self-consciousness. So the soil in which it realizes itself, or the universal medium of reality generally, is itself something spiritual; it must be a soil in which spirit at the same time exists for itself. Humanity, the human world, is thus posited as essential purpose, as the soil of the divine wisdom and the divine power. |

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What follows, thirdly, [is] that human beings obtain in this way an affirmative relationship to their God, for the basic determining character here is that he is self-consciousness. Thus humanity, as one side of reality, has self-consciousness, it exists affirmatively vis-à-vis God,⁵⁰⁹ it is consciousness of the absolute essence as its own essence; in other words, the *freedom* of consciousness is hereby posited as such within God—in him humanity is at home with itself. This moment of self-consciousness is an essential moment of freedom; it is a basic characteristic, even though it is not yet the whole content of the relationship. By virtue of it human beings exist for themselves as ends in themselves; in God their consciousness is free, it is justified in God, it exists freely on its own account, essentially for itself; and inasmuch as it directs itself toward God, human consciousness produces *itself*.

This is the general picture. The more specific forms of this standpoint are the religions of sublimity, of beauty, and of expediency, each of which we now have to consider more closely.

1. The Religion of Sublimity (Jewish Religion)⁵¹⁰

First we have the religion of sublimity, that of the One. The moments of this religion are as follows. First, God is defined as the absolute

509. *Thus G; D reads:* For as regards the relationship, this is self-consciousness.

510. [Ed.] Judaism is the religion of sublimity [*Erhabenheit*] because of its high, exalted conception of the one God. Here for the first time the idea of God is truly attained in the history of religions. Hegel's treatment of Judaism in 1824 differs in significant respects from the interpretation offered in the *Ms*. The primary difference is that the category of "wisdom," though mentioned in 1821, is now elevated to a position of prominence. The absolute power of the Lord is wisdom, wise power, a power that acts in accord with purposes or ends, which on the one hand are abstract

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power that is wisdom; and power as wisdom is, to begin with, reflected into self as subjectivity, and exists initially within itself. This self-determination of power is the completely abstract, universal self-determination that has not yet inwardly sundered itself but is merely reflection-into-self as such. Its determinacy is just determinacy as such. Because of this utterly undifferentiated self-reflectedness God is defined simply as One. In this unity all particularization, all distinction disappears. Second, natural things, the finite in general, the particular, no longer have independent validity in their immediacy; there is just the one power that can stand on its own; | everything else is posited, held in check by the One, for it is abstract subjectivity. It is itself shapeless; configuration counts only as something posited; against the One there is nothing that can stand on its own. The third moment is the defining of its purpose. On the one hand it is itself the purpose—it is wisdom; in addition, its wisdom must be equal to its power. But the One is only universal purpose for itself, i.e., its wisdom is merely abstract, it is only called wisdom. But this wisdom must be realized, and the mode of particularity must accordingly be implicit in it too. This is the first, immediate particularization, whose content is therefore completely limited and entirely singular.

We are dealing with the determining of the concept. [But] this determinacy must not just remain within the concept; it must also

and universal, but on the other are oriented exclusively to one people, the Jewish people. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, but Hegel now stresses, against Schleiermacher (see below, n. 551), that this fear does not issue in a "feeling of dependence" but in a liberation from dependence on all earthly, particular things. It is thus the basis of human freedom, which in Judaism takes the form of absolute trust or infinite faith in the Lord, as exemplified by Abraham and Job. This contrasts sharply with the *Early Theological Writings*, where Abraham is portrayed as epitomizing the alienated and servile consciousness, as well as with the *Ms.*, where the stress is on the *fear* rather than on the wisdom that issues from it. Hegel had long been attracted to the Book of Job ("Job's situation," he says in these lectures, "is a universal one"), and already in the *Ms.* he quotes extensively from Job 31, 33, 38, 40, 42. These quotations are repeated in somewhat briefer form in the 1824 lectures. It is conceivable that the interpretation offered in 1824 reflects the influence of F. W. C. Umbreit's *Das Buch Hiob; Uebersetzung und Auslegung*, published in Heidelberg 11 April 1824. Whereas earlier interpreters had stressed the portrayal of divine majesty in Job, Umbreit stressed the divine wisdom. See Reinhard Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel* (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 169–180, esp. 172.

acquire the form of reality. This *form* of reality, however, is the initially immediate reality, an immediate reality. The purpose of God, therefore, is just this primitive reality, and hence it is a quite specific single purpose. The next stage is for this determinate purpose on its side to be raised into⁵¹¹ universality. In this way we do have here on the one side pure subjectivity, but the determinacy [of its purpose] does not yet correspond to this subjectivity. Its initial purpose is a completely limited one; but, as we have said,⁵¹² humanity is the purpose, self-consciousness is its soil, and as the divine purpose it must at the same time be an inwardly and implicitly universal purpose, universality must be contained within it. The universality it contains, however, is still primitive, it is a natural universality. The purpose is something human as such, and "more exactly"⁵¹³ it is the family. What we have here, then, is a patriarchal religion. Then the family expands into a people. It is this nation, then—a nation is a people as constituted by nature—that is the limited purpose. This family, this people, is the divine purpose to the exclusion of all else.

Such are the basic characteristics of the religion of sublimity or of the One. We now have to consider it in its concrete essence. |

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*a. God as the One*⁵¹⁴

The absolute essence is he who is One, and we have indicated what this definition means. It is subjectivity, which is infinite power, so this subjectivity is simply and solely One. That God is solely One is infinitely important, trivial as it may seem to us, since we are accustomed to think of God as One. As a definition it is formal, too, but it is nonetheless infinitely important, and it is not surprising that the Jewish people regarded it as so important that they worshiped God as the One. That God is One is "the ground of absolute spirituality,"⁵¹⁵ the path to truth. The definition of absolute truth is involved in it; it is not yet the truth as truth, for that involves

511. W (HgG) adds: concrete

512. [Ed.] See above, p. 422–423.

513. Thus P; G reads: so W (HgG) reads: also naturally

514. G reads: 1

515. Thus P; G reads: the root of subjectivity, Ho reads, similar in W: the absolute root of subjectivity, of the intelligible world,

development, but it is ~the principle, truth's absolute harmony with itself, which in concrete terms *is* truth.⁵¹⁶

This one God is therefore without shape or form, for he is pure power; everything particular is posited in him as negative, i.e., as not belonging to him, not befitting him, not yet worthy of him. In nature religion we have seen the aspect of [divine] determinacy as a natural existence, as light, and so forth. We have seen [God's] self-consciousness determined in this manifold fashion; in the infinite power, on the contrary, all this externality is annihilated. Here there is the essence that has no shape and image, that does not have being externally in any natural way for the other, but *is* only for thought, for spirit. This first, formal, simple way of defining the One provides the ground for grasping God as spirit ~or as self-consciousness; it is⁵¹⁷ the root from which his spirituality as such derives, the root of his concrete, genuine content.

*b. The Form of Divine Self-Determination*⁵¹⁸

326 The second point is the form of the divine self-determination generally, the manner of God's particularization. This cannot be absent, ~for it is⁵¹⁹ | necessarily contained in the idea. Initially it is not a matter of God's being particularized internally, for then God would be known as spirit. ~This is only one side, that of defining God, not his inner self-determining.⁵²⁰ This particularization is initially the divine process of determining in general, and that is what we call *creation*, to which we have already referred. It should be noted that the particular form of creation does not consist in a going forth of the particular from any sort of One, as in the case of Brahman. What is expressed by "going forth" is that what has gone forth is independent; to put it another way, the alteration involved

516. Thus P; G reads: the beginning of truth. W₂ (following G, Ho) reads: the beginning of truth and the formal principle of absolute harmony with itself. Ho reads: only its formal principle, absolute harmony with itself.

517. Thus G; W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads: and for self-consciousness it is

518. G reads: 2

519. Thus D; G reads: it is W (HgG) reads: wisdom is

520. Thus G, P; W₂ reads: Because God is One, particularization falls on the other side. Cf. Ho: But as God is One, this moment of particularization does not fall within him but outside him.

in arising is only something transitory, and what has arisen thus loses the character of having arisen ~and becomes an enduring, independent deity.⁵²¹ But what we have here is not this mode of going forth; the positing is not something transitory, and everything that has gone forth continues to have the character of being a posited *creature*. Hence all things are stamped with the mark that shows they are *not* truly independent. That all things created are just posited beings remains basic to their definition, since it is God who, as subject, is the infinite power. This power is the One, and what is particular is defined merely as something negative, merely a posited being in contrast with the subject.

The second inherent characteristic of creation is that God is a presupposed subject, just as he is an enduring subject as power. He also goes forth on this account [into particularization] in Greek mythology and cosmogony,⁵²² but there the spiritually present deities are the last to be begotten. But this is not the case with the one God, the subject that is presupposed and endures; here whatever has gone forth is only a creature. This accordingly lies in the very concept of creation; otherwise | creation is simply a vague notion all too evocative of mechanical, technical, *human* production; and that is a notion that must be eschewed. God is what is [logically] first; his creation is an *eternal* creation, in which he is not the result but the starting point. The higher mode of creation is that in which spirit generates itself, without stepping forth outside itself, at once the beginning and the result; then it is posited as spirit. But here it is not posited [as] achieving its return-to-self through its process of particularization. And since God is simply what comes first, we must not think of the human mode of production. Human, technical production is external; the subject is what comes first, then it begins to be active, steps outside itself, and so enters into an external relationship with the material, which is worked on and molded, resists, and has to be bent to one's wishes; maker and material exist

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521. *Thus P; G reads:* and endure independently, is God. *D reads:* according to which God remains simply something independent.

522. *Thus D; G reads:* He is also a presupposed subject among the Greeks, *Ho reads:* The Greeks also [have] a theogony, an issuing-forth of the gods; Uranus and Cronus come first; Jupiter [Zeus], the spiritual deity, is the last.

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as objects, each already there over against the other. "God, however, creates absolutely, out of nothing; here we do not have one object over against another, but a mode of production in which God is the subject, is simply intuitive, infinite activity. Human production can be represented as follows: here I am, with my | purpose and my consciousness, and I also have a material, about which I know, so that I am in the relationship of a conscious being inasmuch as I am in relationship with something else. Intuitive production, on the contrary, is not conscious production so far as it is intuitive. Instead it is the eternal production of nature, which falls under the concept of vitality. It is an inward act, an inner activity, not directed against something already present to hand—the falling asleep of the intelligence, as the saying went;⁵²³ it is vitality, nature being

523. *Ho reads, similar in W:* But here too, creation is not something done externally on a material that has to be subdued by the subject; for God creates absolutely, out of nothing. Only he is being, what is positive. But he is also the positing of his power. In himself he is the same [power?] as the immediate that sublates itself. Hence the positing of his power is the positing of the immediate as sublated, as posited. This immediate does not lie within God himself, for he is the sublated immediate. So the immediate posited as sublated falls outside him, as the creature. The creature has within itself both moments—to be immediate and to be posited. The fact that God is necessarily the positing of his power is the birthplace of creation and of everything that is created. This necessity is the material out of which God creates; this material is God himself, hence he creates out of nothing material, for he is the *self*, not what is immediate or material. He is not merely One over against something else, already there, but he himself is the something else as determinacy. Because, however, he is *only* One, this determinacy falls outside him as his negative movement. Creation is the infinitely intuitive activity of positing oneself as power. In their productive role human beings are consciously related to something else, but this is not divine creation. The positing of nature necessarily falls under the concept of spiritual life, of the self, and is the falling asleep, for instance, of the intelligence.

[Ed.] The source of the expression, "falling asleep of the intelligence," has not been traced. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:517 (*Werke* 15:652), Hegel refers in a comparable context to Friedrich Schelling's *System des transscendentalen Idealismus* (Tübingen, 1800), p. 4, where Schelling says that so-called dead nature is merely an "immature intelligence" (*eine unreife Intelligenz*), which can be seen at work, although still unconsciously, in its phenomena. Hegel comments that by "immature intelligence" Schelling means "torpid, fossilized intelligence" (*erstarrte, versteinerte Intelligenz*), so the phrase "falling asleep of the intelligence" may be an allusion to Schelling. Hegel uses a similar metaphor in his lectures on the philosophy of right; see Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831*, ed. K.-H. Ilting, vol. 4 (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1974), p. 632 (Griesheim's transcript of § 258): "Spirit also realizes itself in nature, but only as the other of spirit, as sleeping spirit."

produced continually anew. As opposed, therefore, to the definition of the One as the subject, there is the particular that comes forth in this productive activity in nature and externality, the sphere of intuition; in general it is something posited, something created.

The second characteristic that accrues to God in respect of creation is his goodness and his justice. As infinite wisdom, power is no longer mere necessity: created things are in any case, and they are only posited, necessarily determined as being or not being. But here another characteristic is added; as a moment of the divine, the being of finite things must be characterized as [a work of] *goodness*; their nullity and its manifestation is then [the work of] *divine justice*.

Thus the defining and production [of created things] is in the first place an outgoing process. Goodness and justice are moments of power; because the One is presupposed as the subject, they appear as properties, as subjective moments. In consequence, the being of things has the form of purpose: that they shall be is [the work of] goodness; that they shall perish is [the work of] justice⁵²⁴—and in both cases it is the subject who decides. At this point, therefore, there is room for properties, which can be regarded as determining characteristics of the concept itself. But the thing that possesses the properties does not have its nature in them as such; its basic determining characteristics are the One and the power. Its properties do define the subject, but in such a way that the concept, the most inward nature of the subject is still posited independently of them. For if the properties did in fact belong to the subject, these determining characteristics would themselves be totalities, for the concept is absolute goodness, and its characteristics are self-imparted. Only when they form a totality is the concept posited as idea, and no longer as abstract subject. For them to be posited in the concept they themselves would therefore have to constitute the entire concept, which would thus for the first time become truly real; the concept would then be posited as idea and the subject as spirit, its goodness and justice being totalities, not just an abstract determinacy. It follows that the negative moment is justice, to the end that the nullity

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524. *Thus G; D reads:* is defined in the terms that it shall be, in the same way as their disappearance, that it shall not be

of existent things may be made manifest, as we have seen in the coming into being and passing away of Shiva; it is only the aspect of process as such, of the contingent, whose nullity is manifested. So this negativity is not the infinite return-to-self that would characterize spirit; it is just the negativity of justice.

The third point to be noted is what sort of determinateness things that are real receive quite generally. The definition of things is just that they are created, that they have entered into the categories of the external and nonautonomous. In other words, the nature of natural things is here prosaic: they are stripped of divinity and are within themselves devoid of independence—for all independence is concentrated in the One.⁵²⁵ Now it may seem to be a commonplace to complain that in a religion nature has been stripped of divinity; what is then prized on the other hand is the unity of the ideal and the real, of nature with God, in which natural things—sun, animals, trees—are regarded as independent and divine, as subsisting freely. This is what is called the identity of ideality and reality. And indeed the idea does have to be viewed in terms of this unity, but this does not amount to much. This definition of the identity is completely formal, even cheap. There is this identity of the ideal and the real anyway; but what matters most is how it is further defined. There is a genuine identity of the real and the ideal only in the spiritual [realm], in the God who determines himself as real, which means that the | different moments or aspects of the concept of God have their own being at the same time as moments or aspects of the totality. Natural things, however, according to their singularity, are in fact implicitly, in their concept, external and opposed to spirit, set against the concept; so finite spirit itself, and its vitality as such, is something external and opposed to the concept also. Vitality is essentially something inward; but insofar as it is only life, the identity of the ideal and real is something external as against the absolute internality of spirit. So it is too with the consciousness of "spirit."⁵²⁶ Abstract self-consciousness, whatever we call natural, the world, natural being, living being,⁵²⁷ is, by its nature,

525. *Ho* reads, similar in W_2 : for divinity is only in One.

526. *Thus P*; *D* reads: the finite.

527. *Thus P*; *G* reads: the whole array of finite things, abstract being itself,

something implicitly external, and it is just this character of externality that things are first endowed with at this stage. They are posited according to the concept, in their truth. One may lament this externalization of nature, but one must in any case admit that the beautiful union of nature with the gods is valid only for the fancy—the picture is very beguiling, but it is not one that will do for reason. For those who inveigh against the loss of divinity and extol the identity of the real and the ideal, it nevertheless surely remains very hard (if not impossible) to believe in “a ‘ganga,’”⁵²⁸ a cow, a monkey, a sea, and so forth.⁵²⁹ No, the truthful attitude is the one that we have indicated; here the basis is laid for understanding things as cohering together. For on account of its externality just this intelligible coherence of things is [the subject matter of the sciences]. But scientific understanding does not belong to this stage.⁵³⁰

Once things have been defined in this prosaic manner, | God’s 331 relatedness to the world as [an assemblage of] these prosaic, external things is thereby determined too. Even if God’s relation to the world is comprehended as his appearing immediately in these things, any such appearance is a singular, individual event, for a definite purpose, in a particular sphere; so it is here that miracles can enter on the scene. There are no miracles in Hindu religion, because there are not as yet any [properly] natural things, there is no determinate being or process amenable to the understanding; therefore there are no miracles.

A miracle is a singular appearance of God in or upon one of these natural and understandable things. His appearing in or upon such

528. [Ed.] African term, originally derived from the Bantu languages, for a practitioner of white magic. The word is used by Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 89–90 (p. 74), though in a very derogatory sense, to apply to sorcerers and others who did all they could to counter the teaching of the missionaries and so retain their privileged position in the tribe.

529. *Thus G; P reads:* a Greek or Hindu god.

530. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* But the theoretical elaboration of this consciousness to the level of science does not yet occur here. For that would call for a concrete interest in things, and the essence would also have to be grasped not merely as a universal concept but as determinate concept too. The notion of abstract wisdom and one single, limited purpose cannot yet give rise to a determinate sort of theoretical intuition.

a thing is contrary both to the character of the thing and to the concept of God himself. The need for miracles and for belief in miracles manifests itself "when the existing [world of] understandable things is not grasped in such a way that God's appearances in or upon them occur merely as the eternal laws of nature. Belief in miracles disappears when natural things are grasped in such a way that God manifests himself as essence; [then he] implicitly exists according to his concept, essentially in a universal and inwardly necessary way, a way that expresses the concept. This is the system of what we call natural laws. The way that God works is then grasped as a universal and essential effectiveness, and the coherence of things then becomes objectively understandable. The singular things are then known as at any rate subsisting only in coherence, and this coherence, which displays their divine element, is a wholly universal, for all time inwardly necessary, pattern."⁵³¹ Belief in miracles has its place [only] in a representational scheme of this kind, defined in this way.

332 The second way in which God is related absolutely to things in the world | generally is that they are made by him and upheld by him, and that he manifests himself in them as the power over them. This is the intuition of his sublimity, expressing his relationship to natural things.

Sublimity is the idea that expresses or manifests itself, but in such a way that in thus appearing in or upon reality it at the same time shows itself as sublime, exalted above this appearance and reality, so that the reality is simultaneously posited as negated, and the emerging idea is exalted above that in or upon which it appears, so that its appearance is an inappropriate expression.⁵³²

To express sublimity it is not enough that what is substantive is in and for itself higher than the shape in which it is represented; even

531. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* as long as the coherence of things is not grasped as their objective nature, i.e., as long as God's appearance in or upon them is not thought of as the eternal, universal laws of nature, and his effectiveness is not thought of essentially as universal effectiveness. The understandable coherence that is for the first time grasped at this stage is merely the objective coherence that in finitude the singular thing as such is for itself and thus is in an external relationship.

532. *Thus G; W₁ (HgG) adds:* and indeed expressly so, not unconsciously.

if the shape is accentuated, even if it is raised beyond its normal measure, this does not amount to positing sublimity; for sublimity it must also be posited that what manifests itself is at the same time the power over the shape. In Hindu religion the images are grotesque, lacking all measure, but not sublime—they are distortions; or else they are not distortions—for example, the cow and the monkey, which express the whole power of nature—but the meaning and the form do not match, there is nothing sublime, and this absence of correspondence is the greatest deficiency. For the sublime to appear, the negated state of the appearance—the power over this shape—must therefore be posited simultaneously.

In their natural consciousness human beings may have very trivial things in view, but their spirit is not like that. There is no correspondence between it and the objects. There is nothing sublime in simply looking around, but in looking up to heaven and transcending what is before one. This sublimity epitomizes the relation of God to natural things in general. For example, the scriptures and literature of the Jews, the Psalms, the prophets, etc., are famous for their sublimity. The Greek author Longinus⁵³³ quotes from the very beginning of the [first] Book of Moses: “God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light.” This is one of the most sublime passages. “God said”—the text tells us how he works. | Outwardly displayed, in an image, his working is speech. But there is nothing that costs as little effort as a word; as soon as it is spoken, it is gone. Yet this breath [of God] is here light as well, the world of light, the infinite outpouring of light, so that light here becomes merely a word, something as transient as a mere word. God is also pictured [in Psalm 104] as using wind and lightning for his servants and messengers. “Thou makest the winds thine angels,” and so on. What God needs is realized, but in such a way that it is merely an instrument; thus nature

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533. [Ed.] See Dionysius Longinus, *De sublimitate* (Leipzig, 1769) 9.9; the biblical reference is to Gen. 1:3. According to Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben* (Berlin, 1844), p. 10, Hegel made a complete translation of *De sublimitate* at the age of sixteen, between the winter of 1786 and September 1787, which was still preserved when he died. When he lectured in 1824 he apparently was unaware of the recent discovery that the treatise had been wrongly attributed to Longinus.

is obedient to him. We read: "Thou girdest thyself with lightning as with a garment," and again: "Thou sendest forth thy breath, worlds are created; at the voice of thy thunder they haste away. Thou openest thy hand, they are filled with good; thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou withholdest thy breath, they return to the dust; thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are recreated."⁵³⁴ "This is what sublimity is—that nature is represented in this wholly negated, subordinate, transitory fashion."⁵³⁵

The third point we have to speak about here is God's purpose—what can be represented as God's purpose at this level. Initially sublimity is only the representation of power, not yet of a purpose. The purpose, not merely of the One but of God in general, can be nothing else than God himself: that his concept should become objective for him and then return within him, that he should possess himself in what is realized. This would be the universal purpose as such. But if at this point we want to regard the world and nature in general as the purpose of God, it is only because his power is manifested in them. In the world his power becomes objective to him, and his wisdom is still wholly abstract. But if we speak of purpose, then it cannot be mere power; it must be somehow determined as well. The soil in which this purpose is to be found cannot be anything else but spirit as such. And since in spirit as consciousness God is purpose in the spirit set over against him (i.e., here in the
334 finite spirit as such), therefore | his being represented, his being recognized in finite spirit, *is* his purpose. God is here confronted by finite spirit; other-being is not yet posited as having absolutely returned into itself. This finite spirit is essentially consciousness; God must therefore be the object of consciousness as [his own] essence. In consciousness he *is* his own purpose—the purpose being that he should be recognized and venerated. The glory of God is his prime purpose, and this purpose is just what is [achieved] in the world. So the reflection [*Reflex*] of God, the determinacy of God, is in the

534. [Ed.] This and the preceding two quotations are drawn loosely from Ps. 104; cf. vss. 4, 2, 7, 28, 29, 30.

535. *Thus G; P reads:* This notion of sublimity, too, characterizes God's relationship to the world generally; there can be no sublimity other than that through which he expressly manifests himself.

awareness that he is recognized; he is not yet cognized but only recognized. For him to be cognized, he would, as spirit, already have had to posit distinctions within himself, whereas at this stage he still has only the abstract characteristics that we have so far considered.

It is an essential characteristic at this stage that religion as such is the purpose—that God shall be known in the self-consciousness, that in it he is object [for himself, and hence] affirmatively related to it. “God is self-contained;”⁵³⁶ but secondly he appears, and essentially in another spirit, which qua finite is initially set against him. Thus defined, the purpose can be termed the theoretical purpose; for God to be recognized, venerated, honored, means that the finite self-consciousness represents God to itself, knows him as its purpose. But the purpose can also be defined in practical terms, as purpose realized, authentically real, God’s purpose in and in regard to the world as actualized (though always on the spiritual plane). This realized purpose that we are here considering is now God’s prime or first purpose. As God’s purpose it has its being in the actual spirit; therefore it must have inward universality and be the genuinely divine purpose within itself; it must be the purpose that is substantive, that has substantive universality. A substantive purpose internal to spirit is one such that the existing spiritual individuals know themselves as one, behave as one, are united. It is essentially an inwardly universal, infinite purpose, an ethical purpose, for its soil is in self-consciousness, in freedom, in freedom realized. This is where the practical side first emerges, [God’s] purpose in actual consciousness. Second, because it is the first purpose, | this ethical character is directly still the unmediated, natural ethical life, and the existence of this immediate ethical life is therefore the family—the natural ethical realm of family solidarity. Thus the purpose is the family, and this family is one family to the exclusion of all others.

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The real, directly prime purpose of the divine wisdom is still wholly limited and singular because it is the *first* purpose. One may wonder how this character of most limited singularity can cohere with the fact that God is absolute power and wisdom. He is absolute wisdom, but still in the sense of a wholly abstract wisdom; the

536. Thus P, D; G reads: He is God as infinite power and inward subjectivity;

purpose inherent in the divine concept is still a wholly universal purpose, and consequently devoid of content; in its determinate being, this indeterminate purpose that lacks all content turns into unmediated singularity, the utmost limitedness.⁵³⁷

The fact that God's real purpose is inwardly universal therefore determines that it is the family, this single family; [for it to be] many single families would already involve extending the purpose by reflection. This is the striking contrast, infinitely difficult, the most difficult of all. On the one hand God is universal, the God of heaven and earth, the God of all humanity, absolute wisdom and universal power; on the other hand, his purpose and operation in the spiritual world are so limited as to be confined to just this one family, just this one people. All peoples are called upon to recognize him and glorify his name [Ps. 117:1–2], but the actual work that is really brought about is a limited one—just this people, in its conditioned existence, its inner, outer, political, and ethical determinacy. God operates within one single family. Thus he is just “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” and subsequently “the God who led us out of Egypt.”⁵³⁸ Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are the families as families; those that are led out of Egypt are the nation—it is the heads of the families who here constitute the determinate content of the purpose.⁵³⁹ |

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The five Books of Moses begin with the creation of the world. The famous story of the fall [Gen. 3] conveys the intrinsic nature of humanity. But this universal content, [this story] of the creation of the world, the story of Adam and the fall of Adam, representing humanity, has no connection with what the Jewish religion subsequently became. It is merely a piece of wisdom whose universal content did not become truth for the people of Israel. But this

537. *W₂ (Var) adds:* In other words, the implicit potential in which wisdom still holds itself is itself immediacy, the natural realm.

538. *Ho adds, similar in W:* Because God is only One, he is only in one universal spirit, in one people, one family.

539. *W (1831) adds:* Universality is thus still natural universality. So the purpose is solely human, and thus the family. Religion is accordingly patriarchal. The family then extends in scope to become the people. A people is called nation because it has being primarily through nature; this is the limited goal or purpose, and the divine purpose is exclusive vis-à-vis other.

absolute determinateness, and the one God, then entered on the scene in such a way that God is just the God of this people, not of all humanity or of many peoples.

In regard to this connection between God's inwardly universal wisdom and the utterly limited character of the real purpose, a further point can be made in order to clarify the notion. When human beings will the universal good as such, have the universal good as their purpose, they have already thereby made the capriciousness of their will into the principle of what they resolve and undertake. For this general good, this wholly universal purpose does not yet contain any specification within it; and since there has to be action, the real purpose must be somehow determinate. This determinacy can only be found outside the concept, as the concept itself is still indeterminate, abstract; specification is not yet posited precisely because it has not yet been taken up into the universal purpose of the good. In politics—even though the law itself is supposed to be sovereign—still the governing authority is the pure caprice of the individual. The law becomes real only insofar as it is inwardly organized, i.e., insofar as the particular is determined by the universal. It is only through being particularized that the universal becomes alive. So this is the relationship of the real purpose [to universal wisdom].

A more specific way in which the other peoples | are excluded from this single, real purpose is that the people in question possesses its own nationality, it consists of certain families, so that to belong to God's people, to be a member of his folk, to stand in this relationship to God, is a matter of birth. This naturally calls for a particular constitution, laws, ceremonies, and public worship.

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This singleness further includes in its developed form the possession of a particular territory, and of it alone, in such a way, moreover, that each single part of it belongs to particular families or tribes. [It] is something inalienable, with the result that the [divine] exclusiveness acquires this wholly empirical, external presence. There is initially nothing polemical about it, the reality being the particular possession, the enjoyment uniquely confined to this one people, and the relationship of this one people to the all-powerful, omniscient God. It is not polemical in this sense, that there is no obligation to bring other peoples to this form of worship or religion. The others

are called upon to glorify the Lord, but that they should come to do so is only a wish, not a real purpose or goal; ~as a goal we first find it in Islam. Here it is only a singular purpose that all peoples should be brought to glorify the Lord. So it is not fanatical; only in Islam does it become so.⁵⁴⁰ Fanaticism is found among the Jews, but only where their possessions or their religion come under attack, and only then because this single purpose of theirs is utterly exclusive and admits of no mediation, no sharing, no fusion with anything else.⁵⁴¹ |

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540. *Thus G, P; W₂ (Var) reads:* they are merely called upon to do so, in a lazy way, not to any practical effect. A real purpose of this kind first appeared in Islam, where the singular purpose is raised to universal purpose, and so becomes fanatical.

541. *Follows in W (1831):* ^aThird characteristic. What is primarily sublime in all creation is humanity; it is human beings that know, that cognize, that think. Thus humanity is the image of God in quite another sense than this is true of the world. What is experienced in religion is God who is thought; only in thought is God venerated.

We have had dualism in Persian religion. We also have this antithesis in the Jewish religion, but it does not pertain to God but to the other [viz., to finite] spirit—God is spirit, and his product, the world, is also spirit; it is in respect of the world that he is implicitly the other of his essence. Finitude implies difference as scission. In the world God is present to self; the world is good, [W₂: for the world's nullity, out of which it was made, is the absolute itself;] [W₁: this primal division of God W₂: however, the world as this first primal division of God] does not proceed to the absolute antithesis—only spirit is capable of this absolute antithesis, and this is [the measure of] its depth. The antithesis pertains to the other spirit, which is consequently finite spirit. This is the place of the struggle between good and evil, the place where this struggle must also be fought to an issue. All these categories follow from the nature of the concept. This antithesis is a difficult point, for it constitutes the contradiction; good is not contradictory by virtue of itself, it is only through evil that the contradiction enters in, it pertains solely to evil.

But the question arises, How did evil come into the world? This question has meaning and interest at this point. In Persian religion this question cannot give rise to any difficulty, for there evil exists in the same way as good exists. Both have issued forth from the wholly indeterminate. Here, on the other hand, where God is power and the One is subject, where everything is posited solely by him, here evil is contradictory, for God is indeed only the absolutely good. In this regard the Bible has handed down to us an ancient image, that of the fall. This well-known portrayal of how evil came into the world is clothed in the form of a myth—a parable, as it were. Now if what is speculative and authentic is thus portrayed in sensuous configuration, in the manner of something that has happened, unsuitable features inevitably occur in it. The same happens with Plato, when he speaks of the ideas in figurative fashion, that an inappropriate relationship becomes evident. We are told

then that after Adam and Eve had been created in Paradise God forbade these first two human beings to eat of a certain tree [Gen. 2:17], but the serpent induced them to do so, saying "You shall become like God" [Gen. 3:5]. God then imposes a heavy punishment on them, yet says, "Behold, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil" [Gen. 3:22]. Thus on the one hand humanity has, as God expresses it, become God; on the other hand it is said that God barred the way to humanity, driving it out of Paradise.

This simple story can no doubt be taken in the first place as follows. God made a commandment, and Adam, impelled by an infinite presumption to become like God (a thought that came to him from outside), transgressed this commandment, and was then severely punished for his pitiful, one-sided pride. God made the commandment in merely formal fashion, in order to enable Adam to prove his obedience.

Thus according to this interpretation everything proceeds in everyday, finite consequentiality. At any rate God forbids evil. This is something quite different from forbidding to eat of a mere tree; what God wills and does not will must be of an authentic, eternal nature. Moreover, such a prohibition must be directed solely at a single individual. Human beings are rightly indignant at being punished for another's guilt; they are prepared to stand accountable only for what they themselves have done. [But] there is rather in the whole story a deeply speculative meaning. It is Adam or humanity as such who appears in this story; what is related here concerns the nature of humanity itself. And it is not a childish, formal commandment that God lays upon him; the tree from which Adam is forbidden to eat is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil [Gen. 2:17]. And this being so, the externality and form of a tree falls away. Adam eats of it and attains knowledge of good and evil. The difficult point, however, is that we are told that God forbade humanity to acquire this knowledge. For this knowledge is precisely what constitutes the character of spirit. Spirit is spirit only through consciousness, and the highest consciousness lies precisely in such knowledge. How then can this have been forbidden? Cognition or knowledge is this two-sided, dangerous gift; spirit is free, and this freedom embraces good and evil. It can also involve acting capriciously, doing evil. This is the negative counterpart to the affirmative side of freedom. Humanity, we are told, was in the state of innocence. This is, as such, the state of natural consciousness, and it must be sublated as soon as the consciousness of spirit enters in any way on the scene. This is the eternal history and nature of humanity. At first, humanity is natural and innocent and so cannot be held responsible—in the child there is no freedom; yet it is the vocation of humanity to attain to innocence once again. What is its final vocation is here represented as its primitive state—the harmony of humanity with the good. That is what is defective in this figurative representation, that this unity is portrayed as an immediately obtaining state. This original natural state must be the starting point, but the separation that then occurs must also in turn be reconciled. And this is here represented as meaning that that first state ought not to have been relinquished. In the whole figurative portrayal what is inward is expressed as outward, what is necessary as contingent. The serpent says that Adam will become like God, and God confirms that it actually is so, that this knowledge constitutes likeness to God. This deep idea underlies the narrative.

But then Adam is also punished; he is driven from Paradise, and God says: "Cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns

and thistles it shall bring forth to you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return" [Gen. 3:17-19].

We have to acknowledge that these are the consequences of finitude, but on the other hand the nobility of humanity is precisely to eat [bread] in the sweat of its brow and gain its sustenance for itself by its own activity, labor, and understanding. Animals have this happy lot (if it can so be termed), that nature provides them with what they need. Human beings, on the other hand, raise even what is naturally needful to them to [W₂: something pertaining to] their freedom. This is in fact the use they make of their freedom, even if it is not their highest point, which consists rather in knowing and willing the good. That human beings are free in regard to their natural side too is inherent in their nature and is not in itself to be regarded as punishment. [W₁: Even for those W₂: The mourning implicit in the natural state is in any case linked with the nobility of the human vocation. For those] who do not yet know the higher vocation of spirit, it is a mournful thought that human beings must die, and for them this natural mourning is, as it were, the last word. But the lofty vocation of spirit is that it is eternal and immortal. However, this human nobility, this nobility of consciousness, is not yet contained in this story, for there we read that God said, "And now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever" (Gen. 3:22). And also (v. 19), "till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken." Consciousness of the immortality of spirit is not yet present in this [W₁: religion, but first awakens with the Egyptians. W₂: religion.]

Throughout the story of the fall these main features occur in a seemingly inconsistent manner, owing to the figurative way in which the whole is represented. The noble element, which God himself here expresses, is the emergence from the natural state, the necessity that consciousness of good and evil should enter on the scene. What is defective is that death is portrayed as something irremediable. The basic determination of the portrayal is that humanity is called upon to be something other than natural. Implicit in this is the genuinely theological affirmation that human beings are naturally evil; evil is to remain standing in this natural condition, out of which human beings must emerge with freedom, with their will. The next stage is for spirit to regain absolute unity within itself, to achieve [W₁: reconciliation. As regards the Jewish religion, it W₂: reconciliation, and it is in fact freedom that entails this return of spirit into itself, this reconciliation with itself, but at this stage spirit has not yet turned about in this way, differentiation has not yet been taken up within God, i.e., reconciled. Evil still has its abstract character. It] has still to be noted that this story remained dormant among the Jewish people and was not developed [to its true dimension] in the Hebraic writings; [W₁: there is no mention of it in them (as may be the case in later books). W₂: apart from some references in the later apocryphal books,^b there is no mention of it in them.] For a long time it remained fallow, and for the first time attained its true [W₁: valuation W₂: meaning] in Christianity. This is not by any means to say that humanity's internal combat found no place among the Jewish people; on the contrary, this combat is an essential category of the religious spirit among the Hebrews. But it was not grasped in the speculative sense that it derives from human nature itself. [W₁: If they sought to depict a just man, they did not view this combat as an essential moment, W₂: but only as something contingent, represented as occurring in single individuals. Over against sinners and those engaged in combat

Such are the main aspects of the religion of the One, ~as they are immediately entailed in the concept.⁵⁴² |

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*c. The Cultus*⁵⁴³

The third point is the cultus. The first was the metaphysical concept, the second the representation of God, the third is the relationship of self-consciousness to this its essence, or spirit to the extent that it is determined as an “other” over against absolute spirit.⁵⁴⁴ God is | essentially related to self-consciousness; ~he is purposive action, wisdom and power combined; for this absolute spirit, self-consciousness is the first “other.”⁵⁴⁵ What we have to consider first here | is the religious disposition within this self-consciousness, and mediation to the extent that it is a disposition. To mediate is to posit [explicitly] the identity that is implicitly posited and is a mediating

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they sought to depict the just man, in whom evil and the inner combat is not viewed as an essential moment,] but justice is said to consist in doing the will of God and continuing in Jehovah’s service by observing the ethical commandments as well as [W₁: through the cultus. W₂: ritual and civic prescriptions.] Even so, humanity’s inner conflict is everywhere apparent, especially in the Psalms of David; anguish cries aloud from the innermost depths of the soul in the consciousness of its sinfulness, followed by the [W₁: most urgent W₂: most anguished] plea for [W₂: forgiveness and] reconciliation. This depth of anguish is, to be sure, present in this way, but rather as pertaining to the single individual than as known as an eternal moment of spirit.

[Ed.] ^aThe 1831 lectures transfer this discussion of the “fall” of humanity from the section on “differentiation” in the Christian religion (Part III), where it occurs in the earlier lectures (see Vol. 3:101–108, 207–211, 300–304), to the section on Jewish religion in Part II. ^bHegel’s statement that the story of the fall was not mentioned in the other books of the Old Testament “apart from some references in the later apocryphal books” probably relates to Ecclesiasticus 25:24 (“From a woman sin had its beginning, and because of her we all die”); see Vol. 3:107 n. 119. Although the pseudepigraphic Apocalypse of Moses or Life of Adam and Eve carries on the story from the time of the expulsion from Eden, Hegel cannot have had any direct knowledge of it.

542. W₂ (Var) reads: insofar as they concern the [inner] sundering and purposive character of the One. This latter characteristic, that of purpose, leads us to the cultus.

543. G reads: 3.

544. [Ed.] This summary shows that Hegel has applied his standard analytic categories here as elsewhere: abstract or metaphysical concept of God, concrete representation, and cultus. In the 1824 lectures, the second and third are understood as the theoretical and practical relationships to God.

545. W₂ (Var) reads: because the soil upon which his purpose appears is finite spirit.

342 movement. The disposition represents the innermost moments or aspects of this mediating movement within | self-consciousness; the first moment is negativity, and the second is the affirmative attitude.

The first moment, that of negativity, is fear, fear of the Lord, the inmost aspect of the religious disposition. "Fear is what comes over me when I imagine that a possession or interest may be harmed or alienated, and I am without fear when"⁵⁴⁶ I care nothing for the force that threatens me with this, the negating of my own force—when I know myself as a countervailing power so that that force has no power over me—but also when I care nothing for the possession or interest "that is to be wrested from me. For then the violence cannot touch me, I give it no chance, because I give the possession up. This power can lay hold on me only through something determinate, some interest or means of satisfying an interest."⁵⁴⁷ Fear involves, quite generally, a prejudice against oneself, more especially in that I who am afraid do not know myself as power, have not the will to present myself as power; "the fearful are not prepared to
343 push this presentation | of themselves as power to the uttermost, to lay hold on the impregnability they can acquire by staking their whole range of interests; in this way they show that the power of their will extends so far and no further. Those who will without qualification, stick to their resolve and seek to make their will prevail, gather up all their strength and all their interests, and sacrifice them voluntarily, the main concern being just to display this energy.

Now as far as the fear of the Lord is concerned, it is no earthly lord that is feared; the earthly lord is a contingent power, such that, even if I do not fear it, I am only relatively independent in my opposition to it—"this or that possession or interest could be taken from me by another."⁵⁴⁸ The fear of the Lord is rather fear of the
344 invisible, i.e., of the absolute | power. This fear of the Lord is the

546. *Ho reads, similar in W:* Fear in general is what comes over me as the result of imagining a power above me that [negates] me in what is valid for me, whether this appears inwardly or outwardly, as possessions etc.; and I am without fear when, conscious of invulnerable independence,

547. *Ho, W₁ read:* and so stand there in the last resort, stand there invulnerable. *W₂ (Ed) reads:* and so stand there invulnerable, even when injured.

548. *Thus P; G reads:* it is open to question whether another is not stronger than I, to become lord over me.

contrary of the consciousness of my power, the contrary of consciousness; the consciousness of⁵⁴⁹ all one's own strength disappears in it, all particular interests vanish in it. In this fear of the Lord everything that belongs to our earthly nature, everything ephemeral and contingent, is given up. Hence it is the absolute negativity, it elevates us to the level of pure thought, which surrenders all else and has before itself nothing but this pure thought, remains this free element, wills only this. This fear of the Lord, we are then told, is the beginning of wisdom.⁵⁵⁰ For wisdom is not the taking of something particular—be it interest, inclination, or what you will—to be absolute and substantive, but taking it only as a moment or aspect of the one idea. The fear of the Lord is this absolute negativity that is the one essential aspect of freedom; it is not the bad kind of fear that is afraid of something, but the fear that lets everything go, gives everything up. It is the intuition of pure, absolute power, surrendering everything particular, abstracting absolutely from everything particular. Consequently it is not at all what is termed a “feeling of dependence”⁵⁵¹ etc. On the contrary, this fear of the Lord sublates

549. Thus P; G reads: with consciousness

550. [Ed.] See Ps. 111:10; cf. Prov. 1:7; 9:10; Job 28:28.

551. [Ed.] See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt* (Berlin, 1821), § 9. Hegel refers to Schleiermacher in the same context in the 1821 Ms. (see Ms., n. 138), but there the interpretation is just the reverse: “God’s people is the one that he has accepted on condition that they shall fear him, and have the basic feeling of their dependence, i.e., of their servitude.” In the Ms. Judaism is interpreted as the antithesis of the religion of freedom, but now it is viewed as the first of the religions of freedom precisely because the “fear of the Lord sublates all dependence,” “sets us free” from all finite lords, negates our own negativity, issues affirmatively in “absolute trust” or “infinite faith,” which is found also in Christianity. Not only does this interpretation reflect a reinterpretation of Judaism; it also fits in with the dominant emphasis of the 1824 lectures, which provide a sustained critique of any attempt to ground religion in feeling, and an insistence that the relationship of the finite to the infinite must be understood affirmatively rather than merely negatively (for the latter, God remains totally other and beyond, unknowable). (See Vol. 1:71–72, 288–310; on Hegel’s assessment of Schleiermacher in the 1824 lectures, p. 279, n. 37.) In Hegel’s view as we now find it, Judaism did grasp the affirmative aspect of the divine-human relationship in the concepts of radical faith and covenant; the problem is that the covenant was exclusive, limited to a particular people; in other words, Judaism remained a provincial religion, not actualizing its own potential universality. Furthermore, lacking a trinitarian conception of God, it was unable to grasp the true

all dependence. Human beings depend on the particular; but the free human is free of all dependence; the fear of the Lord sets us free from all particular interests. When we say that the goal of individuals is blessedness, this is positing individuals themselves as ends, so it is not dependence but liberation, being free from all dependence. The fear of the Lord is this "negation of one's own negativity, the sublation of all dependence."⁵⁵² The affirmative then arises from and within this fear of the Lord; pure affirmation is nothing else but this infinite negativity, this negativity that goes back into itself.

345 The affirmative aspect is then what we call absolute trust, or infinite faith. This infinite trust consists in having given up what is particular and one's own, and immersing oneself in the Lord, having this unity as one's object and essence. | At a later stage, this trust can take the form of self-consciousness immersing itself in itself, resting upon itself, relying on its own strength of soul and fortitude, being completely reduced to this abstraction—Stoic freedom."⁵⁵³

infinite as that which "overreaches" the finite, which in Hegel's view is the ultimate cognitive basis for understanding the relationship as "affirmative." In sum, as Hegel's criticism of Schleiermacher's interpretation of religion sharpened and became more stringent, his assessment of Judaism became more favorable: no more than Christianity could it be regarded as exemplifying a "feeling of dependence"; that opprobrium is now reserved solely for Roman religion (see below, n. 723), with its superstitious dependence on a multitude of finite deities that control every facet of life. It is another question whether Schleiermacher has been rightly interpreted. In the variant from *Ho* contained in n. 553, Hegel writes: "So absolute fear is not a feeling of dependence, but casting off all dependence and purely abandoning oneself in the absolute self." But is not the latter precisely what Schleiermacher means by the "feeling of *absolute* [*schlechthinig*] dependence"? For Schleiermacher as well as for Hegel, *absolute* dependence entails a liberation from dependence on all finite things, a "pure self-immersion in the Lord" (*Ho* variant). Both reflect at this point the profound influence of the—Jewish—philosopher Spinoza. Hegel's affirmation of Spinoza against the superficial critics of his own time, e.g., Jacobi (see Vol. 1:376–380), may have helped him to reinterpret Judaism. But he never properly understood what Schleiermacher meant by the feeling of absolute dependence. It is true that the adjectival qualifier *schlechthinig* was not used in the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre*, to which alone Hegel had access (see Vol. 1:279 n. 37), but even without it, it is clear that Schleiermacher intended to distinguish *religious* feeling from all forms of worldly dependence.

552. *Thus P; G reads:* absolute negation of everything particular, all being-for-self.

553. *Ho reads, similar in W:* But here fear is not the finite's fear of finite violence. For what is finite is contingent power, which can impinge on me and cause me injury even when I am not afraid. Here fear is rather fear of the inevitable, the absolute;

But at this stage, freedom does not yet have inwardly the form of the subjectivity of self-consciousness; instead ~this trustiness is the affirmation that I am identical with the One, that I am the substantive unity; but this One with which I am identical is at the same time represented as "the other," who is my Lord, the absolute power of God. So within the unity there is this repulsion, but at the same time there is ~the unity~⁵⁵⁴ too.⁵⁵⁵ In the Jewish cultus this is the first moment of the religious disposition.

The second aspect of the cultus is the concrete mediation, which is the first consequence of this trustfulness. Trust has a consequence; to begin with, it is wholly abstract, it has surrendered everything, it is itself only the purpose, i.e., what simply ought to be in and for

it is the contrary of my consciousness of myself; it is the consciousness of the infinite self in opposition to me as the finite self. Through the consciousness of this absolute as the only and simply negative power, all force of my own disappears, everything that belongs to earthly nature is simply eradicated. As this absolute negativity of oneself, this fear raises one to the pure thought of the absolute power of the One. And this fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, which consists in not allowing what is particular and finite on its own account to have validity as something independent and ultimate. What is valid can be valid only as a moment in the organization of the One, and this One exists only as the manifestation of his sublimity, i.e., as the sublation of everything finite. This wise fear [*W₂ adds*: is the essential single moment of freedom and] consists therefore in freeing oneself from everything particular, in breaking away from every contingent interest [*W₂ adds*: in general, in feeling the negativity of everything particular]. Thus it is not a particular fear of the particular but just the positing of this particular fear as null, emancipating oneself from fear. So absolute fear is not a feeling of dependence, but casting off all dependence and purely abandoning oneself in the absolute self, vis-à-vis which and in which one's own self evaporates and dissolves.

But in this way the subject exists only in the infinite One, while absolute negativity is relation to oneself, or affirmation. Through absolute fear the self, in its self-surrender, thus rests in what is absolutely positive. In this way fear turns into absolute trust, infinite faith. This is the self's pure self-immersion in the Lord—this One alone is essence and object. At other stages trust can have the form of the subjective self's resting upon itself. This is, for example, Stoic freedom in chains. *Ho*, *W₁ continue*: At this stage where we now are, however, trust has not this form of subjectivity, but precisely the converse form. The self is absorbed in the One, but the One is equally again represented for me as "other," and trust comes about only through the eternal mediation of fear.

554. *Thus P, D; G reads*: infinite trust

555. *W₂ (Var) reads*: self-consciousness has here to immerse itself in the One, though the One, represented as "the other," is again the principle of repulsion, in which self-consciousness recovers its self-certainty.

itself—faith; but it also has consequences, it passes over into its opposite. Here we have the same turning around of the abstract, infinite power and wisdom into particularized reality that we noted previously: trust passes over immediately into what is determinate, into the obtaining, maintaining, and positedness of a particular kind of existence.

This trust is what strikes us as remarkable in the writings of the Jewish people; it is preserved through so many great victories, which are emphasized also in Christianity. It is this trust, this faith of Abraham's, that causes the history of this people to carry on; it also constitutes the turning point in the Book of Job. Properly speaking, Job's situation is a universal one, the whole story is external to God's people, it does not happen within the [exclusive] territory of this religion. Job becomes unfortunate in this [material] way; it gets to the point where, proclaiming his innocence and the fact that his
 346 change of fortune is undeserved, [he] finds | it unjust that this should happen to him. Thus it is here implied that what ought to be God's purpose is that the good, the just and the God-fearing should prosper. Justice for humanity should be the implicit purpose of God, and it ought to be realized by his might; in other words, human beings ought to be happy. In chapter 31 Job speaks: "What would be my portion from God above, and my heritage from the Almighty on high? Does not calamity befall the unrighteous, and disaster the workers of iniquity? Does not he see my ways, and number all my steps?" [Job 31:2–4]. And the others, who dispute with him, adopt the same principle: "Behold,"⁵⁵⁶ it is from this we find against you that you are not just; for God is greater than man. For God acts thus, that he may turn man aside from his deed and hide him from pride" [Job 33:12, 17]. Then God himself answers Job out of the whirlwind, giving voice exclusively to his might: "Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up your loins like a man, I will question you, and you shall declare to me. Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who determined its measurements?" [Job

556. W (1831) reads: His friends answer in the same sense, except that they turn it around: "Because you are unfortunate,

38:2–5]. “Who is so wise that he can number the clouds?” [Job 38:36]. Here God’s might is preached.⁵⁵⁷ Finally Job makes answer: “I know that thou hast made everything, and that no thought is hidden from thee. Heedless is the man who thinks to hide his counsel. Therefore I acknowledge that I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know” [Job 42:2–3]. “And the Lord turned the captivity of Job, and gave him twice as much as he had before” [Job 42:10].

Thus it is his submission and renunciation that justifies Job, in that he recognizes the boundless power of God, and the others are rebuked. It is only in consequence of this pure trustfulness, this pure intuition of [God’s] power that he has before him, that Job is restored to his former happiness.

The point we had reached was that the intuition of absolute | power turns in a flash into absolute trust. This trust is what comes first, but temporal happiness is what follows from it. The next step then is that the abstract mediation, trust, gains a concrete shape. Trust is trust on the part of self-consciousness that is now essentially an inwardly self-determined self-consciousness. “The concept is here the concept of the subjectivity”⁵⁵⁸ that has its purpose within itself and is inwardly determined. An individual having this kind of trust is at the same time inwardly determined simply and concretely, and this concrete determinateness enters into trust and is inseparable from it. It is not as it was with Brahman, where inner devotion, setting itself apart, jettisons all vitality, all worth, the entire range of determinate being; here trust is this pure moment of consciousness at home with itself, determined essentially in such a way that its essential determinateness enters into the divine relationship, into the idea, into the holy of holies, so to speak, of this actuality. And the result is that the determinateness acquires absolute, essential worth within itself; it is installed in the sanctum of the divine inwardness.

As we have already seen, this determinateness is the family, the empirical existence of the people and the survival of the family, and

557. *W* (1831) reads: There follows a very fine and beautiful description of God’s might, and

558. *Thus P*, similarly *G*; *D* reads: What is basic in this sphere is nothing else but subjectivity

the existence of the family involves property—a land. So the possession of a land, the continuance and subsistence of the family, are what this self-consciousness obtains from its God. So trust in him is *ipso facto* the same as the absolutely limited content of individual family existence.⁵⁵⁹ This possession and the worship [of God] are identical, indissociable. This is what was also expressed as God's covenant with his people. His people possesses the land of Canaan. God made a covenant with Abraham [Gen. 15:18], and this is one side of the covenant—the affirmative side in this sphere of empirical particularity. Thus the two sides are *ipso facto* indissociable—on
 348 the one side possession and on the other trust, piety, | worship. [The fact of] possession thus acquires an infinite, absolute justification, a divine justification, though at the same time this does not take the shape of a⁵⁶⁰ right or of ownership—"ownership" is distinct from possession and is not applicable here. Ownership stems from personality, it has its origin in the freedom of the single individual; human beings are essentially owners in virtue of being persons. Possession as such, on the other hand, this empirical aspect of possession, is completely free, and at the mercy of chance: what I possess is a matter of chance, of contingency, of indifference. It is only when I am recognized as the owner that I am free subjectivity. Possession is the external mode, the free mode—I can give the item in question to another, sell it, and so on. In the present case, by contrast, this possession as such is indissolubly identical with trust, and it is this possession that has such absolute preeminence. The category of ownership does not intervene between the two.⁵⁶¹ God (the absolute idea), free spirit, and lastly ownership and possession are three different stages; here ownership, the intermediate link, falls away and possession is taken up directly into the divine will. It is this empirical, singular [fact of] possession that is willed by God, and

559. *Ho adds, similar in W (in Ho a transition to the story of Job, corresponding to the third paragraph above):* Precisely because human beings, in this absolute negativity of self-surrender, exist in what is utterly positive and are thus restored to immediacy, trust—as surrendered finite interest—turns into the surrender of this surrender [and thus] into the realized finite individual, into his happiness.

560. *W (1831/HgG?) adds:* juridical

561. *W (1831/HgG?) adds:* nor does the category of free will in this respect come into play.

that is to be valid as such.⁵⁶² Arbitrary free will [*Willkür*] is made infinite, made into something divine.

The second side of the covenant corresponds to the affirmative side, by virtue of which this particular family, just as it empirically is, is represented as taken directly up [into God's will]. To this affirmation of its empirical existence there corresponds the negation of this relationship. The recognition of [God's] might must also be characterized as the negative side empirically and outwardly, as a singular fact. Particular actions and real behavior must have their negative side, equally with recognition | of the Lord; action must be the Lord's service, not ~simply this [feeling of] fear~⁵⁶³ but a mode of ~serving.⁵⁶⁴ That is the other side of the covenant, that on the one hand the people should have the possession, but on the other they should also furnish the service. Just as the servants in this land are bond servants under this people, so the people are likewise bound under the service of the law. Now this law [does have] an ethical content in the shape of family laws and relationships on the one hand; but the main point about it on the other hand is that what is inwardly ethical is observed as a purely positive law (to which naturally a host of external, contingent circumstances are adjoined that have to be adhered to without question). The irrationality of the service corresponds to the irrationality of the possession; the service is an abstract obedience that does not need to have any inwardness in respect of its determinacy, just as the possession is only abstractly justified.⁵⁶⁵ The keeping of these commandments, obedience in this duty, obedience to God, is directly bound up with the maintenance of the people's present state and existence. To observe these commandments is the condition for its preservation—this is the other side of the covenant. Because of human free will, departure from the laws is possible; ~any such disobedience incurs a punishment,

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562. *W₂ (1831/HgG?) adds:* and as thus something justified, *then continues* (1831/MiscP?): and is withdrawn from the free determination of the single individual, who cannot sell the possession but can only lease it for a period, and never beyond the jubilee year.

563. *Thus P; G reads:* the surrender of fear

564. *W₂ (Var) reads:* surrendering in the particular.

565. *W₂ (1831/MiscP?) adds:* Because God is absolute might, the actions in themselves are indeterminate and consequently quite external and arbitrary in character.

which is likewise a⁵⁶⁶ loss of the external possession, or else its diminution or wastage. The punishments that are threatened are external and sensible in nature; they concern undisturbed possession of the land. Just as the obedience is not spiritually ethical but is only a determinate, blind obedience, not that of ethically free persons, so too the punishments are | determined externally. The laws and commandments are merely to be carried out and executed as by servants.

If one contemplates these punishments with which the people of Israel are threatened in dread execration, it is noteworthy how this people became real masters at execration; but the curses affect only external fortunes, not what is within, the ethical realm. In chapter 26 of the Third Book of Moses we read:

But if you will not hearken to me, and will not do all these commandments, if you spurn my statutes, and if your soul abhor my ordinances, so that you will not do all my commandments, but break my covenant, I will do this to you: I will appoint over you sudden terror, consumption, and fever that waste the eyes and cause life to pine away. And you shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it. . . . Those who hate you shall rule over you, and you shall flee when none pursues you. And if in spite of this you will not hearken to me, then I will chastise you again sevenfold for your sins, . . . and I will make your heavens like iron and your earth like brass; and your strength shall be spent in vain, for your land shall not yield its increase, and the trees of the land shall not yield their fruit.

Then if you walk contrary to me, and will not hearken to me, I will bring more plagues upon you, sevenfold as many as your sins. And I will let loose the wild beasts among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, and make you few in number, so that your ways shall become desolate.

And if by this discipline you are not turned to me, but walk contrary to me, then . . . I myself will smite you sevenfold for your sins. And I will bring a sword upon you, that shall execute vengeance for the covenant; and if you gather within your cities I will send pestilence among you, and you shall be delivered into the hand of the enemy. When I break your staff of bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, and

566. *W₂ (1831/MiscP?)* reads: but this is only a departure from the commandments and the ceremonial service, not from what is original, for this is valid as such, as it must be. Consequently the punishment attaching to disobedience is also not absolute punishment but only an external misfortune, in other words

shall deliver your bread again by weight; and you shall eat, and not be satisfied.

And if in spite of this you will not hearken to me, but walk contrary to me, then I will walk contrary to you in fury, and chastise you myself sevenfold for your sins. You shall eat the flesh of your sons, and you shall eat the flesh of your daughters. And I will destroy your high places, and cut down your incense altars, and cast your dead bodies upon the dead bodies of your idols; and my soul will abhor you. And I will lay your cities waste, and | will make your sanctuaries desolate, and I will not smell your pleasing odors. And I will devastate the land, so that your enemies who settle in it shall be astonished at it. And I will scatter you among the nations, and I will unsheathe the sword after you. . . .
[Lev. 26:14–33]

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And so on and on. “I will take you to my bosom again only if you acknowledge that I am God.”⁵⁶⁷ Thus there is an indissoluble bond in this abstraction of self-consciousness; and the absence of division is no less indissoluble at the level of empirical fact.

The third aspect of cultus is reconciliation. Properly speaking, this can only concern particular transgressions of single individuals, and reconciliation is effected through sacrifice. We have already noted that in sacrifices something is consumed, individuals sacrifice something they own, something that belongs to [their] real existence; in this way they demonstrate in the very deed that they recognize another before whom ownership is regarded as null and void.⁵⁶⁸ This sacrifice is here bound up in particular with [the view] that the punishment deserved—the manifestation that is deserved of the nullity of the one who has asserted himself in the sin—can, as it were, be transferred to this part [of the sinner’s existence] that is sacrificed.^{569 570} In this connection it was more especially blood that was offered up on the altar of the | Lord, vitality ~[was sur-

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567. [Ed.] This is not an exact quotation but appears to be a summary of Lev. 26:40–45 (“But if they confess their iniquity . . . I will for their sake remember the covenant with their forefathers, whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt in the sight of nations, that I might be their God”)—an important basis for Hegel’s recognition that an “indissoluble bond” remains despite the punishments and the execration.

568. *Ho adds, similar in W₂*: This is sin. It must be expiated.

569. *Ho adds, similar in W*: This is sacrifice. The individual manifests the nullity of what it sets store by. In this way God is reconciled, and the intuition ~ enters in

rendered];⁵⁷¹ what is vital or alive is also given up in this way, dispatched into the wilderness as that which bears the sin of the people. Blood plays a principal role [cf. Lev. 1:5, 11; 3:2] since it was regarded as that which human beings may not consume, containing as it does, in the Jewish view, the life of the animal; this soul or life-principle, therefore, may not be consumed or destroyed, but must be respected.⁵⁷² |

that the manifestation that is deserved of the nullity of the sinner is transferred to the sacrifice, inasmuch as God recognizes the sacrifice and thereby again establishes the self in a positive manner or [as] having its being in him.

570. W_2 (*MiscP*) reads (*parallel in main text follows*): With this is also connected the fact that it is more especially blood that is offered up and sprinkled on the altar. For if vitality is to be surrendered as the highest type of possession, then something actually vital or living must be given up, and the blood wherein the animal's life resides is given back to the Lord. In the case of the Hindus it was the whole animal that was venerated; here this veneration is no longer the case, but the blood is still deemed something untouchable, something divine, is still held in respect and may not be consumed by human beings. The latter still do not have the feeling of their concrete freedom, which makes mere life as life something subordinate.

571. W_1 (*following Ho*) reads: was surrendered as the highest type of possession; *Ho* reads: because what is vital or alive is the highest type of possession;

572. *There follows in W_1 at this point, corresponding to the order of the 1831 lectures, a section on the "religion of anguish," which in W_2 is located in the religion of nature (see the attached editorial note). W (1831) reads: We have already seen that in Judaism evil pertains to the subjective spirit, and the Lord is not in combat with evil but punishes it. Evil consequently appears as something externally contingent; thus in the portrayal of the fall it stems from outside, inasmuch as humanity is led astray by the serpent.*

God punishes evil as what should not be; all that should be is the good which the Lord commands. There is no freedom up to this point, not even the freedom to investigate what is divine and eternal law. The categories of good, which are, to be sure, also categories of reason, are deemed to be prescriptions of the Lord, any infringements of which he punishes; this is the wrath of God. This attitude of the Lord involves only a "should": what he commands, "should" be, is law. Punitive justice belongs to the Lord; what pertains to the subject as finite is the struggle between good and evil. Thus there is in the subject a contradiction, and this introduces the contrition and anguish that the good is only what "should" be.

W_2 reads: We have just been considering the character of the struggle and of the victory [of good] over evil; as the next moment we now have to consider this struggle as anguish. Though the struggle as anguish is seemingly a superficial expression, it implies that it is no longer merely an outward confrontation but occurs in one subject and its inner experience.

W reads: [W_1 : The advance is W_2 : The struggle is then] the objectification of anguish. But anguish is in general the course of [W_1 : finitude. We have considered

the character of the struggle and of the victory (of good) over evil, but must not forget that this is a moment in the nature of spirit, and must enter into the further determination of spirituality. W_2 : finitude and, subjectively, the contrition of heart and mind. This course of finitude, of anguish, of struggle, and of victory is a moment in the nature of spirit, and must enter into this sphere, where power determines itself further as spiritual freedom.] The loss of oneself, the contradiction consisting in being at home with oneself in the other, a contradiction that is sublated in the infinite unity [of the two] (the reference here can only be to genuine infinity), the sublation of the antithesis, these are essential characteristics in the idea of spirit that now enter on the scene. Now we are, to be sure, aware of how the idea develops, of its trajectory as well as of its moments, the totality of which constitute spirit. But this totality is not yet constituted [as such], but allowed to subsist as [separate] moments that successively present themselves in this sphere. [W_1 : From the relationship between master and servant we go on to the anguish of the servant on becoming aware of his lack of freedom.]

[W_1 : Further in regard to the form of this moment, as this moment W_2 : As the content] is not yet posited as entering into free spirit, since the moments are not yet taken back up into subjective unity, [W_1 : this moment W_2 : the content] exists in immediate fashion and is relegated to the form of natural life; it is presented in a natural course, which is, however, known essentially as symbolical and is accordingly not merely a course of external nature but a universal course. [W_1 : We do not yet have spirit but abstract power, which merely rules, whereas subjective spirit merely serves. And the next moment in the idea is that of conflict. W_2 : As opposed to the standpoint which has been ours so far, where the ruling element is not spirit but abstract power, the next moment in the idea is that of conflict.] Spirit consists essentially in coming to itself from its other-being—and from the vanquishing of this other-being—through the negation of negation. Spirit brings *itself* forth. It experiences its own estrangement, [W_1 : but the return from estrangement is W_2 : but as it is not yet *posited* as spirit, this course of estrangement and return is not yet ideal, not yet posited as a moment of spirit, but] immediate and therefore in the form of the natural realm.

The characteristic we have seen here took representational shape in the Phoenician religion and the religions of the Near East generally. The process referred to is to be found in [all] these religions; more especially in the Phoenician religion, emphasis is placed on the defeat and estrangement of God and his resurrection. The image of the phoenix is well known; it is a bird that immolates itself in the flames, and from its ashes a young phoenix issues forth in renewed vigor.

This estrangement, this other-being defined as natural negation, is death, but the death that is likewise sublated, in that a rejuvenated new life arises from it. The eternal nature of spirit is to die to itself, to make itself finite in natural life, but through the annihilation of its natural state it comes to itself. The phoenix is this well-known symbol; it is not the struggle between good and evil but a divine process, pertaining to the nature of God himself [W_2 : and proceeding in one individual]. More specifically, the form in which this process is posited is Adonis, a form or shape that also passed over into Egypt and Greece, and is also mentioned in the Bible, under the name of Tammuz (Ezekiel 8:14): "and behold, there sat women weeping for Tammuz." In springtime a principal festival of Adonis was celebrated; it was a festival of the dead, of lamentation, which lasted for several days. For two days the mourners went about

seeking Adonis; the third day was the festival of joy, when the god had risen again. The whole celebration has the character of a festival of nature, which dies in winter and in spring reawakes. [W_1 : But this process must be taken symbolically; it is not just by way of being a reflection regarding the way nature operates, but it is known as a moment of the absolute, of God. This transition has also been a noteworthy feature in the cultus of the Egyptians; in addition, traces of it are to be found more especially in the Greek myth of Adonis. According to this W_2 : On the one hand, then, this is a natural process, but on the other hand it is to be taken symbolically as denoting a moment of God, as denoting the absolute generally. The myth of Adonis is itself bound up with Greek mythology. According to Greek mythology] Aphrodite was the mother of Adonis; when he was still a tender child, she kept him hidden in a box which she brought to Ais; and when its mother asked for the child back, Persephone was unwilling to give it up. Zeus resolved the dispute as follows, that each of the two goddesses could keep Adonis for a third of the year, while the last third was left to his own choice; and his preference was to spend this time too with Aphrodite, the universal mother who was at the same time his own mother. It is true that according to its [W_2 : most obvious] interpretation this myth refers to the seed lying hidden beneath the earth and then awakening. The myth of Castor and Pollux, who alternate between the underworld and the surface of the earth, relates to the same phenomenon. [W_1 : Its significance is W_2 : But its true significance is] not merely the changing pattern of nature but the transition, generally speaking, from vitality, from affirmative being, to death, to negation, and again the process of rising out of this negation—the absolute mediation that belongs essentially to the concept of spirit.

W_2 reads: Thus this moment of spirit has here become religion.

[Ed.] Hegel's brief treatment of "the religion of anguish" (*Schmerz*) is found only in the 1831 lectures, where it follows Jewish religion and precedes Egyptian religion. In the last lecture series, all of the Near Eastern religions (Persian, Jewish, Phoenician, Egyptian) are considered as "transitional" forms of the religion of freedom, which is the third and final moment of *Determinate Religion*. Since the 1831 structure differed quite radically from that of 1824, which forms the basis of both editions of the *Werke* in Part II, the editors faced irresolvable difficulties in locating the religion of anguish. W_1 attached it to the discussion of the cultus of Jewish religion, thus obscuring the fact that it was treated as an independent religion by Hegel, while W_2 placed it between Persian religion and Egyptian religion in the final, transitional moment of the religion of nature. Furthermore, both editions locate the first two paragraphs, which in 1831 point forward from the religion of sublimity to the religion of anguish, immediately after the quotation from Lev. 26 and before the paragraph treating the third aspect of Jewish cultus (reconciliation). The Strauss excerpts confirm that Hegel did in fact discuss the religion of anguish in 1831, and that this section in the *Werke* was not inserted from the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* by the original editors, as suspected by Lasson.

The "religion of anguish" was not Phoenician religion in any historical sense, but a construct that Hegel seems to have derived from classical mythology relating to the figure of Adonis. Following ancient tradition, Hegel implicitly equates the cult of Adonis with that of Attis. This is also shown by the fact that he explicitly equates "the universal mother," i.e., Magna Mater, with Aphrodite. He departs from the usual form of the myth in that, according to him, Adonis could choose where to spend the last third of the year, whereas in other accounts the choice lay with Zeus, who then delegated it to Aphrodite. For the interpretation of the myth in terms of the growth

2. The Religion of Beauty (Greek Religion)⁵⁷³

⁵⁷⁴In [historical] existence the religion of beauty is that of the Greeks. On its external side, this religion is itself an infinite, inexhaustible

of the seed, an interpretation clearly influenced by the Eleusinian mysteries, see in particular Firmicus Maternus, *De errore profanarum religionum* 3. It is only here that there is reference to the rebirth of Attis. It is also probable that the "true significance" of the Adonis myth, as portrayed by Hegel, is not original but stems from a fusion with the cult of Osiris. Hegel's treatment is largely based on Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie*, vol. 2, chap. 4. It is noteworthy, however, that whereas Creuzer, following C. F. Dupuis, *Origine de tous les cultes; ou, Religion universelle*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1795), 3:476–477, also interprets the myths in astronomical terms, the only trace of such an interpretation in Hegel—his reference to the myth of Castor and Pollux—does not derive from Creuzer. See also E. F. K. Rosenmüller, *Das alte und neue Morgenland* 4:318 ff.

573. [Ed.] Hegel's interpretation of Greek religion in the 1824 lectures is essentially in line with that found in the *Ms.*, reflecting both his deep and long-standing appreciation for Greek culture and his mature recognition of the limits of Greek religion. The influence of Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen* continues to be felt, although Hegel is critical of it at many points. In 1824 Hegel is especially interested in the way in which theogonic tradition and poetic creativity merge to produce the Greek gods. By arguing that the Homeric gods are the result of a poetic transformation of the old nature religion, Hegel mediates between the approaches of classicism (Winckelmann) and romanticism (Creuzer, who already hints at the mediation). (See Leuze, *Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel*, pp. 204 ff.) "Beauty" is only one of the attributes of Greek religion; Hegel also designates it as the religion of art, of freedom, of humanity, and (as in the *Ms.*) of necessity. The classical ideal is to find the true form for the true content, and the result is beauty. The beauty of the human shape and spirit is expressed in plastic form by Greek art and poetically by the Greek gods and myths, but the expression remains finite and external; the gods stand under the necessity of destiny (*Anankē*), and their collapse is inevitable. The true infinite remains beyond the grasp of the Greeks, and the happiness of their religion masks an underlying unhappiness.

574. *Precedes in W (1831):*^a [*W*₁: The point we are now coming to is the definition of God as free spirit. At first, God was defined as substantive power purely on his own account; then we saw this power as creative; God was here *W*₂: Here, to be sure, we are in principle in the sphere of free subjectivity, but in the religion of sublimity this category does not yet permeate the totality of the religious consciousness. God has been defined as the substantive power for thought and as the creator, but as creator he is to begin with only] the Lord and master of his creatures. Thus the [divine] power is the cause that divides itself [*W*₁: absolutely, but what is posited by it is only mastered, and *W*₂: but only masters that into which it divides. And] further progress consists in this other being something free, [*W*₂: given free rein] and God becoming the God of free beings, who are [*W*₂: of themselves] free even in their obedience to him.

If we consider this standpoint abstractly, it contains the following moments; God is of himself free spirit and manifests himself in positing his other over against himself. This other posited by him is his image, for the subject only creates itself, and that

as which it determines itself is again only itself. But for it to be actually determined as spirit, it must negate this other and revert to itself, for it is not free until, in the other, it knows itself. But if God knows himself in the other, then the other too has being for self and knows itself to be free [W_1 : of itself. Here again we have an other given free rein, but this other is free. God remains then the same, the power that creates. W_2 : The other is given free rein as something free and autonomous. Then freedom adheres to the subject, and God is still defined as the power that is for itself, on its own account, and gives the subject free rein.] The difference or further determination we have added seems accordingly to consist solely in the fact that the creatures are no longer merely serving, but in service itself have their freedom [W_1 : and are thus free]. This moment of the freedom of the subjects for whom God is, [W_1 : is something we have already encountered abstractly in the notion W_2 : which is not found at the present standpoint, that of the religion of sublimity, is something we have already encountered at a lower stage, in the sphere of nature religion, namely in Syrian religion; and at the higher stage to which we are now passing over, what was there still envisaged in natural, immediate fashion has to be transposed into the pure soil of spirit, with its inward mediation. There, in the religion of anguish, we encountered the notion] that God loses himself, that he dies and only *is* through the negation of himself. This mediation is the moment that has to be taken up again here: the god dies, and from this death he rises again. This is his negation, which we grasp on the one hand as his *other*, as the world, and he dies *to himself*, which has the meaning that in his death he comes to himself. But as a result the other is posited as of itself free, so that the mediation and the resurrection accrue to the other side, the side of what has been created.

Hence the concept of God does not itself seem to change, but only the side of the other. [W_1 : Here freedom comes on the scene. God dies in his other-being, in the finite, but then the divine issues forth again from the finite. W_2 : That this is where freedom comes on the scene, that the side of the other becomes free, is implied in the fact that in the finite this other-being of God dies and so the divine issues forth again on its own account in the finite.] Consequently the worldly is known to be what has the divine implicit in it, and other-being, which initially has only the character of negation, is in turn negated and implies the negating of negation. This is the mediation that pertains to freedom; freedom is not mere negation, an act of flight and surrender that is not yet true affirmative freedom [W_2 : but only negative freedom]. [W_1 : What is natural negates itself, and so the affirmative category of freedom issues forth. The world, or finite consciousness, is the other, other-being; its servitude, its accidentality is negated—this mediation we have just seen. W_2 : The affirmative category of freedom first arises with the negation of the natural state, inasmuch as this state itself already occurs as the negative. Since the other, i.e., the world, finite consciousness and its servitude and accidentality, is negated, this mediation comprises the category of freedom.] Now what spirit does in raising or elevating itself is to raise itself in this way above the natural state; but this elevation, if it is to be freedom, must be such that in it the subjective spirit too is free on its own account. So this appears, to begin with, only in regard to the [W_1 : subject, but likewise accrues also W_2 : subject: "God is the God of free beings." But in the process of further definition it also comes to accrue equally] to the nature of [W_1 : spirit. W_2 : God.] God is spirit, but he is so essentially only in that he is known to be in himself his own diremption, eternally creating, in such a way that this very creation of the other is a return to

himself, into knowledge of himself. It is in this way that God is a god of free beings.

[W₁: The human in general is the other. Since God is present to self in this other, since this human element is a determination of God himself, human beings know that the human element in God is one moment of the divine itself W₂: Since it is part of the definition of God himself that he is implicitly the other of himself, and that this other is a determination in regard to him (in such a way that in it he reverts to himself and this human element is reconciled with him), then the determination is thereby posited that humanity is inherent in God himself; and human beings thus know the human element to be one moment of the divine itself] and are as a result free in their attitude to God. For that to which they relate themselves as to their essence is contained within the category of humanity itself. In this frame of reference, human beings relate themselves on the one hand to the negation of their natural state, and on the other to a God in whom the human element is itself affirmative, an essential determination. In this relationship to God, human beings are therefore free. [W₂: What is comprised in concrete human beings is represented as something divine, substantive, and human beings are present in the divine according to all their characteristics, according to whatever has value for them. It was, according to one of the ancients,^b from their passions, i.e., from their spiritual powers, that human beings made their gods.] . . .

[W₂: This is the whole of this relationship, which has now become part of the religious spirit:] God is in himself the mediation that is [W₁: spirit W₂: humanity], humanity knows itself in God, and God and humanity say of one another: That is spirit of my spirit, [W₁: both are spirit,] humanity is spirit like God; to be sure, it has in it also finitude and separation, but in religion it sublates its finitude, as it is the knowledge of itself in God. [W₁: This is the religion of humanity, of freedom. The next point to consider is the universal aspect of this stage, but W₂: So we now come to the religion of humanity and freedom. But] the first form of this religion is itself infected with immediacy and naturalness, so that we shall still see the human element in God himself in natural fashion. The inner aspect, the idea, is admittedly in itself what is genuine, but it is not yet raised up out of the first, immediate shape of naturalness. The human element in God constitutes only his finitude, so this religion still belongs, according to its foundation, to the finite religions. It is, however, a religion of spirituality, because the mediation [W₁: here breaks down into its moments and constitutes its foundation. W₂: which, as separated and broken down into its moments, formed the preceding transitional stages, being grasped now as a totality, constitutes its foundation.]

[Ed.] ^aThis passage shows evidence of editorial revision in order to make it serve as a transition from Jewish to Greek religion. For in the context of the 1831 lectures, Phoenician (Syrian) and Egyptian religion intervene between Jewish and Greek religion, and the transition in question is one from all of the Near Eastern religions (Persian, Jewish, Phoenician, Egyptian) to the religion of humanity and freedom. This passage shows in particular how in 1831 Hegel viewed Phoenician or Syrian religion as an advance toward the humanization of God found in Greek religion. The frequent variations between W₁ and W₂ may reflect editorial work, or they may simply be attributable to the additional auditors' transcripts used by W₂. ^bSee Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Heathen* 2: "And some even of the philosophers, after the poets, make idols of forms of your passions (παθῶν), such as fear, and love, and joy, and hope" (*Ante-Nicene Fathers* [New York, 1885], 2:178).

material whose friendliness, charm, and beauty tempt us to linger.

354 But we cannot here | go into the details; instead we must confine
 355 ourselves strictly to defining the concept.⁵⁷⁵ |

a. The Concept in General

With regard to the concept in general, our basic concept is the category of subjectivity or self-determining power. We have already encountered this subjectivity, this wise, self-determining power, as
 356 the One who is simply | indeterminate within himself, but ~who⁵⁷⁶
 by very reason of this abstractness is transformed, on the plane of reality, into the most singular and most limited goal of all. The next
 357 stage is where this subjectivity, this wise | power of mighty wisdom,
particularizes itself. This stage thus involves on the one hand the downgrading of universality, of abstract unity and infinite power, its demotion into a state of limitedness, a “circle” of particularity;
 358 | but on the other hand it also involves raising the limited singularity of the purpose realized, and its development in the direction of universality. Both aspects are present in the particular, which emerges at this point. This then is the general definition of the next stage. But then we have to consider first that the determinate concept, the content of the self-determining power (which is a particular content, for it exists in the element of subjectivity)—that this particular content subjectivizes itself inwardly: it has particular purposes, and these particular purposes, these elements of subjectivity, are subjectivized on their own account to begin with, thus producing a “circle” for a host of distinctive divine subjects.⁵⁷⁷ Thus there is scope for real

575. W (Ed?) adds: So we have A. to describe the concept of this sphere, [W₁: then to consider B. the mode and manner [of the representation] of God and C. the cultus as the finite subject's relationship to this its essential, absolute subject. W₂: then to consider B. the shape of God and C. the cultus as the movement of self-consciousness in the relationship to its essential powers.]

576. W₂ reads: whose goal Cf. Ho: the wise power whose goal

577. Ho adds, similar in W: For subjectivity as purpose is self-determination. Hence it implies particularization, and indeed particularization as particularization, as a world of existing differences that are, however, the divine itself, subjectivities as divine configurations. For subjectivity in sublimity has already a determinate purpose—family or people. But this purpose is fulfilled only to the extent that the Lord's service is not neglected. By reason of this requirement that the subjective spirit for which the determinate purpose exists be sublated, the determinate purpose becomes

ethical life as such; for as the divine penetrates into the determinate | relationships of the actual spirit and determines itself, in accord 359 with [its] substantive unity, the ethical *is* these determinate relationships.

On the one hand, then, particularization concerns the content. The divine posits particular content within itself, which becomes ethical. But the second determinacy is that of the form, of the antithesis between the essential self-consciousness and finite self-consciousness, between the essential spirit and this finite realm. Here, in this determinacy of the form, the appearance of the divine in the natural shape of subjectivity comes into the picture. Subjectivity assumes a natural guise, and the finite self-consciousness imagines this natural figure as divinity, but standing over against itself, as it were. This is where the real freedom of subjectivity enters for the first time. The determinate content is common to the finite subject and its God; its God ceases to be something otherworldly and has determinate content. On his determinate side God is raised to essentiality, not mere singularity but singularity diversified, the diverse aspects going their separate ways.⁵⁷⁸ So much for the concept of this sphere.

b. The Content and Shape of Divine Representation

The second point is how the content is represented, the mode and manner of divinity in this sphere, and the third point is the cultus, the finite subject's relationship to God as its essential, absolute subject.

In regard to how God is represented, we have two aspects to consider: (a) the determinate *content* itself, determinacy and particu-

universal. If, then, on the [one] side subjectivity is downgraded to particularity as the result of the one subjectivity's being fragmented into a plurality of purposes, on the other side particularity is conversely raised to universality, and these differences thereby become divine, universal differences. This particularity of purposes is therefore the convergence of the abstract universality and singularity of purpose, their golden mean. This particularity constitutes the content of universal subjectivity; and to the extent that the content is posited in the element of subjectivity, it subjectifies itself as subject.

578. *Thus P; G reads:* by the annulling of unmediated singularity becomes an essential content.

larization as the content of God, as what he is, as his quality in general; (b) determinacy insofar as it is the object of the singular self-consciousness, i.e., the *shape* of God.

360 (a) The *content* of God. What strikes us at once is the diversity of this content among the Greeks and Romans, as against what we found in earlier religions. We express this by saying that their religion is a religion of humanity, in that concrete human beings are present to themselves in their gods according to what they are, according to their needs, inclinations, passions, and habits, according to | their spirit, their ethical and political characteristics, with everything that is valid and essential therein, also in their rights and duties. In other words we say that their gods have the very same content as is also the content of concrete human beings. This humanity of the gods is what appears in one respect (i.e., in its most external aspect) to be what is inadequate in this religion; but at the same time it is what is attractive in it, because there is here nothing unintelligible, nothing incomprehensible; there is in God no content that is not familiar to human beings, nothing they do not find, do not know within themselves. Here again there are several characteristics for us to distinguish: first, there is the particular content, that in which intrinsic quality properly lies, the particularity of content; but second, above this particular content, above this circle of the gods there remains the One, hovering over their particularization; it is this One that makes them limited. What hovers over them is simple necessity, the fate that is necessity devoid of concept because it lacks all determinacy—ineluctable, unapproachable necessity. Even as in their God human beings possess themselves, so too this same necessity lies above both alike. Third, there is purely contingent singularization, the opposite of the second characteristic—the figure of God degraded to a content that appears in purely contingent, external, arbitrary fashion.

First, then, there is the way God is represented in this sphere. Initially the content is particular; he who is the One, this power and wisdom, must constitute himself, must open himself up, determine himself. This is the essential moment at which we now stand—the inward determinacy of this One.⁵⁷⁹ This particularization must

579. *Thus G*

then also itself acquire the mode of subjectivity: the determinations must become independent deities, for the particularizing of the concept, i.e., subjectivity, is the particularizing of reality, in which the moments become subjective wholes. This is not the particularizing that consists in properties or a multitude of determinacies; these are not the proper content [of particularization]. [For] on the one hand they express relations to others; and on the other hand they belong to the stage of external reflection. Particularization, as the realizing of subjectivity, | is here the totality; being thus reflected into self, 361 it becomes independent deities.

The next question is where this content comes from, what kind of content it should or can be. It cannot be anything else than what is present to consciousness, the material of the natural and spiritual world; but it is this content in its essential aspect, and not the wholly contingent, momentary, merely empirical content [of consciousness]. It has to be the content in its conceptual aspect, and although it is particularized, it must therefore be grasped in its essentiality. It is composed, therefore, of the universal powers, the elements of physical and spiritual life. Every power makes its entrance as this essential content—heaven and earth, rivers, mountains, day and night, the divisions of time, and also the ethical realm: justice, giving of oaths, family, marriage, bravery, science, art, agriculture, civic and political life. Bravery consists especially in the eradication of wild beasts. Thus Diana does not have most notably the meaning of hunting in general but essentially that of hunting for beasts of prey. These beasts, which in other spheres—for example, with the Hindus, Egyptians, and so on—are respected as having absolute validity, are here, by the bravery of spiritual subjectivity, laid low and slaughtered for use. In the words of a sage of antiquity, “From human passions”⁵⁸⁰ didst thou derive thy gods.”⁵⁸¹ The content here is derived from spirit, from whatever [enters consciousness] powerfully as passion, as essential interest or as right.

“Thus we have initially two kinds of content, natural and spiritual. | ⁵⁸²But the basic determination here is *spiritual* subjectivity; and to this extent it is not the natural element or power that 362

580. *Ho reads:* thine own passions, O man,

581. [*Ed.*] See editorial annotation b to n. 574 above.

582. *Precedes in W₁ (HgG/Ed?)*: On the one hand, to be sure, [they] fall apart

can be accounted essential on its own account, but only spiritual subjectivity, spiritual resolve. Even if the natural element or power is also represented as a subject, as the gods of nature, still the shape of this natural content, its subjectivity, is only something borrowed, fantastic, not something true. ~~~Subjectivity⁵⁸³ as such, which | is here the basic determination, cannot have a merely natural content. So it is not the case that Greek phantasy peopled nature with gods, in the way that for the Hindus the figure of God derives from all natural shapes or figures—from just this bird, mountain, or river.

364 | No, the principle of Greek religion is rather the subjective freedom of the spiritual: the natural is no longer worthy to constitute by itself the inner quality or content of any such God. But, in the second place, this free subjectivity is not yet absolutely free. It is not the idea that ~has genuinely realized itself inwardly as spirit.⁵⁸⁴ We have not yet attained that level; the⁵⁸⁵ content provided by free subjectivity exists as particular content as such, but⁵⁸⁶ spiritual. But because, as spirit, it is particular content, its particularity ~is⁵⁸⁷ at the same time a natural side.⁵⁸⁸ Thus there are two characteristics present in the God of particular subjectivity: the essential, basic characteristic is

583. *Precedes Subjectivity in W₁ (HgG/Var?)*: Insofar as it is full of content, [*cf. n. 588, 3d sentence*]

584. *G reads*: genuinely preserves itself inwardly as spirit. *W₁ (HgG?) adds*: universal, infinite subjectivity.

585. *W₁ (HgG?) adds*: spiritual, ethical

586. *W₁ (HgG/Ed?) adds*: remains

587. *W₁ (Ed/HgG?) reads*: has

588. *W₂ (MiscP) reads*: But the new gods too are themselves dual in content, combining within themselves the natural and the spiritual. The natural element or natural power was not in any event what is generally independent for the essential intuition of the Greeks, but only spiritual subjectivity. Insofar as it is full of content, subjectivity as such, which determines itself according to purposes, cannot bear within itself a merely natural inner quality. For this reason Greek phantasy also did not people nature with gods in the way that, for the Hindus, the shape of a god springs forth out of all natural shapes. The Greek principle is rather subjective freedom; and in that case the natural is at all events no longer worthy to constitute the content of the divine. But on the other hand this free subjectivity is not yet absolutely free. It is not the idea that has truly realized itself as spirit, i.e., it is not yet universal, infinite subjectivity. We have not yet attained that level. The content of free subjectivity is still particular; it is spiritual, to be sure, but since spirit has not made itself the object, the particularity is still a natural particularity and is itself still present as one characteristic of the spiritual deities.

that he is of a spiritual kind; but the other characteristic, stemming from the particularity of spirituality, is that of naturalness. The subject is thus the union of a spiritual and a natural power, it has a spiritual but also a natural content—united in such a way that the spiritual principle is dominant, having subjugated the natural principle. Such then are the basic characteristics of God at this stage.

Well, then, there are two relationships that occur in regard to this principle. On the one hand we find the natural and the spiritual quite distinct from each other, and on the other we find them genuinely unified.⁵⁸⁹ Spiritual subjectivity exists only as the triumph over what is natural, as self-produced result, as dominating the

589. *Ho reads, similar in W:* inasmuch as the basic determination is spiritual subjectivity, the natural power cannot of itself count as what is essential. It is, however, one of the particularities and, as the immediate, the first, which must be sublated before the other spiritual powers arise. For we saw that the power of the One and his sublimity on its own account first resulted from creation. This one foundation, as the self of the absolute, is lacking here. So the starting point here is from the sphere of immediate naturalness, which cannot here appear as created by the One, but appears as immediate. In other words, the unity in which these particularities, the natural powers, still rest is not spiritual, but is itself a natural unity, or chaos. "But first of all," sings Hesiod, "was chaos." Hence chaos is itself something posited. But what posits it we are not told: all we are told is that it was or became. For the foundation is not the self but the selfless, necessity, of which it can only be said that it is. Chaos is the unity that sets the immediate in motion, but itself is not yet subject or particularity. So it is not said of it that it creates; on the contrary, as it itself only "becomes," so too this necessity only "becomes" out of it—the "far-flung earth," "the shades of Tartarus," Erebus and Night, and Eros "adorned with beauty before all the immortals."

We see arising the totality of particularity: the earth, the positive element, the universal foundation; Tartarus, Erebus, the night, the negative element; and Eros, the uniting, active element. The particularities themselves *give birth*: the earth brings forth the sky and the mountains, and, without fructifying love, the deserted Pontus; but, united with the sky, it brings forth Oceanus and its rulers. It also gives birth to the Cyclopes, the natural powers as such, whereas the earlier progeny are natural things themselves as subjects. Thus earth and sky are the abstract powers that, fructifying themselves, give rise to the spheres of natural particularity. The last of the progeny is inscrutable Cronus. Night, the second moment, brings forth whatever, from the natural side, has within itself the moment of negation. Third, these particularities couple mutually together and produce positive and negative. Subsequently these are all vanquished by the gods of spiritual subjectivity; Hecate alone remains, as destiny from the natural side.

To consider next the power that rules over this sphere of natural forces: this is the unqualified abstraction out of which they arose, viz., Uranus; and since he is only power as the positing of his abstraction as what is valid, he suppresses all his

natural.⁵⁹⁰ For this reason two kinds of deities now make their appearance: the natural too appears as independent, as distinct from the spiritual, even if it is only a subordinate aspect. "This is the most important point in Greek mythology."⁵⁹¹

365 With the Greeks we have the old deities, the Titans Coeus, Crius, Hyperion, Iapetus, Oceanus, Cronus, Uranus, Helios, Selene, and so on:⁵⁹² these are natural beings, not spiritual beings, | a purely natural content without any spiritual determination. The essential point is that these Titans are subjugated, that the spiritual principle has vanquished nature religion. They are dethroned, driven out to the margins of the earth, the margins of the world of self-consciousness, driven into the twilight, or right out to the limits of

progeny. But the result of the sky is inscrutable Time, the last to be born. And Time vanquished Uranus thanks to the cunning of the earth. For everything here is in the shape of subjective purpose, and cunning is the negative of force or violence. But since these particular forces now make themselves free and valid [on their own account], Uranus gives them the "punitive name of Titans, whose iniquity is sooner or later chastised."

Now the first moment in this natural sphere is therefore chaos with its moments, posited by abstract necessity; the second is the period of creation under Uranus's rule, when these abstract moments issued from chaos are what give birth; the third is the rule of Cronus, when the particular natural powers (who have themselves been born) give birth in turn. In this way what has been posited itself becomes what posits, and the transition is made to spirit. This transition can be more clearly seen in regard to Cronus, in that he gives birth to what in turn destroys him. It is by sublating the immediate shapes that he is ruler. But he himself is immediate and therefore the contradiction, in that, in himself immediate, he is [at the same time] the sublation of immediacy. He produces the spiritual deities out of himself; but insofar as they are, to begin with, only natural, he sublates them, does away with them. But his sublation of the spiritual deities must itself be sublated; and this again happens through cunning in opposition to the natural force or violence of Cronus. Zeus, the god of spiritual subjectivity, lives. Thus Cronus is opposed by his other, and there occurs the battle—for battle it is—between the natural powers or offspring of Uranus and Gaia and the offspring of Cronus and Rhea or the deities of spirit.

[Ed.] The whole of the theogonic myth presented in this variant, which is transmitted only by *Ho* (and followed by *W*), is taken from Hesiod's *Theogony*, vv. 116–735. It is highly probable that it represents a subsequent interpolation by Hotho.

590. *Thus G*

591. *Thus G*

592. [Ed.] See Hesiod, *Theogony* 133–134, 168 ff., 371. The Titans Coeus, Crius, Hyperion, Iapetus, Oceanus, and Cronus are offspring of Uranus and Gaia, while Helios and Selene are offspring of Hyperion and Thea.

the night. They have been overcome by the new gods, led by Zeus. These new gods are now in command; they are the gods of the free spirit, but they are individually characterized by particularity, so they are not yet the gods of the spirit that knows itself according to its absolute freedom. Still they must be distinguished from the Titans. The struggle between the Titans and the new gods is a principal moment in Greek mythology; the victory over the Titans is in such a way that they preserve their honor, even though they lose command. They are natural powers but are not the supreme powers—which are ethical, spiritual, and true. There are still two points to be noted and distinguished in regard to them. Some, such as Helios, Uranus, Coeus, and so on, are mere power; others, the wholly self-contained powers, are also spiritual, but because their content is merely self-contained spirituality, raw, abstract spirituality, they are reckoned among the old deities—for example, the oath, Styx,⁵⁹³ the Eumenides, Dike, whose judgments are purely internal, belong to the old gods. In the kingdom of the new gods, that of Zeus, what counts is civic life, laws that have been promulgated and a system of right based on them, not a law of conscience, which is where the giving of oaths belongs, not the hidden justice of Nemesis and Dike—for this is only the superficial justice of humbling the proud, it lays low him who is exalted though his only crime consists in being raised up, which is not an *ethical* wrong. So this distinction between the old and the new gods is a very important and necessary point in Greek mythology.

This progressive sequence of gods is to be found for instance in Aeschylus's *Eumenides*, where at the beginning of the play the Pythia says: "Worship with your prayers Gaia, vouchsafer of oracles";⁵⁹⁴ the Pythia is then followed by Themis, who is the second after Mother Earth to have her seat in this μαντεῖον [shrine]; | thus she is Dike, a spiritual entity, a right but still an indeterminate right. The third possessor of the oracle is a female Titan, Phoebe, who finally delivers the oracle to Phoebus, the new god, who now has his seat here. Pindar too speaks of this succession of gods who

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593. *Ho* reads: oaths [belong] to Styx or Orcus,

594. [Ed.] Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 1–8. *Ho* uses the Greek term πρῶτόμαντιν (first prophet or seer) instead of "vouchsafer of oracles" (*Orakelgeberin*).

vouchsafed oracles. He makes Night the first, followed by Themis and then Phoebus.⁵⁹⁵ This is the general pattern of the transition from the natural shapes to the new gods.

Now the new gods are intrinsically dual in content, inasmuch as the natural principle is to be found in them. Phoebus is on the one hand the one who knows, and on the other hand he is Helios, the sun, which illuminates everything. In the same way Zeus is the firmament, what is meant by Uranus, principally the force of atmospheric variation, force in the meteorological realm, the Thunderer, the atmosphere in its changeableness—[as when the Romans said] *sub Jove frigido*;⁵⁹⁶ but apart from being this natural principle, he is also the father of gods and men. He it is to whom civic life essentially belongs; he is the [guardian] power of friendship and hospitality, a many-sided ethical power generally. So it is with other deities too. Poseidon is the sea, Oceanus, but essentially keeping to himself control of the raging sea; “[at the same time,] however, he is essentially represented as a spiritual subject.”⁵⁹⁷ In these deities there is still this echo of natural elements, but it is refined because what is dominant is their spiritual determinacy. All the same, no perfect consistency is to be looked for in this respect: sometimes one element emerges more strongly, sometimes the other.

Prometheus⁵⁹⁸ is also numbered among the Titans. He gave human beings fire and taught them to offer sacrifices; but he taught them to do so in such a way as to gain something from the sacrifice

595. [Ed.] The succession Night-Themis-Phoebus does not occur in Pindar himself but in a general scholium to the Pythian hymns. See Pindar, *Carmina*, ed. C. G. Heyne, 3 vols. (Göttingen, 1798–1799), vol. 2, *Scholia in Pindari carmina*, part 2, *Scholia in Pythia Nemea et Isthmia*, pp. 483–484.

596. [Ed.] See Horace, *Carmina* 1.1.25: “Manet sub Jove frigido / Venator, tenerae conjugis immemor” (“Unmindful of his tender spouse, / The hunter tarries beneath chill Jove”).

597. W (Ed/HgG?) reads: however, he is also taken up among the new gods.

598. [Ed.] On Prometheus see esp. Hesiod, *Theogony* 510–615, and *Works and Days* 48–58. Hegel’s account does not bring out the connection that exists between Prometheus’s two deeds. After he has tricked Zeus out of the meat on the occasion of the sacrifice, Zeus hides the fire, but Prometheus steals it from him and gives it to the human race. On the new gods’ opposition to Prometheus as the offspring of Titans (he was the son of Iapetus and Clymene), see Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 928–931, 955–960.

too: Zeus is tricked in that he is given only the bones, covered over with the skin, while the worshipers keep the meat for their own use. So it was Prometheus who taught the human race to eat meat, as well as endowing it with other arts. But these arts, and the discoveries and inventions too that belong to the cultural development of humanity, are all of them just the arts of life; there are no ethical authorities, no social laws, etc., involved. These fall | partly within 367 the domain of Zeus, partly within that of Demeter (agriculture, the institution of marriage). The ethical is not Titanic but pertains essentially to the new gods.⁵⁹⁹

~ There is one other god who can be particularly singled out, namely Hercules.⁶⁰⁰ Hercules is principally represented as having lived and died as a human being who was then raised up among the gods.⁶⁰¹ He possesses human individuality, and he worked like a slave; he was in service, and | by dint of this human toil he earned 368 himself a place in heaven. In Hercules, for instance, there is this purely spiritual natural element. There is no longer any echo of power over nature in him as there is in Apollo; as a human being he has purely spiritual individuality as such for his principle. This spiritual individuality of human beings is on a higher level than that of Zeus and Apollo, for human spirituality is a singular, free, pure, abstract subjectivity, undetermined by nature. Hercules too is a singular subject, with his own natural life, within which his labors and his virtues lie. But this natural life, this conditionedness, this dependence upon natural life is precisely finitude. At the same time it is [only]

599. *Ho adds:* But precisely because Prometheus is still a Titan and what he teaches is Titanic, he is punished by Zeus.

600. [Ed.] Heracles. While normally we follow modern conventions for classical names and figures, including the use of Greek names for Greek gods and heroes, in this instance we give the Latin form Hercules, since it was evidently used by Hegel himself, both in lecturing and in the written *Ms.*

601. *Ho reads, similar in W:* But even if the gods are spiritual particularity in regard to the substance that fragments into them, on the other hand we see humanity through human service raising itself in advance to God and bringing itself into conformity with the divine purpose. [*W*₂: on the other hand the limitation of the particular is thereby conversely eliminated from substantive universality.] In this way we obtain the unity of the two sides, the divine purpose made human and human purposes raised to the divine. This yields the heroes and demigods. Of particular note in this respect is the figure of Hercules.

abstract finitude, the point of singularity, that has comprehended all natural content within itself, but which, as a spiritual subject, both *can* break free from it and *has* done so. The other gods are not free in this way; they still have in their essence a natural content from which they cannot purify themselves.⁶⁰² Zeus is duration, the firmament, etc. There is much evidence to show that the Greeks saw this distinction and were quite aware of it. For instance, they assign to Hercules a very high place indeed. Aeschylus⁶⁰³ makes Prometheus say that what comforts him in his defiance is the fact that Zeus will have a son who will cast him down off his throne; by this he means Hercules. "The same view occurs in Aristophanes⁶⁰⁴ too, but in his own joking fashion, in that he makes Bacchus praise Hercules as the heir of Zeus, supposing Zeus dies."⁶⁰⁵

602. *Ho* reads, *similar in W*: by his virtue he earned himself a place in heaven. So the heroes are not immediately gods, but are of implicitly divine origin and must first inwardly posit the divine for themselves by labor. For the gods of spiritual individuality, though now at rest, have being only through the struggle with the Titans. This their implicit being is posited in the heroes. So the spiritual individuality of the heroes is on a higher level than that of the gods themselves; they are *actually* what the gods are *implicitly*, the activation of this implicit being; and even if they have to labor in order to succeed, in so doing they discard the naturalness that the gods still have in them. The gods derive from the power over nature, but the heroes from the gods.

W (1831) *continues*: So inasmuch as the spiritual gods are what results from overcoming the power over nature, but first exist only through this power, they have their becoming in themselves and show themselves as concrete unity. The powers over nature are contained in them as their foundation, even if this implicit potential is, in them, transfigured. Accordingly this echo of the natural elements is still present in the gods, [*W*₁: but the main thing is their spiritual determinacy. *W*₂: an echo that is not present in Hercules. And there are various pointers to the fact that the Greeks themselves were conscious of this distinction.]

603. [*Ed.*] Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 755–768 (dialogue of Zeus and Prometheus).

604. *Ho* adds: in the *Frogs*,

[*Ed.*] Aristophanes, *Birds* 1641–1645. Hegel erroneously attributes these lines to the *Frogs*, as is evident not only from *Ho* but also from the fact that Hegel places the words in the mouth of Bacchus, who in the opening scene of the *Frogs* asks Hercules for the way into Hades.

605. *W*₂ (*MiscP*) reads: The same prophecy as to the downfall of Zeus's lordship, and that this will come about through the posited unity of the divine and the human that resides in the heroes, is expressed in Aristophanes, who makes Bacchus say to Hercules: If Zeus dies, you shall be his heir.

The second point is that above all these deities there hovers the universal power. Inasmuch as there are so many particular deities, their determinate aspects must be brought under a unity. Initially this is the unity that reigns among themselves, and in which they remain independent. It is Zeus who provides this paternal or patriarchal kind of rule, in which the ruler always ends by doing what the others⁶⁰⁶ also want—they have their say about everything | that happens. But this kind of lordship is not serious; so the unity is something much more serious. The true lordship consists in their being subordinate to an absolute power—this is the absolute unity.

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This power is not yet *fulfilled*: its content or fulfillment is essentially shared out among this multitude of gods—allotted to each of them in his particular way. For this reason the unity that stands over them is a unity devoid of purpose, of subjectivity, a principle without purpose, for the subject is here characterized only as something particular with a particular content. Thus the higher power, above all these gods in their beauty, is abstract necessity, a necessity without purpose and incomprehensible, a necessity that has no concept because it does not contain its own determining within itself; there is [only] a separation into mutually external particulars. Above this divine world of beauty there stands the necessity that spells the disappearance of the particular powers or authorities for whom justification is here afforded—and that mourns for their disappearance. This [abstract necessity] represents one extreme as opposed to this midpoint [of beauty], and in it they [the gods] possess one extreme. The midpoint is not yet absolute unification. Unity lies outside them, because it is not yet the unity that is simply filled with content in and for itself. The other extreme is the extreme of singularity, which is not yet taken up into the midpoint either. That is why it is an extreme; it lies outside the concept. But what is outside the scope of unification is contingent being in general, external contingency. This external contingency is not moderated by the idea, not yet taken up within it. Necessity has no inherent criterion of wisdom, does not yet have its determining or content for itself. Hence it is unsecured on one side, given over to chance and to fancy. These gods therefore

606. *W₂ (Var) adds: by and large*

present a multitude of external aspects, a mass of purely contingent content, which plays upon them from outside, adding the finishing touches that make them just these [singular] divinities. This [singular aspect] is not yet identical with the unity of the concept.

It is to be noted that among the Greeks the twelve principal gods of Olympus are not ordered according to the concept. They are differentiated into particular shapes, and it is a waste of effort to try to systematize them. One or another essential moment or aspect of the idea is displayed to a greater or lesser extent in [each of] them, but it is not to be seen as fully implemented in them; | apart from it, there is a contingent, particular content in each of them. Regarding the contingency of the content it should be borne in mind that each figure is an absolutely individual one; hence it does not have merely an abstract content or an abstract activity—on the contrary, as subjects they also draw on the rich treasury of subjective properties. If only one property were dominant in a particular deity so that it could be comprehended thereby, it would be an abstraction, a universal, like justice, the oath, and suchlike; these are abstract properties, which then become formal deities—inasmuch as they are further vested with subjective configuration—and are therefore only universal. In this [formal vesting] divinity is a form to which the content—justice etc.—does not correspond. Thus Pallas is wisdom, but there is war in her also, technical skill, measure, and other qualities too; for subjectivity is no longer merely an external form, but every deity is made up of a wide range of qualities. They are distinct from one another, but the distinctions are by no means abstractly definite in character.

Particularization comes about in another way too. “There is a natural element in these gods, which has a large number of determinately particular aspects on its own account; for example, the sun rises, sets, becomes bright, obscured, and so on. The divisions into years, months, days, and hours are so many ways of determinately qualifying the abstraction of time. The natural element that is involved here can be characterized in many ways. But since the main characteristic here | is individuality, subjectivity, the modes of determinacy in which the echo of nature is present are transformed into determinate modes of self-conscious subjectivity; thus transformed,

they lose their former significance and meaning and appear as contingent content. "Dupuis⁶⁰⁷ made the Greek gods into calendrical deities, definite divisions of the calendar. Such divisions pertain to time, to the extent that time is involved in physical change. When they are vested with the shape of self-conscious individuals, they no longer have this determinate aspect but appear to be contingent [in their ordering] and must be ennobled; they are not entitled to any respect and can be made into anything at all."⁶⁰⁸ This is (for one thing) the main justification for seeking among these gods for the so-called philosophemes."⁶⁰⁹ Zeus spent twelve days carousing with the gods among the Ethiopians, he suspended Juno between earth and sky, and so on⁶¹⁰—all this is merely contingent. [But] these representations relate to or derive from some abstract representation or other, denoting something regular and essential, but in prosaic fashion; and we have the right to investigate what that something is. Traces of this kind can still be found in these forms of subjectivity; but they have been degraded into contingent figures, and we are under no commandment to reflect these representational images. Self-consciousness has no use for determinate aspects of nature such as these."⁶¹¹

607. [Ed.] C. F. Dupuis, *Origine de tous les cultes; ou, Religion universelle*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1795). It was Hercules in particular whom Dupuis identified as a calendrical deity; see 1:317 ff., where he equates Heracles with the sun and, following Porphyry, his labors with the divisions of the zodiac. See also below, n. 678.

608. *Thus G*

609. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* But even if sublated, the natural element is still a determinacy of the particular powers, and by being taken up into the figure of self-conscious individuals it has become a copious source of contingent determinations. The specification of time, division of the month and the year, all this is still so intertwined with the concrete gods that attempts have even been made, for instance by Dupuis, to make them calendrical deities. Intuition of the creative action of nature, the process of arising and passing away, also gave rise to numerous other connotations in the sphere of the spiritual gods. But once raised to the level of self-consciousness involved in the shape of these gods, these natural determinations appear as contingent and are transformed into determinations of self-conscious subjectivity, which is to deprive them of their significance. There is no gainsaying the major justification for seeking in the actions of these gods for so-called philosophemes.

610. [Ed.] See Homer, *Iliad* 1.423–425, 15.18–21.

611. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* have at any rate their first source in an abstract representation relating to natural circumstances, natural forces, and what is regular and essential in them; and we therefore have the right to investigate what they are. But these natural

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The plastic figures of the gods etc. are the figures of the gods in their purity. Represented, by extension, in poetry, taken up into the field of representation, they give rise to a great variety of stories. These have their original source in particular natural relationships—which are not in the pure state, however, but have been changed into forms that are appropriate to the subjective mode. This is the source of the [stories recounting] Zeus's countless | amorous adventures; the procreative, generative element in nature here has its [representational] form. A second source⁶¹² is the spiritual realm itself, spiritual individuality.⁶¹³ The god is manifested to human beings in their own destinies, in the destinies of a state, in this or that event that is seen as the god's doing, and as [evidence of] his benevolence or his enmity. In this way "an infinitely diverse content arises."⁶¹⁴ Just as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob gave his people the land of Israel, and led them out of Egypt, so a Greek god has done this or that which befalls a people and is envisaged by it as divine.⁶¹⁵ These divine acts or utterances have a local, temporal point of reference. The priests declare the event, whether fortunate or disastrous, to be the act of the god; and this provides the material for a more precise, external definition of the god's actions. This then is the particular material for the infinite mass of what is contingent, indeterminate; it is not inherently contradictory to the facts, but is *poetizing*. Poetizing is not the same thing as inventing or lying. The starting point for poetizing, the prosaic event that the prophets declare to be an act of the god, yields a great many contingent characterizations of God's activity and being. This, then, is the other extreme. Inasmuch as it enters into particularity, the universal lets these characterizations stand separately side by side; and as a result,

relations are at the same time demoted to contingencies, since they have not preserved their purity but are changed into forms appropriate to the subjective, human mode. The free self-consciousness has no more use for such natural determinations.

612. *W₂ (MiscP) adds:* of contingent determinations

613. *W₂ (MiscP) adds:* and its historical development.

614. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* arises an infinitely diverse but also contingent content when an event, whether fortunate or disastrous, is raised to be the act of a god and serves to define the god's actions more precisely and in detail.

615. *W₂ (MiscP) adds:* or as self-determination of the divine.

contingency enters in. This is the essential determinant in regard to the content of the objective god.

(b) The second aspect pertaining to the representation of the god is his *shape*. The first is that subjectivity determines itself inwardly, has content, the second is that this objective content turns toward what we call finite self-consciousness. Here [the principle of] the division into particulars is not the inward element in content, through which a whole heaven full of gods | is produced, but is that through which divinity forms one side, and the finite self-consciousness for which it exists forms the other side. This is a spiritual form—the diremption of the infinite concept, the fact that spirit divides itself: since it is for itself, it is for an other also; this other is itself, and that is how it first comes to be for itself. But here this other is the finite world; this other—the fact that spirit exists for itself as external and finite—this is the mode of its configuration or shaping, of its appearing.

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God appears therefore, i.e., he has a shape, and what we now have to determine is the type and mode of this shape. There are two sides to this appearing or shaping. God appears, he is for an other, he enters into externality. This gives rise to a division, a differentiation which is so determined that there are two modes of appearing. One mode is that which is appropriate to the god as such, the other, to consciousness or to the finite spirit that stands over against him. Appearing is being turned outward, toward an other: it thus comprises two moments—one being what God is represented as doing, the other what consciousness does, for which his action exists.

The side of appearing that is represented as pertaining to God in himself is his revealing himself, showing himself, the activity of appearing attributed to God as such. From this angle self-consciousness merely has the sense of taking something in that shows itself to it, something that is given to it. This mode of showing occurs principally for thought; what is eternally in and for itself shows itself; it is taught, is received, it appears as something merely given.⁶¹⁶

616. *W₂ (MiscP) reads*: given, and is not posited by the caprice of the singular [self-consciousness].

Thus here too [i.e., in Greek religion] there is one side that is [just] God's appearance; he shows himself in dreams, and there is traditional teaching about him. And self-consciousness accepts this as given by the gods. In the case of oracles, too, what shows itself is attributed to the god himself.⁶¹⁷ In this regard the Greeks had all possible forms | including that of a divine image that was a stone fallen from the sky, a meteorite.⁶¹⁸

The other side, which is just as essential, is that the appearance is a product of the self-consciousness to which the god appears. It is the shared limit that separates and relates them, ~in which both are present, and in which the activity belongs to both; and that is just what causes serious difficulty. Later on, in Christianity, this appears as the grace of God, as God's indwelling spirit. At the one extreme human beings are purely passive, just standing there like stones while the spirit works in them; at the other extreme the activity is theirs. Here on the one side there is the appearing that is the work of God; on the other side there is the fact that it is the activity of self-consciousness. It is essential that here at the level of representation, these two sides appear as distinct. On the speculative level, this doubled activity must appear as one activity in which the two sides coalesce; but here two activities are apparent, the one coming from one side, the other as a process of production through the activity of the other side, namely self-consciousness. This standpoint still contains distinction, or the standpoint of particularity. There are both sides of the human [experience] in the divine; human beings intuit | themselves in God, ~primordially as content. This is the action of God in them, the essential powers of their spirit.⁶¹⁹ The other side is the form opposed to this content—activity, production. The two sides are still distinct because the standpoint here is still that of the finite. Similarly it is one aspect of the appearing of God,

617. *Ho reads, similar in W₂*: Dreams and oracles are modes of appearing of this kind.

618. *W₂ reads*: for instance, a divine image fallen from the sky, or a meteor or thunder or lightning, is regarded as an appearance of the divine. *Cf. Ho and the 1827 lectures*; *Ho reads*: a divine image has fallen from the sky; Demeter taught agriculture and the laws, Apollo wandered about among the shepherds.

619. *Thus P; G reads*: in him they have their authentic essentiality, their essential power.

one aspect of his shape, that the appearance is attributed to God himself; the other aspect is the productive activity of the finite self-consciousness. This is the aspect under which human beings make or shape their God for themselves.⁶²⁰ Herodotus⁶²¹ states categorically: "Homer and Hesiod made the Greeks' gods for them." And it has always been the artists who have been responsible for shaping the gods. Their shape is one that is posited subjectively, by finite spirit.⁶²² The appearing [of God] is essentially the product of conscious willing; what brings forth the [divine] shape—the posited [god] with the consciousness that it is—is the finite side. So this is where art has principally its actuality.

[Second,]⁶²³ there is a natural moment in the appearing [of God], because the shape has a sensible aspect. We have not yet reached the sphere where | pure, absolute spirit exists for spirit, where God is worshiped in spirit and in truth [John 4:24], [as] pure thought for pure thought. So it is not the case that appearing—the aspect of determinate being—reaches the point of being immediate actuality, the presence of a singular consciousness, i.e., a human being. The shape that is most genuine and proper [for God] is necessarily that the spirit that exists absolutely for itself goes forth to show itself as a single, empirical self-consciousness. Here we have not yet reached this destination: there is a natural moment in the appearance; [it] has a sensible aspect—but this aspect does not reach the extreme of a particular sensible human being [*die aber nicht bis zum sinnlichen*

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620. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Basically, however, the activity belongs to both sides, though it is very difficult to grasp this genuinely. The same difficulty arises later in connection with the notion of God's grace. Grace illuminates the human heart, it is the spirit of God within human beings, so that they can be represented as passive when it is at work within them and the activity is not their own. In the concept, however, this doubled activity must be grasped as one. At the stage where we now are, this unity of the concept is not yet posited, and the side of productive activity, which also belongs to the subject, appears as independent on its own account, in the sense that the subject brings about the appearance of the divine consciously, as its own work.

621. [Ed.] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.53. What Herodotus actually said was that Homer and Hesiod "established the genealogy of the gods in Greece and gave them their eponyms, apportioned offices and honors among them, and revealed their form."

622. *Thus P; D reads:* In this sphere the absolute is known as something posited by self-consciousness.

623. *P reads:* (2)

Diesen fortgeht]. This aspect is therefore something made by human agency in such a way that what is thus made—wherein the divinity appears—has a sensible aspect. This sensible aspect is necessarily made to match the concept, the content of divinity, which is to be expressed by it. The role of the shape is to represent the divine: the natural or sensible is, as it were, still soft enough to be molded to fit the content it is to express.⁶²⁴ It is only when the process of particularization within God reaches the absolute limit, [when God] emerges in human shape as unmediated consciousness, that this externality is let go, so to speak, and sensibility is given free rein as sensibility—in other words, God makes manifest the contingency and conditionedness of externality.⁶²⁵ At the present stage sensible matter does not yet have this distinctive feature but remains true to its content.^{626 627} |

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624. *W₂ (Var) adds:* as it appears.

625. *W₂ (Var) adds:* and its unfitness for the concept.

626. *Ho reads:* Now third, as regards the work of art, it is the positedness of the doubled activity of God's self-revealing and human shaping. It is therefore a product. But at this stage of differentiation as such, a work of art is something other as opposed to the god who has implicit being and as opposed to human spirit. The god who has implicit being does not return out of his particularity into himself (as we saw when considering the concept for this stage). The unity does not involve self, the process is only the process of necessity. So the work of art is not itself spirit, not God who has being for himself, but only itself the implicit being of being-for-self, being-for-other as such. This includes both explicit and implicit being but without mediation, as an abstract result to which mediation is extraneous. So the side of determinate being does not go so far as to make the god (as work of art) self-knowledge; knowledge is extraneous to him and pertains to the human, subjective spirit.

627. *Ho adds, similar in W₁, abridged in W₂:* Now in regard to the shape of the work of art, it would have to be said that it must be the shape of the self, for the god is the divine particular self, a spiritual, universal power. But this power derives from the naturalness it possesses as posited, so it must still have the natural for its element of configuration, and it must become apparent that precisely the natural is the mode of expression of the divine. The god appears in the stone, the sensible still deems itself to be what is appropriate for the expression of the god as god. It is only when the god himself appears revealingly as this singular being that spirit, the subjective knowledge of spirit as spirit, is the genuine appearance of the god. It is only then that sensible nature for the first time becomes free; that is to say, it is no longer wedded to the god, but shows itself to be unsuited to his shape. Sensible nature, immediate singularity is nailed to the cross. Spirit as universal, the community, is the soil for God's appearance. The appearance is absolute, its element spirit itself.

Now the shape in which the sensible expresses the divine is the *human* shape only, for there is no other bodily shape that would be an embodiment of the spiritual; but it is not the figure of an empirical human being, not a shape that could belong at the same time to the sphere of contingent existence, not one that expresses implicit actuality immediately.⁶²⁸ Instead it is an ideal, an essentially beautiful shape; and this essentially beautiful shape is the essential expression of the spiritual character, the determinate representation of the spiritual that an artist has and expresses.⁶²⁹ As Goethe⁶³⁰ says, it is *significance* that constitutes the character of classical works of art, i.e., in every feature the figure expresses the defined character. The figure of an empirical human being does not yet evince this significance of the spiritual [as such], but also contingency, the influence of the natural and contingent; this gives us forms and figures that are not just significant in their reference to spirit and do not just express the substantive spirituality that is the foundation of the concept of God.

This is the law of appearance. This beautiful shape is the universal law, and the beautiful configuration or shaping is, as it were, the organon for understanding the world. |

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We explain human and natural events by adducing their ground or cause, possibly in terms of some inner force or abstract reflection. Here we do not have an abstraction of that kind. The shape of that from which explanations are derived is not something as prosaic and intellectual as that; instead it is the shape of the beautiful. Among

628. *Ho*, *W*₁ *add*: Poetry, to be sure, is also a spiritualized appearance; even so, it still has as its material the tone. Admittedly this is a form of materiality that sublates itself; even so, the existence of the god consists in tone, gesture, mask, etc.—something sensible in general, not the spirit that knows itself.

629. *Ho*, *W*₁ *add*: The shape in this sensible material is the human shape. For the god is posited by human beings. But this positedness is mediated by the sublation of the singular self, so that the shape is not that of the single human being as such, but the universal, essentially beautiful shape, and so an expression of spiritual character.

630. [*Ed.*] This does not appear to be an exact quotation but a reference to Goethe's discussion of "significance" [*Bedeutsamkeit*] in various writings on art (especially classical art) and art theory. See esp. J. W. von Goethe, *Werke* (Weimar, 1887 ff.), div. 1, vol. 47, p. 17; div. 1, vol. 48, p. 102; also *Goethe-Wörterbuch* (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz, 1980), s.v. *Bedeutsamkeit*.

the Greeks everything is molded to this shape. That is how the vast number of delightful stories that supposedly establish the ground of this and that, the infinite number of fables the Greeks had, originated. They are figures of phantasy, explaining events. In Homer, for instance, Achilles makes to draw his sword but manages to get hold of himself. Nestor, Calchas the priest, or the poet himself explains that Athena held him back.⁶³¹ What motivates the action is always something beautiful or charming of this kind.

Such are the basic determinations in the objective aspect of God and of the gods, first according to its own content, and second regarding the way that that content turns outward toward finite self-consciousness.⁶³²

*c. The Cultus*⁶³³

The cultus is the relationship through which the externality of the represented deity, its objectivity over against subjective consciousness, is sublated; through the cultus the identity of the two is brought about, and self-consciousness becomes conscious of the indwelling of the divine.

1. As regards the *disposition* [*Gesinnung*] of the worshipers in this cultus, the first moment is that the gods are recognized and honored; they are the substantive powers, the essential fulcrum of the natural and | spiritual universe, the universal. Humanity recognizes ~this~⁶³⁴ because it is thinking consciousness, and hence

631. [Ed.] See Homer, *Iliad* 1.188–219, where, however, the episode is interpreted without mention of Nestor or Calchas.

632. *Ho adds, similar in W*: If the work of art is the self-revealing of the god and of human productivity as the positing of this revelation by the sublation of human beings' particular knowing and willing, then it also involves on the other hand the sublatedness of humanity and of God as alien to each other. And the positing of this implicit being of the work of art [*W*₂: of what is implicit in the work of art] is the cultus. It is therefore the relationship whereby the external objectivity of the god vis-à-vis subjective knowledge is sublated and the two are represented as identical. In this way, then, the external existence of the deity as being separate from existence in the subjective spirit is [also] sublated, and the god is integrated within subjectivity itself.

633. *G reads*: 3.

634. *W*₂ (*Var*) *reads*: these universal powers, as they are removed from contingency,

the world is no longer present for it in a merely external, contingent manner, but in truth—we *recognize* these universal powers. For example, we honor duties, justice, scientific knowledge, civic and political life, family relationships; these essentialities are what is true, they are the bonds that hold the world together; what is more, they are the substantive [frame] in which all else subsists.

This content has accordingly to be recognized and venerated as what is essential, what is valid, the only thing that stands out against the contingency and the independence that acts against it.

In the second place, this content is the objective, and it is objective in the genuine sense, namely it is what is *true*, what is valid in and for itself—i.e., it is the objective in the subject as well. For example, these divine powers are people's own customs, their ethical life, the rights they have and exercise, their own spirit, their own substantiality and essentiality, not an external essentiality and substantiality. Thus Athena is the city and also the goddess. The deity is the spirit of the people, not their⁶³⁵ guardian spirit or suchlike, but their living, actual, present spirit represented in its essentiality, its universality.⁶³⁶ The Erinyes are not the Furies, as the representation of something externally objective, but are one's own deeds with their consequences.⁶³⁷ They are what we call conscience; for example, Oedipus's Erinyes is the father's curse upon the son.⁶³⁸ Eros | is the objective element, but he is also love as sensation, the pathos experienced by the subject.

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In this recognition and worship of the essentially substantial, the worshipers are therefore free, are immediately at home. They have their real life in it, and they know it as their own real life. So it is

635. W (1831) reads: an external

636. W (1831) reads: the living, present spirit, actually living in the people, immanent in the individual; this spirit is represented as Pallas, according to its essential [content].

637. W adds in the context of the 1827 lectures a sentence from Ho: The Erinyes is not merely the external Fury that pursues the matricide Orestes but is his own deed; the spirit of matricide brandishes its torch over his head.

638. W (1831) reads: In *Oedipus at Colonus* Oedipus says to his son: Your father's Eumenes [Erinyes] will pursue you.

[Ed.] See Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 1383–1392, although Hegel is here paraphrasing, not quoting. The Erinyes were avenging spirits; in milder form they were known to the Athenians euphemistically as Eumenides (“the kindly ones”).

not a case of their being conscious of something that is beyond their reality or actuality; on the contrary, their religious consciousness is that their own concrete subjectivity is still the essential principle of their real life. In recognizing their essential substance they are free, so the recognition is a serenely free recognition, a veneration of powers that are dear to them because they dwell within them. The universal powers are actualized in deed through subjectivity. This character of freedom in the religious consciousness⁶³⁹ is what constitutes the basic characteristic of this disposition. It is the disposition of freedom, of serenity, of immediate satisfaction in making this recognition.

381 But over and above this disposition of freedom there is another one related to necessity, and the serenity of the former is counter-balanced by the sorrow of the latter. Necessity has its own sphere; it refers only to the particular element in⁶⁴⁰ individuality (insofar as a collision [between it and] the spiritual | power is possible, or insofar as it is subject to contingency and circumstance in its external, present determinate being⁶⁴¹). In their contingent aspect events are affected by necessity and are subject to it. The individuals who raise themselves above the ethical state and seek to carry out something

639. *Ho reads, similar in W*: Eros is thus not merely what is objective, the god, but also inward sensibility. Anacreon describes a contest with Eros: "I also," [he] says, "will now love; for a long time now it was offered me by Eros, but I would not follow. Then Eros attacked me. Armed with breastplate and lance I defended myself. Eros shot all his arrows but then leapt right into my very heart. What use," he concludes, "are bow and arrow to me then? The combat is right within me."^a So in this recognition and worship the subject is simply at home, the gods are the subject's own πάθος. Knowledge of the gods is not knowing them as abstractions beyond actuality, but rather is knowing one's own concrete objective subjectivity, for the gods are also within one. In this way the recognition shows itself to be free. The [divine] powers are well disposed and friendly [toward] human beings, dwell within their breast; and human beings actualize them and know their actuality to be at the same time their own actuality. This breath of serene freedom wafts through the whole world, and [Ed.] ^aSee *Anakreon und Sapphos Lieder nebst anderen lyrischen Gedichten*, ed. and trans. J. F. Degen, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1821), poem 14 ("Auf den Eros"), pp. 36–39. The reference to Eros having "shot all his arrows" (*verschoss sich*) reads "paid no heed" (*verschloss sich*) in *Ho* and *W*₁. We follow *W*₂ since Degen's translation reads, "Already his quiver was empty."

640. *Thus G, D; P adds*: divine

641. *Thus P; G reads*: its particular, circumstantial aspects are subject to contingency

particular on their own account are particularly subject to necessity, and preeminently tragic. The principal personages in Greek tragedies are like this—and for this reason they are also called heroes. They distinguish themselves from their fellow humans by virtue of their own willing. They have an interest transcending the peaceful state represented by the divine authority and government. The others, the chorus, are exempted from this fate; they remain confined within the normal, ethical sphere of life and do not stir up any of the powers in enmity to themselves. Those that belong to the chorus, to the people, are liable to the common lot of mortals, to experience misfortune and the like, to die. They may die in this way or in that, but this is the common lot of mortals, and this universal course that we all run is itself justified. That the individual has his chance misfortunes, that he dies, is part of the order of things.

In Homer⁶⁴² we find Achilles weeping over his early death, and his horses weeping at it too. It was possible for Homer to impute this sort of consciousness to Achilles.⁶⁴³ Nowadays it would be stupid for a writer to do so. It can indeed make a classical Greek, an Achilles, sad, but only momentarily. It is a valid truth for him, it is a fact, but that it is so does not affect the rest of his conduct; he may be sad, but he is not discontented about it. Discontent is a contemporary feeling: it presupposes a purpose that demands something more; and this is a demand that our contemporary caprice holds itself empowered, entitled to make. Where this further purpose is not fulfilled, we tend to be easily discouraged nowadays in regard to all the rest, and have no will to follow our vocation in the other ways | that we could in any case set as our goal; we give up all the rest of our vocation, and set no goal for ourselves at all; in order to have our revenge [for the loss of our destiny in the beyond] we willfully destroy our own vocation and our own courage and energy—we deny the purpose of destiny that we could otherwise still achieve. This then is discontent. But discontent does not enter into

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642. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring to *Iliad* 19.404–424, where Achilles' horse Xanthus foretells his death, bowing its head to the ground and then falling dumb in its distress.

643. W_2 (Var) adds: for the reason that it can alter nothing in what he is or does; the situation is what it is for him, and he too is what he is.

the character of the ancient Greeks; instead there is just sorrow in regard to necessity. The Greeks did not presuppose any purpose as absolute or essential, such that it must be vouchsafed, so their sorrow is a resigned sorrow. It is grief pure and simple, and therefore it has this serenity within it; no absolute purpose is lost to the individual subjects; even in their grief they remain at home, and what has not been fulfilled can be renounced. Things are as they are, so they withdraw into abstraction and do not set their being up against this. What sets the heart at rest about it is nothing other than this abstract unity of the subjective will with what is; the subject is free, though only in an abstract fashion. Such is the character of the religious disposition.

2. The second aspect of the cultus can be described as [*divine*] service or worship [*Dienst, Gottesdienst*]. "This is concerned with the attitude of concrete consciousness to its determinate concrete object; the two are represented as standing or being set against each other, so that"⁶⁴⁴ divine service consists in the reciprocity of giving and receiving. "The divine gives, and the finite receives, the religious disposition being the form of inner mediation, of inner relatedness. The externals of worship are what mediates the external relatedness. There are several points that can be distinguished in this connection.

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(a) First it is clear that if the divine and human | stand over against each other and are to be united, they must come nearer to each other and must both let go some of their mutual independence. It is not just the giving on the one side that is posited, but the finite self-consciousness must also let go, surrender part of its particularity. It is precisely this independence, the form of being parted from each other, that separates them, and they must accordingly modify their

644. *W₂ (Misc P) reads*: If subjectivity has consciously to make itself identical with the divine that stands over against it, then both sides must give up some of their determinateness: God descends from his heavenly throne and offers himself up, while humanity, receiving the gift, must negate the subjective self-consciousness, i.e., recognize the deity, or receive the gift with recognition of the essentiality that is in it.

[*Ed.*] The reference to "God descending from his heavenly throne" is an echo of Schiller's poem "Das Reich der Schatten" in *Die Horen*, vol. 1, no. 9 (Tübingen, 1795), where it is in fact presented as a consequence rather than, as here, the counterpart of humanity's free and unreserved recognition of divinity. Cf. Friedrich Schiller, *Werke: Nationalausgabe*, vol. 1 (Weimar, 1943), p. 250.

mode of existence.⁶⁴⁵ Their original external relationship is that the god, as we here have him, has a natural element within himself, and inasmuch as he stands over against the subjective consciousness as independent, his determinate being is some external, natural appearance. The cultus is not the stage where the representation of the god is *produced*; on the contrary, in cultus the immediate self-consciousness [of the community] is that the members come and go, just as they are, and over against them there appears this god. He has a natural element within himself, and he appears to them just as they immediately are, appearing in a natural way, in the naturally determinate mode—one god appearing more often, another less. This first relationship can thus be comprehended as one between human beings and the gods of nature. So in this relationship divine service is on the one hand the recognition that these natural things have an inherent essence, that they are an essential idea of nature or natural determination that does not depend on human subjects; and hence it is the recognition of their essentiality as distinctive, abiding powers. On the other hand, in that they appear, these natural powers⁶⁴⁶ offer themselves up, sacrifice themselves. The god is this sacrifice of himself, delivering himself up to finite consciousness and allowing it to take possession of him; he sacrifices himself, and what the human worshipers have to do then is to take possession of this sacrifice, while at the same time recognizing the essentiality that is in it.

At the extreme of externality we have sacrifice in general, where the sacrifice is not yet propitiatory. Among the Greeks eating, drinking, and feasting were called sacrifice, and a sacrifice meant nothing more. They ate and drank bread and wine as Ceres and Bacchus; | this Ceres is a spiritual as well as a natural power. These natural powers are recognized, but here Ceres and Bacchus offer themselves up to be consumed by humans. They sacrifice themselves, and their essentiality is recognized as they do so. This recognition of their universality finds expression in the fact that the worshipers

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645. *W₂ (MiscP) reads*: Each side lets go some of the particularity that separates them from each other.

646. *Thus D; P reads*: these natural powers appear, *G reads*: [is] this natural power in which the gods appear,

do not consume everything but pour a few drops of wine from the beaker or a little meal out onto the ground, and burn what they cannot use—the front hairs, the entrails, the fat. They wrap the meat with fat and burn it away, just as cooks do nowadays when they pour fat over a roast.

(b) In this way the gods offer themselves up, and the cultus consists in the enjoyment of assimilating them while at the same time recognizing their power, for the gods still maintain their power.⁶⁴⁷ Next there is the subject's attitude to the gods on their spiritual side. Here again the subject's attitude is one of assimilating on the one hand, of making the god present within and through oneself, causing him to appear in oneself, i.e., in the subject. On the other hand the god, as the conscious subjectivity of the divine, also remains something otherworldly, and the attitude of the human consciousness is that of a mere recipient who has come to the god [for help]. So there is this second aspect, the attitude to the gods as the spiritual and ethical powers generally. Admittedly "service" is not the right word in this context; for at this level in particular there is no service, no servitude. As addressed to these substantive, essentially ethical, spiritual powers, cultus once more consists in recognizing these essentialities of the spiritual and natural world and making them accessible to representation in eulogies, festivals, triumphs, plays, dramas, songs, and so forth—which is how *art* comes in. In this way these deities are properly worshiped—especially in the games and festivals named after them. That is how they are honored. For to have a lofty image or notion of someone and make this notion visible, make it
385 apparent through the way one behaves, *is* to honor that person. |

What the community⁶⁴⁸ has to bear witness to, therefore, is the pictorial representation and recognition of the gods in such a way as to make it appear in the community itself. The subjective consciousness causes this representation of the divine to appear in itself by honoring the divine in⁶⁴⁹ festivals, odes, and so on; it has the cultus in itself. In other words, in its [religious] festivals humanity shows its excellence, displays its best side, the best that it can make

647. *Thus G*

648. *W (HgG/Ed?) reads: the people*

649. *W (HgG/Ed?) adds: artistic productions, in*

of itself. This includes self-adornment: costly jewels and ornaments, apparel and adornment, dancing, singing, and combats, all have a part to play in showing honor to the gods. "For this we exhibit our mental and physical agility and our riches; to honor God humanity displays itself, and derives enjoyment from the way God thus appears in the individual."⁶⁵⁰ This is still the case today, when people on feast days let their wealth, their fine clothes, and their talents be seen. "In a word, the people cause their representation of the gods to appear in them through their own acts by presenting themselves in their outstanding achievements and thus declaring their recognition of the gods."⁶⁵¹ Reference can here be made to the high honors paid to the victors in the Olympic Games; they were the most honored of the people, and at the great festivals they sat beside the archons, and it even happened that in their lifetime they were honored as gods, because through the ability they had shown they had brought the divine into appearance in themselves. In this way individuals make the divine appear in themselves. In their practical activity they honor the gods, act as ethical beings; for the will of the gods consists in the ethical commandments. In practical life they *actualize* the divine. "When they held her pageant on the feast of Pallas, the people of Athens were the presence of Athena, the spirit of the people; the people of Athens are the living spirit, displaying in itself all the skill and dexterity, all the deeds of Athena (Minerva)."⁶⁵² But while | individuals thus honor God in themselves on the practical plane, it is a different matter on the theoretical plane, or in regard to consciousness.

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In this way human beings can make this divinity their own; the presence of the divine may "cause them joy,"⁶⁵³ but behind this there remains an otherworldly aspect of divinity. This lies in the sphere of contingency, within the bounds of what limits them, what befalls them, what they can resolve or decide; here they are incapable of attaining for themselves substantive knowledge. On a practical level they are capable of bringing forth the god in themselves, but

650. *Thus G*

651. *Thus G*

652. *Thus G*

653. *W₁ (Ed) reads: inspire them,*

knowledge as divine stands over against them.⁶⁵⁴ Inside this [human] sphere, knowledge is contingent: this contingent knowledge does not relate to the ethical, the truly substantive, to our duties in respect of fatherland, state, and suchlike—such things the people *know*, they know what the laws of their state or fatherland are—but they do not and cannot know the contingent facts.⁶⁵⁵ There is, however, a need to know such matters, and this need is involved in the level of self-consciousness that we are here considering. It is a common experience that people would very much like to know how this or that undertaking will turn out. At this level of self-consciousness “this is definitely an essential need,”⁶⁵⁶ for self-consciousness is still free individuality here—it is not yet the inwardly infinite subjectivity that trusts itself to take the final decision in regard to what is external; it is not yet the kind of subjectivity that knows an absolute, moral justification within itself; it is only the free subjectivity of infinite | self-consciousness. So it takes this or that decision, acts, and leaves the rest to God. At a deeper level, self-consciousness has the inward force and authority to take the decision by itself. But at this stage the objectivity of self-consciousness is not this infinite inner certainty; for self-consciousness to attain such certainty a higher justification is required, one that is more full of content, namely the belief in providence, or in the absolute wisdom and goodness [of God], for which even the individual self-consciousness as such is a purpose. Inasmuch as the individual has not yet inwardly grasped at this stage that its freedom is infinite, this subjectivity, this final moment of decision, is for it something that lies outside the subject.

(c) This is the third aspect of cultus, namely oracles; [these are] altogether essential in this sphere. The final choice, the final resolve,

654. *Precedes in W₂ (MiscP)*: I can, to be sure, decide in the light of the circumstances I know; but apart from these ones I know, there may also be other circumstances, through which the realization of my purpose is brought to naught. So with these actions I am in the world of contingency.

655. *W₂ (MiscP) adds*: To this extent the decision can accordingly be nothing firm, nothing inwardly grounded; on the contrary, in deciding, I know at the same time that I depend on something else, something unknown. But since the moment of infinite subjectivity is not present either in the divine or in the individual,

656. *Thus P; G reads*: this need has an essential place, *W₁ (Ed) reads*: this need exerts an essential influence,

today to fight a battle, to set off on a journey or to marry, is something that self-consciousness at this level does not yet muster up from within itself; for deciding is just this arbitrary willing and resolving on the part of the individual. But as this individual it does not yet have the [higher] value or justification we have just mentioned; it is not yet posited in itself as infinite subjectivity. This is a point that it is essentially necessary to bear in mind about the freedom of the Greeks. An individual who wishes to marry or engage in some undertaking consults the oracle for advice; but even a general or the state itself as a whole gets the ultimate decision from outside himself or itself, so that some external phenomenon is required to determine his or its course of action. This external phenomenon is a sound, a note ringing out or a voice; but the oracles gave no articulate answer. There was an ancient saying that the voices of the demons (αἱ φωναὶ τῶν δαιμόνων) are inarticulate.⁶⁵⁷ And the oracles too were an indeterminate tone or something of the sort, especially the rustling of leaves, springs, and so on. In Dodona it took three forms: the sound produced by the movement of the leaves of the sacred oak; the murmuring of a spring; and the noise made by a bronze cask under the action of the wind; opposite the cask hung a switch that struck against it when the wind blew.⁶⁵⁸ In Delphi, too,⁶⁵⁹ it was the wind that issued from a ravine, and the noise it set up on the bronze tripod played a principal role. It was only later that vapors had to be used as a means of inspiring the Pythia; and then in her ravings she uttered disconnected, inarticulate words, which then had to be interpreted by the prophet. The prophet also interpreted dreams. In this way the attitude of consciousness was purely receptive. In [Trophonius's cave]

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657. [Ed.] Nonnos, *Ad S. Gregorii orationem contra Julianum* 2.22, quoted by Goethe on the back of the title page to vol. 2 of *Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt, besonders zur Morphologie* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1823).

658. *W₂ (Var)* reads: against which the wind blew bronze switches. *Ho* reads: when the wind set in motion a switch in which was held a bronze statue.

[Ed.] See Etienne Clavier, *Mémoire sur les oracles des anciens* (Paris, 1818), pp. 31, 35.

659. *Ho*, *W* read: In Delos, too, the laurel tree rustled, while in Delphi

[Ed.] Clavier, *Mémoire*, pp. 73–75.

it was faces that the questioner saw.⁶⁶⁰ In Achaëa, according to Pausanias,⁶⁶¹ there was a statue of [Mercury] set up in the market; one burnt incense and whispered a question into the god's ear, then ran from the market clapping one's hands over one's ears; the first word one heard after taking one's hands away was the answer, which was then made to cohere intelligibly with the question through an interpretation. Among the other merely external methods of this kind we can include inspecting the entrails of sacrificial animals, interpreting the flight of birds, and so on. Sacrificial animals were slaughtered until one had external, objective justification⁶⁶²—a decision for something external, this external [phenomenon], some utterance or other. "With oracles there were two things that counted; on the one hand the decision was through the external phenomenon, and on the other it was through⁶⁶³ the interpretation. From this point of view the attitude of consciousness is purely receptive,⁶⁶⁴ in the same way that in the phase discussed previously it caused the gods to appear in itself."⁶⁶⁵ ⁶⁶⁶ |

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660. *W* (following *Ho*) adds: and that were interpreted to him. *Ho* reads: faces that were interpreted.

[*Ed.*] Clavier, *Mémoire*, pp. 143–144.

661. [*Ed.*] Clavier, *Mémoire*, p. 6.

662. [*Ed.*] See Karl Philipp Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791), p. 353.

663. *W* (*Ed*) reads: two moments yielded the decision—the external phenomenon and

664. *W*₂ (*Var*) adds: while on the other side, as interpreting, it is inherently active, for the external phenomenon in itself is indeterminate.

665. *Thus G*

666. *Ho* adds, *similar in W*: But as a concrete expression of the god, these oracles are ambiguous. Human beings act according to them in extracting for themselves [just] one side. Then the other side comes on the scene in opposition. Those who consult them thus have a collision [with the oracle] and are now accountable to themselves. In consulting oracles human beings posit themselves as unknowing, but the god as knowing. Unknowing, they wait on what the knowing god has to say. Thus they are not knowledge, but ignorance, of the manifest. They do not act knowingly in accord with the revelation of the god, who, as universal, does not [have] determinacy within himself and so must be ambiguous in [regard to] the determinate possibility of the two sides. If the oracle says, "Go there, and the enemy will be conquered,"^a then both opposing sides are "the enemy" [for each other]. This revelation, as divine, is universal, and must be universal; human beings, as unknowing, interpret it and act according to it. What they do is their own deed, hence they know themselves to be accountable. A flight of birds or rustling of leaves in oak trees is

3. The third defining characteristic of the service of God or worship is something much more serious. The first was the disposition [of the worshipers], the second was the cultus [“as service”⁶⁶⁷], the concrete relationship, into which, however, negativity as such, an independent relationship of the two sides, has not yet entered. The third aspect is the earnest inward service of God, more precisely the service that involves *reconciliation*. Here the aim is that the divine should be realized inwardly, in the soul, in the subject. The presupposition is that the soul is independent vis-à-vis the divine, negatively determined in contrast with it, and [hence] estranged from it. Their union cannot come about in an immediate way, as it did in the previous phase. It requires ■ mediation in which something essential must be given up—something which in other contexts counts as settled and independent. This negative element that has to be sacrificed in order to overcome the estrangement, the gulf between the two sides, can be regarded in two ways. First, the soul, in its virgin naturalness, is already something negative as opposed to spirit. The second negative is then something positively negative, some misfortune—and especially a moral misfortune or a transgression, for a transgression or crime [is] the highest misfortune, the ultimate estrangement of the subjective self-consciousness from the divine.

As regards the first negative, the natural soul is not the way that it ought to be, for it ought to be free spirit; the soul becomes spirit only by sublating the natural will and appetite in general. This sublating, this subjecting of oneself to the | ethical and, what is more, becoming habituated to so doing, so that the ethical or spiritual becomes the individual’s second nature, all this is the task of education and of cultural formation. But this elevation or reconstruction of human nature must enter consciousness at this level, so as to be recognized as a necessary change of direction; for our present stand-

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a universal sign. To a specific question the god, as universal, gives a universal answer, for only the universal, not the individual as such, is the divine purpose. But the universal is [W: indeterminate and] ambiguous, for it contains both sides.

[Ed.] ⁴Hegel is probably alluding to the Delphic oracle’s utterance to the effect that if Croesus attacked the Persians he would “destroy a great kingdom.” See Herodotus, *Histories* 1.53.

667. Thus W (Ed)

point is that of self-conscious freedom generally. If this process of cultural formation and this change of direction are represented as essential aspects and as essentially living, then we have the pictorial image of a path that the soul has to travel—and in consequence it is an instituted “necessity that the soul must travel this path, both concretely, substantively, in [outer] life, and abstractly in its own inwardness. This involves, for one thing, the intuiting of the path.”⁶⁶⁸ The soul must traverse the path by intuition, it must be seized by this intuition, renounce its natural state, and rise out of this negation. This then is what the mysteries “of ancient times were about. Their content was that this path, this reorientation, this death [of nature] is something spiritual, something necessary.”⁶⁶⁹ In the words of Clement of Alexandria, “these mysteries are full of battles of the gods, the deeds of the gods, their being buried but also their rising again,”⁶⁷⁰ “Out of them the soul grew into the certainty of its unity with the deity.”⁶⁷¹ |

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As a natural soul a human being is not spirit, is not what he ought to be, any more than God, viewed as Father, is as he ought to be. It is only through the conversion [of life] that natural humanity becomes spirit; the intuition of such conversion was, of course, the object of the mysteries; and in personally experiencing this intuition, surrendering to it, the subject “passed through the terror, the fear

668. *W*₂ (1831/*MiscP?*) reads: arrangement in which the intuition of this path is given to it. But if this process of turning about, negating oneself, and dying away is to be set forth for intuition as absolute and essential, it must be envisaged in the divine objects themselves. And help in this direction is in fact afforded by a process that has operated as follows in regard to the way the world of the gods was envisaged.

669. *Ho*, *W* read: were about—[they were] portrayals of the necessity of this process of spirit.

670. *Thus P with G; G reads*: the mysteries are a people of living gods, the gods die, are buried, and rise again. *Ho reads*: “the death, burial, and resurrection of the gods was presented in the mysteries.”

[*Ed.*] Hegel is probably referring here to Clement’s *Protrepticus* 2.19.2: “And this, let it be said once and for all, is what all mysteries are concerned with, with death and burial.” It should, however, be noted that Clement does not speak here of “rising again”; above all, the sentence quoted occurs in the context of his sharp criticism of the mysteries, not of their interpretation as an intuition of the soul’s unity with God.

671. *Ho reads, similar in W*₁: What is displayed is what spirit is as such, and in this way the soul, in purifying itself as spirit, grew into unity with God.

from which its natural essence retreated,⁶⁷² and through which the freedom of spirit itself comes about.

These mysteries were secret but nonetheless familiar; all citizens of Athens were initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. They were secret and mystical in another sense—just as the public teachings of Christianity have been called mysteries even though they revealed the Godhead. The mystical is the speculative, what lies within. So these teachings were secret, but as we have said, this meant no more than that they could not be made the object of idle chatter, of reflection, or of arbitrary phantasy; they were not to be interpreted in terms of contingency or change.⁶⁷³ [They had to] be something

672. *G reads*: passed through the terror, the fear into which its natural essence retreated, *P reads*: thus [the soul] passed through these terrors [from which] in [its] natural essence it retreated,

673. *Ho, W₁ add*: The Greek spirit as such comes from the Orient, and represents to itself in the mysteries the path it has had to traverse. In them it posits to itself its becoming.

W₁ (1831) continues: We must not believe that behind the mysteries deep secrets lay hidden, implying that the priests were cheats and themselves knew something better—this was an opinion for which Voltaire and other French writers^a have been particularly responsible. But in the first place, a people cannot be lied to and cheated in its religious faith, for the religious, eternal truth resides in the spirit; moreover, the priests themselves are not in advance of the spirit of the people. In one of his tragedies Aeschylus is supposed to have betrayed something of the mysteries, namely that Ceres is the daughter of Diana,^b but no particular weight is to be attached to a mystery of this kind. The little that has come down to us about the mysteries is best contained in the compilations of the French writers Sainte-Croix and Silvestre de Sacy.^c In any event it seems that ancient notions were preserved in the mysteries, and human beings are often most reverential toward what they do not understand. These notions, however, do *not* belong to the higher sphere of Greek clarity, but are images of phantasy that have not yet developed to perfection.

In the Eleusinian mysteries it was mainly figurative portrayals that were presented, such as the soul's introduction to an essentiality that lies more remote from it, or the representation of a path that the soul has to traverse—portrayals based on the call to discard the natural state, the presentation of the purification of the soul and its acceptance into a high mystical essence. This seems to have been the main content of the mysteries, to which also attaches the notion of the immortality of the soul. Socrates was said by the oracle to be the wisest of all the Greeks;^d to him can be traced the complete reorientation [*W₂*: what was in fact a complete reorientation] of self-consciousness among the Greeks. Yet this pivotal figure [in the development] of self-consciousness was not himself initiated into the mysteries, which were at a much lower level than what he brought to the consciousness of the thinking world. [*The*

392 unchanging, untouchable. | If the Greeks had spoken of them, they would have done so only in myths.⁶⁷⁴ But the content is precisely not a matter for reflection, for the understanding, and so not for phantasy either. Another point that is logically connected with this one is that the content of these mysteries evidently consisted in representations and traditions derived from the old nature religions, whether Pelasgian, Hindu, Egyptian, or other. Representations of this kind are symbolic; that is to say, their meaning is not the same as what they portray externally. The Greek gods are not symbolic: they have no meaning other than what they show; they are what they portray, in the same way as the concept of a work of art is to express what is meant, not that what lies within should differ from the exterior.

Even if the Greek gods originated from ancient symbolic elements

last two sentences also in *W₂*, preceded by: This was also the reason why the mysteries could not endow the self-consciousness of the Greeks with genuine reconciliation.]

[Ed.] ^aVoltaire's criticism of priests is directed primarily against their worldly power, although on occasion he also accuses them of deceiving the people; see, e.g., *Dictionnaire philosophique*, vol. 6, s.v. "Pierre, Saint," "Prêtres," "Superstition." By "other French writers" Hegel probably has in mind especially Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach, *Le christianisme dévoilé* (London, 1756), esp. chap. 15; and *Théologie portative; ou, Dictionnaire abrégé de la religion chrétienne* (London, 1768), s.v. "Sacerdoce," "Sacrilège." See also Vol. 1:383 n. 47.

^bHegel is probably following the interpretation of C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus; sive, De theologiae mysticae Graecorum causis libri tres*, 2 vols. (Königsberg, 1829), 1:76–85, who suggested that what Aeschylus discloses is that Diana, daughter of Proserpine, is really the mother of Ceres (Demeter); but the terms in which Hegel presents it involve a confusion of Proserpine and Demeter, resulting from the combination of reports by Herodotus and Cicero.

^cHegel was probably acquainted only with the second, enlarged edition of the work of Baron de Sainte-Croix, *Recherches historiques et critiques sur les mystères du Paganisme*, rev. Silvestre de Sacy (Paris, 1817).

^dThe Delphic oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of the Greeks; see Plato, *Apology* 20e–21a, and Xenophon, *Apology of Socrates* 14. That Socrates was not initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries was reported by Lucian of Samosata, *Demonax* 11.

674. *W₂* (*MiscP*) reads: But these intuitions were not mystical in the sense that the public teachings of Christianity have been called mysteries. For in the latter case the mystical is the speculative, what lies within. The main reason why the intuitions afforded by the Greek mysteries had to remain secret was that the Greeks would not have been able to speak of them except in myths, i.e., without altering what was old.

of this kind, what the poets and other artists made of them was the work of art, which perfectly expresses what it is meant to be. There have been many investigations—that of Creuzer particularly—into the historic origin of the Greek gods and their underlying significance.⁶⁷⁵ | But where the god is the object of art, only a good work of art portrays him.⁶⁷⁶ In Egyptian religion this is secret; there is an inner element, a symbol.⁶⁷⁷ Osiris is a symbol of the sun, just as Hercules is (his twelve labors relate to the months).⁶⁷⁸ To the extent that Hercules is a symbol of the sun, [like] Osiris, he exists in another way, a symbolic way. He is a calendrical deity and not what he is as a work of art, i.e., no longer the Greek god of classical times. Thus the content of the mysteries was essentially symbolic in nature, primarily Ceres (Demeter), Bacchus, and the secrets attaching to them; in the same way as Ceres, ⁶⁷⁹ who goes in search of her lost daughter, [is] the harvest corn delivered over to the underworld—or, in prosaic terms, the seed that must die in order to preserve and bring to life what lies implicit in it—so the process of the seed [being buried] into the earth and then sprouting is itself something symbolic, for this process also has the higher meaning of resurrection, as it does in the Christian religion. In other words,

675. [Ed.] See Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie*. Hegel accepted in particular Creuzer's interpretation of the origin of Apollo. In 1827 he was to take issue with K. O. Müller, who, in his *Geschichten hellenischer Stämme und Städte* (Breslau, 1824), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 284, 287–288, argued against any original identity of Apollo and the sun. See also below, n. 678.

676. W₂ (Var) adds: as what he is.

677. W (following Ho) adds: because the shape does not reveal the indwelling significance but is only supposed to reveal it. Ho reads: The Egyptian gods, nevertheless, have a secret element, precisely because their shape . . . it.

678. [Ed.] In equating the labors of Heracles with the months of the year, Hegel is again following Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 2:248–249, although the same interpretation had also been advanced by Dupuis (see above, n. 607). It should be noted that Hegel distinguishes this—symbolic—deity from “the Greek god of classical times,” and in so doing diverges from Creuzer's view. His divergence from Creuzer is summed up in his assertion at the end of the previous paragraph that “the Greek gods are not symbolic.” On the problem of the symbolic, see also Gottfried Herrmann and Friedrich Creuzer, *Briefe über Homer und Hesiodus* (Heidelberg, 1818). Hegel's position is analogous to the one taken by Herrmann against Creuzer; it is also closer to the position of Johann Heinrich Voss than to that of Creuzer.

679. Thus W₂; G reads: Ceres

we can take it in the spiritual sense.⁶⁸⁰ The sense of the symbol alternates: sometimes the content denotes a notion or process, at other times what is denoted itself symbolizes another meaning. For example, Osiris is the Nile, which is dried up by the sun and the scorching wind (Typhon) but then is created anew; but he also symbolizes the sun, a natural power that gives life to all. Lastly, however, Osiris is also a spiritual figure, and then the Nile itself and the daily rebirth of the sun in turn symbolize the spiritual realm. The content of the mysteries is symbolic portrayals of this kind, where old natural powers were represented [in] a process to which the necessary movement of the spirit also corresponds. Such symbols
 394 | are naturally secret: the inward [meaning] is still unclear—it is there at first as a sense or significance that has not yet achieved a genuine portrayal.⁶⁸¹ This is the first form of reconciliation.

The second form of reconciliation, the other negative, can be defined as misfortune in general, as sickness, famine, and other adversities. This negative is what was explained by the prophets and put in the context of a relationship of guilt: some offense had been committed. A negative of this kind first becomes apparent on the physical plane, in external events such as sickness or famine. Agamemnon⁶⁸² was held back by unfavorable winds, and this physical state was viewed and explained as something having a spiritual connection, i.e., as involving a misfortune—the gods' anger or obduracy toward humanity—resulting from some offense. Thunder and lightning, earthquakes, the appearance of snakes, and so forth were explained as a negative factor of this kind, implicitly [ethical] and pertaining to a higher, spiritual, ethical power. In this case the offense that had occurred was to be sublated by a sacrifice, [the belief being] that any transgression can be made good in this way. Whoever, by transgressing, has acted presumptuously accepts a personal loss; for every offense is an act of presumption, an offense against a higher spiritual power to which humility then has to

680. *W₂ (Var) reads:* in the sense that it applies to spirit, whose implicit potential can first bear fruit through the sublation of the natural will.

681. *Ho, W add:* The shape does not fully express the content, so that it remains lying partly unexpressed without emerging into existence.

682. [*Ed.*] See Euripides, *Iphigenia in Aulis* 87–92.

sacrifice something in order to propitiate it.⁶⁸³ Among the Greeks it seems to have been rather a relic from the past ~that Agamemnon performs a rite of human sacrifice in order to obtain a favorable wind when he sacrifices his daughter.⁶⁸⁴ | ~A human sacrifice also occurs in Sophocles,⁶⁸⁵ but later this sort of thing no longer seems to occur. Thucydides says nothing of sacrifices or ceremonies to propitiate the gods during the famous plague in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War. He speaks⁶⁸⁶ only of a prediction that the plague will cease—~a prediction that⁶⁸⁷ in fact implies the obsolete character of such sacrifices ~and of all such ways of winning the gods to one's side.⁶⁸⁸ Thus the outcome of the plague was regarded as something that *had* to happen, as a matter of necessity or fate, where there could be no more question of reconciliation. It was regarded as something inevitable.

The third form of reconciliation is that the negative is an actual crime, and is regarded and spoken of as such, not as something which one first uncovers by having an external misfortune explained. So an individual, or else the state and its people, has committed a crime;

683. *W*₂ (following *Ho*) adds: and restore symmetry. *Ho* reads: In order to restore symmetry, an act of presumption must be followed by the humility of giving up [something].

684. *Ho*, *W* read: When the Greeks wanted to set sail from Aulis and were held back by unfavorable winds, Calchas declared the storm to be the wrath of Poseidon, who was demanding Agamemnon's daughter as sacrifice. Agamemnon is prepared to give her up to the god, but she is saved by Diana.

[*Ed.*] See n. 682.

685. *Ho* reads: We find them [human sacrifices] in the case of Oedipus and in that of Agamemnon, *W*₂ (1831) reads: In the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles a sickness is inflicted through which the patricide's deed is laid bare.

[*Ed.*] As there are no other references to human sacrifice in Sophocles, the text as given by *W*₂ probably affords the key to the cryptic references in the main text and that transmitted by *Ho*. However, this interpretation could have been provided by one of the sources or by the editor. On the sickness in Thebes, see Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, esp. 1–77.

686. [*Ed.*] See Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 2.54. Neither here nor in 2.47, where Thucydides speaks of the outbreak of the plague, does he in fact refer to its cessation; the prediction was only that it would inevitably follow the outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta.

687. *Ho*, *W* read: and this recourse to oracles

688. *Ho* reads, similar in *W*: If in fact advice is sought from the oracles, this means that the outcome of the plague is regarded as determined by God himself, as necessary.

in human terms punishment is atonement for the crime, in the form of⁶⁸⁹ revenge. But here free spirit has the self-consciousness of its majesty, [i.e., its power] to undo *inwardly* what has happened. The external [form of] pardon and so on is something different. But that free spirit should be able to undo in itself what has happened, this is the higher prerogative of free self-consciousness. Where evil as such has its abode—not merely as a deed but as a fixture—is actually in the sinful soul. But the free soul is capable of cleansing itself inwardly from such evil. These pointers to a complete inward reorientation are to be found in the Greek portrayal [of reconciliation], though the character of reconciliation here is more that of external purification. But among the Greeks this external form also appears to be something handed down from the past. From Athens a few
 396 such purifications are known to us. | “One of Minos’s sons came freely to Athens”⁶⁹⁰ and was there murdered; and because of this crime, purification was undertaken.⁶⁹¹ Later an “ambassador”⁶⁹² of Epimenides by the name of Chilon was also murdered, whereupon a youth called Cratinus offered himself for sacrifice in order to purify the city.⁶⁹³ Aeschylus recounts how Orestes was pursued by the Furies, and then absolved by the Areopagus, thanks to the voting

689. W_2 (following *Ho*) adds: punishment or, more brutally, *Ho* reads: The human way of atonement for crime is punishment or, more brutally, revenge.

690. *Ho* reads: When Theseus came to Athens with Androgeos

691. [Ed.] See Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 4.60–61. The “purification”—whereby the drought and famine inflicted on Athens as punishment for the crime were to be lifted—consisted in doing whatever Minos demanded; and this was of course that seven youths and seven maidens should be sent to his court every nine years for the Minotaur to feed upon.

692. *Thus G; P* reads: δοκῆτες

[Ed.] This word, which occurs in comparatively clear script in *P*, is not given even in the *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae*; it could be a mishearing for δοκιμαστής, “investigator,” which might possibly fit the context.

693. [Ed.] This sentence, based essentially on *G* and confirmed by *P*, confuses the story of Minos’s son Androgeos (see preceding sentence) and the story of the treacherous massacre of Cylon and his followers after their unsuccessful revolt and surrender. In the latter connection, following Sainte-Croix, *Recherches historiques et critiques sur les mystères du paganisme* 1:276, Hegel merges two different accounts of the purification of Athens—by Epimenides and by the sacrifice of Cratinus and Ctesebius. Neither account corresponds to that given by Thucydides in *Peloponnesian War* 1.126.

pebble of Athena.⁶⁹⁴ Here the reconciliation appears as an external event, not as an inner conversion. But the kind of complete inward reorientation that foreshadows the Christian conception is represented in *Oedipus at Colonus*,⁶⁹⁵ where the aged Oedipus, after killing his father, marrying his mother and having children by her, and then being driven from the city by his sons, "has a clear inner vision and hears a voice from the gods calling him to come."⁶⁹⁶ This sounds more like a pure reconciliation of spirit, like a reception into grace so to speak, as in the Christian religion.⁶⁹⁷

Other sacrifices belong even more to the external mode, such as the sacrifices Achilles performs on the grave of Patroclus; he slays a number of Trojans so as to propitiate the Manes of Patroclus through the blood of his enemies.⁶⁹⁸ "What is involved is to reestablish the equality of fate on the two sides."⁶⁹⁹

Such are the main characteristics of the religion of beauty.⁷⁰⁰ | 397

694. [Ed.] See Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, esp. 734–741.

695. [Ed.] See Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, esp. 1623–1628, 1658–1664.

696. *Thus P; G reads:* achieves honor among the gods, who call him to them. *Ho reads:* His inner vision becomes clear, as does his eye, and he hears a voice from the gods calling him to the place of his death.

697. *Ho adds:* But Oedipus still retains his character. He rejects Creon's request, and lays his curse on his son.

[Ed.] Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 761–799, 1348–1392.

698. [Ed.] See Homer, *Iliad* 1.26–28, 23.173–176.

699. *Ho reads:* Crime as such is injury to the gods; to establish this [reconciliation] involves recognizing the injury and extinguishing it through purification.

700. *As a transition from the religion of expediency to the Christian religion, W contains the following passage, which in the 1831 lectures formed the transition from the religion of beauty to the religion of expediency:* [W₁: We have considered Olympus, this heaven of the gods, a circle of the fairest figures ever to have been conceived by phantasy. The circle composed of these fair essences has W₂: Olympus, this heaven of the fairest figures ever to have been conceived by phantasy, had] shown itself to us at the same time as free ethical life, as free but still limited folk-spirit. Greek life is fragmented into numerous small [city] states, [W₁: ethical life is limited to W₂: into] these stars that are themselves only limited points of light. [W₁: Free spirituality can be attained only if this limitedness is sublated and the fate that hovers remotely over the Greek world of gods makes its influence felt on Greek civil life, so that W₂: In order for free spirituality to be attained, this limitedness must be sublated and the fate that hovers remotely over the Greek world of gods and folk life must make its influence felt on them, so that the spirits of] these free people collapse. Free spirit must grasp itself as pure spirit in and for itself; its value no longer consists in

3. The Religion of Expediency (Roman Religion)⁷⁰¹

In the religion of beauty we have observed two aspects: abstract, empty necessity and, quite apart from this, the particular powers in the realm of right and of ethical life, "the universal substantialities."⁷⁰² Furthermore, these particular powers are not abstractions but individual spirits or deities; and as individual deities they are particular folk-spirits such as Athena for Athens or Bacchus for Thebes; and also family deities. At the same time they are communicable, they have within them at the same time the character

its being merely the free spirit of the Greeks, of the citizens of this or that state, but humanity must be known freely as humanity, and God is the God of all humanity, the comprehensive, universal spirit. Now this fate [W_1 : is what holds particular freedom in check. By this means it is brought about that one of the folk-spirits attains the level of a universal power, the fate (that hangs) over the others. W_2 : which is what holds particular freedoms in check,] and suppresses the limited folk-spirits, so that [W_1 : they W_2 : the peoples become disloyal to the gods and] become conscious of their weakness and powerlessness, in that their political life is destroyed by [W_1 : a higher W_2 : the one, universal] power. This fate was the Roman world and Roman religion.

701. [Ed.] In the 1824 lectures, the section on Roman religion, as the religion of expediency or *external purposiveness* (*äusserliche Zweckmässigkeit*), is much reduced in size as compared with the lecture *Ms.*, becoming in effect a mere appendix to Sec. B. The lengthy discussion of the teleological proof found at this point in the *Ms.* is moved to the beginning of Sec. B since now Jewish and Greek religion are also considered under the category of purposiveness. In the brief introduction to Roman religion that follows, Hegel argues that the movement is from exclusive purposiveness (the Jewish God is one and almighty but limited to a particular people) to a plurality of purposes (the Greek gods) to a universal purpose, which, in Roman religion, because of its finitude and externality, becomes necessity or fate (*Fatum*). The transcendence and holiness of Jewish religion are lost, as well as the freedom and beauty of Greek religion. Roman religion is the religion of "unfreedom" because human beings become dependent on a host of finite deities that control every facet of life. These deities are abstractions, not spiritual individualities; hence Roman religion does not fit readily under the general category of "The Religions of Spiritual Individuality." In fact, as we have pointed out, in the 1821 and 1827 lectures it is treated as a separate, third moment of *Determinate Religion*. But in 1824, as Hegel's treatment evolved in the course of the lectures, *Determinate Religion* is composed of only two moments, and the triad is completed by *Consummate Religion*. Of course, in 1824 as elsewhere, Roman religion provides a transition to Christian religion by depicting the collapse, as it were, of finite religion in upon itself. For Hegel's major source, see below, n. 719.

702. *Thus P, D; G reads:* and natural powers, the universal, spiritual, ethical substantiality.

of a broader universality, and are thus capable of being communicated, worshiped by other peoples as well. | Accordingly the objects of these gods are particular cities too, particular states, particular purposes, of which there are any number.

The next demand of thought, or necessary development in the concept, is that the abstract necessity should be united with the particularity of the purposes. As fate, necessity is devoid of purpose; [but now] purpose, wisdom, providence, self-determining individuality are to be equated with this power of universal necessity; in other words, the power of universal necessity is to be what wills.

In the first religion of this sphere, the religion of sublimity, we had abstract wisdom, the universal power and wisdom, where the actual content takes the form of a completely single purpose, a quite singular people, one family to the exclusion of others.⁷⁰³ In the second religion of this sphere, the religion of beauty, the multitude of particular powers rest in the lap of the gods and the multitude of particular realities participate in divinity itself. Within divinity the multitude of real folk-spirits find fulfillment and are purposes; there is, so to speak, a divine aristocracy. The third stage is for it to be a *real* purpose that is carried out by the divine power. First, then, there is an exclusive purpose, then many purposes, and these many are now to be extended into a universal purpose; and this one real purpose must itself become necessity, that which is highest. Such is the concept of this third type of religion.

*a. The Concept of Necessity and External Purpose*⁷⁰⁴

What reigns is necessity, fate [*Fatum*], power, and what is initially posited to be identical with it is itself a purpose that is in the first place an empirical, indeed an external purpose (as in the religion of sublimity)—but a purpose that is here raised to the level of an

703. *Ho reads*: the one and only content of the unity was *itself*, so that its real purpose was the absolutely singular purpose (the third purpose is the prophecy of reconciliation, that the head of the serpent shall be trodden under foot [Gen. 3:15]—the proclamation of the Messiah).

704. [*Ed.*] Since the teleological proofs have been considered in detail in the introduction to Sec. B, the present section is quite brief and focuses on the distinctive conceptuality of imperial Roman religion.

399 all-encompassing reality. What makes it empirical is its content; and this next mode of universality—incomplete, abstract universality—is where the empirical purpose is extended to embrace [the whole of] external reality. This purpose thus becomes a universal condition of the world, world dominion, | universal monarchy. This must be clearly⁷⁰⁵ distinguished from the purpose that can also be observed in the Islamic religion; there, too, world dominion is the purpose, but what is to have dominion is the One of thought.⁷⁰⁶ Just as in Christianity it is said that God wills that all should come to “a knowledge”⁷⁰⁷ of the truth, so too in Islam the purpose is universal actualization, but of a spiritual nature, and individuals have their place in it as thinking, spiritual, free individuals; they are present in it, and the whole purpose is focused on them—it is not an external purpose. In this way they take the whole scope of the purpose into themselves. At the present stage, on the other hand, the purpose is still an external, empirical purpose, an all-encompassing purpose but on the plane of empirical reality—i.e., the purpose is a *world dominion*. The inherent purpose is one that is external to the individual, and it becomes ever more so the more that it is realized and externalized, so that the individual is merely subordinated to the purpose, merely *serves* it.

This directly implies the absolute unification of universal power and “singularity in all being,”⁷⁰⁸ but it is, so to speak, a raw unification, one that is devoid of spirit. The power is not wisdom, its reality is not implicitly and explicitly a divine purpose. It is not the one God, whose fulfillment is himself. It is not in the realm of thought that this fulfillment is posited; it is worldly power, mere lordship, worldliness merely as lordship. The power in it [i.e., in the universal empire] is in itself irrational. “At the same time the power

705. *W₂ (Ed/MiscP?) reads:* Just as this category of external purposiveness is distinct from the ethical spirituality of Greek life and from the identity of the divine powers and their external existence, in the same way the purpose comprised by this universal monarchy or dominion must be

706. *W (Ed) adds:* [as] derived from the Jewish religion.

707. *W₂ reads:* consciousness

708. *W₁ (Ed) reads:* universal singularity in all being, *W₂ (Ed) reads:* universal singularity,

of the particular [i.e., of the folk communities] crumbles away⁷⁰⁹ because the particular is not | taken up into it [the universal] rationally. It lies outside the posited unity, it is a content that lacks divinity—it is the egoism of the individual, seeking satisfaction apart from God, ~in particular interests.⁷¹⁰ It lies outside reason; lordship stands cold and egoistic on one side, and the individual equally so on the other. 400

Such is the universal concept of this religion. In it is implicitly posited the demand for the highest—the unification of what is purely self-contained with the purpose pertaining to particularity in its determinacy, but at this stage the unification is just this raw ungodly one [imperial authority].

b. The Configuration of the Gods

The second point to be considered is the configuration of this god [imperial authority] and of the gods. What we have here is a religion of expediency, of a purpose that is not in and for itself the divine, spiritual purpose, so that “purposiveness” here designates conformity to an external purpose generally. In the intuition of the essential, *seriousness* becomes a basic feature as opposed to the cheerful serenity of Greek religion; for what characterizes the content here is an essential purpose. ~In the case of the Greek gods (absolute necessity and the array of particular beautiful divine individuals), the basic characteristic is freedom, and this is what is meant by “serenity” or felicity. The gods are not tied to a singular existence; they are essential powers and are at the same time the expression of irony in regard to what they seek to do. For they attach no importance to the singular, empirical outcome.⁷¹¹ The seriousness that arises from the purpose is a basic feature in regard to Roman religion. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Creuzer, *Symbolik*, volume 2⁷¹²) compares Greek and Roman religion, praising the religious

709. *Thus P; G reads:* The reason why the particular crumbles away in opposition to this power is

710. *Thus G; P reads:* externally singularized purposes.

711. *Thus G*

712. [Ed.] Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 2:992. Creuzer here cites Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Roman Antiquities* 2.18 ff.) in terms very similar to those employed in this and the next sentence.

institutions of Rome and showing what a great advance the Roman religion made over the Greek. The Romans had temples, altars, ceremonies, sacrifices, religious truces, festivals, symbols, and so forth, "just as the Greeks did; but they threw out the myths that depicted the gods with blasphemous features, their mutilations, imprisonments, wars, bargaining, and so on. Yet these features belong to the serene configuration of the gods; they let us take advantage of them, and make fun of them in comedy, but throughout all this they retain their determinate being and their untroubled security. In the serious view of them | the shape or figure, the actions, and the events must all match the principle;"⁷¹³ in free individuality, on the other hand, there are as yet no such fixed purposes or categories of the understanding; the gods contain the ethical, but they are not a one-sided, ethical category of the understanding. Instead they exist at the same time in their determinateness; they do have *one* principal feature in their character, [but] they are many-sided individualities, they are concrete. In this many-sided individuality, what we call seriousness of character is not a necessary constituent; rather, such individuality is free in the singularity of its utterance, it can light-mindedly spin around in all directions, yet remain what it is. "These unworthy-seeming tales hint at general views regarding the nature of things, the creation of the world, and so on, and originate in old traditions and abstract views concerning the action and interaction of the elements. The universal import is obscured but hinted at, and in this disorderly externality one's attention is awakened to the universal or intelligible."⁷¹⁴ On the other hand, in a religion where the determinate purpose is power [i.e., imperial dominion], there is no longer room to attend to all these theoretical viewpoints of the intelligence. "Theogonies and so on of this kind and what they have given rise to,"⁷¹⁵ along with all such universal concerns, are not to be found in the religion of expediency.

713. *Thus G*

714. *Thus G*

715. *Thus P; G reads: Theories, Ho reads: This theogony also disappears at this stage.*

The second point [after seriousness] is that the deity now has a determinate content, which is declared to be the lordship of the world. This is an empirical universality, not ethical or spiritual but a *real*⁷¹⁶ universality that is not spiritual as in the Christian and Islamic religions. The god is here the ruling power, the world-dominating power, and it has its reality in this people, which is inspired and filled by this god. Its dominion is only an abstract one, a cold dominion that is just power as such. This then is the Roman religion, and its characteristics are evident to us in its spirit. This dominion, this dominating authority, is none other than the city of Rome itself, and the lordship consists in | necessity or fortune. There was in Rome a temple dedicated to Fortuna Publica. This divine ruler also takes the shape of Jupiter, but with a different meaning than Zeus—he is essentially Jupiter Capitolinus. Zeus is lord of all the gods and of mortals generally, but this Jupiter Capitolinus is the real lord of existing human beings; i.e., he is the ruler in a real sense. This is the general basic characteristic, to which all else is subordinate.

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In the second place [we should notice] that the particular powers also emerge. As we have already seen, it is the *abstract* lordship of the Roman state that is divine necessity. The particular or the concrete accordingly lies outside it. The particular aspect is manifest partly in the way the Greek gods appear [in Roman religion], but we do not here meet them in the beauty of their free individuality, not in this unconstrained, serene mode, but all gray as it were, because one either knows not where they come from or else knows that they have arisen in definite situations. They have here no proper sense, and we must carefully distinguish the way in which later writers such as Virgil and Horace took them up in their poetic compositions [from their appearance in Greek poetry]. Virgil seems to have copied the Greek models completely, imitating them slavishly and lifelessly, and so they appear as plagiarisms, more or less devoid

716. [Ed.] The German adjective *real* has the sense of “material” or “empirical” by contrast with *ideal/ideell*, which is “ideal,” “ethical,” “spiritual.” Both the ideal and the real are “actual” (*wirklich*).

of spirit.⁷¹⁷ They give the impression of stage machinery, just as they appear in the second-rate works of modern French dramatists as stuffed figures and mechanical devices.⁷¹⁸ This is why the Roman figures of the gods have appealed more to recent times than the Greek gods, because they come before us more as empty deities of the understanding, they belong to a phantasy that has been degraded and is no longer free, no longer alive. Another kind of particularity, the second type, has a content that belongs wholly to the everyday requirements of life. Apart from, and at a more mundane level than, the universal purpose that we have already considered, lie the particular purposes of individuality, of domesticity, and the requirements of family life; when all this is pictured as something essential, it appears as a god, and as a god who is more concerned with matters of practical utility. Thus everyday requirements, the arts of the understanding, were viewed as something essential, as gods, even though they are concerned with wholly subordinate matters, relating to everyday | life, in which the only religious aspect is the formal one that these purposes have now achieved the empty shape of essentialities. Somewhat better in this sphere are the Lares and Penates, as the spirits of the family. Otherwise it is everyday requirements in general that are what the gods are here concerned with.

We must bear in mind that the state, as the world dominion, is one side; this is the abstract power that presses and weighs upon individuals, consuming and sacrificing them. On the other side, where individuals attain to their subjectivity, to a free consciousness that enjoys itself, we have a simply uncultured state of nature. On the one hand we have the state in all its rigor, on the other an

717. [Ed.] Hegel had already made a similar criticism of Virgil in *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. H. S. Harris and W. Cerf (Albany, 1977), p. 89 (GW 4:12). To judge from the context, on that occasion he had Virgil's *Aeneid* in mind. See also *Aesthetics*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1975), 2:1073–1075 (*Werke* 10/3:369–372); and *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Sibree ed., p. 293; Lasson ed., p. 680.

718. [Ed.] Hegel criticizes French dramatists in almost identical terms in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, without however citing the names of authors or works there either. In the Ms. he does specifically criticize Racine's *Phèdre* for making Hippolytus fall in love with Aricia, thus robbing the drama of ethical content.

uncultured condition. For example, there are in this religion constant references to the age of Saturn and to forms of activity that pertain to such a condition, that relate to such a state of nature. The age of Saturn is a natural life of bliss and happiness. A great many Roman festivals⁷¹⁹ relate to this—the Saturnalia, Lupercalia, rustic, countryside life—and the requirements, arts, and so forth that have a place in this state or condition are therefore essential states, essential purposes that have been exalted to divine status. For instance, the Romans had a large number of fertility and craft festivals and deities, e.g., Jupiter Pistor. Jupiter is, generally speaking, a *nomen appellativum*, and there are three or four hundred uses of the name—Jupiter Stator, Capitolinus, and so on. And the same is true of Juno. Jupiter Pistor is the god of the bakers, for the art of baking was a gift of the god. So they had a goddess Fornax, the goddess of the oven, [identical with] the art of roasting corn in the oven, and a goddess Vesta, who was the particular kind of flame needed for baking bread. They had festivals devoted to pigs, sheep, and cattle as well as⁷²⁰ the Palilia, the festival of the goddess of cattle fodder. In regard to the Roman state also, utilities of this kind were venerated as essential—for example, Juno Moneta, the art of minting being an essential one. Mercury too was qualified in special ways. The political deity was Jupiter Capitolinus, and there was Jupiter Latialis, the protector of Latium, and Jupiter Stator, who stayed the Romans' steps when they were put to flight. The representation of the age of Saturn was particularly | celebrated in the Saturnalia, the festival in which the distinction between rich and poor was done away with.

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There are other deities that form part of this pattern, both harmful

719. [Ed.] The source for most of Hegel's knowledge of Roman festivals and the different appellations of gods and goddesses, as presented in this and the following paragraph, was Karl Philipp Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791). See, for example, on the festivals of Fornax (the Fornicalia) and Pales (the Palilia), pp. 44–45, 103–107; on the Saturnalia, pp. 223–224; on Jupiter Pistor, p. 147; on Jupiter Stator, p. 168; on Jupiter Latialis (Latium was the name of the region around Rome), p. 260; on Juno Moneta, p. 129; on Pax (or Tranquillitas) and on Vacuna, p. 145; on Robigo, p. 109; and on Plague, Febris (Fever), and Angerona (Care and Sorrow), p. 253. Hegel has here greatly condensed his description of the Roman festivals and deities from that found in the lecture *Ms.*, where it continues for several sheets.

720. *Ho reads*: The Ambarvalia and Suovetaurilia are also festivals, as are

powers and also useful powers (or rather situations generally that were grasped in the form of independent gods and goddesses and venerated accordingly). Prosaic contents of this kind, quite devoid of phantasy, are the goddess Pax or Tranquillitas, the goddess "Vacuna or Leisure,"⁷²¹ and also harmful powers like Febris or Fever, Robigo or wheat rust, Plague, and Care and Sorrow. It is hard for us to grasp how such things can be venerated as gods. The content can be anything, provided it appears essential for the common needs; it can be any situation, which is [then] comprehended without phantasy and on its own, all idealization and all living phantasy being excluded. It is consistent with this prosaic situation in regard to power that the Romans later came to worship their emperors too as gods. The emperor was an individual who indubitably constituted a power set over them, weighty and with more actual effects than Febris, Robigo, and so on, capable of bringing about a worse state of affairs than *those* powers.

This is how the divine is given shape [at this stage]. But it should be added that all these configurations are subordinated to the universal, real power; they all give way when they come up against the universal, strictly essential power of domination, the greatness of Rome that extends over the whole known civilized world. Within this universal power the destiny of these particular specializations exalted to divine status is necessarily to be dismissed in this abstract universality, to perish just like the living individual divine spirits; their destiny is to succumb to the yoke of this one abstract lordship. Rome becomes the pantheon in which all the gods of all the peoples are set up side by side, so that they extinguish one another; and they are all subject to the one Jupiter Capitolinus, the one necessity, or to the one Rome and her Fortuna. This shows up in single details of a more empirical nature—for example, in Cicero,⁷²² where we

721. *Ho* reads: Paounia [sic] (having nothing to occupy one),

722. *Ho* adds: (*De natura deorum* 3)

[Ed.] According to *Ho*, Hegel is here referring to book 3 of Cicero's *De natura deorum*, i.e., to the speech of Cotta, presenting the New Academy's criticism of the traditional representation of the gods and especially the use made of it by Stoic theology, but not to the presentation of Epicurean doctrine by Velleius or of Stoic doctrine by Lucilius Balbus. Cicero's lists of numerous Vulcans, Apollos, and Jupiters, referred to below, are found in various chapters of book 3 of this work.

find this type of cold reflection upon the gods. In Cicero, cold reflection is the subjective | authority over all of them. He makes a coherent pattern of their genealogy, of what befalls them, of their doings, and so forth; he lists large numbers of Vulcans, Apollos, and Jupiters and puts them side by side; this is the reflection which, by making comparisons, renders doubtful and imprecise what otherwise has a sharp outline. The information he gives in his treatise *De natura deorum* is exceedingly important in other respects, e.g., in regard to the genesis of myths, but all the same the gods are degraded by this reflection on them, their determinate aspects no longer feature in their portrayal, and disbelief and distrust are aroused. We see the Romans conquering Magna Graecia, Sicily, plundering and destroying the temples and carrying off whole shiploads of gods to Rome. In Rome there is toleration; all the religions come together there and are commingled: the Syrian, Egyptian, Jewish, Christian, Greek, Persian religions, Mithraism—the Romans seize on all of them, and precisely in this fusion what gives each religion its shape, the particularity that pertains to art and phantasy, is lost. And as a further result the search is set under way for something more solid.

c. *The Cultus*

We now have to consider in more detail the different moments of the cultus. The first moment here is the religious disposition. What we have in this religion is *empirical* purposes, the one main purpose being dominion over the world. On the subjective side the pathos here is what has been called Roman virtue, or the Roman disposition. This dominion is all that matters. Everything must be sacrificed to it; all living things, all the distinctive variety of ethical life, must give way to this necessity. The subjective consciousness has value only insofar as it devotes itself and all that it is or has to this, insofar as it concentrates on the salvation of the state. This is the so-called Roman virtue. In it the citizens are free; this it is that constitutes their true will, wherein they find themselves as subjects—that is, quite simply, their disposition. But this disposition is, so to speak, a *political* one; it is not an immediately religious disposition as such (the highest mode of our disposition in regard to actuality). The religious disposition as such means [in Rome] that lordship or the

universal in general is owed to the gods; it belongs to Fortuna, to Juno or Jupiter, to a power that is in and for itself, and which is recognized and venerated in Rome's dominion.

406 The second aspect of the Roman disposition is that apart from this one goal of the lordship of Rome, human beings, as concrete, | have many other purposes, interests, and wishes and, in the case in point, that imagination equates the real worldly purpose with the infinite. The [divine] power is represented as operating purposively, as willing real purposes. So the human disposition is imbued with purposes—empirical purposes, conditional, finite, worldly, external purposes, not purposes that exist in and for themselves. These conditional, external purposes have behind, within them a power that can grant them to this or that person in this or that situation. So we get prayers and invocations addressed to the gods, and expressions of thanks when the purposes are vouchsafed. This religion is consequently one of dependence; the prevailing feeling is one of dependence, of unfreedom.⁷²³ Within the lordship of Rome human beings know themselves to be free, but ~the purpose is one~⁷²⁴ that remains external to the individual; Roman virtue too is an external purpose, not one they can realize concretely within their spirit. This is still more true of the particular purposes, and it is in regard to them that the feeling of dependence essentially arises.

According to Cicero⁷²⁵ the Romans are the most pious of all nations, always thinking of the gods, always turning to them, giving them thanks for everything, etc. This is the beginning of the kind

723. [Ed.] As indicated above, n. 551, in the 1824 lectures Hegel associates Schleiermacher's concept of the "feeling of dependence" (*Glaubenslehre*, 1st ed., § 9) only with Roman religion, not with both Jewish and Roman religion, as in the Ms. In the next paragraph he says that for the Romans the feeling of dependence was essentially superstitious because oriented to finite powers and purposes that regulate every facet of life; hence Roman religion is the religion of unfreedom. This argument is also found in the Ms., but in 1824 Hegel does not go on to suggest, as he did earlier, that the "proper development" of the feeling of dependence leads to the veneration of evil and worship of the devil (see Ms., n. 292). That unfair charge, made even before the second volume of Schleiermacher's work had appeared, could not be sustained.

724. W_2 (Var) reads: that in which they possess themselves is a purpose

725. [Ed.] Although this does not appear to be an actual citation from Cicero, he did express himself more or less to this effect on several occasions, e.g., in *De natura deorum* 2.8.

of piety that calls on the immortal gods, is thankful to them, and so on, but which is not free in this relationship because the content of what it calls upon is a finite, limited content. This is the soil of superstition, of unfreedom. When the content is limited and finite, then self-consciousness, that which seeks to embrace the content, that which makes it its essential subject matter, is in the sphere of dependence, on the soil of unfreedom. Religion as such is essentially intuition, consciousness of the infinite essence that is inwardly unbounded; in the intuition of this essence human beings become conscious of themselves only insofar as they abandon their limited, finite interests, wishes, and hopes. Their religion is a dependent one only to the extent that they do not have as their object in a purely theoretical sense the *idea*—i.e., that which is substantive and unlimited. Hence in this Roman religion the feeling of dependence is essentially superstition, because | the purposes here are limited and finite; objects that are limited in their content are treated as absolute purposes. This is therefore a religion of unfreedom.

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The second moment (the *cultus* proper) falls partly into the form that we have already observed. One of its principal distinguishing features is that the gods are recognized and revered in regard to purposes that the worshipers want to achieve. The Romans worship the gods because they *need* them, in other words primarily at times of stress and anxiety, i.e., because they wish to have their own narrow interests maintained as essential. So not only do we see them call upon their gods in distress, but we see also the introduction of new gods in particular moments of need, with an oath to dedicate to the new god a new temple. From this point of view the *cultus* is a theogony in progress—the universal necessity of the gods realized in singular events (victories, triumphs, situations, incidents, and so on). The divine is not the genuine, eternal, implicitly and explicitly ethical power. Fortune is indeterminate; the lordship of power exists only through particular victories or as a consequence of other events, i.e., as the successful accomplishment of particular purposes. It is particular needs, as it were, that call for particular gods and bring them into being. Theogony is the genesis of the particular offspring of necessity. "And that is why other divine [power] too is in the service of this realized purpose of lordship; the Romans made use of

auspices, and the oracles, the Sibylline books, and so on were in the custody of the state, of the magistrates.⁷²⁶

408 Mention should also be made of the particular games and festivals. With a religion that has no doctrine it is particularly through the deity's portrayal in festivals and spectacles that his essentiality is presented in visible form to the community. In a religion of this kind, stage spectacles have a completely different importance from what they have for us. | The Romans took over not only Greek gods but also Greek games and spectacles. [But] one thing was distinctive in their case: the spectacles that consisted in nothing but the slaughter of animals and humans, the rivers of blood, mortal combats. Such spectacles mark the acme, so to speak, of what could be brought before their eyes. [Yet] they are totally devoid of ethical interest, there is not in them the tragic reversal whose content is an intrinsically ethical ill, but only the totally arid reversal effected by death. The Romans built up these spectacles to such a monstrous degree that hundreds of human beings, four or five hundred lions, tigers, elephants, and crocodiles, were slain by gladiators who had to fight with them and who also slew one another. What is brought before the spectators' eyes here is essentially the process of a death devoid of spirit, a murder game, willed by irrational caprice, serving only to give them something to feast their eyes on. This is a necessity that is mere caprice, murder without content, or having only itself for content. This and the envisagement of fate are the acme of experience, to die imperturbably through an empty caprice, not from natural causes, nor through the external force of circumstances, nor in consequence of offending against something ethical. Thus dying is the only virtue a Roman patrician could exercise, and it is one that he has in common with slaves and with condemned criminals. These two extremes here stand opposite each other, the finite or temporal as such—that the particular person is an absolute end—and again that the particular person is of no account, a plaything in the hand of sheer caprice. Over against both stands the present

726. *Ho reads, similar in W:* In this way necessity is transformed by imagination into empirical singularity; empirical singularity is divine, and there arises in identical manner, along with superstition in the form of [religious] disposition, a whole sphere of oracles, auspices, Sibylline books, which on the one hand serve the purpose of the state and on the other private purposes.

power over this finitude: the emperor, an individual, whose willful caprice is inevitably devoid of right and of ethical life. The Romans fared no better under the best emperors than under the worst; under Domitian the peoples of the empire were better off than under the noblest emperors. So on the one side there is Fortuna, death, cold and empty death, and on the other the individual who had the power, the individuality of the emperor.

Such are the main aspects of the religion of expediency.

If we may now add one further general reflection about the standpoint that we have been discussing, the stage we have reached is as follows. Infinite power, the absolute negativity of the concept, | determines itself, it has a purpose; and this purpose is not a limited purpose but a universal one. Yet it is a universal purpose that is still a finite one; indeed, when comprehended in its objectivity, it is just this [universal] dominion. Its particular content is just this or that finite situation. Thus the finite is posited as the absolute purpose, as what has being on its own account—it is not idealized, not posited as sublated in the infinite ideality, but is valid on its own account.⁷²⁷ This is what characterizes this standpoint, and it is essentially necessary. As we have said, it is finitude that is here made into infinitude; the finite is abstract; more precisely, it is subjective self-consciousness in general, finite spirit. It is this subjective self-consciousness that is now regarded as what is strictly the essential—world dominion, the finite purpose as such. This is present for us, it achieves its real significance, only insofar as it is the existence and execution of the purposes of self-consciousness. In this aspect, therefore, it is the releasing of subjectivity as such from all bounds. This infinitude of subjectivity as such can be expressed more precisely as personality, the category into which a human being enters as a person in the realm of right. As a person ■ human being owns property, has the right of possession.⁷²⁸ It is the person who enjoys recognition as such, but only the abstract person, the abstractly

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727. *Thus G; P reads:* Thus it is the finite, and the infinite is transformed into the finite by imagination; the finite is what abides, what is valid on its own account as finite.

728. [Ed.] *Recht des Besitzes*. Here as in his lectures on the philosophy of right, Hegel is probably alluding to the title of ■ work by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, *Das Recht des Besitzes* (Giessen, 1806; the 1st ed., which appeared in 1803, was titled *Abhandlung der Lehre vom Besitz*).

juridical person capable of ownership. It goes no further than that, and I count as infinite in this sphere [only]; as the infinite reference of myself to myself, I am the absolute, self-sustaining atom. Such is the more precise meaning of the definition given in the proposition that the finite is within the infinite. But when the finite is grasped in this way as subject, it is still taken in its immediacy, it is absolute being-for-self but abstract, and this is as far as we have here developed the aspect of personality.

410 This personality, however, or infinitude of the subject, must also be taken in a higher sense, where the personality of the subject pertains to the idea rather than merely being a person immediately. Implicitly, this category is infinite form, and nothing else—not subjectivity as this | immediate person, but subjectivity as such, the absolutely infinite form, the form of self-knowledge and of what knows itself generally, the form of what distinguishes itself both inwardly and in opposition to an other. This infinite subjectivity that is infinite form is the⁷²⁹ moment that is here won for substance and for power; it is what power or the god of substantiality still lacked—his inner self-determination as infinite subjectivity. In power we have had subjectivity in principle, but this power has only one or more singular purposes; its purpose is still not infinite. Only infinite subjectivity has an infinite purpose, i.e., it is the purpose for itself, and its purpose *is* just inwardness, this subjectivity as such. “So, abstractly, this category constitutes what spirit is.”⁷³⁰ Spirit has being only insofar as it is posited as spirit, dirempts itself inwardly, makes itself its own purpose; but in doing so it initially distinguishes itself from itself, and what it distinguishes from itself is spirit; it is the side of reality, the aspect of determinateness that is inwardly infinite for itself. It is defined as the other, but since this existence is also defined as self-containedly absolute, this is at the same time to posit that spirit is for spirit.”⁷³¹

This is the abstract definition to which we have now come and through which we now pass over to the Christian religion.

729. *W₂ (Var) adds:* great

730. *W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads:* This determination of spirit is consequently achieved in the Roman world.

731. *Thus G*

DETERMINATE RELIGION¹ THE LECTURES OF 1827

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Introduction²

³Here belong the particular religions or determinate religions, religion in its determinateness; for there are determinate, particular, | and

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1. *B, Hu, An read: Religion in its Determinacy*

2. [Ed.] The introduction to the 1827 lectures reestablishes the threefold division of *Determinate Religion* inherited from the Ms. but modified in 1824 into a twofold structure. The summary provided in the introduction is similar to that found in 1824, which is not surprising since Hegel made use of Griesheim's transcript of the 1824 lectures when lecturing in 1827. In fact, the introduction to the 1824 lectures also anticipated a threefold structure. The 1827 introduction anticipates certain changes that are more fully developed in 1831, e.g., the two senses of "natural religion" as meaning both primitive religion (the religion of immediacy) and rational religion (see n. 8), and the recognition that in the higher of the so-called nature religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Persian and Egyptian religion) there is already an elevation of thought above merely natural powers, hence an implicit cleavage of consciousness (in 1831 this leads to the treatment of these religions under entirely different categories from that of "nature religion"). With respect to the second main stage, the elevation of the spiritual above the natural, the introduction does not anticipate the reversal of order in which Greek and Jewish religion are in fact treated in 1827 (see below, nn. 18, 347). It suggests, in line with 1824, that the sequence is from particular (Jewish) to plural (Greek) to universal (Roman). Thus it is evident that, just as in 1824, so also in 1827 the initial plan was altered as Hegel proceeded with the detailed treatment. Finally, the distinctiveness of Roman religion from Greek and Jewish is reaffirmed: it cannot be subsumed under the general category of the "religions of spiritual individuality." While providing a transition to Christianity, it does so only in a negative sense: it is universal and purposive but also utterly finite, external, and utilitarian. It is scarcely a religion of freedom and spirit.

3. *W contains the following introduction to the 1831 lectures:* When we speak of determinate religion, it is implied, in the first place, that religion generally is taken as genus and the determinate religions as species. From one point of view this relationship of genus to species is quite legitimate, as when we pass over from the

universal to the particular in other sciences. But in that case the particular is understood only in an empirical manner; it is a matter of experience that this or that animal, this or that right exists. In philosophical science it is not permissible to proceed in this fashion: the particular cannot just be added to the universal; on the contrary, the universal itself definitely resolves itself into the particular. The concept divides itself; it produces an original determination from out of itself. In all cases of determinateness, determinate being and connectedness with an other are directly posited. What is determinate is for an other, and what is indeterminate is not there at all. That for which religion is, its determinate being, is consciousness. Religion has its reality as consciousness. What is to be understood by the realization of the concept is this: that the content is determined by its being for consciousness and being in a certain way. Our procedure is as follows: We began by considering the concept of religion, what religion implicitly is; that is what it is for us, as we have seen it; it is quite another matter [W_1 : how it comes to consciousness. W_2 : for it to bring itself to consciousness.] . . . Only in the true religion does what it is in and for itself, what its concept is, become known; for actual religion is concordant with the concept. We now have to consider the course by which genuine religion comes about. Religion is still not *a* religion in its concept either—for it is essentially present as such only in consciousness. This is the sense of what we are here considering, the self-realizing of the concept. How realization occurs has already been indicated in a general way: the concept is, as it were, a potentiality within spirit, it constitutes the innermost truth, but spirit must attain to the knowledge of this truth. Only then does genuine religion become actual. It can be said of all religions that they are religions, [W_1 : but if they are still limited W_2 : and correspond to the concept of religion; but at the same time, in that they are still limited,] they do not correspond to the concept. And yet they must contain it, or else they would not be religions. But the concept is present in them in different ways. At first they contain it only implicitly. These [W_2 : determinate] religions are only particular moments of the concept, and for this very reason they do not correspond to the concept, for it is not actual within them. Thus, while humanity is, of course, implicitly free, Africans and Asiatics are not, because they have not the consciousness of what constitutes the concept of humanity. Religion is now to be considered in its determinacy. The highest that is or can be attained is for the determinacy itself to be the concept; for in that case the barrier is sublated and religious consciousness is not distinguished from the concept—this is the idea, the perfectly realized concept, but we can discuss that only when we reach the concluding division of our subject.

To educe the concept of religion and make it the object of consciousness has been the labor of spirit over thousands of years. The way this labor has been performed is that immediacy or the natural state formed the starting point; and this had then to be overcome. Immediacy is what is natural, but consciousness is elevation above nature. Natural consciousness is sensuous consciousness, just as the natural will is desire, the individual that wills itself in accordance with its natural state and particularity—sensuous knowing and sensuous willing. Religion, however, is the relationship of spirit to spirit, spirit's knowledge of [W_2 : spirit in] its truth, not in its immediacy or its natural state. Religion becomes determinate as it advances from the natural state to the concept. Initially the concept is only the inward element, the implicit potential of consciousness, not its expression. Regarding this ambiguity, that the concept originally *is* but that its first existence is not its authentic originality, we shall have something more to say later.

hence finite religions, the *ethnic religions* generally.⁴ Up to this point we have spoken generally of God, of consciousness of God and connection with God, of our human knowledge of the divine spirit within ourselves and of ourselves within the divine spirit. [These connections] have been referred to only as indefinite representations, but we want to have them [as definite] in our consciousness. (The third division is the absolute religion, the fulfilled concept of religion, religion worked out in its fullness.) It is in determinate religion that determinations first enter into that universal essence; this is where cognition of God begins. By means of | thoroughgoing determination, the thought of God first comes to be the concept.

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Even as the content, God, determines itself, so on the other side the subjective human spirit that has this knowledge determines itself too. The principle by which God is defined for human beings is also the principle for how humanity defines itself inwardly, or for humanity in its own spirit. An inferior god or a nature god has inferior, natural and unfree human beings as its correlates; the pure concept of God or the spiritual God has as its correlate spirit that is free and spiritual, that actually knows God. In determinate religion, spirit is determinate both as absolute spirit or object and as the subjective spirit that has its essence or absoluteness as its object. Here both sides first achieve their determinateness.

⁵In determinate religion as such, in finite religion, | we have before us only subordinate determinations of spirit or of religion;

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4. L (1827?) adds: (The third division is the absolute religion, the fulfilled concept of religion, religion educed in its fullness.)

5. W₂ (1831) reads (*parallel in main text follows*): Hence the sphere we have to deal with first contains the determinate religion that does not yet emerge from determinacy so far as its content is concerned. A fully achieved freedom is not involved in the activity of emerging from immediacy, but only a process of breaking free, which is still entangled in that from which it is freeing itself.

The first step here is to consider the form of natural, immediate religion. In this first, natural religion, consciousness is still natural, i.e., sensuously desirous consciousness. Hence it is immediate. As yet there is here no inward cleavage of consciousness, for a cleavage of that kind has the characteristic that consciousness distinguishes its sensuous nature from what is essential, so that the natural is known only as mediated through those aspects that are essential. This is where religion can first originate.

In connection with this exaltation to the essential, we have to consider the concept of this exaltation generally. Here the object is defined with certainty, and this *true* object, from which consciousness distinguishes itself, is God. This exaltation is the

we do not yet have the religion of absolute truth. But the progression [of finite religions] is a condition for the arrival of religion at its absolute truth, for spirit's coming to be for spirit, for the relationship of spirit to spirit, a condition for the attainment by spirit itself of its truly infinite determinateness. | These determinate religions

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same one that occurs in a more abstract way in the proofs of the existence of God. In all of these proofs there is the very same exaltation; it is only the starting point and the nature of this essence that differ. But this elevation to God, however it may be defined, is only the one side. The other is the converse: God, defined thus and so, enters into relation with the subject that has thus elevated itself. At this point then arises the question of how the subject is defined; but this is known just in the way that God is defined.

It is also necessary to adduce the subject's conscious turning toward this essence, and this brings in the aspect of the cultus, the subject's uniting with its essence.

The division [of the subject matter] is therefore as follows.

1. Natural religion is unity of the spiritual and natural, and God is here comprehended in this unity that is still natural. Humanity in its immediacy is just sensuous, natural knowing and natural willing. Insofar as the moment of religion is involved in this, and the moment of elevation is still shut up within the natural state, there is something there that has nonetheless to be regarded as higher than anything merely immediate. This is magic.

2. Second, there is the cleavage of consciousness within itself, so that it knows itself as merely natural and distinguishes the genuine or the essential from this. Within the essential [being] this natural state, this finitude, is of no value and is known to be such. In natural religion spirit still lives in neutrality with nature, but God is now defined as the absolute power and substance, within which the natural will, the subject, is only something transient, an accident, something lacking selfhood, devoid of freedom. The highest merit of humanity here is to know itself as something null.

But initially this elevation of spirit above the natural realm is not yet carried through in a consistent manner. On the contrary, there is still present a fearful inconsistency, as a result of which the different spiritual and natural powers are all mixed up with one another. This still inwardly inconsistent elevation has its historical existence in the three Oriental religions of substance.^a

3. But the confusion of the natural and the spiritual leads to the struggle of subjectivity, which seeks to establish itself in its unity and universality. This struggle has also had its historical existence in three religions, which form the religions of the transition to the stage of free subjectivity.^b But since spirit has not yet completely subjected the natural to itself in these stages, any more than in the preceding ones, they constitute, together with the preceding ones, the sphere of

A. Nature Religion.

Set against this is the second stage of determinate religion, at which the elevation of spirit is carried through consistently vis-à-vis the natural realm, i.e.,

B. The Religion of Spiritual Individuality, or Free Subjectivity.^c

[Ed.] ^aBy the "three Oriental religions of substance" Hegel means in the 1831 lectures Chinese religion, Hinduism, and Buddhism/Lamaism. Cf. the 1831 passage

are definite stages⁶ of the consciousness and knowledge of spirit. They are necessary conditions for the emergence of the true religion, for the authentic consciousness of spirit. For this reason too, they are extant historically, and I will even draw attention to the historical mode in which they have existed, for we come to know them in these particular forms as historical religions. In the true science, in a science of spirit, in a science whose object is human being, the development of the concept of this concrete object is also its outward history and has existed in actuality. Thus these shapes of religion have also existed successively in time and coexisted in space. We shall now discuss their general classification.

Of necessity the *first* form of religion is immediate religion, what we can also call *nature religion*. In the modern period this term “nature religion” or “natural religion” has for some time had a different sense; we have understood it to mean what human beings are supposed to be able to cognize⁷ through their reason, through the natural light of their reason.⁸

transmitted by W_2 in n. 49 below. The W_2 and Strauss texts corroborate each other.

^bBy the “three religions of transition” Hegel means in the 1831 lectures the religion of the good (Persian and Jewish), the religion of anguish (Phoenician), and the religion of ferment (Egyptian). Here again the materials in W_2 (n. 266) and the Strauss text confirm each other. “The concluding outline, beginning with the words “But since spirit,” has been editorially revised. It confuses the design of the 1831 lectures with that of 1824. According to Strauss, the “religions of transition” are not included under nature religion, which is confined to magic, but follow the “three Oriental religions of substance,” forming the beginning of the third stage of *Determinate Religion*, the “religion of freedom.” The only lectures in which Hegel refers to the “religions of spiritual individuality” are those of 1824.

6. In *B's* margin: 15 June 1827

7. *W* (*Var*) reads: can educe and cognize of God

8. [Ed.] The concept of the natural light of reason can be traced back through the Enlightenment, Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Aquinas to Cicero; see his *Tusculanae disputationes* 3.1. The concept of “natural religion” was widespread among thinkers of the Enlightenment, e.g., Leibniz, *Theodicy* (1734), ed. A. Farrar, trans. E. M. Huggard (New Haven, 1952), p. 51 (*Philosophische Schriften*, ed. C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols. [Berlin, 1875–1890], 6:26–27); and Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, 2d ed. (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1741), p. 497 (§ 512), and *Philosophia moralis*, Pars tertia (Halle, 1751), chap. 9, pp. 731 ff. While Leibniz made natural religion clearly subordinate to revealed religion, Wolff already placed the two on an equal level. Hegel’s criticism of the concept of natural religion could have been prompted by Hume’s *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (London, 1779), with which he was probably familiar, although this cannot be confirmed.

416 From that point of view natural religion has been opposed to revealed religion, ~as the religion delivered by reason.⁹ "Natural reason" is an erroneous expression. We do indeed speak of the nature of reason, i.e., its concept; but on the whole "the natural" is understood to mean "the immediate," the sensible generally, the uncultivated. Reason then, by contrast, is the not being [of something, and specifically of human nature] in the way that it immediately is to begin with; spirit is precisely this self-elevation above nature, this self-extrication from the natural; not only is it liberation vis-à-vis the natural but the subjection of the natural to itself, making it fit the measure of, and be obedient to, itself. Because of this ambiguity we should avoid the expression "natural | reason" in this modern meaning. The genuine sense of natural reason is "spirit or reason according to the concept." When reason is taken in this sense, however, as what reason or spirit truly is within itself, then there is no antithesis between it and revealed religion. The latter is revelation of God, revelation of the Spirit. We should nevertheless remark here that spirit according to its concept can indeed be set in opposition to revealed religion; but on the other hand ~revealed religion is valid only¹⁰ for spirit, and spirit can reveal itself only to spirit. What spirit is in its essence, or according to its genuine meaning, cannot be revealed to what is devoid of spirit or devoid of reason; on the contrary, for reception through the Spirit to be possible, the receiver must itself be spirit. "Spirit must bear witness to the Spirit," ~as it is traditionally expressed in religious terms.¹¹ All religion is natural in the sense that spirit has to bear witness, i.e., it is in conformity with the concept and addresses spirit.

"Natural religion," as the term has been employed in more recent times, has also referred to mere metaphysical religion, where "metaphysics" has had the sense of ~"understandable thought."¹²

9. *W₂ (Var) reads:* and maintains that only what human beings have in their reason can be authentic for them.

10. *Hu reads:* only revealed religion is valid

11. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads:* The witness that spirit bears to spirit is the highest witness; all other kinds of attestation or authorization serve merely as a stimulus for the standpoint of consciousness that we have to consider here. Once spirit has attained to its consciousness of self, it has risen above external attestations of the kind that are directed to its phantasy etc.

12. *W (Var) reads:* understandable thoughts, representations of the understanding.

That is the modern religion of the understanding—or what is called “deism,” a result of the Enlightenment, the knowledge of God as an abstraction, the knowledge that God is the father of all humanity.¹³

The first [stage] for us is nature religion, i.e., religion defined as the unity of the spiritual and the natural, | where the spirit still is in unity with nature. In being this way, spirit is not yet free, is not yet actual as spirit.¹⁴ This placid unity, this neutrality with nature or mingling of the spiritual with the natural, spirit in its wholly immediate mode, is first of all the human individual. Religion begins in the situation where the human being as singular counts as the highest or absolute power; one takes oneself to be an absolute power and is so regarded by others.

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The *second* stage of religion is the *elevation of the spiritual above the natural*. This can occur in two ways: on the one hand *in thought*, namely that God is for thought and only for thought, i.e., “God” can be regarded abstractly; on the other hand, that God is present as a *concrete individuality*. But this individuality does not exist in an immediate or natural manner only, and is not a natural essence at all; for on the contrary, the spiritual is the ruling or dominant aspect, although it still has the natural as its reality or outward shape. It is not yet present as pure spirit¹⁵—as spiritual individuality. In consequence the natural is subordinated to spirit, and at the same time the individuality is this particularized one. It follows at once that there is a multitude of such particularized individualities, which

13. *W₂ reads*: to which all definitions of God—all belief—are reduced. *L, W (1827?) continue*: This cannot, properly speaking, be called natural religion; it is the final, extreme position of the abstract understanding that results from the Kantian critique.

[*Ed.*] A reference to Kant’s criticism of all speculative theology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1930), ¶ 659–732, esp. 703.

14. *L (1827?) adds*: God is everywhere the content; but here it is God in the natural unity of the spiritual and the natural. It is the natural mode that characterizes this form of religion in general. It assumes many different shapes, all of which are called nature religion. In nature religion, so we are told, spirit is still identical with nature, consciousness stands united with nature, and to that extent this religion is the religion of unfreedom.

15. *L (1827?) adds*: That first moment, that first form, is the religion of sublimity, the Jewish religion. The other moment is where the spiritual appears as concretely spiritual

are still burdened with natural existence and a natural configuration.¹⁶

418 “The *third* form is the *religion of expediency or purposiveness*,¹⁷ where there is posited in God a purpose, or purposes generally, albeit a rather external purpose and not yet a purpose that is purely spiritual, not yet the absolute purpose. This can also be called the religion of fate or destiny, | because the purpose is not yet a free and purely spiritual purpose. One particular purpose is posited in God, and this purpose is then something without any [absolute] reason as compared with other private purposes, because those purposes might be no less justified than this one, which is only another particular purpose too.

So far as the historical development is concerned, nature religion is the religion of the East. The second form of religion, namely that in which the spiritual elevates itself above the natural, is in one aspect the religion of sublimity (that of the Jews) and in the other aspect the religion of beauty (that of the Greeks).¹⁸

If we speak here of “the elevation of spirit,” this must be defined more precisely, for even within nature religion we will find an elevating of thought above mere natural powers, above the dominion of the natural. But this elevation is carried out inconsistently, and it is just this monstrous and terrible inconsistency, in which the

16. L (1827?) *adds*: —this is the religion of beauty, or Greek religion.

17. L (1827?) *reads*: In its gods, singular spirit wills only its own subjective purpose; it wills itself, not the absolute content. So the religion of expediency is that

18. W₂ (1831) *adds*: In the religion of sublimity, the one God is the lord, and the singular subjects behave as his servants. In the religion of beauty too, the subject has purified itself from its merely immediate knowing and willing; but it has also retained its will and knows itself as *free*. It knows itself as free, moreover, because it has completed the negation of its natural will and, as an ethical, free being, has an affirmative relation to God. But the subject has not yet passed through the consciousness and the antithesis of good and evil. Hence it is still contaminated with naturalness. So even if the religion of beauty forms the stage of reconciliation as contrasted with the sphere of sublimity, this reconciliation is still an unmediated one, because it is not yet mediated through consciousness of the antithesis.

[*Ed.*] In the 1827 lectures Hegel actually treats Greek religion (the religion of beauty) first and Jewish religion (the religion of sublimity) second. See below, n. 347. In 1831 the order of 1821 and 1824 is restored, but Jewish and Greek religion are treated under different categories—consciousness of good and evil, and consciousness of reconciliation and freedom, respectively.

differentiated powers, the natural and the spiritual, are blended together, just this mixture of the spiritual and the natural, that is the content of this stage. The second stage is therefore the consistent elevation into self as against the natural, so that the natural is subordinated: on the one hand, as something entirely mastered (in the religion of sublimity); on the other hand, so that it serves only as the outward shape, appearance, or manifestation of subjectivity.¹⁹

The third form, the religion of external purposiveness or expediency, is Roman religion, which we certainly have to distinguish from Greek religion | and which constitutes the transition to absolute religion.²⁰ It is the religion of external purposiveness—external in that although the purpose is essentially posited, the only extant purposes are limited ones, themselves finite and external. These are the three forms of the determinate religions.

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A. IMMEDIATE RELIGION, OR NATURE RELIGION

Introduction²¹

a. *The Original Condition*

Before we consider religion in its characteristic shape, we need to pay attention to a representation that is customary, which our imagination depicts for us, and which moreover is affirmed and treated as valid. It was the view that the first religion was also the true and excellent one, and that all subsequent religions present only

19. *Thus L; Hu reads:* manifestation, or beauty.

20. *In B's margin:* 18 June 1827

21. [Ed.] The introduction to Sec. A of the 1827 lectures retains only the discussion of the "original condition" of humanity as represented in religious mythology. The lengthy treatment of the cosmological proof, which occurs here in 1824, is gone, having been assimilated along with the other proofs into the section on "Religious Knowledge as Elevation to God" in Part I. The generic representation of God in nature religion is also removed from the introduction, which concludes with an outline of the four main forms of nature religion. The four differ from 1824 in that the religion of being-within-self (Buddhism, Lamaism) is no longer considered a subcategory of the religion of magic, and the Persian and Egyptian religions are combined under the category of "the religions of transition."

a degenerate state of this religion. Remains, fragments, and indications have survived from the decline of this religion, and these are the foundation of the subsequent religions; these remains are recognizable, and historical cognition of them holds particular interest for us.²²

This view is believed to be justified partly in and for itself or a priori, and partly in a historical way, a posteriori. If we pursue the history of religion, science, and cognition right back to its origin, we find there traces of truths and cognitions that indicate a yet higher origin and that have preserved themselves in the later states of religion—traces that we are unable to understand in connection with the determinate religions themselves or even with the scientific culture and information of the nations concerned.

The a priori aspect is just the view that we have already mentioned: that human beings were originally created by God and in God's image [Gen. 1:26–27]; that the first human beings were in conformity with their concept; that in the purity of their concept they were good without evil; and, more specifically, that [they lived] knowingly in this unity with God and nature, so that in this original
 420 purity they knew God | as God is; that they behaved in accordance with God's essence and with their own proper essence; that they had not yet stepped forth into duality and were still uncorrupted. And so, because spirit's gaze was not yet clouded and darkened, because humanity had not yet sunk down into the prose of reflection and understanding, which is just what constitutes the divorce between the subject and nature; because they had not yet found themselves thus sundered from nature, or from external things, and did not yet have particular interests that could make them view [nature] practically as a complex of useful things—because of this they beheld the inner being of nature itself, they knew the inner being of nature

22. [Ed.] Hegel is alluding especially to the views of F. W. J. Schelling and Friedrich Schlegel. See Schelling's *On University Studies* (1803), trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 83 (*Sämmtliche Werke* 5:287); Schelling's *Treatise on "The Deities of Samothrace,"* trans. R. F. Brown (Missoula, Mont., 1977), p. 25 (*Sämmtliche Werke* 8:362); and Schlegel's *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), pp. 198, 205 (*Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:295–297, 303). See also below, n. 42, and 1824 lectures, n. 27.

and cognized nature truly.²³ Just as they related themselves to the pure God according to their own purity, | so also they related to nature not as to an external thing; instead they saw into the heart of nature as it is; thus they possessed absolute knowledge just as they did the true religion.²⁴ We can form this representation readily for ourselves just by thinking; but, as we have already said, it is also found in the religions of diverse peoples. Most religions begin with a sojourn in paradise, and hence with an original state of human innocence—thus the Greeks have the golden age and the Romans the Saturnian age.²⁵ This is very much a universal representation

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23. [Ed.] Expressions of a mystical unity with nature are found in Albrecht von Haller's poem, "Die Falschheit der menschlichen Tugenden," in *Versuch schweizerischer Gedichte*, 6th ed. (Göttingen, 1751), no. 6, p. 100; and in Jacob Boehme's *De signatura rerum*, in *Theosophia revelata* (1715), pp. 2178–2404, esp. pp. 2180–2181. See 1824 lectures, n. 35.

24. W (1831) reads: Cognition of nature of the former [i.e., pre-rational] kind is explained as intuiting, which is nothing else but immediate consciousness. If we ask, "What has been intuited?" it is not sensuous nature superficially considered (a kind of intuition that can also be attributed to animals) but the essence of nature. But the essence of nature, as the system of its laws, is nothing but the universal. Nature in its universality, the system of developing organic life, and this development in its authentic form, [W₁: this W₂: not nature in its singularity, in which it exists for sensuous perception or for intuition, but the *form* of the natural,] is nature as permeated by thought. Thinking, however, is not something immediate; it starts with the given, but rises above [W₁: it W₂: the sensuous manifoldness of what is given]. It negates the form of singularity, forgets what has happened in sensuous form, and produces the universal, the genuine. This is not action of an immediate kind but is the labor of mediation, the emergence from finitude. [W₂: It is of no avail to contemplate the heavens no matter with what pious and innocent faith; what is essential can only be *thought*.] Hence the assertion that one has a direct sight or vision of things [*ein Schauen*], an immediate consciousness, proves itself to be worthless as soon as we ask what is to be seen in this way. The knowledge of nature in its truth is a mediated form of knowing, not immediate knowing. And it is the same with willing. The will is good insofar as it wills the good, what is right and ethical. But this is something quite different from the immediate will. The immediate will is the will that does not advance beyond singularity and finitude, that wills the singular as such. The good on the contrary is the universal; in order for the will to attain to the point of willing the good, a mediation is necessary through which it has purified itself from that sort of finite willing. This purification is the education and labor of the mediation, and the mediation cannot be something immediate and primary. The same applies to the cognition of God; God is the center of all truth, the pure truth without any boundary, and in order to attain to him it is even more imperative that human beings should have labored to free themselves from their natural particularity of knowing and willing.

25. [Ed.] See Hesiod, *Works and Days* 108–119, and Virgil, *Eclogues* 4, 6.

which even in modern times thought has sought to justify once more by argument alone.

This, then, is what²⁶ has been understood by “nature religion”—an initial or original revelation, a revelation first impaired by human beings, lost or corrupted by them as they passed over to the evil side through sin, passion, and evil generally. Of course it is easy to recognize that evil, ignorance, passion, selfish inclination, private pursuits, and the will that wishes to determine itself for itself obscure the moment of insight into truth as the knowing and willing of the good. So the question is whether this character [of innocence] is to be viewed as a state, and in fact as the initial, original, and authentic state.

So far as the basic determination in that representation is concerned, it must be acknowledged not only to be correct but also, as a true representation, to be foundational. But we must distinguish the form, i.e., whether in fact this true representation should be characterized as an initial, original, natural, and authentic *state*. The basic determination is nothing else but this, that the human being is no natural essence as such, is no animal, but rather spirit. Insofar as humanity is spirit, it has this universality in itself quite generally, the universality of rationality, the activity of concrete thought | and reason; and it is partly the instinct of reason, and partly its development, to know that reason is universal and that nature is therefore rational. Of course nature is not conscious reason, but it has determination according to purpose within it. Nature is rationally ordered, it was made by a wise creator—and wisdom is purpose, concept, free rationality itself. Thus spirit also knows that God is rational, absolute reason, absolute rational activity, and it has this belief instinctively, it knows that it cognizes God as well as nature, that it must find in God something quite distinct [from itself] but also its own essence too, when it relates itself to these objects in its rational investigation. Spirit believes that in its rational inquiry into God and nature it will recognize itself, the rational.

This is undoubtedly the basic determination [of the story]; but now the question is whether it describes the initial state. As far as

26. *L* (1827?) adds: apart from the metaphysical meaning discussed earlier,

the representation of the lost paradise is concerned, however, we should declare here that the very fact that it is a *lost* paradise shows already that it is not an essential state. The true or the divine does not get lost; it is eternal, and abides in and for itself. So if this unity of humanity with God and nature is represented as the true, then the higher concept shows that this [lost paradise] is not the state of the true.²⁷ This unity of humanity with itself, with God, and with nature is, in the universal sense or as in-itself, in fact the substantial, essential determination. Humanity is reason, is spirit; in virtue of the capacity of reason, of the fact that humanity is spirit, it is implicitly what is true. But that is only the concept or the in-itself, and when we arrive at the *representation* of what the concept is, or what is in itself, we are quite accustomed to represent it to ourselves as something past or future, not as something inward that is in and of itself. We picture it instead in the mode of immediate, external existence, as an [actual] state.²⁸ |

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So, of course, the concept must realize itself; but the realization of the concept, the activities through which it actualizes itself, and the present shapes and appearances of this actualization and of the actuality, have a different look to them than does that which is the simple concept within itself. The unity of which we speak is in fact the concept, or the in-itself, and not an actual state or existence; only the realization of the concept constitutes actual states or existence, and this realization must be quite different from the way that the state of paradise and innocence is depicted.

The human being is essentially spirit, and spirit²⁹ is essentially this: to be for oneself, to be free, setting oneself over against the

27. *Thus An with B and Hu; L (Var) reads:* But as we have said, it is not to be represented as a state, as it is pictured among most peoples that what was original in point of time is the true human state and the one we long for, the loss of which was a misfortune and an occasion for mourning.

28. *W₂ (1831) adds:* So what is involved here is only the form of existence or how the state occurs. The concept is what is inward, the implicit potential, but it has not yet come into existence. So the question arises what stands against our believing that the implicit potential was present in advance as actual existence. And what does stand against it is the nature of spirit. Spirit is only what it makes itself. This bringing forth of what is implicit is the positing of the concept of existence.

29. *W₂ (Var) adds:* is not in immediate fashion, but

natural, withdrawing oneself from immersion in nature, severing oneself from nature and only reconciling oneself with nature for the first time through this severance and on the basis of it; and not only with nature but with one's own essence too, or with one's truth. We make this truth objective to ourselves, set it over against us, sever ourselves from it, and through this severance we reconcile ourselves with it. This oneness brought forth by way of severance is the first spiritual or true oneness, that which comes forth out of reconciliation; it is not the unity of nature. The stone or the plant is immediately in this unity, but in a oneness that is not a unity worthy of spirit, is not spiritual oneness. Spiritual oneness comes forth out of severed being.

424 A misunderstanding can arise when we call that initial state the state of *innocence*. Then it can seem objectionable to say that human beings must depart from the state of innocence and become guilty. But the state of innocence consists in the fact that nothing is good and nothing is evil for human beings; it is the state of the animal; *paradise* (παράδεισος) is in fact initially a zoological garden [*Tiergarten*];³⁰ it is the state where there is no accountability. An ethical state of humanity begins only with a state of accountability or of capacity for guilt,³¹ and this is now the human state. "Guilt" means in general "holding to account."³² But guilt in the universal sense means that for which human beings are accountable; to have guilt means to be accountable, that this is one's knowledge and one's will, that one does it as what is right.

30. [Ed.] See Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.2.7, where Cyrus is said to have kept wild animals in a large park for hunting. The Hebrew word for "garden" was translated in the Septuagint as παράδεισος, which stems from the Old Persian *pairi daēza*, meaning a park enclosed by a wall. See also Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 2.10, and Josephus, *Antiquities* 10.226.

31. Thus An with B and Hu; L (Var) reads, similar in W: —(paradise = zoological garden)—or of unconsciousness, where humanity is totally ignorant both of good and of evil, and what is willed is not determined either as good or as evil. If there is no knowledge of evil, then there is no knowledge of good either. But the state of guilt, in contrast with this, is the state of accountability,

32. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: "Guilt" is usually taken in a pejorative sense. It is usually understood to mean that someone has done something evil. What this says is that humanity *must* become evil.

As a state of existence, that initial natural oneness is in actuality not a state of innocence but the state of savagery, an animal state, a state of [natural] desire or general wildness. The animal in such a state is neither good nor evil; but human beings in the animal state are wild, are evil, are not as they ought to be. Humanity as it is by nature is not what it ought to be; human beings ought to be what they are through spirit, to which end they mold themselves by inner illumination, by knowing and willing what is right and proper. This point, that human beings as they are according to nature are not as they ought to be, has been expressed in the thesis that human beings are by nature evil. When it is represented as original sin [*Erb-sünde*], then inheritance [*Erblichkeit*] is a form that exists for representation, a form of popular guise.³³ In this way the primordial state according to the concept hovers before the imagination of [all] peoples, and this primordial state is oneness. But they express this primordiality as either a past or a future state. What is primordial as a state, however, is | savagery, while on the other hand what is primordial in thought is the concept, which realizes itself by releasing itself from the form of its naturalness.

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We find in the Bible a well-known story [*Vorstellung*] abstractly termed *the fall*. This representation is very profound and is not just a contingent history but the eternal and necessary history of humanity—though it is indeed expressed here in an external and mythical mode. For this reason there are bound to be inconsistencies in this representation. In its vitality the idea can be grasped only by thought and can be presented only by thought; when it is expressed in sensible imagery, then, of necessity, elements that will not fit together must emerge. Therefore the story is not without inconsistencies. But the essential or basic features of the idea are contained in it: namely that, although human beings are implicitly this unity, they depart from this in-itself or leave the natural state behind because they are spirit, so that they must come into distinction, into (primal) division, must come to judgment between what is theirs and what

33. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: What this implies is that human beings, insofar as they live only according to nature and follow their heart, i.e., what merely springs up spontaneously, their inclinations, ought to regard themselves as not being as they ought to be.

is natural. Only thus do they first know God and the good. When one knows this, one has it as the object of consciousness; and when one has it as the object of consciousness, then, as an individual, one distinguishes oneself from it. So if the idea, that which is in and for itself, is portrayed mythically in the mode of a temporal process, then inconsistency is unavoidable.

The basic features of this representation are as follows [cf. Gen. 3]. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil portrayed in it belongs to the sensible mode; we see that straightaway. Then the story says that human beings let themselves be led astray and ate this fruit, and in this way they came to the knowledge of good and evil. This is called the fall, as if they had come only to the knowledge of evil, and had become only evil; but they came equally to the knowledge of good. The story says that this should not have happened. But on the one hand it is involved in the concept of spirit that human beings must come to the knowledge of good and evil.³⁴

426 As for what the story | says—that they ought not to have come to this knowledge—this too is involved in the idea, inasmuch as reflection, or the rupture of consciousness, is contained in this knowledge of good and evil. In other words, there is posited here the cleavage that is freedom, the abstraction of freedom. Insofar as human beings exist for themselves (i.e., they are free), good and evil exist for them and they have the choice between the two. This standpoint of formal freedom in which human beings are face-to-face with good and evil and stand above both, are lords of both, is³⁵ a standpoint that ought not to be—though not, of course, in the sense that it should not be at all or should not arise. On the contrary, it is necessary for the sake of freedom, else humanity is not free, and is not spirit; rather it is a standpoint that must be sublated, that must

34. *W₂ (Var) reads:* But it is involved in the concept of humanity that it should come to knowledge; in other words, spirit consists in becoming cognitive consciousness. *L (1827?) adds:* However, as already noted, humans know nothing of good if they know nothing of evil. And yet this knowledge is also essential; humans *are* human and rational *only* to the extent that they have this consciousness, this knowledge, of good and evil.

35. *W₂ (Var) reads:* the cleavage and reflection constitute freedom, implying that the human being has a choice between the two sides of the antithesis and stands before us as lord over good and evil; so we have

come to an end with reconciliation, in the union with the good.³⁶ Consciousness grasps the double aspect within itself: on the one hand this cleavage, namely that together with reflection and freedom it contains within itself the bad or evil, that which ought not to be; on the other hand, however, it is likewise the principle or source of healing, of freedom, i.e., it is spirit. It is also clear that both aspects are contained in the story. The one aspect, that the standpoint of cleavage ought not to persist, is implied by the statement that a crime has been committed, something that ought not to be, ought not to endure. It was the serpent who said: "You will be like God."³⁷ The arrogance of freedom is the standpoint that ought not to persist. The other aspect, that the cleavage ought to persist, insofar as it contains the source of its healing, is expressed in the speech of God: "Behold, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil." So what the serpent said was no lie; | on the contrary, even God himself corroborated it. But this verse is usually overlooked, or else nothing is said about it.

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So we can say that it is the eternal story of human freedom that we do go forth out of this stupor, in which we are in our earliest years, and come to the light of consciousness, or, speaking more precisely altogether, that there is good for us and also evil.³⁸ So far as we apprehend what is actually there in this portrayal, it is the same as what appeared again later in the Christian religion,³⁹ namely that human beings, as spirit, must come to reconciliation.⁴⁰ That is the genuine idea in contrast with the mere image of paradise, or this stupefied innocence devoid of consciousness and will.

36. W_2 (Var) reads: that must be sublated. It is not, however, one that should not make its appearance at all, the truth rather being that this standpoint of cleavage terminates, according to its own nature, in reconciliation.

37. W_2 (Var) reads: Thus it is said that the serpent beguiled humanity with its lies.

38. L (1827?) adds: On the one hand this standpoint also involves cleavage, formal freedom, evil, pride; here human beings have the choice between good and evil, so that it is also necessary for them to emerge from this standpoint, to the extent that it is a standpoint of cleavage.

39. Thus Hu ; L , W (Var) read: is in the idea,

40. L (1827?) adds, similar in W : or, to put it superficially, that they must become good, must fulfill their vocation. In order for this to come about, this standpoint of reflective consciousness, or cleavage, is [L , W_1 : no less necessary. W_2 : no less necessary than the abandonment of it.]

428 That in that initial state human beings had the most perfect acquaintance with the good and with nature has certainly been an accepted notion, but it is quite absurd.⁴¹ I have this brief comment about it. The laws | of nature and the like are discovered only through meditative thinking, and it is only the maturest meditation that arrives at the knowledge that these things are in accord with the idea; this thinking is in utter contrast with immediate knowledge.

As for the historical data that have been appealed to [in support of the claim] that the oldest religions and sciences still contain remains of earlier sciences, it is partly untrue and partly based upon the earlier erroneous historical accounts of the lofty knowledge of the Indians and the Chinese. Since we in Europe have become acquainted with the sources, such notions have shown to be invalid. Thus, for example, Delambre has exposed the false assertions of Bailly⁴² regarding Indian astronomical records.⁴³

41. *W (Var) reads*: had the highest knowledge of nature and of God, occupied the highest standpoint of science, is a foolish view, and one which, moreover, [has] been shown to be quite unfounded historically.

42. [Ed.] The view that the earliest tangible evidences of scientific knowledge are simply the remains of the science of an earlier, forgotten period was fairly widespread at the end of the eighteenth century. See, e.g., Jean-Sylvain Bailly, *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne depuis son origine jusqu'à l'établissement de l'école d'Alexandrie*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1781), pp. 106–107. Hegel believed that Bailly's view of the matter—which was shared by Schelling, *Treatise on "The Deities of Samothrace,"* pp. 25, 37 (cf. *Sämtliche Werke* 8:362, 416–417), although Schelling was here referring to Greek mythology and the Kabbala rather than Chinese and Indian mythology—had been refuted by Jean-Joseph Delambre in his *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1817), esp. pp. vi, xix, 400.

43. *W (1831) reads*: When Indian literature was first discovered, it was said that the huge chronological numbers point to a very great age of the culture and appear to yield quite new information. Recently, however, we have been compelled to abandon this [implausible] Indian chronology, [*W*₁: for in a few places the numbers express ratios or orders of magnitude, but are otherwise quite meaningless. *W*₂: for the numbers express no prosaic conditions whatever as regards years or recollection of the past.] The Indians are also said to possess great astronomical knowledge; they have formulae for calculating the eclipses of the sun and the moon, but they use them in a quite mechanical way, without knowing what is presupposed in them or how to derive the formulae. More recently, however, the astronomical and mathematical knowledge of these peoples has been more closely investigated.^a A distinctive cultural tradition is acknowledged to be undoubtedly present here, but in these branches of knowledge the level that they reached was still far below that of the Greeks. The astronomical formulae are so needlessly involved that they are far behind the methods of the Greeks,

b. The Forms of Nature Religion

Let us sum up as briefly as possible our discussion of this initial form of religion, or nature religion; knowledge of God in the universal sense belongs to religion generally, and we can assume at least this much, that God is spirit. Hence nature religion contains the spiritual moment directly,⁴⁴ so that the spiritual is the highest reality for human beings.

This rules out the view that nature religion is one in which human beings revere natural objects as God. Reverence for natural objects does indeed play a part in it, but in a secondary way. Even in the basest religion the spiritual is, for human beings as such, always nobler than the natural; for instance, the sun is not | nobler than a spiritual being for them. Hence nature religion is not a religion in which external, physical objects are taken to be God and are revered as God; instead it is a religion in which the noblest element for human beings is what is spiritual, but the spiritual [recognized] first in its immediate and natural mode. The initial and natural mode is the human being, this existing human being. Inasmuch as it is natural, therefore, nature religion has the natural within it, but not sheer external or physical naturalness; it has a spiritual side at the same time, but what is *naturally* spiritual, this human being here present and sensibly facing us.⁴⁵ The spiritual element is not the idea of humanity, Adam Kadmon, the primordial human being,⁴⁶

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let alone our own; genuine science is precisely that which seeks to reduce its problems to the simplest elements. These complicated formulae point, no doubt, to a praiseworthy diligence, to painstaking effort, but more than that is not to be found in them; what they rest on is long-continued observations.

[Ed.] ^aIn addition to the work by Delambre cited in the preceding note, Hegel could be referring to a number of works on Indian astronomy. See, e.g., *Asiatic Researches*, vols. 8 (J. Bentley), 5 (F. Wilford), 2 (W. Jones).

44. W (Var) adds: and therefore essentially,

45. W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads: In its beginnings, or as immediate religion, the religion of nature means this: the spiritual, a human being, even in its natural mode, ranks as what is highest. This religion does not have the merely externally and physically natural element as its object, but the *spiritually* natural, this human being as the one actually facing us.

46. [Ed.] The idea of Adam Kadmon as receiving and transmitting the divine primal energy is referred to by August Neander in his *Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme* (Berlin, 1818), pp. 88 ff., 102. Hegel drew heavily from this work.

or the Son of God—those are more developed images only present through thinking and for thought. Therefore it is not the thought-image of human beings in their universal essentiality, but rather this particular and natural human being. It is the religion of the spiritual in its externality, naturalness, and immediacy, that is to say, this human being here present, immediately and sensibly facing us. This is another reason why it concerns us to become acquainted with nature religion, in order to make us conscious that God is always a present reality for human beings from time immemorial, and in order to bring us back in this way from the abstract otherworldliness of God.

The way forward from this initial, abstract determination is for spirit to be purified of this externality and naturalness, this sensible immediacy, and to be known as spirit in thought, i.e., that human beings should attain to the representation of spirit as spirit in both their imagination and their thought.⁴⁷

The *first* religion is this, that consciousness of the highest is consciousness of a human being as dominion, power, and lordship over nature. This first religion, if we can call it that, is the religion of
430 *magic*. |

^{48 49} The *second* form, which contains the higher element, is no longer the human being in the immediate, natural state, in immediate

47. *L* (1827?) *adds*: Such is the definition of the field of nature religion, of which we see different forms; for the sphere of the natural is always the mutual externality of distinct elements.

48. *In B's margin*: 19 June 1827

49. *W₂* (1831) *reads* (*parallel in main text follows*): The way forward from this first form of religion is for spirit to be purified from externality, from sensible immediacy, and attain to the representation of spirit as spirit in both imagination and thought.

The interesting feature in this advance is just the objectifying of spirit, i.e., that spirit becomes purely objective and comes to have the meaning of universal spirit.

II.

The Inward Rupture of Consciousness within Itself

The first step forward is for the consciousness of a substantive power, and the powerlessness of the immediate will, to enter on the scene. Since God is here known as the absolute power, this is not yet the religion of freedom. For although the entry of a substantive power upon the scene of consciousness means that humanity does rise above itself, and although the essential differentiation of spirit is accomplished,

still, since this power on high is known *as* power and is not yet further determined, the particular is something merely accidental, merely negative and of no account. Everything subsists by means of this power; in other words, it is itself the subsistence of everything, so that the freedom of subsisting-for-self is not yet recognized. This is pantheism.

This power, which is something thought, is not yet known as a thought product or as inwardly spiritual. Since it must now have a spiritual mode of existence but does not yet have the moment of being free on its own account within itself, it once more has the moment of spirituality only in one human being, who is known as this power.

In the elevation of spirit with which we are here concerned, the point of departure is the finite, the contingent, this being defined as the negative, and the universal, self-subsistent essence as that in which and through which this finite is something negative, something posited. Substance, on the contrary, is what is not posited, the self-subsistent, the power in relation to the finite.

Now the consciousness that elevates itself does so as thought, but without having a consciousness regarding this universal thought, without expressing it in the form of thought. And to begin with, the elevation is an upward movement only. The other movement is the converse one, namely, that this necessary element has returned to the finite. In the first movement the finite forgets itself. The second is the relationship of substance to the finite. Since God is determined here only as the substance of the finite and the power over it, he himself is still undetermined. He is not yet known to be inwardly determined on his own account; he is not yet known as spirit.

On this general basis several forms take shape, progressive attempts to grasp substance as self-determining.

1. To begin with (in the religion of China), substance is known as the simple foundation, and so is immediately present in the finite or contingent.

The progress made by consciousness comes from the fact that even though substance is not yet grasped as spirit, spirit is nonetheless the truth implicitly underlying all the phenomena of consciousness and that therefore even at this stage nothing can be lacking of what pertains to the concept of spirit. So here too, substance will determine itself as subject, but the question is how it does this. At this point the determinations of spirit, which are present implicitly, come on the scene in an external mode. Complete determinateness, the culminating point of the shape of being-for-self, of the unity of being-for-self, is now posited externally, in the sense that an actually present human being [*ein präsenter Mensch*] is known as the universal power.

This consciousness is already apparent in the Chinese religion, where the emperor is at all events what wields or actuates the power.

2. In Hinduism substance is no longer known merely as foundation, but as abstract unity, and this abstract unity is also more nearly akin to spirit, since spirit is itself this abstract unity as ego. In raising itself to its inner abstract unity, humanity raises itself here to the unity of substance, identifies itself with it, and thus gives it existence. Some by nature partake in the existence of this unity, while others are capable of rising to it.

Of course, the unity that is here the dominant element does also attempt to unfold itself. The true unfolding, and the negativity that grasps all differences at once, would be spirit, which determines itself inwardly and becomes apparent to itself in its subjectivity. This subjectivity of spirit would give it a content worthy of it, and this

self-consciousness, or in subjective desires, but instead the human being as entering into self and concentrating self internally, so that
 431 this inwardness | is the essential, higher, powerful and ruling factor. This second form is the human being as *being within self* or *self-contained* [*in sich seiend*].

The *third* form is then this, that human consciousness (albeit self-
 432 contained and withdrawn into itself) is at the same time outside | this abstraction of being-within-self, that the concrete is not situated in the self-containment as such but is instead a disintegration into endlessly many powers, configurations, and universal moments, which stand in connection with the self-contained essentiality, and which are more or less *imaginative forms of this essentiality*.⁷

The *fourth* form is the incipient separation from the immediate individual, *incipient severance or objectification* of what is known as *the highest*. This has two shapes. In the first, the simple is set against the concrete in this objectification; but this simple aspect is

content would itself have a spiritual nature too. But in the present case the characteristic of naturalness still remains, inasmuch as an advance is made to differentiation and unfolding *only*, and the moments occur in an isolated fashion alongside one another. Thus the unfolding that is necessary in the concept of spirit is here itself devoid of spirit. Hence one is sometimes at a loss to find the spirit unfolded in nature religion. This is the case, for instance, with the image of the incarnation and the triad in Hindu religion. Moments will be found that pertain to spirit, but they are interpreted in such a way that at the same time they do not pertain to it. The characteristics occur in isolated fashion and present themselves as falling to pieces. Thus the triad in Hinduism does not become the Trinity since only absolute spirit has the power over its own moments.

The representation of nature religion evinces major difficulties in this respect; it is everywhere inconsistent, and inwardly contradictory. Thus on the one hand the spiritual, which is essentially free, is posited, while on the other hand it is represented in natural determinacy, in a [state of] singularity, with a content that has hard-and-fast particularity, and that is therefore wholly inappropriate to spirit, since it is only as free spirit that spirit is genuine.

3. In the last form that belongs to this stage, that of the cleavage of consciousness, the concrete embodiment and presence of substance subsists and lives in *one* individual, and the unstable unfolding of the unity that was peculiar to the previous form is sublated at least to the extent that it is nullified and evaporated. This is Lamaism or Buddhism.

Before proceeding to consider more closely the historical existence of this religion, we have [to discuss] the general determinacy of this whole stage and its metaphysical concept. More precisely, we have here to define the concept of elevation and the relationship of substance to the finite.

still abstract, and in a natural mode, though it equally contains the spiritual determination within it. Accordingly the⁵⁰ second shape of the objectification of the substantial consists in the fact that the concept of subjectivity or of the concrete, the development of the concrete and this development as totality, come to consciousness explicitly in the subject.

These are the four forms of the religion of nature. As noted, these configurations or determinations are existing configurations of religion; so the course of these forms or determinations of spirit is at the same time the foundation of the history of religion.⁵¹ 433

1. The Religion of Magic⁵²

a. *The Concept of Magic*

⁵³We shall discuss now the first stage of nature religion, the religion of magic, which we may deem unworthy of the name "religion." In order to grasp this standpoint of religion we must forget all the representations and thoughts that we are perhaps so familiar with and that themselves belong to the most superficial habits of our culture.⁵⁴ We must consider human beings all by themselves | upon 434

50. L (*Var*) reads: this

51. L (1827?) adds: Beyond nature religion and in the religion of beauty and sublimity God for the first time emerges—partly in thought, partly in phantasy—in distinctive independence as free vis-à-vis the immediate individual.

52. [Ed.] The treatment of the religion of magic is briefer in 1827 than in 1824 since Buddhism/Lamaism is no longer considered under this category. The section is also organized differently since now the phenomenology of primitive religious consciousness is concentrated in subsection a and examples of the religion of magic are in subsection b. While the latter are taken almost verbatim from 1824, the former differs considerably from the earlier lectures. Now all the "less developed" forms of magic involve a direct exercise of power over nature, from which is distinguished only a "more developed" form of magic—the religion of ancient China, the treatment of which is also revised considerably (see below, n. 96).

53. W₁ (Ed) adds: It has to be regarded from both sides, as the religion of magical power and as that of being-within-self.

1. The Religion of Magical Power.

54. W₂ (1831) adds: For natural consciousness, which is what we here have before us, the prosaic categories such as cause and effect are not yet valid, and natural things are not yet degraded into external things.

Religion has its soil only in spirit. The spiritual knows itself as the power over the natural, it knows that nature is not what has being in and for itself. This

the earth, the tent of the heavens above them and nature round about them, and so, to begin with, without any reflective thought,⁵⁵ altogether devoid of consciousness of anything universal; only on this basis do more worthy concepts of God emerge.

It is difficult to get the sense of an alien religion from within. "To put oneself in the place of a dog requires the sensibilities of a dog."⁵⁶ We are cognizant of the nature of such living objects, but we cannot possibly know what it would mean to transpose ourselves into their place, so that we could sense their determinate limits; for that would mean filling the totality of one's subjectivity wholly with "these characteristics. They remain always objects of our thought, not of our subjectivity, of our feeling; we can grasp such religions, but we cannot get the sense of them from within. We can grasp the Greek divinities, but we cannot get the inner sense of genuine adoration toward a divine image of that kind."⁵⁷

But the first nature religion is much more remote from the totality of our consciousness than this."⁵⁸ Human beings in that situation

[knowledge] constitutes the categories of the understanding, in which nature is grasped as the other of spirit and spirit is grasped as what is genuine. This basic determination is the starting point for religion.

Immediate religion, in contrast, is that in which spirit is still natural, and where the distinction between spirit as absolute power and spirit as what is single, contingent, transient, and accidental has not yet been drawn. This distinction, the antithesis between universal spirit (as universal power and essence) and subjective existence (with its contingency), has not yet entered into play. It forms the second stage within nature religion.

In the primal, immediate religion, here in this immediacy, humanity still knows no higher power than itself. There is, to be sure, a power over contingent life, over its purposes and interests, but this is still no essential power, as a universal in and for itself, but falls within the compass of humanity itself. The spiritual subsists in a singular, immediate mode.

55. *W (Var) adds:* or elevation to thinking.

56. *An reads:* We have the representational image of the elephant, but to think ourselves completely into its nature is beyond our capability; to do so we would have to have an elephant's nature.

57. *An reads:* have a representation of the Greek religion of beauty. We can understand it, and its gods, and grasp them in thought, but we cannot bend the knee to them.

58. *W₂ (Var) reads:* a singular determination of this kind, so that it would become *our* determinateness. We cannot enter experientially in this way even into religions that approach more nearly to our [own] consciousness; they cannot for a single moment become *our* determinateness to the point that we would, for example, worship the

still exist in a state of immediate desire, force, and action, behaving in accord with their immediate will. They do not yet pose any theoretical questions such as: "Where does this come from?" "Who made it?" and "Must it have a cause?" This inward divorce of objects into a contingent and an essential | aspect, into a causative aspect 435 and the aspect of something merely posited, or of an effect, does not yet occur for them. Similarly, even the will in them is not yet theoretical; there is not yet this rupture in them, nor any inhibition toward themselves. The theoretical element in willing is what we call the universal, right, duty—i.e., laws, firm specifications, limits for the subjective will. These are thoughts, universal forms that belong to the thought of freedom. They are distinct from subjective arbitrariness, desire, and inclination; all of the latter are restrained and controlled by the universal, or are conformed to this universal; the natural willing of desire is transformed into willing and acting in accord with such universal viewpoints.

But here human beings are still undivided with regard to willing; desire⁵⁹ is the governing factor here. Similarly in their representations, in the imagination of these human beings, they "carry on"⁶⁰ in this undivided state, this benighted condition, a stupor in the theoretical domain and a wildness of will. This is just spirit's primitive and wild reliance upon itself. There is indeed a fear present here, a consciousness of negation, though not yet the fear of the Lord; it is instead the fear of contingency, of the forces of nature, which display themselves as mighty powers over against humanity.⁶¹ The fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of wisdom,⁶² is fear before a spiritually self-sufficient being opposed to arbitrariness. This fear

Greek statue of a god, however beautiful it might be. And the stage of immediate religion is still further off—as remote from us as it can be. *L (Var) adds*: In this case one must forget just those views that are most commonly accepted. *W₂ (Var) continues*: since in order to make it intelligible to ourselves we have to forget all the forms current in our culture.

59. *W₂ (Var) adds*: and wildness of will

60. *Thus W; L reads*: maintain themselves *An reads*: hold themselves *Hu reads*: relate themselves

61. *W₁ (Ed) adds*: We have here to deal (a) with magic in general, (b) with the characteristics of the religion of magic, and (c) with the cultus.

62. [*Ed.*] See Ps. 111:10; Prov. 1:7; Job 28:28.

first enters human experience when in one's singularity one knows oneself to be powerless, when one's singularity is inwardly shaken. The beginning of wisdom is when singular privateness and subjectivity senses itself as not being what is true, and, in the consciousness of its singularization and impotence, by way of negation, it passes over to knowledge, to universal being-in-and-for-self.

436 This earliest form of religion—although one may well refuse to call it religion—is that for which we have the name “magic.” To be precise, it is the claim that the spiritual aspect is the power over nature; | but this spiritual aspect is not yet present as spirit, is not yet present in its universality. Instead the spiritual is at first just the singular and contingent human self-consciousness which, in spite of being only sheer desire, self-consciously knows itself to be nobler than nature, and knows that self-consciousness is a power transcending nature.⁶³

Two different points are to be noted here. First, insofar as immediate self-consciousness knows that this power lies within it, that it is the locus of this power, in the state where it is such a power it certainly distinguishes itself altogether from its ordinary state. When human beings do ordinary things, such as eating, drinking, sleeping, and the like, when they go about their simple occupations, they are concerned with particular objects; in these pursuits they know that they are dealing just with these things, for instance in fishing or hunting.⁶⁴ Consciousness of this ordinary existence “with its instincts”⁶⁵ and its activity is one thing, whereas the consciousness of oneself as having power over the general “vicissitude”⁶⁶ of nature is another matter altogether. In the latter case individuals do not know themselves [to be engaged] in ordinary activities and instincts; rather one knows that, insofar as one is a higher power,

63. *L* (1827?) *adds*: So the main characteristic of this sphere is the direct mastery of nature by the will, by self-consciousness, the fact that spirit is something higher than nature. However bad this appears in one perspective, it is nonetheless higher than the situation where humanity is dependent on nature, and afraid of it.

64. *W*₂ (*Var*) *adds*: and they confine their energy to that activity alone.

65. *W* (*Var*) *reads*: and instincts *Cf. An*: where human beings are only conscious of the existence of nature and make use of natural objects, in pursuit of their desires

66. *W*₂ (*Var*) *reads*: power of nature, and over the vicissitudes

one must transport oneself into a higher state, distinct from ordinary consciousness. This higher state is the state and gift of particular human beings—and these are the magicians⁶⁷—who transport themselves into it in order to be this power.⁶⁸ |

The second point is that this power is a direct power over nature generally, one not to be compared with the indirect power that we exercise upon natural objects in their singularity. Such power of trained persons over single natural and perceptible things presupposes that they have already stepped back from the world, that the world has acquired externality in their eyes, that they have accorded to it over against them an autonomy, specific qualitative characteristics and laws, that these perceptible things are also relative to one another in their qualitative determinacy and stand in a web of connections with one another. The specially trained person exercises a power⁶⁹ through familiarity with the qualities of perceptible things, i.e., of⁷⁰ things as they are relative to other things; that is where something else has an impact upon them and their vulnerability is manifest. One learns to know this susceptibility, and through it acts upon things by equipping oneself with a means through which one lays hold of⁷¹ this weakness. One brings external things into such a connection that they act upon one another according to one's purpose. Thus it is the one trained [in traditional lore] who freely releases [the power of] the world in its quality and qualitative connections. This really entails that human beings are free—inwardly free. For only free persons can allow the external world, other human beings, and natural things to confront them freely. But for the one who is not free, others are not free either. Only from the standpoint where human beings are inwardly free, and set the world free to confront them, does *indirect influence* upon natural things, a mediating dominion over nature, fall within their

67. Thus Hu, similar in B; An reads: not of races and strict castes

68. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: and who have to learn by tradition the ways of utilizing this state. There is a select group of individuals who go to the elders for instruction, and who sense within themselves this obscure inwardness.

69. W (Var) reads: This power, which freely releases [the power of] the world in its qualitative aspect, is exercised by the specially trained person

70. W (Var) reads: with

71. W (Var) adds: and capitalizes on

power and range of vision. In contrast, a *direct efficacy* of human beings by means of representation and will presupposes a corresponding absence of freedom, in which power over external things is indeed vested in human beings as the spiritual factor, but not as a power that behaves in a free manner. For this reason it does not behave in a mediating fashion, over against what is free; instead the
 438 power over nature has in this case a direct relationship—and | that is magic. Now, in the self-consciousness of these peoples this is the noblest feature;⁷² and it continues to insinuate itself deeply into other, higher religions in a secondary way, for instance the practice of witchcraft in Christendom, and of invoking devils. But, on the one hand, it is there known to be unavailing, and on the other hand it is regarded as something unfitting and godless.

Prayer has been regarded (even in the Kantian philosophy, for example) as if it were a kind of magic, because human beings want to effect and bring forth something not by means of natural mediation but directly from the spirit.⁷³ But the distinction is that, in turning to God in prayer, one is turning to an absolute will for which even the single individual is the object of care, which can grant the petition or not, and which in so doing is altogether determined by the furtherance of the good. But it is black magic when, at their own subjective caprice, human beings have the spirits or the devil under their control and compel them to do whatever they wish.⁷⁴ There is a mediation in this case, too, but one where the human will conjures and commands them, and those powers of nature obey it. From the standpoint of magic the human will is the authority and the higher powers are at its disposal.

This is the general characterization of this first and wholly immediate standpoint, i.e., that human⁷⁵ consciousness, this

72. W (Var) reads: As far as the outward existence of this view is concerned, it is found in a form that implies that this magic is what is highest in the self-consciousness of [these] peoples;

73. [Ed.] See Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960), pp. 182–183 (on prayer as an illusion), 165–166 (on the illusion of thinking one can conjure up divine assistance by magic).

74. Thus An; L (Var) reads, similar in W: But magic consists precisely in the fact that, in their own natural state of desire, human beings have [L: nature W: it] in their power.

75. Thus W; Hu reads: the first human L reads: natural

human being in his own will, is known as power over the natural. But what is meant by “natural” here has by no means any wider scope; the natural objects [controlled] are the things that immediately surround one. The universal form that nature possesses for the will is: “That is just how it is”—without the application of any meditative thought. Human beings are at first insensible toward the environment, toward the stirring of nature. The sun rises and sets, and they observe it daily but remain unmoved; it becomes for them something they are used to. What is on the whole stable—day and night, the seasons—is just what *is*; that is what they are accustomed to. What touches or awakens interest in them is a disruption of the stable, i.e., such unstable conditions as earthquakes, thunderstorms, protracted drought, flood, rapacious beasts or enemies.⁷⁶

b. Less Developed Religions of Magic

⁷⁷Now we are going to cite more detailed descriptions of how these types of magic have developed in human societies. The religion of magic is still found today among wholly crude and barbarous peoples such as the Eskimos. Thus Captain Ross—and others, such as Parry⁷⁸—discovered Eskimos who knew no other world than their icy rocks. When interviewed, these people said that they had no representation of God, or of immortality and the like. They do hold the sun and moon in awe. But they have only magicians or conjurers, who claim the authority to produce rain and gales, or to cause a whale to approach them. They say that they have learned their art

76. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?)* reads: as in our view of it. For at this stage the greater part of nature is still indifferent to humans, or is just as they are accustomed to see it. Everything is stable. Earthquakes, thunderstorms, floods, menacing beasts, enemies, etc., are another matter. To defend themselves against these they have recourse to magic.

77. *In B's margin*: 21 June 1827

78. [Ed.] John Ross, *A Voyage of Discovery, Made under the Orders of the Admiralty, in His Majesty's Ships Isabella and Alexander, for the Purpose of Exploring Baffin's Bay, and Enquiring into the Probability of a North-West Passage*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (London, 1819), 1:168–169, 175–178, 179–180; William Edward Parry, *Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific* (London, 1821). We know that Hegel was familiar with Ross's account, but not necessarily Parry's. See 1824 lectures, nn. 109, 110.

from ancient magicians (“angekoks”). These magicians put themselves into a wild state; their gestures make no sense. One could hear them invoke the ocean, but their words were not directed to a higher essence; they only have to do with natural objects. They have no representation of a universal essence. For example, someone asked one of them where the Eskimos believed they go after death. He replied that they were buried. In ages past an old man had indeed said they might go into the moon, but no rational Eskimo believes that any longer.

We still find this form widespread in Africa, and it is developed more fully among the Mongols and the Chinese. Long ago Herodotus said that the Africans are all magicians.⁷⁹ In whatever historical period people became acquainted with them, they were invariably characterized in this way. So in Africa, too, there are particular individuals whom we would term priests, and who are called Singhili. As do the shamans among the Mongols, | these people also transport themselves into a state of ecstasy, a wild state of stupefaction. This state is the higher standpoint that they attain in contrast with ordinary consciousness and ordinary action. Among the populace there are particular individuals who dedicate themselves to this ecstatic state and are esteemed for that reason; or else there is a particular family that is highly respected alongside the king and that exercises particular power over the tribe.

Where their condition is more developed, so that they form a kind of state, an aristocracy or monarchy, these magicians do not constitute a particular priestly caste, but instead the king himself is at the head of these Singhili; he both participates in such activities himself and also delegates them to his ministers; he makes these individuals into persons whose task is to exercise such authority. In contrast, among tribes where this type of organization is not prevalent, the clan or tribe always retains power even over these magicians. But these magicians do not possess a secure worldly power. When the people need their help, they bring them gifts; if the magicians refuse, then even violence is used against them [and they are] terribly ill-treated. The special occasions for their recourse

79. [Ed.] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.33.

to the magicians are in storms that last a long time and against which they cannot protect themselves, during sickness, and when they are of a mind to wage war.⁸⁰ Here therefore we have “immediate” human beings, who ascribe to themselves this [direct] dominion over nature, or to whom it is ascribed.

Regarding the Africans, who still stand essentially at the stage of direct magic, we can indeed say that they also progress a small step further through their veneration of the dead, in that they ascribe power over nature to the deceased, to their departed relatives. A dead person is already no longer a wholly sensible | immediacy and singularity, but is elevated into the form of representation and is not in the immediate present. If the representation is stressed, then the deceased has lost sensible singularity and already partakes in the character of something more universal, something elevated to thought. At this stage the dead, the departed ancestors or relatives, do not receive veneration in the strict sense; there is here no cult of the dead, but instead present [ill] effects are to some extent attributed to them, and a remedy for these ills is sought from them. The onset of this trouble is attributed to them, but people turn to them for averting it as well. What we call “natural” these people still do not yet know to be natural; they know nothing of natural causality. So they attribute sickness, for example, not just to a living enemy but more especially to a dead one who has projected hatred upon the diseased person. For they represent the departed not as transfigured, but as wholly subject to sensible passions and necessities like those that the living themselves have. In the same way, too, a calamity of a different kind, such as crop failure and the like, is attributed to them.

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Some of the bones of the dead are carefully preserved, and when one wishes to make use of them or they are supposed to render a service, then service or reverence is shown to them, a procession is made to them, an adoration or ablution performed. People even carry

80. *Thus B, An, Hu; L (Var) reads:* For example, if there is no rain or persistent drought, the priest must help them and must undertake the requisite ceremony; if he does not come willingly, he is dragged along forcibly and is ill-treated. Thus it is the will of the king or of the ordinary people, the will of the tribe; they have in their hands someone to whom they ascribe direct power [over nature].

them along with them in valuable coffers, especially the skulls of slain enemies through which, they believe, they have at their disposal might against the tribes to which those enemies belonged.

442 ⁸¹A missionary (Cavazzi)⁸² tells of terrible phenomena concerning the Jaga—a tribe from the south of Africa, from the Congo, with which the Portuguese had extensive dealings. They had a queen who had given laws to them. All the wilder types of magic were present among them to the highest degree, and the queen is supposed to have introduced the veneration of the dead, or at least made it into the sole cultus. If their Singhili want to produce rain, then sacrifices are brought to the dead; | they make gestures toward the sky, they address, entreat, command, scold, and threaten the sky, they take rods in their hands and strike out against the sky and spit at it; and when a cloud makes an appearance they redouble their entreaties, and when the rain will not come they utter the greatest abuse at the sky, shoot arrows toward it, and swear that they will treat it badly.⁸³

The missionaries describe in detail different scenes that they observed. When it is a matter of making the sick well, one goes to the magician, who then declares the reason for the sickness; it is some enmity, and the enemies, in particular those who are deceased, must be compelled to desist from their vengeance. The precise way of accomplishing this is frightful, and usually it is accompanied by murder. The Singhili and all about begin a fearsome shrieking that lasts for several hours. One of their views about this is that the magician compels a dead person to enter into him and to disclose what must occur in order to have power or in order to conciliate another dead person—murder, gruesome practices, or bloody sacrifices. Also, the Singhili then states that he needs two human beings who must be sacrificed, and designates them from the

81. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: So the dead play here an especially large role.

82. [Ed.] J. A. Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung der in dem unteren occidentalischen Mohrenland ligenden drey Königreichen Congo, Matamba, und Angola* (Munich, 1694), p. 233 (*Istorica descrizione de' tre regni Congo, Matamba, et Angola situati nell'Etiopia inferiore occidentale* [Bologna, 1687], pp. 198–199). Since it is not certain whether Hegel used the German or the Italian edition, we give the Italian page references in parentheses. The Jaga were leaders of one of the fiercest of the Bantu tribes of the Congo basin, the Bangala of Kwango, who were cannibals.

83. [Ed.] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 250–251 (p. 215).

bystanders, takes a knife, stabs them, drinks their blood, distributes their pieces among the bystanders, and the whole company devours their flesh. Such bloody sacrifices are very common.⁸⁴ It is recounted of that queen of the Jaga that, in order to be strong in war, she pounded her own son in a mortar and, in company with her female companions, devoured his flesh and drank his blood.⁸⁵ What is evident here is precisely the frightful means through which [natural] human beings seek to raise themselves above ordinary consciousness, to make themselves aware of something higher—an elevation that manifests itself here in that horrible expedient of murdering human persons according to chance.

It is told of another king that when war was imminent, he consulted with the Singhili and received from them the instruction that during the night he should sound his horn and so give his bodyguards the sign⁸⁶ to murder all of those they might encounter on the street. Thirty years ago an English ambassador found himself in this capital and, together with his entourage, he escaped destruction only because that secret was made public and he was warned. The resolution was actually carried out, and although not very many succumbed, this nightly havoc nevertheless continued for seventeen days.⁸⁷

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In all these cases we see a uniquely special elevation above immediate consciousness, and one that involves representations of the deceased, who on the one hand are regarded as powers⁸⁸ and yet on the other are compelled to do whatever those still alive want them to do. This goes so far that the Negroes, who with their still wild sense have not yet attained to a universal rationality, encounter the deceased in dreams and are tormented by these dead persons;

84. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 259–264 (pp. 223–227).

85. [Ed.] Ibid., pp. 218–219 (pp. 187–188).

86. *Thus An; Hu reads*: there was a great procession to the grave of the enemy king, and there they prayed; then a command was issued, on behalf of the king,

87. [Ed.] See T. E. Bowdich, *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee* (London, 1819), pp. 419–421. Bowdich does not actually refer to the Singhili but only to “the officers whose duty it is to attend at sacrifices”; and according to him the sign was given by drum rather than horn. In other respects Hegel’s account is accurate but condensed.

88. *In B’s margin*: 22 June 1827

various magical means are adopted against this. When their bodies still exist they are disinterred, the head is struck off, and the fluid from it is given to the tormented persons to drink, in order to cause the deceased pain and to take power from them.⁸⁹ In this way the empirical self-consciousness remains very much the master and has no other dominion over against it.

On this account every illness is supposed to be the consequence of an enmity, and in this connection they think the same thing about death too. Therefore they do not want human beings to appear to die of natural causes. Sick people, especially kings, are killed by them. If a king grows ill or old, then they do not let things get to the point where he would be killed by a hostile nature, but instead they slay him themselves. Dissatisfied chiefs seek by that means to get rid of the king themselves. If a king rules too harshly, then they inform him that he must die—he is allowed to determine the ceremonies himself.⁹⁰ In other words, they find it fitting that a human being should die through human will. Natural causation or connection is not yet present to the spirit of this | people; they attribute everything
 444 evil to the ill will of human beings, living as well as dead, or to other nonnatural forces; everything is explained in an unnatural manner and attributed to something else. This representation further intensifies into what we call “the devil.” Belzoni,⁹¹ an Italian who brought great treasures with him from Egypt, also transported a colossal head of Memnon to England, a stupendous work. The Egyptians had always seen this head lying on the bank of the Nile; but when they were motivated by monetary payment to carry this great head into the ship, and had indeed handled it themselves, they were very frightened and—despite the fact that they had done it—attributed the movement to the power of the devil.

The Negroes have an endless multitude of “divine images”⁹²

89. [Ed.] Cavazzi, *Historische Beschreibung*, pp. 257–258 (pp. 221–223).

90. [Ed.] Hegel is possibly referring to the same report which he gives at much greater length in his philosophy-of-history lectures. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Nisbet ed., p. 187; Hoffmeister ed., p. 230. The source of the report has not been identified.

91. [Ed.] G. B. Belzoni, *Narrative of the Operations and Recent Discoveries in Egypt and Nubia*, 3d ed. (London, 1822), 1:68–69.

92. W (Var) reads: idols, natural objects

which they make into their gods or their “fetishes” (a corrupted Portuguese term).⁹³ The nearest stone or butterfly, a grasshopper, a beetle, and the like—these are their Lares⁹⁴—indeterminate, unknown powers that they have made themselves; and if something does not work out or some unhappiness befalls them, then they throw this fetish away and get themselves another.⁹⁵

The use of charms and fetishes among these peoples does, of course, lead to the representation of a power outside of empirical consciousness, or of the will and passion of the living and the dead; but this power is set forth only as something external and sensible, and remains completely within the caprice of those who have raised things of this sort to such power.

We have yet to mention a more developed form of this religion whose character we have outlined, where humanity has not yet emerged from its subjective particularity, not yet gone out into the separation of something universal in and for itself, as opposed to its own isolated being and to nature. | This more developed form is the religion of the Chinese empire.

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*c. The State Religion of the Chinese Empire and the Dao*⁹⁶

This religion still stands within the scope of this principle; it is a developed religion of magic.

93. [Ed.] Hegel may be referring to the Journal by Professor Smith appended to *Narrative of an Expedition to Explore the River Zaire, Usually Called the Congo, in South Africa, in 1816, under the Direction of Captain J. K. Tuckey, R.N.* (London, 1818), p. 375. See 1824 lectures, n. 157.

94. W (Var) adds: from whom they expect to derive good fortune

95. W (Var) reads: and, accordingly, if anything unpleasant befalls them, [W₂: and they do not find the fetish serviceable,] they do away with it [W₂: and choose another].

96. [Ed.] Hegel's treatment of ancient Chinese religion is considerably revised in 1827 as compared with the 1824 version (see 1824 lectures, n. 172). He recognizes more clearly that Tian symbolizes heaven, although in his view it represents physical power rather than a spiritual deity. He discusses at greater length the relationship between Tian and the emperor, although he continues to view them as more closely identified than they were in fact. And he introduces for the first time references to the Dao and Daoism, which have their roots in the Zhou traditions (see below, n. 115). Hegel's basic source remains the Jesuit *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1776–1814), and he draws upon them more fully although he makes use of other sources as well. See the subsequent annotations for details. In place of

446 In the Chinese empire there is a religion of Fo or Buddha, which was introduced in A.D. 50⁹⁷ Then there is the ancient Chinese religion of Dao—this is a distinctive god, | reason. But the state religion, the religion of the Chinese empire, is the religion of heaven, where heaven or Tian is acknowledged as the highest ruling power. What is called “heaven” here is not merely the power of nature, but the power of nature bound up together with moral characteristics, through which this power of nature dispenses or withholds its blessings according to moral deserts and conduct.⁹⁸

We seem, therefore, to have entered a quite different and higher sphere. For us “heaven” signifies “God”—without the admixture of anything physical. With this Tian, which is first of all physical power, we seem, insofar as it also determines itself morally, to have left the sphere of nature religion and magic behind. But if we consider it more closely, we find that we are still standing wholly within this sphere where the single human being, the empirical consciousness, the will of the individual, is what is highest.

Tian means “heaven.” There were many controversies over this, especially among the Catholic orders that had been sent to China as missionaries.⁹⁹ They were most welcome at the court; they were

the chaotic romanization of Chinese characters in the sources available to L and W, we have used the Pinyin system, officially adopted in 1958 and now the accepted scholarly norm.

97. [Ed.] The *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen* (Leipzig, 1750), 6:358 gives a date “some sixty-five years after the birth of our Lord,” while the *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* 5:51, 58 give A.D. 63 or 64. See also Francis Buchanan, “On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas,” *Asiatic Researches* 6:262. Present estimates are between A.D. 65 and 67.

98. L (1827?) adds: Consequently this physical power also determines itself in a moral way.

99. [Ed.] The controversies among the different Catholic orders began with the missions to China on the part of the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians, beginning in 1633. The Papal bull *Ex quo singulari* condemned the Jesuit mission in 1742. Reference to the Capuchins is found only in *An*, and could be due to an error in the source or a misunderstanding on Hegel’s part. The controversy did not center principally on the designation of God but on the permissibility of combining Chinese rituals, especially those of Confucianism and the ancestor cult, with Christianity. Hegel, however, represents it as focusing on the question how the designation of God as “heaven” is to be properly understood. This may be regarded as an indication that his treatment is based primarily on the account in the *Allgemeine Historie* 6:386, where it is presented in this light.

occupied with the preparation of the calendar, which the Chinese were at one time unable to do. The Jesuit missionaries propagated the Christian religion there, but they allowed the Chinese to use the name "Tian" for God; for this they were harshly indicted before the Pope by other orders (the Capuchins and Franciscans), because "Tian" designates the physical power and not a spiritual deity.¹⁰⁰ Tian is the highest, though not only in the spiritual and moral sense. This Tian designates wholly indeterminate and abstract universality; it is the wholly indeterminate sum of the physical and moral nexus as a whole. In this context it is the emperor and not heaven who is sovereign on earth; it is not heaven that has given or gives the laws¹⁰¹ of religion and ethical life, which human beings respect. It is not Tian that rules nature, for the emperor rules everything and only he is connected with this Tian. Only he brings offerings to Tian at the four main festivals of the year; | it is only the emperor who

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100. *W₂ (1831) reads:* We have now to consider the more specific forms in which pantheism has defined itself as a religion.

1. The Chinese Religion, or the Religion of Measure

a. Its General Determinacy

In the first place, substance continues to be thought of under that aspect of being which does indeed come nearest to essence, yet still pertains to the immediacy of being; and spirit, which is distinct from substance, is a particular, finite spirit, i.e., it is a human being. This spirit is on the one hand the wielder of authority, the one who carries the power into effect; while on the other hand, as subject to the power, it is something accidental. If a human being [such as the Chinese emperor] is represented as this power, so that it is regarded as operative in him or that it comes, through the cultus, to the point of positing itself as identical with him, then the power has the shape of spirit, but of finite, human spirit; and with this we have the [element of] separation from others, over whom the power is exercised.

b. The Historical Existence of this Religion

It is true that we have gone beyond the immediate religion constituted by the standpoint of magic, inasmuch as the particular spirit now distinguishes itself from the substance and its relationship to the substance in that it regards it as the universal power. In the Chinese religion, which is the closest approximation, in historical form, to this relationship to substance, substance is known as the entire sphere of essential being, as measure; measure is regarded as what has being in and for itself, the unchangeable, and Tian, heaven, is the objective intuition of this sphere of being-in-and-for-self. However, the characteristic of magic-working also still intrudes into this sphere, insofar as in actuality the singular human being, with its will and empirical consciousness, is what is highest. The standpoint of magic has here broadened to yield an organized monarchy, whose intuition has something grandiose and majestic.

101. *W (Var) reads:* divine laws, laws

converses with Tian, who directs his prayers to Tian. He alone stands in connection with Tian, and thus it is the emperor who rules the whole earth. Among us the prince rules, but God does, too; the prince is bound by the divine commandments. But here [it] is the emperor who has dominion even over nature and rules the powers themselves, and that is why all things on earth are the way they are.

We distinguish the world or worldly phenomena in such a way that God rules beyond this world too.¹⁰² That is where heaven is, which is perhaps populated by the souls of the dead. The heaven of the Chinese or Tian, by contrast, is something totally empty.¹⁰³ The souls of the dead do indeed exist and survive their departure from the body, but they, too, belong to the world,¹⁰⁴ and the emperor rules over them as well, putting them in their appointed places and removing them from them.¹⁰⁵ It is this single self-consciousness that

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consciously carries out the perfect governance.¹⁰⁶ |

102. *W₂ (Var) adds*: But here it is only the emperor that rules.

103. *In Hu's margin*: It has no sway over higher spirits or the bodies of the deceased, as is sometimes imagined to be the case in other religions.

104. *W₂ (Var) adds*: since they are thought of as lords over the natural spheres,

105. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?) adds (cf. n. 103)*: If the dead are represented as directors of the natural realms, it might be said that in this way they are exalted; but in fact they are demoted into genii of the natural world, and therefore it is right that the self-conscious will should direct them.

Hence the heaven of the Chinese is not a world that forms an independent realm above the earth (as we picture it with angels and the souls of the departed, or in the way the Greek Olympus is distinct from life on earth). On the contrary, everything is upon earth, and everything that has power is subject to the emperor.

106. *W (1831) adds*: [*W₁*: In this connection, what is noteworthy is how what has being in and for itself is known as order and determinate existence. In this form, substance is conceived as measure. But there is also the power over these measures, over this substance—this power is the emperor. Measure itself is an established categorial determination; it is called Dao, or reason. *W₂*: As regards measure, there are established categorial determinations which are called reason (Dao).] The laws of Dao, or the measures, are categorial determinations or figurations, [*W₁*: not of abstract being or of abstract substance, but established, universal determinations. These figurations can in turn be viewed more abstractly, in which case they characterize nature and human spirit, they are laws of human will and human reason. *W₂*: not abstract being or abstract substance but figurations of substance, which can be viewed in more abstract fashion but also characterize nature and human spirit, are laws of human will and human reason.] The detailed exposition and development of these measures would comprise the entire philosophy and science of the Chinese. Here we merely need to draw attention to the principal points.

The measures^a in their abstract universality are quite simple categories: being and not-being, one and two (which is equivalent in general to the many). These universal categories were denoted by the Chinese with straight lines. The basic figure is the line; a simple line (—) signifies the one, an affirmation or “yes”; the broken line (— —) denotes two, cleavage, and negation or “no.” These signs are called Gua, and the Chinese story is that they appeared upon the shell of the tortoise. There are many different combinations of these signs, which in turn give more concrete meanings of the original categorial determinations. In particular, these more concrete meanings include the four quarters of the world and the center; four mountains corresponding to these regions of the world, and one in the center; and five elements, earth, fire, water, wood, and metal. There are likewise five basic colors, each of which belongs to [W_1 : one region of the world. W_2 : one element.] Each ruling dynasty in China has a particular color, element, etc. There are also five key notes in music, and five basic ways of characterizing human actions in relation to others. The first and highest is the behavior of children toward their parents, the second is reverence for deceased ancestors and the dead, the third is obedience to the emperor, the fourth is the behavior of brothers and sisters toward one another, and the fifth is how one behaves toward other people.

These determinations of measure constitute the basis—reason. Human beings have to conform to them; and as regards the natural elements, their genii are to be venerated.

There are those who devote themselves exclusively to the study of this reason, who hold aloof from all practical life and live in solitude. Yet what is always the important thing is that these laws should be applied in practical life. If they are observed, if human beings perform their duties, then everything is in order in nature as well as in the empire; both the empire and the [dutiful] individuals prosper. There is a moral coherence here between human action and what happens in nature. If misfortune overtakes the empire, whether owing to floods or to earthquakes, conflagrations, drought, or the like, this arises entirely from the human failure to follow the laws of reason, from the fact that the determinations of measure have not been properly maintained in the kingdom. Because of this omission the universal measure is destroyed, and this kind of misfortune strikes. This measure is known here as what has being in and for itself. This is the general foundation.

The next step concerns the implementation of measure. Maintenance of the laws is the prerogative of the emperor, of the emperor as the son of heaven, which is the whole, the totality of measures. The sky [W_1 : is on the one hand the visible firmament, but it is also W_2 : as the visible firmament is at the same time] the power over the measures. The emperor is directly the son of heaven (Tian-zi); he has to honor the laws and secure recognition for them. By means of a careful education, the heir to the throne is made acquainted with all the sciences and with the laws. The emperor alone renders honor to the law; his subjects have only to give [W_1 : honor to him, as the one who administers the laws. W_2 : him the honor that he renders to the law.] The emperor brings offerings. This means nothing else than that the emperor prostrates himself and reverences the law. Among the few Chinese festivals one of the main ones is that of agriculture. The emperor presides over it; on the day of the festival he himself plows the field; the corn that grows upon this field is used as offerings. The empress has under her direction the production of silk; this supplies the material for clothing, just as agriculture is the source of all nourishment. When floods, plague, and the like lay waste and scourge the country, the emperor alone must deal with

449 From the Jesuit memoirs and from ancient history books there has come to us a quite unusual representation that has something magnificent about it, a representation of the events antecedent to a change of dynasty | —how the Zhou dynasty came to rule and

the situation; [W_2 : he acknowledges his officials, and especially himself, to be the cause of the misfortune—] if he and his magistrates had maintained the law properly, the misfortune would not have occurred. The emperor therefore commands the officials to examine themselves and to see how they have failed in their duty; and he in like manner [W_1 : spends time in W_2 : devotes himself to] meditation and penitence because he has not acted rightly. Thus the prosperity of the empire and the individual depends on the fulfillment of duty. In this way the entire service of God reduces to a moral life for the subjects, and nothing more. So the Chinese religion can be termed a moral religion (and this is the sense in which it has been possible to ascribe atheism to the Chinese). For the most part these determinations of measure and specific rules of duty derive from Confucius; his works are principally concerned with moral questions of this kind.

This might of the laws and of the determinations of measure is an aggregate of many particular determinations and laws. These particular determinations must now be known as activities too; as something particular they are subject to the universal activity, namely the emperor, who has power over the whole range of activities. But the particular powers are also represented as human beings, and especially as the departed ancestors of existing persons. For people are especially known as power when they are [W_1 : dead. But they are also equally this power when they segregate themselves from the world, i.e., when W_2 : departed, in other words no longer entangled in the interests of everyday life. But people can also be regarded as departed if they segregate themselves from the world, in that] they sink deeper within themselves, direct their whole activity to the universal or to the cognition of these powers; when they renounce the associations of everyday life and hold themselves aloof from all enjoyments; in this way too they have departed from concrete human life, and consequently they also come to be known as particular powers. In addition to them, there are also creatures of phantasy that possess this power. Thus the realm of these particular powers is very extensive. They are all subject to the [W_1 : power W_2 : universal power, namely that] of the emperor, who installs them and gives them commands. The best way to gain a knowledge of this wide realm of representation is to study a section of Chinese history as we have it in the information given by the Jesuits in the learned work *Mémoires sur les Chinois*.^b

[Ed.] *Hegel's references to the categories of measure (*das Mass*, the measures *die Masse*), and their signs, the Gua, as found in the 1831 lectures, are derived from Fr. Gaubil's annotated translation of the *Shu-king* published in Paris in 1770 under the title *Le Chou-King, un des livres sacrés des Chinois*, as well as from other sources, such as the *Mémoires sur les Chinois*. For the specific information contained in this paragraph, see *Le Chou-King*, pp. 165, 169–170; and *Mémoires* 2:35–36, 167, 181, 186. The Gua are discussed primarily in the *Yi-king*, but Hegel does not seem to have been familiar with it. The two universal categories are more commonly known as yang (one line) and yin (two lines). ^bSee *Mémoires* 15:228–241.

expelled its predecessor.¹⁰⁷ The establishment of this dynasty is fully narrated there, how the new prince Wu-wang decreed the laws of his | dynasty and organized the realm. This dynasty came to rule in 1122 B.C. "Chinese history contains documents from 2300 B.C."¹⁰⁸ Since this description is very characteristic, I will present an excerpt from it. This new prince came to the throne. The [imperial] residence was not yet Beijing. The last prince of the preceding dynasty had consumed himself in flames, together with all his wealth, his mandarins, etc., in his palace in the capital—a palace that was itself a city. When the flames were extinguished, the new prince made his entrance, but had it proclaimed that he would not solemnly take possession of the throne until everything was regulated between him and heaven, i.e., until the laws and the administration of the empire were brought into order. This regulation consisted of the emperor's publication of the two books that had been preserved up to that time by an old man on an ancient mountain. One book contained the new | laws, though they were almost the same as the old ones;¹⁰⁹ and they were promulgated. The other book contained the titles of officials of the realms; the mandarins constituted [one of] the two classes of officials; the other kind of official consisted of the dead, the Shen. These Shen were appointed by the emperor just as were the living officials of the new administration. From that day on the emperor still rules the genii of his realm, who are the dead, and the state calendar today still consists of these two divisions. Then the narrative tells how the emperor's general undertook the filling of the offices according to the emperor's will. The general, who obtained the books and was commissioned with the nomination of the Shen,

107. [Ed.] For the information contained in this and the next paragraph, see *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* 15:228–241.

108. *Thus Hu, who reads*: 23,000

[Ed.] It is now known that this computation is not based on historical evidence but on later cosmological speculation. Hegel disregards the statement in the *Allgemeine Historie* 6:408–409 that Chinese chronology can only be reliably extended back to 400 B.C., and instead follows Gaubil's translation of the *Shu-jing*, which begins its dating of events from 2357 B.C.; see *Le Chou-King*, pp. 1 ff.

109. *Thus Hu; in An's margin*: the content of which, however, was nothing new; they are entirely those that had been introduced previously;

then tells of his expedition on the occasion of his investiture of the genii¹¹⁰ in their offices, which is the main point.

452 "The recognition of the dead, the nobility of the [earlier] empire, simultaneously honored their [surviving] families and linked them to the new dynasty."¹¹¹ The general was sent to one of the holy mountains; there he built an altar, set himself upon a throne, laid his scepter of command [before him], and bade all the dead to come into his presence. After the sacrificial offering, the general made known the emperor's command:¹¹² they should respectfully accept the decrees of heaven that were to be proclaimed to them by the emperor and announced by the general. He made known what sort of offices these spirits were given by the emperor. He continued by reproaching in the strongest terms the assembled genii because of their negligence. The Shen, especially the more recently dead, were rebuked for the poor administration of the realm, | as a result of which the empire fell into ruin. Then he said, to those who were the cause of the state's disorder, that they were dismissed by heaven and could go wherever they wished—even to enter upon a new life in order to rectify their errors. Then the whole company of the Shen drew back; the general donned his cuirass and took the yellow flag in his left hand. Thereupon, from the throne, he ordered a certain Bo-qian to read aloud the register of the imperial promotions. First stood the name of Bo-qian; he had therefore become the first Shen. The general congratulated him, who had averted so much misfortune from the state by his victories. The fallen ones from the preceding dynasty were brought forward.¹¹³ Among these stood Wen-zong, the name of the uncle and field marshal of the previous

110. *An adds:* (in the register)

111. *L (1827?) reads:* The Shen are not immediate natural powers or natural phenomena, but are rather the form of powers, or of forces, that [are] not merely represented for the imagination but are deemed to belong to human beings who are deceased. What was interesting here was, first, that no power was independent of the emperor, and, second, that those men who had been esteemed in the previous dynasty were also honored, and a bond (therefore, a political tie) was established between their families and the new emperor.

112. *In B's margin:* 25 June 1827

113. *W₂ (Var) reads:* The delegated commander in chief named the new Shen and ordered one of those present to take the register and read it aloud. He obeyed, and found his name to be the first on the list. The commander in chief congratulated him that his virtues had been recognized in this way. He was an old general. Then

ruler; he was at first unwilling to appear; then he came, but was unwilling to kneel; he alone remained standing. The general spoke to him, saying: you are no longer the one you were during your lifetime; now you are nothing; you should therefore heed the commands of heaven with complete deference. Then this Wen-zong did fall to his knees, and he was appointed the chief inspector over clouds, storms, and rain. Then twenty-four other genii were appointed over fire, epidemic diseases, etc.—in short, over everything of which natural humanity stands in need.

That is the imperial organization with respect to the invisible powers. The emperor is lord over the visible world of the mandarins just as he is over the invisible Shen. The Shen of rain, of rivers, and the like, are the general overseers who have the particular local genii under them, those who watch over the rain, rivers, etc., in smaller regions. Almost every particular mountain, shrub, or village has its particular Shen. The Shen were indeed worshiped; but one did not hold them in particular esteem. They were subordinate to the mandarins, to whom the emperor gave his commands directly. The mandarins | must take care to rule well; if they do not, then both they and the Shen are removed from office. This is the form of this nature religion: the emperor alone knows the mandates of heaven, he alone stands in communication with heaven, and his lordship extends over both the visible and the invisible.

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We have yet to mention a particular circumstance concerning the reported constitution of Wu-wang.¹¹⁴ After the emperor had made known to his people the official charter that had previously been disclosed to the Shen, the emperor held his own grand inauguration, performed a sacrifice to Tian, and elevated his entire deceased family to imperial dignity, whereby they enjoyed particular honor. Then he rewarded all his generals and officers. He showered them all with benefits—only one class remained excluded from his rewards, namely those who professed the particular faith of the Dao, the followers of the sect of the Dao.

the others were summoned, some having been killed in the interests of the new dynasty, others having fought and sacrificed themselves on behalf of the former dynasty.

114. [Ed.] Hegel's source for the account in this and the following paragraph is *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* 15:249–252.

Dao generally means “the way,” the right way of spirit, i.e., it means “reason.” The sect of the Dao occurs already (as we see) in the twelfth century B.C.¹¹⁵ It was a noteworthy event that the emperor passed over esteemed officers with his rewards; his intention was in a subtle way to put them to one side,¹¹⁶ to separate them from his other retainers. These gallant officers included masters of the teaching as well as some who were only initiates at a lower level. Seven noble officers had distinguished themselves by particular deeds of valor; in the eyes of the mass of soldiers they were regarded as Shen who had only assumed human bodies, and they presented themselves in that light as well. On a ceremonial day the emperor addressed them, saying he had not forgotten them, that he recognized very well the value of their merits. “Even though you have bodies,” he continued, “you are Shen, of that there is no doubt. The outstanding actions that you have performed under my eyes are sufficient proof of that to me. The intention, for the sake of which you returned to the earth, can only be to acquire for yourselves new merits, to disclose new virtues. I can do no better than to put you in a position | to practice these virtues, by safeguarding you against the corruption of the times.” He therefore determined the mountains to be their residence, where they could spend their remaining time in intimate association with the Shen who no longer have human shape. They were supposed to take with them all who belonged to

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115. [Ed.] A similar date is given in Hegel's sources. While the idea of the Dao (the “way,” the ultimate ordering principle of the world as evident in the regular patterns of nature) goes back to the Western Zhou period (1122–771 B.C.), Daoism as a movement did not appear until toward the end of the Eastern Zhou dynasty. According to legend, its founder was Lao-zi, an elder contemporary of Confucius (551–479 B.C.), to whom is attributed the *Dao De Jing* (Classic of the Way and Its Power), which scholars today believe was probably compiled in the third century B.C. The doctrines of Confucius and Lao-zi were opposed in fundamental respects—the one being ordered to social ritualization and the other to natural conformity. However, they both represent appropriations of the ancient concept of the Dao. See N. Nielsen, N. Hein, F. Reynolds, et al., *Religions of the World* (New York, 1983), pp. 264, 266–276. While Hegel's reference to “the sect of the Dao” seems to suggest Daoism as a movement, he may have the older, generic concept in mind here, since he identifies it with reason rather than with mystical experience (as was characteristic of Daoism), and since he refers below to a later “renewal or improvement of the Dao teaching, attributed especially to Lao-zi” (see n. 120).

116. *An reads:* he wanted to purge his state of these men without deeds of violence,

their sect, all who strove solely to attain immortal life. He made these seven into chiefs over all the mountains of the realm and gave them all rights of dominion over the initiates. Thus they were to apply themselves to the study of the Dao and to the effort to make themselves immortal; together with the other Shen, they were also supposed to acquire information about the secrets of nature that are impenetrable to other human beings. Thus they were separated from actual society.

From this account we see that at that time there was already a class of people who occupied themselves with the inner life, who did not belong to this universal state religion but built up a sect that devoted itself to thinking, withdrew within itself and in its thinking sought to bring to consciousness what the true might be.¹¹⁷

Therefore, the next stage of this initial configuration of nature religion—which was this very knowing by immediate self-consciousness of itself as the highest, as the ruling element, i.e., this immediacy of taking immediate willing to be what is highest—is the return of consciousness into itself, the demand that consciousness should be inwardly meditative—and that is the sect of the Dao. Linked with this, in any case, is the fact that human beings who recede into thought or into the inner domain, who “applied themselves to the abstraction of thought,”¹¹⁸ have at the same time the intention “of being immortal, of being pure sages,”¹¹⁹ of whom some are newly initiated while others have attained the mastery or the goal and | already regard themselves as higher essences also with respect to their existence and actuality. 455

Therefore we already find among the Chinese in antiquity this orientation toward the inner, to the Dao, an orientation to abstractly pure thinking, which orientation constitutes the transition to the

117. [Ed.] See *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* 15:209–210, although the stress in this passage is on acquiring knowledge “of all the operations of nature,” in its entirety and as a whole.

118. *W (Var) reads:* apply themselves to the abstraction of thought, *B reads:* applied themselves to thought, *L reads:* live in the abstraction of thought,

119. *Thus Hu; ■ reads:* of becoming immortal, *L (Var) reads:* of becoming in essence immortal on their own account, *W reads:* of becoming immortal essences, pure on their own account,

[Ed.] Where *Hu* reads *Weise* (sage), *L* and *W* read *Wesen* (essence).

second form of nature religion. There occurred in later times a renewal or improvement of the Dao teaching, attributed especially to Lao-zi,¹²⁰ a sage who was somewhat older than Confucius but who lived contemporaneously with Confucius and Pythagoras.¹²¹ Confucius is thoroughly moralistic and no speculative philosopher. Tian, this universal power of nature, which by the emperor's authority is an actuality, is linked to the moral nexus, and Confucius chiefly developed this moral aspect. His teaching coalesced with the state religion. All the mandarins had to have studied Confucius. But the sect of the Dao based itself solely on abstract thinking.

¹²²Dao is the universal. It is quite noteworthy that the determination "three" immediately comes into play¹²³ to the extent that Dao is something rational and concrete. Reason has produced one, one has produced two, two produced three, and three the universe—the same doctrine that we see in Pythagoras. The universe rests upon the dark principle and is at the same time embraced by the bright principle, by light. A spirit or breath unites them, and brings about their harmony and maintains it.¹²⁴ The initial determination of the triad is the One, and is called J; the second determination is the Chi or light breathing; the third is Wei, what is sent, the messenger. These three symbols are perhaps not Chinese; one sees in them the three letters J, H, W, and correlates this with the Hebraic tetragram Jehovah, and with the trigram Yao of the Gnostics.¹²⁵ ¹²⁶The One

120. [Ed.] This is probably based on Abel-Rémusat, *Mémoire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu* (Paris, 1823), who states, p. 2, that Lao-zi "flourished at the beginning of the sixth century B.C." and "is still considered to be the patriarch and reformer of the sect of the Dao."

121. [Ed.] See *ibid.*, pp. 36 ff. Hegel makes no mention of the later, legendary report of a visit of Confucius to Lao-zi (*ibid.*, p. 4).

122. In B's margin: 26 June 1827

123. W₂ (Var) adds: in Dao—in the totality—

124. [Ed.] Hegel's source for the three preceding sentences is again Abel-Rémusat, *Mémoire*, p. 31, although Abel-Rémusat does not at this point draw a parallel with Pythagoras or refer to the "dark principle" and the "bright principle," but only to "matter" and "aether."

125. [Ed.] The preceding two sentences are drawn from a much longer passage in Abel-Rémusat, *Mémoire*, pp. 40–49. The identification of J with the life-giving energy of the One, of Chi with a light breath, and of Wei with the messenger is not accepted by Abel-Rémusat, who attributes it to Montucci and says that the three characters in fact have no meaning but are used simply to denote sounds that do not

is the indeterminate, that without characteristics, the impoverished initial abstraction, what is wholly empty. If it is to be internally concrete, | to be living, then it must be determinate, and thus it is the Two, and the Third is the totality, the consummation of determinateness. Thus, even in the first efforts of humanity to think in the form of triunity or trinity, we can observe this necessity.¹²⁷ Unless three determinations are recognized in God, "God" is an empty word. Right at the beginning of thinking we find the very simplest and most abstract determinations of thought. If, from this assertion that the absolute power is, there occurs the progression to the universal, then thinking begins, though the thinking itself is originally quite empty and abstract. Further developments of this relationship are found in Chinese literature. The symbol of the Dao is on the one hand a triangle, and on the other hand three horizontal lines one above the other, the middle one of which is shortest, with a vertical stroke through all three as a sign that these three are to be grasped essentially as one.¹²⁸ In China these symbols are called Gua.¹²⁹ The [eight] Gua embody the elements of the higher Chinese reflection.

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Thus in the sect of the Dao the beginning consists in passing over

occur in Chinese. And his lengthy discussion of whether the Hebraic tetragram (JHWH) came to be expressed in three Chinese characters, and if so how, is not at all reflected in Hegel's flat statement that they were correlated. This view was reinforced by H. J. Klaproth in his review of G. Pauthier, *Mémoire sur l'origine et la propagation de la doctrine du Tao, fondée par Lao-tseu* (Paris, 1831), in *Nouveau Journal Asiatique* 7 (1831): 491–493— a view no longer regarded as correct. Hegel also quotes from this passage of Abel-Rémusat in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:124–135 (cf. *Werke* 13:444), but adds: "If philosophizing has got no further than such expressions, it is still at the first stage."

126. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W₂*: As soon as we arrive at the element of thinking, the determination "three" makes its appearance at once.

127. *W₂ (Var) reads*: If it is to have the principle of organic life and spirituality, an advance must be made to determination. Unity is actual only insofar as it contains two within itself, and this yields the triad.

128. [Ed.] Hegel's source for this assertion has not been identified. In any case it seems to be erroneous. The Gua (see the following note) include neither a triangle nor the sign described by Hegel consisting of three horizontal lines intersected by a vertical stroke. The latter suggests the sign 玉 (*wang*² = king, prince); the character for the Dao is much more complex: 道 (*dao*⁴ = way, truth, reason).

129. [Ed.] In regard to the eight Gua, see above, n. 106, annotation a.

into thought, the pure element; but one should not believe that a higher, spiritual religion has established itself in this case. The determinations of the Dao remain complete abstractions, and vitality, consciousness, what is spiritual, do not, so to speak, fall within the Dao itself, but are still completely within the immediate human being. Thus Lao-zi is also a Shen, or he has appeared as Buddha.^{130 131} The actuality and vitality of the Dao is still the actual, immediate consciousness; in fact, it is even a deceased individual such as Lao-zi, although it transforms itself into other shapes, into another human being, and it is vitally and actually present in its priests. Just as Tian, this One, is the ruling element, though as this abstract foundation, whereas the emperor is the actuality of this foundation, the one who in fact rules; so the same is the case with the Dao, with the representation of reason. Reason is likewise the abstract foundation that |
 457 has its actuality for the first time in existing human beings.¹³² Since the universal, the higher, is only the abstract foundation, the human being thus abides in it without any properly immanent, fulfilled inner element; one has no inner hold on oneself. One has for the first time a footing within oneself when freedom and rationality emerge, when one has the consciousness of being free and when this freedom elaborates itself as reason. This developed reason provides absolute principles and duties; and people who are themselves conscious of these principles in their freedom and within their conscience—people in whom they are immanent characteristics—have for the first time a footing within themselves, in their conscience. But insofar as human beings find themselves in that preceding relationship, where

130. [Ed.] See *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* 15:255, 258, where, however, it is not claimed that Lao-zi had appeared as Buddha, only that he had himself claimed to have been a Shen.

131. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*: God is for us the universal, but inwardly determined. God is spirit, his existence is spirituality. But here

132. *Precedes in W₂* (1831): Cultus is, properly speaking, the whole existence of the religion of measure, the power of substance having not yet inwardly assumed the shape of firm objectivity; and even the realm of representation, to the extent that it has developed in the realm of the Shen, is subject to the power of the emperor, who is himself merely the one who implements the substantive in actuality.

If, then, we inquire into cultus in the narrower sense, there is only the relationship of the general determinateness of this religion to inner life and to self-consciousness left for us to investigate.

the absolute is only an abstract foundation, they¹³³ have no footing within themselves, no immanent, determinate inwardness. For that reason everything external is for them something inward; everything external has significance for them, it has a relation to them, and indeed a practical relation. This relationship is in general the constitution of the state, the circumstances of being ruled from without.

No inherent morality is bound up with the Chinese religion, no immanent rationality through which human beings might have internal value and dignity¹³⁴; instead everything is external, everything that is connected with them is a power for them, because in their rationality and morality they have no power within themselves. The consequence is an indeterminable dependence on everything external, the highest | and most contingent kind of superstition.¹³⁵ The Chinese are the most superstitious people of the world;¹³⁶ they have a ceaseless fear and anxiety of everything, because everything external has a significance for them, is a power over them, is something that exerts authority over them, something that can affect them. Divination in particular makes its home there; anxiety in the face of every contingent situation impels them to it. In every locale there are many who occupy themselves with prophesying; the correct place for one's dwelling, for one's grave (both the

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133. *Thus An, Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in W:* Only insofar as human beings have knowledge of God as spirit and of the determinations of spirit—only then have these determinations of the divine become essential, absolute determinations, or, in a word, rationality; what is duty within them, what, as far as they are concerned, is immanent within them. But where the universal is merely this abstract foundation as such, they

134. *W₂ (Var) adds:* and protection against what is external

135. *W₂ (1831) adds:* Speaking generally, what lies at the foundation of this external dependence is the fact that nothing that is particular can be placed in an inner relationship with the universal that remains merely abstract. The interests of individuals lie outside the universal determinations put into effect by the emperor. With regard to particular interests, what we find is rather the representation of a power that exists on its own account. It is not the universal power of providence, which extends its sway even over particular destinies. Instead, the particular is made subject to a particular power. This power is that of the Shen, and with this an enormous realm of superstition comes into play.

136. [Ed.] Hegel's examples of Chinese superstition are taken from *Allgemeine Historie* 6:389–390.

locality and the spatial arrangement)—the Chinese engage in such things throughout their entire lives. In the building of a house, if another house flanks one's own, or if the front has an angle facing it, then "all possible ceremonies are performed with respect to it, and so on."¹³⁷

2. The Religion of Being-Within-Self (Buddhism, Lamaism)¹³⁸

¹³⁹Thus the second form of nature religion, the more determinate and intensive being-within-self, which is coherent with the mode of

137. *Hu reads:* they have first to consider the location carefully and to think whether it might not give rise to some misfortune. *W₂ (1831) omits:* and so on *and adds:* and the particular powers are rendered propitious by means of gifts. The individual is wholly without the power of personal decision and without subjective freedom.

138. [Ed.] In the 1827 lectures, Buddhism/Lamaism is no longer considered under the category of magic, as in 1824, but as the second form of nature religion, in which the absolute is grasped as substance, as being-within-self. In this connection, Hegel introduces another discussion of pantheism, arguing (as he does characteristically in the 1827 lectures) that no true religion is pantheistic in the sense of claiming that "everything is God," and comparing Oriental consciousness with Spinozism. See Vol. 1:375–378. In the 1824 lectures, the question of pantheism is considered more briefly in the introductory discussion of the metaphysical concept of God. On the whole, the 1827 treatment of Buddhism is more fully developed and balanced than in 1824, evidencing a better mastery of the available sources. Hegel sometimes refers to Buddhism as "the religion of Fo"; Fo is the Chinese name of Buddha. See 1824 lectures, n. 183.

139. *Precedes in W₂ (1831), following the treatment of Hinduism, as in the order of the 1831 lectures:* Since there has been no rational determination such as could achieve solidity, the condition of this people as a whole could never become one that is founded in right and inwardly justified; it was always merely a condition of sufferance, a contingent and confused one.

3. The Religion of Being-Within-Self

a. Its Concept

The general foundation here is still the same as that which is peculiar to the Hindu religion; what advance there is consists merely in the necessity of the categorial determinations of Hindu religion being brought together again out of their wild, unrestrained falling-apart into separateness; it consists in their being brought out of their natural segregation, and into an inner relationship with one another, so that their unchecked reveling is stilled. This religion of being-within-self is the concentration and tranquilization of spirit as it returns, out of the destructive disarray of Hindu religion, into itself and into essential unity.

The essential unity and the differences have so far been mutually exclusive to the point where the latter stood independently by themselves, and vanished in the unity only in order to emerge again at once in all their independence. The relationship between the unity and the differences was an infinite progression, a constantly

going-into-self that we have just considered—a going-into-self in the Dao, which is still wholly abstract and does not separate itself from the immediate personality—is as follows. | The highest power or the absolute is grasped not in this immediacy of self-consciousness but as substance, as an essence which, however, at the same time still retains this immediacy, so that it exists in one or more individuals. This substance, with its existence in these individuals, is power or dominion; it is the creation and maintenance of the world, of nature and of all things—the absolute power over the world. 459

This form has a multitude of more detailed configurations whose distinctions we do not want to go into. “The religion of Fo—or of Buddha in India—belongs here; this Buddha is also called | Gautama. The religion of the Lamas belongs in the same context. In India Buddha is a historical person. These deceased persons are revered, but at the same time they are represented as being present in their images just as they are in their priests. In the religion of Lamaism the view is that definite individuals are God, that they are the divine substance as living, as sensibly present here.”¹⁴⁰ This sensible presence in a human being is the abiding, principal feature [of this religion]. It is the most widespread religion on earth—in Burma and 460

alternating disappearance of differences in unity and their [reemergence] in self-subsistent independence. Now this alternation is cut short, because what is implicitly contained in it is actually posited, namely the coming together of the differences in the category of unity.

As this being-within-self for which all other-connectedness is now precluded, the essence is self-contained essentiality, the reflection of negativity into itself, and thus it is what rests and persists within itself.

Defective as this determination may be, since the being-within-self is not yet concrete and is only the disappearance of the independent differences—

140. *W₁ (Var) reads:* With the Hindus, too, Buddha is a divine incarnation, and also a historical person, as is Fo. These are deceased historical persons; [as such] they are venerated, but they are also represented as present and operative in their images as well as in their priests.

Lamaism holds that some of these human beings are the deity itself, that they are the [divine] substance as living, as here present. There is in itself nothing contradictory in the fact that an individual—in this case, the Dalai Lama—is known as the absolute power of substance; he is, of course, mortal, like the rest of us, but even so the deity is present within him. Beyond this no extraordinary power attaches to him, but the power of substance is within him, an immediate, unconscious power that is utterly permeating and directly present. This view coheres very closely with what we were considering previously.

China, in Mongolia, etc. The peoples adhering to this religion are more numerous than the Muslims, as the Muslims in turn are more numerous than the Christians.

Here we find the form of substantiality in which the absolute is a being-within-self, the one substance; but it is not grasped just as a substance for thought and in thought (as it is in Spinoza); instead it has at the same time existence in sensible presence, i.e., in singular human beings. With reference to the character of the people who adhere to this religion, this substantiality involves an elevation above the immediate, singular consciousness as it presents itself in magic, where it is just the singular consciousness that is the power, [natural] desire, or a yet untamed savagery.¹⁴¹ At the stage to be considered here, on the other hand, the highest is known as the One, the substantial, and it involves an elevation above desire and singular will; it involves the limitation of untamed desire and immersion | 461 in this inwardness, [i.e., it involves] unity. The image of Buddha is in the thinking posture, with feet and arms intertwined so that a toe extends into the mouth—this [is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself.¹⁴² Hence the character of the peoples who adhere to this religion is one of tranquillity, gentleness, and obedience, a character that stands above the wildness of desire and is the cessation of desire. Great religious orders have been founded among these peoples; they share a common life in tranquillity of spirit, in quiet, tranquil occupation of the spirit,¹⁴³ as do the Bonze in China and the shamans in Mongolia.¹⁴⁴ Attainment of this

141. *W₂ (1831/Var²) reads:* This religion of substantiality has particularly influenced the character of the peoples who adhere to it inasmuch as it has made the immediate, singular consciousness an omnipresent requirement.

142. [Ed.] The image is not a representation of the Buddha. Hegel is probably referring to fig. 2 in plate xxi of the volume of illustrations accompanying Friedrich Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819). Creuzer identifies (p. 9) the subject as Brahmā Narāyana, a Hindu figure from the cosmogony of the Code of Manu whom he elsewhere (1:597) associates explicitly with the posture described. See also below, annotation a to n. 217.

143. *W₂ (1831) reads:* contemplation of the eternal, without taking part in worldly interests and occupations,

144. *Thus An; L (Var) reads:* the Rabane in Burma.

[Ed.] "Rabane" is probably a misreading for "Rahāns" or "Rahāne." See Francis Buchanan, "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas," *Asiatic Researches* 6:273–280.

pure, inward stillness is expressly declared to be the goal for human beings, to be the highest state.

“So far as this stillness is also expressed as a principle, especially in the religion of Fo, the ultimate or highest [reality] is therefore nothing or not-being. They say that everything emerges from nothing, everything returns into nothing.¹⁴⁵ That is the absolute foundation, the indeterminate, the negated being of everything particular, so that all particular existences or actualities are only forms, and only the nothing has genuine independence, while in contrast all other actuality has none; it counts only as something accidental, an indifferent form.”¹⁴⁶ | For a human being, “this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All characteristics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished.”¹⁴⁷ “To be blissful, human beings

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145. [Ed.] The remainder of this paragraph follows fairly closely a passage in the *Allgemeine Historie* 6:368–369, which describes the concept of “the empty” or “nothing” found in the “religion of Fo” as the source from which everything emerges and to which everything returns. In other words, it is described in Western ontological categories as the ground of being, and it is in these terms that Hegel attempts to make sense of it. Union with the nothing, or the state of nirvana, is achieved by stripping away all desire and all mental and physical activity. One thereby becomes “perfect as the God Fo.” The depiction of nirvana found here—although the term is not used in this passage from the *Allgemeine Historie*—is oriented to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

146. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* 1. The absolute foundation is the stillness of being-within-self, in which all differences cease, and all determinations characterizing the [merely] natural state of spirit, all particular powers, have disappeared. Hence the absolute, as being-within-self, is the undetermined, the annihilation of everything particular, so that all particular existences, all actual things, are only something accidental, or are merely indifferent form.

2. Since reflection into itself as the undetermined (according to the standpoint of nature religion, do not forget) is merely immediate reflection, it is expressed as a principle in this form: nothing and not-being is what is ultimate and supreme. It is nothing that alone has true independence; every other actuality and every particular thing has no independence at all. Everything has emerged out of nothing, and into nothing everything returns. The nothing is the One, the beginning and the end of everything. However diverse human beings and things may be, there is only the one principle, nothingness, from which they proceed, and it is form alone that constitutes quality and diversity.

147. *W (Var) reads:* [*W₁*: this state of negation is the highest: *W₂*: inasmuch as the stillness of being-within-self is the extinction of everything particular, is nothingness, this state of negation is also the highest human state, and one’s vocation is] to im-

themselves must strive, through ceaseless internal mindfulness, to will nothing, to want [nothing], and to do nothing. When one attains this, there is no longer any question of something higher, of virtue and immortality. Human holiness consists in uniting oneself, by this negation, with nothingness, and so with God, with the absolute. A human being who has reached this holiness, this highest level, is indistinguishable from God, is eternally identical with God; and thus all change ceases. The soul no longer has to fear [trans]migration. Thus the theoretical moment finds expression here: that this pure nothing, this stillness and emptiness, is the absolutely highest state; that the individual is [something] formal.¹⁴⁸ In the practical domain | human beings will and act where they [suppose that they] are the power.¹⁴⁹ ¹⁵⁰[But here] one has to make nothingness of oneself.¹⁵¹ Within one's being one has to behave in this negative |

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merge oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity, the nothing as such—or in the substantial in which all determinations cease, and there is [W₁: no virtue,] no will, no intelligence [W₁: where all characteristics of the natural state and of spirit have vanished].

148. *W (Var) reads*: By persistent immersion and inward mindfulness every human should become like this principle, should be without passion, without inclination, without action, and should arrive at a condition of willing nothing and doing nothing.

There is no question here of virtue or vice, of reconciliation or immortality. Human holiness consists, in this negation and silence, of uniting oneself with God, with the nothing, the absolute. The highest state consists in the cessation of all bodily motion, all movement of the soul. Once this stage has been attained, [W₂: there is no descent to a lower stage, no further change, and] one does not have to fear [trans]migration after death, for then one is identical with God. Here the theoretical moment finds expression: that a human being is something substantive and self-subsistent.

149. *W (1831) reads*: and when they will, what is is an object for them, which they alter and upon which they imprint their form. The practical value of religious sensibility is determined in accordance with the content of what is regarded as the true. But in this religion [W₁: there is at least this value W₂: there is, however, first of all this theoretical element still] present: that this unity, this purity, this nothingness is absolutely independent vis-à-vis consciousness, i.e., that its characteristic is not to act in opposition to what is objective, to mold it, but [W₁: that this stillness may be preserved and produced in it. W₂: to let it be preserved so that this stillness is produced in it.]

150. *Precedes in L (Var)*: This stillness, or emptiness, is the absolute. *Precedes in W (Var)*: This is the absolute.

151. *W (1831) adds*: The value of a human being consists in this, that one's self-consciousness is affirmatively related to that theoretical substantiality. This is the opposite of the [Buddhist] relationship which, since the object has no determination

way, to resist not what is external but only oneself. The state that is represented as a human being's goal, this state of unity and purity, the Buddhists call nirvana, and it is described in the following way. When one is no longer subjected to the burdens of stress, old age, sickness, and death, nirvana has been attained; one is then identical with God,¹⁵² is regarded as God himself, has become Buddha.

¹⁵³At first glance it must astonish us that humans think of God as nothing; that must be extremely strange. More closely considered, however, this characterization means nothing other than that God

for it, is of a merely negative nature, and which for that very reason is affirmative only as a relation of the subject to its own inwardness (which is the power to change all objectivity into a negative)—or in other words, it is affirmative in its vanity alone. In the first place, that still, gentle state of mind has, momentarily in the cultus, the consciousness of such eternal tranquillity as essential, divine being, and this gives the tone and character for the rest of life. But it is also open to self-consciousness to make its entire life a continuous state of that stillness and of that contemplation devoid of existence; and this actual withdrawal from the externality of needs and the actuality of life into the quiet inner region, and the consequent attainment of union with this theoretical substantiality, must be considered the supreme consummation.

W₁ continues: A more detailed view of these general determinations is offered by the reports available to us about the characteristics that the worshipers of Fo or Buddha—or perhaps rather of Fo and Buddha, both being in equal measure the supreme head of the religion of Lamaism—adduce as the essence of this God of theirs.

There are still two other determinations to be mentioned, which derive from what has been demonstrated; one of them relates to the shape of God, the other to the external nature of the subjective self-consciousness. But we must confine ourselves to the general basic determinations of both, since they follow quite simply from the definition of the divine nature that has been given. For the divine nature itself has not got beyond the undeveloped abstraction of tranquil being-within-itself that lacks all determinacy. Consequently any further shaping or representation [of it] is surrendered, partly to the contingency of empirical historical events, and partly to that of the imagination; these less structured details belong to a description of the countless, confused products of the imagination concerning the adventures and destinies of these deities, and of their friends and disciples, as well as the other ceremonies and practices of the external cultus—a mass of material which has but little interest or value of any other kind as far as its inner content is concerned, and which (as we have already indicated) has not the interest of the concept.

[Ed.] Cf. n. 186.

152. *Similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* If one assumes this negative mental attitude and resists not what is external but only oneself, and if one unites oneself with nothingness, rids oneself of all consciousness, of all passion, one is raised to the state that the Buddhists call nirvana. One is then unburdened, no longer subject to stress, to sickness, old age, or death; one

153. *In B's margin:* 28 June 1827

purely and simply is nothing determinate, is the indeterminate; there is no determinacy of any sort whatsoever that is applicable to God; God is the infinite. For when we say that God is the infinite, that means that God is the negation of everything particular. When we adopt the forms that are commonplace today, i.e., "God is the infinite, the essence, the pure and simple essence, the essence of essences and only the essence," then this sort of talk is necessarily either totally or tolerably synonymous with the claim that God is nothing. That does not mean, however, that God is not, but rather that God is the empty, and that this emptiness is God. When we say, "We can know nothing of God, can have no cognition, no representation of God," then this is¹⁵⁴ a milder | expression for the fact that for us God is the nothing, that for us God is what is empty; that means that we must abstract from every determination of whatever sort. What remains left over then is the nothing and the essence; and the essence only, without any further determination, is surely the empty, the indeterminate. That is a definite and necessary stage of religious representation: God as the indeterminate, as indeterminacy, as this total void in which the initial mode of immediacy¹⁵⁵ is superseded, has disappeared.

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The principal cultus for human beings [in this religion] is the uniting of oneself with this nothing, divesting oneself of all consciousness, of all passions. This cultus consists of transposing oneself into this abstraction, into this complete solitude, this total emptiness, this renunciation, into the nothing. When one has attained this, one is then indistinguishable from God, eternally identical with God.

In the doctrine of Fo we find the dogma of¹⁵⁶ the transmigration of souls. This standpoint is [higher than] that according to which the followers of the Dao wish to make themselves Shen, wish to make themselves immortal. While Daoism presents the attaining of immortality through meditation and withdrawal into oneself as the highest destination of human beings, it does not in that connection declare that the soul persists intrinsically as such and essentially, that

154. W (Var/Ed?) reads: That modern way is therefore only

155. W₂ (Var) reads: immediate being and its seeming independence

156. W (Var) reads: the representation of [W₂ adds: immortality and]

the spirit is immortal, but only that human beings can make themselves immortal through the process of abstraction¹⁵⁷ and that they should do so. The thought of immortality lies precisely in the fact that, in thinking, human beings are present to themselves in their freedom. In thinking, one is utterly independent; nothing else can intrude upon one's freedom—one relates only to oneself, and nothing else can have a claim upon one. "This equivalence with myself, the I, this subsisting with self,"¹⁵⁸ is what is genuinely immortal | and subject to no alteration; it is itself the unchangeable, what has actual being only within itself and moves only within itself. The I is not *lifeless* tranquillity but movement, though a movement that is not change; instead it is *eternal* tranquillity, eternal clarity within itself. Inasmuch as it is first at this stage that God is known as the essential and is thought in his essentiality—that being-within-self or presence-to-self is the authentic determination—this being-within-self or this essentiality is therefore known in connection with the subject, is known as the nature of the subject, and the spiritual is self-contained. This essential character also pertains [directly] to the subject or the soul; it is known that the soul is immortal, that it has within itself this [power of] existing purely, or being purely inward, though not yet of existing properly as this purity, i.e., not yet as spirituality. But still bound up with this essentiality is the fact that the mode of existence is yet a sensible immediacy, though only an accidental one. This is immortality, that the soul subsisting in presence to self is both essential and existing at the same time. Essence without existence is a mere abstraction; essentiality or the concept *must* be thought as existing. Therefore realization also belongs to essentiality. But here the form of this realization is still sensible existence, sensible immediacy.

So there is therefore the representation that the soul is immortal and still persists after death; but it is always known in another sensible mode, and this is the transmigration of souls. Because it is grasped abstractly as a being-within-self similar to God, it is thus

157. *W (Var)* adds: and elevation

158. *An* reads: Freedom is the genuinely infinite, *Hu* reads: This universal I—I am free—is the infinite, *W₁ (Var)* adds: the genuinely infinite, *W₂ (Var)* adds: the genuinely infinite—this, it is then affirmed at this standpoint,

a matter of indifference into what sensible form the soul passes over after death, whether into a human or an animal form; spirit is not known as something concrete. Only the abstract essence is known, and the determinate being or the appearance is just the immediate, sensible shape.¹⁵⁹ But a human being who attains this self-negation, this abstraction, is thus exempted from transmigration of souls, is relieved from resumption of this [mode of] existence, i.e., from being tied to this external, sensible configuration.

467 God is grasped as nothing, as essence generally; this has to be explained more precisely, | and in particular the fact that this essential God is nevertheless known as a specific, immediate human being, as Fo, Buddha, or Dalai Lama. This may appear to us as the most repugnant, shocking, and unbelievable tenet, that a human being with all his deficiencies could be regarded by other human beings as God, as the one who eternally creates, preserves, and produces the world. "A Dalai Lama has this image of himself and is revered as such by others."¹⁶⁰ We must learn to understand this view, and in understanding it we shall see its justification. We shall show how it has its ground, its rational aspect, a place in [the evolution of] reason. But it is also pertinent for us to have insight into its defective and absurd aspect. "It is easy to say that such a religion is just senseless and irrational. What is not easy is to recognize the necessity and truth of such religious forms,"¹⁶¹ their connection with reason; and seeing that is a more difficult task than declaring something to be senseless.

159. *L adds, similar in W (1827?)*: The fact that a human being passes over into this [new sensible] shape is now combined with [the thought of] morality, or of merit.

160. *W₂ (1831) reads*: When God is worshiped in human shape in the Christian religion, that is something altogether different; for the divine essence is there envisaged in the man who has suffered, died, risen again, and ascended to heaven. This is not humanity in its sensuous, immediate existence but a humanity that bears upon its face the shape of spirit. But it appears as the most monstrous contrast when the absolute has to be worshiped in the immediate finitude of human being; the latter is an even more inflexible singularization than is [the finitude of] the animal. For the human shape embodies the further demand of self-transcendence [*Erhebung*], and hence it seems repugnant that this demand should be debased into a sheer persistence in ordinary finitude.

161. *W (Var) reads*: We must learn to see in [all] religions that our object is not merely something senseless and irrational, that what matters more is to recognize what is true [in them],

Being-within-self is the essential stage, consisting in the progression from immediate, empirical singularity to the determination of essence, of essentiality; or to the representation or consciousness of substance, i.e., of a substantial power that governs the world, that causes everything to come about and be produced according to a rationally coherent pattern. About this substantial power we know only that it is something operating unconsciously; but just for that reason it is undivided efficacy, it has in it the characteristic of universality, it is the universal | power. For this to be made clear to us, we need to recall at this point the efficacy, spirit, and soul of nature; in speaking this way we do not mean that the spirit of nature is a conscious spirit; we are not thereby thinking of anything conscious. The natural laws of plants and animals, of their organization and activity, are something devoid of consciousness. These laws are the substantial aspect of living organisms; they are their nature and their concept. This is what they are implicitly, the reason immanent in them, the living soul; but it is unconscious.

The human being is spirit, and one's vitality consists in spirit determining itself as soul, as the unity of what is living—a vitality which, in the unfolding of [a person's] organization, is simply one, permeating and supporting everything. This efficacy is present in the person so long as one lives, without one's knowing it or willing it, and yet one's living soul is the cause, i.e., the original thing [*Sache*]¹⁶² that makes it actual. The human being who is this very living soul knows nothing of this, does not will the circulation of the blood nor prescribe it, and yet one does it and the doing is one's own deed: the human being is the motive power that actualizes what takes place within its organization. This unconsciously operative rationality or unconsciously rational efficacy, the efficacy of nature, the ancients called *voûç*. Anaxagoras says that *voûç* rules the world.¹⁶³ But this

162. *W* (*Var*) adds: the substance

163. [Ed.] In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel relies principally on the accounts of the pre-Socratics found in Aristotle. In one passage of the *Metaphysics* (984b15–22), Aristotle does attribute to Anaxagoras the view that “reason is present in nature, as in animals, as the cause of order,” although he also asserts (985a18–21) that Anaxagoras only drags “reason” in to explain the creation of the world in a mechanical manner, when he does not know why something is “necessarily” so. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1924), 1:125–126. See also Aristotle, *De anima* A 2, and Plato, *Phaedo* 97b–99d.

rationality [is] not conscious. In more recent philosophy this rational efficacy has even been called intuiting; Schelling in particular designated God as intuiting intelligence.¹⁶⁴ "God is intelligence,"¹⁶⁵ and reason, as intuiting, is the eternal creating of Nature—what is called preservation of nature, for creating and preserving are not to be separated. In finite intuition we are immersed in things; they occupy us fully. This immersion in objects prior to any representing, reflecting, and judging, is the lower level of consciousness. Reflecting upon them, arriving at representations, producing points of view from oneself and applying these to objects, judging—these things are no longer intuiting as such.

469 This, therefore, is the standpoint of substantiality or of intuiting—the very one that we presently have before us; it is just the one | that should be understood as the standpoint of "pantheism" in its proper sense—this Oriental knowing, consciousness, or thinking of this absolute unity, of the absolute substance and its internal efficacy, an efficacy in which everything particular or singular is only something transitory or ephemeral, and not genuine independence. This Oriental way of viewing things is opposed to that of the Occident: just as the sun sets in the west, so it is in the West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivity. In the West singularity is the main determination, so that the singular [consciousness] is what is independent. Whereas in Oriental consciousness the main determination is that the universal is what is genuinely independent, in Western consciousness the singularity of things and of human beings stands higher for us. The Occidental viewpoint can indeed go so far as to maintain that the finite and finite things are autonomous, i.e., absolute. The expression "pantheism" has the ambiguity that universality always has. "Ev καὶ πᾶν means the one

164. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring to Schelling's concept of intellectual intuition; further evidence to this effect is provided by the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:520–521 (cf. *Werke* 15:655). See F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, 1978), pp. 27–28; and *On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 49 (cf. Schelling, *Werke* 3:369–370, 5:255–256)—although God is not explicitly designated in these works as intuitive intelligence.

165. W (Var) reads: God, intelligence,

All, the All that remains utterly one; but $\pi\alpha\nu$ also means “everything,” and hence the phrase passes over into a thoughtless, shoddy, unphilosophical view. Then one understands “pantheism” to mean that everything is God—the doctrine that “everything is God” [*Allesgötterei*], not the doctrine that “the All is God” [*Allgötterei*]. For in the doctrine that “the All is God,” if God were the All there would be only one God; in the All the singular things are absorbed, they are merely accidental, or are only shadows or phantoms.¹⁶⁶ But philosophy is presumed to be “pantheism” in that first sense.¹⁶⁷ That is precisely the ambiguity of universality. If one takes it in the sense of a universality of reflection, then it is “allness” [*Allheit*], and allness is initially represented in such a way that the singular things remain independent. But the universality of thinking, substantial universality, is a unity with itself in which everything singular or particular is only something ideal, and has no true being.

On the one hand, this substantiality begins here. It is the basic determination, but *only* the basic determination, of our knowledge of God. The basis or ground, however, is not yet what is true. We say, “God is the absolute power, all actual being is only ideal within the absolute | power of God.” Everything that ventures to say of

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166. W (Var/1831?) adds: They come and go, their being consists precisely in this, that it disappears.

167. [Ed.] It is not entirely clear to what “in that first sense” refers. In regard to the two senses of $\pi\alpha\nu$, the first would in fact be the philosophical sense, namely, that the All “remains utterly one.” But this conception is not for Hegel something which philosophy is “presumed” to hold; rather it is a necessary philosophical conclusion—even if not the highest conclusion. Consequently he would seem to be referring to the second of the two senses he distinguishes, the doctrine that “everything is God.” It is doubtful that “more recent philosophy” could be accused of a literal deification of everything that is. Yet a consistent philosophy of the understanding (Enlightenment rationalism) is commonly reproached for identifying the cosmos—as the totality of nonsublated but subsisting finite things—with God; whereas for Hegel the quintessence of the concept of the All was just the *negativity* of the finite. On the charge of “cosmotheism,” see below, nn. 172, 177.

168. W₂ (Var) adds: sublated, is

religion, too.¹⁶⁹ The “omnipresence of God” (to the extent that this is not an empty phrase) is just the way that this substantiality is expressed; substantiality is its ground. But these¹⁷⁰ expressions are babbled away senselessly or in mere rote memory; there is no seriousness about them, for one is serious only about what is in thought. When Spinoza grasped the omnipresence of God in thought, as substantiality, he was reproached with pantheism,¹⁷¹ for one forgets straightway that when God is grasped as substance, as all-effective, i.e., as operative in everything, then precisely by this comprehension all things are annihilated inasmuch as God is verily what is operative in them.¹⁷² As soon as one ascribes true being to the finite, as soon as things are independent and God is excluded from them, then God is by no means omnipresent; for when one says God is omnipresent, then one is at the same time saying that God is actual.¹⁷³ But God is not alongside things, in the interstices, like the God of Epicurus;¹⁷⁴ instead God is actual in the things; but then the things are not actual. This is the ideality of things. But in

169. *L* (1827?) adds: But it is difficult to grasp this. Although the finite is said to have no authentic being, opponents of this way of thinking forget this and say, “Well then, everything is God”; the finite that has just been sublated they straightway take as authentic being.

170. *W* (*Var*) adds: profound

171. [*Ed.*] Hegel sees here as elsewhere a connection between the general Oriental principle of unity and Spinoza’s concept of substance. See Spinoza, *Ethics* (1677), part I, esp. prop. 15.

172. *Thus An*; *L* and *W* (*Var*) read, *one page previously*: This is how theologians in particular speak; indeed they even censure Spinozism on these grounds, inasmuch as what is singular or particular has disappeared in the Spinozistic substance and no truth, no actuality, no being is attributed to it.

[*Ed.*] Hegel is probably referring especially to F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner; oder, Die wahre Weihe des Zweiflers*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825), p. 231, where Hegel’s name was linked with those of Spinoza, Fichte, and the Eleatics as exponents of “pantheism of the concept,” as distinct from “pantheism of the imagination” (Schelling) and “pantheism of feeling” (the mystics). The problem of interpreting Spinoza to which Hegel refers is more clearly dealt with by Jacobi than by Tholuck. Jacobi regards the argument—advanced by Hegel among others—that Spinoza is not an atheist but an acosmist (because he does not deny the existence of God but of the world) to be a mere play on words, and himself terms Spinoza a cosmotheist. On Spinoza’s acosmism see Vol. 1:377, n. 27.

173. *W*₂ (*Var*) adds: and things are not.

174. [*Ed.*] Hegel is referring to the Epicurean doctrine that the gods live in the *intermundia*, the spaces between the different worlds. See Cicero, *De divinatione* 2.17, and *De natura deorum* 1.18.

this feeble thinking, one concludes that therefore the things are God, i.e., they are and remain insurmountably preserved, as an insurmountable actuality. So if we are serious when we say "God is omnipresent," | then God must have a truth for spirit, for the mind, for thought, and spirit must have an interest in this issue.¹⁷⁵

Jacobi said of Spinozism that it is atheism,¹⁷⁶ he attacked it most violently, and yet this very Jacobi himself said: "God is the being in all determinate being."¹⁷⁷ This being, however, is nothing else but substance. But by the very fact that God is the affirmative, the singular thing is not the affirmative but is only what is ideal, what is sublated. Spinozistic philosophy was the philosophy of substantiality, not of pantheism; "pantheism" is a poor expression, because in it there is the possible misunderstanding that $\pi\alpha\nu$ be taken as a collective totality [*Allesheit*], not as universality [*Allgemeinheit*].

In all higher religions, but particularly in the Christian religion, God is the one and absolute substance; but at the same time God is also subject, and that is something more. Just as the human being has personality, there enters into God the character of subjectivity, personality, spirit, absolute spirit. That is a higher determination, although spirit remains nevertheless substance, the one substance. This abstract substance, the ultimate element of Spinoza's philosophy, this substance that is thought, that only is for thinking, cannot be the content of a folk religion; it cannot be the belief of a concrete spirit.¹⁷⁸ Concrete spirit supplies what is lacking, and the deficiency is that subjectivity, i.e., spirituality, is lacking. But at this point, at the level of nature religion which we are now dealing with, this spirituality is not yet spirituality as such, it is not yet a spirituality that is thought or universal; instead it is sensible and immediate spirituality. Here it is a human being as a sensible, external, immediate spirituality: a [particular] human being.

175. L, W (*Var/1831?*) add: God is the persisting of all things.

176. [Ed.] See Jacobi, *Werke* 4/1:216, also his Preface to Vol. 4 (pp. xxxvi–vii), where he says cosmotheism is just the same thing as atheism, which he defines (pp. 216–219) as the belief in a supreme being but one that acts only according to necessity. Thus Hegel's and Jacobi's concepts of atheism are different.

177. [Ed.] Jacobi, *Briefe*, p. 61 (*Werke* 4/1:87). Jacobi, however, is not representing his own view here but that of Spinoza, which he criticizes. See 1824 lectures, n. 76.

178. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: Spirit is concrete. It is only abstract thinking that sticks to this one-sided determinateness of substance.

472 This substantiality known in its truth is subjectivity inwardly, and thereby this pure substantiality includes spirituality; at the standpoint of immediacy, however, there is not yet self-knowing spirituality, but instead spirituality in an immediate | mode, though in the shape of a particular human being.¹⁷⁹ ¹⁸⁰And if this human being abides within itself (in contrast with this substance, the universal substance), then when the question arises how a human individual can be represented as universal substance, we must recall what was stated above:¹⁸¹ that as living substantiality the human being is after all this inwardly substantial actuality, an actuality determined by one's corporeality. It must be possible to think that in this vitality life is substantially effective within one.

This standpoint contains the universal substantiality in an actual shape. Here therefore is found the view that it is in mediation, in preoccupation with self or deep absorption within self, that a person is the universal substance, not just (let us say) in terms of his vitality; instead,¹⁸² the *voûç* [is] then posited as center, but in such a way that the *voûç* within does not become conscious of itself in that person's character or development. This substantiality of the *voûç*, this deep absorption represented in one individual, is not the meditation of a king who has before him in his consciousness the administration of his realm; it is to be represented in such a way that this absorption within the self, this abstract thinking in itself, is the effective substantiality, is the creating and preserving of the world. This is the standpoint of the Buddhist and Lamaist religion.

There are three Dalai Lamas: in Lesser Tibet, in Greater Tibet, and in southeastern Siberia, in the mountain valleys of the Asian plateau from which Genghis Khan set out.¹⁸³ It makes no difference that there are multiple high lamas, and that they are also the superiors of religious orders that dedicate themselves to a life of withdrawal, and that others are held in honor comparable to that of the Dalai

179. *W₂ (Var) adds*: of an empirical, single consciousness.

180. *In B's margin*: 29 June 1827

181. [*Ed.*] See above, pp. 531–532.

182. *W (Var) reads*: but rather in the immersion within self or in the center of *voûç*;

183. [*Ed.*] Hegel here erroneously calls all the high lamas Dalai Lamas. By this he means the Dalai Lama from Lhasa (an incarnation of Avalokiteshvara), the Panchen Lama (an incarnation of Buddha Amitabha) in Tashilumpo and, presumably, the chief

Lama. Here the subjective shape is not yet exclusive; only with the penetration of spirituality, of subjectivity and of substance, is God essentially One. Thus here the substance is indeed one, but the subjectivity and the shapes are multiple, and | it is immediately 473 implicit in them that they are multiple. For in its relationship to substantiality this configuration itself is, to be sure, represented as something essential, but also at the same time as something accidental. Antithesis or contradiction first emerges in consciousness and volition, in particular insight; hence there cannot be multiple worldly sovereigns in one land, but there can well be multiple Dalai Lamas. But although this spiritual efficacy does indeed have a spiritual form for its existence and its shape, it is still only efficacy of substance, and not a conscious efficacy, a conscious will.

There is a distinction between Buddhism and Lamaism; but this account is common to both.¹⁸⁴ It is said of Fo¹⁸⁵ that eight thousand times he has incarnated himself in existence as a human being.¹⁸⁶ Europeans have hardly ever come to where the great

of the Khutuktus. For Hegel's knowledge of the Panchen Lama, see below, n. 188; the report by Samuel Turner referred to there also mentions a visit by the Dalai Lama to the Panchen Lama. On the chief of the Khutuktus (legates of the Dalai Lama) see *Allgemeine Historie* 7:219–220. In Hegel's day the terms Greater Tibet (*Gross-Tibet*) and Lesser Tibet (*Klein-Tibet*) were used with a variety of meanings; by "Greater Tibet" Hegel also understands the area surrounding Lhasa, whereas in the *Allgemeine Historie* the term "Greater Tibet" is equated with Bhutan.

184. W (1831) adds: and those who worship Fo and Buddha worship the Dalai Lama also. The latter is worshiped, however, more under the form of someone deceased, but one who is also present under [the form of] his successors.

185. [Ed.] According to the *Allgemeine Historie* 6:360, the disciples of Fo claimed that their teacher had been born eight thousand times, but in animal as well as in human form. Cf. *Mémoires concernant les Chinois* 5:59.

186. W (Var) reads: and been present in the actual existence of a human being.

W₂ (1831) continues: Such are the basic determinations that follow from what is here the divine nature, and which are all that follow from it, since the divine nature itself has not got beyond the undeveloped abstraction of the tranquil being-within-itself that lacks all determinacy. Consequently any further shaping or representation [of it] is surrendered, partly to the contingency of empirical historical events and partly to that of the imagination; the details belong to a description of the countless, confused products of the imagination concerning the adventures and destinies of these deities, and of their friends and disciples, and yield material that has but little interest or value so far as its inner substance is concerned, and which (as we have already indicated) has not the interest of the concept.^a

In regard to the cultus too, we are not concerned here with outward ceremonies

474 lama in China lives, | whereas (about 1770) Englishmen visited the one in Lesser Tibet.¹⁸⁷ From the English emissary, Turner, we have an account¹⁸⁸ of the lama in Lesser Tibet; the lama was a child two or three years of age whose predecessor had died of smallpox on a journey to Beijing, where he had been summoned by the Chinese emperor; the lama was rediscovered in a two-year-old child. Acting on this child's behalf in matters of governance, there was a regent, the minister of the previous Dalai Lama, known as his cupbearer.¹⁸⁹ That child was indeed still nursing, but was a lively spirited child who conducted himself with all possible dignity and propriety, and seemed already to have a consciousness of his high office.¹⁹⁰ And the emissaries could not adequately praise the regent—and his associates—for the noble disposition, insight, dignity, and dispas-

and customs. All we have to describe is the essential element, namely, how being-within-self, the principle of this stage, appears in the actual self-consciousness [of the worshipers].

[Ed.] ^aCf. n. 151.

187. *An reads (in place of first clause):* The Chinese keep Europeans away from their sovereign domain, and so from Greater Tibet. *W₁ (1831) reads, similar in W₂:* There are three principal lamas. The first, or Dalai Lama, is to be found in Lhasa, to the north of the Himalayas, where Europeans have not yet come, since this city is indeed within Chinese territory. Then there is another lama in Lesser Tibet, in Tashilumpo, in the neighborhood of Nepal. *L (1827?) adds:* From reports about the Dalai Lama, he could be regarded as in the main a charlatan, who takes advantage of these peoples. The English, however, found matters quite otherwise.

[Ed.] On the principal lamas and the geographical terms, see above, n. 183. The *Allgemeine Historie* 7:222 speaks of a Capuchin friar, Brother Horace, as having paid a number of visits to the Dalai Lama, but this seems to have escaped Hegel's attention.

188. [Ed.] See Samuel Turner, "Copy of an Account Given by Mr. Turner, of His Interview with Teeshoo Lama," *Asiatic Researches* 1:197–205. The "cupbearer" is referred to in another narrative by Turner, "An Account of a Journey to Tibet," *Asiatic Researches* 1:207–220, in which he describes a journey by Poorungeer to Tashilumpo, although it is clear that the cupbearer and the regent are two different persons. The information that the young lama's predecessor had died of smallpox on a journey to Beijing and that the young lama was still nursing cannot have come from these accounts, but rather from an edited version of Turner's accounts in Harnisch, *Die wichtigsten Reisen* 6:343–345, 358–359. Hegel may also have been familiar with Turner's monograph on his journeys published in London in 1800.

189. *W₁ (1831) adds:* Lastly there is yet a third lama living in Mongolia.

190. *In An's margin:* It is absurd to think that this is a case of priestly deception and to regard the Dalai Lamas as charlatans. As soon as a Dalai Lama dies, the world spirit passes into another human individual, and the only difficulty then is to locate

sionate tranquillity that the child possessed. The previous lama had also been an insightful, dignified, and noble man.¹⁹¹

We have indicated the relevance of the fact that the substance is, as it were, present in particular in one individual, that it has concentrated itself in him in order to show itself outwardly. This substantial efficacy is what is universally effective in the world, this substance is the universal $\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta$; and it is not such a very different matter to suppose that the latter has its existence in one human being | in particular, that it is present to and for other people in a sensible, external manner. Here we will let these determinations stand. We are still at the standpoint of the substantiality that is indeed necessarily bound up with subjectivity, with spirituality; but here what is spiritual is still in immediate, sensible existence, and this subjectivity is still an immediate subjectivity. The standpoint of substantiality also constitutes the foundation of what is to follow, and we are not yet ready to abandon it; but we can now pass over to the third form.

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3. The Hindu Religion¹⁹²

"This is the third form of religion."¹⁹³ It is defined in such a way that here the substantiality is found in the totality of its externality; it

and identify him; a few external traits serve this purpose.^a Cf. *W₁ (Var)*: For when a Dalai Lama dies, the god has for a moment withdrawn his personal presence from humanity; but then he immediately appears in another human shape, and he has only to be sought out again, as he can be known by certain signs.

[Ed.] ^aThis reference was probably drawn from the *Allgemeine Historie* 7:217. In any event, the information transmitted by Strauss that the Lama is recognized by facial lines shows that Hegel was acquainted with other regulations governing the succession. See 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 54.

191. *L, W₂ (1827/1831?) add*: There is, however, an inner consistency in the fact that an individual in whom the [divine] substance has become concentrated should outwardly display this worthy, noble demeanor.

192. [Ed.] In 1827 Hegel does not appear to have provided a philosophical designation for Hinduism; he simply refers to it as *die indische Religion*, rather than as *die Religion der Phantasie* as in 1824. This may be because he now views Hinduism as having two primary characteristics: the unity of substance and the multiplicity of powers—and it is only with reference to the latter that Hindu phantasy comes into play. In 1831 primary emphasis is placed on the first characteristic since Hinduism is defined as "the religion of abstract unity"; thus 1827 plays a transitional role between 1824 and 1831. However, 1827 follows 1824 in treating Hinduism after Buddhism, whereas in 1831 the sequence is reversed. The decisive advance of religious con-

sciousness to substantiality is still accredited to Buddhism. The German term *Phantasie* is translated by the English variant spelling "phantasy" in order to convey the sense of visionary, fanciful imagination, as distinguished from that of an unreal mental image or illusion. Hegel's *die indische Religion* is rendered as "Hinduism" or "Hindu religion." Whereas in the preceding section, on Buddhism, we have consistently translated *Insichsein* as "being-within-self," in the present section we have alternated between this rendering and "self-containment," which is more appropriate when the reference is to the Hindu concept of Brahman as impersonal metaphysical substance.

193. W_2 (1831) reads: The second main form of pantheism, when this latter actually appears as religion, is still within the sphere of this same principle of the one substantive power, in which all that we see around us, and even human freedom itself, is only something negative or accidental. We saw that the substantive power, in its first form, is known as the multitude and range of essential determinations, and not known as what is in its own self spiritual. The question immediately arises, therefore, how this power is determined in its own self, and what its content is. Self-consciousness cannot, like the abstractly thinking understanding, confine itself in religion to the representational image of the power that is known only as an aggregate of determinations that merely *are*. For then the power is not yet known as real unity, subsisting by itself, it is not yet known as principle. The opposite of this way of defining it is for the manifold determinateness to be taken back into the unity of self-determination. This concentration of self-determining contains the beginning of spirituality.

1. As self-determining, and not merely as a multitude of rules, the universal is thought, and exists as thought. It is in our thinking alone that nature, the power that brings forth everything, exists as the universal, as this one essence, as this one power that is for itself. What we have before us in nature is this universal, but not *as* universal. What is true in nature is brought into prominence on its own account in our thinking as idea or, more abstractly, as universal. In its own self, however, universality is thought; and, as self-determining, it is the source of all determining. But at the stage where we now are, the stage where the universal emerges for the first time as what is determinative (or as principle), the universal is not yet spirit but abstract universality generally. Being known as thought in this way, the universal remains as such shut up within itself. It is the source of all power, but it does not externalize or express itself as such.

2. The act of differentiating and fully developing the difference belongs to spirit. The system of this full development includes both the concrete unfolding of thought on its own account and the unfolding which, as appearance, is both nature and the spiritual world. But since the principle that comes on the scene at this stage has not yet reached the point where this unfolding could occur within the principle itself—since, on the contrary, it is held fast in a simple, abstract concentration—the unfolding and the richness of the actual idea falls outside the principle, and consequently differentiation and manifoldness are abandoned to the wildest externality of phantasy. The particularization of the universal appears in a plurality of independent powers.

3. This multiplicity or wild dispersal of powers is [finally] taken back again into the initial unity. In terms of the idea, this retrieval, this concentration of thought, would consummate the moment of spirituality if the initial, universal mode of thinking were to make itself inwardly accessible to differentiation and were known inwardly as the act of retrieval. On the foundation of abstract thought, however, the retrieval

is represented and known in and by this externality, by the totality of the world. The first thing that we find here, therefore, is this same substantiality in which everything | else, the determinate and particular, the subject, is only something accidental, is even mortal. But the second thing, the additional aspect, is the concrete, the richness of the world, the particularizing of that universal substance which, with reference to the substance | or the universal power, also represents itself for consciousness; i.e., it is both spiritual power and natural power. The result is that those distinctions are also known as belonging to the absolute, those powers appearing in one aspect as particular and independent, but at the same time vanishing, being consumed, and standing under that initial unity, under the universal being-within-self of the initial substantiality.

Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. The viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. | We still have substance as this one essential power; but the other aspect is the concrete, what previously was, in this way or that, nothing but a contingent element. What is more determinately concrete is in the first place this, that the idea is one, it is immediate and identical with self. But just as the One is God, the absolute power, so also in the second place the idea differentiates itself internally; it particularizes itself, and these particularizations yield distinct, particular configurations or powers. The third aspect is that these particular configurations, these spiritual powers of nature, are represented as returned into and contained by the One. We have here an intelligible realm that particularizes itself, arrives at subsistence,

itself remains devoid of spirit. Nothing is lacking here as far as the moments of the idea of spirit are concerned; the idea of rationality is present in this advance. But these moments do not constitute spirit; the unfolding is not so consummated as to yield spirit, because the determinations remain merely universal. There is merely a perpetual return to that universality which is self-active but which is held fast in the abstraction of self-determining. Thus we have the abstract One and the wildness of unrestrained phantasy, which is, of course, known to remain identical with the first [principle] but which does not expand into the concrete unity of the spiritual. The unity of the intelligible realm achieves its specific permanence; but this last does not become absolutely free, for it remains confined within the universal substance.

But just because the unfolding does not yet truly return to the concept and is not yet inwardly taken back by the concept, it still retains its immediacy along with its return into the substance.

but does not become absolutely free on its own account, being instead contained by the universal substance. The foundation for rational development is present here, but only in its most general characteristics.

a. The One Substance

A more precise cognition of this standpoint specifies it as the standpoint of the Hindu religion.¹⁹⁴ In Hinduism there is just this one

194. W (1831) reads: Subjectivity is inward power, as the connection of infinite negativity with itself; it is not merely implicit power—on the contrary, in subjectivity God is for the first time posited as power. Of course, these ways of characterizing it have to be distinguished from one another, and are of particular importance in relation both to the ensuing concepts of God and also to an understanding of the preceding ones. We must therefore consider them more closely.

Both in religion generally and in the wholly immediate and crudest religion of nature, power in general is the fundamental determination, as the infinitude which the finite, as sublated, posits within itself. And insofar as this is represented as outside the finite, is represented as *existing*, it nevertheless comes to be posited only as something that has emerged from the finite as from its ground. The determination that is all-important here is that the power is posited to begin with simply as the ground of the particular configurations or existences, and the relationship of the self-contained essence to these existences is that of substantiality [to what is accidental]. Thus it is merely implicit power or power lying within the existences; and as self-contained essence or as substance, it is posited solely as the simple and abstract, so that the determinations or differentiae are represented as being configurations existing in their own right outside it. This self-contained essence may indeed also be represented as self-sufficient, in the way that Brahman is self-thinking. Brahman is the universal soul; in creating, it goes forth out of itself as a breath, it contemplates itself, and from then on it is for itself. But this does not at the same time eliminate its abstract simplicity, for the moments, i.e., the universality of Brahman as such and the “I” for which that universality is, are not reciprocally determined, and their relation itself is therefore simple. Thus, as having being abstractly for itself, Brahman is, of course, the power and the ground of existences, and everything has emerged from it, just as—in saying to themselves, “I am Brahman”—they are all returned to it and have disappeared in it. They are either outside it (exist independently) or within it (have disappeared); there is only the relationship of these two extremes. But being posited as differentiated determinations, they appear as independent entities outside Brahman, because it is at first abstract, not inwardly concrete.

Posited only implicitly in this way, power acts inwardly without appearing as [external] efficacy. I appear as power insofar as I am cause, and more specifically insofar as I am subject—whenever I throw a stone, etc. But power that has being implicitly operates in a universal manner, without this universality being a subject on its own account. The laws of nature, for instance, are this universal mode of operation, grasped in its true character.

W₁ (Ed) continues: We have already indicated how this standpoint is manifest, how it appears in its existence.

substantiality, and it is, of course, present as pure thinking, pure being-within-self, and this self-containment is distinguished from the multiplicity of things; it is external to particularization, so that it does not have its existence or its reality as such in the particular powers. This is not the way God has his existence or determinate being in the Son, for this being-within-self instead remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power; but at the same time it is power over everything, and the particularization or distinction falls outside of this being-within-self. But because it is abstract in this way, the self-containment must in turn have an existence, and insofar as this existence itself is still immediate, still outside the distinction, it is not authentically divine existence, but is once more an immediate existence in the concretely existing, immediate human spirit. |

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b. The Multiplicity of Powers

That is the first aspect; the second then is the distinction into many powers, and these many powers [depicted] as a plurality of deities—an unbridled polytheism that has not yet progressed to the beauty of figure. These are not yet the beautiful deities of Greek religion; nor is the prose of our understanding present here to any great extent. In part the powers are objects such as sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or they are greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape.¹⁹⁵ These are the particular powers that maintain themselves externally to self-contained being, so that they are not yet taken up into spirit, are not yet posited as truly ideal, but also are not yet distinct from spirit. The substance is not yet spiritual,¹⁹⁶ for the powers are not yet posited outside of spirit. They are not yet considered by understanding, but neither are they

195. *W (Var)* reads: change, taking shape.

196. *W₂ (MiscP)* reads: Only when the prose of thinking has permeated all relationships, so that we humans behave everywhere in an abstractly thoughtful fashion, do we speak of external things. At this stage, on the contrary, thinking is only this substance, only this presence to self; it is not yet applied and has not yet permeated humanity as a whole. The particular powers, which are partly objects such as sun, mountains, rivers, or else are greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change, taking shape, etc., are not yet taken up into spirit, not yet genuinely posited as ideal. But they are also not yet distinguished from spirit by the understanding, for pure being is still concentrated in that self-containment of substance which is not yet spiritual substance,

images of a beautiful imagination [*schöne Phantasie*]; they are merely fanciful [*phantastisch*]. They are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoes of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng. The specification that the particular is grasped with understanding is not yet present.

480 We say of natural objects that they are things that have external being, such as sun, moon, ocean, and the like.¹⁹⁷ But here pure | being is not concentrated in that self-contained being. At this stage thinking has not yet permeated ~thought as a whole,¹⁹⁸ spirit as a whole. ~Only the prose in which thinking is universal speaks of universal things. When we consider the world, we think it; we say that the objects are; that is their category, that they are external things; hence they are grasped prosaically. But at this stage thinking is the substance, the in-itself. Thinking is not yet applied; the natural powers are not yet grasped in categories;¹⁹⁹ categories such as “independence” and “thing” are not yet in command.²⁰⁰

Furthermore, the objective content is not grasped in the mode of beauty either; i.e., these powers, universal natural objects or the powers of the soul such as love, are not yet grasped as beautiful figures. Moreover, there belongs to beauty of figure that free sub-

197. *W₁ (Var) reads:* We say of a universal natural entity (and likewise of universal natural powers) that such a thing *is*; for example, the sun is. These are externally existent beings, are “things”: to say something is a “thing” is to predicate this reflected being of it.

198. *Thus B; W₁ (Var) reads:* humanity as a whole

199. *W₁ (Var) reads:* The understanding says that they are, that we think them and we think them as distinct from ourselves; this is their predicate, their category, this is how they are comprehended in prosaic terms. Not until prose or thinking has permeated all relationships, so that human beings everywhere behave in an abstractly thinking fashion, do they speak of external things. Here, on the contrary, thinking is only this substance, this presence to self; thinking is not yet applied; objects are not yet regarded in the form of this category, as external, as cohering, as cause and effect;

200. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W₁:* Independence of the natural powers is spiritual personality; although spirit has not yet advanced to [the level of] the understanding, they are nonetheless independent, inasmuch as they are personified.

jectivity which, even in the sensible, in determinate being, both is free and knows itself freely. For the beautiful is essentially the spiritual that expresses itself sensibly, that shows itself in a sensible mode of determinate being, but in such a way that this being is thoroughly and totally permeated by the spiritual, in such a way that the sensible does not have being on its own account, but only has complete significance within the spiritual and through the spiritual, and is the *sign* of the spiritual. This is genuine beauty—that the sensible does not have being on its own account, does not exhibit its own self but rather directly represents as itself something other than it itself is. In the living human being, in the human countenance, there are many external influences that inhibit pure idealization, this subsumption of the corporeal and sensible under the spiritual. | This relationship [i.e., the mode of beauty] is not yet present here, and so, because the spiritual is at first still present only in this abstract characteristic of substantiality, the relationship has also not developed into these particularizations or particular powers; for the substantiality is still by itself, and has not yet permeated or overcome this particularization, these its particularities, and the sensible, natural mode of being. The substance is, as it were, a universal space that has not yet organized what fills it, namely, the particularization that has proceeded from it, has not yet idealized this and subordinated it to itself. Because these powers are not at the same time represented in a universal way, because they are present as independent only for representation but are not thought, the independence attributed to them is one that human beings have in principle. The highest determination that has been grasped is spiritual determination; those powers are personified, but in a fanciful mode, not in a beautiful mode.

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The substance is the foundation, so that the distinctions emerge or appear from the One as independent deities, as universal powers, but in such a way that, besides being independent, these deities also resolve themselves again into the unity. This shocking inconsistency is present here and permeates the entire world of images. On the one hand, the independence of the deities is represented; on the other it is shown that they are the One, through which their particular shape and nature, their particularity, once again vanishes. At the

same time this One or this substance is not just objectively known, and does not yet have this [abstract] objectivity for thinking; instead the One has essential existence²⁰¹ as the human being who elevates himself to this abstraction, i.e., it has existence as human consciousness.

482 ²⁰²The next feature is the representation of the objective content of this standpoint. The basic content is the one, simple, absolute substance; this is what the Hindus call “Brahman” and “Brahmā”; “Brahman” [*Brahm*, *Brahman*] is neuter or is, as we say, “the divinity”; “Brahmā” [*Brahma*] expresses the universal essence more as a person or subject. Incidentally, this is a distinction that is not consistently observed, and indeed in the different grammatical cases it disappears | of its own accord, for masculine and neuter have many cases the same.²⁰³ ²⁰⁴

The distinctions also emerge with respect to this simple substance, and these distinctions occur in such a way²⁰⁵ that they are determined according to the instinct of the concept, that precisely the basic determination and development of the concept is present. The first is the totality in general as One, taken quite abstractly; it emerges here as one of three, it is downgraded, and what embraces the three is represented as distinct from this initial One. The second is determinacy or distinction in general, and the third is in accord with genuine determination, so that the distinctions are led back into the unity, the concrete unity. This formless unity is Brahman;

201. W₁ (Var) adds: in human consciousness

202. In B's margin: 2 July 1827

203. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: Moreover, no great stress should be laid on the distinction in this regard either, since Brahmā is only superficially personified, and the content of Brahman remains, as we said, this simple substance.

204. [Ed.] Wilhelm von Humboldt drew attention to the distinction, and the fact that it is often obscured in Sanskrit grammar, in a paper read to the Berlin Academy of Sciences on 30 June 1825 and again on 15 June 1826. See *Über die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gītā bekannte Episode des Mahā-Bhārata* (Berlin, 1826), pp. 22, 40–41. The problem was also discussed by A. W. Schlegel in a letter reproduced in his journal *Indische Bibliothek* 2, no. 4 (Bonn, 1827): 420–424. See also Hegel's review of Humboldt's paper in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1827, p. 1476 (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 136 ff.).

205. W (Var) reads: it is noteworthy that the way in which these distinctions occur is

according to its determinacy it is three in unity.²⁰⁶ "When we express it more precisely, the second moment is one of distinct powers. This triad is only a unity; distinction has no right as against the absolute unity, and so it can be called the eternal goodness; rightness or justice [*Gerechtigkeit*] accrues to the distinction from the fact that [though] what subsists [initially] is not, it attains its right, it becomes changed, it becomes a particular determinacy."²⁰⁷ "The triad as totality, which is a whole and a unity, the Hindus call Trimurti. "Murti" means "soul," or in general every emanation, everything spiritual; the Trimurti is the three essences."²⁰⁸

The first, which is "the simple substance,"²⁰⁹ is what is called Brahṁā or Brahman; but we also meet with Parabrahmā, that which

206. L (Var) reads (at the end of this paragraph), similar in W (at this point): This threefold nature of the absolute, grasped according to its abstract form or when it is merely formal, is sheer Brahman, the empty essence; in its determinateness it is three, but only within a unity, so that this triad is only a unity.

207. W (Var) reads: If we define this more closely and speak of it under another form, the second [point] means that there are distinctions, different powers; but the distinct power has no right as against the one substance, the absolute unity; and since it has no right, we can call it eternal goodness that what is determinate [is allowed to] exist, too—it is a manifestation of the divine that even what has been distinguished [i.e., set apart] should attain the state that it is. This is the goodness by virtue of which what the power posits as show or semblance obtains momentary being. It is absorbed in the power, but goodness allows it to subsist.

Upon this second [point] follows the third, namely the rightness or justice through which—[though] the subsistent determinate [initially] is not—the finite attains to its end, its destiny, its right, which is to be changed, to be transformed always into another determinateness; this is justice in general. Becoming, perishing, and generation all belong to it in abstract fashion; even nonbeing has no right, for it is an abstract determination over against being and is itself the passing over into unity.

208. W (1831) reads: This totality, which is unity or a whole, is what the Hindus call Trimurti (*murti* = shape, and all emanations of the absolute are called *murti*). This highest being [is] inwardly differentiated in such a way that it has these three determinations within it.

This trinity in unity is indisputably the most striking and greatest feature in Hindu mythology. We cannot call them persons, for they lack spiritual subjectivity as a fundamental determination. But to Europeans it must have been in the highest degree astonishing to encounter this lofty principle of the Christian religion here; we shall become acquainted with it in its truth later on, and we shall see that spirit as concrete must necessarily be grasped as triune.

[Ed.] The 1831 lectures give the correct definition of the Sanskrit term *murti*. Hegel's source or sources are not known.

209. W (Var) reads: the One, the one substance,

is above Brahmā—a complicated business! All sorts of stories are told of Brahmā insofar as he is subject; but thought or reflection once again goes beyond such a characterization as Brahmā in which something determinate is grasped²¹⁰; it goes beyond what is just determined as one of these three and makes for itself that higher aspect which is determined by its contrast with what is other. Insofar as Brahmā or Brahman is utterly substance and in turn appears only as one alongside another, it is the requirement of thought to have yet a higher, Parabrahmā—but then one cannot say in what determinate relation such forms stand to one another.

484 Brahmā is what is grasped as the substance from which everything proceeds or is begotten; this is the power that has brought forth or created everything. But inasmuch as the one substance (or the One) is thus the abstract power, | it also equally appears as what is inert, as formless, inactive matter. Here, then, we have in particular the formative activity, as we would express it. Because it is only the One, the one substance is the formless—and this is also one way in which it becomes apparent that substantiality is not satisfied—namely because form is not present. Thus Brahman, the One, the self-same essence, appears as something inert, indeed appears as begetter but at the same time behaves passively, as if it were the feminine principle. Vishnu says: Brahman is my uterus,²¹¹ in which I sow my seed, so that everything is procreated.²¹² Everything goes forth from Brahmā: gods, world, human beings; but it is at once apparent that this One is inactive, is what is inert.²¹³

This distinction also carries over into the different cosmogonies or portrayals of the creation of the world. We should not suppose, by the way, that the Hindus have a definite story or a firmly established representation of creation such as we possess ~from the Jewish books;~²¹⁴ instead, everyone there—poet, seer, or prophet—

210. *W*₂ (*Var*) adds: as one of these three

211. *W* (*Var*) adds: the mere recipient

212. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*: Even in the definition “God is essence,” the principle of movement, of bringing forth, is not contained; it involves no activity.

213. [*Ed.*] See James Mill, *The History of British India*, 3 vols. (London, 1817), 1:232.

214. *W*₁ (*Var*) reads: in the Christian and Jewish religion;

constructs his own representation in personal fashion, by speculative immersion within himself. Hence there is nothing fixed, but instead everyone has a different viewpoint. This creation is [described] one way in the Code of Manu, but differently in the Vedas and other religious works²¹⁵—each account has its own special version. In general, one cannot say that the Hindus maintain this or that about creation; for everything is always simply the view of one sage; the common element consists only in the basic features that we have presented. Thus in the Vedas a description of the world's creation is advanced in which Brahmā is alone in solitude, wholly by himself, and in which an essence that is then represented as something higher says to him that he should expand and beget himself. For a thousand years, however, Brahmā had been in no position to grasp his expansion; for he | had again receded into himself. Here Brahmā is indeed represented as world-creating, but because he is the One, because of being inactive and needing to be summoned by something other and higher, Brahmā is represented as what is formless.²¹⁶ Hence there is need for another. On the whole, Brahmā is this one, absolute substance.²¹⁷ |

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Then the second [essence] is Vishnu or Krishna, i.e., the embodying of Brahman; this is the determinate being of preservation,

215. [Ed.] For the cosmogony of the Code of Manu and of the Vedas, see annotations a, e to n. 217; see also Alexander Dow, *The History of Hindostan, from the Earliest Accounts to the Death of Akbar*, 2 vols. (London, 1768), l:xlvi–xlix.

216. [Ed.] See Francis Buchanan, "On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas," *Asiatic Researches* 6:273–280.

217. W (1831) adds: As this simple activity, power is thought. In Hinduism this characteristic is the most prominent of all; it is the absolute foundation and is the One, Brahman. This form is in accordance with the logical development: first came the multiplicity of determinations, and the advance consists in the resumption of the determining into unity. That is the foundation. What still remains to be added is partly just historical, but partly it is the necessary development that follows from that principle.

As the active element, the simple power created the world. This creation is essentially a relating of thought to itself, a self-referring activity and not a finite one. This too is expressed in the Hindu ways of viewing the matter. They have a great number of cosmogonies, which are all more or less barbarous, and out of which nothing of a fixed character can be derived; [W₁: as was the case with the Jewish myths. W₂: there is not just one representation of the creation of the world, as in the Jewish and Christian religion.] In the Code of Manu, in the Vedas and Puranas, the cosmogonies

are continually comprehended and presented differently; but there is always one feature essentially present in them, namely that this thinking, which is at home with itself, is the begetting of itself.

This infinitely profound and true feature constantly recurs in the various portrayals of the creation of the world. The Code of Manu begins as follows: "The Eternal with a single thought created the waters," and so on.^a We also find that this pure activity is called "the Word," just as God is in the New Testament.^b With the Jews of later times, e.g., Philo, σοφία is the first-created [being] that goes forth from the One.^c The "Word" is held in very high esteem by the Hindus, it is the image of pure activity, something that has external, physical, finite being, but which does not abide. Instead it is only ideal, and disappears immediately in its externality. The Eternal created the waters, the record then says,^d and deposited fructifying seed in them; this seed became a resplendent egg, and in it the eternal itself was born again as Brahmā. Brahmā is the progenitor of all spirits, of what exists and what does not exist. In this egg, the story goes, the great power remained inactive for a year; at the end of that time it divided the egg by thought, and created one part masculine and the other feminine. The masculine force is itself [W₂: begotten, and becomes again a begetter and] effective only when it has practiced strict meditation, i.e., when it has attained to the concentration of abstraction. Thought therefore is what brings forth, and what is brought forth is just that which brings forth, namely the unity of thinking with itself. The return of thinking to itself is found in other accounts too. In one of the Vedas (from which some fragments have for the first time been translated by Colebrooke^e), a similar description of the first act of creation is to be found: "There was neither being nor nothing, neither above nor below, [W₂: neither death nor immortality,] but only the One enshrouded and dark. Outside of this One there existed nothing, and the One brooded by itself in solitude; through the energy of contemplation it brought forth a world out of itself; desire or impulse first formed itself in this thinking, and this was the original seed of all things."

Here again thinking is presented in its self-enclosed activity. The thinking is, however, further known as thinking in the self-conscious essence, in the human being who constitutes its actual existence. The Hindus could be reproached with having attributed a contingent existence to the One, since it is left to chance whether or not the individual raises itself to the abstract universal [W₂: to abstract self-consciousness]. But [this is unfair because] Brahman is immediately present in the caste of Brāhmins; it is their duty to read the Vedas and to withdraw into themselves. Reading the Vedas is the divine element (is God's very self), and so is prayer. The Vedas can even be read without taking in the sense, or in complete stupefaction; this stupefaction itself is the abstract unity of thought; the I and its pure intuitive activity is what is perfectly empty. Thus it is the Brāhmins in whom Brahman exists; through the reading of the Vedas Brahman is, [W₂: and human self-consciousness in the state of abstraction is Brahman itself].^f

[Ed.] ^aSee *Institutes of Hindu Law* (Calcutta, 1794), chap. 1, On the Creation, esp. pp. 1–2. ^bA probable reference to the cosmogony described by Alexander Dow (see above, n. 215). Hindu cosmogonies had already been compared with the creation by the Word, by William Jones, "On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India," *Asiatic Researches* 1:244, although as Jones pointed out, in the case of the Code of Manu the creative activity is attributed to thought rather than word. ^cA probable reference to August Neander's treatment of Philo in *Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten*

the manifestation or appearance on earth that is quite completely developed, the appearing one, humanity, particular human beings. The Hindus enumerate many different instances of this incarnation. The general point is that here Brahmā appears as a human being. Nevertheless we still cannot say that it is Brahmā who appears as a human being; for this becoming-human is not posited as the bare form of Brahman. The vast poetic creations of the Hindus are relevant here.²¹⁸ The representations of these incarnations seem in part to contain resonances of historical events; it seems that there are princes and mighty kings among them, that they include great conquerors | who have given a new shape to the conditions of life, who are deities.²¹⁹ These deities are also the heroes of amorous tales.²²⁰ 487

The third [essence] is Shiva, i.e., Mahadeva²²¹; this is [the moment of] change in general; the basic character is on the one hand the vast energy of life, and on the other the destroyer, the devastator, the wild energy of natural life. His principal symbol is therefore the bull

gnostischen Systeme (Berlin, 1818), p. 10. ^dSee above, annotation a. ^eSee H. T. Colebrooke, "On the Vedas," *Asiatic Researches* 8:404–405, where Colebrooke gives a translation of the Nāsadiya hymn from the eleventh chapter of the Rig Veda. In the part played by "darkness" and "desire," as portrayed in the hymn, Colebrooke sees an analogy to Hesiod, *Theogony* 116. ^fOn the divinity of reading the Vedas, see esp. J. A. Dubois, *Moeurs, institutions, et cérémonies des peuples de l'Inde* (Paris, 1825) 1:186–187, a passage to which specific reference was made by P. von Bohlen, *Das alte Indien* (Königsberg, 1830), 2:13. The Brāhmins' duty to read the Vedas was supposedly assigned to them by the Supreme Being at the time they and the other castes were created (see *Institutes of Hindu Law*, p. 12). On reading them in a dull, thoughtless manner see H. T. Colebrooke, "On the Vedas, or Sacred Writings of the Hindus," *Asiatic Researches* 8:390. On the immediate presence of Brahman in Brāhmins see *Institutes of Hindu Law*, p. 286.

218. W (*Var*/1831?) adds: Krishna is also Brahmā, Vishnu.

219. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: [W: and are thus described as deities.] The deeds of Krishna are conquests, and the way they happen is quite ungodlike.

220. W (*Var*) reads: Generally speaking, conquest and amours are the two aspects or the principal acts of the incarnations.

221. W (1831) adds: the great god, or Rudra, who ought to be the return into self. The first stage, Brahman, is the remote, self-enclosed unity. The second, Vishnu, is manifestation, life in human shape. (The moments of spirit are up to this point unmistakable.) The third stage ought to be the return to the first, in order that the unity should be posited as returning within itself. But it is just this third stage that is devoid of spirit; it is merely the category of becoming generally, or of generation and perishing.

on account of its strength, the image of natural virility but at the same time also the destroyer; the most general representation for it, however, is the lingam (something revered among the Greeks as the phallus), this symbol that most temples have—the innermost sanctum contains this image. Hence, as we said, the third aspect here is only change in general, procreation and destruction.²²² The authentic third aspect in the profound concept is spirit, the return of the One to itself, its coming-to-self; not just change, but change through which the [moment of] distinction is brought to reconciliation with the first [moment], and the duality is sublated.

In this religion, which still belongs to nature, this process of becoming is still grasped as sheer becoming, sheer change.²²³ This
 488 | distinction is essential and is grounded upon the whole standpoint. From the very standpoint of nature religion it is even necessary.

As we said, the distinctions presented are finally grasped as unity, as the Trimurti; and the Trimurti, not Brahmā itself, is grasped as the highest. But “equally”²²⁴ each person of the triad is also in turn taken alone, by itself, so that it is itself the totality, is the entire god.

It is noteworthy that the older portions of the Vedas do not speak of Vishnu, even less of Shiva; there Brahmā, the One, is God altogether alone. The distinctions of the Trimurti are determinations that are introduced only later.²²⁵ There are also castes; one reveres

222. *Precedes in W₂ (1831), similar in W₁ (at the end of this paragraph):* Such are the three fundamental determinations. The whole is portrayed by a figure with three heads, again in a symbolical manner, and not beautifully.

[Ed.] Again Hegel is probably referring to an illustration depicting the Trimurti, accompanying Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie*, plate xxii, fig. 1. The Trimurti is also said to be represented by the image of three conjoined human heads, in the account of FitzClarence's journey in Harnisch, *Die wichtigsten Reisen*, vol. 7 (1825), pp. 60–61.

223. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* It is not a change in the differentia, through which unity produces itself as the sublation of the difference into unity. Consciousness or spirit is also a change in the first or immediate unity. The other element is the primal division or judgment, the having of an other over against one. I know that I exist in such a way that, inasmuch as the other is for me, I have returned to myself in that other, I am within myself. But here, instead of being what reconciles, the third moment is only this wild play of begetting and destroying. *W₂ (1831) continues:* So the unfolding ends in a wild, delirious whirl.

224. *W (Var) reads:* just as this is grasped as Trimurti, so

225. [Ed.] This is probably derived from Colebrooke's "On the Vedas," *Asiatic Researches* 8:377–497, esp. pp. 494–495. See 1824 lectures, n. 258.

only Krishna, the other Shiva, and great strife arises from this.²²⁶

²²⁷The one called Vishnu says about himself in turn that he is everything, that he is the absolutely formative activity, that Brahman is the womb in which he engenders all. Indeed, he even goes on to state: "I am Brahman."²²⁸ Here the distinction is sublated. Likewise when Shiva avows that²²⁹ he is the absolute totality, the fire in jewels, the luster in metal, the power in the male, the reason in the soul; he, too, is in turn Brahman.²³⁰

Apart from these distinctions, the particular phenomena | and 489
powers are further represented as both free and having being on their own account; but they are personified. Hence sun, moon, the Himalayas, the Ganges and the other rivers, are represented as persons; and similarly, particular subjective sentiments such as vengeance, or powers such as evil, are personified; everything is in confusion. Their being is a personification even if they are represented as animals; they are spoken of in human terms, and always as alive.²³¹ | The first bird to alight on the branch is the god of love; 490
the cow and the ape enjoy great reverence. They do not have hospitals

226. *W (Var) reads:* The Hindus, moreover, are divided into many sects. Among many other differences the principal one is this, that some worship Vishnu and others Shiva. This is often the occasion of bloody conflicts; at festivals and fairs especially, disputes arise which cost thousands their lives.

[*Ed.*] This may be based on W. C. Seybold, *Ideen zur Theologie und Staatsverfassung des höhern Alterthums* (Tübingen, 1820), p. 45; see also Mill, *History of British India* 1:226.

227. *Precedes in W (Var):* Generally speaking these distinctions are to be understood as meaning that

228. [*Ed.*] See Mill, *History of British India* 1:232.

229. *W (Var) reads:* is brought on the scene speaking,

230. [*Ed.*] Hegel is obviously referring again here to the Atharvasira Upanishad; but most of the comparisons he lists in fact belong to the self-avowal of Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gita. He probably includes them here because he has already mentioned them in Part I (Vol. 1:376). On "the luster in metal" and "the reason in the soul" see *Bhagavad-Gita*, ed. A. Schlegel (Bonn, 1823), pp. 162 ff. (10.36, 22). The comparison to "the fire in jewels" is found elsewhere, serving as a reference to the Mahābhārata in the Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa; it is not certain what Hegel's source is. See also 1824 lectures, n. 246.

L (1827?) adds, similar in W: In this way everything dissolves into one person, into one of these [three] distinctions, even the other two persons, along with the other powers, nature deities, and genii.

231. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W₁:* That the [divine] substance should also have animal form is a commonplace for the Hindus.

for sick people, but they do for sick cattle.²³² Even the god of heaven, Indra, stands far below Brahmā, Shiva, and Vishnu;²³³ he in turn has many deities beneath him, even the stars. All of the particular powers in their peculiar natures attain this independence, although it is a vanishing independence.²³⁴

232. [Ed.] See Mill, *History of British India* 1:281, where a footnote refers to a report by Dr. Tennant to this effect, except that Tennant does not say there were no hospitals for the sick generally, but none "for the sick poor."

233. [Ed.] Hegel does not refer to the fact that this subordination of the old Vedic god of thunderstorm and of war, Indra, reflects the replacement of the old religion of the Vedas by Brahmanism, despite the fact that elsewhere he shows that he has a rudimentary knowledge of this development in the history of Hindu religion.

234. W (1831) reads: Apart from this main foundation and fundamental determination in the Hindu mythology, everything else is personified superficially through phantasy. Great natural objects, such as the Ganges, the sun, the Himalayas (which are in particular the dwelling place of Shiva), are identified with Brahman itself. Everything—love, deceit, theft, cunning, as well as the sensuous powers of nature in plants and animals, [W₂: so that substance has animal form]—is comprehended by phantasy [W₂: and represented as free on its own account]. Thus there arises an infinite world of deities of the particular powers and phenomena, which is known nonetheless to be subordinate to something above it. At the head of this world stands Indra, the god of the visible heavens. These gods are mutable and perishable, and subject to the supreme One; abstraction absorbs them. The power which humankind acquires by means of abstraction strikes them with terror; indeed, Vishvamitra even creates another Indra and other gods.^a

W₂: Thus at one moment these particular spiritual and natural powers are regarded as gods subsisting independently, and at another moment [they are regarded] as vanishing [beings] whose nature it is to be submerged in the absolute unity, in substance, and again to arise out of it.

So the Hindus say that there have already been many thousand Indras, and there will be still more; in the same way the incarnations are posited as transient too.^b Since the particular powers return into the substantive unity, the unity does not become concrete but remains abstract; and it also does not become concrete inasmuch as these determinacies emerge from it—rather they are phenomena defined as having their independence outside it.

W: To form an estimate of the number and value of these deities is out of the question here. There is nothing that partakes of a fixed shape, since the phantasy we are dealing with is totally lacking in determinacy. These configurations disappear again in the same way as they are created. Phantasy passes over from an ordinary external mode of existence to divinity, and this in turn reverts in like manner to what was its basis. It is impossible to speak of miracles here, for everything is a miracle, everything is crazy and is not determined by a rational nexus of thought categories. In any event much of it is symbolical.

[Ed.] ^aSee below, n. 244. ^bSee below, n. 255.

c. *The Cultus*

Now we are going to speak of the cultus, of the relation of human beings to Brahman.²³⁵ The absolute or highest cultus is that most complete emptying out of the human, the renunciation in which the Hindus relinquish all consciousness and willing, all passions and needs (nirvana), [or] this union with God in the mode of integral self-concentration (yoga). The sort of person who lives only in contemplation, who has renounced all worldly desires, is called a yogi. On the one hand the devotion of the Hindus, when concentrated within themselves, is a passing state like our devotion; on the other hand, however, the Hindus make this abstraction into the character of their consciousness, and of their entire existence. [Their goal is] total indifference toward everything, and complete austerity. One essential determination is that, while it is the case for Hindus, as it is for us, that devotion is a momentary elevation after which one returns to one's former activity and interests, it is also the case that for them this abstraction also appears as something that persists for the whole of life, so that what prevails is total indifference toward everything ethical, toward all worthy human pursuits. In this state devoid of thought, in this pure egoism, the human being is Brahman itself. But when an Englishman²³⁶ asked such a person: "What is Brahman, this meditation? Do you have a temple for Brahman?" the reply was: "We revere one Brahmā. We have no temple for Brahmā, but only for Vishnu and Krishna, just as the Catholics have no church for God, but always just for a saint." (Canova pledged his great artistry to his native city, in order to build a magnificent church to the honor of God; but the clergy would not allow it, for it must belong to a saint.²³⁷) When one asks the Hindu what this absorption is called, however, the reply is: "When I direct

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235. *W₁ (Var) reads:* The relationship of the subject to the absolute and especially to Brahman (which relationship is the cultus) will show more precisely what this Brahman properly is.

236. [Ed.] Francis Wilford, "An Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West," *Asiatic Researches* 11:125–126.

237. [Ed.] Hegel makes the same comparison in his Humboldt review, p. 1484 (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 145–146; cf. pp. 708–709), citing official reports as his source. It has not been possible to identify them more precisely.

my devotion to the honor of some god, when I concentrate totally within myself, then I say inwardly to myself that I am Brahman itself, that I am the highest essence."²³⁸ Pure being-with-myself is Brahman.²³⁹

240 The highest point in this cultus is the state of being dead to the world, the making of this inward immobility of self into one's character or one's fixed principle.²⁴¹ Those who have attained this are | called yogis. There are distinct levels of yogis. An Englishman²⁴²

238. [Ed.] See above, n. 236.

239. *W₁ (Var) reads:* but on the other hand, the fact is that humans make this abstractness (which they initially attain only momentarily) into their character, the character of their entire consciousness, of their entire existence. Hence they do not just elevate themselves momentarily, but remain at this level, completely indifferent to ethical concerns, to the ties that bind us together as human, to society, to what merits their attention and involvement. One who remains at this abstract level, who renounces everything and is dead to the world in general, is a yogi.

One who inwardly concentrates oneself in this thoughtlessness, this emptiness, this pure selfhood, this pure presence to self, is Brahman. And the highest mode of the cultus for Hindus is to make this abstractness something completely habitual.

W₂ (1831 with 1827?) reads: The highest point to which one attains in the cultus is that union with God which consists in the annihilation and stupefaction of self-consciousness. This is not affirmative liberation and reconciliation, but is rather a wholly negative liberation, complete abstraction. It is the complete emptying that renounces all consciousness, will, passions, needs. In the Hindu view, persistence within one's own consciousness is ungodly. Human freedom consists not in emptiness, but precisely in being at home with oneself in one's willing, knowing, and acting. To the Hindu, on the contrary, the complete submergence and stupefaction of consciousness is what is highest, and one who remains at this abstract level and is dead to the world is called a yogi.

240. *In B's margin:* 3 July 1827

241. *W₁ (Var) reads (parallel in main text follows):* Even nowadays there are still individual Hindus who inflict such exercises and torments on themselves in order to attain to the power of the Brāhmins, a power that is itself above the gods; for example, they spend ten years with their arms above their heads, they have themselves buried alive, have themselves swung through fire, etc.

One who has reached the highest rung on the ladder of penances (in other words, he has had himself buried alive) has attained consummation and is the actual Brahman who has power over all gods; Indra and all the gods of nature are subject to him, so that he is accounted to be what we saw previously in the sorcerer (namely that this singular subject exercises all power over the violent forces of nature). The Brāhman is born with this merit of the yogi; he is twice-born, and hence he has universal power over nature.

242. [Ed.] Samuel Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet, Containing a Narrative of a Journey through Bootan, and Part of Tibet* (London, 1800), pp. 270–272. See 1824 lectures, n. 277.

who had journeyed to the Dalai Lama reported that he had known one who was at the first stage and who had slept in a standing position for twelve years. The second stage was going to be when he would keep his hands folded over his head for another twelve years. After one had accomplished this, other trials then ensued, such as sitting in the midst of five fires for three and three-quarter hours. One yogi got to the point where he wanted to hang suspended by one foot over a fire, also for three and three-quarter hours, but he was unable to endure it. The greatest test is to allow oneself to be buried alive and to continue in this situation for three and three-quarter hours. Having endured all this, one is then perfect and has absolute power over the whole of nature, over all deities; one is Brahṁā himself, and is accorded the status that we saw previously in the case of the sorcerer, of having power over the forces of nature.²⁴³ From an epic we know that a certain Vishvamitra wanted to attain this status (cf. the poem "Rāmāyana").²⁴⁴ |

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243. [Ed.] It is clear from his Humboldt review, p. 1459 (*Berliner Schriften*, p. 117), that Hegel is again referring here to Humboldt's paper on the Bhagavad-Gita (see above, n. 204).

244. W (1831) reads: There is an episode in the Rāmāyana^a that transposes us completely to this standpoint. The story of the life of Vishvamitra, the companion of Rama (an incarnation of Vishnu), is related as follows: There was a mighty king, and being so mighty, he demanded a cow (which in India is worshiped as the generative force of the earth) from the Brāhman Vasishta, after he had got to know of its marvelous energy. Vasishta refused to give it; thereupon the king seized it violently, but the cow escaped back to Vasishta and reproached him for having allowed it to be taken from him, [W₁: and promised him, as a Brāhman, all power, which would be greater than that of a Kshatriya, which the king was. W₂: since the power of a Kshatriya (which the king was) did not exceed that of a Brāhman.] Vasishta then charged the cow to raise up for him a power wherewith to resist the king, who then confronted this power with his whole army, and both armies struck repeatedly at one another. Finally, however, Vishvamitra was conquered, after his hundred sons too had been destroyed by means of a wind that Vasishta had caused to issue from his navel. Full of despair, he handed over the government to his sole remaining son and betook himself with his consort to the Himalaya Mountains in order to obtain the favor of Mahadeva (Shiva). Moved by the severity of his exercises, Mahadeva is prepared to fulfill his wishes. Vishvamitra asks to have complete knowledge of the science of archery, and this is granted him. Armed with this, Vishvamitra intends to coerce Vasishta; with his arrows he lays waste his forest. But Vasishta seizes his staff, the Brahṁā weapon, and lifts it up; thereupon all the gods are filled with apprehension, for this violence threatened the entire world with destruction. They entreat the Brāhman to desist. Vishvamitra acknowledges the Brāhman's power and

now resolves to subject himself to the severest disciplines in order to attain that power. He retires into solitude and lives a thousand years in abstraction, alone with his consort. Brahmā comes to him and addresses him thus: "I recognize thee now as the first royal sage." Not content with this, Vishvamitra begins his penances anew. Meanwhile a Hindu king had applied to Vasishtha with the request that he would raise him up to heaven in his bodily shape. The request was refused, however, on account of his being a Kshatriya; but as he haughtily persisted in it, Vasishtha degraded him to the chandala caste. He then betook himself to Vishvamitra with the same request. Vishvamitra prepares a sacrifice, to which he invites the gods; however, they refuse to come to a sacrifice offered for a chandala. But Vishvamitra, through his strength, raises the king to heaven. At the command [W_1 : of the gods W_2 : of Indra] he falls down, but Vishvamitra sustains him between heaven and earth, and thereupon creates another heaven, another Pleiades, another Indra, and another circle of gods. The gods were filled with astonishment, repaid in humility to Vishvamitra, and agreed with him about a place to be assigned to that king in heaven. After the lapse of a thousand years, Vishvamitra [W_1 : was called W_2 : was rewarded, and Brahmā called him] chief of the sages. [W_2 : But he did not yet declare him to be a Brāhman. Then Vishvamitra begins his penances all over again.] The gods in heaven become apprehensive; Indra attempts to excite his passions (for a perfect sage and Brāhman should have subjugated his passions). He sends him a very beautiful girl, with whom Vishvamitra lives for twenty-five years; but then he removes himself from her, having overcome his love. In vain, too, do the gods try to provoke his anger. Finally, his Brahmā strength has to be conceded.

Precedes in W_1 (1831): It is only the Brāhman who are privileged to read the Vedas, and this privilege belongs to them by right of birth. Their whole life expresses the existence of Brahman; they enter into all worldly affairs, to be sure, but they are regarded as already possessing the absolute power in themselves. All other castes stand far below the Brāhman caste. The highest point that can be attained in the cultus is stupefaction, the annihilation of self-consciousness; this is not affirmative liberation and reconciliation, but rather wholly negative liberation, complete abstraction. In the Hindu view, persistence within one's own consciousness is ungodly. But human freedom consists precisely in being free in willing, knowing, and acting. To the Hindu, on the contrary, the complete submergence and stupefaction of consciousness is what is highest.

The Brāhman is the existence of Brahman.^b According to the myth, they issued from its mouth. Those who are not Brāhman can also raise themselves to this level, but only through ceaseless asceticism, by forcing themselves to mortify themselves for years at a time and so attaining what the Brāhman has immediately through birth. When the most ignorant Brāhman reads the Vedas, Brahman is within him. Other Hindus can raise themselves to this level, by bringing themselves to the point of being quite lifeless in the final stupefaction of consciousness. This is a basic trait in Hindu life. What the great epic poems of the Hindus principally express^c is the Brāhman's loftiness, and they treat of the monstrous tasks and penances that the Kshatriyas have performed in order to attain this perfection of power. Hindu renunciation is the way of perfection that does not presuppose sin.^d

[Ed.] ^aThe account transmitted by W follows fairly closely *The Ramayana of Valmeeki* in the translation by W. Carey and J. Marshman, vol. 1 (Serampore, 1806), secs. xli–lii, except that it is not Vasishtha but Vishvamitra who terrifies the gods and

The Brāhmins enjoy from birth the status of the yogi; they are called twice-born—first a natural birth, secondly one via the abstraction of spirit. This means that when a Brāhman is born, then a powerful god is born; the king should | beware of provoking such a person to anger, for he could destroy the king's entire power. No king can call them to account. The other castes have boundless reverence for these Brāhmins. According to the Hindu law books the Brāhman holds this elevated status even though he is only human like everyone else. Nowadays the life of the Brāhmins has changed very much; they are employed by the English as scribes and in other activities. In the last insurrection of the Burmese, Brāhmins also were among the captives; | they were shot just like the others—though according to the laws Brāhmins cannot be brought to justice by the king.²⁴⁵

worlds by use of “the Brahmā weapon.” It is also not Vasishtha himself but his sons who utter the curse whereby the king is made a chandala. The same error occurs in the extract Hegel made from the English translation in his Humboldt review, pp. 1460–1464 (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 119–123), despite the fact that he was also familiar with a German translation of the same episode by Franz Bopp in *Über das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache* (Frankfurt am Main, 1816), pp. 159–235. Thus we may assume that in lecturing, Hegel based himself on the text of his review or the materials he had assembled for it. The shifts between past and present tense occur in W_1 and W_2 .^b For the idea that Brāhmins are sprung from the mouth of Brahman, see *Institutes of Hindu Law*, p. 12. “This in fact applies only to the Rāmāyana.”^d This sentence indicates that the term “penances” (*Büssungen*) is an inappropriate expression for what the Hindus call “austerities” (Sanskrit *tapas*)—the term in fact used by Hegel's source, the Carey-Marshman translation. Without sin there can be no “penance.” Hegel may have been unfamiliar with the English term “austerities.” In the 1824 lectures, where his source was most likely Bopp's German translation, he uses the term *Strengigkeiten* instead of *Büssungen* and says specifically that such *Strengigkeiten* are not “penances” (*Büssungen*) for offenses committed (see above, p. 343). The W text adds following *Strengigkeiten* the misspelled word “austerities” (see 1824 n. 279)—probably the hand of the editor.

245. [Ed.] On the concept of the twice-born, see *Institutes of Hindu Law*, p. 38. The statement that Brāhmins cannot be “brought to justice [*gerichtet*]” by the king probably refers to pp. 237–238; the German verb can mean either “sentenced” or, sometimes, “executed” (more properly, *hingerichtet*), and it is clear from the source that the latter is intended here. On the power and elevated social status of the Brāhmins, p. 224; on their divine dignity, pp. 13, 286. The source of Hegel's remark concerning changes in the status of Brāhmins has not been positively identified, although it is possible he is again referring to an incident in Mill's *History of British India* 2:129–130, 134, where the author describes how the French governor of

²⁴⁶Thus the highest point is this detached contemplation as Brahman wholly for itself, which comes into existence in this deep absorption in nothing, in this wholly empty consciousness and intuition. The remaining content of spirit and nature, however, is allowed to run wild in all directions. The [contemplative] unity that stands uppermost is, to be sure, the power from which everything proceeds and into which everything returns; but it does not become concrete as the bond of the manifold powers of nature, nor does it become concrete in spirit as the bond of the many and varied spiritual activities and sensibilities. In the first instance, when the unity becomes the bond of natural things we call it necessity; this is the bond of natural forces and phenomena. This is how we consider natural properties and things, as being in their independence essentially conjoined to one another. Laws and understanding are in nature, in the fact that phenomena cohere in this way. But the unity of Brahman remains solitary, by itself; hence its fulfillment is here a wild and unruly one. Similarly in the spiritual domain, we do not have the concrete here; the universal or thinking does not become something concrete in the spirit, something internally self-determining. When thinking determines itself internally and the determinate is sublated within this universality, when pure thinking is concrete, that is what we call reason. There is duty and right only in thinking. These determinations, posited in the form of universality, are rational with regard to conscious truth and insight, and likewise with regard to the will. But such concrete unity, reason, and rationality does not also become that One of Brahman, that solitary unity. On this account there is no right or duty present here either. For freedom of will and of spirit is precisely a being present to oneself

Pondicherry exacted forced labor from all the inhabitants, regardless of caste, and later had six Brāhmans shot from the muzzles of guns as spies. In his Humboldt review, p. 1490 (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 152–153), Hegel also referred to FitzClarence's report that any Brāhman who held a subordinate post with the English was treated with scant respect.

246. *Precedes in L* (1827?): No reverence is shown to Brahman; it is not worshiped or venerated, has no temple or altars; its unity is not related to what is real, to actually effective self-consciousness. From the fact that consciousness of the One is isolated in this way, it follows that at this level nothing in the relationship to the divine is defined by reason.

in determinacy; but this presence to self or this unity is here abstract and lacks determination. |

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In one respect this is the source of the fanciful polytheism of the Hindus. We have noted that there is here no category of being. They have no category for what we call the independence of things, for what we articulate by the phrase "there are" or "there is"; rather, in the first instance, human beings know themselves alone as independent. For this reason an independent element in nature is represented as endowed with our own human type of independence, the kind we carry in our own being—in our human shape and consciousness. Hence the imagination here makes everything into deities. This is what we see in its own way among the Greeks, too, where every tree is made into a dryad, every spring into a nymph. There we say that the beautiful imagination of human beings animates everything, ensouls everything, represents everything as inspirited; that human beings walk among their own kind, anthropomorphize everything, and through their beautiful fellow-feeling give to everything the beautiful mode [of life] that they themselves have.²⁴⁷ Among the Hindus, on the contrary, it is a wild and unruly mode. We duly note that they are so generous as to share their mode of being; but we must state that this liberality has its ground in an impoverished image of themselves and, to be precise, in the fact that their humanity does not yet have in it the content of freedom, of the eternal, of actual being truly in and for itself, and they do not yet know that their own content or specification is nobler than the content of a spring or a tree.²⁴⁸ Among the Greeks there is more a play of imagination, while among the Hindus there is no higher self-feeling or self-awareness present. The view that they have of being is simply the one they have of themselves; they set themselves on the same plane with all their images of nature. This is the case because thinking has slipped back so wholly into abstraction.

Furthermore the powers of nature, whose being is known and represented anthropomorphically, transcend concrete human beings who, as physical beings, are dependent on them and have not yet

247. *W₂ (Var/1831?) adds:* and so embrace everything as ensouled.

248. *W₂ (Var/1831?) adds:* Everything is squandered on the imagination, and nothing is kept back for living.

distinguished their freedom from their natural aspect. Coherent with this is the fact that human life has no higher worth than the being
 497 | of natural objects or the life of a natural being. Human life has worth only when humanity itself is inwardly nobler; but for the Hindus human life is something contemptible and despicable—it has no more value than a sip of water. Here one cannot ascribe worth to self in an affirmative way, but only negatively: life gains worth only through negation of self. Everything concrete is only negative when measured against this abstraction. Every aspect of the Hindu cultus follows from this, such as the fact that human beings sacrifice themselves and their parents and children; widow-burning after the death of the husband fits in here too.²⁴⁹ This sacrifice [of self] has a higher value when it is done expressly with regard to Brahman or some god; for the god is also Brahman. It counts as a higher sacrifice when they climb up to the snowy crags of the Himalayas where the sources of the Ganges are, and cast themselves into these streams.²⁵⁰ Those are not penances for transgressions, not offerings in recompense for some evil, but rather a sacrifice merely to gain worth for oneself. This worth is just what can only be attained in a negative manner.²⁵¹

Bound up with the fact that the human being is in this way without freedom and has no inner self-worth, there is a concrete expansion of this unspeakable and endlessly variable superstition, these tremendous fetters and limitations. The relationship of dependence

249. [Ed.] See H. T. Colebrooke, "On the Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow," *Asiatic Researches* 4:205–215.

250. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to an anonymous review of Alexander von Humboldt's *Sur l'élévation des montagnes de l'Inde*, in *The Quarterly Review* (London), 22, no. 44 (1820): 415–430. See also his reference to a report of Turner on the practices of a yogi, above, n. 242; and to the mortification of Vishvamitra, above, n. 244.

251. *W*₂ (1831) adds: The Hindu's animal-worship is also closely connected with the position that is here given to humanity. An animal is not a conscious spirit, but precisely in this concentration of unconsciousness, human being is not far removed from the beasts. Among the Hindus efficacy is not viewed as a specific activity but as simple force that operates through everything. Particular activity is held of little account; only stupefaction is valued, and all we are then left with is the organic life of the animal. When no freedom, no morality, no ethical life is present, then power is known only as internal, obscure power, such as pertains both to animals and to those people in the most complete torpor.

upon outward and natural things that is insignificant to the European is made into something fixed and abiding. For this is precisely where superstition has its ground: in the fact that human beings are not indifferent to external things—and they are not indifferent when they have no inward freedom, when they do not | have true independence of spirit.²⁵² Thus it is prescribed with what foot one should stand up, and how one should pass water, whether to the north or to the south. This is where the prescriptions that Brāhmans have to observe fit in (see also the tale of Nala in the *Mahābhārata*).²⁵³ And just as the superstition arising from this lack of freedom is unbounded, so it also follows that there is no ethics to be found, no determinate form of rational freedom, no right, no duty. The Hindu people are utterly sunk in the depths of an unethical life.

²⁵⁴The essence is absolute unity, inward self-absorption of the subject. This self-absorption has its existence in the finite subject, in the particular spirit. To the idea of the true there belongs the universal, the substantial unity with self, and self-equivalence; but this belongs to the true in such a way that it is not only indeterminate, not only substantial unity, but is determinate within itself. What is called Brahman has determinacy external to it. The supreme determinacy of Brahman is, and can only be, the consciousness and knowledge of its real existence; and this determinacy or this subjectivity of the unity is here the subjective self-consciousness as such. In another form the determinacy is the particularization of the

252. *W₂* (1831) *adds*: All that is indifferent is fixed, while all that is not indifferent, all that belongs to right and morality, is jettisoned and given over to caprice.

253. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to the extremely detailed prescriptions in the *Institutes of Hindu Law*, chap. 4 ("On Economics and Private Morals"). The prescription "with what foot one should stand up" is not, however, found in this chapter. The phrase "to the north or to the south" reads in *Hu* (our only source at this point) *gegen Winter oder gegen Süden*. Sec. 4.50 instructs a Brāhman to void feces or urine "to the north" by day and "to the south" by night; however, 4.48 instructs him never to do so "facing the wind." Hegel probably cited both passages, while Hube conflated them, mishearing *Wind* as *Winter*. For the tale of Nala, see Franz Bopp, ed. and trans., *Nalus: Carmen Sanscritum e Mahābhārato* (London, 1819).

254. [Ed.] The next thirteen paragraphs (ending on p. 612) are derived almost exclusively from *L*; they are not substantiated by *B* and only in a very fragmentary fashion by *An* and *Hu*. However, it is clear from the dates given by *B* that the text delivered was more or less of a length that would include them.

universal, the particular spiritual and natural powers. This particular aspect also steps outside the unity, and as a result there is only a fluctuation, so that the particular powers that have the value of deities are at one time independent and at another vanishing; they are what perishes in abstract unity or in substance, and then emerges from it once more. Thus the Hindus say: "There have indeed been many thousand Indras and there will be still more."²⁵⁵ In the same vein, incarnations are posited as something transitory. Although the particular powers return into the substantial unity, it does not become concrete; rather it remains an abstractly substantial unity; and although these determinacies emerge out of it, the unity does not become concrete even on that account, for they are outside it, they are phenomena posited with the characteristic of independence.

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d. Transition to the Next Stage

²⁵⁶—The transition at which we stand is this [state of] being distinct; this existence or subjectivity collapses into a category where we are

255. [Ed.] See H. T. Colebrooke, "On the Philosophy of the Hindus," *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1 (1824): 27, although the statement was originally intended in a historical sense, meaning that the Vedic world of gods would give way to later philosophical conceptions, rather than in the futuristic sense that Hegel gives it.

256. W_2 (MiscP) reads (parallel in main text follows): In respect of its necessity, this transition is based upon the fact that the truth which in the preceding stages is present implicitly, as the foundation, is here actually drawn forth and posited. In the religion of phantasy, and [that] of being-within-self, this subject, this subjective self-consciousness, is identical, but immediately identical, with the substantive unity that is called Brahman or that is indeterminate nothingness. This One is now grasped as unity determined within itself, as implicitly subjective unity, and consequently this unity is grasped as implicit totality. If the unity is defined as implicitly subjective, it contains the principle of spirituality; and it is this principle that unfolds in the religions that stand at this transitional point.

In Hinduism, moreover, the One (or the unity of Brahman) and determinateness (or the many powers of the particular, and the emergence of differences) stood in the relationship that the differentiae were at one moment held to be independent while at another they had disappeared and were submerged in the unity. The dominant and universal feature was the alternation between origination and perishing, between the particular powers' being annulled in the unity and their emerging from it. It is true that in the religion of being-within-self this alternation was brought to rest insofar as the particular differentiae fell back into the unity of nothingness; but this unity was empty and abstract, while the truth, by contrast, is the inwardly concrete

within the universal. Subjectivity is a determinate being, is being for another, manifestation, appearance. The transition is that this subject, this subjective self-consciousness, is posited as identical with the substantial unity that is called Brahman, that this One is now | grasped as determinate unity within itself, as subjective unity 500 intrinsically, and so this unity is grasped as totality in itself. In accord with the initial element in which this unity is implicitly determined, is grasped as subjective, the unity therefore has implicit in it what makes it into spiritual unity, what belongs to it because its being is spiritual; because it is subjectively determined implicitly, it has the principle of spirituality in itself. This unity is spiritual, although it is not yet absolute spirit. But since it is also concrete totality, it no longer requires the self-conscious subject. For the Hindus it is not separated, and is inseparable, from them; insofar as it is still what is incomplete—not being the subjective unity implicitly—the unity still has the subject outside it. As complete totality it no longer needs the subject. At this point, however, begins genuine independence, and with it this separation of consciousness from ob-

unity and totality. In this way even that abstract unity, together with diversity, enters into the genuine unity in which the differentiae are sublated, are ideal, are posited negatively as dependent but are at the same time preserved.

W₂ (1831) *continues*: Up to this point, therefore, the unfolding of the moments of the idea, the self-differentiation of the thought of absolute substance, was defective, because on the one hand the shapes lost themselves in rigid fixity, while on the other hand it was only the flight that achieved unity (or to put it another way, the unity was merely the disappearance of the differences). But now the reflection of manifoldness into itself comes into play—or the fact that thought itself contains determination within itself, in such a way that it is self-determining; and determining has worth and inner content only to the extent that it is reflected into this unity. With this the concept of freedom, of objectivity, is posited, and as a result the divine concept becomes a unity of the finite and the infinite. The infinite is the thought that is only self-contained, the pure substance; the finite (according to this thought-category) consists of the many gods; the unity is negative unity, the abstraction that submerges the many in this One. But the One has not gained anything through this submergence; it is as undetermined as before. The finite is affirmative only outside the infinite, not within it; and hence, as affirmative, it is finitude without any rationality. But at this next stage the finite, or the determinate in general, is taken up into infinitude, the form is commensurate with the substance, infinite form is identical with the substance that determines itself inwardly and is not merely abstract power.

ject or content, the objectivity of the absolute, consciousness of its self-made independence."²⁵⁷

Up to this point we had this unseparated unity. Heretofore the highest aspect in this form of religion was still not separated from the subjective, empirical self-consciousness—it was just this
501 unseparated unity. Now the split occurs, and it does so precisely to the extent that this content becomes known in itself as concrete totality.

Implicit in this transition are two noteworthy definitions that have to be relegated to the science of logic for their development, and that emerge here more as subsidiary propositions to which we will appeal further.

²⁵⁸One of these lemmas is that this unity that we saw as Brahman, and then these determinacies—these many powers, the empirical subject, this emergence or emerged being of the distinctions which at one time count as independent but at another time have vanished and hence have perished—are not mutually external, that that unity and these distinctions revert to the concrete unity. Their truth is the internally concrete totality or unity, such that what is present is no longer an alternation between particular powers being annulled in the unity and their emerging from it—an alternation of origination and perishing as for the Hindus. Instead, the idea or the true is this, that the distinctions are sublated in the unity; they are ideally or negatively posited on the one hand as without independence, but equally on the other hand they are preserved. The fact that this concrete unity is what the true is gets developed in logic, and here we can only refer to it."

The other, equally essential definition is that at this point there occurs for the first time the separation of empirical self-consciousness from "absolute self-consciousness,"²⁵⁹ from the content of the

257. *W₂ (Ed?) reads, in a later passage:* So substantive unity is still inseparable from the subject, and insofar as it is still what is incomplete, and is not yet in itself subjective unity, it still has the subject outside it. We do not yet have the objectivity of the absolute, the consciousness of its independence on its own account.

258. *In B's margin:* 5 July 1827

259. *W (Var) reads:* the absolute,

highest, so that here God attains proper objectivity for the first time. On the preceding levels it is the inwardly absorbed empirical self-consciousness that is Brahman, this inward abstraction; or the highest is present as a human being. Only now does the break between objectivity and subjectivity begin, and only here does the objectivity properly merit the name "God," even though this object is still incomplete. And we have this objectivity of God at this point, because this content has determined itself implicitly as being concrete totality in itself. This means that God is spirit, that God is spirit in all religions.

Nowadays when one says especially of religion that subjective consciousness belongs to it, that is a correct | view. This is the instinct that subjectivity belongs to religion. But we see what the [prevalent] view is, namely that the spiritual can occur as an empirical subject; ~we see that people take a natural thing as their god,²⁶⁰ with the result that spirituality is able to fall only within consciousness, and God, too, as natural essence, is able to be the object of this consciousness. Thus on the one side there is God as a natural essence. But God is essentially spirit—this is the absolute determination of religion and accordingly the fundamental determination, the substantial foundation in every form of religion. The natural thing is represented in a human guise, even as personality, or as spirit or consciousness; but the gods of the Hindus are only superficial personifications. Personification still does not produce the result that²⁶¹ God is known as spirit. There are these particular objects, such as sun and tree, that are personified (even in the incarnation [of God]); but the particular objects have no independence, because they are particular²⁶²; they have only an imputed independence. What is highest, however, is the spirit, whereas this ~characterization derives²⁶³ from empirical, subjective spirit, from subjective self-

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260. W_2 (Var) reads: which can then as empirical consciousness have a natural thing for its God,

261. W_2 (Var) adds: the object or

262. W_2 (Var) adds: and natural objects

263. W_1 (Var) reads: spiritual characterization derives W_2 (Var) reads: spiritual characterization and independence derives in the first instance

consciousness, and applies to it either to the extent that it is developed, or because Brahman has its existence in and through absorption of the subject into itself.

But now it is no longer the case that the human being is simply God, and God simply the human being, that God is only in an empirically human mode; instead God is truly and intrinsically objective, God is ²⁶⁴ essentially object and is altogether in opposition to human beings. We will take up later their reconciliation and return, the fact that God even appears as a human being, as the God-man.²⁶⁵ But it is from this point onward that God's objectivity begins. As this concrete totality, God is in a twofold way. That is the
503 fourth mode of this wild totality. |

This new form is the incipient separation from the immediate individual, the incipient severance and objectification of what is known as the highest.²⁶⁶ This resumption, differentiation, or
504 objectification has two forms. It is first portrayed in a pure | and

264. W_2 (Var) adds: in himself totality, concretely determined within himself, i.e., is known as being in himself subjective; as a result he is for the first time

265. [Ed.] See Hegel's portrayal of the Christian religion, Vol. 3:290 ff.

266. W_2 (1831) reads: But if the universal is grasped as inwardly self-determining, then it comes into opposition with what is other, and is in strife with this its other. In the religion of power there is no opposition, no strife, for the accidental has no value for substance.

Since it determines itself by its own act, power does not now, to be sure, have these characteristics as something finite. On the contrary, what is determined subsists in its implicit and explicit truth. Thereby God is defined as the good; and "good" is not here posited as a predicate—on the contrary, God is *the* good. In what is indeterminate there is neither good nor evil. Here, on the other hand, the good is the universal, but it has a purpose, a determinacy concordant with the universality in which it subsists.

To begin with, however, self-determining at this transitional stage is exclusive. Thus good comes into relation with what is other, with evil, and this relation is strife—a dualism. Reconciliation (here only as becoming or as what is to be) is not yet thought of as within and implicit to the good itself.

A necessary consequence of this is that the strife comes to be known as a characteristic of substance itself. The negative is posited in spirit itself, and this is compared with its affirmation, so that this comparison is present in sensation and constitutes pain and death. The strife that resolves itself at this stage is, in the last analysis, spirit's struggle to come to itself, to attain to freedom.

From these fundamental determinations there results the following division of this transitional stage.

1. The first determination is that of Persian religion. Here the being-for-self of

simple way, but then in a seething manner, as a unity that is at the same time struggle, the fermenting of these distinct elements into a unity—an impure subjectivity that is the striving toward pure unity itself. The first of these modes is for us the fourth form.”²⁶⁷

4. The Religions of Transition²⁶⁸

*a. The Religion of Light (Persian Religion)*²⁶⁹

The first form is thus the pure, simple totality, though for that very reason still the abstract totality. It is the form in which God is known as what truly has being in and for itself, and known truly as this;

the good is still superficial, so that the good has a natural shape, but as a natural being that is shapeless: light.

2. The form in which strife, pain, or death itself becomes part of the essence: the Syrian religion.

3. The struggling out of strife, the advance to the determination of free spirituality in the proper sense, the overcoming of evil, the consummated transition to the religion of free spirituality: the Egyptian religion.

Generally speaking, however, what is common to these three forms of religion is the resumption of the wild, unrestrained totality into concrete unity. That giddy whirl [*Taumel*] in which the determinations of unity are precipitated into externality and contingency, where this wild world of gods, without any concept, proceeds out of unity, as it did out of Brahman, and where development breaks up into confusion because it is not concordant with the unity—this state devoid of anything to give it steadfastness has now passed away.

267. *W₂ (Var, possibly with editorial additions) reads:* This resumption into the substantive unity, which is in itself subjective, has two forms, however. The first resumption is that seen in Parseeism; here it occurs in a pure, simple fashion. The second is that which ferments in the Syrian and Egyptian religions, where the fermentation of totality mediates itself into unity, and unity comes into being in the strife of its elements.

268. [*Ed.*] In the 1824 lectures, the transition from nature religion to spiritual religion is provided by Egyptian religion; in 1827 Persian religion is also included among the transitional forms. God is now known as that which is self-determining within itself, and hence as good, but this goodness is still represented in natural images such as light. The interpretation of Persian religion is essentially similar to what is already found in 1824, but its reclassification reflects a general upgrading of the Near Eastern religions, a process that is carried even further in 1831.

269. [*Ed.*] The historical name used by Hegel is *die Religion der Parsen*, “the religion of the Parsees” or “Parseeism.” Today Parseeism usually refers to the Zoroastrian sect in India descended from a group of Persian refugees who fled from the Muslim persecutions of the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. However, Hegel intends by this term the religion of ancient Persia, whose classic text was the Zend-

so God is in truth what is independent, what is inwardly determinate, and hence God is the good. But for that reason God is the good that itself still has its existence in a natural mode. In general, this form is what is called the religion of light; and in it the concept of subjectivity, or of what is concrete, the development of the concrete and its demonstration as totality, come directly to consciousness for the subject. We have to consider the determinations in it more closely, and to exhibit their necessity, which is a necessity arising from the concept or from thought. We shall on the one hand presuppose the logical element, but on the other hand only hint at the sort of necessity this is.

The first point is that the resumption is what is true. It is a substantial unity that is inwardly subjective, and hence it is altogether self-determining; in other words, this unity determines itself, but not in such a way that its determinations once more attain externality or contingency. That wild, nonconceptual world of deities emerges from Brahman; the development is not compatible with the unity, but falls outside it and is fragmented. But here, in contrast, the unity is inwardly self-determining. So the determinateness is not an empirical or manifold determinateness, but is itself what is pure, universal, and self-identical; it is a determining of substance whereby it ceases to be substance—the unity that defines itself as subject. It²⁷⁰ has a content, and the fact that this content is what is determined by it and in conformity with it (or that it is the universal content) is what is called the good or the true. For goodness and truth are only forms that pertain to the subsequent distinctions of knowing and willing, though in the supreme subjectivity they are only one truth, i.e., they are particularizations of this one truth. The fact that this universal is through the self-determining of spirit, that

Avesta, and which today is known as Zoroastrianism. Hegel is aware that in modern times the old religion survives in India and in Iran only in small sects (see n. 284), and at one point he specifically distinguishes between “Parsees” (*Parsen*, the people of the religion) and “Persians” (*Persern*, the people of the land) (see n. 286). Since “Parsee” simply means “Persian,” and since Zoroastrianism was the state religion of the ancient Persian Empire, we can refer to it as “Persian religion,” which is the term used in the editorial section headings, but in the text we usually follow Hegel’s practice and translate as “religion of the Parsees.”

270. *W₂ (Var)* reads: and begins to be subject. This unity, as self-determining,

it is determined by spirit and for spirit, is the aspect according to which it is truth. It is the good inasmuch as it is posited through spirit, and is a self-determining in conformity with its unity; i.e., it is its own self-determining whereby in its universality it remains true to itself, and no other determinations than that unity itself emerge. It is therefore the true content that has objectivity, the good that is the same thing as the true; this good is at the same time the self-determining of the One, of the absolute substance, and hence it remains immediately the absolute power. The good as absolute power: that is the definition of the content.

The second point is that precisely in this determining of the absolute lies the connection with the concrete, with the world, with concretely empirical life in general. All things proceed from this power. This fact, that all things proceed from it, is only a subordinate moment of what we saw previously,²⁷¹ that this mode of self-determination has abstract significance as a mode of determination; it is not a self-determining that has gone back into self and remains identical, [as what is] universally true and good, but is just a general determining instead.²⁷² This moment is present here too, but as subordinate. It is²⁷³ the world in its manifold | existence; but the important point is that the connection of the good with the concrete world is contained in the good, inasmuch as the good is self-determining and this absolute determination lies within the good itself.

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There is subjectivity or particularity in general within this substance, within the One itself, the absolute subject. This element that pertains to particular life, this determinacy, is at the same time posited within the absolute itself and is, accordingly, an affirmative coherence of the absolute, the good and true, the infinite, with what is called the finite. In the previous forms of religion the affirmative

271. [Ed.] See the discussion of Hinduism, above, pp. 579 ff.

272. *W₂ (1831) adds:* Power as such is neither good nor wise; it has no purpose, but is determined merely as being and nonbeing; it is characterized by wildness, by a general disorderliness [*Aussersichkommen*] of action. For this reason power is intrinsically what lacks determination.

273. *W₂ (Var) adds:* therefore concrete life, cf. *Ho:* The good is that in which concrete life too can intuit its affirmation,

coherence is found in part only in that pure absorption in which the subject says, "I am Brahman"; but that is an absolute, abstract coherence, which subsists only through this obscuring or abandoning of all concrete actuality of spirit, that is, only through negation. This affirmative coherence is, as it were, a pure strand; moreover, it is the abstractly negative—those acts of sacrifice and self-mortification. In the affirmative coherence at this present stage, however, it is said that [finite] things are altogether good. Because of it, the stones, animals, and human beings are altogether good; the good is a present substance in them, and what is good is their life, their affirmative being. So far as they remain good, they belong to the realm of the good; they are received into grace from the outset: it is not the case that only a subset of them are twice-born, as in India, but rather the finite is created from the good and is good.

The third point to note is that although this good is, of course, internally subjective, although it is internally determined and determines itself as good, although it is in conformity with the substantial unity, with the universal itself, in this definition it is still abstract. The good is internally concrete, yet this determinateness of being concrete is itself still abstract.²⁷⁴ The good [thing] can be employed
507 this way or that, or the | human agent has good intentions; but the question is, "What is good?" A further development or determination of the good is required. Because we still have the good in such an abstract way, it is still one-sided for us, still burdened with an antithesis. It is the absolute antithesis to another, and this other or opposite is evil.

In this simplicity of the good the negative is not yet accorded its rightful place. Hence we have two principles, the realm of the good and that of evil, this Oriental dualism. It is this great antithesis that has here arrived at its universal abstraction.²⁷⁵ The good is indeed

274. *W*₂ (1831) *adds*: For the good not to be abstract, the form must be developed, the moments making up the concept must be posited. In order to be the rational idea, in order to be known as spirit, its determinations, the negative element, the differentiae as constituting its powers, must be posited in it through thought, and so known.

275. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: There is manifoldness and differentiation, to be sure, in the multitude of previous gods; but for this duality to have become the universal principle, for the differentiated elements to stand confronting each other as this duality—that is another matter altogether.

the true and the powerful, but it is in conflict with evil, so that evil stands over against it and persists as an absolute principle.²⁷⁶ Evil ought surely to be overcome, to be counterbalanced; but what ought to be is not. "Ought" is a force that cannot make itself effective, it is this weakness or impotence.²⁷⁷

Religion and philosophy as a whole turn upon this dualism. This is the concern of religion and of philosophy—the distinction grasped in its complete universality. In the mode of thought this antithesis attains the universality that is proper to it. Dualism is a form [of thought] even today; but when we speak of it today, it is in meager and delicate forms. Whenever we take the finite to be autonomous, so that the infinite and the finite stand opposed to one another, so that the infinite has no part in the finite and the latter cannot cross over to the infinite,²⁷⁸ we have the same dualism as the antithesis of Ahriman and Ormazd, or that of Manichaeism—except that we lack the thought or the heart to represent these antitheses to ourselves [honestly]. The finite, in its broadest sense maintaining itself as finite and autonomous, over against and thereby in conflict with the infinite or the universal, is what is evil. But all the same, we stick with this thoughtlessness in which both are accorded value, finite as well as infinite. God, however, is only *one* | principle, *one* power, and therefore the finite, and evil as well, have no true independence.

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276. *In B's margin*: 6 July 1827

277. [Ed.] Hegel implicitly relates Persian religion to the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, according to which, in Hegel's view, the good is to be realized only in a progression that extends to infinity, and thus is not recognized as something already present at all times. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, esp. pp. 126–127 (Kant, *Werke* 5:122); and Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, p. 231 (Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* 2:397).

278. [Ed.] Hegel is criticizing contemporary attempts, beginning with Jacobi, to reemphasize the gulf between finite and infinite in contrast to Spinoza's attempt to replace this type of transition from the one to the other by the principle of an immanent cause. In Hegel's view, the consequence of present-day criticism of the pantheistic concept of immanence is that the transition from finite to infinite becomes unintelligible, and this in turn has the result that the infinite, placed in isolation on the other side, likewise becomes something finite too. See in this connection Jacobi, *Briefe*, p. 24 (*Werke* 4/1:56); also Schelling, "Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus," letters 6 and 7, in *Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft deutscher Gelehrter* 3 (1795): 190–191, 196 ff.; and Schelling, *Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre*, in *Sämmtliche Werke* 1:367–368.

The third determination is that the good in its universality has at the same time a natural mode, a pure manifestation, a natural being, the simple manifestation—light. Light is this abstract subjectivity within the sensible. Space and time is the abstract; the concrete, [not in particular] but in its physical universality, is light.²⁷⁹ From this [naturalistic] viewpoint, Brahmā would only be space that does not yet have the inner strength to be represented as internally independent; Brahmā requires the empirical self-consciousness of the human being.²⁸⁰

281—There is perhaps a difficulty, in that the good to which we have come is also still supposed to have in itself essentially the aspect of natural being, | although it is of course the pure natural being

279. W (Var) reads: But furthermore, good, [W_1 : in its W_2 : by virtue of its] universality, has at the same time a natural mode of existence, of being for other— [W_1 : a form of W_2 : light, which is] pure manifestation. In the same way that the good is what is self-identical or is subjectivity in its pure identity with [W_1 : itself, so the manifestation is what is pure and simple, namely light. Light is this abstract subjectivity in the sensuous realm—pure physical intuition—as the good is in the realm of the spiritual. Space and time are the primary abstractions in the sphere of mutual exclusion, but the concrete physical element in its universality is light as the good. W_2 : itself in the spiritual realm, so light is this abstract subjectivity in the sensuous realm; space and time are the primary abstractions in the sphere of mutual exclusion, but the concrete physical element in its universality is light.] W_2 (1831) continues: If therefore the inwardly good, because of its abstractness, comes to have the form of immediacy and therefore of naturalness (for immediacy is what is natural), then this immediate good, which has not yet purified itself and raised itself to the form of absolute spirituality, is light. For in the natural world light is pure manifestation, the act of self-determining, but in a wholly simple, universal manner.

280. W (Var) reads: If Brahman had to be represented in a sensuous fashion, it could only be represented as abstract space. But Brahman still does not have the inner strength to be represented independently; instead it has the empirical self-consciousness of the human being as its reality.

281. W_1 (1831) reads (parallel in main text follows): In the Hindu religion, Brahman was what is highest—the One as unconsciousness and indeterminateness; at this stage, substance is not yet determined in itself. What comes next is the self-determining One; and the inward determination of the One, in its highest form, is what is good. The true and the good are one and the same; the former [is expressed] in knowing, the latter in willing. That is what power advances to. Power is neither wise nor good; it has no purpose, but is determined merely as being and nonbeing. It is characterized by wildness, by a general disorderliness. For this reason power is intrinsically what lacks determination. (It is then a logical progression that the indeterminate passes over to the determinate, and we adopt this point as a lemma

of light. But nature cannot be altogether omitted from spirit; it belongs to spirit. Even when God is grasped as internally concrete and as pure spirit, God is at the same time essentially creator and lord of nature. Therefore the idea in its concept, God in his inward essence, must posit reality or this externality that we call nature. The moment of natural being cannot be lacking; but here it is abstract, it is still in immediate unity with | the spiritual, with the good, because the good itself is still this abstraction. The good contains determinateness within itself, and in the determinateness is the root of all natural being. We say, "God creates the world." "Creating" is the subjectivity to which the determinateness in general belongs. The determination of nature lies within this activity or subjectivity, and indeed the more precise relation is that it is something created. But here this further precision is not yet present; what we have instead is abstract determinateness. This determinacy has essentially the form of nature generally, the form of light and of immediate unity

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[to our argument]; but this progression must also be one accessible to the imagination.) What lacks determination passes over to a purpose, and to one that is concordant with universality too; it passes over to the absolutely final end (which is the good in general), and this is the final end that has to be realized. Brahman, we can say, is what is inwardly good; and this is itself still abstract to begin with; because of its abstractness this self-contained good is posited in the form of immediacy, but of pure immediacy. Immediacy, however, is what is natural, or the purely physical, which is light, the manifestation that is only determined in a quite simple and universal manner. It is not the good that has purified itself, but is to begin with the immediate good. There is a logical or conceptual linkage here, so it is not to be taken as contingent that light has been intuited as the good.

But in the next step, the good passes over directly into its antithesis, into evil and darkness. *W*: Light is an infinite expansion, it is as rapid as thought; but in order for its manifestation to be real, it must strike upon [*W*₁: a dark object, a solid body. *W*₂: something dark.] Nothing is made manifest by pure light [*W*₁: as such]; it is only by means of this other that determinate manifestation enters on the scene and good accordingly emerges in opposition to evil. This manifestation is a determining, but it is not yet the [*W*₂: concrete] development of the determining; hence the concreteness of the determining lies outside it; owing to its abstractness it [*W*₁: is related to an other. This antithesis belongs to the concept of spirit, and the question is what position it occupies vis-à-vis the unity. *W*₂: has its determination in the other. Without the antithesis there is no spirit, and it is only in the development of spirit that the question arises as to what stance the antithesis occupies toward the mediation and toward the original unity.]

with the good; for the immediate, just as it stands, is the "absolute,"²⁸² because the determinateness [we are dealing with] is only this universal, undeveloped one. Hence the light has darkness over against it. In nature these determinations are external to one another. This is the impotence of nature, that light and its negation are side by side, although light is the power of banishing darkness. Therefore the "idea of"²⁸³ God that we have here is itself still something powerless. Because of its abstraction, it is unable to embrace the antithesis or contradiction within itself and to endure it, so it has evil alongside it instead. Light is the good and the good is light—this inseparable unity is the basic idea."

284—"Historically this is the religion of the Parsees. Ormazd and
511 Ahriman are superficial personifications. When the content | is still

282. *W (Var/Ed?) reads:* abstract,

283. *W (Var) reads:* determination in

284. *W (1831) reads (parallel in main text follows):* [*W*₁: This *W*₂: This religion of light—or of what is immediately good—] is the religion of the ancient Parsees, founded by Zoroaster. There are still some communities that belong to this religion, in Bombay and on the shores of the Black Sea, in the neighborhood of Baku, where naphtha springs are particularly numerous; and some have imagined they could find an explanation for the fact that the Parsees have made fire the object of their worship in this accident of geography.^a We get some information about this religion from Herodotus and other Greek writers,^b but it is only in later times that a more accurate knowledge of it has been achieved, through the discovery of this people's principal and fundamental books (the *Zend-Avesta*) by the Frenchman Anquetil du Perron;^c these books are written in the ancient *Zend* language, a sister language to Sanskrit.

The light that is worshiped in this religion is not like a symbol of the good, an image under which the good can be represented; on the contrary, it might just as well be said that the good is the symbol of light. Neither of them is the meaning or the symbol, but they are directly identical. [*W*₁: What is substantive here confronts the subject in its particularity; *W*₂: At this stage—among the Parsees—worship enters on the scene, and substantiality is here objectified for the subject in its particularity;] humanity as a particular kind of good confronts the universal good, [*W*₁: and also] light in its pure, as yet undisturbed, manifestation [*W*₂: i.e., the good as natural existence].

The Parsees have also been called fire-worshippers.^d This is incorrect inasmuch as the Parsees do not direct their reverence toward consuming, material fire, but only to fire as [*W*₁: light. And this light is personified too, but only superficially, for substance is not yet known as subject. *W*₂: light, which comes into appearance as the truth of what is material.] . . .

[*W*₁: It has been claimed that the first syllable "Or-" has affinities with the Hebrew אור.^e] The stars are lights appearing singly. [*W*₂: Since what appears is something particular, natural,] there arises a distinction between what appears and

what is implicit; [W_1 : the stars are W_2 : and what has implicit being is then also something particular, a genius. Just as the universal light is personified, so too are the particular lights. Thus the stars are] personified as genii. On the one hand they are appearance, but on the other they are personified as well. They are not differentiated into light and good, however; instead it is the whole unity that is personified; the stars are spirits of Ormazd, i.e., of the universal light, and of what is good in and for itself.

These stars are called the Amshaspands,^f and Ormazd, who is the universal light, is also one of the Amshaspands. The realm of Ormazd is the realm of light, and in it there are seven Amshaspands. One might think of the planets in this connection, but they are not more precisely characterized either in the Zend-Avesta or in any of the prayers, not even in those that are addressed to them individually. The lights are the companions of Ormazd, and reign with him. Like this realm of light, the Persian state is portrayed as the realm of righteousness and good. The king was surrounded by seven magnates, too, who formed his council, and were regarded as representatives of the Amshaspands, just as the king was thought of as the deputy of Ormazd. Taking turns day by day, the Amshaspands govern with Ormazd in the realm of light; so what is posited here is merely a superficial distinction of time.

To the good or to the realm of light belongs all that has life. What is good in all beings is Ormazd; by thought, word, and deed he is the life-giving element. So we still have pantheism here, to the extent that the good or light is the substance informing everything; all happiness, blessing, and felicity flow together in it; whatever exists as loving, happy, strong, etc., that is Ormazd. He bestows the radiance of light on all beings, upon trees as well as upon noble humans, upon beasts as well as upon the Amshaspands.

[Ed.] ^aHegel is probably referring to J. G. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage und das gesammte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer, Meder und Perser oder des Zendvolks* (Frankfurt am Main, 1820), p. 111, where the author speaks of the continuous petroleum (naphtha) flares emitted from holes in the ground in the neighborhood of present-day Baku (which is on the Caspian Sea, not the Black Sea). In regard to Hegel's knowledge of the Parsees in Bombay, see Carsten Niebuhr, *Voyage de M. Niebuhr en Arabie et en d'autres pays de l'orient*, 2 vols. (Switzerland, 1780), 2:460–464. ^bSee Herodotus, *Histories* 1.131–140. Of the other classical writers who gave an account of Zoroastrianism, Hegel was familiar in particular with Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 46–47, and with those whose references to the subject were included in *Zend-Avesta, Zoroasters lebendiges Wort*, trans. and ed. J. F. Kleuker from the French ed. of Anquetil du Perron, 5 vols. (Riga, 1776–1783), supp., vol. 2, pt. 3. ^cHegel was familiar with the Zend-Avesta through Kleuker's translation (see annotation b). It is uncertain whether or not he also knew the original French text of Anquetil du Perron (Paris, 1769–1771). ^dSee *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 1:149–150 (cf. *Zend-Avesta* [SBE], 2:357–361). On how and why the Parsees first became known as “fire worshipers,” see Joseph Görres, *Das Heldenbuch von Iran aus dem Schah Nameh des Firdussi*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1820), 1:8. ^eIt has not been possible to identify Hegel's source positively. He is probably referring to Kleuker's linguistic parallels in his edition of the *Zend-Avesta*, supp., vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 14; but similar parallels were to be found in several other authors of the period. For example, Friedrich Sickler drew a parallel between אור and the Greek ΩΡ, but only as an ending; see *Kadmus; oder, Forschungen in den Dialekten des semitischen Sprachstammes* (Hildburghausen, 1818),

not an inwardly developed subjectivity, the personification is only formal. The deities were represented as subjects or persons among the Hindus, too; but how the person is determined in its substance
 512 or its essence depends solely on the content. If the substance | is not yet determined as developed subjectivity, then the subjectivity, which appears as personality, is only a superficial mode; that is again the case here.

Everything belongs to the light, everything living, all essence, all spirituality. The entire world in all its levels and kinds is Ormazd, and in this realm of light everything is good. Distinction belongs to subjectivity. Everything hinges on the way in which the distinctions are brought to unity, whether they are mutually external or are posited in a truly ideal fashion. Thus even light differentiates itself, and sun, stars, and planets are also personified. The sun is the power of vitality, upon which the cycle of vitality depends and with which it therefore coheres. Hence the sun and the planets are represented as the first principal spirits, as deities presiding over the world of light by turns, a heavenly people pure and great, each protecting, benefiting, and blessing [the world]. By the same token the act, the growth of finite things, everything energetic, everything spiritual—all is light, is Ormazd. Light is not simply the universal, sensible life, but is the energy, spirit, soul, love and bliss therein; all this belongs

p. xxii. Schelling established a similar connection, to which he traces the name of the deity Chrysor, and with which he associates the meaning of the German prefix *Ur-*, the inner, essential fire; see *The Deities of Samothrace*, n. 64 (p. 34) (*Sämtliche Werke* 8:388). Evidence for Ormazd himself being an Amshaspand (Amesha Spenta) could be found in the *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 1:81 (cf. *Zend-Avesta* [SBE], 3:196); see also A. H. L. Heeren, *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1804–1805), 1:509; and J. G. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage und das gesamte Religionssystem der alten Baktrer* (Frankfurt am Main, 1820), pp. 316–317, 365. Regarding the organizational similarity between the kingdom of light and the Persian state, see below, n. 286. It is in the 1831 lectures that Hegel first deals in any detail with the Amshaspands. They are not referred to in the Zoroaster Gāthās but only in the later parts of the Avesta. The Amesha Spentas are glorious immortal beings who possess saving powers. As their names indicate, they are personifications of certain qualities; the six usually mentioned in addition to Ormazd are Good Thinking, Truth, Mastery, Submissiveness, Wholeness, Not Dying. They are regarded as protective spirits for the realm of the ethical as well as for that of the natural.

to the realm of Ormazd. He is the substance, and all the particular things contain this substantial element; for that reason they are good, and belong to the realm of light, as good actions do also. In their particular existence, however, things are distinguished from the universal as well. Everything living—sun, star, tree—is revered as something good, but only the good or the light in it, not its particular shape, its finite, transitory mode.²⁸⁵ |

The state, too, is represented in this way. The prince of the Parsees²⁸⁶ is regarded as deputy of the highest light [i.e., the sun], but not of the pure Ormazd himself; his officials are regarded as deputies of the planets and stars, the ministers and aides of Ormazd. One among them is Mithra, whom Herodotus already knows, the μεσίτης or mediator.²⁸⁷ It is peculiar that Herodotus already singles him out; for in the religion of the Parsees the determination of mediation or reconciliation seems not yet to have been dominant. The worship of Mithra was developed generally only later

285. L (1827?) adds (following a sentence from the 1824 lectures), similar in W: There is a separation between the substantial and what belongs to transience. But that is a minor difference; the absolute distinction is between good and evil.

286. L (1827?) adds, similar in W₁: —and it was reputedly the same with the Persians—

[Ed.] This organizational similarity between the kingdom of light and the Persian state is emphasized in the introduction to *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 1:57–72. Rhode, *Heilige Sage*, pp. 536 ff., is very reticent in this regard; but Heeren states categorically, *Ideen über die Politik* 1:513, that the form of government is modeled on the hierarchy in the kingdom of Ormazd, though subsequently, pp. 527 ff., he also mentions the differences and concludes from them that Zoroaster cannot have been a contemporary of the Persian state as we know it.

287. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to Herodotus, *Histories* 1.131, where, however, the reference is to Mitra, who seems to be a Persian love-goddess quite distinct from Mithra—Herodotus says that Mitra is the Persian name for Aphrodite. Moreover, it is not, as Hegel seems to think, Herodotus who calls Mithra the “mediator” but Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 46. Creuzer also, though he distinguishes between the Mithra mentioned in Plutarch and the Mitra mentioned in Herodotus, proceeds to combine them as a single androgynous deity; see *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:728–738. The situation is further confused by the fact that the Persian Mithra does correspond to an Indian god of light, Mitra, who is obviously distinct from Herodotus’s love-goddess. In any event it is important to distinguish between the Persian Mithra and the later Roman cult of Mithra(s), which the Romans imported into northern and western Europe.

on, when the need for reconciliation became stronger and more conscious, more vital and determinate in the human spirit. Herr Rhode²⁸⁸ in Breslau disagrees about this with Creuzer, who exalts Mithra a great deal; [Rhode] maintains that in the Zend writings Mithra does not yet have his complete development; that is quite true. He gained a particular development among the Romans in the Christian era (and even in the Middle Ages we still find a secret worship of Mithra, ostensibly connected with the Order of Knights Templar). One essential image belonging to the Mithra cult is that of Mithra thrusting the knife into the neck of the bull; it has been found frequently in Europe.

One kind of genii in this religion are the so-called Fravashis. Here we find the representation that the water of immortality springs from a tree—a striking agreement with the tree of knowledge.²⁸⁹

514 Light is the highest element in everything that the Parsees revere. The Parsee cultus follows immediately from this determination of their religion.²⁹⁰ | The entire life of the Parsee should be this cultus, one should carry out the good in words, deeds and thoughts,²⁹¹

288. [Ed.] Rhode's repeated criticisms of Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie* on this score relate to the first edition (1810–1812). In the second edition (1819–1821) Creuzer replied very sharply (1:783) to Rhode's criticisms, without really entering into their substance. The criticisms were directed not only against Creuzer's fusion of later, Hellenistic ideas with the Mithra of the Zend-Avesta but in general against Creuzer's tendency to interpret Oriental mythology in the light of Greek antiquity and then to readmit the ideas thus retrojected into earlier times, in other words to derive Greek mythology from the East.

289. W_1 (Var) reads, similar in W_2 (at the end of next to last paragraph): A distinction is posited in humanity too; something higher is distinguished from our immediate corporeality, naturalness, and temporality, from the insignificance of our external being or finite existence. This higher aspect is represented by the genii, the Fravashis. One among the trees is singled out; from the tree called Hom springs the water of immortality; Hom is to be compared with the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. These are parallels that should be noted, but no great weight should be attached to them.

290. W_2 (1831) adds: Its purpose is to glorify Ormazd in his creation, and the adoration of the good in everything is its beginning and end. The prayers are simple and uniform, without any distinctive nuances. The main characteristic of the cultus is that humans should keep themselves pure inwardly and outwardly and should maintain and disseminate this purity everywhere.

291. W (Var) reads: everywhere, should foster all that is good among humans, as well as human beings themselves, [W_1 : should foster all life,]

should dig wells,²⁹² plant trees, make life fruitful, be lively and cheerful, and promote all good, so that good and light may flourish everywhere.^{293 294}

Transition to the Next Stage²⁹⁵

The religion of light was the first form in this transition, this resumption of the manifold, the natural, into concrete unity; the second form, which contains concrete subjectivity within itself, is the abandonment to externality of that simple subjectivity; the subjectivity is developed, but in a way that is at the same time still wild and has not yet attained the composure of the spirituality that actually is inwardly free. Just as this development was fragmented for the Hindus—with alternating generation and perishing, but no return into itself—so here we have determinateness in its untrammelled state, but in such a way that these elementary powers of the spiritual and the natural are essentially tied to subjectivity, so that it is *one* subject that traverses these moments, *one* subject that keeps distinction enclosed within itself and overpowers it.²⁹⁶

The onesidedness of this form consists in the fact that this pure unity of the good—this reversion to self and presence to self—is lacking; here freedom | merely arises, thrusts itself outward, and brings itself forth, but does not yet attain completion. It is not yet the beginning whereby the end or result is produced. So we have

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292. W (Var) reads: canals,

293. W (1827?) adds, following a sentence from 1824: Such is this one-sidedness of abstraction.

294. [Ed.] On the Parsee cultus, see *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, esp. 2:114, 118 (SBE 3:390).

295. [Ed.] This transitional section anticipates in certain respects the separate discussion in the 1831 lectures of “Phoenician” or “Syrian” religion as the “religion of anguish.” See the reference in the concluding paragraph to the dying and rising of God, as well as the allusion to “other diverse configurations” of the type from which Egyptian religion has been singled out at the beginning of the next section (below, n. 317).

296. W (1831) reads: We had generation and perishing in Hinduism too, but not subjectivity or the return into the One, not a One that passes through these forms or these differences itself, and in and from them returns to itself. It is this higher power of subjectivity which, when it is developed, lets the distinction go out of itself, yet keeps it enclosed within itself, or rather overpowers it.

here subjectivity in its reality, though not yet in truly actual freedom but only seething in and out of this reality.

Here the dualism of light and darkness that we had before us at first begins to unify itself, so that the dark or negative aspect occurs within subjectivity itself, an aspect that in its intensification becomes evil. The unifying within self of opposed principles is what subjectivity is—it is the might to endure and resolve this contradiction within itself. Ormazd always has Ahriman opposed to him. To be sure, the representation that in the end Ahriman will be overcome and Ormazd alone will rule is maintained too, but it is not expressed as a present state, it is only something future. God, the essence or the spirit, must be present and contemporary, not relegated to the domain of imagination, into the past or the future.²⁹⁷

This standpoint is the unity, the drama of the subjectivity that itself traverses these different moments—it is the affirmation that itself passes through negation and reconciles negation with itself, concluding with the return into self, with reconciliation. But it does this in such a way that the deed of subjectivity is found only in its ferment, rather than its being the subjectivity that actually has fully attained and consummated itself. These are the moments of this stage.

A subject is this distinction, something inwardly concrete, a development in which subjectivity introduces itself into the developed powers and unites them in such a way that²⁹⁸ this subject has a history, the history of life and of spirit. It is inner movement, in which it fragments into the distinction of these powers and inverts itself into something strange to itself. The light does not perish; but here it is a subject that estranges itself from itself and is held fast in its own negativity, yet within and out of this estrangement it restores itself. | The result is the representation of free spirit, though at first only the drive to bring forth its emergence.²⁹⁹

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297. *W₂ (Var?) adds:* The next requirement is that the good must also be posited in actual fact as real power within itself, and must be grasped not only as universal subjectivity but also as real subjectivity.

298. *W (Var) adds:* they are set free,

299. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Here we have God as subjectivity generally, and the principal moment in it is that negation does not fall outside, but within, the

³⁰⁰It is this moment of negation that we have to make some further remarks about. The moment of negation,³⁰¹ insofar as it is posited as natural, and is a determinate aspect of natural being, is death. Hence the determination that makes its entry here is the death of God. The negative as an abstract expression has very many determinacies, it is change in general. Even change involves partial death. On the natural level negation appears as death; in this guise negation itself is still within natural being, is still not purely in spirit, or the spiritual subject as such. On the spiritual level negation appears within human life, within spirit itself, as the characteristic that one's natural will is something other for one, that essentially and spiritually one distinguishes oneself from one's natural will. Here this natural will is the negation, and the human being comes to itself and is free spirit in overcoming this naturalness; one has reconciled one's heart or natural individuality—which is other than rationality or the rational—with the rational, and so one is present to oneself. This being at home with self, this reconciling, is present only through the movement or through this process. The natural will appears as evil; thus negation (as natural will) appears as something already there. In raising themselves up to their truth, human beings find this natural determination already there in opposition to the rational.

We shall discuss negation in a still higher and more spiritual form later on.³⁰² For in another perspective, negation is something posited by spirit. Thus God is spirit in that God begets his Son or his own other, | posits what is other than himself; but in this other, God is present to himself.³⁰³ There the negation is something vanishing as well, and therefore negation in God is this determinate, essential moment.

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subject itself; and the subject is essentially a return into itself, i.e., it is self-communion. This being at home with itself includes the difference that consists in positing or having an other than itself. It includes negation, but it also includes the return into itself, and being at home or identical with itself in this return—i.e., it includes affirmation.

300. *In B's margin*: 9 July 1827

301. *W (Var) reads*: There is *one* subject; the moment of the negative,

302. *[Ed.] See Vol. 3:275–290.*

303. *Thus also W; W (Var) adds*: [*W*₂: and beholds himself and is eternal love.] Here the negation is likewise the vanishing element. *In An's margin*: a negation that immediately vanishes again, however, since God beholds himself in the Son himself.

But here we have at first only the representation of subjectivity in general. The subject itself goes through these distinct conditions as its own, so that this negation is immanent in it. Insofar as this negation therefore appears as a natural determination, the determination of death makes its entrance too, and God with the characteristic of subjectivity appears here "as the eternal history,"³⁰⁴ as being the absolutely affirmative, which itself dies,³⁰⁵ becoming estranged from itself and losing itself; but through this loss of self it rediscovers itself and returns to itself. It is³⁰⁶ one and the same subject that traverses these³⁰⁷ determinations. The negative that we had [in Persian religion] in the form of evil as Ahriman, so that the negation did not belong to the "being"³⁰⁸ of Ormazd, here belongs to the self of God.

³⁰⁹In Hindu mythology there are many incarnations; for instance, Vishnu is the history of the world and is now in the eleventh or twelfth incarnation;³¹⁰ similarly, in that religion it is the case that the Dalai Lama and Buddha, likewise Indra, the god of natural life, die, and other gods also die and come back again. But this dying is different from the negativity we are discussing here,³¹¹ for the latter pertains especially to the subject. In making this distinction everything depends on logical determinations. Analogies and similitudes can be found in all religions, for example God's becoming human [in Christianity] and | the incarnations [in Hinduism]. Volney³¹² even linked

304. *W (Var) reads:* in his eternal history, and shows himself

305. *W (Var) adds:* —the moment of negation—

306. *W (Var) adds:* in this religion, then,

307. *W (Var) adds:* different

308. *W (Var) reads:* self

309. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* We have already had negation in the form of death too.

310. [Ed.] It has not been possible to identify Hegel's source. Since reference to an "eleventh or twelfth" incarnation occurs only in *L* and *W* (11:433) and is not corroborated by *An*, *Bo*, or *Hu*, it is probable that we have here an erroneous transmission by the transcript upon which both *L* and *W* may have relied. Buddha is reckoned as the ninth incarnation of Vishnu (see Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:578, citing an Iranian source); the tenth incarnation—Kalki—has not yet occurred.

311. *W (Var) adds:* namely death,

312. [Ed.] See C. F. C. de Volney, *Les ruines; ou, Meditations sur les revolutions des empires*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1798), pp. 275, 386.

Krishna and Christ by virtue of their names.³¹³ But correlations of this kind are extremely superficial even though they embody a common element, a similar characteristic. The essential thing, the thing that matters, is precisely a further determination that is overlooked. The thousandfold dying of Indra or the rising again of Krishna is of a different kind than the death of the subject: the substance remains one and the same. At the death of the lama the negation does not apply to the substance; the substance just vacates the³¹⁴ body of one lama, but has immediately selected another. The substance is not concerned with this dying, this negation; here the negation is not posited in the [divine] self or in the subject as such; it is not a proper, inner moment or immanent determination of the substance, and the latter has not the anguish of death. Thus it is only now that for the first time we have the dying of God as internal to God himself, the determination that the negation is immanent in God's essence³¹⁵; and it is essentially through this that this God is verily characterized as subject. This is what the subject is—bringing itself forth by giving to itself inwardly this otherness, and returning to itself through the negation of itself. For this reason the third determination in regard to this anguish and death is rising again from the dead and being restored [to life].

*b. Egyptian Religion*³¹⁶

Religion exists in this mode of determinacy as the religion of the Egyptians. What I have stated is its soul or principal determination; it is on this account that Egyptian religion has been singled out from

313. *In An's margin*: in his *Ruins*

314. *W (Var) reads*: this individual

315. *W (Var) adds*: is within himself.

316. [Ed.] In 1827 as in 1824, Hegel describes Egyptian religion as the religion of the enigma or riddle (*Rätsel*) because everything in it symbolically denoted something that remained unexpressed, and it did so in ways that were enigmatic and obscure. The primary instance of this, he says, is the image of the sphinx, half human and half animal, in which we see the artistic shape forcing its way out of the animal form into the human; it has not yet arrived at the shape of beauty, which was the shape of Greek religion; it remains enigmatic, lacking Greek clarity. Hegel's source of information remained primarily the classical authors (Herodotus and Plutarch), but he was increasingly familiar with recent archaeological expeditions (see ensuing notes).

519 other diverse configurations³¹⁷ as the principal figure [of this type].³¹⁸ |

When we consider it in detail, the image of this standpoint is that the principal figure, called Osiris, has opposed to him (as his enemy) the negation as external or other, as Typhon.³¹⁹ But the negation does not remain thus external to him, so that he would only abide in struggle, as in the case of Ormazd; instead, the negation enters into the subject itself. The subject is killed, Osiris dies; but he is perpetually restored, and thus—posited as one born a second time, as a representation—he is not something natural but something set apart from the natural and the sensible. Thereby he is defined and posited as belonging not to the natural as such but to the realm of representing, to the soil of the spiritual, which endures beyond the finite. According to his own inner definition, Osiris is the god of representation, the represented god. The fact that he dies, but is also restored to life, expresses explicitly the point that he is present in the realm of representation as opposed to sheerly natural being. But he is not merely represented in this way, for he is also known as such; it is two different things, whether he simply is as a represented being, or is also known as a represented being.

In his role as a represented being, then, Osiris is the ruler in the

317. [Ed.] Hegel probably has in mind here the so-called Phoenician or Syrian religion, to which he devotes a separate section in the 1831 lectures.

318. *W₂ (Var) reads:* In this religion, as it actually exists in the religion of the Egyptians, we encounter an endless multiplicity of images. But the soul [or living principle] of the whole is what constitutes the chief characteristic, and it is emphasized in the principal figure.

W₁ (1831) has the following transition to the Egyptian religion at another place: If we express the idea as meaning that spirit is what coalesces with itself through the negation of the other, and stress this moment of negation of the other on its own account and in isolation, then we are beginning from the other of spirit, and not from spirit, not from the fact that spirit is the setting of something against itself; but the other of spirit as such is nature generally, so that the transition then appears as the moment that has been stressed. The next step, then, is where the passing-over is not yet grasped as reconciliation in love, but as strife and struggle. God is intuited in this struggle itself; what is to be attained by it is the elevation of spirit out of the natural state. We find this struggle most notably in the Egyptian religion; this is the religion of ferment, in which everything is mixed together.

319. [Ed.] On the opposition of Osiris and Typhon, see Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, esp. chap. 13; also Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 1.21.

realm of the dead, of Amenti,³²⁰ just as he is lord of the living, so also he is lord of what no longer exists sensibly, of the soul that continues to exist divorced from the body, from the sensible and the transitory.³²¹ | Typhon, the evil one, is overcome, and pain with him, and Osiris is the judge over right and justice. Inasmuch as evil is overcome and condemned, judging enters for the first time at this point in such a way that this judging is the decisive thing, i.e., the good has the might to enforce its authority.³²²

If we say then that Osiris is a ruler of the dead, this means that the dead are precisely those who are not posited in the sensible or the natural realm, but endure by themselves on a higher plane. Linked to this is the fact that the singular subject is known as something that endures; it is withdrawn from the transitory and is secure by itself, is distinct from the sensible. For this reason it is a most important saying of Herodotus about immortality, that the Egyptians were the first to declare that the human soul is immortal.³²³ We find survival and metamorphosis in China and India, but—like the perpetuation of the individual—in Hinduism immortality itself is only something subordinate and nonessential. The highest state there is not an affirmation or perpetuation, but rather nirvana, a state of annihilation of the affirmative, one that only seems to be affirmative, that of being ~similar~³²⁴ to Brahman. This identity with Brahman, however, is at the same time dissolution into that unity which does indeed seem to be affirmative but is totally devoid of determination or internal distinction. In Egyptian religion, then, the following is logically involved: the highest element of consciousness is subjectivity as such; this is totality and is capable of being inwardly

320. [Ed.] Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 27, 29; also Herodotus, *Histories* 2.123. See 1824 lectures, n. 352.

321. W_1 (Var/1831?) adds: This involves the higher vocation of humanity. W_2 (Var/1831?) adds: The realm of the dead is the one where natural being is overcome; it is the realm of representation where precisely what does not have natural existence is preserved.

322. W (Var) adds: and to destroy what is null, what is evil.

323. [Ed.] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.123. Hegel also refers to this report by Herodotus on a separate sheet (*Berliner Schriften*, pp. 706–707), but there observes that belief in immortality rests on the feeling of the inner infinitude of spirit and that this was not yet present in Egyptian religion.

324. W (Var) reads: identical

521 independent—it is the representation of true independence. The independent is what is not in antithesis but overcomes it. It does not set³²⁵ something finite over against itself but has the antitheses within itself and by the same token has overcome them. This characteristic of subjectivity, which is objective and befits the objective, befits God, is also the characteristic of subjective self-consciousness in the mode of immortality. It knows itself as subject, as totality and true independence and thus as immortal.³²⁶

This is the universal. Around this universal plays an endless throng of representations and deities. Osiris is but one of them, and according to Herodotus³²⁷ he is even one of the later deities; but he has elevated himself above all the deities, most notably³²⁸ as ruler of the dead or as Serapis (which is the focus of greatest interest).³²⁹

325. *W (Var) reads:* retain

326. *W₂ (Var/1831?) adds:* With this knowledge the higher vocation of humanity has dawned upon consciousness.

327. [Ed.] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.144–145. Hegel's account is a condensation and to some extent an inference from Herodotus's actual words. Hegel also misrepresents the relationship between Osiris and Serapis: Serapis is not a particular incarnation of Osiris but a Hellenistic amalgam incorporating, it is true, many features of the earlier Osiris. Hegel probably has in mind Plutarch's statement, *De Iside et Osiride* 27, that Osiris received the name of Serapis "after he had changed his nature." Hegel's knowledge of the Serapis cult also came from J. D. Guigniaut, *Sérapis et son origine: Commentaire sur les chapitres 83–84 du livre IV des Histoires de Tacite* (Paris, 1828).

328. *W (Var) adds:* in the kingdom of Amenti,

329. *W (1831) adds:* [*W₁*: But the principal figure is Osiris.] Herodotus, following the statements of the priests, gives a sequence of the Egyptian gods, and Osiris is here to be found among the later ones. [*W₂*: But] the further development of the religious consciousness also takes place within a religion itself, and we have already seen in the case of the Hindu religion that the cultus of Vishnu and Shiva is of later date. In the sacred books of the Parsees, Mithra is listed among the other Amshaspands and stands on the same level with them; but Herodotus already gives prominence to Mithra,^a and by Roman times, when all religions were brought to Rome, the worship of Mithra was one of the principal religions, [*W₁*: not the worship of Osiris. *W₂*: while the worship of Ormazd did not have the same importance.]

Among the Egyptians too, Osiris is said to be a deity of later date. We know that in the time of the Romans Serapis, a special shape of Osiris, was the main deity of the Egyptians; yet [*W₂*: even though he emerged for spirit at a later stage] Osiris is nonetheless the [Egyptian] deity in which [*W₁*: the higher consciousness *W₂*: the totality of consciousness] disclosed itself. [*W₁*: Just as the Parsees have the antithesis of light and darkness, so the Egyptians have that between Osiris, who portrays light or the sun, and Typhon or evil generally. But this antithesis *W₂*: The antithesis contained

As with | Mithra, so also here: the [logical] determination that lies within him has been lifted out as the most interesting one, and just as the Parsee religion became the worship of Mithra, so the Egyptian religion became that of Osiris. Osiris, however, became the focus not of the immediate world but of the spiritual, intellectual world. 522

From what we have said, we can see that here for the first time we have subjectivity in the form of representation. We are dealing with a subject, with something spiritual that is represented in a human fashion. But it is not an immediate human being that is revered by the Egyptians—its existence is not posited in immediacy, in the realm of immediately determinate being, but in the realm of representation. It is a content that in its movement is subjectivity, one that has within it the moments and movement through which it is subjectivity; but even in its form, on the soil of spirituality, it is exalted above the natural. Thus the idea is posited on this soil of representation, and its deficiency is that it is only the representation

in the Egyptian way of viewing the matter] for its part loses its profundity and becomes a superficial one. Typhon is physical evil and Osiris is the vitalizing principle; the barren desert belongs to the former, and he is represented as the burning wind, the scorching heat of the sun. Another antithesis is the natural one between Osiris and Isis, the sun and the earth, which is regarded as the principle of procreation generally. Thus even Osiris dies, vanquished by Typhon, and Isis seeks everywhere for his bones; the god dies, which is again this negation. The bones of Osiris are then buried, but he himself has now become the ruler of the realm of the dead. Here we have the course of living nature, a necessary cycle returning into itself. The same cycle also belongs to the nature of spirit, and this is expressed in the fate of Osiris. Here again the one signifies the other.

The other deities are [logically] tied to Osiris; [W_1 : They are, as it were, only singularized moments of Osiris, who unites the whole within him. One of the principal deities is Amon (Jupiter Ammon), who especially represents the sun, W_2 : for he is their point of union, and they are only singularized moments of the totality that he represents. Amon for instance is the moment of the sun,] a characteristic which also pertains to Osiris. There are, in addition, a great number of deities who have been called calendrical deities because they relate to the natural revolutions of the year. Particular periods of the year, such as the spring equinox, the early summer, and the like, are singled out and personified in the calendrical deities.

Osiris, however, signifies not only what is natural but what is spiritual. He is a lawgiver, he instituted marriage, he taught agriculture and the arts. These figurative accounts contain historical allusions to ancient kings; and thus Osiris contains historical features too. In the same way the incarnations of Vishnu and the [legendary] conquest of Ceylon [by Rama] seem to allude to the history of India.

[Ed.] ^aSee above, n. 287.

523 of subjectivity, that subjectivity is only abstractly there in its foundation, that it is still present only in its abstract foundation. The depth of the universality of the antithesis is not yet in it, subjectivity | is not yet present in its absolute universality, absolute spirituality. Because it is not yet known in the depth of universality, but only in representation, it is thus ■ contingent, superficial, external universality.

The content that is in the representation is not bound to time; on the contrary, it is universality.³³⁰ That something is in this time, in this space, that it is this sensible singularity, is stripped away. Through representation, in that it is on the soil of spirit, everything already has a universality even though but little of the sensible is stripped away (as, for instance, in the representation of a house). Thus the universality is only an external universality, what is common to many instances.³³¹ This coheres with the fact that the foundation, this representation of subjectivity, has not yet gone down absolutely into its inward depth, it is not yet the internally fulfilled foundation, so that the world would be posited in it ideally, and all natural things would be absorbed in it.

To the extent that this subjectivity is the essence, it is the universal foundation, and the history that the subject is, is known at the same time as the movement, life, and history of everything in the immediate world. As a result, we have the distinction that this universal subjectivity is also the foundation of the natural, that it is the inner universal, or that which is the substance of the natural. We have therefore two determinations here, the natural and the inner substance, and that gives us the definition of the symbolic. Another foundation is ascribed to natural being, the immediately sensible receives another substance: it is no longer immediately itself, for it represents something else that is its substance and its significance (and that is what a symbol is). The story of Osiris is³³² also the inner, essential story of the natural, of the order of nature in Egypt. To

330. W_1 (Var) reads: it is universality. W_2 (Var) reads: it is planted in the soil of universality.

331. *Precedes in W_2 (Var)*: The fact that external universality is still the dominant feature here,

332. W_2 (Var) adds: in this abstract connection

this story belong the sun and its path, and the Nile with its fecundating and changing stages. |

The story of Osiris therefore is the story of the sun. The sun climbs to its zenith and then recedes. Its rays and its strength grow more feeble [up to] December 21; but after this period of growing feeble and weak, it begins again to rise higher in the sky; it is reborn with new strength. In this way Osiris signifies the sun and the sun Osiris.³³³ The sun, the year, and the Nile are grasped as this cycle turning back upon itself.

The particular aspects in a cycle of this kind are momentarily represented as independent, as particular deities each of which designates a single aspect, a moment of this cycle. If we say the Nile is the inner, that the sun and the Nile are the significance of Osiris, that other deities are calendrical deities, all this is correct.³³⁴ One is the inner element and the other is the portrayer, the sign or signifier by which the inner discloses itself outwardly; here there is changeableness, this being the case at one time, the reverse at another. The natural cycle of plants, of seeds, and of the Nile occurs in this manner, for its life is the same universal story. One can take them reciprocally, one as the inner, and the other as the form of its presentation or the form for grasping it. But what is in fact the inner is Osiris, subjectivity as such, this cycle going back into itself.

This is how the symbol is the ruling element, something inner and on its own account that has an outward mode of determinate being. The two are distinct from each other. It is the inner, the subject,

333. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: The sun is comprehended as this cycle, and the year regarded as the one subject that of its own accord traverses these various states. The natural realm is grasped in Osiris in the sense that it is a symbol of Osiris. Thus Osiris is the Nile, which rises, making everything fruitful, overflows its banks, and then becomes small and impotent during the hot season—here the evil principle comes into play—but eventually recovers its strength.

334. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring to Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:279, 289–290, where Creuzer argues that the Osiris myth as a whole and in its details is an allegorical portrayal of the solar and lunar years. Regarding the identification of Osiris and the Nile, see Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 36, although he merely says that the Nile is an “emanation” of Osiris; and neither he nor Creuzer speaks in this connection of “the inner element” as opposed to a sign. See also C. F. Dupuis, *Origine de tous les cultes; ou, Religion universelle*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1795), esp. 1:366–395.

that has here become free and independent, so that the inner is the substance of the outer, not in a contradiction or dualism with it but as the significance, the representation on its own account, as against the sensible mode of determinate being. The final aspect in this sphere is that, inasmuch as the significance constitutes the focus over against the sensible aspect, "there lies in it the impulse"³³⁵ | to bring the representation to an intuited state.³³⁶ The representation as such must express itself, and it is human beings who must bring this significance forth from themselves to intuitable visibility. The immediate has disappeared. If it is to be brought to intuition, to the mode of immediacy—and representation has the need to complete itself in this manner—if the representation so integrates itself, then this immediacy must be "a mediating,"³³⁷ a human product. Previously we had the intuitable aspect—the immediacy as natural thing—in a natural mode that is quite unmediated. In India, for instance, Brahman has its existence, the mode of its immediacy, in thinking, in the sinking of the human being into self. Or in Persia, "light is"³³⁸ the form of immediacy, which is in an immediate way. But here, since representation is the starting point, it must bring itself to intuition, to immediacy; and therefore immediacy is here mediated and posited by human beings. It is the inner that has to be brought to immediacy. The Nile and the course of the year are immediate existences, but they are symbols of what is inner; their natural history is comprehended in representation as the subject. This comprehended being, both this process as a subject and the subject itself, is inwardly this returning movement; this cycle is the subject, it is this comprehended whole that is the representation, and as subject it should be made intuitable.

Generally speaking, this impulse toward intuition can be regarded as the cultus of the Egyptians, the infinite impulse to labor, to construct outwardly what is to begin with still inward, what is

335. *W (Var) reads:* [*W*₁: subjectivity in this determinacy, subjectivity as represented, *W*₂: the fact that subjectivity is represented in this determinacy as the focus] is closely connected with the impulse

336. *In B's margin:* 10 July 1827

337. *W (Var) reads:* something mediated,

338. *W*₂ (*Var*) *reads:* the good is light, and therefore in

contained in representation, and for that reason has not yet become clear to itself. The Egyptians toiled for millennia, above all to prepare and preserve their soil; their labor in its connection with their religion, however, is the most astonishing thing ever brought forth either upon the earth's surface or beneath it: works of art that are extant now only in dilapidated ruins | (as compared with what they once were) 526 but which have amazed everyone on account of their beauty and of the effort involved in their construction. This was the occupation and the deed of this people, to keep on bringing forth such works. The entire people was involved in this endeavor, driving on beyond all measure. There was no pause in this production; the toiling spirit did not rest from making its representation visible to itself, from bringing to clarity and consciousness what it inwardly is. These works are grounded immediately in the definition that God has in this religion.³³⁹ | 527

339. W (1831) adds: [W₁: Thus in Osiris we see spiritual moments also revered, W₂: First of all we may recall how, in Osiris, spiritual moments are also revered,] such as right, morality, the institution of marriage, art, and so forth. But Osiris is especially the lord of the realm of the dead, the judge of the dead. We find countless pictures in which Osiris is portrayed as the judge, with a scribe before him who is enumerating for him the deeds of the soul that has been brought into his presence.^a This realm of the dead, the kingdom of Amenti, constitutes one of the main features in the religious representations of the Egyptians. Just as Osiris and Typhon were opposed as the life-giving and the destructive principles, and the sun was opposed to the earth, so here the antithesis of the living and the dead now comes on the scene. The realm of the dead is just as fixed a representational image as the realm of the living. It discloses itself when natural being is overcome; it is there, in the realm of the dead, that what no longer has natural existence persists.

The enormous works of the Egyptians, which have come down to us today, are almost entirely works that were destined for the dead. The famous labyrinth had as many chambers above as beneath the ground.^b The palaces of the kings and priests have been transformed into heaps of rubble, while their graves have defied time. We have found deep grottoes extending for quite some distance that were hewn in the rock for the mummies, and all their walls are covered with hieroglyphics. But what excites the greatest admiration are in particular the pyramids, temples for the dead [that were built] not so much in their memory as in order to serve them as burial places and as dwellings. Herodotus says that the Egyptians were the first who taught that souls are immortal.^c It may occasion surprise that, although the Egyptians believed in the immortality of the soul, they nonetheless devoted so much care to their dead; one might think that people who deem their souls immortal should no longer have particular regard for their bodily side. Yet it is precisely the peoples who do not believe in immortality who deem the body to be of little account after its death

528 This colossal diligence of an entire people was not yet in and for itself pure fine art; rather it was the impulsion toward fine art. Fine art involves the characteristic of free subjectivity; spirit must have become free from desire, | free from natural life generally, from subjugation by inner and outer nature; it must have become inwardly

[W₂: and do not provide for its preservation]. The honor that is shown to the dead is in every way dependent upon the way immortality is represented. [W₁: Humans do not want nature to exert its power directly W₂: Even if the body must fall into the grip of a natural power that is no longer under the control of the soul, then at least we humans do not want nature as such to be what exerts its power and physical necessity] over the inanimate body, this noble casket of the soul. [W₂: It must be we humans, rather, who bring this about—at least in some degree.] So we seek to protect the body against nature as such or we return it (of its own free will, so to speak) to the earth or destroy it by fire. In the Egyptian mode of honoring the dead and preserving the body, there is no mistaking the fact that they knew human beings to be exalted above the power of nature, and hence they sought to preserve the human body from that natural power in order to exalt the body (as well as the soul) above nature. The ways that different peoples deal with the dead are altogether bound up with their religious principles, and the different burial customs always have significant connections [with those principles].

[W₂: Well then, in order to grasp the particular standpoint of art at this stage, we have to recollect that although subjectivity does, of course, emerge here, it only emerges in a basic way, and the picturing of it still passes over into that of substantiality. Consequently the essential differences have not yet mediated and spiritually permeated one another but are still only mixed together instead.] [W₁: There are a few other W₂: There are several] noteworthy features that can be listed to elucidate the way that what is present and living is intermixed and combined with the idea of the divine—so that on the one hand the divine is made into something present, or on the other hand human, and in fact even animal, figures are elevated into a divine and spiritual moment. Herodotus refers us to the Egyptian myth that the Egyptians had been ruled by a succession of kings who were gods.^d Here we have the mixture already, in that the god is known as the king, and the king in turn as the god. There are also countless artistic portrayals representing the consecration of kings, in which the god appears as the consecrator and the king as the son of this god; and then, too, the king himself is represented as Amon. It is related of Alexander the Great that the oracle of Jupiter Ammon declared him to be the son of that god.^e This is quite in accordance with the Egyptian character, for the Egyptians said the same thing about their own kings. And the priests too are regarded on the one hand as priests of the god, but also as the god himself. We have many monuments and inscriptions from the later Ptolemaic age, where King Ptolemy is always just called the son of God or God himself; and the Roman emperors are treated in the same way.

[W₁: Particularly astonishing in the case of the Egyptians W₂: Astonishing to be sure—although in the light of the intermingling of the representation of substantiality with that of subjectivity, no longer inexplicable—] is the animal worship that was practiced [W₂: by the Egyptians] with extreme crudity. The different districts of Egypt

free, it must have the need to know itself as free, and to be free, as the object of its own consciousness. Inasmuch as spirit has not yet arrived at the stage | of freely thinking itself, it must freely intuit itself, it must have itself before its eye intuitively as free spirit. The fact that it becomes an object for intuition in the mode of immediacy

worshiped particular animals, such as cats, dogs, monkeys, and so on, and even went to war with one another on their account. The life of these animals was held absolutely sacred, and their killing was severely punished. Dwellings and possessions were allotted to them, moreover; and provisions were collected for them. Yes, and even in time of famine, starving human beings were left to die, rather than their drawing upon these stores.^f Apis was most revered, for they believed that this bull represented the soul of Osiris. In the coffins in some of the pyramids, Apis-bones have been found carefully preserved.^g [W₁: It has been said that all forms of religion were to be found in Egypt, including animal worship; to be sure, W₂: All the forms and shapes of this religion were mingled in with animal worship. To be sure,] this worship of animals belongs to the most offensive and odious aspect of it. But we have already shown, in connection with the religion of the Hindus, how human beings could come to the point of worshiping animals. If God is known [W₂: not as spirit but] as power in general, then this power is an unconscious working—perhaps a universal life. Hence when this unconscious power emerges into outward shape, it is initially the shape of an animal. For the animal is itself something unconscious, it bears within it a dull, still life (as compared with human free will) such that it may seem as if it had within itself that unconscious power [W₂: which works in the whole]. One especially typical [W₂: and characteristic] configuration [W₂: however,] is that the priests or scribes frequently appear in sculptures and paintings wearing animal masks—as also do the embalmers of mummies. This duplication—an external mask concealing another figure beneath it—conveys the awareness that consciousness is not just submerged in dull, animal vitality, but knows itself also to be separated from that animal state, and recognizes a further meaning in this fact.

[W₁: Regarding the political state of Egypt, W₂: We find the struggle of spirit seeking to extricate itself from immediacy in the political state of Egypt too;] our histories often speak of the battles of the kings with the priestly class, and Herodotus mentions them as dating from the earliest times, saying that King Cheops caused the temples of the priests to be closed, while other kings reduced the priestly caste to complete subjection and wholly excluded them [from politics].^h [W₂: This antithesis is no longer [typically] Oriental.] Here we see human free will rebelling against religion. This emergence from dependence is a trait which it is essential to take into account.

[W₁: There are some naive and highly intuitive portrayals of spirit's struggle to escape from the natural state. This emergence and struggle is expressed in many shapes. W₂: This struggle of the spirit to escape from the natural state and its emergence from it is, however, expressed in particular in naive and highly intuitive portrayals in the visual arts. We need only to remember the image of the Sphinx as one example.] In Egyptian works of art everything is symbolical; significance attaches even to their smallest detail; even the number of pillars and of steps is not calculated to serve ordinary external purposes, but instead signifies such things as the months [of the year]

(which is a product) implies that this, its determinate being or immediacy, is wholly determined by spirit, and has through and through the character of dwelling here as a free spirit. But this is just what we call the beautiful, where all externality is completely characteristic and significant, is determined from within as from what is free. It is a natural material such that its features are only witnesses to the spirit that is internally free. The natural moment must be mastered everywhere in such a way that it serves only for the expression and revelation of spirit. And since the content in the

or the number of feet that the Nile has to rise in order to overflow the land. The spirit of the Egyptian people is, in fact, an enigma. In Greek works of art everything is clear, everything is set forth; in Egyptian art we are everywhere presented with a problem—the work of art is an external object that hints at something [else] not yet expressed.

[W₂: But even though at this stage spirit is still in a state of fermentation and still entangled in obscurity, and even though the essential moments of the religious consciousness partly are just mixed together and partly are in a state of mutual strife in terms of, or rather because of, this mixing: in any case, what is emerging here is free subjectivity.]

[Ed.] ^aHegel's knowledge of portrayals of this kind probably comes in particular from the collection of the Prussian general and Egyptologist J. H. C. von Minutoli, which he saw in Berlin in April 1823; see Hegel's letter to Creuzer, 6 May 1823, *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington, 1984), p. 370 (no. 450a). See also the list of items in J. Passalacqua, *Catalogue raisonné et historique des antiquités découvertes en Égypte* (Paris, 1826). ^bSee Herodotus, *Histories* 2.148. Herodotus says that the labyrinth, which he claims to have seen himself, was built slightly above the lake of Moirios, near the so-called "city of crocodiles"; he gives a detailed description of it and says it was even more grandiose than the pyramids. ^cSee above, n. 323. ^dHerodotus, *Histories* 2.144. In the Temple of Zeus there were 345 statues representing 345 generations of high priests. Herodotus says he was told that before the line of high priests, Egypt had been ruled by gods, the last of whom was Horus, the son of Osiris, whom the Greeks called Apollo. ^eHegel is referring to Alexander's visit to the oracle of Ammon in the Libyan oasis of Siwa; see Plutarch, *Life of Alexander* 27. The story recounted by Plutarch was that the prophet who gave utterance to the oracle intended to address Alexander as "my son" (*paidion*) but through unfamiliarity with Greek said *paidios* instead, which Alexander interpreted to mean "son of Zeus." ^fSee Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 1.84, though what Diodorus says is that many actually resorted to cannibalism but no one was ever accused of eating one of the sacred animals. ^gThis is based on G. B. Belzoni, *Narrative of the Operations and Recent Discoveries within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs, and Excavations, in Egypt and Nubia* (London, 1822), 1:425–426; see also Belzoni's description of the mummified remains of cattle, sheep, monkeys, foxes, cats, crocodiles, fish, and birds, pp. 261 ff. ^hSee Herodotus, *Histories* 2.124, 127.

Egyptian determination is this subjectivity, there is present here that | impulsion or craving for fine art which operated especially in the domain of architecture and at the same time sought to pass over to beauty of figure. Insofar as this was only craving, however, beauty itself has not yet emerged here as such. 530

This craving or impulsion involves the struggle of meaning with material, with external shape generally; it is only the attempt or the striving to place the stamp of inner spirit on outer configuration.³⁴⁰ Here it is only craving because meaning and its portrayal, representation and determinate being, are still separated; as distinction they are in principle mutually opposed. The distinction subsists because the subjectivity is to begin with only general and abstract; it is not yet fulfilled and concrete.³⁴¹ The figure has not yet risen to be a

340. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: The pyramid is a self-sufficient crystal [*ein Kristall für sich*], in which a dead person is preserved; but in the work of art, which is reaching out for beauty, the externality of the configuration is imbued with the inner soul, with the beauty of what is within.

341. W (1831) adds: Thus the Egyptian religion actually exists for us in the works of Egyptian art, in what they tell us when they are combined with the historical record that has been preserved for us by ancient historians. In recent times in particular, the ruins of Egypt have been examined by many investigators; the mute language of the statues has been studied, and the enigmatic hieroglyphs as well.

[W₁: Above all, therefore, we must W₂: We must] recognize the superiority of a people that has consigned its spirit to works of language over one that has only left mute works of art behind it for posterity. [W₂: But we must at the same time bear in mind that no written [religious] documents were yet in existence among the Egyptians because spirit had not yet clarified itself but had consumed all its energy^a in what was indeed an external strife, as is apparent in the works of art.] By dint of prolonged study, progress has been made in deciphering the hieroglyphic language, to be sure; but in some ways the goal has still not quite been achieved, and the hieroglyphs will always be hieroglyphs.^b Numerous rolls of papyri have been found alongside the mummies, and it was believed that these constituted a real treasure-trove that would yield important conclusions. They are nothing but a kind of archive, however, and for the most part they contain deeds of purchase regarding pieces of land or objects that the deceased had acquired. So it is therefore principally the extant works of art whose language we have to decipher, [W₁: and apart from that we can only hold fast to the information handed down by the Greeks. W₂: and from which a cognitive grasp of this religion is to be derived.]

Now if we contemplate these works of art, we find that everything in them is wonderful and fanciful, but always with a definite meaning, which was not the case among the Hindus. Thus we have here the immediacy of externality along with the meaning, or thought. We find both together in the monstrous conflict of the inner

531 free and beautiful one, | it is not yet spiritualized to clarity; what is sensible and natural has not yet been completely transfigured into the spiritual so that it would be only an expression of the spiritual; and this organization and its features are only signs, only signifiers of the spiritual.³⁴²

The Egyptian principle therefore still lacks clarity and transparency on the part of the natural or external features of the configuration; what abides is just the task of becoming clear to itself.

“The stage this principle exhibits can be grasped quite generally as that of the *enigma*: the meaning is something inner that impels itself to make itself outwardly visible; but it has not yet arrived at the consummation of its portrayal in externality.”³⁴³ The inscription of the

with the outer; there is a monstrous urge on the part of what is inner to work itself free, and the outer aspect portrays this struggle of spirit for us.

[Ed.] ^a*sich abarbeiten*. This verb has the double meaning of “wearing oneself out” and “working oneself clear.” The contrast between *sich noch nicht abgeklären* and *sich abarbeiten* in this sentence suggests the former meaning, but Hegel may have intended both, especially in light of what he says at the end of the variant about the “urge on the part of what is inner to work itself free.” ^bA reference to the success achieved over preceding years in deciphering hieroglyphic script thanks to the Rosetta Stone. See J. F. Champollion, *Lettre à M. Dacier relative à l’alphabet des hiéroglyphes phonétiques* (Paris, 1822); and *Précis du système hiéroglyphique* (Paris, 1824). Hegel speaks of numerous investigations of Egyptian ruins and writings, but we do not know to what extent he was informed of the attempts made by Silvestre de Sacy and Johann Akerblad to decipher the hieroglyphs. Hegel’s daybook indicates that already in Jena he had become acquainted with earlier efforts through reports in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, vol. 4 (October–December 1802). In the *Philosophy of World History*, Sibree ed., p. 200 (Lasson ed., p. 463), Hegel deals at greater length with the deciphering work of Thomas Young and J. F. Champollion. He also owned a copy of the French translation of Brown’s *Aperçu sur les hiéroglyphes d’Égypte* (Paris, 1827), which discusses the problems in detail. Brown (p. 34), however, contests Champollion’s claim to be the first to decipher the hieroglyphs and contends that the credit belongs to Young’s article on Egypt in a supplementary volume to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

342. Similar in *W*; *An reads*: The spiritual [content] and the form are not yet in free unity.

343. *W*₁ (1831) *reads*: Hence we can intuit the Egyptian spirit only as still caught up in a state of fermentation. This obscurity toils, so to speak, in the field of outward expression; in these works of art we find the moments mixed together, especially the moments of strife. We have already considered the antithesis of good and evil, or of light and darkness, in the religion of the Parsees; and we find these antitheses again here.

temple of the goddess Neith in Sais is given in full as follows: "I am what was, what is, and what will be; | no mortal has yet lifted my veil."³⁴⁴ The fruit of my body is Helios, etc."³⁴⁵ This still hidden essence expresses clarity or the sun, that which is itself becoming clear or the spiritual sun, as the son who is born from it.

This clarity is what is attained in the forms of religion that we now have to consider, in the religion of beauty, or that of the Greeks, and in the religion of sublimity, or the Jewish religion.³⁴⁶ In Greek religion the riddle is solved; according to one very significant and admirable myth the Sphinx is slain by a Greek and the riddle is resolved in this way: the content is the human being, the free, self-knowing spirit. So much, then, for the first form, the religion of nature, with which we have tarried so long because it is the more remote from us, and because nature is burdened precisely with the fragmentation [of the religions] into their proper independence.

We proceed now to the second stage of ethnic religion, which we have to consider next.

344. *W₂ (MiscP) reads:* It is now that the spiritual consciousness seeks for the first time—as what is *inward*—to struggle free from the natural state.

The most important presentation, the one in which the essence of this struggle is rendered completely visible to intuition, is to be found in the image of the goddess at Sais, who was portrayed as veiled. What is symbolized in this image, and is explicitly expressed in the superscription in her temple—"I am what was, what is, and what will be; no mortal has yet lifted my veil"—is that nature is something inwardly differentiated, namely, something other than the appearance that presents itself immediately—it is an enigma, it has an inner [content], something hidden.

But this inscription continues as follows.

345. [*Ed.*] Hegel quotes this inscription not in the form handed down by Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 9, but in the form found in Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeon* 1.30 (except for the final sentence). Hegel's statement that the inscription stood in the temple of the goddess is a further reference to Proclus; according to Plutarch it was on the goddess's throne at Sais. Drawing on Schiller, "Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais," *Die Horen*, vol. 1, no. 9 (1795) (cf. Schiller, *Nationalausgabe* 1:254–256), Hegel understands the veil as a shroud for the statue of Neith, not as an allusion to the goddess's virginity. Elsewhere he criticizes the customary reference to a "veil" of the goddess, citing from Aloys Hirt, *Ueber die Bildung der ägyptischen Gottheiten* (Berlin, 1821), p. 7, the formula, "No one raised my tunic," noting that there was no mention of a veil in the description, nor was one to be seen in the pictorial representations. See "Hegel und die ägyptischen Götter: Ein Exzerpt," ed. Helmut Schneider, *Hegel-Studien* 16 (1981): 65.

346. *W₂ (Var) adds:* i.e., in art and in the beautiful human shape on the one hand, and in objective thought on the other.

B. THE ELEVATION OF THE SPIRITUAL
ABOVE THE NATURAL:
THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS AND THE JEWS³⁴⁷

This is the stage where the spiritual elevates itself above the natural, to a freedom that is partly beyond natural life, and partly within it, so that the [simple] blending of the spiritual and the natural ceases. It is the second stage of the ethnic religions.

The first stage was the religion of nature. It comprises much within it. On the one hand it is the most difficult to grasp because it is the farthest removed from our imagination, and because it is the crudest and most incomplete stage. On the other hand the natural thus has diverse configurations within it because in this form of naturalness and immediacy [the moments of] the universal, absolute content fall apart from one another. What is higher is also deeper, for there these different moments are comprehended in the ideality of subjective

347. [Ed.] Our title for Sec. B is adopted from the heading found in the Königsberg anonymous transcript used as the basis for Lasson's edition. According to Lasson (2/1:249–250), the heading was quite lengthy and consisted of a phrase, "The Elevation of the Spiritual above Nature," followed by the words making up the first sentence of the preface to the section, and ending with a second heading, "Religion of the Greeks and the Jews." The first phrase corresponds to the language used in the summary of the whole of *Determinate Religion* at the beginning of Part II: "The second stage of religion is the elevation of the spiritual above the natural." The second phrase is supported by the Hube transcript. Thus we have combined the two phrases. This is apropos because the problematic of "elevation" pervades Hegel's entire discussion of Greek and Jewish religion. It should be noted, however, that the German edition uses as a heading for Sec. B: "The Religion of Beauty and Sublimity: The Religion of the Greeks and the Jews."

The 1827 lectures restore the basic structural arrangement of the Ms. in the sense that Roman religion is considered under a third separate category, that of "expediency," which is not a subcategory of Sec. B as in 1824. Far from representing the "elevation of the spiritual above the natural," the purposiveness of Roman religion is not yet (or no longer) a free and purely spiritual purposiveness. It is rather an external, utilitarian, totalitarian purpose, although universal in a political sense. While it may combine elements from the religions of beauty and sublimity, it also destroys them; their true fulfillment is found only in the Christian religion.

The most significant organizational innovation of the 1827 lectures, however, is the reversal of the order in which the religions of sublimity and beauty were treated in the first two series, so that now Greek religion is considered first and Jewish religion second. The reasons for this change and its implications are discussed in the Editorial Introduction.

unity, and this fragmenting of immediacy | is sublated, is brought back into subjective unity. That is the reason why whatever falls under the determination of natural life exhibits such a multiplicity of configurations, which present themselves as indifferently external to one another, as properly independent. 533

The universal characteristic of this [second] stage is the free subjectivity that has satisfied its [definitive] craving or impulse. It is the free subjectivity that has attained lordship over the finite generally, over the natural and finite aspects of consciousness, over the finite whether it be physical or spiritual, so that now the subject is spirit and the spirit is known as spiritual subject. [The subject is] related to the natural and the finite in such a way that the natural is "only instrumental";³⁴⁸ it has only the characteristic of glorifying, manifesting, and revealing the spirit; [what it reveals is] that in this freedom and power, in this reconciliation with itself within the natural and the finite, the spirit is on its own account and is free. It has come forth and is distinguished from this finite natural-spiritual [world]; it is distinct from the situation of empirical, changeable consciousness, as well as from that of external being. That is the characteristic determination of this sphere. Because spirit is free and the finite is only an ideal moment in it, spirit is posited as inwardly concrete, and because we consider it as inwardly concrete (i.e., consider spirit's freedom as inwardly concrete), it is rational spirit; the content constitutes the rational aspect of spirit. According to the relationship of the content, this determinacy formally is just the one that we stated above: that the natural and finite is only a "sign"³⁴⁹ of spirit, and is only instrumental to its manifestation. Hence we have here the religion within which rational spirit is the content.

This free subjectivity has at once a double determination, one we have to distinguish. In the first place, the natural and finite is transfigured in the spirit, in the freedom of spirit. Its transfiguration consists in the fact that it is a sign of spirit, in which connection the natural itself constitutes in its finitude the other side to that [spiritual] substance; or, in this transfiguration of the physically or spiritually

348. *W (Var) reads:* partly just instrumental, but partly the garment of the spirit [that is] present concretely within it, as representing that spirit;

349. *W₂ (Var) reads:* witness

534 natural element, it stands over against that essentiality, the substantiality, or the god. The god is the free subjectivity of which the | finite is posited only as a sign, ~within which³⁵⁰ the god, the spirit, appears. That is the mode of present individuality, or of beauty—Greek religion. The other form is the religion of sublimity, namely that in which the sensible, the finite, the spiritually and physically natural element, is not taken up and transfigured in free subjectivity. For when it is transfigured in free subjectivity, the finite element still has at the same time a natural and external aspect: although it is elevated into a sign of spirit, it is nevertheless not purified of externality and sensibility. The other determination, therefore, is that free subjectivity is raised up into the purity of thinking, this other extreme. We have this in the religion of sublimity—in the³⁵¹ form that is more in keeping with the content than the sensible aspect is. Here [however] the sensible is ruled by this free subjectivity, which is in itself a power and within which the other is only an ideal element and has no genuine subsistence as opposed to free subjectivity.³⁵²

In the first form the reconciliation of the spiritual and the natural has occurred, so to speak, in such a way that the natural is only a sign or moment of the spiritual. But the spiritual continues to be afflicted with this externality. It is in the second form that the finite is first ruled by spirit, with spirit elevating itself [so that it is] raised up beyond naturalness and finitude, and is no longer afflicted with and clouded by the external (as is still the case with the form of beauty). The first form yields the religion of beauty, the second the religion of sublimity.

1. The Religion of Beauty, or Greek Religion

We could directly call this the religion of the Greeks, which is an infinite, inexhaustible theme. The content that especially interests us is that this religion is a religion of humanity. Humanity comes
535 to its right, to its affirmation, | in which what the human being concretely is, is portrayed as the divine. There is no content in the

350. Thus also W_2 ; W_1 (Var) reads: inasmuch as

351. W (Var) reads: a

352. W (Var) adds: Spirit is what raises itself, what is raised above the natural, above finitude. This is the religion of sublimity.

Greek divinities that was not essentially familiar to humans. Here we have to consider first the objective, God in his objectivity; and secondly the cultus.

*a. The Divine Content*³⁵³

There are three aspects to distinguish in the content, namely (1) what is full of import as such, the divine in its essentiality, (2) what stands over this divine aspect as the higher [power], i.e., fate, and (3) what stands beneath this divine aspect as the subordinate [level], i.e., the external individualities.

As for the import as such or the pure content, the substantial foundation is, as we showed in the transitional remarks, rationality in general, the freedom of spirit or essential freedom. This freedom is not caprice; it must certainly be distinguished from that. It is essential freedom by definition, the freedom that determines itself. Because the freedom that determines itself is the foundation of this relationship, it is rationality or, more precisely, ethical life. The way this follows here is to be assumed as a lemma: freedom is the self-determining, what is formal; it first appears as something formal. That this formal element turns over into the content that we call ethical life is something we presuppose. Concrete rationality is essentially what we call ethical principles. The point that freedom is a willing of nothing else than itself, i.e., freedom, and that this is ethical life and that ethical determinations result from it, cannot be developed further here.

Because ethical life constitutes the essential foundation here, what we are dealing with is the initial [mode of] ethical life so to speak, ethical life in its immediacy. There [simply] is this [social] rationality, the rationality or ethical life being wholly universal, being therefore in its substantial form. The rationality does not yet subsist as a subject, it has not yet raised itself up out of this unalloyed unity in which it is ethical life, into the unity of the subject, nor has it deepened itself inwardly. For this reason | the spiritual and essentially ethical characteristics appear as a mutually external [complex]. It is a content most full of import, but [its elements are] mutually external.

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353. *Text reads:* 1. The Content. *In B's margin:* 12 July 1827

Ethical life has to be distinguished altogether from morality; the latter is the subjectivity of the ethical, what knows itself as inwardly accountable—having premeditation, intention, ethical purpose, and also knowing the substantial being that the ethical realm is. Ethical life is just the substantial being, the true being of the ethical, but it is not yet the knowing of this ethical domain. The ethical is an objective content such that a subjectivity or this internal reflection is not yet present.

Because it has this character, the ethical content fragments. Its foundation is constituted by the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$,³⁵⁴ the essential spiritual powers, the universal powers of ethical life—especially political life, life in the state, and also justice, valor, family, oaths, agriculture, science, and the like. Bound up with the fact that the ethical fragments into these, its particular determinations, is the fact³⁵⁵ that the creaturely³⁵⁶ domain also comes forward against these spiritual powers. The character of immediacy that has this fragmentation as its consequence involves the characteristic that natural powers [such as] heaven and earth, mountains and streams, day and night, emerge over against [the spiritual]. These are the general foundations.

But however much this fragmentation obtains, in which the natural powers appear as by themselves, as autonomous, the unity of the spiritual and the natural likewise emerges more and more, and this is the essential thing; it is not, however, the neutralization of the two, but instead the spiritual is not only the preponderant aspect in it but also the ruling and determining one; while the natural on the contrary is idealized and subjugated.

The relationship appears on the one hand in the fact that there are nature deities: Cronus, Time (in this mode, an abstraction), Uranus, Oceanus, Hyperion, Helios, Selene. In the cosmogonies, which are at the same time theogonies, we encounter these nature deities—universal powers of nature, formations and configurations

354. [Ed.] See Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Heathen* 2: "And some even of the philosophers, after the poets, make idols of forms of your passions [$\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$], such as fear, and love, and joy, and hope" (*Ante-Nicene Fathers* 2:178).

355. W_2 (Var) reads: is the other fragmentation, namely,

356. W (Var) reads: natural

of nature, which we number together among the Titans.³⁵⁷ They, too, are personified; but in their case the personification is superficial; | it is only personification, for the content of Helios, for example, is something natural and not something spiritual, it is no spiritual power. That Helios is represented in a human fashion or is active in human fashion is an empty form of personification. Helios is not the god of the sun—the Greeks never express themselves this way; one nowhere finds ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἡλίου; there is not a natural sun and then also a Helios as god of the sun, but rather Helios, the sun, is the god. Oceanus is likewise the god itself. These are the³⁵⁸ powers of nature.

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The second point, therefore, is that these powers of nature are subordinated to the spiritual ones, and this is not merely our view of the Greek gods, for the Greeks have expressed it themselves; they are conscious of it themselves. About this aspect we need only say what the Greeks themselves have said about their gods; for the concept, the essential, is contained in what they said. A major point of their mythology is that the gods, with Zeus at their head, have gained the mastery for themselves by a war, by violence. The spiritual power has cast down the giants, the Titans, from the throne; the sheer power of nature has been overcome by the spiritual, the spiritual has elevated itself above it and now rules over the world. Thus this war with the Titans is not a mere fairy tale but is the essence of Greek religion. The entire concept of the Greek gods lies in this war of the gods.³⁵⁹ That the spiritual principle elevated itself, that it subordinated the natural to itself, is the gods' own proper deed and history.³⁶⁰ | The Greek gods have indeed done none other than

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357. [Ed.] See Hesiod, *Theogony* 133–134, 168 ff., 371.

358. W_1 (Var) reads: Oceanus is not god of the sea and such like; he is the god [itself]. . . . What we have here are these W_2 (Var) reads: Oceanus is not god of the sea in such a way that the god and what he rules over are distinguished from each other; on the contrary, these powers are

359. L (1827?) adds, similar in W : When they take up the cause of an individual, of Troy, this is not something that gods do to one another. W_2 (Var) continues: So it is no longer *their* history and is not the historical development of their nature.

360. W_2 (Var/1831?) reads: But the fact that, as the spiritual principle, they have attained the mastery and have overcome the natural realm is what constitutes their essential act; and this is the essential consciousness that the Greeks have of them.

this. "The Titans were banished to the edge of the earth; therefore they still exist. But, in their being posited as subordinate to the spiritual, not only are they external with respect to the spiritual, but they also constitute an intrinsic determination with respect to the spiritual gods. The victory over them is of the kind in which they nevertheless still retain their rights and their honor. They are powers of nature, but they are not the higher, ethical, and true power, the spiritually essential forces. Nevertheless there is still a natural moment contained in those forces themselves."³⁶¹ But it is only a trace of the natural element, and hence it is only one aspect in them.

But there are still two varieties to be distinguished among the ancient gods themselves. For it is not only the nature powers, which are sheer power, that belong among them; Dike, the Eumenides, the Erinyes, the Oath, the Styx, νέμεσις, and φθόνος are counted among them too. Although they are of a spiritual type, these deities distinguish themselves from the newer ones in that they are the aspect of the spiritual as a power that has being only inwardly; they are the powers that merely subsist within themselves but that are also spiritual. Yet because the spirituality that subsists only inwardly is only an abstractly crude spirituality and is not yet true spirituality, they are for this reason counted among the ancient gods; they are the universals that are to be feared: the Erinyes are just the internal judges, the Oath is this certainty in my inmost self—whether or not I declare it externally, its truth resides within me; we can compare the Oath with conscience. In contrast, Zeus is the political god, the god of laws and of lordship, but of laws that are well known. What is valid here is not the laws of conscience but right according to public laws. In the state it is not conscience but rather the laws (what is established) that have the right. What conscience, if it is of the correct

361. *W (1831) reads:* Thus the natural gods are subdued, and driven from their throne; the spiritual principle is victorious over the religion of nature, and the natural forces are banished to the borders of the world, beyond the world of self-consciousness, though they have also retained their rights. Though they are the powers of nature, they are posited also as ideal, as subject to the spiritual; so that they constitute one determination with respect to what is spiritual or to the spiritual gods themselves, and the natural moment is still contained in the gods themselves.

sort, ought to know as the right must also | be objective.³⁶² Alongside Dike, Nemesis is also an ancient deity; she is [found] together with φθόρος [and] with love and consists in bringing down the stiff-necked, the proud, the self-exalting ones whose wrong consists only in being someone exalted, and is not an ethical wrong. It is a justice that is of the superficial sort, consisting only in equalization and in leveling; it is envy, a dragging down of what is superior so that it stands on the same level with the rest. Only strict, abstract right is contained in Dike. Orestes is pursued by the Eumenides, therefore by gods of strict right; he is acquitted by Athena, by ethical right, the visible, ethical power of the state.³⁶³

Here we want to give a few examples of how the natural is mingled with the spiritual. Zeus is the firmament generally, atmospheric change (*sub Jove frigido*);³⁶⁴ he is the thunderer; but, apart from this natural principle, he is not merely the father of gods and human beings but also the political god, the god of the state, and the right and ethical life of the state, the highest power on earth, [and also] the power of hospitality.³⁶⁵ Phoebus is sometimes the knowing god. But obviously, according to the analogy of the substantial logical determination, knowing corresponds to light and [Apollo] is the aftereffect of the sun's power; he is Helios, the sun that shines upon everything. Indeed, light and knowing correspond implicitly and explicitly, and the logical determination is just that of making

362. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: What is genuine is not hidden but manifest. If human beings appeal to their conscience, one may have one conscience and another another; in order that one's conscience may be of the correct sort, what one knows to be right must be in conformity with objective right, it must not merely dwell within one. If conscience is right, then it is a conscience recognized by the state, once the state is ethically constituted.

363. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: Ethical right is something other than merely strict right; the new gods are the gods of ethical right.

[Ed.] See Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, esp. 734–741.

364. [Ed.] Horace, *Carmina* 1.1.25.

365. *Thus Hu*; L (1827?) adds (*after an insertion from 1824*), *similar in W*: with reference to the old customs at a time when the relationship of the different [city-] states was not yet defined, and hospitality was the essential sphere of the ethical relationship of citizens belonging to different states. *Precedes in W*: He is, moreover, a many-sided ethical power, the god of hospitality

540 manifest | whether in the natural or in the spiritual [realm]. So Phoebus is not only the knowing one, the revealing one, the oracle; he is also called the Lycian Apollo, and λύκειος has an immediate connection with light. That comes from Asia Minor; the natural aspect, the light, is more prominent to the East. In his work on the Dorians, to be sure, Müller³⁶⁶ denied this affinity of Phoebus with the sun, but right at the beginning of the *Iliad* Phoebus sends pestilence over the Greek camp near Troy;³⁶⁷ this connects directly with the sun, this effect of the hot summer, the sun's heat, and in a hundred other portrayals we find this same point echoed.³⁶⁸

Pindar and Aeschylus too (in the *Eumenides*) speak of a succession of oracles of the ancient gods right up to the new god Phoebus.³⁶⁹ In the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus the initial scenes take place before the temple of Apollo. There Pythia states that the first to be worshiped are Gaia and Themis, and then the other or new gods.³⁷⁰

366. [Ed.] See Karl Otfried Müller, *Geschichten hellenischer Stämme und Städte*, vol. 2 (Breslau, 1824), pp. 284, 287–288. Müller's conclusion was that the identification of Apollo and the sun was a late development, after the old gods had been turned into predicates of νοῦς or interpreted as material forces and objects. Müller himself also established a link between Apollo's epithet λύκειος and the adjective λευκός ("light"), without however attaching weight to it as an argument for identifying Apollo and the sun. In opposing Müller, Hegel also implicitly took up a position against J. H. Voss and in support of Friedrich Creuzer, according to whose interpretation, based ultimately on Herodotus, "two Egyptian sun-gods contributed to the genesis of a twofold Hellenic Apollo" (Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 2:158; cf. also pp. 132 ff. for the interpretation of λύκειος). On other matters, such as the assessment of the symbolic character of the Greek gods, belief in the mysteries, and Mithra, Hegel is not so close to Creuzer's viewpoint (see above, n. 288).

367. [Ed.] Homer, *Iliad*, bk. 1, esp. vv. 9–10 concerning Apollo's anger against Agamemnon.

368. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: Even the pictures of Phoebus have attributes and symbols that are closely connected with the sun. W (1831) continues: The same divinities that were Titanic and natural in the earlier phase appear later with a spiritual basic character, and this is the predominant one; it has been disputed, indeed, that there was any natural element still in Apollo. In Homer at all events, Helios is the sun, but at the same time he is immediately brightness, the spiritual moment that shines upon and illuminates everything. But even at a later period Apollo still retained something of his natural element, for he was portrayed with a nimbus around his head.

369. [Ed.] This succession does not occur in Pindar himself but in a general scholium to the Pythian hymns.

Thus we see what follows: that the natural gods are the lowest and the spiritual gods are higher. This is not to be taken historically, but in a spiritual way.³⁷¹ |

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³⁷²Thus the first mode of giving oracles, the noise and rustling of leaves and suspended cymbals, as in Dodona, is by mere natural sounds. Only later appears [the figure of] the priestess who gives the oracle in human tones (although in keeping with the oracle's mode she does not do so in clear speech).³⁷³ Similarly, the Muses are at first nymphs, i.e., springs, the rippling, murmuring, and burbling of brooks; everywhere the beginning arises from the natural mode, from powers of nature that are transformed into a god of spiritual content.³⁷⁴

370. [Ed.] Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 1–8.

371. W (1831) reads: Here we have the summons to worship. The first to be worshiped is the giver of oracles (Γαῖα), the nature-principle, then Θέμις, who was already a spiritual power, though, like Dike, she belongs to the ancient gods; next comes night, and then Phoebus—the oracle has passed over to the new gods. Pindar also speaks of a similar succession [W₁: of the gods W₂: in connection with the oracle]. He makes night [W₁: first among the gods W₂: the first oracle-giver], then comes Themis and next Phoebus. Thus we have here the transition from natural figures to the new gods. In the sphere of poetry, where these doctrines originate, this [sequence] is not to be taken historically [W₂: is not so hard-and-fast as to preclude any deviation from it].

372. *Precedes in L* (1827?): This is the universal, even though it was not particularly noticeable in the gods taken one by one.

373. [Ed.] See Etienne Clavier, *Mémoire sur les oracles des anciens* (Paris, 1818), pp. 72–75.

374. W₂ (1831) adds: A similar transformation can be seen in Diana. The Diana of Ephesus is still Asiatic and is represented with many breasts and bedecked with images of animals. Her foundation is natural life in general, the procreative and sustaining force of nature. The Diana of the Greeks, on the other hand, is the huntress who slays animals; she has not the sense and meaning of hunting generally, but of the hunt directed at wild animals. And these animals are indeed subdued and killed through the bravery of spiritual subjectivity, whereas in the earlier spheres of the religious spirit they were regarded as absolutely inviolate.

[Ed.] This portrayal of Diana of Ephesus is found in Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 22.5 in terms similar to those used by Hegel. However, Hegel probably has in mind not this text but the illustration in Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie*, plate 3, no. 4. In his *Handbuch der Archäologie der Kunst* (Breslau, 1830), pp. 472–478, K. O. Müller also discusses the difference between the modes of portrayal prevalent in Greece and those in Asia Minor.

³⁷⁵Prometheus gave fire to humanity and taught people to sacrifice.³⁷⁶ This means that the animals had belonged not to humanity but to a spiritual power, i.e., human beings had [previously] eaten no meat. Then Prometheus took the entire offering to Zeus; he had made two constructs, one wholly of bones and entrails with the skin drawn over it, and the other entirely of meat; but Zeus seized the first one. So to sacrifice means to hold a feast, with the gods receiving the entrails and the bones. Zeus was deceived when the bones wrapped in fat were offered up to him while human beings themselves enjoyed the meat. This [Titan] Prometheus taught
542 human beings to lay hold of animals | and make them their food.³⁷⁷
³⁷⁸So it was Prometheus who taught human beings to eat meat, and imparted to them other skills as well; he is recalled with gratitude as the one who made human life easier. "But notwithstanding the fact that human powers of understanding are displayed here, he still belongs among the Titans for the very reason that these skills are only to satisfy human needs—they have no ethical authority, they are not laws."³⁷⁹ A passage in Plato,³⁸⁰ where he speaks of Prometheus, contends that Prometheus indeed fetched fire from the

375. *Precedes in W* (1831): Prometheus, who is also reckoned among the Titans, is an important, interesting figure. Prometheus is a natural power; but he is also a benefactor of human beings, in that he taught them the first arts. He brought fire down from heaven for them; the power to kindle fire already presupposes a certain level of civilization; humanity has already emerged out of its primitive barbarism. The first beginnings of culture have thus been preserved in grateful remembrance in the myths.

376. [Ed.] Hesiod, *Theogony* 510–615, and *Works and Days* 48–58.

377. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: Among the Hindus and Egyptians, on the other hand, it is forbidden to slaughter animals.

378. *Precedes in L* (1827?): Artemis is the human power to hunt animals. In this connection there are various myths that refer to this new departure in the matter of the relationship of human beings to animals.

379. *W* (1831) reads: But Prometheus is a Titan. He is chained to the Caucasus and a vulture constantly gnaws at his liver, which always grows again—a pain that never ceases. What Prometheus taught human beings was only the skills that pertain to the satisfaction of natural needs. In the simple satisfaction of these needs there is never any [final] satiety; instead the need comes back again, and always has to be ministered to afresh. That is what is signified by this myth.

[Ed.] See in particular Hesiod, *Theogony* 520 ff., and Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*.

380. [Ed.] Plato, *Protagoras* 321c–d.

Acropolis but that he was unable to bring the πολιτεία or ethical life down to human beings; that was kept in the citadel of Zeus, Zeus withheld it for himself.³⁸¹ In Aeschylus³⁸² Prometheus says that in his defiance he takes solace and satisfaction in the fact that to Zeus will be born a son who will cast him down from his throne: Heracles, the only god who was first a human being and then was placed among the gods. What is asserted here is that Heracles will attain the lordship of Zeus; that can be viewed as a prophecy that has come to pass.

³⁸³Up to this point we have considered concrete characteristics of the Greek gods; now we want to indicate the abstract ones.³⁸⁴ The | gods are scattered; Zeus rules them as a family. The higher power, absolute unity, stands above the gods as a pure power. This power is what is called destiny, fate, or simple necessity. It is without content, is empty necessity, an empty, unintelligible power that is devoid of the concept. It is not wise, for wisdom falls within the circle of the gods and includes concrete characteristics that belong in the sphere of the particular, and pertain to single gods. Destiny is devoid of purpose and wisdom, it is a blind necessity that stands above all, even above the gods, uncomprehended and desolate. The abstract cannot be comprehended. Comprehending means knowing something in its truth. What is debased and abstract is incomprehensible; what is rational is comprehensible because it is inwardly concrete.

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As far as the disposition of finite self-consciousness [toward this

381. W (1831) reads: and this expresses the fact that it belonged to Zeus personally.

382. [Ed.] Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 755–768.

383. In B's and Hu's margin: 13 July 1827

384. Thus Hu; L reads: The two moments that have still to be considered are the extremes. The midpoint of this religion is the thought of God in his concrete determination. . . . The other two moments are the abstract determinations as opposed to the concrete ones. . . . There is a plurality of gods; in and for itself, of course, the content is the genuine, spiritual, ethical substance; but it is still fragmented, it is still divided into many particularities. W₁ (Var) reads: 1. There is a plurality of gods—[though] the content is in and for itself the genuine, spiritual, ethical substance. But it is still fragmented, [there are] still many particularities, and together they make a unity. W₂ (1831/Var?) reads: The unity that binds the plurality of the particular gods together is still at first a superficial unity.

necessity] is concerned, and its relationship to it, this necessity [is viewed as] underlying everything, gods and human beings alike; on the one side there is an iron power, on the other a blind obedience without freedom. But there is still one form of freedom that is at least present, and that is on the side of [finite] disposition. In having this conviction regarding necessity, the Greek achieves inner peace in saying: It is this way and there is nothing to be done about it; I must be content with it. This implies that I *am* content with it and thus that freedom is present after all, in that it is my own state. This conviction implies that human beings are confronted by this simple necessity. In adopting this standpoint and saying, "It is this way," one has set aside everything particular, one has renounced it and abstracted from all particular goals and interests. Dissatisfaction occurs when human beings hold fast to a goal and there is no
544 harmony or agreement | between what they want and what is."³⁸⁵ But from this standpoint [of fate] all dissatisfaction and vexation are removed, because human beings have withdrawn into this pure rest, this pure being, this "it is." In that abstract freedom there is on the one hand in fact no solace for human beings.³⁸⁶ One needs solace [only] insofar as one demands a compensation for a loss; but here no compensation is needed, for one has given up the inner root of what one lost. One has wholly surrendered what has been given up."³⁸⁷ That is the aspect of freedom, but it is abstract and not concrete freedom, the freedom that only stands above the concrete but is not posited in essential harmony with what is determinate,

385. *W (1831) reads:* and will not give this up; and if things do not match this end or are even in conflict with it, they are dissatisfied. There is no harmony then between what is actually present and what they want, because they have within themselves the ought: "That ought to be."

Thus discontent and inward cleavage are present; but from this standpoint one does not hold firmly to any purpose or interest in the face of actually existing circumstances. Misfortune, discontent, is nothing but the contradiction, [*W*₁: that there is opposition to what I want to be. *W*₂: the fact that something is contrary to my will.]

386. *W*₂ (*Var*) *adds:* but solace is also unnecessary.

387. *W*₂ (*Var*) *reads:* one has renounced the inner root of racking worry and discontent and has wholly surrendered what is lost, because one has the strength to look necessity in the face.

the freedom that is pure thinking and being, or being-within-self, the annulment of the particular.³⁸⁸

“The opposite extreme to that universality is external singularity, and this likewise is not yet taken up into the middle term; it also stands on its own account, as does that abstraction of thinking, of retreat into self.”³⁸⁹ Both extremes emerge from the same ground, from the same general determinacy, viz., that rationality, the rational content and ethical import, is still immediately present, is still | in the form of immediacy—“this is the logical determination from 545 which the further characteristics proceed. Singular selfhood is subjectivity, but only in an external way. It is still not the one infinite subjectivity that is posited; for in that the external singularity is superseded. “Here on the contrary”³⁹⁰ the singularity is an external one just because it is not yet infinite subjectivity;”—³⁹¹ and the manifold content that plays about the gods falls on the side of externality. “Hence contingency of content enters into this sphere.”³⁹² “So we should not believe, for instance, that the twelve main gods of Olympus are ordered and arrayed in correspondence with the concept. “They are not sheer allegories but are | concrete 546 (though not infinite) spirituality instead. They are also individual figures, and as concrete essences they have diverse properties; [but]

388. *W₂ (MiscP/1831?) adds:* In contrast, there is in the higher forms of religion the consolation that the absolutely final end will be attained despite misfortune, so that the negative changes around into the affirmative. “The sufferings of this present time are the path to blessedness [*die Leiden dieser Zeit sind der Weg zur Seligkeit*].”

[*Ed.*] The rhyming of the German suggests that the source may be a Lutheran hymn, but there is also an allusion to Rom. 8:18: “I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory [*Herrlichkeit*] that is to be revealed to us.”

389. *Precedes in W₁ (MiscP/Var?):* Necessity is the one extreme. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads:* Abstract necessity as this abstraction of thought and of the retreat into self is the one extreme; the other extreme is the singularity of the particular divine powers.

390. *W₁ (Var) reads:* External singularity is one thing, while subjectivity as inwardly infinite is something different. Here

391. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads:* in other words, subjectivity is not posited as infinite subjectivity, and hence singularity comes on the scene in its external guise;

392. *W₂ (MiscP/Var?) reads:* But since particularity is not yet tempered by the idea, and necessity is not a meaningful measure of wisdom, an unlimited contingency on the part of the content enters into the sphere of the particular gods.

they are only imagined as concrete in such a way that what is inward is only one property. They are, however, still no universals.³⁹³ ~394

The natural element is still a factor in these determinations of the concrete and constitutes one side of the contrast. For instance, the sun rises and sets; the year, the appearance of the months, plays a part here, and for that reason the Greek gods have been made into calendar gods.³⁹⁵

One moment that we have to hold on to [firmly] is the so-called philosophical meaning [*Philosopheme*]; this is a moment that has its seat originally in the mystery rites. The mysteries are related to the manifest religion of the Greeks in the way that natural elements are related to the spiritual import: "They are the most ancient cultus, the crude, natural cultus."³⁹⁶ Just as the ancient gods are in the main only natural elements, so the content of the mysteries is the sort of crude content that spirit has not yet permeated. This is the relationship that both is necessary in and for itself and also at the same time is historical. But just as it was believed that "particular depths of

393. *W₂ (1831) reads:* Finally, the free individuality of the gods is the main source of the manifold contingent content that is ascribed to them. Even though they are not yet infinite, absolute spirituality, they are at least concrete, subjective spirituality. As such they do not have an abstract content, and there is not just one property in them, but they unite several characteristics within them. If they possessed only *one* property, it would be only an abstract inner [content], or one simple meaning, and they themselves would merely be allegories, i.e., only *imagined* to be concrete. But in the concrete richness of their individuality they are not tied to the limited direction and kind of efficacy of one single exclusive property. Instead they can let themselves go freely in any direction they choose, including arbitrary, contingent ones.

394. *W₁ (Var) reads:* The twelve principal gods of Olympus, for example, are not ordered by means of the concept, they do not constitute a system. Moreover, they are concrete spirituality but not yet absolute subjectivity, and hence they are individual figures.

As concrete spirituality they do not have abstract content; what they have in them is not one distinctive property but several (as concrete). Were there only one property they would be allegories, they would only be *imagined* as concrete, with the result that the inward [content] or the meaning would be just the one distinctive property. But here we have subjective spirituality, though not yet infinite subjectivity.

395. *W₁ (Var?) adds:* as Dupuis does.

[*Ed.*] Dupuis, *Origine de tous les cultes* 1:317 ff. Dupuis identified Heracles in particular as a calendrical deity.

396. *W₁ (Var) reads:* This is either ancient religion or a more recent, imported cult.

religion were at home in India,³⁹⁷ so it is believed here.³⁹⁸ From all of this [the mystery rites],³⁹⁹ some elements also find their way into the concrete representation of the spiritual gods who are raised above this level. Inasmuch as the representations of origination and perishing are carried over into the spiritual circle, there are echoes of that transference here too. This is the case when an endless number of amours is ascribed to Zeus, occasioned by the sort | of myths referring to natural relationships and natural powers.⁴⁰⁰

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The other aspect of the content is that of appearance or of its shape.⁴⁰¹ At this stage beauty is everywhere the dominant factor. The god appears. These powers, these absolutely ethical and spiritual determinations, are known, they exist for the empirical self-consciousness. Thus they exist for an other, and what must concern us now is the precise manner in which they exist for their other, for the [worshiper's] subjective self-consciousness.

The first point is therefore that this content reveals itself in the innermost [being], comes into prominence within the spirit; but this

397. Thus L; An reads: great and ancient wisdom belonged to the Hindus and Chinese,

[Ed.] Hegel is probably referring in particular to Friedrich Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), pp. 90, 103 (cf. *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:193, 205). See above, n. 22.

398. L (1827?) adds, similar in W₁: Origination and perishing was comprehended in Hinduism as a content and was known in particular as a universal power. The mysteries contain premonitions in which an attempt was made to see the natural forces grasped in a universal way.

399. W₁ (Var) reads: this epoch,

400. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: Another relevant feature is the locality in which the consciousness of a god first began; in this regard the cheerfulness of the Greeks, the element of production, gave rise to a number of delightful stories. To investigate these different aspects, to decide where this or that single detail originated, is the task of scholarship.

401. L, W (1831) add: So far we have considered the way that the configuration of the divine is grounded in the implicit potential of these divinities, i.e., in their individual natures, their subjective spirituality, their geographically and temporally contingent emergence, or as it occurs in the involuntary transformation of natural determinations into the expression of free subjectivity. The configuration that we have now to consider is the one that is accomplished with consciousness. This is the appearing of the divine powers that occurs for "another," i.e., for subjective self-consciousness, and is known and shaped within the latter's own comprehension.

ethical and true content can reveal itself only within a spirit that itself is in itself and has been elevated to this spiritual freedom. These universal determinations come to consciousness for it, they manifest and reveal themselves inwardly. Contrariwise the other aspect is that, inasmuch as this level is only one of initial freedom and rationality, that which is a power within the spirit appears as an outward mode [of intuition]. That is the natural aspect with which this standpoint is still afflicted.⁴⁰² This whole external aspect is the rustling of the trees at Dodona, the silence of the wood where Pan is, falling stones, thunder and lightning—in short, the external phenomena in nature that are taken to be something higher. | These phenomena occasion only the initial manifestation, so to speak, for the consciousness for which these determinations exist.⁴⁰³

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~So the other to that immediacy or being, whether internal or external, is the grasping of that initially abstract [freedom], and is the real stuff of self-consciousness. ~But the organ by which self-consciousness grasps this subsisting thing, this substantial and essential [being], is phantasy, which images what is initially abstract, the inwardly or outwardly subsisting [essence], and produces it as what is first deemed to be a god.⁴⁰⁴ | Explanation here consists in

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402. *W₂ (Var) adds (cf. the following footnote):* If the authorities and laws that announce themselves to the inward [thought] are spiritual and ethical, still they are [such] initially just *because* they are, and it is not known whence they come.

[*Ed.*] Hegel is referring to Antigone's defense of her behavior vis-à-vis Creon; see Sophocles, *Antigone*, vv. 453–457.

403. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W₁ (cf. the preceding footnote):* These shapes [*W₁*: authorities] and these laws simply *are*, the ethical *is*, and no one knows whence it came; it is eternal, or it is something external, thunder and lightning.

404. *W₂ (Var/1831?) reads:* It is self-consciousness that grasps, clarifies, or images what was initially abstract (whether inwardly or outwardly so) and produces it as what is deemed to be God.

W₂ (1831) continues: Natural phenomena or this immediate, external [mode of appearing], however, are not appearance in the sense that the essence would be only a thought within us—as when we speak of the forces of nature and their expressions. Here it does not lie in the natural objects themselves, does not lie objectively in them as such, that they exist as appearances of what is inward; as natural objects they exist only for our sense perception, for which they are not an appearance of the universal. Thus it is not in light as such, for example, that thought, the universal, announces its presence; on the contrary, in the case of natural essence we must first break through the outer shell behind which thought, or the inwardness of things, is hidden.

making it representational, in enabling consciousness to represent to itself something divine. We have already seen what the definition of this phantasy is: because this content still has in it this finitude of being immediate rationality, so that it presents itself as a particular, as a content that is not yet within infinite subjectivity, it involves finitude as such and is afflicted with the natural aspect. Phantasy is the activity of giving shape either to what is inwardly abstract or to what is external, what is initially an immediate being (for example, thunder or the ocean's roar); it shapes both of these aspects and posits them as something concrete, one of which is the spiritual and the other the natural; the result is that the external being is no longer independent but is downgraded into being just a sign of the indwelling spirit, into serving just to make the implicit spirit apparent."⁴⁰⁵

Hence the gods of the Greeks are products of human imagination or sculptured [*plastisch*] deities formed by human hands. They originate therefore in a finite manner, one produced by poets, by the Muse. The gods have this finitude because they have finitude within them in accord with their own import; that is, they have particularity, or the falling asunder of the spiritual power and the natural

But the natural, the external, at the same time must be posited in itself, it must in its externality be posited as sublated and in itself be posited as appearance, with the result that it has meaning and significance only as the outward expression and organ of thought and of the universal. Thought must be for intuition; in other words, what is revealed is on the one hand the sensuous mode, while what is perceived is at the same time thought, the universal. It is the necessity that has to appear in a godlike way, i.e., it has to appear within [finite] being as necessity in immediate unity with finitude. This is posited necessity, i.e., the necessity that has being and exists as simple reflection into itself.

405. *W₂ (MiscP/1831?) reads:* Phantasy is now the organ with which self-consciousness gives shape either to what is inwardly abstract or to what is external, what is initially an immediate being, and posits it as concrete. In this process what is natural loses its independence and is downgraded into the sign of the indwelling spirit, so that it just lets the implicit spirit be apparent.

W₂ (1831) continues: The freedom of spirit here is not yet the infinite freedom of thought; the spiritual essentialities are not yet [subjected to] thought. If human beings were thoughtful in such a way that pure thinking constituted the foundation, there would be for them only one God. But here they do not come upon their essentialities as present and unmediated natural shapes; to the contrary, they bring them forth for the imagination. As the midpoint between pure thought and immediately natural intuition, this bringing forth is phantasy.

550 aspect. “This finitude of content is why they | originate in a finite manner as human products.⁴⁰⁶ At this stage the divine is grasped neither by pure thinking nor in pure spirit. “God is not yet worshiped in spirit and in truth [John 4:24].”⁴⁰⁷ The divine is not yet [present] as absolute truth, it is not even grasped by the external understanding, in the abstract categories of the understanding; for these categories are what constitute prose. For this reason these gods are humanly made—not [with respect to] their rational content but [in their appearing] as gods. Every priest was, so to speak, such a maker of gods. Herodotus says that Homer and Hesiod made the Greeks’ gods for them.⁴⁰⁸ “⁴⁰⁹ This interpretation of an external [phenomenon] just means shaping it, giving it the shape of the activity
551 of a god. “The explanation | here is not for the understanding but⁴¹¹ is produced by phantasy for phantasy.

406. *L* (1827?) *adds*: The gods’ shape is one that is posited by the subjective side and by finite spirit, and human beings themselves are conscious that they are the ones who have brought forth this shape.

407. *Thus An*, *similar in Hu*; *L* (*Var*) *reads*, *similar in W₁*: There is truth in this rationality, the truth that this is only something manifesting the spiritual.

408. *W₁* (*Var*/1831?) *adds*: i.e., every priest or experienced old man.

[*Ed.*] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.53. What Herodotus actually said was that Homer and Hesiod “established the genealogy of the gods in Greece and gave them their eponyms, apportioned offices and honors among them, and revealed their form.”

409. *W₂* (1831) *reads*: They are discovered by the human spirit, not as they are in their implicitly and explicitly rational content, but in such a way that they are *gods*. They are made or poetically created [*gedichtet*], but they are not fictitious [*erdichtet*]. To be sure, they emerge from human phantasy in contrast with what is already at hand, but they emerge as *essential* shapes, and the product is at the same time known as what is essential.

It is in this sense that we have to understand Herodotus when he says that Homer and Hesiod made the Greeks’ gods for them. The same could be said of every priest or experienced old graybeard who was capable of understanding and expounding the appearance of the divine and of the essential powers in the natural.

410. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*: When the Greeks heard the roaring of the sea at the funeral of Achilles, Nestor came forward and said that Thetis was taking part in the mourning.^a And during the plague Calchas said that it was sent by Apollo because he was angry with the Greeks.^b

[*Ed.*] ^aHomer, *Odyssey* 24.47–56. ^bHomer, *Iliad* 1.92–96.

411. *Thus Hu*; *L* (1827?) *reads*, *in part similar in W*: In the same way they give a shape to the inward element. Achilles restrains his anger; the poet expresses this inner prudence, the restraining of anger, as the doing of Pallas: Achilles has been restrained by Pallas. We explain things quite differently in physics and psychology. Here explaining consists in making the matter visualizable by consciousness. It becomes

⁴¹²Insofar as spirit has natural and sensible existence, the human figure is the only way in which it can be intuited. | That does not mean, however, that spirit is something sensible or material, but rather that the mode of its immediacy and reality, its being for an other, is its being intuited in human shape. That is why the Greeks

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so because it is given shape that is an image, *W₂ (1831) continues*: Those innumerable charming tales and the endless quantity of Greek myths originated in this kind of interpreting.

From whatever side we are able to consider the Greek principle, we see the sensuous and the natural permeating it. In the way that they issue from necessity, the gods are limited, and also for that reason they have the resonance of the natural in them, since they betray their own origin from the struggle with the powers of nature. The appearance with which they announce themselves to self-consciousness is still external, and even the phantasy that gives form and shape to this appearance still does not elevate their starting point into pure thought. We have now to see how this natural moment is wholly transfigured into beautiful shape.

412. *Precedes in W₁ (1831) (in W₂ partly shortened, partly MiscP?)*: These gods are spiritual powers, but spirit is fragmented into its particularities, there are many of these spiritual powers, and hence we have polytheism here; this is the side of finitude. One side of this finitude is that freedom still bears the resonance of the natural state, while the other moment of it has just been noted.

The many powers are [there] for humanity. They are the absolute essentialities of human spirit, and in this way they are distinct from the changeable individuality of humans; but they are *represented*; and for that reason another form of finitude comes into play, one pertaining to the imaginative mode. What we have here is not yet the infinite freedom of thought, the spiritual essentialities are not yet [subjected to] thought; if these humans were thoughtful, there would be for them only one God. But divinity here falls entirely within [the range of] representation, which is not the foundation of pure thinking. It is only the religion of absolute truth that has thinking as its pure foundation. The Greek gods subsist for phantasy. Human beings do not come upon these essentialities as natural shapes ready to hand; they bring them forth for the imagination instead; and this bringing forth *is* phantasy. The shapes of the gods emerge from human phantasy in contrast with what is already there for the finding, but they emerge as *essential* shapes; there is a sensuous element involved in this, but it is raised through beauty into conformity with the spiritual. The Greek religion is the religion of beauty. There is a spiritual foundation in the Greek gods, but inasmuch as they are represented objectively, a natural element enters into them. They have the natural [side] in their manifestation: they are made or poetically created [*gedichtet*] (thinking and poetizing are linked), but they are not fictitious [*erdichtet*]. And this [poetic] product is known to be what is essential; it is something spiritual, not burdened by the natural. Instead, nature itself has only the meaning of the spiritual, because it is beautiful. [*W₁*: Manifestation here falls on the subjective side, it is finite. Thus God is something made by human beings. Poets, sculptors, and painters taught the Greeks what their gods were; they beheld their god in the Zeus of Phidias. What is manifested and exhibited for phantasy [however] is the representational shape of

a thought. For this reason the Greek religion is the religion of beauty. The consciousness of free spirituality pertains to beauty even though the content is limited and finite. But if it is to be manifested in sensuous form, free spirituality can be manifested only in human shape. This is the shape of spirit that has existent being. W_2 : If manifestation falls on the subjective side in this process, so that God appears as something made by human beings, that is only *one* moment. For this positedness of God is mediated rather by the sublation of the singular self; that is why it was possible for the Greeks to intuit their god in the Zeus of Phidias. The artist did not give them his own work (in some abstract sense); he gave them the proper appearance of the essential, the shape of necessity in existent being.]

W continues: Thus [W_1 : this shape W_2 : the shape of the god] is the ideal shape. Before the time of the Greeks there was no genuine ideality, [W_1 : neither with the Hindus nor in the Near East nor with the Egyptians. Moreover, this Greek ideality could not W_2 : nor could it] occur at any subsequent time. Certainly the art of the Christian religion is beautiful, but ideality is not its ultimate principle. [W_1 : The Greek gods are anthropopathic, i.e., they involve the determinations of finitude generally, even as something immoral, which may perhaps originate in higher myths. But the main defect is not that there is too much of the anthropopathic in the Greek gods; not at all, for there is still too little humanity in them for one thing. There is still too little that is human in God. W_2 : We cannot get at what is lacking in the Greek gods by saying that they are anthropopathic, a category of finitude to which we can then also impute the immoral element, for example the amours of Zeus, which may have their origin in older myths based on a [mode of] intuiting that is still natural. The main defect is not that there is too much of the anthropopathic in these gods, but that there is too little.] [W_1 : Humanity must be grasped in the divine or in God as *this* human being; but only as a moment, as one of the persons of God, in such a way that this actually existing human being is posited in God, but as taken up into infinitude—and this only by means of a process, in that he, as this single, sensibly existing human being, is sublated. The Jewish commandment, “Thou shalt not make unto thyself any image of God,”^a refers to the fact that God is essentially for thought; but the other moment of divine life is its externalization in human shape, so that this shape is involved in it as [its] manifestation. The manifestation, however, is only one side and is essentially taken back into the One, who thus is [present] for the first time as spirit for thought. Spiritual freedom has not yet come to consciousness in infinitude. W_2 : In this inversion, however, it also becomes clear that the externalization of God in human shape is only one side of the divine life; for this externalization and manifestation is taken back again into the One, who thus for the first time is [present] as spirit for thought and for the community; the single, actually existing human is sublated and is posited in God as a moment, as one of the persons of God. In this way humanity, as this human being, is for the first time truly within God, the appearance of the divine is thus absolute, and its element is spirit itself. The Jewish view that God is essentially for thought alone, and the sensuousness of the Hellenic beauty of shape, are equally contained in this process of the divine life and, being sublated, they are freed from their limitedness.]

[*Ed.*] ^aSee Deut. 27:15. This original form of the prohibition comes closest to Hegel’s interpretation since here the stress lies on not worshipping God in an image made by human hands. The later, better-known formula of Exod. 20:4 relates rather to the ban on worshipping foreign gods.

represented the gods as human beings. | People have taken amiss 553
 this practice of the Greeks as also that of [other] peoples.⁴¹³ It must
 not be said that human beings do it because it is their own shape,
 as if that were all it amounted to; but in fact they are right to do
 it because this is the only shape in which spirit exists;⁴¹⁴ the
 spiritual surely cannot come forth, for example, in the shape of a
 lion.⁴¹⁵ 416 The organization of the human body is, however, only
 the [phenomenal] shape of the | spiritual; the necessity of this linkage 554
 belongs to the realm of physiology or of the philosophy of nature
 and is a difficult point, in fact one still too little discussed.⁴¹⁷

These are the principal moments on which the knowledge of God
 in his determinacy depends.

413. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: Xenophanes said that if lions had gods, they would
 picture them as lions. But it is just this point that lions never get to. Cf. *W₁ (Var)*:
 A philosopher of ancient times says that if lions had gods, they would picture them
 as lions.

[Ed.] Hegel is referring to a fragment of Xenophanes contained in C. A. Brandis,
*Xenophanis Parmenidis et Melissi doctrina e propriis philosophorum reliquiis
 veterumque auctorum testimoniis exposita* (Altona, 1813), p. 68. See Xenophanes,
 frag. 15, in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*,
 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1983), p. 169: "But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or
 were able to draw with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would
 draw the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make
 their bodies such as they each had themselves."

414. *L (Var) adds*: That is not a matter of chance, but the physiological link with
 the shape assumed by spirit. *W₁ (Var) adds*: That is not a matter of chance. On the
 contrary, the linkage is a necessary one.

415. *W₁ (Var) reads*: in animal shapes spirit does not give itself its *own* existence.

416. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: As Aristotle pointed out, in the transmigration of
 souls it is assumed that the soul and the corporeal organization of a human being
 are only accidentally connected. *W₁ (Var) reads*: As Aristotle noted, in the transmigra-
 tion of souls it is assumed that the soul and the corporeal organization of a human
 being are only contingently posited. The human organism is only the shape of the
 spiritual. *W₂ (Var) reads*: That only the human organization can be the shape of the
 spiritual was stated long ago by Aristotle, when he marked it as a defect of the [doc-
 trine of the] transmigration of souls that on that view the corporeal organization of
 a human being would be merely contingent.

[Ed.] Aristotle, *De anima* 407b13–26.

417. *W (Var) reads*: The proper task of physiology is to discern the human
 organism, the human shape, as [*W₁*: the one authentic shape for spirit *W₂*: the only
 one that is authentically adequate for spirit]; but it has so far done little in this respect.

b. *The Cultus*

Now we shall discuss the cultus. The cultus of the Greek religion covers a wide scope; we can draw attention only to the main points.

555 ⁴¹⁸The character of [any] cultus is this, that empirical consciousness raises itself up, giving itself the consciousness or feeling of the indwelling of the divine within it, of its unity with the divine. The general character of this [Greek] cultus is that the subject has an essentially affirmative relationship to its god. Here the cultus involves the recognition and reverence of these "absolute powers, of this essential inner substance that is removed from contingency."⁴¹⁹ "But at the same time these powers are the ethical aspect that is proper to humanity, the rational aspect of [human] freedom, the ethical vocations of human beings, their extant and valid | rights, their own spirit, not an external substantiality and essentiality. This implies that, with respect to the content, one has this affirmative relationship to one's gods; this substantial element that is revered as God is at the same time the proper essentiality of the human being."⁴²⁰ "Thus, for example, Pallas Athena is not the goddess of the city."⁴²¹ What is represented in Pallas Athena is the living, actual spirit of the Athenian people according to its essentiality. The Erinyes are

418. *In B's margin*: 16 July 1827

419. *W₁ (Var) reads*: substantial powers, of the essential inner substance of the natural and spiritual universe (which is removed from contingency), in the way that these essentially valid spiritual powers are present in the empirical consciousness.

420. *W (1831) reads*: [*W₂*: The Greeks are therefore the most *human* people. They affirmatively endorse and develop all that is human; for them the human is the norm.]

This religion is, in general, a religion of humanness. In other words, concrete humanity is present to itself in its gods—concrete humanity in its being, in all its needs, inclinations, passions, and habits, in its ethical and political determinations, or with respect to everything that is of value and essential in all this. The gods have this content of the noble and the true which is at the same time the content of concrete humanity. This human quality of the gods is what is defective, but at the same time what is attractive in Greek religion. There is nothing unintelligible, nothing incomprehensible, in it; the god has no content that is not known to us humans and which we do not find or do not know within ourselves. [*W₂*: Human confidence in the gods is at the same time human confidence in humanity itself.]

L (1827?) adds, similar in W: The Pallas who restrains the outbreak of Achilles' wrath is Achilles' own prudence.

421. *Thus Hu; An reads*: Athena is the city of Athens, the goddess [is] Athens.

the presentation of the [guilty] human's own deed, and the consciousness that plagues and torments one (insofar as one knows that deed as evil *within* one). They are the just ones, and for this very reason the well-disposed ones, the Eumenides.⁴²² Eros is the power, but precisely the subjective sensibility, of the human [lover]. In the recognition of this objective [power] the human [worshippers] are at the same time in communion with themselves, and for this reason in the cultus they are free. Here there is not only the negative relationship as with the Hindus, where the relationship of the subjects—even when of the highest sort—is only the sacrifice or negation of their consciousness.

Freedom constitutes the cheerfulness or serenity of this cultus.⁴²³ In the cultus, honor is bestowed upon the god, but revering God turns into the reverence proper to humanity itself, the reverence that makes the consciousness of one's affirmative relationship and unity with the gods valid in one's own self. In this worship, human beings celebrate their own "honor."⁴²⁴ But inasmuch as the god still has an external, natural aspect, this unification has further modifications. Bacchus and Demeter, wine and bread, are external [goods] for the human being. The way to make oneself identical | with them is to consume them, to assimilate them into oneself. The singular [natural product], the gift of the gods, still remains external to the [divine] power of nature. But the natural forces or productive

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422. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: This is not a euphemism; on the contrary, it is the Eumenides who desire right, and those who infringe it have the Eumenides within themselves.

423. Thus B, similar in Hu, An; L, W₂ (1827/1831?) read: Speaking generally, this religion has the character of absolute cheerfulness or serenity^a; self-consciousness is free in its relationship to its own essentialities, because they *are* its own; and at the same time it is not fettered to them because absolute necessity floats above the essentialities themselves and they return into it too, just as consciousness with its particular ends and requirements sinks back into it.

[Ed.] "Cheerfulness or serenity" renders *Heiterkeit*. If Hegel meant to depict the Greeks as serene, this may be an attitude toward them influenced by Schiller or Hölderlin. The typical Greek disposition, however, was more an active, energetic happiness than a calm, passive composure (especially by contrast with the meditative disciplines of the Oriental religions).

424. W₁ (Var) reads: subjectivity.

powers are spiritual essences as well; Bacchus and Demeter are the mystical divinities.⁴²⁵

In the festivals where the god is worshiped, it is humanity that shows itself forth; the worshipers let the divine be seen in themselves, in their joyfulness and cheerfulness, in the display of their bodily dexterity.⁴²⁶ Their artistic productions have a place in these festivals too, and human artists are honored in the festivals at the same time (in dramas etc.).⁴²⁷ At the festival of Pallas there was a great procession. Pallas is the people or nation itself; but the nation is the god imbued with life, it is this Athena who delights in herself.

Besides the content of the gods we must recall the two previously mentioned relationships, i.e., those of necessity and contingency. The disposition corresponding to necessity is the restfulness that holds itself in stillness, or in the freedom that is still an abstract freedom. To this extent it is a flight; but at the same time it is freedom insofar as the human being is not vanquished or bowed down by fate as something external. Whoever has this consciousness of independence, should he die, is indeed outwardly defeated but not conquered, not vanquished.

In addition to this relationship to simple necessity within the consciousness of the divine and its relation to human beings, there is also, conversely, another aspect to mention briefly, namely that the divine is also known to share in the lot of the finite and in the abstract necessity of the finite. To the abstract necessity of the finite there belongs death someday, the natural negation of the finite. But in the way it appears in the divine, finitude is the subordination of the ethical powers | themselves. Because they are particular, they have to experience transitoriness in themselves, one-sided being and the lot of one-sidedness. This is the consciousness that the ancients have represented and brought to view most notably in the tragedies—necessity as something that fulfills itself, something that has import

425. *L* (1827?) adds, similar in *W*₁: Demeter, or Ceres, is the founder of agriculture, of property, of marriage. In general, both [Bacchus and Demeter] are in charge of the mysteries.

426. *W*₁ (*Var*) adds: and beauty.

427. *W*₁ (*Var*/1831?) reads: so that they regard them as having divine content, but at the same time as [displaying] their own expertise and skill.

and content. The chorus is withdrawn from natural destiny, it abides in the peaceful course of the ethical order and arouses no hostile power. The heroes, however, stand above the chorus, above the peaceful, static, uncleft ethical process; they are the ones who properly will and act. They bring forth order, and because of their action, changes are effected; in further development a cleavage comes about. The higher cleavage, the cleavage that is properly of interest for spirit, is that in which the ethical powers themselves appear as severed and as coming into collision. The resolution of the collision is when the ethical powers that are in collision (due to their one-sidedness) themselves renounce the one-sidedness of independent validity; and the way that this renunciation of one-sidedness appears is that the individuals who have committed themselves to the realization of the singular, one-sided, ethical power perish. For example,⁴²⁸ in the *Antigone* the love of family, the holy, the inner, what is also called the law of the lower deities because it belongs to sentiment, comes into collision with the right of the state. Creon is not a tyrant, but rather the champion of something that is also an ethical power. Creon is not in the wrong; he maintains that the law of the state, the | authority of the government, must be preserved and punishment meted out for its violation.⁴²⁹ Each of these two sides actualizes only one of the two, has only one side as its content. That is the one-sidedness, and the meaning of eternal justice is that both are in the wrong because they are one-sided, but both are also in the right. In the unclouded course of ethical life, both are acknowledged; here each has its validity, but one counterbalanced

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428. *L reads*: I regard it as the absolute example of tragedy when *W* (1831/*Var?*) *reads*: Fate [*Fatum*] is what cannot be conceptualized; it is where justice and injustice disappear in abstraction; in contrast, in tragedy destiny [*Schicksal*] falls within the sphere of ethical justice. We find the most sublime [expressions] of this in the tragedies of Sophocles. Both destiny and necessity are spoken of in them; the destiny of the [tragic] individuals is portrayed as something incomprehensible, but the necessity is not blind; on the contrary, it is recognized as authentic justice. This is what makes these tragedies such immortal spiritual products of ethical understanding and comprehension [*W*₂: or such eternal models of the ethical concept]. Blind destiny is an unsatisfying thing. In these tragedies, justice is *comprehended*. The collision between [*W*₁: ethical *W*₂: the two highest ethical] powers is portrayed in a plastic fashion in the absolute example furnished by tragedy when

429. [*Ed.*] See Sophocles, *Antigone*, esp. 480–485, 659–675.

by the other's validity.⁴³⁰ In this way the conclusion of the tragedy is reconciliation, not blind necessity but rational necessity, the necessity that here begins to be [rationally] fulfilled.

⁴³¹This is the clarity of insight and of artistic presentation that Greece reached at its highest stage of culture; but there still remains something unresolved, to be sure, in that the higher element does not emerge as the infinitely spiritual power; there remains an unhealed sorrow here because an individual perishes. The higher reconciliation would consist in the subject's disposition of one-sidedness being overcome, in its dawning consciousness that it is in the wrong, and its divesting itself of its unrighteousness in its own heart. But to recognize its guilt and one-sidedness, and to divest itself of it, does not come naturally in this domain. This higher [reconciliation] would make external punishment and natural death superfluous.

559 The first signs and anticipations of this reconciliation do indeed emerge here too; | but the inner conversion still appears more as an external purification.⁴³² In the *Eumenides* Orestes is acquitted by

430. W (Var/1831?) adds: It is only the one-sidedness [in their claims] that justice comes forward to oppose.

W₂ (1831) continues: We have another example of collision portrayed in Oedipus. He has slain his father, and is seemingly guilty, but he is guilty because his ethical power is one-sided; that is to say, he falls unconsciously into this horrible deed.^a Yet he is the one who excels in knowing, the one who solved the riddle of the Sphinx.^b Hence a counterweight is set up as [his] Nemesis. The one who knew so much stands in the power of the unconscious, so that he falls as deeply into guilt as the height on which he stood. Here, then, there is the antithesis of the two powers, that of consciousness and that of unconsciousness.

[Ed.] ^aSee Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, esp. 800–819, 1183–1185. ^bA reference to the Theban sphinx legend, as distinguished from the Egyptian sphinx.

431. *Precedes in L*, W (1831): It is justice that is in this way satisfied with the maxim, "There is nothing that is not Zeus,"^a i.e., eternal justice. Here we have an active necessity, but one which is completely ethical; the misfortune suffered is perfectly clear. There is nothing blind or unconscious here.

[Ed.] ^aSee Sophocles, *Trachiniae* 1277–1278.

432. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: A son of Minos had been slain in Athens; for this reason a purification was carried out, and the deed was declared to be undone. It is spirit that wants to make what has been done undone.

[Ed.] See Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica* 4.60–61. See 1824 lectures, n. 691.

the Areopagus.⁴³³ In that instance, too, there is a collision. He has murdered his mother—on the one hand here is the greatest crime against piety; on the other hand he has gained justice for his father. He was head of the family and also of the state. In one and the same action he committed an outrage and at the same time carried out complete and essential necessity. The acquittal is a uniting of these one-sided stances.⁴³⁴ *Oedipus at Colonus* hints at reconciliation, and more precisely at the Christian representation of reconciliation: [Oedipus] comes to honor among the gods, the gods call him to them.⁴³⁵ Today we require more, because for us the representation of reconciliation is higher: [we have] the consciousness that this reversal (whereby what has been done is made undone) can occur within the inner self. Human beings who turn over a new leaf, who surrender their one-sidedness, have purged it from within themselves, from within their wills where the enduring abode or place of the deed would be, i.e., they have negated the deed at its root. But this kind of reconciliation is not pervasive among the ancients. It is more in accord with our feelings that the tragedies have denouements that are reconciling.

This is the relationship of necessity.

The other is the relation to the other extreme, to the singularity that we see playing about these divine essences themselves, the singularity that is present in the human [agent] and comes in question here. This singular aspect is the contingent aspect, and at this level of religion human beings are not yet free, not yet universal self-consciousness; they are indeed the self-consciousness of ethical life, but [only] of its substance generally, and the ethical substance is not yet the subjectivity that is inwardly universal.

In the sphere of the contingent, therefore, what a human being has to do falls outside of ethical duty. Since God | is not yet determined as absolute subjectivity, this contingent element is not yet placed in the hands of a providence, but instead in those of destiny.

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433. [Ed.] Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, esp. 734–741.

434. Thus Hu; L, W (Var/1831?) read: Acquittal [*Lossprechen*] means precisely this, making something undone.

435. [Ed.] Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, esp. 1623–1628, 1658–1664.

This means that human beings do not know themselves as free; they are not the decisive subjectivity. Connected with this is the fact that they allow the decision to be given from without; here occurs the aspect of religion that we call oracles. These oracles have a natural origin, for "here no articulated answer was given."⁴³⁶ Their manifestation is some sort of external transformation, metallic forms, the rustling of trees, the blowing of the wind, visions, examination of sacrificial animals, and contingencies of that sort. People needed such things in order to reach decisions. The Greeks are not free in the sense that we are free, i.e., in their self-consciousness; they let themselves be determined from without.⁴³⁷

These are the principal moments of the religion of beauty. Spirit or reason is the content, but reason is still substantial in its content, so that it falls asunder into its particular [shapes]. In its form, the spiritual shape, the human shape, has the natural in it, [but] as ideal,

436. [Ed.] In the Ms. Hegel refers to them as "very naive oracles," alluding to the Greek motto (Αἱ τῶν δαιμόνων φωναὶ ἄνθρωποι εἰσὶν) found on the back of the title page of Goethe's *Zur Morphologie* (1823), which is vol. 2 of his *Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt*.

437. W_1 (Var) reads: they are external in character for human beings, and the manifestation is some sort of external, natural change—sounds from the rustling of leaves or ringing tones.

No articulated answers are given by oracles. In Delphi it was the wind that blew out of the gorge and produced a rushing noise. Elsewhere it is visions, or the examination of sacrificial animals, chance externalities that have a natural origin or are externalities as such—these it is that humans use in order to make their resolve.

The free Greek is not free in self-consciousness as we are free. The commander who wishes to engage in battle, or the state that is about to establish a colony, consults the oracle;^a this democracy still did not have the force or energy of self-consciousness that [enables] the people to determine itself, to form its own resolve.

Socrates was the first to recognize that one's own resolve is what counts. His δαιμόνιον is nothing else but this.^b He says of it that it only told him what was good, and then only about completely external, contingent circumstances. It did not reveal any truths to him, but only gave him the decision in singular cases of action. Here fate [*Fatum*] is the subjective will, the resolve.

[Ed.] ^aThe *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:423 (cf. *Werke* 14:97) shows that Hegel is here thinking in particular of Xenophon, *Anabasis*, and Herodotus, *Histories* 9.33 ff. ^bIn Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.1–9, esp. 1.1.4, Socrates is said to have spoken in such and such a way, or advised his friends to do thus and so, because his *daimonion* (divine sign) had so indicated. See also Plato, *Apology*, esp. 24b–c, 26b–e.

so that it is only an expression of the spiritual and is no longer something independent. The finitude of this religion has been made plain from every aspect. |

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2. The Religion of Sublimity, or Jewish Religion⁴³⁸

What is common to the religions of this sphere is this ideality of the natural, the fact that it is subordinated to the spiritual, that God, who is spirit, is known as spirit. To begin with, then, God is known as spirit whose determinations are rational and ethical. But this God still has a particular content, i.e., is still only his ethical power. God's appearance is that of beauty; but this appearance is a natural material and a soil of sensible, external stuff or of sensible representation. The soil of that religion is not yet pure thought. The necessity of the elevation of the religion of beauty into the religion of sublimity lies in what we have discussed already, i.e., in the need that the particular spiritual powers, the ethical powers, should be embraced within a spiritual unity. The truth of the particular [moment] is the universal unity, which is subjectivity and is inwardly concrete,⁴³⁹ inasmuch as it has the particular within it but at the same time subsists essentially as subjectivity. But for this rationality that subsists as subjectivity—indeed, it even subsists as universal subjectivity with respect to its content and is free with respect to its form—for this pure subjectivity the soil is pure thought; it is withdrawn from the natural and so from the sensible [realm], withdrawn both from external sensibility and from sensible representation. It is the spiritually subjective unity—and for us this is what first merits the name of God.

438. [Ed.] As noted earlier (n. 347), in the 1827 lectures the treatment of the religion of sublimity follows that of the religion of beauty; the reasons for this reversal are discussed in the Editorial Introduction. The 1827 interpretation of Judaism carries further the favorable reassessment initiated in 1824. Almost the entire section is devoted to an analysis of the representation of God as creator and the implications of this for understanding the relationship between God and the world. While this material is already present in 1824, it is expanded and systematically ordered, becoming the focus of the whole section.

439. W_1 (Var) reads: and subjectivity is inwardly concrete W_2 (Var) reads: which is inwardly concrete

a. The Unity of God

This subjective unity is not substance, ~for it is subjective,⁴⁴⁰ but it is indeed absolute power; the natural is only something that is posited by it, is only ideal and not something that is independent. The unity does not appear or reveal [itself] in natural material, but instead does so essentially in thought: thought is the mode of its determinate being or appearing. Absolute power ~we have seen often enough already;⁴⁴¹ but the main point is that here it is concrete and inwardly determinate—hence it is absolute wisdom. |

Also, the rational determinations of freedom, the ethical determinations ~united in one purpose and one determination of this subjectivity, are⁴⁴² holiness. In this way ~divinity⁴⁴³ determines itself as holiness. The higher truth of God's subjectivity is not just a beautiful subjectivity where the import or the absolute content is still separated out into particularities⁴⁴⁴—a relationship like that of animals to human beings. Animals do in fact have particular characters; the character of universality belongs to humans. The ethical rationality of freedom and the explicitly self-subsistent unity of this rationality is what authentic, inwardly self-determining subjectivity is. This is wisdom and holiness.⁴⁴⁵ The contents of the Greek deities are the ethical powers; they are not holy, because they are still particular and limited.

Here the absolute, or God, subsists as the One, as subjectivity, as universal and pure subjectivity, or conversely this subjectivity that is the universal inwardly is precisely the one inwardly determined unity of God.⁴⁴⁶ It is not a matter of the unity being exhibited implicitly, of the unity of God being the underlying ground, being implicit: that is the case in the Hindu and Chinese religion. For there,

440. *W (Var) reads:* but rather subjective unity,

441. *Thus Hu; L (Var) reads:* is also in the earthly realm; *W (Var) reads:* is also in Hinduism;

442. *W (Var) reads:* are united in one determination, one purpose, and thus the defining characteristic of this subjectivity is

443. *W (Var) reads:* ethical life

444. *W₂ (Var) adds:* but is the characteristic of holiness; and the relationship between these two determinations is

445. *In B's margin:* 17 July 1827

446. *W (Var/1831?) adds:* so that there is a consciousness of God as One.

when God's unity is only implicit, God is not posited as infinite subjectivity and the unity is not known, it is not [present] as subjectivity for consciousness.⁴⁴⁷

Thus the unity of God contains one power within it, which is accordingly the absolute power. Every externality,⁴⁴⁸ every sensible configuration | and sensible image, is sublated in it. For this reason God here subsists without shape⁴⁴⁹—he subsists not for sensible representation but only for thought. The inwardly infinite, pure subjectivity is the subjectivity that is essentially thinking. As thinking it subsists only for thinking, and therefore subsists in its [activity of] judgment. Thinking is the essential soil for this object. Here we must now mention the characteristic of divine particularization, of divine judgment.

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b. Divine Self-Determination and Representation

God is wisdom; what this involves is God's self-determining, God's judging, and hence (more precisely) what is called God's creating.⁴⁵⁰ God's wisdom consists in being purposive, or determinative. But this wisdom is at first still abstract, being still the initial subjectivity, the initial wisdom,⁴⁵¹ and therefore God's judgment⁴⁵² is not yet

447. W (1831) *adds*: God is now known as a personal One [Einer] rather than as a neuter One [Eines] as in pantheism. Thus the immediately natural mode [of representing God] disappears, for instance the mode that is still posited in the Parsee religion as light. Religion is posited as the religion of spirit, but only in its foundation, only upon the soil that is proper to it, the soil of thought.

448. W (Var/1831?) *adds*: and consequently all that belongs to sensible nature,

449. W (Var/1831?) *adds*: without any externally sensible shape; having no image,

450. W (1831) *adds*: Spirit is what is utterly self-mediating inwardly, or what is active. This activity is a distinguishing from self, a judging (or primal division). The world is what is posited by spirit; the world is made out of its nothing. But the negative of the world is the affirmative, the Creator, in whom the nothing is what is natural. Within its nothing, therefore, the world has arisen out of the absolute fullness of the power of the good. It has been created from its own "nothing," which (its other) is God.

451. W (Var) *reads*: and that is why it is abstract to begin with,

452. W (Var) *reads*: particularization

[Ed.] The interchange between "judgment" (*Urteil*) and "particularization" (*Besonderung*) is not surprising since etymologically the two terms have a similar sense, that of "sundering" (*sondern*), "division" or "parting" (*teilen*). Hegel intends to connect them through their root meanings: the divine particularization is a judging, a primal division (see n. 450 and the last sentence of the preceding paragraph of the main text).

posited as internal to itself. Instead what is assumed is that God decrees, and what is posited or determined by God subsists at once in the form of an unmediated other.⁴⁵³ Were God's wisdom concrete, then God would be his own self-determining in such a way that God himself would produce within himself what is created and sustain it internally, so that it would be⁴⁵⁴ known as sustained within him as his Son; God so defined would be known as "truly concrete"⁴⁵⁵ spirit. But since the wisdom is here abstract, the judgment or what is posited is thus something subsisting although only as a form: it is the subsisting world. |

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Thus God is creator of the world. The world is something immediate, but in such a way that the immediacy is only something mediated: the world is only a created product.⁴⁵⁶ ⁴⁵⁷God's creating is very different from procession, wherein the world goes forth from God. "For the Hindus, the "worlds go"⁴⁵⁸ forth from Brahṁā."⁴⁵⁹ In the Greek cosmogonies the highest or spiritual gods finally go

453. *W* (1831) *adds*: The higher view is certainly that of God's creation within himself, that he is in himself beginning and end, and hence he has the moment of movement (which still falls outside him at this present stage) within himself, in his inner nature.

454. *W* (*Var*) *adds*: created and

455. *W* (*Var*) *reads*: the concrete God, genuinely known as

456. *L* (1827?) *adds* (*cf. n. 461*): The creature is something that is not inwardly independent; it may *be* (or it has being), but it does not have independence. This distinction is essential.

457. *Precedes in W*₂ (1831): Since power is represented as absolute negativity, so its essence (i.e., what is identical with itself) is to begin with in a state of repose, of eternal calm and seclusion. But just this self-contained solitude is merely a moment of power, not the whole. Power is also negative relation to self, inner mediation, and since it refers negatively to itself, this sublation of abstract identity is the positing of difference, of determination, i.e., it is the creation of the world. But the nothing from which the world is created is the absence of all difference, the very category in which power or essence was first thought of. So if it is asked where God got matter from, the answer is, just that simple reference to self. Matter is what is formless, what is identical with itself; this is only one moment of the essence, and as such it is something other than absolute power, and hence it is what we call matter. The creation of the world, therefore, means the negative reference of power to itself, insofar as it is initially defined as what is only identical with itself.

458. *Thus B; An reads*: world goes *Hu, L, W read*: gods go

459. *W* (1831) *reads*: All peoples have theogonies or, what comes to the same thing, cosmogonies, in which the fundamental category is always going-forth, not being-created. *W* (*Var*): The gods go forth from Brahṁā.

forth; they are the last to emerge. ⁴⁶⁰What has gone forth is what exists, what is actual, so that the ground from which it has gone forth is posited as sublated, as nonessential, and what has gone forth counts as independent. ⁴⁶¹ Here, in contrast, the subjectivity of the One is what is absolutely first, the initiating factor, and the conditioned state | is sublated. Over against this posited [being], over against the world, which is God's creation, over against the totality of its determinate being, of its negation, over against the totality of immediate being, God is what is presupposed; God is the absolute subject, which remains the absolutely first. Here the fundamental definition of God is this: subjectivity that relates itself to itself. As abiding subjectivity that has being within itself, it is what is first. But for the Greek gods—and precisely for the highest or spiritual gods—the status of having gone forth belongs directly to their finitude. It is the condition of their being, the presupposition upon which their nature rests, just as in the case of finite spirit [its] nature is presupposed.

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Thus over against the determination of the One as the subject is the particular, what comes forth in this producing, in nature, externality and dependence; in general, what is created in the posited [world]. Only the divine subjectivity that is abiding within itself is self-relation and accordingly is the first.

But although subjectivity is here what makes the absolute beginning, it is the initiating factor only, and it is not the case that this subjectivity could be determined also as the result. ⁴⁶² God is the first; God's creation is an eternal creation; but God is the initiator of creation, not the result. If the divine subjectivity were determined as result, as self-creating, then it would be grasped as concrete spirit. ⁴⁶³

460. *Precedes in W (1831)*: At this point the inadequate category of going-forth disappears, since the good, or the absolute power, is a subject. This going-forth is not the relationship of what is created [to its creator].

461. *W (Var/1831?) reads (cf. n. 456)*: is posited not as a creature but as something independent, not as the sort of thing that lacks inward independence. *W₁ adds*: It may be, it has being, but not independence.

462. *W (Var) adds*: and as concrete spirit.

463. *L (1827?) adds*: For at the higher stage, when God is defined as spirit, he is the one who does not step outside himself, and so he is also the result, or that which is self-creating.

566 If what is created from the absolute subject were this subject itself, then in this distinction the distinction would likewise be superseded, the last subject would be⁴⁶⁴ that which results from itself. We do not yet have that determination here, but only the one where the absolute subject is what is utterly initiating, is the first.⁴⁶⁵ |

The second aspect is God's relation to what is created. What we call God's attributes—these characteristics of God in relation to the world and to the creatures—are God's determinacies. Or in other words, since we already saw God's particularizing or self-determining, and saw this as the creation of the world, saw the determinate as a subsisting world, then the attributes of God are God's relation to the world. That is to say, the attributes are the determinate [result] itself but as known in the concept of God. One aspect [the world] is the determinate known as what has being, not as reverting into God or belonging to God, and the other [the attributes] is the state of determinateness as God's own determinacy. This is what is called God's relations to the world, and it is a misguided expression if it means that we only know about this relation of God to the world but know nothing about God. Instead that relation is God's very own determinateness, and hence God's own attributes.

⁴⁶⁶The way in which one human being is related to another—that is just what is human, that is human nature itself.⁴⁶⁷ When we are cognizant of how an object is related [to everything else], then we are cognizant of its very nature. To distinguish between the two [i.e., relation and nature] is to make misguided distinctions that collapse straightaway because they are the productions of an understanding that does not know what it is doing—an understand-

464. *W*₁ (*Var*) reads: last subject would be the first, *W*₂ (*Var/Ed?*) reads: first subject would be the last,

465. *L* (1827?) adds: God is not yet grasped here as spirit, as what first returns into itself through its particularization. But since God is what is utterly first, his creating must not be thought of under the guise of human producing.

466. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*: Even from the sensual point of view something *is*, and that something is on its own account. Its properties, its relation to another, are distinct from it; yet these are what constitute its peculiar nature.

467. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: The acid is nothing else than the specific mode of its relation to the base—that is the nature of the acid itself.

ing unfamiliar with them, one that does not know what it is dealing with in these distinctions.

As something external and unmediated, [but] as the determinacy of God himself, this determinacy is God's absolute power; as we have seen, however, this power is wisdom.

The specific moments of wisdom are goodness and justice. Goodness consists in the fact that the world is. The world does not attain being [proper].⁴⁶⁸ Being, the truly actual, is only in God. The being of what is | mutually external, outside of God—that being has no claims; it is only the self-externalization of God, the fact that God releases himself from himself, and sets his content (which is the determinacy of absolute subjectivity) free even from his absolute unity—that is God's goodness, and only here can God be the creator in the true sense as infinite subjectivity. In that role God is free, and so his determinateness or self-determining can be set free. Only what is free can have its determinations over against it as free, or can let them go as free. This release that lets them go their separate ways so as to yield the totality of finitude, or the world—this [mode of] being is goodness. Justice in turn is the manifestation of the nullity or ideality of this finite [being], it is the fact that this [finite] being is not genuine independence—this manifestation [of God] as power is what endows finite things with their right.

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This goodness and justice must not be regarded merely as moments of substance but as moments of the one subject; in substance these determinations are found to be subsisting just as immediately as not subsisting but as coming into being. But here the One subsists not as substance but as the personal One, as subject. The being of things is posited herein as purpose; it is the specification of purpose, the proper determinacy of the concept. The world ought to be, and likewise it ought to transform itself and pass away. This is justice as the specification of purpose, justice as the subject

468. W (1831) adds: for being is here downgraded to a moment, and is only a createdness or positedness. This judgment or primary division [*Ur-teilen*] is the eternal goodness of God. What has been differentiated has no right to be, it is outside the One, it is a manifold and therefore a limited, finite [thing] whose destination is *not* to be; that it nonetheless *is*, is the goodness of God. But as something posited, it also passes away, it is only appearance.

that distinguishes itself from its own determinations, or from its world.

568 The third aspect is the form of the world, the character that things in general obtain, the reality that they receive. Or, the world is now prosaic, it confronts us essentially as a collection of things, it is rendered profane. Now nature is divested of divinity. In the Orient and especially with regard to the Greek god, people delight in friendliness and cheerfulness, and in the relationship to nature and to the divine, in the fact that inasmuch as human beings relate themselves to nature they relate themselves to the divine.⁴⁶⁹ This unity of the divine | and the natural—we call it the identity of the ideal and the real—is an abstract and wholly formal determination, an identity that is cheaply obtained. In fact it is everywhere. What matters most would be the authentic specification of this identity; and the authentic identity is the one found within infinite subjectivity, that which is grasped not as neutralization or reciprocal blunting [of differences], but just as infinite subjectivity. Since infinite subjectivity determines itself as such, and lets its determinations go free as the world, these determinations are things without any independence as they truly are. They are not deities but merely natural objects. The particular ethical powers, which are in essence the supreme deities for the Greeks, have independence only according to their form, because the content as particular is dependent and finite. That is a false form. For the situation with dependent things that are immediate is this: we are only aware of their being as something formal, something without independence. The only being that pertains to them, therefore, is not absolute or divine but is an abstract, one-sided being. Since abstract being is their lot, they stand under the categories of being; and since finitude is their lot, they are subject to the categories of the understanding.

At this stage, therefore, there are prosaic things, just as the world contains prosaic things for us also, as understanding beings—external things in the manifold nexus of understanding, of ground and consequent, of quality and quantity, subject to all these categories of the understanding. Here then is what we call natural or necessary connection; and for that reason the category of “miracle” emerges

469. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: Their liberality spiritualizes what is natural, makes it something divine, gives it a soul.

here for the first time too, as opposed to the natural connection of things. In Hindu religion, for instance, there is no miracle; everything is jumbled together there from the outset. Only in contrast with order, with the lawfulness of nature, with natural laws—even though these laws are not recognized and one finds only a consciousness of a natural nexus—only in that context does the category of “miracle” arise; then miracle is represented as God being sporadically manifest in singular events.⁴⁷⁰ The true miracle is the appearance of spirit in nature, and the authentic appearance of spirit is, in its fundamental aspect, the spirit of humanity and the human consciousness of the world.⁴⁷¹

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In this religion, therefore, the world appears as finite things that act upon one another in a natural way, things that stand within an intelligible nexus. The relationship therefore is: God, world, creation of the world, the fundamental categories of worldly things. Miracle is grasped as a contingent manifestation of God; the genuine manifestation of God in the world, however, is the absolute or eternal manifestation, and the mode or manner of this manifestation, its form, appears as what we call “sublimity,” and for that reason we call this religion the religion of sublimity. The infinite subject in its self-containment one cannot call sublime; it is the absolute in and for itself, [i.e.,] it is holy. Sublimity emerges as the appearance or relation of this infinite subject to the world. The world is grasped as a manifestation of this subject, but as a manifestation that is not affirmative; or one that, to the extent that it is indeed affirmative, still has the primary character that the natural or worldly is negated as unbecom[ing] the subjective,⁴⁷² so that God’s appearing is at once grasped as sublimity that is superior to appearance in [ordinary] reality.⁴⁷³

470. *W₂ (Var)* adds: and at the same time in opposition to their [natural] outcomes.

471. *L (1827?)* adds, *similar in W*: For what we know of the world is that in all this confusion and manifold contingency it still maintains regularity and reason everywhere—relatively speaking, this is a miracle.

472. *W (Var)* reads: and is known as such,

473. *W (Var)* reads: [*W₁*: It is the appearance and manifestation of God in the world in such a way that this appearing *W₂*: Sublimity is therefore the mode of God’s appearance and manifestation in the world, and it may be defined as follows: this appearing] does at the same time show itself as sublime, as superior to appearance within [ordinary] reality.

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In the religion of beauty we have a reconciliation of the meaning with the material, with the sensible mode, with being for another; the spiritual reveals itself wholly in this outward manner. The outward mode is a sign of the inner, and this inner is completely recognized in the shape of its externality. Sublimity, by contrast, simultaneously annihilates | the matter or the material in which the sublime appears. The material is directly and expressly known as inadequate; it is not an inadequacy that is unconsciously overlooked. For it does not suffice for sublimity that the substantial is in and for itself something higher than its shape; instead the primary point is that the inadequacy is directly posited in the shape. For the Hindus there is only wildness and grotesqueness, but no sublimity.

God is explicitly the One, the one power as inwardly determined. God is the wise one, i.e., he manifests himself in nature but in a sublime manner. The natural world is only something posited and limited, only a manifestation of the One in such a way that God is at the same time superior to this manifestation; God at once distinguishes himself from the manifestation even within it, and does not get his being-for-self, his essential presence [*Dasein*] from this externality, as in the religion of beauty.⁴⁷⁴ Nature is submissive and manifests only God, but in such a way that God subsists at the same time outside this manifestation.

The fourth aspect⁴⁷⁵ is God's purpose. Here we are concerned with the category of *essential* purpose, namely that above all God is wise—wise in nature generally. Nature is God's creation and God makes his power recognized in it, though not only his power but also his wisdom. This is evident in its products, from their purposeful

474. *W₂ (Var/MiscP?) reads:* The sublimity of the appearance, by contrast, simultaneously annihilates its reality, its matter and material. In his appearance God also distinguishes himself from it, in such a way that it is expressly known as inadequate. The One does not therefore have his being-for-self and his essential presence [*Dasein*] in the externality of the appearance, as do the gods of the religion of beauty; and the inadequacy of the appearance is not something that is unconsciously overlooked, but is expressly and consciously posited as such.

475. *Hu reads, similar in An:* third aspect

[*Ed.*] The three preceding aspects are: (1) creation, (2) the attributes of God, (3) the form of the world. If this is an error of Hegel, it is explicable from the fact that he was using the Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures as the basis of the 1827 presentation, and in *G* the theme of purpose is the "third point."

orientation. But this purpose is only something undetermined and superficial, it is more external.⁴⁷⁶ The true purpose and its realization do not fall within nature as such, but essentially within consciousness instead. Purpose manifests itself in nature, but its essential appearance is its appearing within consciousness as in its reflection [*Widerschein*]; it appears reflectedly in self-consciousness in such a way that its purpose is to become known by consciousness, and for consciousness the purpose is to acknowledge it. Acknowledgment and | praise of God is the determination that emerges here: the whole world should proclaim the glory of God, and indeed God's universal glory. Not merely the Jewish people but the whole earth, all peoples, all the Gentiles should praise the Lord.⁴⁷⁷ This purpose of becoming known by consciousness can above all be called God's theoretical purpose; the more determinate sort is the practical purpose that is realized in the spirit of the world as such.

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So this essential purpose is in the first place ethical life or uprightness, namely, that all human beings should keep legality or right in mind in whatever they do; this legality or right is precisely what is divine, and insofar as it is something worldly within finite consciousness, it is something decreed by God. God is the universal; the human being, in determining itself or its own will,⁴⁷⁸ is free and therefore universal will. It is not one's own particular ethical life or right conduct that is the basic determination here, but rather walking before God, a freedom from self-seeking aims, the righteousness that has value before God. The human being does what is right in relation to God, to the glory of God; so this righteousness has its seat principally in the will, in the inner self.

The natural state of existence, of human beings and their action, stands opposed therefore to this willing, to this inwardness with regard to God. This broken state is posited in humanity: God *is* on his own account, while nature has a sort of being [*ein Seiendes*], but

476. Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in W: an external purposiveness: "Thou givest to the beast its fodder" [Ps. 147:9].

In B's margin: 19 July 1827

477. [Ed.] See Ps. 117:1: "Praise the Lord all ye nations, praise him all ye peoples." See the quotation of this Psalm in the 1831 text contained in n. 492 below.

478. W₂ (Var) adds: in terms of this universal

under [the Lord's] dominion. This same distinction is found within the human spirit, namely, the distinction between right conduct as such and humanity's natural existence. But the latter is determined by the spiritual relationship of the will, just as nature in general is something posited by absolute spirit. Humanity's natural mode of being, our external, worldly existence, is posited in connection with the inner aspect. If one's will is an essential will and one's action is right conduct, then the outward existence of the human agent should also be in agreement with this inner aspect or right; a human being should prosper, but should prosper only according to his works.⁴⁷⁹ One should in general | not only behave ethically,⁴⁸⁰ observe the laws of one's country, and sacrifice oneself for one's country, no matter how one fares as a consequence; but also there crops up the definite requirement that prosperity should come to the one who does right. We have here the relationship that real existence or outwardly determinate being is conformed and subordinated to the inner aspect, to the right, and is determined by it; and this relationship comes into play here in consequence of, and on the ground of, the fundamental relationship of God to the natural and finite world. Here there is a purpose, and this purpose shall be carried out—a distinction, however, that should at the same time be in harmony, so that natural existence shows itself to be ruled by the essential, by the spiritual. The natural existence of human beings is likewise supposed to be determined and ruled by the truly inward, by what is upright.⁴⁸¹ In this way human well-being is affirmatively and divinely legitimated; but it has this legitimation only to the extent that it is conformed to the divine, to the ethically divine law.

This is the bond of necessity, but it is no longer blind as in Greek religion, no longer just an empty, indeterminate necessity devoid of concept, so that the concrete is outside it.⁴⁸² Now, on the contrary, the necessity is concrete; what is actual being in and for itself is what

479. W (Var) reads: prosper only according to his works.

480. W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads: not only behave ethically in general,

481. W₂ (Var) reads: right-doing.

482. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: Among the Greeks the gods, the ethical powers, stand apart from necessity and are under it; necessity does not have what is ethical and right in its definition.

gives the laws—it wills the right, the law.⁴⁸³ In consequence, this being has conformed to it a determinate mode of being that is affirmative, an existence that is well-being, prosperity. In this sphere, human beings know this unity and harmony. That prosperity is permitted or indeed owed to one, is something conditional; the human being taken as a whole is an end for God. But the human being as a whole is itself something inwardly differentiated, for it involves both will and external existence. Such a [divided] person knows then that God is the bond of this necessity, is this unity that produces well-being commensurate with the inner will, makes it correspond to right conduct; one knows that this connection is the divine, universal will (and the divine is the power), but moreover that it is also the inwardly determined will of the finite spirit.⁴⁸⁴

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The consciousness that this linkage obtains is the faith and confidence that is a fundamental feature of the Jewish people; and indeed it constitutes one of their remarkable features. The Old Testament scriptures are full of this confidence.⁴⁸⁵ It is this pattern of events too that is presented in the Book of Job, a book whose connection with the Jewish tradition is not precisely known.^{486 487} Job is guiltless; he finds his misfortune unjustifiable and so is dissatisfied. This means there is an antithesis within him, the con-

483. *W (Var) reads:* good.

484. *W₁ (Var) reads:* exists—the divine universal will (and the divine is the power to achieve this), but also this inwardly determined will. *W₂ (Var) reads:* exists, for the divine, universal will is at the same time the inwardly determined will, and hence it is the power to bring about this connection.

485. *W (Var) adds:* especially the Psalms.

486. *Thus B; W (Var) reads:* the only book whose connection with the soil of the Jewish people is not precisely known.

487. [Ed.] The origin and date of compilation of the Book of Job were at that time highly controversial matters. J. D. Michaelis, whose translation of the Old Testament into German was published in 1769, regarded it as the oldest book in the Bible, possibly written by Moses to comfort the Israelites in Egypt. This view is reflected in the prominence Hegel accords to it, especially in the first two lecture series. J. G. Herder, by contrast, in *The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry* (1787), trans. James Marsh, 2 vols. (Burlington, Vt., 1833), vol. 1, dialogue 5 (esp. pp. 103–111), expressed the view that the author was not an Israelite at all. In his translation and commentary, *Das Buch Hiob* (Heidelberg, 1824), F. W. C. Umbreit discussed the opposing standpoints and concluded that the book is purely Hebraic in origin, but of post-Mosaic date. See 1824 lectures, n. 510.

consciousness of the justice or righteousness that is absolute and of the incongruity between his fate and this righteousness. He is dissatisfied precisely because he does not regard necessity as blind fate; it is known to be God's purpose to bring about good things for those who are good. The critical point, then, occurs when this dissatisfaction and despondency has to submit to absolute, pure confidence. This submission is the end point. On the one side there stands the requirement that the righteous should prosper, and on the other side is a submission, a renunciation, an acknowledgment of God's power; upon that submission there follows the restoration of good fortune by God, precisely as the consequence of this acknowledgment.⁴⁸⁸ This trust in God, this unity and the consciousness of this harmony of the power of God with the truth⁴⁸⁹ and righteousness of God, the consciousness that God is inwardly characterized as purpose and that God has purposes, is the first step, and God's blessings are what follow from it. That trust in God is none other than

574 the consciousness of this harmony between power and wisdom. |

We have still to draw attention here to this inwardizing of spirit, its own movement within itself. A human being is supposed to do right; that is the absolute commandment, and this right conduct has its seat in one's will. As a result one is directed to one's inner being, and one must be occupied with consideration of one's inwardness, with whether it is in the right, whether one's will is good. The inner inquiry about this and the grief when it is not so, the crying of the soul for God, this descent into the depths of spirit, this longing of spirit for the right, for conformity to the will of God, is a particular characteristic that is dominant in the Psalms and the Prophets.

In addition, however, this [divine] purpose appears at the same time as a limited one. It is indeed the aim that human beings should know and acknowledge God, that they should do whatever they do for God's glory, that what they will should be conformed to God's

488. W (1827 with 1831?) reads: on the other side even this discontent must give way. This renunciation, this acknowledgment of God's power, restores Job to his property and his former happiness; this acknowledgment is followed by the restoration of his good fortune. At the same time this good fortune must not be expressed by the finite [creature] as a right vis-à-vis the power of God.

489. W (Var) reads: wisdom

will, that their will should be true will. [But] this aim has also a limitation, and we will now indicate to what extent this limitation lies in the definition of God, how far the concept or representation of God still contains a limitation. If the representation of God is limited, then these further realizations of the divine concept within human consciousness will also be limited.⁴⁹⁰

God is what is self-determining in its freedom and according to its freedom, "God is the spiritual, free being"⁴⁹¹—this is wisdom. But this wisdom, this purpose, is only an initial purpose, wisdom in general. The wisdom and self-determining of God does not yet include God's development. This development in the idea of God is first found in the religion where the nature of God is open and manifest. The defect of this idea at the present stage is that God is indeed the One, but yet is within himself only in the *determinacy* of this unity; he is not what is eternally self-developing within itself. This is still not a developed determination; | to this extent what we call wisdom is an abstraction, it is abstract universality. 575

⁴⁹² Hence a limitation is present in [this] religion, insofar as it is consciousness of God, a limitation understood partly in terms of

490. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: This is always the essential but also the most difficult point, to recognize limitation in the One as also a limitation of the idea, so that the idea is not yet the absolute idea.

491. W (Var) reads: in such a way that the spiritual is the free

492. W (1831) reads (*parallel in main text follows*): (2) God is the exclusive Lord and God of the Jewish people. It need not surprise us that a [W₂: an Oriental] nation should limit religion to itself, and that its religion should appear as wholly tied to its nationality, for we see this in Eastern lands quite generally. The Greeks and the Romans were the first to adopt foreign forms of worship; all types of religion infiltrate Roman culture, but they do not have the status of a national religion there. But in the Eastern lands, religion is completely tied to nationality. The Chinese and the Persians both have their state religions, which are just for them. Among the Hindus, birth already indicates each individual's social status and relationship to Brahman; hence they do not in any way demand that others should adopt their religion. For the Hindus such a demand makes absolutely no sense because, on their view, all the peoples of the earth belong to their religion, and the foreign peoples are reckoned collectively as one particular caste. All the same, this exclusiveness rightly astonishes us more in the case of the Jewish people, for the binding of religion to nationality completely contradicts the view that God is grasped only in universal thought and not in a partial [*partikular*] definition. For the Persians God is the good; that too is a universal way of characterizing him, but it is itself still in the sphere of immediacy, so that God is identical with light, and that is a partial view. The Jewish God is only

the fact that the Jewish God is only a national God, has restricted himself to this nation. | Certainly this is the case, but such is true of other religions as well; the God of the Christians is restricted too. We may well be aware of a [universal] Christendom, but we also represent it as one [particular] family, one nation, or one people;

for thought, and that stands in contrast with his limitation to the nation. It is true that consciousness rises to universality among the Jewish people too, and this is expressed in several passages. Psalm 117:1[-2]: "Praise the Lord all ye nations, praise him all ye peoples. For his grace and truth are great toward us to all eternity." The glory of God is to be made manifest among all peoples; it is in the later prophets especially that this universality emerges as a higher demand. Isaiah makes God even say: "Of the heathen who shall honor Jehovah will I make priests and Levites,"^a and a similar thought is expressed in the words, "In every nation anyone who fears God and does what is right is acceptable to him."^b This, however, comes later. According to the dominant basic idea, the Jewish people is the chosen people, and universality is thus reduced to partiality [*Partikularität*]. [*W*₁: But this partiality derives from the subjective side. What is proper to the Jews is their worship and acknowledgment of Jehovah; *W*₂: But we have already seen above, in the development of the divine purpose, how its limitation is grounded in the limitation that is still involved in the definition of God, and we have shown that this limitation in turn stems from the nature of the servile consciousness; and we can now see also how this partiality derives from the subjective side too. What is proper to the Jews, as his servants, is this worship and acknowledgment of Jehovah;] and they are quite conscious that it is peculiar to them. It is also linked to the history of the Jewish people: the Jewish God is the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God who brought the Jews out of Egypt. [*W*₁: etc. *W*₂: and there is not the slightest reflection that God also may have done other things, that he also may have dealt affirmatively with other peoples.] So partiality here enters on the scene from the subjective side, [*W*₂: from the side of the cultus,] and in any case it can be said that God is the God of those who worship him, for God is the one who is known in the subjective spirit, and knows himself in it. This moment belongs essentially to the idea of God; and knowing and acknowledging belong essentially to this definition of him. It often appears in what is for us a distorted guise, as when, for instance, God is said to be mightier and stronger than the other gods, as if there were other gods in addition to him.^c But for the Jews, these are the false gods. [*W*₁: This partiality pertains therefore to the side of subjective worship.]

It is this people that worships him, and so he is the God of this people, he is its Lord in fact. He it is who is known as the creator of heaven and earth, he has established for everything its purpose and measure, bestowed on everything its distinctive nature, and even given to humanity its measure, its goal, and its right. This is the definition under which he (as the Lord) gives his people their laws, laws of every kind, both the universal laws, the Ten Commandments, which are the universal basic ethical and rightful foundations of lawgiving and morality and are not regarded [by them] as rationally based but as [simply] prescribed by the Lord, and also all the other political ordinances and regulations. Moses is called the lawgiver of the Jews, but he was not to the Jews what Solon and Lycurgus were to the Greeks (for these two legislated

thus this consciousness of God is also consciousness of a national God. When we represent ourselves thus as a family, then God is restricted to this family. In the consciousness of the family that knows such a God there is, however, not only the element that God is the universal creator and lord of the world; in addition, God should also

simply as human beings). Moses just made known the laws of Jehovah; according to the story, it was Jehovah himself who engraved them on the stone.^d Attached to the most trifling regulations, e.g., to those concerning the arrangement of the tabernacle, or to the usages in connection with sacrifices and all other ceremonial matters, we find in the Bible the formula "Jehovah says." All law is given by the Lord, and hence it is positive commandment throughout. There is in it a formal, absolute authority. The particular aspects of the political constitution are not developed out of the universal purpose at all, nor are they left to human beings to determine, for the unity [of the absolute] does not permit human caprice, human reason, to persist alongside it, and every political change is called a falling away from God. But as something given by God, the particular is [valid] as established forever. And the eternal laws of right and morality are here placed in the same rank and stated in equally positive form with the most trifling regulations. This forms a marked contrast with our concept of God. Their cultus is then the service of God; the good or righteous person is one who performs this service by keeping and observing both the moral commandments and the ceremonial laws. That is the service of the Lord.

That the Jewish people gave itself up wholly to this service is connected with their representation of God as the Lord. This explains also their admirable steadfastness, which was not a fanaticism of conversion, as exists in Islam, [W₂: a religion that is already purged of nationality and recognizes believers only,] but a fanaticism of stubbornness. It rests entirely on the abstraction of the one Lord. Vacillation of spirit occurs only when various interests and points of view come to stand beside one another; in a combat between them, one can take one side or the other, but in this concentration on the one Lord, the spirit is completely held fast. It follows that there is no freedom vis-à-vis this firm bond; thought is tied utterly to this unity, which is the absolute authority. Many consequences follow from this. Certain institutions were regarded as divine among the Greeks too, but these had been established by human beings; the Jews, however, drew no distinction between the divine and the human in this way. [W₁: And for this reason W₂: And on account of their lack of freedom] they did not believe in immortality either; for although one might, if one wished, point to a few traces of it, these passages always remain very general in character and do not exert the least influence on religious and moral points of view. The immortality of the soul is not yet recognized; hence there is no higher purpose than the service of Jehovah, and the purpose of humanity with reference to itself is to preserve life for oneself and one's family as long as possible. According to the law, each family received a plot of land, which could not be transferred to the ownership of someone else; and this was to provide for the family. The main purpose of life was consequently the preservation of it.

[Ed.] ^aSee Isa. 66:21. ^bSee Acts 10:35. Hegel seemingly regards this verse as an Old Testament text, somewhat similar to Ps. 146:18–20 or 147:11 and Isa. 56:6–7,

578 | be universally honored, all peoples should attain a cognition [of him] | such that they do not hold the knowledge of God to be something particular just for themselves. In accord with the nature of this unity, the proclaimed purpose is that all peoples should come to cognition of the true God, that this knowledge should spread throughout the whole earth. It is only a limitation in this respect and not a limitation of the religion [as such].

But at this stage the limitation is present in yet another way. Because the purpose is still in fact abstract, the consequence is that the commandments, both those in force as properly religious and those of the cultus, appear only as something given by God, as something prescribed and immutable, something eternally and firmly posited. The purpose is still abstract; and when we speak of “abstraction” in the purpose, we are referring to something immediate in its determinate being or existence—something subsisting in just this one way, something immutable.

c. The Cultus

The cultus is what is called ceremonial service, an action done because it is so commanded, so prescribed, a carrying out of [a law] that is abstract, wise indeed, and universal; but for the very reason that what is done in this way is [also] the carrying out of something particular, it therefore involves the requirement that these activities be understood, that their wisdom be known; it demands the insight that these activities are rational, that they have a connection with the particularity of human life and sensibilities (indeed, with its *legitimate* particularity). But here wisdom is not a developed wisdom. Here there are particularities in which the wisdom is not recognized; it is undeveloped and does not penetrate into feeling. To that extent the divine commandment is only an abstract precept of wisdom; in

although he judges correctly that it cannot date from before the Exile or post-Exilic period. “See, e.g., Jethro’s avowal in Exod. 18:11: “Now I know that the Lord is greater than all gods.” Hegel is referring to the widespread evidence for a period of Old Testament henotheism, to which one of the sources available to him, C. P. W. Gramberg’s *Kritische Geschichte der Religionsideen des Alten Testaments*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1829–1830), devoted an entire chapter (chap. 6). ^dThis is in accord with one tradition: Exod. 31:18, 32:16, 34:1; Deut. 4:13, 9:10, 10:1–4; but cf. Exod. 24:4, 34:27–28.

this mode it is not understood, it is done as something external. Because God is absolute power, the activities are intrinsically indeterminate, and for that reason they are external, being determined quite arbitrarily.

The same pattern holds for other commandments beyond the scope of the cultus itself. Details of the political constitution and other institutions are likewise given as something prescribed by God only abstractly, something simply to be obeyed and forever immutable. As worldly, the political domain and statutory institutions are inherently changeable; but here they are taken to be something that is immutable. Part of this same pattern is the fact that the territory that this people has in its possession likewise counts as an immutable possession. |

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There is one family; the condition is wholly patriarchal, the political constitution imperfect. The people possesses a land; the particular family has its particular lot, share, and family goods. This is an inalienable possession which forever belongs to the family, and the individual cannot freely dispose of it. If it was sold or obligated for debts, it reverted to the family in the Jubilee Year.⁴⁹³ This is not a rising above, not an indifference to, worldly existence or property. Property in the legal sense is not yet present. These features constitute the limitation in the idea and in the realization of the idea in self-consciousness.⁷

C. THE RELIGION OF EXPEDIENCY: ROMAN RELIGION⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹⁵The religion of nature was the first form. The second, that of spiritual being-for-self, comprised the religion of beauty and the religion of sublimity. The third form of the determinate religions is that of purposiveness, the totality in this domain [of determinate religion], being primarily the unification of the religions of beauty and of sublimity.

493. [Ed.] See Lev. 25.

494. [Ed.] The treatment of Roman religion in 1827 is quite similar to that of 1824 and is of comparable length. Only the transitions are different—the transitions from Greek and Jewish to Roman religion, and from Roman to Christian—and these are analyzed in the Editorial Introduction.

495. In B's margin: 20 July 1827

1. The Concept of Purposiveness

⁴⁹⁶It is the next requirement of thinking that abstract necessity should be filled by particularity, by inward purpose. We had that already in the religion of sublimity; but there the purpose partly is an abstract wisdom, and partly (in its reality) is only an isolated purpose expressed in a single family that is restricted to a natural territory. The higher stage now is that this purpose is enlarged to embrace particularity in general. | This developed, extensive,⁴⁹⁷ manifold particularity we had in the religion of beauty; the fact that it is now also posited in unity cannot furnish that truly spiritual unity, the pure spirit of thinking as in the religion of sublimity.

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First of all it [the religion of expediency] is the one relative totality,⁴⁹⁸ a totality in which those two religions do indeed lose their one-sidedness, but the two principles perish conjointly, each by means of assimilation into its opposite; still, it is this very homogeneity that interests us in them. The religion of beauty loses the concrete individuality of its gods and hence also their ethical, independent content; the gods are reduced to means. The religion of sublimity loses the orientation toward the One, the eternal, the transcendent. In their combination the two religions turn into a primarily empirical universal purpose, into a fully developed, externally universal aim. In the religion of expediency the purpose is this comprehensive [universal], but one that is external and therefore falls within the human sphere.^{499 500} This [human]

496. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* In the religion of beauty we have empty necessity, and in the religion of sublimity we have unity as subjective. To the former there pertains ethical substantiality, what is right, what is present and actual in empirical self-consciousness—outside of necessity. In it we have the ethical powers represented as individuals, as spiritual, concrete subjects (particular folk-spirits, living spirits). This particularity, when reduced to a single theme, is the next determinacy.

497. *W₁ (Var) reads:* particularity, and develops it. The extensive, *W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads:* power, and power itself is developed in consequence. The extensively developed,

498. *W₂ (Var) reads:* Instead the characteristics of the earlier stages are merely taken back into a relative totality, into

499. *W₂ (Var) reads:* But their union results in progress, in that the singular purpose and the particular purposes are broadened into one universal purpose.

500. *W₁ (Var?) adds:* Thus it is the religion of the understanding.

[Ed.] In the *Ms.*, Hegel describes Roman religion as, among other things, the religion of the “understanding” (*Verstand*), because it is the understanding that holds fast to finite, external purposes.

purpose is to be realized, and the deity is the power for realizing it.⁵⁰¹

This is the relationship of purposiveness; it has this defect, that the purpose is one posited by human beings, it is an external and empirical purpose. But this defect has its ground in a yet higher defect—in the fact that God has *this* purpose. This purpose is to be realized. According to its content it is an external purpose; so its realization is external too—within the finite, out in the world. “The | true realization”⁵⁰² would be that the purpose or the concept is realized, and through this realization is posited the unity of the concept, God or the divine subject, with that in which it is realized, i.e., with objectivity.⁵⁰³ This latter is then God’s nature itself, it is the inner purposiveness in which the aspect of reality itself in the concept is identical with the concept; it is this process, this movement, in which the concept itself objectifies itself and posits this objective aspect as identical with itself”⁵⁰⁴—in which it is the absolute purpose, the absolutely final purpose. But at the present stage the absolute idea is not yet present as this circle, as this self-relation; and for this reason the concept “that is to be realized”⁵⁰⁵ is something external, and the content that is to be realized is the sort that occurs within the world, in human consciousness, insofar as it is to be realized.

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What the purpose here consists in is, more precisely, as follows. In the religion of sublimity the purpose, albeit a limited one, is an essential purpose as well, though one that is as yet undeveloped. Thus its inner [being] is the family, or natural ethical life as such. Now this purpose gets enlarged; the comprehensive, essential end is in general the state. This state is an external, worldly end, so that the “content”⁵⁰⁶ does not yet properly fall within God himself; it does

501. *W₁ (Var) adds:* There is an affirmative unity of God and humanity, and God is the power to realize that purpose.

502. *Thus B, Hu, similar in An; W₁ (Var) reads:* purposiveness

503. *W₁ (Var) adds:* with its realization.

504. *W₂ (MiscP/1831?) reads:* Genuine purposiveness is where the unity of the concept, the unity of God, the divine subject, with that in which the concept realizes itself, with objectivity and realization, is posited. It is the very nature of God that accomplishes itself in objectivity, so that it is identical with itself under the aspect of reality.

505. *W₁ (Var) reads:* the substantial, what is to be objectified,

506. *W₁ (Var) reads:* purpose

of course fall within God, but is not God's own proper nature. Also, this state is, to begin with, only the abstract state; it is the unification of human beings under one bond but in such a way that the unity is not yet a rational organization internally, and the state is not yet a rational organization internally because, so to speak, God is not yet rational organization within himself, God is not yet concrete spirit. The purposiveness is external; if it were grasped as internal, it would be God's own proper nature. Because God is not yet this concrete idea, not yet his true fulfillment through himself, this | purpose or the state is not yet this rational organization or rational totality internally; hence also it does not merit the name "state." Instead it is dominion, the uniting of individuals and peoples within one bond, under one power. And since we have here the distinction between purpose and realization, this purpose is initially present as subjective only and not as developed, while the realization is conquest, acquisition of dominion, the realization of a purpose that is a priori, that takes priority over the peoples and simply fulfills itself. That is what the specification of the purpose involves; this distinction is quite essential.

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We pointed out earlier that Athena is the spirit of the people. There [in Greek religion] the well-being of the city of Athens and its fortune is not the purpose of Athena; in that instance there is no relationship of a purpose that ought to be realized. On the contrary, Athena is the substantial unity, the spirit of the people, and Athens is the outward existence of this spirit, is immediately identical with it. "Pallas is not the goddess of Athens, who has Athens for her purpose."⁵⁰⁷ But now this category of external purposiveness is the main point upon which everything hinges.⁵⁰⁸

2. The Configuration of the Gods

Our second task is to describe the external appearance of this religion or the soil on which it came to be, and the type of configuration of its god or gods. As an external phenomenon, this religion is the religion of the Romans. We always introduce the external appearance

507. *W₁ (Var) reads:* This is not the relationship of purpose to the realization of purpose.

508. *W₁ (Var) adds:* That is the general characteristic of this sphere.

in order first to show that the religion accords with the determinacy of the concept; and this provides the opportunity to develop concretely the more detailed characteristics that are contained in the concept. On a superficial view, Roman religion is lumped together with Greek religion; but the spirit in the one is essentially quite different from that in the other. Even though they have configurations [of the gods] in common, these nevertheless have a quite different standing in Roman religion from what they had in Greece. The whole religion and the religious disposition is essentially distinct in each case, as is quite evident even from an external and superficial consideration. | For it is generally granted that the state or the constitution and the political fate of a people depend upon its religion, that religion is the basis and substance of politics, its foundation. But the spirit, culture, and "history"⁵⁰⁹ of the Greeks and the Romans are essentially distinct from one another; therefore the two religions also must be distinct.⁵¹⁰

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Moreover, with regard to the abstract disposition or the orientation of spirit, the first thing to note is the seriousness of the Romans. Where there is a purpose that is to be realized, an essentially firm purpose, the understanding comes into play and with it the seriousness that holds firmly to this purpose as against the variety of other impulses in the mind or in the external environment.

The cheerfulness or serenity of Greek religion, its basic dispositional feature, has its ground in the fact that there is, to be sure, a purpose in Greek religion too, something revered and holy. But at the same time the freedom from purpose is immediately present in it, in that the Greek gods are many. Each Greek god has a more or less substantial trait of its own, an ethical essentiality; but just because there are so many particularities, the consciousness or spirit also simultaneously stands above this multiplicity or manifold and is withdrawn from its particularity. Consciousness lays aside what is determined as essential and can even be treated as an end; consciousness is itself this mode of treating things ironically. In contrast, wherever there is a highest principle or highest purpose,

509. *W (Var) reads:* character

510. *W₂ (Var) reads:* and this in itself must lead to the distinction in religious substance.

this cheerfulness cannot occur. Moreover, the Greek god is a concrete individuality; each of these many particular individuals in turn has within it many different characteristics: it is an opulent individuality which must necessarily have contradiction in it and must exhibit it simply because the antithesis [of one and many] is not yet absolutely reconciled. Because the gods have this abundance of outward characteristics in themselves, indifference toward these particularities is also present, and frivolity can have fun with them. The contingency that we observe in the divine stories about these gods falls under this heading. |

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“The definite”⁵¹¹ purpose is precisely the purpose of dominion, and the god is the power of realizing this purpose, the highest or universal power, this dominion over the world. We can see this god in the figure of Fortuna Publica, for example. “This Fortuna Publica is the inherent”⁵¹² necessity, the necessity that embodies the Roman purpose itself; it is just Rome itself. Rome is the dominant lord and, as such, is exalted as a holy, divine essence. This dominant Rome in the form of a ruling god is Jupiter Capitolinus.⁵¹³ He is the principal god who makes Rome dominant—the Jupiter who has the meaning of ruling and has a purpose within the world, and it is the Roman people through whom and for whom he accomplishes this purpose.⁵¹⁴

The second point is that this God of real [world] dominion is not the genuine One, the spiritual One; and just for that reason the particular falls outside this unity of dominion. The power is only

511. *W*₁ (*Var*) reads: The character of the Roman disposition is this seriousness on the part of the understanding, a seriousness that has a definite purpose; this

512. *W* (*Var*) reads: It is the necessity that is for others a cold, unsympathetic necessity; it is the inherent

513. *W* (*Var?*) adds: a particular Jupiter—for there are many Jupiters, maybe three hundred Joves in all.

[*Ed.*] Hegel is probably relying on a faulty recollection of a reference in Tertullian’s *Apology* 14.9. Tertullian quotes the figure of three hundred Joves from a satire by Varro, no longer extant, in order to pour scorn on Roman religion. A similar criticism is found in Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 22.6.

514. *W*₂ (*MiscP/1831?*) adds: The Roman people is the universal family, whereas in the religion of beauty many families were the divine purpose, and in the religion of the One, by contrast, one family only.

abstract, it is only power; it is not a rational organization, or a self-contained totality. For that very reason the particular makes its appearance as something that falls outside the One, the ruler. And so we have here the appearances of gods of the sort that, as indicated, may also in fact be Greek gods or else ones equated with them—for one nation sometimes does equate its gods with those of other nations. Thus the Greeks [sometimes] find their gods in Persia, Syria, and Babylon, [a discovery] which was after all at the same time something different from the distinctive way in which their own gods were intuited and characterized; only at a level of superficial generality are they to be viewed as similar. But they [the Roman gods] have no free individuality | as in Greece. They⁵¹⁵ appear to be old and gray, so to speak; we know not where they came from, but only that they have been introduced from elsewhere. These Roman gods have then no true meaning; in the poets they are only a lifeless imitation of the Greek gods. There is not to be found in them that consciousness or feeling of humanity and subjectivity which is the substantial element in gods as it is in humans, and in humans as in gods. They show themselves to be derivative; they appear to be machinery devoid of sense. (Mechanical gods of this kind were introduced in France also.⁵¹⁶) They show themselves to be really gods of the understanding who have no place in “a beautiful”⁵¹⁷ imagination.

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Apart from these particular gods that appear to be common to both Romans and Greeks, the Romans have many of their own typical gods and forms of worship. Dominion is the goal of the citizen; but the individual is not wholly taken up with that. The

515. *W₁ (Var) reads:* Generally speaking, these [Roman gods]—or many of them—are the same [as the Greek gods]. But these [Roman] gods, who do not have that beautiful, free individuality [of the Greek gods], *W₂ (Var) reads:* Generally speaking, the particular Roman deities—or many of them—are the same as the Greek gods. However, they do not have that beautiful, free individuality, for they

516. [Ed.] Hegel criticizes French dramatists in almost identical terms in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, without however citing the names of authors or works there either. In the *Ms.* he does specifically criticize Racine’s *Phèdre* for making Hippolytus fall in love with Aricia, thus robbing the drama of ethical content.

517. *W (Var) reads:* a beautiful, free spirit, within a beautiful, free

individual has also a particular purpose, and these private purposes fall outside of that abstract purpose.⁵¹⁸ But these particular purposes become wholly and prosaically private matters; what emerges here is the shared private concerns [*Partikularität*] of human beings according to the multiple aspects of their need, or of their ties with and dependence upon nature. The god is not the concrete individuality.⁵¹⁹ Private life [*Partikularität*] by itself in this way, forsaken by that universality, is just the wholly common and prosaic private concerns | of human beings. But that is their human goal; one needs this thing and that, and whatever is a human goal then becomes in this sphere a determination of the divine. Thus human purposes count as divine purposes and accordingly as divine powers. Human purpose and divine purpose are one and the same; but the goal is one that is external to the idea. In this way the goal is first of all the universal goal; dominion over the world is one aspect. This is the abstract power that is oppressive and burdensome for individuals, the power that consumes and sacrifices them. The second aspect is the goal as private; for that reason private aims, needs, and powers also appear as gods, because [fulfillment in] the human sphere is the fulfillment of God.

This is the basic feature of Roman religion. It is the common needs that furnish the content for the gods here. So we have many highly prosaic deities. The content of these gods is practical utility;⁵²⁰ they serve ordinary, practical functions. The Lares and Penates belong to the private citizen, to be sure, though they are connected with natural ethical life and piety, i.e., with the ethical unity of the family. But most [of the religion] has a content that pertains to merely private utility.

518. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: As against the universal of dominion there is something particular present, human purposes and interests, these private purposes, human life and human needs. Thus on one side we see this universal power that is sovereignty; in it individuals are sacrificed, having no value as such. The other side, the determinate element, falls outside the divine unity just because God is what is abstract, and the human element is essentially purpose. The filling of God with a content is the human aspect.

519. W (Var) adds: Jupiter is merely sovereignty, while the particular gods are dead, devoid of life and spirit, or, what is worse, they are borrowed.

520. In B's margin: 23 July 1827

Since this human life and activity also takes on a form that is at all events lacking the negative [moment] of evil, the satisfaction of these needs is thus a simple, peaceful, uncultured, natural state. The satisfaction of the needs appropriate to it appears as a host of gods. A state of innocence hovers before the Roman mind as the Age of Saturn. They have many festivals⁵²¹ connected with the benefit of the earth's fruitfulness and the human ability to utilize the gifts of nature. Furthermore, these are gods of the skills and types of activity that are wholly concerned with immediate needs and their satisfaction: for example, Jupiter Pistor, the baker or the skill of baking⁵²²; Fornax, the oven in which the grain was dried | ~and the oven for baking, is the oven goddess.⁵²³ Vesta [is at first] the fire for baking bread (~and later has a higher significance⁵²⁴ relating to family piety); the festival of Pales, the goddess of livestock fodder; Juno Moneta [the mint]. ~And [there are gods] for all sorts of human conditions [and concerns]: the goddesses Pax, Tranquillitas, Vacuna [leisure], Febris [fever], Pestis [plague], Robigo or wheat rust, and Aerumna, the goddess of trouble and care—all these relate to quite prosaic needs. Nothing could be so devoid of imagination as a circle of such gods!^{525 526}

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~This multitude of gods constitutes a very wide-ranging circle of divinities, to be sure; but it is the immediate character of the universality of Roman destiny, or of the ruling Jupiter—it lies in the very

521. W (Var) adds: and a host of gods

522. W (Var) adds: ranks as something divine, and the power to exercise it counts as something essential

523. W (Var) reads: is a goddess by herself.

524. W (Var) reads: for as Ἑστία she has acquired a higher significance

525. W₁ (Var) reads: Certain special human conditions [and concerns] are also regarded as divine power, insofar as they are injurious or useful, or insofar as they appear friendly or inimical: the goddesses Pax and Tranquillitas, Vacuna, the goddess of leisure, also Febris, Fames [famine], Robigo or wheat rust, Aerumna and Angerona (i.e., care and woe), etc. They also dedicated altars to the plague.

Furthermore, these are gods of the skills and types of activity that are wholly concerned with immediate needs and their satisfaction—highly prosaic deities, devoid of phantasy: there is nothing more devoid of imagination than a circle of such gods. Here spirit is more perfectly at home in the finite and in what is immediately useful.

526. [Ed.] For this description of Roman festivals and divinities, Hegel is relying on the detailed account provided by K. P. Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791).

definition of this foundation—that all these gods together, the individual gods, are gathered into one.⁵²⁷ The extension of the Romans' worldly dominion consisted in this: that individuals and peoples were brought under one power and rule, and likewise their ethical powers, the divine national spirits, were compressed into one pantheon,⁵²⁸ assembled under one destiny, subordinated to the one Jupiter Capitolinus. Whole cargoes of gods were hauled to Rome from | Egypt, Greece, Persia (the Mithra worship), etc. Rome is a potpourri of all sorts of religions;⁵²⁹ the total condition is one of confusion.⁵³⁰

3. The Cultus

Our third topic is the character of the cultus. Its specification lies in what has already been said: God is served for the sake of a purpose, and this is a human purpose. The content does not begin, so to speak, with God—it is not the content of God's nature—but instead it begins with humans, with what human purpose is. The Romans were praised by Cicero⁵³¹ for being the most pious nation, one that⁵³² associates religion with everything it does.⁵³³ This, we can say, is in fact the case. What is present [in this piety] is precisely the abstract inwardness of the Roman principle, the universality of the purpose that is the destiny in which particular individuals with their ethical life and humanity are suppressed and not permitted to have concrete presence or self-development. This universality⁵³⁴ is the foundation for the way that everything is connected with the universal, and because everything is connected with this inwardness, there is religion

527. *W₂ (Var) reads:* Viewed from another aspect, however, there was also a more general religious requirement (together with the oppressive power of Roman destiny) that assembled the individual gods into a unity.

528. *W₁ (Var) reads:* suppressed by one power and sovereignty,

529. *W (Var) reads:* thus became the assembly of all religions, of the Greek, Persian, Egyptian, and Christian religions, and of the worship of Mithra;

530. *W (Var) adds:* in which every kind of cultus is jumbled together.

531. [*Ed.*] Although this does not appear to be an actual citation from Cicero, he did express himself more or less to this effect on several occasions, e.g., in *De natura deorum* 2.8.

532. *W (Var) adds:* thinks on the gods in all aspects of life, one that

533. *W (Var) adds:* and thanks the gods for everything.

534. *W (Var) adds:* and inwardness

in everything.⁵³⁵ But at the same time this inwardness, this higher or universal element, is only the form; the content or purpose of this power is human, it is given by human beings, and the gods as powers are supposed to carry it out. More specifically, we see that the Romans worship the gods because they need them and when they need them, especially in times of particular exigency.^{536 537} For the Romans, such need is the | general theogony from which their gods arise. The oracles and the Sibylline Books are the higher means for informing the people what ought to be done.⁵³⁸ But they are in the hands of the state, of the magistrates. Thus on the one hand the individual perishes in the universal, in the sovereign authority, in the *Fortuna Publica*; but on the other hand human purposes hold sway and the human subject has an independent, essential value. These extremes and their contradiction are the whirlpool in which Roman life tosses and turns.

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Roman virtue or *virtus* is that cold patriotism [which dictates] that the individual must serve the interest of the state or the sovereign authority completely. The Romans themselves even made this negativity, this submergence of the individual in the universal, into a spectacle; it is what constitutes an essential feature in their religious plays. The religious dramas of the Romans consist of the shedding of torrents of blood. There is no ethical interest, no tragic reversal and upheaval that would have for its content an ethical interest or a misfortune that might be connected with ethical characteristics; instead the picture is that of the dry, cold conversion of death. Hundreds and thousands had to slay one another. This cold-blooded murder was a delight to their eyes; in it they beheld the nullity of

535. *W*₂ (1831/*MiscP?*) adds: Thus, in complete accord with the Roman spirit, Cicero derives religion from *religare*, for in fact religion in all its relationships was for the Roman spirit something that binds and commands.

[*Ed.*] This etymology of "religion" is not as unambiguous as Hegel makes out. The derivation from *religare*, which he accepts as correct, is in any event not to be found in Cicero but in Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 4.28.2, who there opposes Cicero's derivation from *relegendo* (*De natura deorum* 2.72).

536. *W* (*Var*) reads: the exigency of war.

537. *Precedes in W* (*Var*): The introduction of new gods happens at times of exigency and fear or because of vows.

538. *W* (*Var*) reads: is to be done or is to happen in order to obtain a benefit.

human individuality, the worthlessness of the individual (because individuality has no ethical life within it). It was the spectacle of the hollow, empty destiny that relates to human beings as a contingency, as blind caprice.

590 There is a further characteristic that can be linked to this, one that draws together all that we have said; despite the fact that it is not an integral part of religion, it can become caught up in it. "Since cold, irrational destiny or sheer dominion is in fact what predominates, in the viewpoint prevalent in the Roman | Empire there appears, transcending individuals, the all-pervasive power, the power of arbitrariness [that is vested in] the emperor—a power that can rage wildly and without restraint, beyond all legal or ethical bounds. It was in fact quite consistent for the emperor, this supreme power, to receive divine honors; for he is purely and simply this ungrounded power over individuals and their circumstances.

This, therefore, is one aspect, the perishing of "the individuals;"⁵³⁹ and the other extreme stands opposed to it."⁵⁴⁰ Namely, a goal for the power is present at the same time too. In one respect it is blind, and spirit is not yet reconciled and brought into harmony; for that reason the two sides stand one-sidedly opposed to each other. This power is a purpose, and the purpose is the human, finite purpose. This [divine] purpose is dominion over the world, and its realization is the dominion of human beings—of the Romans. In the real sense this universal purpose has its ground or seat in self-consciousness. "So the independence of this self-consciousness is thereby posited."⁵⁴¹ On the one side there stands an indifference to concrete life, on the other the reserve or inwardness that is equally the inwardness of the divine and that of the individual, though it is a wholly abstract inwardness on the part of the individual. This involves what constitutes for the Romans the basic feature, the fact that the abstract person as such has attained this visible status. The

539. *W₁ (Var) reads:* the individual in general;

540. *W₂ (MiscP/1831?) reads:* In contrast with this extreme of empty destiny in which the individual perishes, the destiny that finally found its personal portrayal in the power of the emperor, an arbitrary power that rages wildly regardless of ethical considerations, the other extreme is the worth of the pure singularity of subjectivity.

541. *W (Var) reads:* So this self-consciousness is independent, since the purpose pertains to it.

abstract person is the person with rights. Hence the elaboration of right⁵⁴² is an important feature of Roman culture; but right is restricted to juridical right, to the right of property. There are higher rights than this: human conscience has its right,⁵⁴³ and a right much higher still is that of ethics, of morality. But these higher rights are no longer present here in their concrete and proper sense, for the abstract right of the person prevails here instead, a right that consists in the determination of property alone. It is personality, to be sure, that maintains this exalted position, but only abstract personality, only subjectivity in this abstract sense. |

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These are the basic features of the religion of expediency.⁵⁴⁴ Contained in it are the moments whose unification constitutes the definition of the next and final stage of religion. The moments that in the religion of expediency are individuated though they subsist in relationship and for that very reason in contradiction—when these moments (present here in a spiritless way) are united in accord with their *truth*, they give form to the determinate shape of spirit and of the religion of spirit.

542. *W (Var) adds:* or the category of property

543. *W (Var) adds:* (for it is equally a right)

544. *W (1831) adds:* [*W*₁: In this religion God was known as what is purposive too; but here the purpose *W*₂: In this religion of purposiveness the purpose] is none other than the Roman state, so that the Roman state is the abstract power over all other national spirits. In the Roman pantheon the gods of all the peoples are assembled and cancel out one another through the very fact of their union. The Roman spirit [*W*₁: brings to pass this misfortune of the destruction of the beautiful life and consciousness. It was fate [*Fatum*] as the Roman spirit that destroyed this happiness and serenity of the preceding religion. *W*₂: as this fate destroyed the happiness and serenity of the beautiful life and consciousness of the preceding religions, and compressed all their shapes into unity and uniformity.] This abstract power it was which produced this monstrous misery and a universal sorrow, a sorrow that served to prepare the birth pangs of the religion of truth. [*W*₁: By it the limitation and finitude in the religion of the beautiful spirit was negated too.] Repenting of the world, laying aside finitude, and [*W*₁: renouncing all hope of finding satisfaction in this world *W*₂: despairing of finding satisfaction in temporality and finitude, a despair that gained the upper hand in the spirit of the world]—all of this served to prepare the soil for the genuine, spiritual religion. This preparation had to be carried out on the part of humanity [*W*₁: —“When the time was fulfilled,” we are told, “God sent his Son”; the time was fulfilled when this despair of finding satisfaction in temporality and finitude had gained the upper hand in the spirit. *W*₂: in order that “the time might be fulfilled.”]

[*Ed.*] A reference to the New Testament concept of the fullness of time; cf. Mark 1:15; Gal. 4:4; Eph. 1:10.

APPENDIXES

THE TELEOLOGICAL PROOF

ACCORDING TO THE LECTURES OF 1831¹

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Kant has already criticized this proof too,² like the other proofs of God's existence; and he has in large measure destroyed their reputation, so that it is now hardly considered worthwhile to examine the proofs themselves at all carefully. Yet Kant himself says of this proof that it deserves at all times to be treated with respect;³ when he adds that the teleological proof is the oldest, however, he is mistaken. The first definition of God is that he is *power*; it is only later that he is defined as wisdom. Moreover, this proof first occurs among the Greeks; it was formulated by Socrates (Xenophon, *Memor.*, end of book 1).⁴ Socrates makes purposiveness—especially in the form of the good—the basic principle [of reason]. The reason for his imprisonment is, according to him, that the Athenians have deemed it good.⁵ Even historically, therefore, this proof coincides with the development of freedom.

We have already considered the transition from the religion of power to the religion of spirituality in general. The same mediating

1. [Ed.] In the 1831 lectures Hegel treated the teleological proof in relation to Greek religion, whereas in the *Ms.* it was considered in relation to Roman religion, and in 1824 at the beginning of Sec. B, preceding the discussion of Jewish, Greek, and Roman religion. The *Werke* reproduced the 1831 version of the teleological proof in an appendix at the end of vol. 12 along with other materials (see our Vol. 3:351 n. 1). Our text for this section is based on *W*₂ 12:517–535, and may be compared with Strauss's excerpted version of the same section (Sec. C.2.b) printed below.

2. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (London, 1930), B 648–658.

3. [Ed.] *Ibid.*, ¶ 651. In relation to this and the following references, see *Ms.*, pp. 199–204 and relevant notes.

4. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, nn. 239, 240.

5. [Ed.] See Plato, *Phaedo* 98a–99a.

process that we were cognizant of in the religion of beauty we have also encountered already in the intermediate stages; but in these stages it is still interpreted in a manner devoid of spirit. Now that this transition to the religion of spirituality has introduced a further essential determination, we must first identify and demonstrate it in abstract fashion.

We have here the category of freedom as such, the definition of an activity as freedom—a creating in accord with freedom, no longer an unrestrained creation in accord with power, but in accord with purposes. Freedom is determining oneself; and what is active, to the extent that it determines itself inwardly, implicitly has self-determination as its purpose. Power is simply self-projection in such a way that | there is something unreconciled in what is projected; it is, to be sure, implicitly a mirror image, but it is not yet explicit in consciousness that, *in its creature*, what creates is merely preserving and bringing forth *itself*, so that in the creature the [essential] characteristics of the divine are themselves present. God is here grasped under the defining characteristic of wisdom, of purposive activity. [Divine] power is benevolent and just, but it is only purposive action that has this defining mark of rationality—[the certainty] that from [divine] action only what is already determined in advance emerges, i.e., this identity of the creator with itself.

What distinguishes (differentiates) the proofs of God's existence is just the diversity of their defining categories. [Each of] them has mediation, a starting point, and a point of arrival; in the teleological and physicotheological proof the defining category of purposiveness attaches both to the starting point and to the conclusion. The proof begins from a [mode of] being that is now defined as purposive, and what is thereby mediated is God as positing and activating his purpose. The being which, as immediate, is the starting point of the cosmological proof is, to begin with, a manifold, contingent being; God is then defined as necessity that has being in and for itself, the power over the contingent. The higher specification here is that purposiveness is present in [contingent] being. In this purpose rationality is already explicit, as a free self-determining and activating of this [contingent] content, to the end that (although, as purpose,

it is initially something inward) it should be realized and reality [should] correspond to the concept or to the purpose.

A thing is good insofar as it fulfills its definition, its purpose; this means that the reality matches the concept or the definition. We can perceive in the world a concordance of external things, things that are present without reference to one another and come into existence on their own account (quite accidentally as far as the others are concerned and having no essential connection with each other); yet, although these things are quite separate from one another, a unity shows itself, by virtue of which they are directly in conformity with one another. Kant describes this in detail as follows.⁶ The world that we are in offers us an immense spectacle of multiplicity, order, purposiveness, etc. This purposive character is particularly apparent in living matter, both inwardly and in its connection with the external environment. | Both the human and the animal [organism] are implicitly a manifold (with just these limbs, internal organs, etc.). Although they seem to subsist merely side by side, it is everywhere just the general purposive definition that maintains them; the one exists only through the other and for the other, and all human limbs and components are merely means for the self-preservation of the individual, which is here the purpose. The human [organism], or living matter in general, has a multitude of requirements. Air, nourishment, light, etc., are necessary for its preservation. All this is present on its own account, and the capacity to serve as purpose is something external to it; the animals, meat, air, etc., that human beings need do not in themselves have the express character of being purposes, yet the one is purely and simply a means for the other. There is here an inner coherence, which is necessary, but which does not exist as such. This inner coherence is not brought about by the objects themselves, but is produced by something other than the things themselves are; purposiveness does not come about by itself, the purposive activity is extraneous to the things, and this implicit and self-positing harmony is the power over these things, which determines that they shall stand in a purposive orientation to one

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6. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 650.

another. Thus the world is no longer an aggregate of contingent things but a mass of purposive connections—but the connections accrue to the things themselves from outside. This purposive connection must have a cause (and a cause that is full of power and wisdom).

This purposive activity and this cause is God.

According to Kant, this proof is the clearest and is intelligible to the ordinary man; through it, nature has, for the first time, a [moral] interest, it brings the study of nature to life (just as it is from that study that it derives).⁷ This is, in general terms, the teleological proof.

Kant's critique, now, is as follows.⁸ He argues that the first deficiency in this proof is that only the form of things enters into consideration here. The purposive relation concerns only the definition of the form: everything maintains itself, and hence it is not merely a means for something else but a purpose unto itself; and that by virtue of which a thing can be a means concerns only its form, not its matter. The sole conclusion to be drawn, therefore, would be that there is a form-giving cause, but this cause does not also bring forth matter. Thus the proof, says Kant, does not fulfill | the idea of God (that he is the creator of the matter, and not merely of the form).

Form contains the determinations that relate to one another, whereas matter is supposedly what is formless and so devoid of connections. Accordingly, in Kant's view, this proof yields only a Demiurge, one who shapes the material; it does not yield the creator.⁹ In respect of this criticism it can be said at least that *all* relation is form—this is how form is separated off from matter. We can see that God's activity would consequently be a finite one. For if we produce something technical, we must take the material for it from outside; in this way our activity is limited, finite, and matter is thus posited as subsisting on its own account, or as eternal.

That whereby things are turned against [their] other is their qualities, their form, not the subsistence of the things as such. Their subsistence is their matter. To begin with, this is right enough, to be sure, that the relations between things pertain to their form; but

7. [Ed.] Ibid., B 651–652.

8. [Ed.] Ibid., B 654–655.

9. [Ed.] Ibid., B 655. See Ms., n. 246.

the question is whether this distinction, this separation between form and matter, is admissible, whether we can put everything on the [one] side [or on the other] in this particular way. On the contrary, we have shown in the *Logic* (*Encyclopedia*, § 129)¹⁰ that matter without form is an absurdity, a pure abstraction of the understanding—one that we can indeed construct but that should not be given out to be something true. The matter that is set up against God as something unchangeable is merely a product of reflection; to put it another way, this identity of formlessness, this continuous unity of matter, is itself a formal determination; hence we have to recognize that the matter that is here put on one side does itself belong to the other side, the side of form. But in that case, form is identical with itself too. It relates to itself, and in so doing it has just the self-subsistence that is differentiated as matter. The activity of God itself (simple unity with itself, or form) *is* matter. Thus there is this subsistence, this abiding unity with self, with respect to the form—so that it relates to itself, and this is *its* subsistence, the very thing that “matter” is. So there is no form without matter or vice versa; rather they are both the same.

The starting point for the syllogism, Kant continues,¹¹ is the order and purposiveness that is observed in the world—there are purposive arrangements, and this connection between things, which they do not themselves imply, consequently serves as the starting point; by virtue of this | a *tertium quid*, a cause, is posited. From the purposive[ness that we observe] we infer the existence of the author who is responsible for the purposiveness of the connections. So we cannot [validly] infer anything more than what, as far as content is concerned, is given in what is present, and concordant with the starting point. Now the purposive arrangements show themselves to be astonishingly great, highly excellent and wise, but a very great, a properly marvelous wisdom is not yet absolute wisdom; we recognize an extraordinary power in it, but that is not yet omnipotence. The leap to omnipotence, says Kant,¹² is one that we are not entitled to take; so we have recourse to the ontological proof,

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10. [Ed.] *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 129; cf. *Science of Logic*, pp. 450–456 (GW 11:297–302).

11. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ¶ 655–657; see also above, *Ms.*, n. 247.

12. [Ed.] *Ibid.*, ¶ 657–658.

the one that starts from the concept of the most real essence. But mere perception, which provides the starting point in the teleological proof, does not extend to this totality.

We must in any case grant that the starting point has a lesser content than what is arrived at: in the world there is only relative wisdom, not absolute wisdom. This should be examined more closely, however. We have here a syllogism: from one thing something else is inferred; from the way the world is constituted, we infer an activity, something that binds together the mutually extraneous existences, an activity that is their inner [side], their implicit potential, and which does not already reside immediately within them. The form of the inference gives rise to a false semblance, as though God had a foundation, which provides our starting point; God appears as conditioned. The purposive ordering or arrangement is the condition, and the existence of God seems to be expressed as something mediated or conditioned. This is the particular objection that Jacobi¹³ has underlined, that the proof aims to attain to the unconditioned through conditions. But, as we have already seen, this is only a false semblance, one that is sublated in the meaning of the conclusion itself. As far as this meaning is directly concerned, it will be granted that it [the proof] is only the process of subjective cognizing. The mediation in the proof does not attach to God himself. For he is, indeed, what is unconditioned, the infinite activity that determines itself according to [its] purposes, and orders the world purposively. The argument does not imply that the conditions that provide our starting point are prior to this infinite activity. On the contrary, the whole process is one of subjective cognizing, and the conclusion it arrives at is this, that it is God who posits these purposive arrangements | and that these are therefore from the beginning what is posited by him, and not the abiding foundation. The ground [*Grund*] that we start from is itself undermined [*geht zu Grunde*] by what is defined as the authentic ground. This is the meaning of this syllogism, that what conditions can in its turn only be explained as what is conditioned. The conclusion expresses the fact that it was a defect to posit as foundation something that is itself

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13. [Ed.] Jacobi, *Briefe*, Beilage VII, p. 424–426 (*Werke* 4/2:153–155).

conditioned. Thus this process is in fact and in its climax not just a subjective process, not something that is mired in thought; instead this defective aspect is itself eliminated by the conclusion. Thus what is objective expresses itself even in the cognition. It is not merely an affirmative passing over, but it involves a negative moment, although that is not posited in the form of the inference. In this way there is a mediation that is the negation of the first immediacy. The process of spirit is indeed a transition, a passing over to the activity that subsists in and for itself and posits purposes; but at the same time it is implied by the process that the determinate being of this purposive order is not to be taken for what is in and for itself (only reason, only the activity of eternal reason, is what is in and for itself). The being of the purposive order observed in the world is not something authentic but only the show or semblance of the eternal activity.

There is, moreover, a distinction that must be made, in the determination in terms of purpose, between form and content. If we consider the form in its purity, we have a purposive being that is finite; and as far as the form is concerned, the finitude consists in the fact that the purpose and the means are distinct—the means being the material in which the purpose is realized. This is its finitude. Thus, for our purposes we need a material; the activity is ours; and the material is something distinct from it. This is the finitude of purposive being, the finitude of form; but the truth of this relationship is not finite in this way. The truth is in the purposive activity that is at the same time means and material in itself, an activity that brings its purposes to fruition all by itself—that is the *infinite* activity of purpose. The purpose accomplishes itself, it realizes itself through its own activity, and thus it closes with itself in the course of its execution. As we have seen, the finitude of purpose lies in the separateness of the means and the material; where this obtains, the purpose is still a *technical* mode of operating. The *truth* of purposive determination [i.e., the genuine case] is where the purpose contains its own means in itself and the material in which it accomplishes itself as well; in this case | the purpose is authentic in regard to form, for objective truth consists precisely in the correspondence of the concept to reality. The purpose is authentic only when the mediating

[activity] and the means, equally with the reality, are [all] identical with the purpose. In that case the purpose is present as what has reality in itself; it is not something subjective, one-sided, for which the moments are extraneous. This is the authentic case of purpose, whereas the purposive connection in a finite situation is the inauthentic case.

We must remark at this point that purposive activity, the purposive connection as it has just been defined according to its truth, exists as something higher, even though at the same time it is present; we can no doubt say of it that it is the infinite—since it is a purposive activity that has its means and material in itself—but at the same time it is finite in another respect. This true case of purposive determination that we are seeking actually exists (even if only one-sidedly) in what is living or organic. Life as subject is the soul, and the soul is purpose, i.e., it posits itself, it brings itself to fruition. So the product is the same as the productive [activity]. But what is living is an organism, and organs are means. The living soul implies a body; and only with that body does it constitute a whole, something actual. The organs are the means of life, and these means—the organs—are also that in which life comes to fruition and preserves itself; they are also the material. This is what self-preservation is; what is alive preserves itself, it is the beginning and the end; the product is also what starts [the activity]. What is living is, as such, always in activity; need initiates activity and drives toward its satisfaction, but this is again the beginning of need. The living organism is [there] only to the extent that it is always a product. Here we have the truth of purpose in regard to form: the organs of what is living are means but also end; in their activity they bring forth nothing but themselves. Each organ maintains the other and thereby maintains itself. This activity constitutes *one* purpose, *one* soul [or living principle] that is present everywhere [in the organism]: every part of the body has sensation, the soul is present in it. This is purposive activity in its authenticity.

But the living subject is also something finite through and through; so purposive activity has here a formal truth, but one that is not complete. What is alive produces itself, it contains in itself the material for its own emergence; | every organ secretes the animal

lymph that is used by others to reproduce themselves. What is alive contains its material in itself, but this is only an abstract process; the finite aspect of it consists in the fact that while the organs are living off themselves, they need material from outside. Everything organic is in an active relation to inorganic nature, which is out there as something independent. In one respect the organism is infinite, since it forms a circuit of pure return into itself, but there is at the same time a tension between it and the external inorganic nature—it has *needs*. The means for meeting these needs come from outside; human beings need air, light, and water; and they also consume animals and other living things, which they thereby make into inorganic nature, into a means. It is this relationship in particular that leads us to assume a higher unity, i.e., the harmony in which the means correspond to the end. This harmony does not lie within the subject itself; yet, as we have seen, the harmony that constitutes organic life *is* within the subject. The whole structure of the organs—the circulatory and nervous system, the intestines, lungs, liver, stomach, etc.—is marvelously concordant. But does not this harmony itself require something else extraneous to the subject? We can leave this question aside; for if one grasps the concept of the organism as we have presented it, this development of the purposive determination itself necessarily follows from the mere fact of the subject's being alive, and if this concept were not grasped, what is living would no longer be the concrete unity that we have defined it to be. And then, in order to understand the unity, one has recourse to conceptions involving external mechanical processes (in the circulation of the blood) or chemical processes (for the decomposition of foodstuffs); but processes of this kind cannot render an exhaustive account of what life itself is, so that a *tertium quid* must be assumed which has established these processes. But in fact this unity, this harmony of the organism, is precisely the subject; this unity, however, also involves the active relation of the living subject to external nature, which has only a contingent, indifferent being vis-à-vis the subject.

The conditions involved in this relationship are not developed by the living thing itself; yet if it did not find them already present, it could not exist. The consideration of this immediately brings with

601 it the feeling of something higher, | something that has established this harmony; and this at once arouses human emotion and wonder too. Every animal has its own small range of foodstuffs; indeed, many animals are restricted to a single food (this is another respect in which human nature is the most general). The fact that this external, quite peculiar condition holds for every animal arouses humanity to an astonishment that passes over into a high veneration for that third being (in addition to nature and the subject) who has posited this unity. This reverent wonder is the elevation of humanity to the higher being that brings forth the necessary conditions for its own purpose. The subject is actively concerned with its own preservation; this active concern is present—though unconscious—in every living thing. It is what we call instinct in the animal; one animal secures its own maintenance by violence, another produces it by ingenuity. This is the wisdom of God in nature (in which this infinite multiplicity of activities and conditions necessary for all particular forms is encountered). When we consider the particular ways in which living beings are active, we see that they are something contingent. They are not posited by the subject itself, but require an external cause. In the life principle, only the general principle of self-preservation is posited; but living beings differ in an infinitude of particular ways, and this [particular variety] is posited by an *other*.

But the question is: how is inorganic nature adapted to the organic, how does it come to be capable of serving as the means for organic life? Here we encounter a view of the matter that grasps this coincidence in a distinctive fashion. Animals are inorganic vis-à-vis human beings, and plants are inorganic vis-à-vis animals. But the nature that is inorganic in itself, such as the sun, moon, and whatever appears as a means or as matter generally, has *immediate* being in the first place, i.e., it is already there before the organic. Consequently the relationship is so constituted that the inorganic is independent, while the organic by contrast is what is dependent; the inorganic, which is here termed the immediate, is the unconditioned. Inorganic nature appears as self-sufficient: plants, animals, and humans are added to it afterward from outside; the earth could subsist without vegetation, the vegetable kingdom without animals,

and the animal kingdom without humans; hence these different aspects appear to be independent of one another. We appeal to experience in support of this too: there are mountains without any vegetation, and without animal | or human life; the moon has no atmosphere, there is on it no meteorological process such as provides the necessary condition for vegetation, so it subsists without any vegetation; and there are other similar examples. Something inorganic of this kind appears to be self-subsistent; humanity is an extraneous addition to it. So we come to the view that nature is inwardly a productive power that produces blindly, from which issues forth vegetation; out of vegetation there springs the animal world; and last of all humanity with its thinking consciousness. In any case we can say that nature produces stages, among which each one is always the condition for the next one.

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But if organic life and humanity are contingent accretions of this kind, the question that arises is whether human beings will or will not find what is necessary there ready for them. According to this view this will likewise be a matter of chance, since on this view there is no unity that is valid on its own account. Aristotle already suggests this same opinion:¹⁴ nature produces living beings continually, and the question then is whether they can exist; whether one of them can maintain itself is wholly a matter of chance. Thus nature has already conducted an infinite number of experiments and has produced a whole host of monsters; many myriads of configurations have emerged from it, but they were not able to survive; their disappearance, however, was of no importance. As evidence to prove this assertion, we are referred especially to the remains of monsters that are still to be found here and there. These genera perished, so it is assumed, because the conditions necessary for their existence had ceased to obtain. In this way the concordance of the organic and the inorganic is established as contingent; there is no need to ask for a unity, and the very fact of purposiveness is explained as contingent.

The conceptual determinations involved here, therefore, are the

14. [Ed.] Aristotle, *Physics* 198b32–36. But Aristotle's argument in this passage seems to be that everything—or nearly everything—produced by nature occurs of necessity and nothing as a matter of chance.

603 following: speaking generally, what we call inorganic nature as such is represented on its own account as self-subsistent, while the organic is represented as an external accretion, so that it is a matter of chance whether it finds in what stands over against it the necessary conditions for its existence. We must take note here of the form of the conceptual determination; inorganic nature is what is first and immediate. (It also matches the childlike sense of the Mosaic age that heaven and earth, light, etc., were created first and the organic emerged later in time.¹⁵) The question is whether this is the authentic way of defining the concept of the inorganic, and whether living beings and humanity are what is dependent. Against this view, philosophy exhibits the truth involved in the determination of the concept; but even without that, human beings are in no doubt that they are actively related to the rest of nature as [its] end or purpose, and that nature has only the role of a means vis-à-vis humanity—for this is the role of the inorganic generally vis-à-vis the organic. In formal terms, the organic is in itself what is purposive—it is both means *and* end, and so it is implicitly something infinite; it is purpose returning into itself, and even on the side of its external dependence it is defined as purpose. Therefore, it is what is genuinely first as against what has been termed the immediate, i.e., as against nature. This immediacy is only a one-sided determination, and must be downgraded to being only something posited. The genuine relationship is this: humanity is not an accidental accretion upon what comes first; on the contrary, what comes first is, for the organic, itself; and the inorganic has only the semblance of being in regard to it. This relationship is logically developed in science itself.¹⁶

But in this relationship we still have separation, the fact that the organic involves on one side an external relatedness to inorganic nature, instead of inorganic nature being posited implicitly in the

15. [Ed.] See the Priestly account of creation, Gen. 1:1–2:4a. The Yahwistic account, Gen. 2:4b–25, interposes the creation of Adam before that of plants and animals, and thus may be said to have more of a “childlike sense” than the Priestly account.

16. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Encyclopedia* (1830), part 2, *The Philosophy of Nature*, sec. 3, §§ 337–376.

organic itself. The living being develops from the seed, and development is the action of the members, the inner organs, etc.; the soul is the unity that brings forth this action. Here too, however, the truth of organic and inorganic nature is only the essential connection between the two, their unity and inseparability. This unity is a third term, which is neither the one nor the other; and the absolute category that unites the organic and the inorganic is not to be found in immediate existence. The subject is what is organic, and the other term appears as object; but then it changes into the predicate of the organic and becomes posited as belonging to it. This is the reciprocity of this connection; the two terms are posited in one, within which each of them is something dependent and conditioned. In general terms we can call this third term to which consciousness raises itself God; but a great deal is still lacking from the concept of God. God is in this sense the activity of production, which is a primal division [*Urteil*] through which the two sides are both produced together; | in this one concept they fit together, they are for one another.

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We are therefore quite right in emphasizing that the truth of the purposive relation is this third term, as we have just defined it. But this only defines the third term formally, on the basis of what it is the truth of; it is itself living activity, but this is still not spirit or rational action. The correspondence of the concept, as the organic, to reality, as the inorganic, is nothing but the meaning of life itself. More specifically, this is what the ancients called *νοῦς*:¹⁷ the world is a harmonic whole, an organic life that is determined according to purposes—this was what the ancients understood by *νοῦς*. Another way of defining it was as the world soul, or *λόγος*.¹⁸ All that is posited by this is vitality [the life principle]; it is not yet posited that as spirit the world soul is distinct from its life principle. The soul is the life principle in the organic, and no more; it is not something sundered from the body, something material, but is the

17. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring to Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. For Anaxagoras, see 1827 lectures, n. 163; for Plato, esp. *Timaeus* 29d–36d; and for Aristotle, esp. *Metaphysics* A 3–4.

18. [Ed.] See Plato, *Timaeus* 30b–36d, esp. 34a–b, where Plato says that the universe consists of a body and a central, all-permeating soul.

life force that permeates the body. For this reason Plato called God an immortal ζῶον, i.e., an eternally living principle.¹⁹ He did not get beyond this category of life principle.

When we grasp the life principle in its truth, we find that it is *one* principle, one organic life of the universe, one living system. Everything that is, constitutes the organs of the one subject; the planets that revolve around the sun are only giant members of this one system. Thus the universe is not an aggregate made up of many mutually indifferent accidents, but a system based on the principle of life. This account, however, still does not involve the positing of the category of spirit.

We have [now] considered the formal side of the purposive relation. The other side is that of content. Here the question is: what are the determinations of the [divine] purpose, or what is the content of the purpose that is realized, or how are these [determinate] purposes constituted with respect to what was called *wisdom*? As regards the content, the starting point is again what is found ready in experience; we start from immediate being. It is consideration of the purposes in this empirical light (as they are found in experience) that has been largely responsible for the teleological proof being set on one side, and indeed for its being looked down on with contempt. We talk of the wise orderings of nature. | As determinate forms of organic life, the manifoldly various types of animal life are finite; and the external means to support all this life are present. The living forms are the goal; if we ask then what constitutes the inner substance of the goal, the answer is that it is nothing but the preservation of these insects, these animals, etc. We can, indeed, rejoice about their vitality, but the necessity of their being as they are is a very inadequate, or representational, type of necessity. It is a pious way of looking at it to say that God has arranged it all thus; it exalts the mind to God. But what is represented in regard to God is an absolute, infinite purpose; and these petty purposes contrast sharply with what is found in regard to God. When we survey the higher spheres and consider the human purposes that we can regard as being

19. [Ed.] Plato, *Timaeus* 30b–31a. In *Phaedrus* 246b–d, Plato describes the world as an immortal living entity (ζῶον), explaining that by living entity he means a whole in which soul and body are conjoined.

relatively the highest, we find that for the most part they are stultified and perish without issue. In nature millions of seeds perish in their seed phase, without germinating to develop into a living [organism]. For the most part everything alive lives basically upon the death or decay of other life. It is the same story with the higher purposes. If we traverse the field of ethical life to its highest stage, that of the life of the state, and observe whether the purposes are fulfilled or not, we shall, to be sure, find that many of them are fulfilled, but that still more (including the greatest and noblest) are stultified and brought to grief by human passions and vices. We see the earth covered with ruins, with the remains of the splendid buildings and monuments of the noblest peoples—those whose goals we recognize as essential. Great natural objects and human artifacts do indeed endure and defy time, but the glorious life of those peoples has perished irrevocably.

Thus on the one hand we see petty, subordinate, even despicable purposes fulfilled; on the other side, those which we recognize as essential come to grief. When we deplore the ill fortune and the perishing of so much that is excellent, we must in any event ascend to a higher category and a higher purpose. However much they interest us, we must regard all these purposes as finite and subordinate, and ascribe the destruction that has befallen them to their finitude. But the universal purpose we have to consider here is not to be found in experience, and this radically alters the character of the transition [in the argument]. | For we started our argument from what is already present, we drew a conclusion from what we find in experience. But what we encounter in experience has a character of limitedness. The highest purpose is the good, the universal final goal of the world; and reason has to *regard* this as the absolute final goal of the world, the purpose that is directly grounded in the category of reason, the purpose beyond which spirit [itself] cannot go. And the source in which this purpose is recognized is thinking reason. This purpose, moreover, shows itself to be fulfilled in the world; but the good is what is determined in and for itself by reason, and nature stands over against it—physical nature, on the one hand, which goes its own way and has its own laws, but also the natural aspect of humanity, with all the private purposes that run counter

to the good. When we appeal to perception, we can see that there is much good in the world, but also an infinite amount of evil; and one would, of course, have to count the sum of the evil and of the good that does not come to its own fruition in order to learn which has the upper hand. However, it is of the very essence of the good to *be*; it pertains to it essentially that it should be realized. But it only *ought to be* actual, for (such is our premise) it does not demonstrate itself in experience. It remains a postulate and does not get beyond what “ought to be.” And since the good has not of itself the power to realize itself, a *tertium quid* is postulated through which the final goal of the world *will be* actualized. This is an absolute postulate; what is morally good is the affair of human beings; but since their power is only finite, and the good in them is limited by their natural aspect, humanity is itself the enemy of the good and is therefore incapable of actualizing it. God’s determinate being is represented in this [moral] argument merely as a postulate, an “ought,” which *should* have subjective certainty for human beings, because the good is the ultimate category in their reason. But this certainty is only subjective; it remains just a faith, an “ought,” and it cannot be demonstrated that it is actually the case.²⁰ In fact, if the good as such is to be an actually present *moral* good, it has got to be postulated and presupposed that the disharmony will be everlasting, for the morally good can only subsist, it only has its being, in the battle against evil; thus the everlasting activity of the enemy, or of what is opposed to the good, is a postulate too.²¹

20. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to the doctrine of postulates, in particular the postulate of the existence of God, in Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (New York, 1956), pp. 128–136 (cf. Kant, *Werke* 5:124–132). On the concept of “ought” and infinite progress, see also the following note.

21. [Ed.] See Hegel’s reference to Kant and Fichte in the context of his interpretation of Persian religion in the 1827 lectures, above, p. 613. He is criticizing Kant and Fichte for tying the good to the moral activity of the individual subject and also for their view that the good is realized only in infinite progress. He has in mind on the one hand Kant’s use of infinite progress in justifying the postulate of immortality (see Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, esp. pp. 126–127 [Kant, *Werke* 5:122]), and on the other hand Fichte’s reference to the infinite self-directed striving of the ego as the condition for the possible existence of an object (see Fichte, *Science of Knowledge* [New York, 1970], p. 231 [Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* 2:397]). It is clear that Hegel has the latter reference in mind from his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:498 (*Werke* 15:633).

When we turn to the content, therefore, we find that it is limited; and when we pass on to the | highest purpose, we find ourselves 607 in a different domain. Here the starting point is internal; we do not start from what is present in experience. If, on the contrary, the only starting point is experience, then the good, the final goal, is itself just something subjective, and the contradiction between the other side and the good has necessarily to last forever.

EXCERPTS

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BY DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF THE LECTURES OF 1831¹

PART II. DETERMINATE RELIGION

Introduction

Religion is genus, and religions species. These species, however, are not to be taken empirically but must be deduced from the universal. We began with the concept of religion, i.e., what it is implicitly or for us; the next thing is to see how this concept of religion realizes itself in and for itself. It is only in the true religion that consciousness first matches the concept of religion; while the concept of religion is also present in lower religions, it is present only implicitly, and what it is in truth is not yet present in consciousness. These are therefore untrue religions, even if they have the concept of religion implicit within them; for in this connection everything

1. [Ed.] On the Strauss excerpts of the 1831 lectures, see the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1. The excerpts indicate that the conception and treatment of *Determinate Religion* differed quite radically in 1831 from that found in the earlier lectures. Evidence for the new treatment is found in the *Werke*, although the *Werke* itself follows the basic structure of the 1824 lectures. The original editors included a large number of passages from no-longer-extant transcripts of the 1831 lectures in Part II of the *Werke* editions; these are juxtaposed to passages of both 1824 and 1827 text (rather than just 1827, as in the case of Parts I and III). In accord with the principles of this edition, they are footnoted in relation to 1824 and 1827 text (depending on the original *Werke* context), and the more substantial passages (at least 15 lines in length) are cross-referenced to the Strauss excerpts at the appropriate points below (with parallel passages marked by tildes). For the sake of uniformity with the earlier lectures, we have altered the system by which headings are enumerated, but the headings themselves are for the most part those provided by Strauss.

depends on consciousness—it is of no help to Africans, for example, that humanity is implicitly free, because they do not have this in their consciousness.

Religion is the relationship of spirit to spirit; but this relationship, this concept, occurs initially in its immediacy and naturalness; and the action, the advance of spirit consists in sublating this immediacy.² Our first task, therefore, is to consider natural religion. In it consciousness is still sentient, it is not yet ruptured within itself.

The next step is for consciousness to raise itself above this naturalness—and here we have to note the various ways in which it does so, which then become various ways of characterizing the divine, corresponding to the various proofs of the existence of God.

This progressive definition of religion also has the historical aspect that these determinate forms of religion are the religions of the various peoples. These religions are not our religion, but they are all contained within it as moments of it.³ |

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Division of the Subject

A. Religion in its *immediacy*, or *natural* religion. Here humanity is no more than natural in both its knowing and its willing (i.e., animal willing). Properly speaking, therefore, this is not religion; what is called magic falls under this head.

B. Religion, properly speaking, is first introduced with the inward *rupture of consciousness* into God as absolute power, and the subject as transitory accident.⁴

C. The *reconciliation* effected within this sphere is the religion of *beauty*. The subject has purified itself from its naturalness into the ethical [subject], so that the divine is no longer related to it negatively but affirmatively. But on the one hand the subject has not yet passed through the infinite antithesis of good and evil, while on the other hand the gods are not infinite spirit but are still burdened with naturalness.⁵

2. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 3.

3. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 4.

4. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 5.

5. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 18.

A. NATURAL RELIGION⁶

1. The name of natural religion has also been given to what human beings are able to cognize of God through the light of their reason—*deism*. But this is not a religion of naturalness but of abstraction.

2. Another sense in which the term is used is that natural religion was the *primitive, true* religion of the human spirit. Fragments of this religion supposedly occur in all other religions (Friedrich von Schlegel).⁷ However, the Hebrew and Greek traditions of a time of innocence and a golden age speak only of simplicity of needs and absence of passions, not of cognitive knowledge of the deity. In any case, these peoples were portraying what is in itself or the essence of humanity as a past or future state. Against the view that it was actually a temporal state, and in fact the first temporal state, stands the concept of spirit, which only *is* what it makes itself, so that it does not emerge | immediately as spirit but to begin with is spirit only implicitly, i.e., as something to build on. "Neither willing nor knowing can be immediately perfect. Knowledge as knowing the universal arises only with the negation of perception, just as willing the good arises only with the negation of immediate, purely natural willing. Both are therefore something mediated. *A fortiori*, in order to attain to the cognition of God, human beings must have sloughed off their natural particularity."⁸ As regards the supposedly historical

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6. [Ed.] The scope of nature religion is drastically reduced in the 1831 lectures, being limited essentially to the religion of magic (par. 3 below). The section begins with a discussion of the meanings of the term "natural religion" (paras. 1 and 2). The first sense of the term alludes to the Enlightenment controversy over "natural" vs. "revealed" religion—the one being "rational" and the other "suprarational"—and is discussed fully for the first time in 1831, although anticipations of the theme are found in 1827 (see 1827 n. 8); the second sense, namely, that natural religion is "primitive" religion, picks up the earlier discussion of the "original condition" of humanity.

7. [Ed.] See Friedrich Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), esp. pp. 198, 205 (cf. *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* 8:295–297, 303). Schlegel refers to the traditional Hindu belief that error arose when the human spirit forsook or lost the simplicity of divine knowledge, although "traces of such knowledge continued to shine forth in the midst of superstition and night."

8. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 24.

evidence adduced for such an original religion, this does not stand up to examination.⁹

3. By natural religion as the most basic form of religion what is commonly understood is a religion in which natural objects—sun, moon, mountains, rivers, etc.—are worshiped. But this is false. Even at the earliest stage of self-consciousness, human beings experience the spiritual (i.e., themselves) as something higher vis-à-vis nature; for religion has a place only in the realm of spirit. In immediate religion, however, the spirit is still immediately natural—it has not yet differentiated itself as universal power from itself as singular, contingent, and accidental. Human beings are entirely dependent on external things and impelled by equally finite purposes. They know spirit as power over these natural beings, but only as the power to avert this or that evil or procure this or that sensuous enjoyment. This power is still not an essential one, and so pertains immediately to human beings themselves.¹⁰ The next step, however, is that, after all, human beings are not immediately this power, i.e., not *all* human beings and not without preparation—a mediation, through exaltation, is involved. Human beings in this external state are now known to be the power over this set of natural circumstances. This is the *religion of magic*, as we still find it among many peoples. It does on the one hand include the moment of freedom, though still very imperfectly because directed only to natural ends; on the other hand it is dominated by fear.

This is the only religion found among the Eskimos. They have magicians, known as *angekoks*, who can summon whales, arouse storms, etc., and also use dancing in their incantations.¹¹

614 Very similar are the shamans of Mongolia and elsewhere. These are | individuals with a disposition to magnetic [hypnotic] sleepwalking, who intoxicate themselves through potions and leaping, etc., fall to the ground, and then in this state make wild utterances.

We already find Herodotus¹² telling us that all Negroes are magicians. And they still are. The village chief is supposed to bring

9. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, pp. 242–249; and 1827 lectures, p. 530, incl. n. 42.

10. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 54.

11. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, nn. 109, 110, 115.

12. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 116.

rain—but for the purpose they tie him up and constrain him. Then they go up onto a hill, fantastically attired, talk, shout and spit against the sky.¹³ Here again the main thing is ecstasy. In a state of ecstasy, individuals transcend their habitual limited state and so become power over nature.

But they do so even more when they are *dead*. For this reason Negroes assign to the dead power over the living. Evil and death are the doing of a dead enemy, or sometimes of a still living enemy, for they do not regard death as an act of nature but always solely as the doing of human hands.¹⁴ The dead are constrained by spells; if they have not been buried for long, they are exhumed, their heads cut off, etc. Recourse is also had to sorcerers; they fly into a rage and then declare how the dead person is to be propitiated. Power lies especially in the blood and the bones, so the bones are preserved, painted with blood, etc. They also hang themselves about with bones as power over wild beasts.¹⁵ At this stage, religious belief is magic.

The Negroes also make themselves gods, *fetishes*. They make anything, a tree, a beast, into their fetish, their demon. If anything happens to them, the fetish is destroyed.

This lowest form of religion is widespread, especially in Africa, the midpoint for the debasement of consciousness, a debasement that shows itself also in social life in the form of cannibalism and slavery. Dignity does not accrue to human beings as natural, immediate will but only inasmuch as they have knowledge at least in principle of something that exists substantively in and for itself, and go on from that to surrender the natural subject to it. |

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B. THE INTERNAL RUPTURE OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

Introduction

Consciousness ruptures internally, splitting into two and setting up a substantive power over against itself as the natural and contingent; as singular it relates itself to this power merely as an accidental that

13. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 118.

14. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, nn. 119, 123, 161, 162, 163.

15. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 160.

is of no account. This power is the subsistence of everything but at the same time its passing away; this is the form [of religion] that is called pantheism. This power is admittedly something thought, but it is not yet known as inwardly spiritual. There are different aspects to be considered in this regard.¹⁶

(1) The *elevation* of consciousness. This is not merely our thought, but it pertains to the consciousness of this form of religion itself, for consciousness here elevates itself to thinking, but without having any thought of what it is doing. Thoughtful consideration of this thinking elevation is what we add to the process.¹⁷

(2) However, we also have to consider the relationship of this power to the contingent. Since the contingent is nothing on its own account, the substance is present immediately, and this is the defining characteristic of *pantheism*.

(3) Since substance is not yet determined as spirit, it seeks to endow itself with this configuration [of spirit], but in such a way that this only accrues externally and is not known as determination of the essence. Here we encounter diverse flights of phantasy.

(4) The last point of determinacy is the *one*, or this single entity; determination as singular individuality pertains to the character of subjectivity. But this is here known externally in such a way that a sensibly present human being is known as the universal power.

(5) What human beings have to do in order to remain united with their essence is the *cultus*.

We shall consider the first two of these points—which are of a general nature—on their own account, while the others will be considered under the concrete forms of religion.

1. *The elevation of consciousness from the finite to the infinite.* This is the quintessential movement of spirit; it is what is expressed in the *cosmological proof*. [It is] not as though, | in thus raising themselves to the level of God, people made this formal inference, nor as though their conviction rested on this inference. Consciousness of the single steps of this inference pertains only to the cultured consciousness. Of course this elevation takes place in thinking, but it cannot be said often enough that thinking is one thing and the

16. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 49.

17. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 63.

consciousness of it another. Human beings are conscious of themselves and the world; but since they experience both themselves and the world as merely contingent, they are not satisfied by either and elevate themselves into something that has being in and for itself, something necessary, which is the power over this contingency. This can occur in the simplest form of feeling, as when one looks up to the heavens.

The purely formal description of this process is the cosmological proof as an inference: Everything contingent presupposes something necessary; but this world is something contingent, a mere aggregate; therefore it presupposes something necessary. This proof goes from the contingent to the necessary; but instead we can also posit the finite and infinite, or the one and many. The ordinary formulation of this inference is as follows: because there is the contingent, there must also be the necessary. But the truth is that the contingent, the many, etc., do not truly exist, but only the One. This can also be grasped abstractly as follows: The truth in all determinate being [*Dasein*] is being [*Sein*]. The singular finite being *is* the infinite inasmuch as it is essentially related to its negative (human beings to air, water, etc.) and so raises itself to the infinite. In the common consciousness of these proofs the negative moment is lacking; the finite, the starting point is left standing, as it is, so that the infinite appears as something mediated, conditioned. But inasmuch as the many is posited rather as something that does not have being, the transition and mediation are also reduced to the level of semblance.

The other aspect is

2. *The relationship of substance to accidents.* The substance turns toward the accidents, which have been forgotten in the process of elevation. Spirit does not confine itself to the result of the process but grasps it in its entirety. What is in and for itself necessary is without qualification, but it also implies accidents, which are determined as a kind of being that is nothing, as a nullity. These accidents are constantly alternating and transmuting between being and nothing, etc.; birth is death and death birth. All that subsists is this change, and the latter thought of as unity is the substantive. This is the Oriental or Spinozist substance.¹⁸

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18. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 90.

What is now lacking is that we have only coming to be and passing away, not the self-activity of substance. Substance is not yet subject, it is still inwardly without determination. Shapes come and go, but without purpose. Everything enters into substance, but nothing comes back out of it,¹⁹ i.e., nothing determinate, only a revel of confused images (as in the case of the Hindus). This system is usually called *pantheism*. Substance relates itself passively and negatively to things: on the one hand it is only through things that it subsists; on the other, substance is the purification of being from this limitation, i.e., the annihilation of the finite. To interpret pantheism as treating every [finite] thing as God is just for this reason absurd. Pantheism is to be found in the loftiest form among Oriental poets, especially the Persian Muslim poets, e.g., Jalal-ud-din Rumi [translated] by Rückert.²⁰

~The essential relationship of substance to the accidental is to be its power. The abstract thought of substance can perhaps confine itself to this one aspect, but religion, as the consummate idea, must also, even in its subordinate stages, include the moment of spirit, which is still absent from mere substance. Now as substance itself is not spirit, spirit is external to substance, in the form of finite spirit, a human being, as the executor of this power that pertains to substance.²¹ But this is only one aspect of the matter, that humanity in this or that individual exercises authority; the other aspect is that human beings are of no account vis-à-vis substance; so it is only through subjection and renunciation that they achieve identity with this power. Thus substance for its part is actual as finite spirit, but
618 over against it stand other [beings] that are not independent. |

Such [is] the general character of this form of religion. It has come into existence in determinate fashion in three forms of Oriental religions:

(1) *Chinese* religion. Here the substance is known, but as inwardly determined foundation, as *measure*.

19. [Ed.] Hegel's analysis at this point touches on his critique of Spinoza, as elaborated especially in his lectures on the history of philosophy.

20. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, n. 22.

21. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 82.

(2) *Hindu* religion. Substance as abstract unity, akin to spirit; human beings raise themselves to the level of this *abstract* unity.

(3) *Lamaism* and *Buddhism* find in a particular individual substance made concrete in this way, a level to which other human beings then also raise themselves, this being *annihilation*.

1. "Chinese Religion: The Religion of Measure"²²

Fundamentally the Chinese state religion is likewise a pantheism of this kind.²³ Substance is known as measure, and these hard-and-fast determinations are called reason. These laws and measures are initially figurations, then, grasped more abstractly, categories, e.g., – yes, – – no.²⁴ These categories have their concrete significance in regard to nature, in regions of the world or elements, and also in regard to human beings, in the five basic laws—relationship to one's parents, one's ancestors, the emperor, brothers and sisters, spouses,

22. [Ed.] We have added the subhead since it indicates the unique way that Hegel defined Chinese religion in 1831. It is noteworthy, of course, that ancient Chinese religion is no longer treated under the category of "nature religion" but is the first of the religions of rupture (*Entzweiung*). In the *Science of Logic*, pp. 327 ff. (cf. GW 11:189 ff.), "measure" (*Mass*, *Maass*) is the third category of the doctrine of being, in which the first two are united, namely quality and quantity (or determinateness and magnitude). It is *qualitatively* determined *quantity*. Hegel regards it as replacing the Kantian categories of relation and modality, and the Spinozistic category of mode, which is the third after substance and accidents, or substance returned to itself. In the 2d ed. of "The Doctrine of Being" (1832), on which the English translation is based, and which Hegel was preparing for publication while lecturing on philosophy of religion during the summer of 1831, he refers to "Indian pantheism" as an instance of measure (including both Hinduism and Buddhism) (pp. 328–329). Measure in its more developed, reflected form, as with the Greeks, is necessity or fate. Thus to conceive God as "measure" is an advance beyond an undialectical view of substance, and an approximation to an understanding of God as "essence," since essence is already implicit in measure. It would appear, then, that Hinduism and Buddhism are also religions of measure, but at a higher stage, the stage at which substance takes the accidents back into its abstractly determined unity.

23. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 100.

24. [Ed.] A reference to the eight Gua, which are discussed first and foremost in the Yi-jing. One line signifies yang, two lines yin. Hegel also draws on the Yi-jing in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Sibree ed., p. 117; Lasson ed., p. 280. However, he does not seem to have had any direct knowledge of the Yi-jing himself, and is probably relying on the account in the edition of the Shu-jing that was available to him, namely, *Le Chou-king*, trans. Gaubil, ed. de Guignes (Paris, 1770). p. 353, where the two lines are explained. See also 1827 lectures, annotation to n. 106.

and all one's fellow human beings.²⁵ Many devote their entire lives to the study of this reason, but the main point is that these laws are to be applied to everyday life in the empire, for otherwise misfortune befalls the state as a punishment. The maintenance of these measures is the responsibility of the emperor, the son of heaven, of Tian, i.e., of the visible heaven with its proportions. The emperor alone worships and sacrifices to the law, to heaven; the others worship the emperor. If public misfortune occurs in the form of wars, flooding, or cholera, the emperor does penance for not holding the reins of the kingdom as tight as he should have done, and he also calls on his officials to examine themselves.

619 In Chinese religion everything is reduced to a moral life, and it can therefore be termed a moral atheism.²⁶ These duties and categories of measure are, though | of more ancient origin, contained especially in the work of Confucius.²⁷

These hard-and-fast categories, however, are an aggregate of many many particular determinations, which are also known as activities and powers, but as subject to the emperor. They are pictured more particularly as deceased ancestors, but also as fantastic images or genii.²⁸ A new dynasty installs a new circle of genii; on this occasion the graves of the ancestors who had previously been powers are destroyed and the new pattern of organization [is] read out to the genii by a general, those who have been deposed being roundly abused. This is what happened with the inauguration of the Zhou dynasty in 1142 B.C.²⁹ The particular vocations of the individual are also specified by particular powers, especially the Shen or genii. This

25. [Ed.] See *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1776–1814), 5:28. In his lectures on the philosophy of world history, Hegel refers in this regard to the Shu-jing (see *Le Chou-King*, pp. 12, 33, 154).

26. [Ed.] Contrary to the wording of the text, Hegel in all probability applied this epithet not to Chinese religion as a whole but to Confucianism. See *Le Chou-King*, p. iii.

27. [Ed.] Hegel's knowledge of the works of Confucius is derived partly from the earlier, influential work, *Confucius Sinarum philosophus* (Paris, 1687), and partly from the translation of the Lun-yü by J. Marshman, *The Works of Confucius* (Serampore, 1809), vol. 1. He could also have found a detailed if somewhat embellished account of Confucius's life in *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, vol. 12.

28. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 106.

29. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 172. The actual date was 1122 B.C.

opens the door to all manner of superstition; people find their freedom in imputing whatever runs counter to them not to themselves but to this or that genie. The Chinese also make fetishes for themselves and have soothsayers; prophecy takes the form of throwing little rods, which correspond to these universal lines.

2. Hindu Religion: The Religion of Abstract Unity³⁰

“Whereas in Chinese religion the [divine] power is known as an aggregate of basic characteristics—in other words, not as reason or as [first] principle, [i.e.,] as spirit—in Hindu religion this multiplicity is resumed into unity, and this concentration is the beginning of spirituality, is thinking, which is the One determining itself [*das Eine sich selbst Bestimmende*]. The starting point of Hindu pantheism is that substance is a kind of thinking, and exists in our thinking. But this still does not make spirit an absolute of this kind. Thinking remains locked in self-containment; it may be the source of all power, but it gets no further than this representational image. Second, thinking is in and for itself the elaboration of the difference to yield the system of appearance. Since, however, the principle of Hinduism has not yet matured to this level, this development [i.e., the elaboration of the difference] falls outside it and is at the mercy of a wild infinity. Third, the spirituality of the idea is completed as a result of the differences being finally taken back into unity. This return does occur in Hinduism, but in a way that is devoid of spirit. All moments of spirituality are present, but they do not constitute spirit.

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30. [Ed.] In 1831 Hegel reverses the order in which he treats Buddhism and Hinduism, taking up Hinduism as the older of the two religions and the source of Buddhism, which of course it is. In his time there was still scholarly uncertainty as to which of the two was older. Hegel's reversal may not reflect more precise historical information but rather a clearer articulation of his basic religio-geographical-historical schema, namely, the advance of *Geist* from China to India (and the India-born religions), then to the Near East (Persian, Jewish, “Phoenician,” Egyptian religion), and finally to Greece and the West. In any case, since Hinduism now precedes Buddhism, it assumes the role of providing the conceptual advance to unitary substance that Buddhism held earlier, and consequently Buddhism receives only brief attention. Moreover, the defining characteristic of Hinduism is now “abstract unity” rather than “phantasy” (phantasy is rather the mythological form of the unity). Finally, in line with his 1831 highlighting of the Trinity and of triadic logical structures, it is not surprising that Hegel attends at greater length than before to the Hindu Trimurti.

We have now to consider in the first place this abstract One, "then the wildness of phantasy given free rein,"³¹ and finally the taking back [of everything] into the One."³² The cultus is bound up with this third stage.

1. Here the principle is a determinate and self-determining universal, but it does not advance beyond this formal level of knowing.

This initial principle is called Brahman, about which we are told that we think this universal and that our thinking itself *is* this universal. Brahman enters into existence as this thinking. This principle, and our abstract thinking, is power.³³ "This pure power has created the world; in Hindu presentations it is portrayed in very different ways, but always with the basic feature that the pure self-relating activity of thinking is self-production. This pure activity is also termed the "word." According to one presentation, Brahman created water and placed in it a seed from which was formed an egg; in the egg Brahmā was born; he divided it by the power of his thought, and by his word he brought into being the other forces.³⁴ According to another, there was initially only the One, who through the power of thought first created desire, etc."³⁵

This thinking, however, is known as thinking in self-conscious beings, in *human* beings; in other words, Brahman exists in the caste of Brāhmans, and their reading of the Vedas is God himself.³⁶ Since self-consciousness in its abstraction is Brahman itself, the cultus of Brahman coincides with Brahman itself, and it has no separate cultus. In cultus, human beings are filled with the content of the divine essence but are still capable of distinguishing it clearly from themselves. With Brahman this distinction, and with it cultus, disappears. The task of Brāhmans is to bring about this abstract self-consciousness. When a Hindu prays to the honor of some deity, with eyes closed, arms folded and mind devoid of thoughts, this *is*

31. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 231.

32. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 193.

33. [Ed.] See *Werke* texts, 1824 lectures, n. 262, and 1827 lectures, n. 194.

34. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, annotation a to n. 217.

35. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 251.

36. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 217. See also annotation f to this note.

Brahman.³⁷ “The acme of cultus consists not in affirmative but in purely negative redemption from finitude, the dulling and annihilation of consciousness; instead of liberation it is only the shunning of particularity. |

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The Brāhmans are born from Brahmā’s mouth; they are this absolute power immediately. The other castes can rise to this only through the mediation of endless penances.”³⁸ But “penances” here is not to be taken in the Christian sense; they are here the path to perfection without the presupposition of sin. Hindu philosophy is equally abstract; its purpose is not concrete insight into God, the world, etc., as it is with us, but rather withdrawal from all concrete content.”³⁹

The abstract self-consciousness, however, is known here as the absolute power. Whoever achieves it through such austerities is called a Yogi. A Yogi or Brāhman can control the weather, unmake kings, fly, etc.⁴⁰ But this self-consciousness is known generally as the power of *nature*; a Brāhman inherits the world—but unconsciously,⁴¹ just as this absolute thinking is always unconscious thinking.

The Hindus also have animal worship; the cow in particular is greatly venerated. In the dulling of consciousness that is the divine, humanity is not far removed from the beast. Since any given human activity ranks as a nullity, there is also no freedom in India; for freedom implies that particular human purposes are regarded as essential.

2. Since unity is known only as abstract, multiplicity lies outside it. This is where mythology takes root. Just as unity is what is devoid of figure, multiplicity is a multiplicity of figures. The mythology has a twofold aspect: (1) this manifold content, which is not known as the inward unfolding of the first [the unity] but falls outside it. But (2) these manifold forms are not regarded prosaically according to their determinate categories, as things, but are invested through

37. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, p. 337, including n. 263.

38. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 244. See also the editorial annotations to this note.

39. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 280.

40. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, nn. 277, 289.

41. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, annotation f to n. 217.

phantasy with spirituality, with soul.⁴² As the content is wholly limited, e.g., the Himalayas or Ganges, the subjective element attaching to it is empty form. In the religion of beauty the spiritual form of the subject is always matched by a spiritual content, but in Hinduism by a natural. This mismatch between content and form lies at the root of what is the ugliness of the mythological figures—a deity with elephant's head, etc.^{43 44} |

The most important element in Hindu mythology is the Trimurti: Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva.⁴⁵ Vishnu is here the main determining factor; he is active in this world below through his incarnations. His incarnations are described—how he comes as loving shepherd, etc., depicted with all the grace of Hindu arabesque. Shiva, or Mahadeva (*magnus deus*), [is the third moment]. This third moment, if it wanted to be spirit, and to have the dignity of the Christian Trinity, would have to be the return of the whole within itself. The first, abstract, only implicitly subsisting being of Brahman would thus have to become a concrete, posited unity. But instead, this third moment is only the spiritless determination of coming to be and passing away. Shiva is represented more particularly in the symbol of procreation, as male and female. The Trimurti is also portrayed with three heads.⁴⁶ Thus the way it is figured echoes the spiritual, but in spiritless fashion; in this being-outside-self there is only a wild spinning around, devoid of spirit. Krishna and Shiva are produced only later, as the fruits of phantasy impelled by reason and instinct; they are not to be found in the oldest books of the Vedas.⁴⁷ Some Hindus worship Krishna, others Shiva, and this often leads to religious wars.⁴⁸ In themselves both are Brahmā.

42. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 229.

43. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, nn. 232, 233.

44. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to the Hindu god Ganesha, a companion of Shiva, with whose image he was probably familiar from G. F. Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–1821), plates xxvii, xxix. See also William Jones, "On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India," *Asiatic Researches* 1:226 (the elephant head is a "symbol of sagacious discernment"), including the figure following this page; also 1:586.

45. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 238.

46. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, annotation to n. 222.

47. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 258.

48. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 259.

In addition to these general foundations, everything possible is personified in the same superficial manner—the Ganges, the Himalayas, love, the cunning of a thief, etc. At the summit of the subordinate world of deities stands Indra, the god of the heavens. These gods are transitory and tremble before Vishvamitra.⁴⁹

The cultus consists in particular usages and texts whose purpose is the blotting out [of consciousness]. For instance, there are various ways of reading the Vedas—backwards, by repeating every second word, etc.⁵⁰ The acme is this annihilation—even in a bodily sense, by drowning in the Ganges, being crushed beneath the wheels of Shiva's chariot,⁵¹ also intoxication through sensual overindulgence. |

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3. Buddhism and Lamaism: the Religion of Annihilation

These religions are very much akin to Hinduism.⁵²

Lamaism is also pantheism, but the universal presence of substance already gives way to the concrete presence of the individual, who is worshiped as absolute power. This individual eats and dies like any other, yet is at the same time the power of substance, which is something unconscious. There are three Lamas, chief among whom is the Dalai Lama in Lhasa under Chinese rule; the second was in Tashilūmpo when he was visited by the Englishmen, a child three years old; the third was in northern Tartary.⁵³ If a Lama dies, a new one must be sought, for which purpose there are distinguishing marks in the folds of the face.⁵⁴

49. [Ed.] For the parallel *Werke* text, see 1827 lectures, n. 234; for a *Werke* addition on the Ramayana account of Vishvamitra, see 1827 lectures, n. 244, including the editorial annotations.

50. [Ed.] See H. T. Colebrooke, "On the Vēdas, or Sacred Writings of the Hindus," *Asiatic Researches* 8:390. Colebrooke actually says, "repeating the words alternately, backwards and forwards," which is somewhat different; he adds that copies of the Rig-Veda and Yagush are especially prepared for these modes of recital.

51. [Ed.] For the source of Hegel's reference to the practice of drowning oneself in the Ganges or allowing oneself to be crushed beneath the wheels of one of the chariots used to carry images of certain gods (the source does not actually speak of Shiva) during solemn festivals, see James Mill, *The History of British India*, 3 vols. (London, 1817), 1:274–275. The term *Rädernlassen*, which we have translated "being crushed beneath the wheels," is uncertain in S's text but is confirmed by the source.

52. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 139.

53. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 183.

54. [Ed.] The source of this assertion has not been identified. For other methods of regulating the succession see 1827 lectures, n. 190.

Unlike Hinduism and Lamaism, Buddhism does not have a living being but a dead teacher, Buddha, as its object, though Buddha is also worshiped by the Hindus as an incarnation of Vishnu. His physical presence, however, is preserved by religion. This religion is very widespread, in Ceylon, China, among the Burmese, etc. In this religion, as in Hinduism, the acme is to be united with Buddha, and this *annihilation* is termed nirvana.⁵⁵ Those who do not attain this nirvana during this life have to undergo the transmigration of souls.⁵⁶

C. THE RELIGION OF FREEDOM⁵⁷

The essence of this stage is that substance determines itself inwardly.⁵⁸ This determinateness, because [it is] *self-determina-*

55. [Ed.] See *Werke* addition, 1827 lectures, n. 151.

56. [Ed.] On Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu see 1824 lectures, n. 214; on nirvana, 1824 lectures, p. 314 and n. 216, and 1827 lectures, pp. 565–568.

57. [Ed.] The third section of the 1831 lectures begins with the “transitional” religions, Persian and Egyptian, which in the earlier lectures were treated at the end of the first section. Judaism (earlier the first of the religions of spiritual individuality) is now included among these transitional religions, to which a brief section on the religion of anguish is also added. This arrangement has the advantage of linking together all of the Near Eastern religions in a single section and showing certain logical connections and progressions between them. It also shows the advance of spirit from China to India to the Near East to Greece, Rome, and the West. It has the disadvantage of seeming to reduce Judaism to the same level of significance as the other religions treated in this section. In fact, however, Hegel’s discussion shows that he attributes far greater significance to Judaism than to the others. It is certainly misleading to categorize Judaism under the term “dualism,” as Hegel does in the outline at the beginning of the section. If Judaism is dualistic, it is so in a quite different sense than Persian religion is: it is the duality or difference between Creator and creation, and the fact that the anguish of finitude does not seem to be taken into the divine substance itself, as it is in the religion of anguish, with its symbolic representation of the death of God. When Hegel actually discusses Judaism, it is as the “religion of the good,” i.e., of the God who is good and wise as well as omnipotent. This shift indicates that the schema is still fluid in Hegel’s mind. In fact, the “division of the subject” at the beginning of the 1831 lectures gives yet another picture, locating the transitional religions at the end of the second moment rather than at the beginning of the third (see Vol. 1:463). Finally, the new arrangement has the disadvantage of downplaying the difference between Greek religion and Roman. Can the latter be described as a religion of “freedom” and “reconciliation”? Again the actual treatment shows that it cannot.

58. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 256.

tion, is not a finite determinateness but rather one that is appropriate to universality; therefore substance is defined right away as good. But good exists on its own account, self-containedly, and hence it enters into conflict with evil, which gives rise to dualism. But this is initially one of the

1. Transitional forms.

a. Dualism [Persian and Jewish religion]. The next step then is |

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b. That this conflict is taken into substance itself as a constituent moment, in the form of anguish ["Phoenician religion"]—the god dies.

c. This is then a self-dissolving conflict, a struggle to emerge from this conflict and come to oneself and to freedom [Egyptian religion].⁵⁹ This ultimately gives rise to

2. Greek religion.

[3. Roman religion.]

1. Transitional Forms

a. *The Religion of the Good*

The religion of the good has been manifest in two forms, (1) as the *Persian* religion, where, however, personality was only superficial, confined to a natural configuration, and (2) as the *Jewish* religion, where the good exists on its own account, as creating nature.

(1) Persian Religion

~Brahman was unity devoid of determination and therefore devoid of consciousness. The next step is for the One to determine itself. But the highest level of the self-activity and [self-]determination of spirit is, on the side of knowledge, truth, and, on the side of volition, the good; and the true and the good are the same. Power is also determining, but only in general; [it is] something contingent because the determining [is] devoid of purpose. This is the point where the essential determination—definition in terms of the absolute purpose—enters into play, and this is the good. At the very outset, however, this good is only abstract, and consequently it is there in

59. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 266.

the purely immediate form of the physical [being] that has not yet been particularized, the form of *light*.

Because this good and self-determining [power] is initially abstract, however, there is in addition something other than it; pure light is not manifest without darkness, nor abstract good without evil.⁶⁰ This is *dualism*. Light is here wholly identical with good—it is not merely a symbol. Persians do not worship fire because it burns, |
 625 but only what gives light within it. Personified in a superficial manner, light is called Ormazd. Ormazd himself, like his manifestation, the light, is a particular [being], a genie; he is himself one of the “amshaspands,” the spirits of the stars. The kingdom of light was mirrored in the Persian state, where the king stood at the apex and seven notables beside him. Ormazd is the life-giving element; everything that has life and shares it belongs to his kingdom.⁶¹ The special role of the cultus is to glorify Ormazd in his creation, by promoting life, agriculture, etc. Alongside this kingdom of light, however, there is pictured the kingdom of darkness, of Ahriman, the two being locked in mutual struggle, and this struggle is also represented as that between Iran and Turan.⁶²

(2) Jewish Religion

Whereas the good as light only had personality attached to it as something superficial, in the Hebrew religion the good is *for itself* in such a way as to belong to the essence of the substance; the light of Persian religion on the other hand could as readily give free rein to the characteristic of personality. At the same time this absolute, free subjectivity now exists as an exclusive singularity—God essentially as the One. What we now have to consider is (a) this absolute

60. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 281.

61. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 284, including the editorial annotations.

62. [Ed.] On the struggle between Iran and Turan, see *Zend-Avesta*, ed. Kleuker, 2:200, 202, 251 et passim (cf. *Zend-Avesta* [SBE] 2:67, 71, 189). The mythical story of this struggle was, however, probably known to Hegel less from these isolated references than from J. Görres's translation of the *Book of Kings*, which centers on this struggle (*Das Heldenbuch von Iran aus dem Schah Nameh des Firdussi*, 2 vols. [Berlin, 1820]). See also above, *Ms.*, n. 18 (where, however, Hegel appears to regard this book as pantheistic rather than dualistic).

subject, then (b) what is posited separately from the One, namely, the world, and (c) the relationship of humanity to the One.

(a) In reference to God, every natural mode of existence disappears, because he is posited to subsist merely for thought; hence this is where the religion of spirit begins. It is precisely this subjectivity that constitutes the progress as compared with Persian religion: the Persian power of light is an impersonal unity, that which is One, while the Jewish God is personal, he who is One. As subject, God is what is mediated with itself, and hence he is no longer the unmediated, the natural; no image may be made of him, he cannot be cognized in immediate, sensuous fashion, but only through the medium of thought.

(b) Here for the first time God is truly known as *creator* and lord of the world. For it is only as what mediates itself with itself that the [divine] subject is what effects primal division—and this is the creation of the world. | ~Creating is not an immediate mode of being; instead the world is made from nothing, i.e., from *its* nothing, and this negative is itself the affirmative once more, the plenitude of power of the good.⁶³ In the earlier religions the [first] category is always theogony, and the basic characteristic is the mistaken category of issuing forth, of emanation; it is only with subjectivity that this disappears and the category of creation comes in, as that of primal division [*Urteil*]. This primal division is the eternal goodness of God, for as falling outside the One, what has been differentiated has, properly speaking, no right to exist. This negative character is also manifest in it; it passes away and so characterizes itself as appearance.

⁶⁴(c) As regards the relationship of this creation to the One, the good, absolute subjectivity's bringing forth is not a wild release; on

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63. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 457.

64. [Ed.] Beginning here, and continuing for the next four paragraphs, Strauss's excerpts show that in 1831 Hegel introduced into his treatment of Judaism a discussion of the story of the fall, which in the earlier lectures had been taken up in relation to Christianity because the story of Adam and the fall had been appropriated by the Christian religion but neglected by the Jewish. Now, however, the problematic under which Hegel is treating Judaism is that of good and evil: it must be shown how and why evil enters into the unity of finite spirit but not of God as absolute spirit. Just this marks the profound difference between Jewish and Persian religion; the antithesis

the contrary, it is at home in what it brings forth, the creation is a likeness of the creator. In the process the world, as external, is demoted to the level of what we call prosaic things; it is stripped of divinity, it becomes no more than the manifestation of God. To be this mirror of divinity is the purpose of the world. Thus this religion is the religion of sublimity.

[But] human being, as active, mirrors God in quite a different way than does nature. The antithesis of good and evil also occurs in Persian religion; for it, however, evil is not found within the unity of spirit itself but outside God in another being. In the Jewish religion evil, as cleavage, enters into the unity of spirit itself—though, to be sure, not of spirit as *absolute* spirit, for even in its absolute and primal division, in the world, absolute spirit is at home; the world is good. But spirit as *finite* is the locus of good and evil and the struggle between them.

Here for the first time the question how evil has come into the world acquires a meaning. In Persian religion, good and evil *existed*; but here, where God is defined as subjectivity and everything is posited by him, evil contradicts this whole foundation. We are told about this in the form of a parable or myth, Genesis, chap. 3, where unsuitable features have also entered in because of the historical form. There is a profoundly speculative feature in this story. Adam is humanity in general, and what happens to him concerns human nature as such. It is forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge of good
627 | and evil, though such knowledge constitutes the essence of spirit, the likeness of God. But knowledge has this two-sided aspect, the freedom to determine itself to caprice [*Willkür*] or to the good. Humanity's aim is to transcend this cleavage, to enter again into harmony with itself and with God, to regain the state of innocence; this is represented here as meaning that the cleavage should never

of good and evil is grounded neither in a cosmic dualism nor in absolute spirit but rather in the free fall of finite spirit. This is the insight conveyed by the Adamic myth, which accordingly is internal to the logic of Jewish religion (as well as Christian). Hegel's recognition of this reflects a deeper appreciation for Judaism, even if the structural framework in which he takes up Jewish religion in 1831 is in other respects unsatisfactory. A lengthy variant text from the *Werke* is found in the 1824 lectures, n. 541 (parallel in the excerpts follows).

have occurred. God's judgment [*Urteil*] is on the one hand that human beings have actually become like God, and on the other hand that they are, by way of punishment, driven out of Paradise, with death and toil as their lot in consequence. Here we can see what this consciousness lacks, for the fact that human beings by their own activity fashion themselves as ■ likeness⁶⁵ [of God] and so show their superiority over nature is one of their advantages; and death is fearful, a punishment only to those who have still no consciousness of spirit in its essentiality. The true tenor of this story accordingly consists in positing the necessity of humanity's transcending the natural state but positing also the task of spirit's return into absolute unity with itself.

This story of the fall lay fallow in Jewish religion and attained its true meaning only in the Christian religion. The struggle between good and evil does indeed appear as an essential characteristic of Judaism, but in such a way that evil is represented as occurring in a purely contingent fashion, in single individuals, over against whom stand the just, in whom such a struggle is wholly absent or at least does not exist as an essential moment. Justice is said to consist in worshiping God and fulfilling his commandments; the struggle and pain of evil is portrayed in an especially striking manner in the Psalms, but to a greater extent only as pertaining to the individual.~

In Hebraic religion, God is known essentially as lord and doubtless also as love and justice; but in the Book of Job,⁶⁶ for example, the claim made on God's justice is resignedly subordinated to his power. ~God is the Lord of the people of Israel, and *only* of them. The other Oriental religions are such that they cleave to nationality because with them God | is still known in a categorially particular way. With the Hebrews, however, God is known in his full universality. Objectively speaking, therefore, God is universal lord, but viewed subjectively the Jewish people alone is his chosen property, because it alone recognizes and worships him. But the extension of this subjective relationship, meaning that the Gentiles also are to be worshipers of Jehovah, is expressed in many writers, particularly

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65. [Ed.] *Ebenbild*: reading uncertain.

66. [Ed.] See Job 40:3–4; 42:1–6.

in the prophets.⁶⁷ We too can say that God is only the God of those who worship him, for his nature is to know himself in his image, in subjective spirit. Objectively God is creator of heaven and earth. To be sure, we also find here the distorted formulation that he is mightier than other gods.⁶⁸ God has imposed his measure and his aim on all, including humanity. The laws do not yet appear as laws of reason but as prescriptions of the Lord, and in that connection all manner of political prescriptions enter in, down to the smallest detail, in external categories, so that the eternal laws of right and ethics, which subsist in and for themselves, stand on a par with laws relating to blue or yellow curtains.⁶⁹ All this stems from the characterization of God as the lord whose worship is a form of service through which the subjective spirit does not attain freedom; thus there is no differentiation between divine and human laws. In this abstract direction toward the one Lord lies the ground for that formalism of constancy which we find in the Jewish spirit in reference to its religion, in the same way as in Islam we find the formalism of expansion. And because the subjective spirit achieves no freedom in it, there is also no immortality; rather the individual vanishes away in the goal of the service of Jehovah, preservation of the family, and long life in the land.⁷⁰

Thus we have here at one and the same time both struggle and anguish in the finite subject. The next step is the objectification of this anguish; for if power and substance are to become spirit, this moment of antithesis and its resolution are indispensable. This anguish of unfreedom is to be found on its own account—not yet taken back into unity—in a number of religions, which we can designate the “religion of anguish.” |

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67. [Ed.] This inclusion of other peoples is found especially in the exilic prophets, e.g., Isaiah 40–55 (Deutero-Isaiah), and in the postexilic period, e.g., Haggai 2:6 ff. Although Hegel does not distinguish the different prophetic periods, he recognizes that this universalism occurs in later writings. Thus in the variant from the *Werke* contained in the 1827 lectures, n. 492 (see below, n. 70), he alludes to Ps. 117:1, Isa. 66:21, and other passages (see annotations to that note).

68. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 492, annotation c.

69. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring to the furnishings, not of the temple, but of the tabernacle. See Exod. 35–38, 40, esp. 36:35, 37; and 38:9, 16, 18.

70. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 492.

*b. The Religion of Anguish*⁷¹

[It is found] specifically in a few Near Eastern, and especially Phoenician, religions. In Hebraic religion we have spirit as lord and as servant, i.e., estranged from itself; in order to be actual spirit, it must turn away from this estrangement and return to itself. However, this still pertains to the element of natural life as a process with symbolic significance.

Here belongs the representation of the *phoenix*, a death that is the reentry into a rejuvenated life—and this is what spirit is. Here we no longer have the struggle between two distinct principles but the process in regard to a *subject* itself, and not a human but rather the divine subject.

A more proximate form of this process is Adonis. In spring there is a festival of mourning during which Adonis is sought with great lamentations, then on the third day a festival to commemorate his resurrection. On the one hand this has the character of a consciousness of the course of nature, but it is also to be taken symbolically as meaning that this transition is a universal characteristic, a moment of the absolute.⁷²

71. [Ed.] What Hegel describes as “the religion of anguish” is not Phoenician religion in any historical sense, but a construct that he seems to have derived from classical sources. Phoenician religion was in fact a form of Canaanite nature religion, lacking any association with the sacred bird known as the phoenix. It was the Greeks who called these Canaanite peoples “Phoenicians,” probably because their sailors had reddened, sunburnt skin; “Phoenician” derives from φοῖνος, meaning “bloodred.” A word deriving from the same root, “phoenix” (φοῖνιξ), was also used for the sacred bird of the Egyptians, in stories recounted by Herodotus, Pliny, and Tacitus. From an excerpt contained in the *Berliner Schriften*, p. 706, it appears that Hegel’s source was Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:438, where Creuzer gives Herodotus, *Histories* 2.73 as the chief source for the myth of the phoenix. However, Herodotus’s account, in which the phoenix carries its father from Ethiopia to the sanctuary of the sun in an egg made of myrrh, does not support Hegel’s interpretation, which derives from other sources cited by Creuzer, including Pliny, *Natural History* 10.2. Hegel was attracted to the image of the phoenix as a representation of the death of God, and it is around this image that he constructed his “religion of anguish,” which is properly attached to Greek and Egyptian rather than Semitic, Syrian, or “Near Eastern” sources. As indicated below, n. 72, the *Werke* provides a complete text of this section; see 1824 lectures, n. 572 (including the annotation).

72. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 572.

c. *Egyptian Religion: The Religion of Ferment*⁷³

Properly speaking, the transition to Greek religion is found in Egyptian religion, or rather in Egyptian works of art. Here too we find phantasy, as with the Hindus, but not empty phantasmagoria; everything is symbolic, and the externalia merely express spirit's struggle to understand itself,⁷⁴ a struggle that is grasped as the activity of God himself. Egyptian religion is the religion of ferment.⁷⁵

The main figure is Osiris, admittedly one of the four younger gods, from whom, according to Herodotus,⁷⁶ eight older gods are distinguished; but it was in fact later on that the higher consciousness emerged into view. Osiris as what fructifies is opposed by Typhon, the principle of the desert. Beside Osiris stands Isis as the female principle, i.e., as the earth where he is the sun. Here again we have a natural process involving the sun, the Nile, and annual fertility.

630 | Thus the sun and the Nile symbolize the higher thought constituted by Osiris, and conversely this personification of Osiris symbolizes the Nile and sun. Osiris is killed by Typhon, Isis seeks and buries his bones, but his death is not his end; he is lord of the kingdom

73. [Ed.] In 1831 the name for Egyptian religion shifts from "enigma" (although this term is also used at the end of the section) to "ferment" (*Gärung*). The idea seems to be that spirit is struggling to rise forth out of the ferment of natural symbols that characterize Egyptian religion. This image perhaps accords more closely with the central features of this religion—the Osiris cult, the belief in immortality, the role of animal symbolism. The sphinxes may be enigmatic figures, but Hegel of course knew that the story of the riddle of the sphinx and its solution by Oedipus was of Greek rather than Egyptian provenance. In fact it is just this point that furnishes the transition from Egyptian to Greek religion in 1831.

74. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 341.

75. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 318.

76. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring, even if not quite correctly, to Herodotus, *Histories* 2.43. It was, according to Herodotus, not Osiris but Heracles who belonged to the circle of twelve gods—a middle group from whom the third, youngest group of gods stemmed, including Osiris, who was equated with Dionysus (see above, 1827 lectures, n. 327). Thus Hegel disregards the distinction between the second and third generations of gods. For the relationship of the first group of eight gods to the second group of twelve (four more being added to the original eight), Hegel was dependent on the interpretations of Aloys Hirt, *Ueber die Bildung der aegyptischen Gottheiten* (Berlin, 1821), and P. E. Jablonski, *Pantheon Aegyptiorum*, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Oder, 1750–1752).

of the dead.⁷⁷ It is true that the natural aspect is here predominant, but inasmuch as this cycle also pertains to the concept, the natural symbolizes the spiritual, but also vice versa.

There are in addition other deities who express only individual aspects of this process. Osiris is also lawgiver, founder of marriage, etc.; thus his intrinsic quality is spiritual.⁷⁸ Particular prominence, however, attaches to the kingdom of the dead, of Amenti.⁷⁹ According to Herodotus,⁸⁰ the Egyptians were the first to teach the immortality of the soul. It might seem surprising, therefore, that they took so much care to preserve the dead body. However, the regard paid to the soul is rigorously coherent with that paid to the body. When the body is dead and has paid its due to the power of nature, other peoples endeavor at least to prevent nature from exerting its power over it directly—they lay the body in the flames or the earth, and this then appears as a human deed, as the doing of spirit. In the same way the Egyptians knew human beings with their bodies to be on a higher plane than nature, and so honored the body.

In the Egyptian spirit the divine is on the one hand made [sensibly] present, while on the other hand consciousness has worked its way forward to the level of the spiritual. The tradition that the Egyptians were previously ruled by a race of robbers⁸¹ furnishes the reference

77. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 353, and 1827 lectures, n. 334. On Isis as the earth principle and her search for the bones of Osiris, see Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, chaps. 38, 18.

78. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 329.

79. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 352.

80. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 323.

81. [Ed.] *Räubergeschlecht*. S reads *Rbrgsch*. According to Herodotus, prehistoric Egypt was ruled by a race of gods (*Göttergeschlecht*) (see 1827 lectures, n. 327); according to other interpretations, by a race of shepherds (*Hirtengeschlecht*) (but see Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie* 1:299 ff.). The reading *Räubergeschlecht* is uncertain, but *Königsgeschlecht* (i.e., a race of kings who were gods) or *Hirtengeschlecht* would be inconsistent with the text. Since a source for Hegel's version of the legend cannot be found, it is possible that he has here confused legends concerning the early days of Rome and Egypt. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Sibree ed., pp. 283–288 (Lasson ed., pp. 665–673), he affirms on several occasions that the Roman state originated with a “band of robbers” or a “company of robbers” or “robber-herdsmen.” But it is also possible that Hegel was comparing the Roman and Egyptian legends, and that the comparison was truncated by Strauss or his source.

to nature. The king of the Egyptians is known not merely as the favorite of the god, especially of Ammun or Ammon, the sun-god, but as this god himself. (Alexander the Great.⁸²) In the same way the priests too are themselves in turn regarded as gods.

631 Peculiar to the Egyptians is the *worship of animals*, which is also found, as we have seen, in Hinduism, but assumed its severest form in Egypt. The different districts worshiped different | animals. To harm them brought murder and death in its train. Particular honor was paid to Apis, in whom the soul of the animal was thought [to be present].⁸³ Even if God is not yet cognized as spirit but only as unconscious power, as natural striving, still this power does come forth in animal shape. Animals' heads are often used as masks, e.g., for mummies, and this implies that the spiritual is cognized behind this animal mask and independently of it. In Egypt for the first time we see a struggle between the priestly caste and the warrior caste,⁸⁴ so that here we have human political will stepping forth in opposition to the cultus and its substantiality. The sanctuary of Neith bore the superscription: "No mortal has yet lifted my veil—I bear a son, Helios,"⁸⁵ [which means that] nature is something hidden but there issues from it something other, the manifest. Everything in Egypt denotes symbolically something unexpressed. The spirit of this people is the enigma. The transition from this enigma of the natural to the spiritual is the sphinx, with its animal body and human head.⁸⁶

It is the Greeks who make the transition from this enigma to the

82. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, annotation ■ to n. 339.

83. [Ed.] See Herodotus, *Histories* 2.65–76, esp. 69 (worship of crocodiles) and 71 (hippopotamuses); and, in regard to the sacred bull Apis, 3.28. Herodotus, however, says nothing about Apis representing "the soul of the animal," and Hegel probably got this idea from Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 23, where Apis is described as a "soul-imbued image" of Osiris, which, however, is born only when a shaft of moonlight impregnates a cow already in calf.

84. [Ed.] As confirmed by the parallel *Werke* text (see n. 86), Hegel is referring to Herodotus's report that the Pharaohs Cheops and Khafre closed the temples and prevented the people from sacrificing throughout their reigns (*Histories* 2.124, 127). The ensuing rift between the priestly and warrior castes is referred to in 2.141, and was also described in detail in A. Heeren, *Ideen . . . der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1804–1805), 2:595–614.

85. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 345.

86. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 339.

clear consciousness of spirit; and they express it in the most naive form in the story of the sphinx, whose riddle was solved by the Greek Oedipus when he pronounced the answer to be: man.⁸⁷ It is Greece that makes the transition to God being known as spirit inasmuch as it knows in him essentially the moment of humanity.

2. Greek Religion⁸⁸

a. Summary⁸⁹

The first moment was the [divine] power as substance, and then as creator and lord of created things. The next step is that this other of substance is something free, that human beings are not simply obedient to the commandment of God but that they are at the same time free on their own account in this obedience. To begin with, this determination seems to relate only to the subject, to human beings; but it relates no less to the nature of God: God is spirit only inasmuch as he eternally divests himself in the other and returns from this other into himself. As creator he posits over against himself |

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87. [Ed.] Hegel does not here distinguish between the Egyptian sphinx and the Theban sphinx that was overcome by Oedipus. For the Theban sphinx legend, see *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "sphinx."

88. [Ed.] The section on Greek religion is unusually long in Strauss's excerpts; while this may reflect his personal interest in the subject, much of his text is confirmed by parallel passages in the *Werke*. The section begins with a summary of the argument, continues with a detailed synopsis of the teleological proof, and then turns to a description of Greek religion as the religion of freedom, albeit still a freedom infected with natural being, hence the religion of beauty; we have added subheads to mark these points.

89. [Ed.] In this summary, which is both retrospective and prospective, the category of "freedom," or "religion of freedom," clearly transcends Greek religion as such. Freedom as it relates to God first appeared in the Persian idea of the good but more especially in the Hebraic understanding of God as the personal One and as wise, purposeful creator, advanced with the "death of God" in the image of the phoenix, and reached its consummation in the Christian Trinity. The freedom of humanity came to birth in Greek religion but remained tinged with finite and natural immediacy; the true basis of human freedom is when humanity knows itself to be a moment, an essential determination, in the life of the infinite God, as in the Christian idea of incarnation. Thus the religion of freedom began to emerge in Greece (and in Israel, Persia, and Egypt), but reached its consummation in the Christian West, after the setbacks it suffered in the political religion of imperial Rome had been overcome.

an other that is his likeness, and in so doing he sets himself up over against himself; but this is still not a divestment—for he continues to be defined as head, and what stands over against him is defined as subservient. The next step in the advance to the liberation of spirit is essentially this, that God loses himself, that he *dies*, and only has being through this negation of himself. This negation, this other-being of the divine, is created being; but since God also returns into himself from out of this negation, this other is a moment of the divine, and is essentially reconciled with it. Thus human beings know humanity as a moment of God; it is true on the one hand that in obedience to God they behave in a negative manner, but inasmuch as they obey a God in whom the human is an essential determination, they behave in such obedience as free. In the death of God, death itself dies again within the finite and the divine emerges from it; in this elevation above the natural state lies freedom.

The first form of this religion of art is still characterized by immediacy and naturalness. Humanity first possesses the divine in an immediate, and therefore also a finite, manifold form—this is the religion of beauty, the Greek religion, which, although its basis [is] true thought, nevertheless belongs to the finite religions because of this sensible aspect.⁹⁰

As regards the abstract foundation of this religion of freedom in its primal shape, what first emerges here is the thought of *purpose*, of purposeful activity, of the wisdom of God. For free activity is activity in accordance with purposes. Power creates, but it is not known that what creates maintains itself in what is created, that it comes together with itself in it. Purposeful doing, by contrast, is that in which no other content emerges than what was posited in advance, a doing which is only the self-maintaining of what is active. This is free activity; free power is what determines itself, and its self-determinations are called purposes.

*b. The Teleological Proof*⁹¹

Once God is raised up into this category of purposeful, wise activity, the teleological proof of God's existence comes into being. In this

90. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 574.

91. [Ed.] W₂ provides a secondary transmission of the full text of the teleological proof in 1831, which we have printed as an appendix preceding the excerpts (see

proof the two extremes, the world (as the point of departure) and God (as the point of termination⁹²), are held together through the categorial determination of purpose. | This proof is essentially a continuation of the cosmological proof: God is first known as power, and only on that basis as wisdom. This proof does first occur, properly speaking, in the free Hellenic spirit. In the words of Socrates, God has given human beings eyes to see, eyelids to cover their eyes, and eyebrows to hold back the sweat that runs from their forehead.⁹³ In the world we perceive a series of things that are mutually contingent, and yet a unity is evident to which they utterly conform. For example, human beings need light, air, water, and food; but these things come into being and exist independently on their own account, and their relation to human beings is for them an external one. Animals too are complete and self-contained; they do not express explicitly the fact that they are means for human beings, yet they are so. And since in this way things imply relations that they do not themselves posit, there must be an activity that posits these characteristics or purposes, which is the power of the things.

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Kant's critique⁹⁴ of this proof is, first, that purposive relations concern merely the *form* of things, not their material—so that God, as he who posits purpose, is merely the fashioner of the world, or demiurge. What Kant is saying is that where things are portrayed in the relationship of purpose, their relation to an other does not already contain their relation to self, the latter being separated off, as matter, from the former, as form. The question now arises whether it is right to make this distinction. This relation to self, this quiet

Teleological Proof, n. 1). A disadvantage of the new arrangement is that, if purpose is central to the Jewish concept of the wisdom of God (as it surely is, although not emphasized as such by Hegel in 1831), then Jewish as well as Greek and Roman religion should be considered in relation to the teleological proof. In the Ms., Hegel took up the teleological proof only in connection with Roman religion; in 1824, in relation to Jewish, Greek, and Roman religion; and in 1831, in relation to Greek and Roman. Here is another example of the fluidity of his conceptual schema.

92. [Ed.] Reading *Endpunkt* for *S*'s abbreviated *End(?)t*, in parallel with *Ausgangspunkt* ("point of departure"). The abbreviation could also be deciphered as *Endlichkeit* ("finitude"), in which case Hegel may have intended a wordplay: the God of the teleological proof, the God who is the end or purpose of the world, who creates the world according to purposes, is still a finite God.

93. [Ed.] See Ms., n. 240.

94. [Ed.] See Ms., n. 242.

stability, this abiding unity with self that is matter, is itself one of the determinations of form; in other words, matter is nothing other than the quiet relation to self that also marks form in all of its activity. So if God creates the form of the world, he does not first need to get the matter for it from somewhere else.

Kant's second criticism⁹⁵ of this proof is that from the great and multifarious but only relative wisdom that we perceive in the world we infer an absolute wisdom; in other words, the conclusion of the inference does not match its starting point. This much must be granted, but spirit is entitled to *think* its perceptions, i.e., to raise them from their contingency to universality. |

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A further deficiency in these proofs, which Jacobi⁹⁶ especially has underlined, is that in this form of inference the starting point, the world, appears as a foundation for God, who thus appears as something conditioned. But this is only a false appearance arising from the inference, which is only the process of subjective cognizing; and in the inference itself, what appeared as conditioning returns to being the conditioned. The result itself expresses the fact that the starting point was defective. The syllogism involves the negative moment that the determinate being of the finite purposive order is not vouchsafed for the subject that has being in and for itself, but that the eternal reason is what is true.

True purposiveness is not where purpose, material, and means are separated; on the contrary, it is the purpose that accomplishes itself in and through itself. This infinitude of the form of purpose exists in organic life; the living organism produces itself, it has itself for purpose. But its finite aspect is that it needs material from without. And, of course, every living organism needs its own peculiar nourishment as well as its inorganic nature. Since what is organic needs its inorganic material in this way, yet the inorganic is not posited by the organic, there must be a *tertium quid* that posits both. Moreover, the purposive activity of the organism, the instinct of animals, is something unconscious, not posited by them, and requires a cause [external⁹⁷] to this subject. If nature is thought of as a power

95. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, nn. 247, 248.

96. [Ed.] See *Teleological Proof*, n. 13.

97. [Ed.] Replaces an illegible word.

that produces blindly, first the inorganic and then the organic realm, then it remains a matter of chance that the organic has found [in the inorganic] what makes its existence possible; it might just as easily not have found it, as the ancients used to say about monsters that had perished for that very reason. In recent times a so-called philosophy of nature has breathed new life into this ancient representational picture.⁹⁸ But, properly speaking, human beings know themselves essentially as purpose over against the rest of nature, and furthermore they know the organic as purpose over against the inorganic. But the organism is nonetheless always related to what is outside it; there are two [terms] that stand in opposition—their truth is their unity; and the unity is in a third term that | posits this primal division. This third we can in general call God, and spirit raises itself to him from out of this purposive relation. But in order to complete the concept of God much is here still lacking; God is initially posited as organic life, as *νοῦς*, which rules the world, as the world soul (but a soul that is not separated from its body).⁹⁹ Thus we arrive at the concept of the organic life of the universe, wherein the seemingly independent images are downgraded to the level of moments or aspects.

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So far, however, we have been discussing only the form of the purposive relation; now we are discussing its content also. On this side there is in the first place a marked contrast between the finite tenor of the purposes and God, to whom they are related. For instance, this plant is ordained by God precisely to provide nourishment for this animalcule. But it also happens that many of these purposes are in no wise fulfilled: the goal of animals is a contented feeling of life, yet they are slaughtered; the goal of the seed is to unfold, yet it fails to develop and dies. In the spiritual realm, purposes of this kind are stultified to an even greater extent through human passions, through evil; whole peoples perish. So we see small purposes coming in part to fruition, and in part remaining essentially

98. [Ed.] In his history-of-philosophy lectures Hegel refers to the idea found in contemporary philosophy of nature of a mere “issuing forth” (*Hervorgehen*), which is not to be confused with purposive development. On the “ancient representational picture,” see *Teleological Proof*, n. 14.

99. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 163, and *Teleological Proof*, nn. 17, 18.

unfulfilled. But this is what reveals these purposes to be limited, and we must ascend to a *universal* purpose, which, however, we no longer find in appearance but which we infer rationally. This supreme purpose Kant apprehends as the good, and the next thing would be that the world should correspond to it.¹⁰⁰ But nature, and *a fortiori* human passions, have laws and purposes of their own, and the question would be to inquire into whether the sum of good or of evil in this world is the greater. Kant merely insists that the good *ought* to be realized, and since it is not itself the power whereby it is actualized, a *tertium quid* is here postulated—and by this means Kant arrives at God.¹⁰¹ These then are the defects of the physicotheological proof: (1) formally speaking, as regards the form of the purposive activity, it attains no further than life; (2) materially speaking, if determinate being is taken as the starting point, all that is demonstrated are finite purposes (and if the starting point is the concept of good, there is no advance beyond the level of “ought”).¹⁰²

*c. The Religion of Freedom and Beauty*¹⁰³

636 These defects of the physicotheological proof are also to be seen | in the corresponding form of religion, namely, the Greek. Through

100. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to the definition of the final end (*Endzweck*) in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* (Oxford, 1952), esp. p. 116 (Kant, *Werke* 5:448). That the world should correspond to it is probably an allusion to pp. 128–129 (*Werke* 5:458).

101. [Ed.] See *Teleological Proof*, nn. 20, 21.

102. [Ed.] See the *Werke* text of the 1831 version of the teleological proof, above, pp. 703–719. In the 1827 version, Hegel adds: “The genuine form [of the proof] is as follows: there are finite spirits. But the finite has no truth, for the truth of finite spirit and its actuality is instead just the absolute spirit. The finite is not genuine being; it is implicitly the dialectic of self-sublating or self-negating, and its negation is affirmation as the infinite, as the universal in and for itself. It is surprising that this transition was not specified in the proofs of God” (Vol. 1:431). In fact this deficiency characterizes Greek religion, to which Hegel now turns, for Greek religion thematizes *only* the finitude of humanity, not recognizing the lack of truth and the self-sublation of finitude.

103. [Ed.] In the 1831 lectures, Hegel uses several terms to characterize Greek religion: it is the religion of freedom, of humanity, of beauty, of art. The first two seem to form an ethical pair, the second two an aesthetic. Our subhead is intended to indicate this double focus. It is conceivable that in the last lectures Hegel emphasizes the ethical implications of Greek religion because of his heightened concern at this

the category of purpose, Greek religion attained to freedom, but only to the first level of freedom; it was infected therefore with natural being, a finite freedom. The natural is certainly posited as subordinate and God consequently as subject, but he is not yet raised to absolute infinitude; on the contrary, God is still finite spirit. "On the one hand he is made by human agency, on the other hand in terms of his content he is anthropopathic. And this is why this religion is a religion of humanity, or of the serene enjoyment of freedom. Everything that is humanly great is known as divine."¹⁰⁴

"As regards the natural then, it is on the one hand left behind; spirit has wrestled its way out of it. On the other hand it is still contained within spirit, though in a subordinate position."¹⁰⁵ Greek mythology clearly expresses the transition from natural to spiritual gods; the natural gods have a merely superficial personality, only a mask of spirituality—they are called the old gods or Titans, Uranus, etc. But this naturalism is a widespread feature of Greek mythology (as the elemental stuff of a figure like Phoebus, etc.). The old deities are gods of nature; admittedly they also touch upon the spiritual, but just as some are abstract externality, so others are abstract internality—e.g., the Erinyes with their wholly internal judgments. But these old gods or Titans are cast down by the new deities and banished to the borders of the earth, to outer darkness, while the new gods have established their hegemony in the clear light of human consciousness.

The new gods are spiritual, ethical, but still with an echo of the natural. Helios gives way to Apollo, he who gives light to him who knows, but Apollo still has the sun's rays around his head.¹⁰⁶ Cronus becomes Poseidon, founder of cities; but the principal god is Zeus,

time with the question of religion and state (see Vol. 1:451 n. 1). In any case Hegel attends in a special way to the connection between freedom and beauty on this occasion. Greek art is beautiful because and to the extent that it matches perfectly the concept of free spirituality (this is the mark of classical as distinguished from symbolic art). In this sense the ethical category of freedom has become the more fundamental attribute.

104. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 420.

105. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 404.

106. [Ed.] For the linking of Helios and Apollo, see 1824 lectures, n. 675, and 1827 lectures, n. 366.

the divinity of the state, and as far as his natural echoes are concerned the god of thunder and lightning.

As regards the beginnings of human consciousness and education, Prometheus is especially worthy of note. The Greeks often depict the natural state by saying that human beings used to live off plants and vegetables and were not allowed to eat the sacred oxen of Helios. It was Prometheus who taught humans to subdue the beasts and, more especially, to make fire. He then taught them to eat the flesh themselves and sacrifice to Zeus only skin and bones. It might seem surprising that this teacher of the human race should be numbered among the Titans and chained to the Caucasus.¹⁰⁷ But the arts he taught relate only to the satisfaction of natural needs, and here we come up against the insatiability of appetite, which (like Prometheus's liver) continually grows again as often as it is satisfied. Plato says of Prometheus that he was unable to bring to humanity the art of politics as this lay hidden in Zeus's citadel.¹⁰⁸

A similar transition from natural to spiritual is portrayed in Artemis. The Ephesian Artemis is bedecked with bosoms and animal figures as the generative and nourishing power of nature; the Greek Artemis on the other hand is the huntress.¹⁰⁹ Hercules too gloried in the slaying of wild beasts; in this transition the killing of beasts emerges as a major moment.¹¹⁰

Demeter is not only the teacher of agriculture; she also institutes the ethical bond of marriage and landed property. For nomads as for slaves, the ownership of land is the real beginning of divine, ethical freedom.

Pallas Athena is particularly noteworthy as the folk spirit of Athens, as the city's ethical, spiritual life. In all of these gods the basic characteristics of the rational, free will are honored. "But the spirit that is in them is still fragmented into its particular aspects—

107. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 598.

108. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 380.

109. [Ed.] See 1827 lectures, editorial annotation to n. 374.

110. [Ed.] Reading "major moment" (*Hauptmoment*) is uncertain. Hegel is referring to the labors of Hercules, in particular the overpowering of the Nemean lion, the Lernean hydra, the Arcadian doe, the Erymanthine boar, the Stympalian birds, the Cretan bull, the Bistonian mares, the Geryonian cattle, the dragon Lado, and, last but not least, Cerberus.

hence polytheism. The finitude of these gods consisted on the one hand in their naturalness, while on the other it lay in the fact that they are not yet thought, only pictured representationally, and are therefore not yet fused into a single God but are still many gods. Human beings do not simply find these essences [*Wesenheiten*] outside them, but bring them into being through their representation, as phantasy.¹¹¹ That is why the gods are given a sensuous configuration; but because at the same time they emerge as essences, the sensuous element is wholly matched to the spirit—the religion of beauty.

Since, however, it is the representation of phantasy from which the gods proceed, they appear as “made”: ποιηταί | means “makers.” As Herodotus¹¹² says, Homer and Hesiod made their gods for the Greeks,¹¹³ while Phidias’s image [of Zeus] gave them their absolute representation of the father of the gods.

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Greek religion is essentially religion of beauty. For if it is to be portrayed in sensible form, there is no other figure [*Gestalt*] for the free spirituality to which the Greeks had attained than the human figure, as the essential and necessary figure for spirit. At the same time the human figure [of Greek art] is ideal. Earlier art was symbolic—in other words, it sought to externalize some abstract representation; but then the external element could not correspond to what was within. It is only when the concept and spirit are concrete that their configuration can become adequate. In what is not beautiful there is a rupture between the eternal concept and what exists in externality; for instance, something else has contributed to the face of a Socrates¹¹⁴ than the inner concept. Where the corporeal is portrayed as begotten wholly from the spiritual soul, however, there we have beauty. But the spiritual is portrayed only through the facial features and the bodily attitude and gestures, and this can

111. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 405.

112. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 621.

113. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 409.

114. [Ed.] Hegel is probably referring to Alcibiades’ speech in Plato’s *Symposium* 215a–b. Alcibiades, addressing Socrates, declares that outwardly he resembles a statue of the satyr Marsyas (and thus is quite grotesque) but that whether the resemblance pertains in other respects is another matter.

also be presented in clothed figures; for the rest, the body is only a living organism, and its portrayal nude belongs only to [the sphere of] sensible beauty.

Although the Greek god certainly does have spiritual freedom as its foundation, it is still affected by the finitude of contingency. So there are a host of local and historical features, of natural and symbolic echoes, that enter into [the makeup of] the single deities. Subordinate categories come into play that do not belong to free spirituality—for example, the category of procreation and Zeus's countless marriage-beds. These legends obviously originate in another sphere.

639 The Greek gods are no longer abstracta but subjects and, as such, individual; they combine within themselves more than one [abstract] feature. It is the same with the heroes: Achilles is not merely the abstraction of bravery but is also love, etc. This is precisely why the Greek gods do not form a system. It is the anthropopathic side of the Greek gods. It must be said, however, that the Greek gods are marked by too small rather than too large an anthropopathic element. The God-man in Christianity is much more markedly anthropopathic; | he is an actually existing, sensible human being, but is sublated in divinity.¹¹⁵

Above this great array of finite gods there is a single power. Because the concrete is something finite and particular, this universality stands above it. But because the finite is the concrete, this universality is an abstract one. This is fate [*Fatum*], the power that is devoid alike of concept and purpose. When confronted by fate, it is only by self-denying submission that human beings can save their freedom—so that although fate conquers them externally, it does not do so inwardly. Because outward existence is not in harmony with *their* purpose, they abandon *all* purpose—this is an abstract freedom. The viewpoint of the absolute religion is that even misfortune yields an absolute content, so that the negative turns into the affirmative once more. But the Greek spirit had still no absolute content to oppose to this external necessity. Similarly, over against external contingency, the Greek people still did not possess in its

115. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 412.

political life the infinitude of the subjective will, [i.e., the ability] to make one's decisions purely from oneself; being [only] the first level of freedom, its freedom was tinged with finitude, and this is what made oracles a necessity. In deciding whether to build a house, get married, or engage in battle, one relied on the rustling of leaves, the words of priests in a trance, etc. Deciding inwardly, from one's own resources, begins with Socrates' *daimonion*, which all people now have within themselves.¹¹⁶

However, destiny [*Schicksal*] in the form of ethical justice finds its truest and loftiest portrayal in Greek tragedy, especially the tragedies of Sophocles.¹¹⁷ Here destiny is partly expressed as something incomprehensible [i.e., fate, *Fatum*], but on closer examination it is revealed as true justice. It is the collision of ethical powers, which [are] equally justified but also equally one-sided and, as they collide, perish.¹¹⁸ The conclusion then is that only Zeus is the true.¹¹⁹ Greece did not yet have this consciousness in its Homeric texts but only achieved it at the highest point of its culture. The colliding powers are family and state, conscious and unconscious.

As one of its moments the Greek cultus therefore involves enjoyment, because in cultus the Greek spirit is immediately at home with itself. More specifically it involves the recognition of these powers—all of these powers, | not simply this and that one in a one-sided manner. Another aspect of the cultus is teaching. The rhapsodies taught the Greeks their Homer. During the festivals the tragedies provided profound teachings. In the mysteries representational images were communicated that are far removed from idle chatter or argumentation; in all its lucidity the Greek spirit had still the

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116. [Ed.] On Socrates's *daimonion*, see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.1–9, esp. 1.1.4, where Socrates is said to have spoken in such and such a way, or advised his friends to do thus and so, because his *daimonion* (divine sign) had so indicated. See also Plato, *Apology*, esp. 24b–c, 26b–e; and Hegel's interpretation in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:421–425 (cf. *Werke* 14:94–101).

117. [Ed.] Elsewhere in these lectures Hegel refers on more than one occasion to Sophocles' tragedies, *Antigone*, *Oedipus Rex*, *Oedipus at Colonus*, and *Trachiniae*. See *Ms.*, p. 184; 1824 lectures, pp. 479, 497, nn. 638, 695, and annotation to n. 697; and below, *Loose Sheets*, n. 3.

118. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 428.

119. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, n. 207.

premonition that there was something beyond its sphere—hence the altar to the unknown god.¹²⁰ “The mysteries conveyed figurative portrayals of the purification of the soul and of its being taken up into the higher essence; the doctrine of immortality was particularly important here. But Socrates, the wisest of all the Greeks, refused to be initiated¹²¹—which shows that all this stood far beneath what Socrates had accomplished.”¹²² Inasmuch as in the Greek cultus humanity knows itself to be identical with the essential powers, this cultus is stamped by serenity. Cultus itself is a game in which humanity manifests itself and human beings enjoy themselves at their highest pitch of beauty and dexterity. Here there is no longer a disharmony between humanity and God, but reconciliation from the start.

“The next step is for this free spirit to cleanse itself of its finitude. The way this happens is that fate breaks in upon Greek life, these folk spirits in their particularity and naturalness perish; God is known as pure spirit, and all humanity (no longer merely a few citizens) is known as free in and for itself. One of these particular spirits raises itself to become the fate of all the others, which, being thus oppressed in their political existence, become conscious of the weakness of their gods. This fate that overthrew the world of the Greeks was the world of Rome.”¹²³

3. Roman Religion: the Religion of Expediency¹²⁴

Roman religion is not to be confused with Greek. Its principle is not beauty but external purposiveness or expediency. God is known as something that operates purposively, and the absolute purpose is the

120. [Ed.] See Acts 17:23.

121. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, n. 201.

122. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 673.

123. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1824 lectures, n. 700.

124. [Ed.] The principle of Roman religion is not beauty, says Hegel; nor is it freedom, since this is a religion that binds and dominates. Roman religion does not fit the broad category (“freedom”) under which it is treated in 1831 any more than in 1824. It is merely transitional: the way to the “cleansing” of spirit of its finitude is through the absolutization of finitude, with the result that the whole world of the gods collapses—a *Götterdämmerung*.

Roman state as the abstract power over all other states. The Roman spirit is the power of abstract universality, and was worshiped by them as *Fortuna Publica* or *Jupiter Capitolinus*. |

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The Romans are said to be the most religious of all peoples:¹²⁵ but religion was for them something binding and dominating. Their *virtus* consists in unreservedly serving the state. The particular aspects of religion also serve this purpose: the auspices in the hands of the aristocrats, and the majority of the gods introduced superstitiously at a time of need. In a writer like Virgil, gods such as Minerva or Apollo are dead machinery;¹²⁶ on this alien soil they lack what is proper to them, their ethical freedom.

The Romans also have a whole host of powers of prosaic utility, devoid of any ethical character, [such as] *Fornax* (the art of baking bread), *Pax*, *Pestis*.¹²⁷ Likewise a rustic element with festivals like the *Palilia*. The *Saturnalia* [were] of similar character. This is the one side of Roman religion—that the gods are wholly limited, external powers of nature.

The other side, however, is an abstract inwardness, a dread of some unknown inward element—an inner fate, as it were. Under this heading falls Rome's secret name: *Amor* and *Eros* or *Valentia*.¹²⁸ Whereas the Greeks were able to fashion something beautiful, a myth etc., out of anything, the Romans stood fast in this sullen inwardness, which adhered to everything as a sense of awe. For this reason the Romans had a large number of specific regulations, as for example in the event of a monstrous birth. They themselves produced no fine works of art but stole them from the Greeks. In their tragedies—e.g., in Seneca—there is no ethical principle, only slaves, wretched servants, etc.¹²⁹ In Greek drama, speech and bodily attitude were what counted most, while mime was inhibited by the use of masks;

125. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 725.

126. [Ed.] See 1824 lectures, n. 718.

127. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, pp. 210–219; and *Loose Sheets*, pp. 765–766.

128. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, annotation to n. 269.

129. [Ed.] On Hegel's adverse view of Seneca's tragedies, see *Ms.*, p. 221 and n. 298. However, even the sharpness of the judgment pronounced there does not justify what is said here. Strauss is seemingly mingling Hegel's criticism of Seneca and of the Later Comedy.

with the Romans, pantomime came into its own,¹³⁰ only to be succeeded by the bloody combats of wild beasts. Here the spectacle was one of prosaic death; to die imperturbably was for the Romans the pinnacle of greatness, e.g., Seneca—abstract greatness.¹³¹

642 This abstract power of the Roman spirit was then personified in the emperor. The emperor was God, and rightly so to the extent that he was a totally different power from wheat rust, pestilence, etc. This brought to naught the serene happiness of the previous religion. This abstract power brought into the world the monstrous unhappiness and anguish that were to be the birthpangs for the religion of truth. It was by renouncing satisfaction | in this world that the soil for the true religion was prepared. And in the fullness of time,¹³² i.e., when this state of despair had been brought about in the spirit of the world, God sent his Son.¹³³

130. [Ed.] Hegel is possibly referring to a report in K. A. Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791), pp. 88–89, which speaks of mimes performed principally by troupes from Etruria.

131. [Ed.] See Tacitus, *Annals* 15.62–64.

132. [Ed.] A reference to the New Testament concept of the fullness of time; cf. Mark 1:15; Gal. 4:4; Eph. 1:10.

133. [Ed.] See *Werke* text, 1827 lectures, n. 544.

LOOSE SHEETS

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RELATING TO HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT¹

[156a]

Roman religion – of expediency

Necessity passes over into concept – [to the] subjective [concept] – particular content

Oracles are not a [form of] cultus – they have particular subjectivity for their content

God comprehended, grasped, as expediency according to specific finite purposes – purposes of human beings

With the Romans this the main purpose – Etruria – *haruspex*, soothsayer, Sibylline Books – Pontifex – popular assemblies – *fasti* and *nefasti dies*

On occasion of Thucydides' plague Greeks introduced no particular new religion²

Oedipus of Sophocles³ – plague – at that time pray to Apollo

Melampus introduced particular rite to Greece⁴

Roman gods created out of a need

Lectisternia – where the purpose is finite – [to resist] the enemy or what restrains

1. [Ed.] These sheets are from the literary estate of Karl Rosenkranz, now deposited in Houghton Library of Harvard University. For further information, see the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 3, pp. 6–7. The sheets printed in this volume contain preparatory materials for Hegel's discussion of Greek and especially Roman religion in the *Ms.*; they are interspersed with sheets containing similar materials on the Christian religion, which are printed as an appendix to Vol. 3.

2. [Ed.] See *Ms.*, n. 259, and 1824 lectures, n. 686.

3. [Ed.] Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, prologue, vv. 1–150.

4. [Ed.] Hegel is referring to Herodotus, *Histories* 2.49. The "particular rite" was the festival of Dionysus, together with the accompanying procession bearing a phallic image.

[Being] on one's own account [means] offering resistance
Hunger [is the god] Fames, [and there are gods called] Febris,
Cloacina
Sibylline books

Innumerable festivals [dedicated] to the emperors – to make them *divi*
Where there is consensus about expediency new gods and new [forms of]
worship [are] continually [introduced]

For finite purposes are of themselves mutable – they may be forwarded [or]
they may not

Gods for finite purposes prove themselves impotent, ineffective

Russians beat their saints, throw them into the fire and replace them by others⁵

Just as the Greeks created theoretical [gods] – works of art – so the Romans
[created] practical gods or gods for practical life [*Praxis*]

Compare Roman expediency with the People of God – [whose purpose was
the] dissemination of his name

(α) Human purpose, requirement, need or happiness not natural
– this [human concern is] the content and genesis of expediency
– not free power or beauty |

[The divine] powers [are] free, not a particular purpose on its own
account, surrender it in necessity

(β) Negatively – [in] hostile [situation] – to get something or protect
oneself against something – selfishness – fear

Cultus identical

[157a]

Mystical worship – universal intuition (and setting in motion) of what is
within

Many essentialities in one – presentiment

(α) Not as purpose – with the [Greek] gods – [or with] oracles

For human beings their particular destiny is their purpose

Not a [divine] purpose, not wisdom – though it may be justice

Human beings could [believe] in these gods

Unveiling of what repels the individual

In other respects contains everything – revelatory – [shows it] forth

Out of all this:

(α) Expediency of finite purposes – have to be sought in the world, in
the natural and spiritual world

5. [Ed.] Hegel's source has not been identified, but there is a similar report in a book from which he is known to have made extracts (cf. *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 717–718), namely, C.-F. P. Masson, *Mémoires secrets sur la Russie*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1800), pp. 98–100, where, following a description of the so-called “pocket deities,” it is said that a princess heaped reproaches and insults upon her crucifix when things went badly.

(β) In the spiritual world [there is] infinite purpose; all that remains for subjectivity are the natural, finite purposes – subjective too, but subordinate –
as finite purposes, subordinate [to] the purpose that is in and for itself

Thought (α) chance, not cause, external necessity

(β) but a purposive connection – in opposition to [something] – an external connection

(γ) [one that is] in itself, i.e., an inward [connection]

Categories for nature

(α) External necessity, cause and effect

(β) Contingent external connection, and yet unity

[What is] right or just is a formal purpose

Expediency in natural things – psychological proof of the existence of God⁶

Concordance of independent, [mutually] indifferent [forms of] determinate being – to the extent that one [such form] is used as means – utility

External purposiveness [is] a tertium quid – the understanding

Presupposition of their independent existence – only sides of a relationship

Foundation, manifoldness devoid of unity |

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All bonding [seen] as external, as not the nature of the thing – on the contrary, plurality [is] the nature of the thing

Psychological forces – equally striking here – the nature of the thing is here the ego, the unity that I am

For admittedly unity is putting in order – externally

As if God were not needed for what is the nature of the thing

Mountains, sea – inorganic unities

Life, self-directed purpose the organization of a life –

Edifying considerations – theoretical

Disposed in a merely marginal, subordinate position, subordinated to an absolute purpose – felicity.

Finite purpose, so that the basic categorial determination of religion is the highest of finite human purposes – the state

Cultus one with the objective category

Need, requirement determines the object

“From thy πάθει” – here [becomes] “From thy needs”⁷

[156b]

Religion of the understanding

(α) Hard-and-fast determinacy

(α) Necessity – freedom, concept, expediency –

6. [Ed.] See Ms., n. 251.

7. [Ed.] See Ms., n. 150.

Without purpose, not wisdom – [here means] surrender of all purposes

Necessity involves mediation in general, determinacy – but in pure necessity as such [determinacy is present] only as disappearing – in other words it is so, this event has occurred – so even in terms of its content it exists as a contingent [determinacy]. Formal process of necessity – to hold fast just to the abstract alone

[There is here] a sense of depth, once the concept is a content that maintains itself against the passing over

Form of the purposive category – not something lacking ground, the coming forth of an other, but determined in advance

“Conceived” [means] to see something as [one] moment of a coherent whole – formally – [in terms of] cause and effect, even external necessity – but [the necessity] of a coherence whose inner substance is something determinate in and for itself, something primary. |

What purpose still unspecified –

Necessity degraded to the level of form

(β) Character, determinacy of the gods

Justice, virtue in Hercules – passed over from humanity to Olympus

Human virtue not defined as purpose – [that] is a Christian way of representing it – [it] is a universal purpose – [we are] not yet [at that point]

(β) Separation of purpose and reality – purpose as power over reality – negative definition

Spiritual shape – comes close to purpose – but not the understanding – beauty [does] not [see] separation impending –

In life and the ideal – to build many definitions – this purposiveness [is] unity of the concept and reality

(γ) Finite purpose – initially the purpose itself [is] formal but [it is] *one purpose* – the Roman republic – the state

(Not the infinite purpose with individuals)

(α) However, human beings [are] not means – immanent forces – do it themselves –

(β) Not in opposition to one another

[157b]

Prosaic religion. Moritz⁸

Boxers and wrestlers – p. 92 – no tragedies – behind the wings returns to life – but [there is] a veritable life-and-death struggle

8. [Ed.] Hegel bases his interpretation of Roman religion as a prosaic religion on detailed information provided by Karl Philipp Moritz, *Anthousa; oder, Roms Alterthümer* (Berlin, 1791). Although in what follows he refers solely to this work and uses virtually no other source for the 1821 lectures, his interpretation is directly

[In Greek religion] ethical drama – here only ugly [drama] and actuality
Singing songs of praise p. 93

Cereals in Greek religion – very many other peoples too

P. 100 they had the aged Ceres brought from Enna in an emergency

Similarly the aged mother of the gods from Pergamus

A succession of sacrificial animals

Jupiter Pistor p. 147 – Stator p. 168

Not produce beautiful images themselves – mainly statues of individuals

P. 101 cow in calf – reconciling the earth

P. 103 Palilia goddess of cattle fodder

[P.] 109 [festival] of Robigo, wheat rust, a terrifying being

Flora – Lares – Manes

P. 124 merchants, have their wares blessed |

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Fortuna Publica p. 126

Juno Moneta 129 – muliebris 177, virilis, fortis 167 – Lares – Manius

Goddess Carna

Ara Tranquillitatis Ventorum

No oracles

Mundus patens 200

Patriotic festivals, one after another

Sibyls p. 276

Ops consiva 203 – the day after Mundus patens

Opalia p. 252

Sancus 136

Occasion [for festivals] in every case a completely prosaic Roman event

Abstracta – Saturn

(α) Patriotic festivals

(β) Trade and fertility festivals, Ambarvilia p. 164. – The thirty curias
p. 101 celebrated the Fordicidia, each one separately – cow in calf

(γ) Festivals on the occasion of an emergency

(δ) Festivals of abasement

Temple of Saturn [was] the treasury

P. 229. The masters waited on the servants

Gifts a serious matter – Martial p. 235

Pliny removes himself 237 so as not to embarrass his slaves

Angerona p. 253 troubles and woes

Mania 255

opposed to that of Moritz, who indicates in his preface (p. vii) that he understands the sacred practices and festivals of the Romans to be the expression of a “religion of phantasy,” and indeed of the “consecration of ordinary life.” Virtually every line of what follows can be referenced to passages in Moritz’s work. The German edition provides such references, but we have omitted them, referring the reader instead to the corresponding materials in the *Ms.* (see above, pp. 206–219), where Hegel’s interpretation is set forth quite clearly and his use of Moritz is annotated.

Festival of Mens 137

– of Vacuna or leisure 145

– Jupiter Pistor 147

– Fornax 146

Pluto and Proserpine

[P.] 287 for being saved from the plague

Circumstances (α) Purpose; the state

[162a]

(β) The most finite religion

The human taken seriously; principle of immediate presence,

648 Emperor power for worldly purposes |

[163b]

Prose – negative states of affairs, for us – the negative or concrete is only a state of affairs – allegorical essences, pertaining to reflection – fever, plague, hunger – having no inner substantiality or universality – [mere] circumstances – is not easy to comprehend

Superstition, magic-working, miracles – their belief [was] in finite things taken in isolation – as absolute

Important link in the transition [to Christianity] – [God represented] concretely – [as] finite, immediate actuality

Revering the devil, from a feeling of dependence

Worshiping the emperor, an actual human being, as God – a cause of situations far more malign than fever or pestilence – [he is] lord over hunger, [and] immediately over life – revered the devil – in this [we see] the feeling of dependence at its strongest?

The categories of the concretely finite – concrete purpose – developed into immediate actuality

Transition to Christian religion

Intermediate link (α) Purpose, a concrete categorial determination

(β) Immediate actuality and singularity – spirit driven back into itself

Spectacles – murders

9. [Ed.] An allusion to Schleiermacher. On its significance, and especially Hegel's attempt to link devil worship with "the feeling of dependence," see *Ms.*, n. 292. See also the excerpt found in *Berliner Schriften*, p. 708: "Febris [fever], Pestis [pestilence], and Cloacina [purifier, from *cloaca*, sewer] were deities for them. – From this it is a short step to the devil. – These are mere physical devilments – if we raise them to the spiritual plane, then we have devils." Hegel's point seems to be that it is bad enough to venerate malignant physical powers, but it is even worse to worship the emperor. The latter is the strongest case of the feeling of dependence—but this is a somewhat different point from the one made in the *Ms.*

PAGINATION OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES FOR THIS EDITION

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

The Ms. numbers ("a" = recto, "b" = verso) are given in the text in square brackets but are reproduced here for the sake of convenience.

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a. The Metaphysical Concept of God	32b-33b
b. Concrete Representation	34a-36b
c. The Side of Self-Consciousness: Subjectivity, Cultus	37a-38b
Brief Reflection on the State, Freedom, Reason	39a
B. The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty	39a-40b
a. Metaphysical Concept	41a-43a
b. Concrete Representation, Form of the Idea	
a. The Religion of Sublimity	43a-44b
β. The Religion of Necessity	44b-47a
c. Cultus	
a. The Religion of Sublimity	47a-48b
β. The Religion of Beauty	
a. Spirit of the Cultus; Religious Self-Consciousness	49a-51a
β. The Cultus Itself	51a-58b

C. The Religion of Expediency or Understanding	59a-60b
a. Abstract Concept	61a-62b
The Teleological Proof of God's Existence	62b-64a
b. Configuration or Representation of the Divine Essence	64b-66b
c. The More Specific Nature of These Powers and Deities in General	66b-72b

THE LECTURES OF 1824

The pagination given here is that of the Griesheim transcript. While our basic text is *G*, it has been supplemented and corrected by *P* and *D*, which are not noted either in the text itself (except where there is an uncertainty about the reading) or in this listing.

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1. The Religion of Sublimity (Jewish Religion)	64-66
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b. The Form of Divine Self- Determination	67-84
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2. The Religion of Beauty (Greek Religion)	98
a. The Concept in General	98-100
b. The Content and Shape of Divine Representation	100-124
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THE LECTURES OF 1827

The pagination given here is that of the Lasson edition. When Lasson's text has been supplemented or replaced by two or more sentences from one of the extant sources (*An*, *B*, *Hu*), this is noted in the following list by the symbol "Q" (meaning *Quelle*, source). Commas indicate breaks in Lasson's text.

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In the footnotes, works are frequently cited in abbreviated form, without full bibliographical information. In cases where a short title is not immediately recognizable from this bibliography, it is so designated in parentheses following the full title. Frequently cited works by Hegel are listed at the beginning of this volume.

With respect to classical authors, the bibliography does not list specific works—e.g., individual tragedies of Aeschylus or dialogues of Plato—but rather editions with which Hegel is likely to have been familiar. In the footnotes, classical works are cited in the abbreviated short form customary today, followed by book, chapter, and section references, but without indicating the editions that Hegel himself used or modern editions. Works with both Greek and Latin titles are cited only with the Latin title.

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Terms common to Hegel's philosophical vocabulary occur with great frequency in the text and are indexed on a selective basis only when a more sustained discussion of them occurs. Mythological names, and terms related to religious history and practices, are also indexed selectively. The German for key concepts is given in parentheses. The German edition contains, at the end of Part 2 (*Vorlesungen*, Vol. 4b, pp. 859–1024), a set of exhaustive indices for the complete work—biblical references, philosophical and theological concepts, mythological names, terms relating to religious practices, proper names, and personal names. These indices can be used in conjunction with the English translation by referring to the page numbers in the margins.

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ERRATA

To Volume 1:

Page 340, line 7, read: When Mendelssohn was urged by [the Abbot] Jerusalem to change over . . .

Page 340, note 157, lines 2–3, read: Hegel is not using “Jerusalem” as a reference to the Abbot Jerusalem but is . . .

To Volume 3:

Page 141, lines 20–21, read: . . . be it ever so vain—*nos prona natamus*;²¹⁰ not to have shared . . .

Page 141, note 210, read: “We swim lying on our stomachs.” Possibly the meaning of this unidentified aphorism is that, no matter how vain, frivolous or conceited innocence may be, in fact, just as a swimmer looks downward and cannot see far ahead, so the innocent person does not share in the truth of spirit and in that sense is sinful. This aphorism may contain an allusion to Is. 25:11, an ambiguous text, which in medieval tradition was interpreted as equating the activity of swimming with the plight of the damned (“he [Moab?] will spread out his hands in the midst of it [a dung-pit?] as a swimmer spreads his hands out to swim; but the Lord will lay low his pride . . .”).

Page 193, note 78, read: This is an allusion to Goethe’s *Die Braut von Corinth*, vv. 120–123.

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

VOLUME III

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION

Edited by

PETER C. HODGSON

Translated by

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with the assistance of

H. S. HARRIS

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ABBREVIATIONS, SIGNS, AND SYMBOLS

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

- [. . .] = Editorial insertions in the text.
- < . . . > = Passages in the margins of the *Ms.*, including both passages integrated into the main text and unintegrated passages that are footnoted.
- ~ . . . ~ = Passages in the main text that correspond to footnoted variant readings. These symbols are used only in the case of textual variants, which offer a different version of the designated passage, usually from a different source, not textual additions, which occur at the point marked by the note number in the main text. Normally the variant is placed in the notes at the end of the parallel in the main text; exceptions are noted.
- = Freestanding en dash indicating a grammatical break between sentence fragments in footnoted *Ms.* marginal materials.
- ^{1 2 3} etc. = Footnotes containing (a) unintegrated marginal materials from the *Ms.*; (b) textual variants, additions, and deletions; (c) special materials from *W* and *L*, both variant readings and additions; (d) editorial annotations. The type of note is designated by an initial italicized editorial phrase in each instance. Notes are at the bottoms of the pages and are numbered consecutively through each text unit.

- [Ed.] = Editorial annotations in the footnotes; materials following this symbol are editorial.
- 34 | = Page numbers of the German edition, on the outer margins with page breaks marked by vertical slash in text. The German edition is *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, Vol. 5, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, III: Die vollendete Religion*. Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg, 1984.
- [73a] = Sheet numbers of the Ms., in the text at the point of occurrence; “a” and “b” refer to the recto and verso sides of the sheets.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

- W W₁ W₂ = *Werke*. Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. Vols. 11–12 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. 1st ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke (Berlin, 1832) (W₁); 2d ed., edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer (Berlin, 1840) (W₂). When no subscript is used, the reference is to both editions. Part III is contained in vol. 12 of both editions under the title *Die absolute Religion*.
- L = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. Edited by Georg Lasson. 2 vols. in 4 parts. Leipzig, 1925–1929 (reprint, Hamburg, 1966). Part III is contained in vol. 2/2 under the title *Die absolute Religion*.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

- Ms. = Hegel’s lecture manuscript of 1821
- D = Deiters transcript of the 1824 lectures
- G = Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures
- Ho = Hotho transcript of the 1824 lectures

<i>K</i>	= Kehler transcript of the 1824 lectures
<i>P</i>	= Pastenaci transcript of the 1824 lectures
<i>An</i>	= Anonymous transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>B</i>	= Boerner transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>Hu</i>	= Hube transcript of the 1827 lectures
<i>S</i>	= Strauss excerpts from a transcript of the 1831 lectures

SPECIAL MATERIALS IN W AND L

These are given in parentheses and identify the no-longer-extant sources of the variant readings and additions making up the special materials found in *W* and *L*. Since the source of special materials in *W* relating to the *Ms.* cannot be identified with certainty in each instance, the source designation is omitted from these passages, although the probability in most cases is that it is from *Hn*.

<i>(Hn)</i>	= Henning transcript of the 1821 lectures
<i>(MiscP)</i>	= Miscellaneous papers in Hegel's own hand
<i>(1827?)</i>	= Unverified transcripts of the 1827 lectures
<i>(1831)</i>	= Transcripts of the 1831 lectures
<i>(HgG)</i>	= Notes by Hegel in the copy of <i>G</i> used by <i>W</i> ₁ and <i>W</i> ₂
<i>(Ed)</i>	= Editorial passages in <i>W</i> ₁ and <i>W</i> ₂
<i>(Var)</i>	= Variant readings in <i>W</i> or <i>L</i>

FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS

WORKS BY HEGEL

- Werke* = *Werke*. Complete edition edited by an Association of Friends. 18 vols. Berlin, 1832 ff. Some volumes issued in second editions.
- GW = *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Academy of Sciences of Rhineland–Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 40 vols. projected. Hamburg, 1968 ff.
- Vorlesungen* = *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. 10 vols. Hamburg, 1983 ff. Vols. 3–5 contain *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, edited by Walter Jaeschke.
- Berliner* = *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*. Edited by
Schriften J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1956.
- Briefe* = *Briefe von und an Hegel*. Edited by J. Hoffmeister and J. Nicolin. 4 vols. 3d ed. Hamburg, 1969–1981.
- Early* = *Early Theological Writings*. Partial trans-
Theological lation of H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Ju-*
Writings *gendschriften*, by T. M. Knox and R. Kroner. Chicago, 1948.

- Encyclopedia* = *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.
(1817, 1830) Translated from the 3d German ed., with additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts, by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. 3 vols. Oxford, 1892 (reprint 1975), 1970, 1971. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. 1st ed. Heidelberg, 1817: forthcoming in GW, vol. 13. 3d ed., Berlin, 1830: *Werke*, vols. 6–7 (containing additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts); forthcoming in GW, vol. 19. 6th ed., based on the 3d ed. without additions, edited by F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler, Hamburg, 1959. Citations given by section numbers in the 1817 or 1830 editions.
- Faith and Knowledge* = *Faith and Knowledge*. Translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, 1977. *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie*. Tübingen, 1802. GW, vol. 4 (edited by H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler).
- History of Philosophy* = *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Translated from the 2d German ed. (1840) by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. 3 vols. London, 1892. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Edited by C. L. Michelet. 1st ed., Berlin, 1833: *Werke*, vols. 13–15. Because of variations between the two German editions, the English translation often does not correspond exactly to the cited German texts. A new German edition is being prepared by P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke: *Vorlesungen*, vols. 6–9.

- Nohl, = *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*. Edited by H. Nohl. Tübingen, 1907 (reprint, Frankfurt, 1966). These and other early writings will be newly edited and appear in GW, vols. 1–2.
- Phenomenology of Spirit* = *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, 1977. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807. GW, vol. 9 (edited by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede).
- Science of Logic* = *Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. London, 1969. *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Vol. 1, *Die objektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1812–13. GW, vol. 11 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). Vol. 2, *Die subjektive Logik*. Nuremberg, 1816. GW, vol. 12 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, *Die Lehre vom Sein*. Berlin, 1832. Forthcoming in GW, vol. 20 (edited by F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke). The English translation uses the 2d ed. of vol. 1, Book 1, hence there is not an exact correspondence between it and GW, vol. 11, Book 1.

WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS

- Baumgarten, = A. G. Baumgarten. *Metaphysica*. 7th ed. Halle and Magdeburg, 1779.
- Descartes, = René Descartes. *A Discourse on Method and Selected Writings*. Translated by John Veitch. New York and London, 1951. Contains: *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637); *Meditations on the First Philosophy* (1641); *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644).

- Fichte, = Johann Gottlieb Fichte. *Gesamtausgabe*.
Gesamtausgabe Edited by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. 30 vols. Stuttgart–Bad Canstatt, 1962 ff.
- Kant, = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*.
Critique of Judgment Translated by J. C. Meredith. Oxford, 1952. *Kritik der Urteilkraft*. 1st ed., Berlin and Libau, 1790; 2d ed., Berlin and Libau, 1793. *Werke*, vol. 5.
- Kant, = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Practical Reason*.
Critique of Practical Reason Translated by L. W. Beck. New York, 1956. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Riga, 1788. *Werke*, vol. 5.
- Kant, = Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*.
Critique of Pure Reason Translated from R. Schmidt's collation of editions A and B by N. Kemp Smith. London, 1930. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. 1st ed., Riga, 1781 (A); 2d ed., Riga, 1787 (B).
- Kant, = Immanuel Kant. *Gesammelte Schriften*.
Werke Edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. 24 vols. Berlin, 1902–1938.
- Leibniz, = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Die philosophische*
Philosophische Schriften *Schriften*. Edited by C. J. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 1875–1890.
- Leibniz, = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Selections*.
Selections Edited by Philip P. Wiener. New York, 1951. Contains *The Monadology* (1714), *The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason* (1714), and other writings.
- Lessing, = Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. *Sämtliche*
Sämtliche Schriften *Schriften*. Edited by K. Lachmann and F. Muncker. 3d ed. Leipzig, 1886–1924.
- Neander, = August Neander. *Genetische Entwicklung*
Gnostische Systeme *der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme*. Berlin, 1818.

- Schleiermacher, = Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. *Der
Der christliche Glaube* *der evangelische Kirche im Zusammen-
hang dargestellt*. 1st ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1821–22 (cf. Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Div. 1, vol. 7/1–2, edited by H. Peiter [Berlin and New York, 1980]). 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1830–31. The two editions differ considerably; Hegel knew only the first. Comparative references to the 2d ed. may be checked by paragraph number in the English edition: *The Christian Faith*. Translated from the 2d German ed. by H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart, et al. Edinburgh, 1928.
- Spinoza, = Benedictus de Spinoza. *Chief Works*. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. New York, 1951. Contains: *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670); *The Ethics* (1677); *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (1677); *Correspondence*.
- Wolff, = Christian Wolff. *Theologia naturalis metho-
Theologia naturalis* *do scientifica pertractata. Pars prior, integrum systema complectens, qua existentia et attributa Dei a posteriori demonstrantur*. Editio nova. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1739. *Pars posterior, qua existentia et attributa Dei ex notione entis perfectissimi et natura animae demonstrantur*. 2d ed. Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1741.

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

1. Text, Title, and Translation

This volume contains Part III of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*; its subject matter is the Christian religion, for which Hegel's philosophical designation is the "consummate" or "revelatory" religion.

The lectures on the philosophy of religion were delivered four times over the eleven-year period 1821–1831. Hegel's conception and execution of them differed so significantly on each of the occasions they were presented that all past attempts to conflate the several series into a single, editorially constructed text have unavoidably done violence to the materials. Hence the fundamental principle of this edition is to establish authentic and critical texts by separating the lectures and publishing them as independent units on the basis of a complete reediting of the available sources. These include Hegel's own lecture manuscript (Ms.), composed for the first lecture series in 1821; auditors' notebooks or transcripts of the 1824 lectures, of which the principal one was prepared by K. G. Griesheim;¹ the text of the 1827 lectures contained in G. Lasson's edition of 1925–1929, as compared with the two editions of the *Werke* (1832 and 1840) and checked against several recently discovered 1827 notebooks of lesser quality; excerpts by D. F. Strauss from a transcript of the lectures of 1831, of which all

1. The 1824 transcript by C. Pastenaci breaks off at the end of Div. I of Part III, leaving essentially only Griesheim as the source of the main text, checked against P. F. Deiters's much briefer transcript and supplemented by the variant passages from H. G. Hotho's freely edited notebook.

of the original transcripts have been lost; and those passages in the *Werke* for which original sources are no longer extant, which have been footnoted at appropriate places in relation to the Ms. and the 1824 and 1827 texts.

Details concerning editorial principles and procedures are contained in the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1 of this edition,² while a comparative analysis of the structure and development of Hegel's treatment of "The Consummate Religion" in each of the lecture series is provided in Sec. 2 of the present Introduction.

The most difficult editorial question relating to Part III of the lectures concerns its title, since Hegel himself used several titles. In the lecture manuscript he first wrote *Die vollendete Religion* ("The Consummate Religion"), but added the words *oder offenbare* ("or Revelatory") below the title, as an addition to it. The heading in the Griesheim transcript of the 1824 lectures is *Die offenbare Religion*, although Hegel began these lectures immediately by describing Christianity as *die vollendete Religion*. C. Pastenaci offers as a title *Die vollendete Religion oder die geoffenbarte Religion, christliche Religion*, while P. F. Deiters gives *Die notwendige, die offenbare, die christliche Religion*, and H. G. Hotho *Die christliche Religion*. Of the transcripts used by Lasson for the 1827 lectures, the Königsberg Anonymous had as its heading *Die offenbare Religion*, while J. E. Erdmann offered as a title the words used by Hegel in the opening sentences of the 1827 lectures: *Die vollendete Religion, die Religion, die für sich ist, oder die Religion, die sich selbst objektiv ist*.³ Finally, according to Strauss's excerpts, the title in 1831 was *Die vollendete Religion*.⁴

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 1, *Introduction and The Concept of Religion*, ed. P. C. Hodgson (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984) (*Vorlesungen*, Vol. 3). Vol. 2, *Determinate Religion* (*Vorlesungen*, Vol. 4), is scheduled for publication in 1986 or 1987.

3. L 2/2:237. Among the presently available transcripts for 1827, the title in the Berlin Anonymous is *Die geoffenbarte Religion*, while J. Hube uses *Christliche Religion*, and I. Boerner is similar to Erdmann, except that *offenbar* replaces *vollendet*.

4. This is confirmed by the introductory paragraph of the 1831 lectures as transmitted by W (see 1827 lectures, n. 3).

It is evident that the two most frequently occurring titles are *Die vollendete Religion* and *Die offenbare Religion*. The former has been selected as the title of the new edition because it appears to be the primary heading in the Ms. and because it occurs more frequently in the body of the texts of all the lecture series. Unfortunately, both *vollendet* and *offenbar* are adjectives that resist felicitous translation into English. For the former we have preferred “consummate” to alternatives such as “final,” “perfect,” or “complete,” since it encompasses all of these meanings, and all are indeed intended. For *offenbar* we have settled on “revelatory” in order to stress the *process* of “making open” or “becoming manifest” and thus to be able to distinguish *offenbar* from *geoffenbart*, which refers to something that *has been* “revealed” in historical, positive fashion. Hegel clearly intended a distinction as well as a relation between these terms (see 1827 lectures, p. 252). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he described Christianity as *Die offenbare Religion*,⁵ whereas in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* he titled it *Die geoffenbarte Religion*,⁶ thus the usage in the philosophy-of-religion lectures indicates a return to the earlier (and more suggestive) title. In some contexts we translate *offenbar* as “manifest,” but for the title we prefer a term that also suggests the connection with *geoffenbart* and maintains whatever distinction Hegel may have intended between *offenbaren* and *manifestieren*.

Notably, none of the manuscripts or transcripts in our possession contains the title *Die absolute Religion*. While this phrase occurs in the text of the lectures along with all the others, it is reasonably certain that Hegel did not use it as a title. Instead, Marheineke introduced it when he published the lectures in 1832—possibly viewing it as more felicitous than *Die vollendete Religion* and assuming that *vollendet* and *absolut* meant roughly the same thing for Hegel (see especially the Introduction to the 1824 lectures). Although this is the title by which Part III of the philosophy-of-religion lectures has become familiar (Lasson perpetuated the tra-

5. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, chap. VII.C (GW 9:400 ff.). Unfortunately, both Baillie and Miller translate this term as “revealed.”

6. *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 564 ff.

dition), it is probably the least suitable of any of the titles. While there are indeed similarities between “consummate” (in the sense of “final” or “perfect”) and “absolute,” the two terms have distinct nuances. Christianity is the “consummate” religion in the sense that the concept of religion has been brought to completion or consummation in it; it simply *is* religion in its quintessential expression. But while the object or content of religion is the absolute, religion itself does not entail absolute knowledge of the absolute: that is the role of philosophy. The representational forms of religious expression, even of the Christian religion, must be “sublated” (annulled *and* preserved) in philosophical concepts. Thus in Hegel’s scheme of things there is an *absolute knowledge* (the science of speculative philosophy) but a *consummate religion*. Whether religion as such is to be superseded by philosophy is another question, which we shall consider in due course.

As an alternative to all of the philosophical (or system-related) names for this religion, one might employ as a title its historical name, “the Christian religion,” which also occurs in the texts of the lectures. This was in fact the solution adopted by the volume that was a forerunner to this one, *The Christian Religion: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part III: The Revelatory, Consummate, Absolute Religion*.⁷ However, in the context of the systematic structure of the philosophy of religion, and of the place of religion in the philosophical system as a whole, the historical names of the religions are out of place, and Hegel used them only rarely (though he does indeed speak of the “Christian religion” more freely than he does of the others). Certainly very concrete historical realities lie behind Hegel’s philosophical redescrptions, but the redescrptions are designed precisely to elicit a grasp of the distinctive stage of consciousness present in each religion, and for this purpose the historical names are of little service. In any event, to maintain consistency with Volumes 1 and 2, it is appropriate that Volume 3 be entitled *The Consummate Religion*. To bring out the fact that Hegel commonly used *two* titles or names for Part III, our title

7. Ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson (based on the edition by Georg Lasson), American Academy of Religion Texts and Translations Series, no. 2 (Missoula, Mont., 1979).

could have been *The Consummate or Revelatory Religion*, thus approximating the complete title as found in the Ms. But such a title is unwieldy, and it is advisable in any case to maintain consistency with Volume 3 of the German edition, which is titled *Die vollendete Religion*.

For all intents and purposes, what is offered here is a new edition, not a revision of *The Christian Religion*. While distinguishing the sources (indeed more clearly and accurately than the Lasson edition, on which it was based), *The Christian Religion* wove them together under a common set of section headings. This was feasible since Hegel treated the topics of Part III in roughly the same order in all of the lectures. The advantage of being able to compare what Hegel had to say on the same topic at different times was offset by obscuring the still significant structural and substantive differences that obtained between the four series of lectures. To bring the latter out clearly, and thus to provide the textual context in terms of which valid interpretations of Hegel's developing thought can be established, is the primary objective of the present edition. Thus the four lecture series (the Ms., 1824, 1827, 1831) are distinguished and presented as autonomous units (the latter only in outline form, on the basis of Strauss's excerpts). Just as important, all of the texts have been completely reedited on the basis of the original sources, and the translations are based on the newly edited texts. Lasson's treatment of the Ms. and the 1824 lectures still left much to be desired in Part III, although what he offered was a distinct improvement over his work on Parts I and II. However, Lasson's version of the 1827 text serves as the primary source for our new edition, since the best of the original transcripts for these lectures have all been lost.⁸ Thus, with the exception of the 1827 lectures, the reader will discover that the new edition bears only a distant resemblance to *The Christian Religion*.

The translation of Hegel's lecture manuscript has been prepared by P. C. Hodgson; of the 1824 lectures and of the materials in the Appendix, by J. M. Stewart; and of the 1827 lectures, by R. F. Brown and P. C. Hodgson. All translation drafts have been thor-

8. For details, see Secs. 3-5 of the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1.

oroughly checked and revised by H. S. Harris and put into final form by the editor with the assistance of J. M. Stewart. In addition to his detailed editorial work on the German text, W. Jaeschke has helped with some of the translation puzzles for the English edition.

The Appendix to this volume is of special note. The first item contains the text on the ontological proof from the 1831 lectures as provided by the *Werke* at the end of volume 12.⁹ In the 1831 lectures Hegel once again treated the proofs for the existence of God in relation to the various religions, as he had done in the *Ms.* and in 1824, whereas in 1827 all of the proofs were drawn into *The Concept of Religion*. The proof that corresponds to the Christian religion is the ontological proof, for reasons Hegel makes clear, and thus the proper location for this material is in Volume 3. However, it cannot appropriately be attached to the *Ms.* or the 1824 text (and obviously not to the 1827 text, which in other respects the 1831 lectures approximate); hence we have placed it in the Appendix.

The second item in the Appendix is the text for Part III of the excerpts prepared by D. F. Strauss of a transcript of the lectures of 1831.¹⁰ Because of the decision on the location of the proofs, Hegel found it necessary in 1831 to adopt the structural arrangement of the 1824 lectures; he thus included a section on "The Abstract Concept of God," where the ontological proof is discussed. (Strauss's excerpted version may be compared with the full text transmitted by the *Werke*.) In other respects the substance of the 1831 lectures approximates that of 1827, although an interesting rearrangement of materials on "natural humanity" and the question of good and evil occurs,¹¹ and Hegel introduces for the first time as a divisional principle the reference to the three "kingdoms" of the Father, Son, and Spirit,¹² which was adopted by both editions of the *Werke*.

The third item in the Appendix contains several of the loose sheets of notes used by Hegel in preparing those portions of the

9. See below, *Ontological Proof*, n. 1.

10. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 1.

11. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, nn. 14, 26.

12. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 7.

lecture Ms. that treat Greek, Roman, and Christian religion (the notes on Greek and Roman religion are appended to Volume 2). These sheets are from the literary estate of Karl Rosenkranz (Hegel's former student and biographer), now deposited in Houghton Library of Harvard University. It is not clear how these sheets came into Rosenkranz's hands, but it is clear that they do not belong to the miscellaneous papers used in preparation of the later lectures, and it is unlikely that they were composed after the Ms. was completed and inserted into it (as was for instance sheet 3 of the *Introduction*). Rather they were almost certainly a preliminary sketch of portions of the Ms., probably completed in mid-July 1821.¹³ This is evident from the content, which is similar to the Ms.'s depiction of the relation of Christianity to previous religions, although the sheets are much more schematic and the conception less fully articulated. Moreover, they contain materials found only in the Ms., such as the outline of the concluding section on "the passing away of the community" and references to ending "on a note of discord." They also contain allusions and references, such as to the Low Country "beggars" (the Gueux), that did not find their way into any of the lecture series. These sheets help us to understand how Hegel composed his lectures: he worked from preliminary sketches to a more fully articulated manuscript, to which he later added papers containing revisions and elaborations. Normally the preliminary sketches would have been destroyed once the manuscript had been composed.

Finally there are found in the Appendix several brief fragments from lost transcripts of the 1821 and 1824 lectures prepared by Carl Ludwig Michelet. The second of these transcripts, described by Philipp Marheineke as having been written "with unmistakable care,"¹⁴ was used by Bruno Bauer in preparing the second edition of the *Werke*, and portions of it (while unidentifiable) are included among the variant readings from *W₂* given in our footnotes to the 1824 text. Michelet himself quoted a few passages from his own notebooks of Hegel's lectures in his *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, Part 2 (Berlin,

13. On the dating, see below, *Loose Sheets*, n. 20.

14. See his preface to *W₂* (11:vii).

1838). These recoverable fragments, all of which are from Part III of the *Lectures*, are of value primarily as a confirmation and correction of the Griesheim version of the 1824 lectures at certain points. The second of the fragments from the first lecture series confirms the text of the *Ms.* on an interesting point. Our notes accompanying the fragments set them in their appropriate contexts.

Following the Appendix, and a table showing the pagination of the original sources, the German-English glossary is found, which in its successively amended versions has served as a translation guide for all three volumes. We stress the term “guide” since there are obviously contexts in which the equivalences listed in the glossary are inappropriate. The glossary is limited to a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation; it certainly is not an exhaustive list of Hegel’s systematic vocabulary. The general principles guiding the translation of the *Lectures* as a whole are discussed in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1, and the specific arrangement of the glossary is explained at the beginning of the listing.

Some adjustments in the translation of specific terms have occurred in Volume 3 as compared with Volume 1, occasioned partly by the different context in which they occur and partly by the experience of the translation team. For *anschauen* in some instances we are now using “envisage,” and for *Anschauung*, “envisagement,” although the standard term remains “intuition.” When *Bestimmung* means “vocation” in the sense intended by Fichte, we so translate it. For *seiend* we have experimented with “subsisting” as an alternative to the awkward expression “having being,” especially in phrases such as *eine in sich seiende Weise*, “an inwardly subsisting mode,” or *der ansichseiende Geist*, “the implicitly subsisting spirit.” Similarly, for *Seiende*, when it refers to finite entities, we have employed “subsisting being” and sometimes even “entity.” The disadvantage of this policy is that it is then no longer possible to reserve “subsist” exclusively for *bestehen*. In the case of *Vorstellung* we have found it necessary to be more flexible when it is used in nontechnical contexts, as it often is in Volume 3. We have employed “image” or “imagination” (as when one has a hundred thalers in one’s “imagination”), “view” (e.g., the Reformed “view” of the sacrament of Communion), and even “notion,” although rarely

(such “notions” are not worthy of further consideration). To maintain the distinction between *Vorstellung*, *Begriff*, and *Idee*, we *never* use “notion” for *Begriff* or “idea” for *Vorstellung*, and we avoid such expressions as “conceptual picture” or “picture thinking” for *Vorstellung*. *Begriff* is consistently translated as “concept,” *Idee* as “idea,” and in its technical sense *Vorstellung* remains “representation.” Finally, when *Geist* clearly refers to the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God in the context of discussions of the Trinity or the community of faith, it is appropriate to capitalize it in translation. Here *Geist* is being used as a religious *Vorstellung* rather than as a philosophical *Begriff*. For the sake of consistency, capitalization normally occurs when the term is preceded by a definite article: thus “the Spirit,” but “spirit.”

Hegel’s citations of biblical passages, of which there are a good many in this volume, are often imprecise. Generally we translate Hegel’s version into modern English (guided by the Revised Standard Version), and if this version is sufficiently accurate, we simply give the reference in square brackets following the quotation; otherwise additional necessary information is provided in the footnotes. In the case of Synoptic parallels, the source closest to Hegel’s quotation (frequently Matthew) is cited. References to classical authors are given in the abbreviated form customary today, without attending to the question of which editions Hegel may have used. Information on symbols, abbreviations, and frequently cited works in the footnotes is provided at the beginning of the volume. We have avoided the repetition of detailed information found in the editorial footnotes to Volume 1, giving instead cross-references to these notes.

2. The Structure and Development of “The Consummate Religion”

As pointed out in the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1, this edition makes possible for the first time a comprehensive comparison of the four series of lectures Hegel presented on the philosophy of religion as well as an analysis of the development in his conceptualization and treatment of this subject. A comparative analysis of Parts I and II will be found in the Introductions to the first two volumes; we turn now to Part III, *The Consummate Religion*. The attentive reader will discover that differences of nuance, emphasis,

and substance are much greater among the several lecture series for Part III than had earlier been suspected, despite the similar ordering of topics. The altered polemical context, especially for the 1824 and 1827 lectures, reverberates through to the very end.

For what follows, readers will be helped by referring to the table providing a synopsis of the structure of *The Consummate Religion*, which is printed on pp. 54–55. The section headings in the *Ms.* are part of the original document except for those enclosed in square brackets, which have been added by the editor. However, the numbers and headings in all the other documents are the work of the editor without being specifically identified as such. Even when headings occur in the original transcripts, we must assume that they are not attributable to Hegel himself but rather to the transcribers. Thus we have felt free to revise and supplement the headings in the transcripts in order to bring out the systematic structure of Hegel's lectures as clearly as possible. They certainly do have such a structure even if Hegel did not make a point of enumerating and identifying the stages of his oral presentation in just the way we have done, though the formulations used for our headings are frequently suggested by wording in the texts themselves. References are made to the more detailed discussion of specific matters in the editorial footnotes, so as to avoid repetition between the Introduction and the notes.¹⁵ In this Introduction, we can offer only a brief sketch, which provides at most merely the foundations of an interpretative commentary, and which does not attend to the growing body of secondary literature.¹⁶

a. Hegel's Lecture Manuscript

Introduction

Hegel starts (in Sec. I) by reminding his hearers that "this religion" was earlier defined (at the very end of the general *Introduction*

15. These references are cited not by page numbers but by note numbers, which run consecutively through each text unit. By using the running heads, readers can readily identify the appropriate text units.

16. For a survey of this literature, especially as it relates to Part III of the lectures, and for a commentary on aspects of Hegel's philosophical interpretation of Christianity, see Walter Jaeschke, *Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels* (Darmstadt, 1983).

to the *Ms.*) as the one in which the concept of religion has returned to itself or become objective to itself by becoming an object of human consciousness explicitly. Since, as pointed out in Part I of the *Ms.* (Sec. B.2, 3), the concept of religion is the relationship of finite consciousness to its absolute object, God, and ultimately the unity between them based on the absolute's self-mediation or self-consciousness, the religion in which this relationship is made fully manifest is the "consummate" and the "revelatory" religion (see *Ms.*, nn. 3, 16). Hegel continues (in Sec. 2) by establishing that the Christian religion, as thus defined, has certain "characteristics" (*Bestimmungen*), the chief of which is that it is the religion of *revelation*. It is so, not because *something* is revealed in historical or positive fashion, but because the very being of God is to be open, manifest, revelatory. God's eternal nature is his "revelatory action," which is to say that God is spirit—infinite spirit revealing itself to finite spirit, the absolute idea "appearing" to worldly consciousness, and thus returning to itself as infinite self-consciousness or absolute spirit. From this fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion several others follow: it is the religion of truth, reconciliation, and freedom—the first because *the true* is its content and is cognized as it is, the second because the implicit unity of divine and human nature has now become explicit (in at least one individual), and the last because freedom means to be at home with oneself in the other.

The Two Triads

In the lecture manuscript, Hegel's philosophical redescription of the Christian religion is structured in two triads, one within the other.¹⁷ The outer triad is an analytic framework already applied to each of the determinate or finite religions in Part II. This analysis considers first the "abstract concept" of divinity of the religion in question; then its "concrete representation" of divinity and of humanity's relationship to it in terms of specific symbols, images, and other thought-categories (the "theoretical" relationship to God); and finally the practices of its "cultus" by means of which there is an actual participation in or communion with deity (the "practical"

17. A second inner triad is found in Sec. C and is discussed below, but it is not of significance for the overall structure of the *Ms.*

relationship to God). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel also uses this framework to structure his presentation of the concept of religion in Part I. If the concept of religion is absolute spirit in its self-mediation (a matter on which Hegel achieved clarity at the end of the 1824 *Concept*), then we can expect that religion as such will reflect the development or self-realization of absolute spirit in the three moments of its substantial self-unity, its self-differentiation, and its self-reunification or return to self.

The inner triad sets forth the concrete representation of God that is found in the Christian religion. As is clear from the “division of the subject” found at the beginning of Sec. B, this triad is composed of: (a) the idea of God in and for itself (the immanent Trinity); (b) the idea in diremption or differentiation (creation and preservation of the natural world); (c) the appearance of the idea in finite spirit (the “history” of estrangement, redemption, and reconciliation). At this point a tension in Hegel’s thought emerges. If what constitutes the “concrete representation” of God in the Christian religion is the self-mediation of the triune God both inwardly and outwardly—and this is indeed Hegel’s view of the matter—then one would expect a trinitarian structure. But what is in fact offered is a philosophical triad, drawn from the three branches of philosophy—the logical idea, nature, and (finite) spirit—and recapitulated in Hegel’s depiction of “the revealed religion” in §§ 567–570 of the *Encyclopedia*. It has the peculiar result that the “Son” (anthropology and christology) occupies the third moment of the triad rather than the second. The third trinitarian moment, the “Spirit,” becomes a kind of appendage, treated under Sec. C of the outer triad, “Community, Cultus.” What is required, then, to give an adequate account of the distinctively Christian idea of God is to combine the second and third moments of the philosophical triad (nature and finite spirit) in the second moment of the trinitarian dialectic (God’s self-differentiation or self-diremption by creating a world of *both* nature *and* finite spirit as God’s own otherness *ad extra*) and to incorporate the third moment of the outer triad (community, cultus) into the third moment of the trinitarian mediation (God’s return-to-self in and through the transfigured subjectivity of the community of Spirit). The philosophical triad is grounded

in the dialectic of thought itself, namely, the three logical moments of the syllogism: universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*), and singularity (*Einzelheit*).¹⁸ But genuinely trinitarian speculation requires a modification so that the moments become: abstract unity (universality), differentiation (particularity + finite singularity), return (subjectivity or infinite singularity)—or, as Hegel finally expressed it in 1831, the kingdoms of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

Hegel made just such an adjustment in the later lectures. Sec. C of the Ms. becomes the “third element” of the development of the idea of God, “Community, Spirit” (1824 and 1827),¹⁹ or the “Kingdom of the Spirit” (1831). And Secs. b and c of the inner triad in the Ms. are combined into the “second element,” namely, God’s “representation” and “appearance” in the world (1824 and 1827), or the “Kingdom of the Son” (1831). Thus the original analytic scheme of “abstract concept,” “concrete representation,” and “community, cultus,” is broken apart, and the inner triad is converted into genuinely trinitarian moments. With respect to the second moment of the latter (namely, God’s worldly appearance or the kingdom of the Son), there are still two phases, but they no longer correspond to the philosophical distinction between nature and finite spirit. Rather they are the phase of differentiation (including now not only the natural world but also the “fall” of humanity into estrangement and evil) and the phase of reconciliation (beginning with the appearance of the idea of divine-human unity in a single individual). The “turning point”—the extreme of divine self-divestment and the moment initiating the return—is no longer the creation of the first Adam (as the Ms. depicts it) but the incarnation and crucifixion of the second Adam (see n. 88). In 1824 the structure of the lectures is adjusted accordingly, so that Secs. b and c.α of the inner triad in the Ms. together comprise the moment

18. See *Science of Logic*, pp. 600 ff., 664 ff. (GW 12:36 ff., 132 ff.), and *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 181 ff.

19. There is already an anticipation of this in the words Hegel added to the heading of Sec. B in the Ms.—whether immediately or in preparation for the 1824 lectures is not certain—namely, that concrete representation involves the “determination,” i.e., the “development of the idea [of God],” and “weaves itself by itself into the cultus.” See Ms., n. 39.

of differentiation, while Sec. c.β comprises the moment of reconciliation. In this way the disproportionately large amount of material in Sec. B.c—over a third of the entire Ms. text for Part III—is spread out, and the disproportionately small amount of material in Sec. B.b is supplemented.

The Abstract Concept of God

Under Sec. A of the outer triad, Hegel considers the form of the proof of the “existence” of God appropriate to the revelatory religion, namely, the ontological proof, following the pattern already established in the treatment of the determinate religions, where the cosmological and teleological proofs were taken up in relation to the abstract conception of divinity found in the various “finite” religions.

The *concept* of God in this religion is that he is the absolute idea, or is the idea of *absolute spirit*. It must now be shown that this concept has “reality” (*Realität*), that “being” (*Sein*) or “existence” (*Existenz*)²⁰ is contained in it. This is the case because the very concept or idea of absolute spirit is to be the unity of divine and human nature. Spirit is a process of actualization, of manifestation, “the living process by which the implicit unity of divine and human nature becomes explicit, or is brought forth.” Therefore, if God is properly defined as absolute spirit, he necessarily has reality, is indeed the most real of all realities.

The *abstract* definition of this idea of spirit is the unity of concept and being, and the so-called ontological proof shows this unity in a formal way. At the strictly formal, logical level, the proof is quite simple, since logic shows that the *concept* (*Begriff*) is “the third to being [Sein] and essence [Wesen], to the immediate and to reflection. Being and essence are so far the moments of its becoming; but it is their *foundation* and *truth* as the identity in which they are

20. In Part I of the 1824 and 1827 lectures, Hegel makes it clear that the usual expression “existence of God” (*Dasein Gottes*) is at best imprecise and in the strict sense inaccurate, since God does not “exist” like other finite entities in the sense of having “determinate being” (*Dasein*). Normally he speaks of the “being” or “reality” of God, but occasionally uses the loanwords *Existenz* and *existieren*. See Vol. 1, 1827 *Concept*, pp. 414 ff., and the discussion of the translation of the terms *Sein* and *Dasein* in the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1, pp. 57–58.

submerged and contained.”²¹ In the *true* concept, being as the most empty, indeterminate, and immediate philosophical category is contained, and in this respect it is not saying very much to say that God “has being.” But Hegel acknowledges that “the concept in our sense is not what is ordinarily meant by ‘concept.’” What is ordinarily meant is that concepts (or thoughts) are just in the head and that what is *real* is life, the immediate world, empirical human being, and the like. This is the point of view of subjectivity, of the understanding, and it is from this point of view that Kant and others have criticized the Anselmian proof. Anselm (according to Hegel) argued that the concept of God is that he is the “most perfect” and that being (or reality) is necessarily contained in this concept since, as everyone knows, what is unreal or merely imagined is less “perfect” than what is real. This is “quite correct,” says Hegel, and Anselm was also correct in recognizing that the unity of concept and being could not just be presupposed by religion and philosophy; it had to be *demonstrated*, even if Anselm’s proof still had the form of understanding. Of course, it is just this classical presupposition of the unity of concept and being, of thought and reality, that has broken down in modern times, Anselm’s proof to the contrary notwithstanding. This is why Kant’s critiques of reason are such a watershed in the history of consciousness. Kant is correct “in the finite realm”: being or reality certainly is *not* contained in the *subjective* concept (i.e., in the thoughts we have in our brains). The task of speculative philosophy is to demonstrate, in the light of critical philosophy, that the subjective or finite concept is not the *true* concept. Only this can serve any longer as the philosophical basis for the fundamental presupposition of religion that God *is*.

Concrete Representation

We come now to the three moments of the inner triad of the Ms. to which reference has already been made.

1. The *first* of these, Sec. B.a, concerns “God in his eternity, the idea in and for itself, *God as triune*,” which is also the “absolute idea of philosophy,” a “purely speculative content” (n. 51). This section remains relatively constant across the four lecture series,

21. *Science of Logic*, pp. 577 ff., cf. pp. 82 ff. (GW 12:11 ff., 11:33 ff.).

although the wealth of material it contains is gradually worked out more consistently. By the term "Trinity" Hegel ordinarily means the immanent, logical, or preworldly Trinity—that is, the *actus purus* of the inner divine life, the process of differentiation and return contained *within* the eternal idea ("the show of finitude . . . has not yet taken place"). At the same time Hegel recognizes that the divine differentiation *ad intra* is the ground for the possibility of God's relation to the world *ad extra* and that the outward relations reenact the inner distinctions without simply reduplicating or repeating them (see n. 79)—in effect a correspondence between (not an identity of) the immanent and economic Trinities. The truth of the Trinity is most adequately grasped in purely speculative, logical categories as the dialectic of unity, differentiation, and return. It is a mystery, but a rational mystery—the mystery of reason, of thought itself. The truth of the Trinity may also be grasped in the representational language of love and personality. Love entails a union mediated by relationship and hence distinction; to be a person means to be reflected into self through distinction, to find one's self-consciousness in another, to give up one's abstract existence and to win it back as concrete and personal by being absorbed into the other. But when the understanding enters in and tries to count three divine "persons," it falls into irresolvable contradictions and the "harsh" equation $3 \times 1 = 1$. Thus, in the Ms. at least, Hegel is not much attracted to the representational language of traditional trinitarian doctrine and its central symbols, "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." Nonetheless, truth is present in these symbols, as it is in the prefigurations of the Trinity in the triads of Hindu and Greek religion, of Plato and the Pythagoreans, of Alexandrian Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, and finally of Boehme and Kant.

2. In Sec. B.b, Hegel addresses the difficult question of the relation between God and the *natural world*. The latter *corresponds* to the second moment of the *inner dialectic of the divine life*, but Hegel makes it clear many times that the created world is not simply *identical* with God in the moment of self-differentiation ("the eternal Son of the Father") (see n. 79). This would entail a crude pantheism, which he consistently avoids.²² His position is rather

22. See especially Sec. A of *The Concept of Religion* in the 1827 lectures, where Hegel defends himself vigorously against the charge of pantheism.

that of panentheism: the world exists in God and is dependent on God (creation is a continuous preservation), but is not in any empirical sense identical with God. Yet the element of explicit and present *difference* does seem to presuppose an implicit and teleological *identity*, for the vocation of both God and world is to achieve actuality together, to move toward union in an eschatological consummation. The quality of the natural world, as a “disappearing moment” in this process, is precisely to sublimate itself, “to pass over,” “to take itself back into the final idea.” Here Hegel’s affinity with Neoplatonism and German mysticism is evident. At the end of this section he considers briefly the presence of the idea (the “wisdom of God”) in nature and the emergence of spirit out of nature.

3. Sec. B.c is the lengthiest and most complex of the *Ms.*, for reasons already discussed (see also n. 88). By means of the Greek letters α and β Hegel divides it into two parts. In the *first part* (α) he treats finite spirit qua finite—as estranged, cloven, “natural humanity”—that is, theological *anthropology*. Human being is “natural” and merely finite when it chooses to exist according to the immediacy, particularity, and externality of the natural world (n. 90). This is the life of desire, of singularity, of utter dependence on nature. This is in fact the “original condition” of humanity; but also, because human being is spirit, it is not false to represent the original condition mythically as our having been created in the image of God: spirit is *implicitly* the divine idea itself. This original condition, however, is neither “good” nor “evil,” and it is wrong to think of human being as either good or evil “by nature,” which is a doctrine of “recent times.”

Humanity becomes either good or evil (for the most part, evil) with the *transition* from its so-called original condition (whether primitive or mythical) to the actual conditions of historical existence and culture. The transition involves essentially an act of *cognition* or *knowledge* (Hegel’s term is *Erkenntnis*), the willful choice of what is natural and immediate, a choice for which human beings are responsible, with the result that they are guilty. It is this knowing choice that is in the strict sense evil. The role of knowledge in the occurrence of evil is the central theme of *the story of the fall*, but Hegel is primarily concerned with the contradictions that are present in the story. First there is a contradiction with respect to knowl-

edge: on the one hand, the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is forbidden by God, yet on the other hand it is precisely this knowledge that is the likeness of God in humanity, without which Adam would be just like the beasts. Then there is a contradiction with respect to *mortality* (see n. 118): is it a punishment for sin (the penalty of death for eating of the fruit), or is it a concomitant of finitude (in order to gain immortality Adam would have to eat of the tree of life but misses the chance)? By bringing out these contradictions we are able to see through the mythical form of the story and to grasp its speculative truth: cognition is the spiritual essence of humanity and intrinsically good; yet when conjoined with finitude it yields the choice of nature rather than of spirit, and hence inner rupture and outward evil. Evil is now seen to be a dialectical necessity in the rise of consciousness, not an inscrutable, absurd force. Cognition both “gives the wound and heals it.”

In the *second part* (β) of Sec. B.c, Hegel attends to the reversal out of this situation, the “elevation” of spirit out of its natural will and evil and into consciousness of the universal, of God—in other words, *christology*. He clearly demarcates the stages of this lengthy analysis by a series of Greek letters ((α) through (ϵ)). The first point to be established (point (α)) is that humanity is conscious of the universal as its *own* essence, its *own* infinity: *both* absolute essence *and* infinite subjectivity are essential. This can be otherwise expressed as “*the unity of divine and human nature*” or simply the “divine idea,” which humanity bears implicitly within itself, the consciousness of which “consummates religion as the cognition of God as spirit.” But in the second place (point (β)), because of ignorance and evil this cognition must *come to us*, this implicit idea must *appear* explicitly, and it must appear in such a way that it is empirically universal for immediate consciousness, which is the state that most of us are in. This means that it must appear in a “wholly temporal,” “completely ordinary” human being—but one who is at the same time known as the divine idea, not merely as a teacher. Such an immediate certainty and presence of divinity is the “Is” of truth for natural consciousness—divine truth present as an empirical, historical fact in all its “isness.”

At this point Hegel sums up the steps of the argument and further elaborates them. First, the divine idea is present implicitly *in the whole* of humanity immediately (a recapitulation of point (α) above). The quotations from Schiller and Goethe support this point, if our reading of them is correct (nn. 129, 131): “the *entire* realm of spirits,” with all its “anguish,” is needed in order that God may enter into possession of his own infinitude. Second, the divine idea is realized *for* humanity in a *single individual*. First it must be shown that *individual subjectivity as such* is the true form in which universality appears (“substance is subject”). But then it must be established that only *one* single, unique individual can be the ultimate appearance of the universal, for otherwise divinity would become an abstraction, and the idea of divine-human *unity* would be dispersed. “Once is always. . . . In the eternal idea there is only one Son.” (On the arrangement of these points, see n. 133.)

That any particular historical individual should be this “holy one” for us requires “a local and exclusive occasion.” In the case of the Christian religion, this occasion is Christ (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth²³). Even though the only true attestation that he is the divine idea is the witness of the Spirit in *forming the community of faith*, *Christ’s teaching* (point (γ)) is a kind of attestation since it unifies the whole of his life and destiny in which the divine idea is portrayed (*dargestellt*). “The words of Christ confirm the truth of the idea, what he has been for his community.” In a fairly detailed exegesis, which has its own rigor, though certainly not of a historical-critical kind, Hegel distinguishes three aspects of the teaching: its concentration on *inwardness and intentionality*, displacing all worldly interests, elevating its hearers to the “heaven within,” the “universal soil” and “homeland” of spirit—the kingdom of God, of which communal love is the closest approximation; its “revolutionary” opposition to all the established orders (of religion, family, civil society, and the state); and the relationship of Christ to God and humanity (“he states very specifically his identity with the Father” and “refers to himself as the Son of Man”—i.e., the one man who is humanity as such).

23. In accord with the conventions of his time, Hegel uses the word *Christus* as a proper name (see n. 211).

The burden of the next section (point (δ)) is to show that *the life and death* of this teacher are in conformity with these teachings in the sense of actualizing their content, the kingdom of love, so that it can indeed be said that “it is the divine idea that courses through this history.” Hegel never shows very clearly what it is about Christ’s *life* that manifests this conformity other than the teaching itself “and the love with which he conducted himself.” Rather it is Christ’s *death* that is central. In passages that are among the most powerful of the *Ms.*, he argues that since death is the ultimate destiny and negativity of finite spirit, the death of *this* individual is the supreme portrayal of the *unity* of the divine and the human, the highest divestment of the divine idea—this and not the divine *imago* in fallen Adam, as suggested earlier. “God himself is dead.” This death is both the deepest anguish and the highest love, because love means the supreme surrender of oneself in the other. The “speculative intuition” is that the “monstrous unification” of the absolute extremes of divinity and death, of the eternal God and mortal humanity, is love itself—the very love that was the substance of Christ’s teaching. As if that were not enough, this is no ordinary death but the dishonoring death of a political criminal; yet what the state dishonors is converted into the highest honor (here we are given a preview of the decadence of the Roman Empire, with which Hegel will shortly compare our own time).

The redemptive death of Christ (we have not discussed Hegel’s views on satisfaction) already represents the “transfiguration” of human finitude, the beginning of the “return” of the divine idea to itself. But what has still to be added is the “envisaged consummation” of this return. This first appeared for immediate consciousness in the mode of actuality as something that happened to a single individual—the *resurrection and ascension* of Christ (point (ε)). Although Hegel does not say so directly, this has nothing to do with a physical miracle or visible appearances: “resurrection” rather means the “death of death,” and “ascension” the “festive assumption of humanity into the divine idea.” Hegel makes no attempt to unpack these metaphors at this point. Rather, as he surveys and summarizes the three spheres (the inner triad) of “Concrete Representation” at the conclusion of this section, he empha-

sizes that Christ's return and elevation to the right hand of God is only *one* aspect, only one side of the consummation of the third sphere, which includes not only one single individual but also the community of the Spirit: the divine idea is brought to completion in the world of actuality only when the *many* single individuals have been brought back into the unity of the Spirit, into the *community* (see n. 184). In other words, given the arrangement of the Ms., Sec. C of the outer triad, "Community, Spirit," really ought to become point (ζ) of the second part of the third sphere of Sec. B, since it consummates the return of the divine idea to itself out of its worldly diremption. In this fashion, "concrete representation" "weaves itself by itself" into "community, cultus" (n. 39). Hegel is already cognizant of the tensions present in his original design, according to which Son and Spirit both belong to the third sphere, while the second is occupied solely by the natural world.

Community, Spirit

Sec. C is composed of another inner triad, which is neither theological nor philosophical but historical, namely, the sequence of origin, preservation, and perishing that applies to all historical phenomena. Preceding this triad, however, is a transitional section ("The Standpoint of the Community in General"), which expands upon the transitional remarks at the end of Sec. B. The transition is one from the sensible to the spiritual presence of God—that is, from the Christ of history to the community of the Spirit. We must make this transition without at the same time shunning sensible presence "in monkish fashion." The transition is necessary because the single individual in whom God was present has been "removed from the senses and raised to the right hand of God"; God is now present in the inwardness and subjectivity of the spiritual community. The subjectivity in question is a renewed, transfigured, communal subjectivity—in essence a unique and unsurpassable *intersubjectivity*, distinguishable from all other forms of human love and friendship. Privatistic and exclusivistic modes of existence are set aside, as are all distinctions based on mastery, power, position, sex, and wealth, and in their place is actualized a truly universal justice and freedom. The symbol "Holy Spirit" refers to the unifying

and liberating power of divine love arising from infinite anguish—the same love that was objectively represented on the cross of Christ but that now works inwardly, subjectively, building up a new human community. “This is the Spirit of God, or God as the present, actual Spirit, God dwelling in his community.” This spiritual community is the same as the kingdom of God proclaimed by Christ: “The kingdom of God is the Spirit,” or more precisely, “the kingdom of the Spirit.” Thus already in the *Ms.* Hegel has introduced the term by which he will eventually characterize the third moment of the consummate religion, the moment of the return of the divine idea to God and of the consummation of all things in God.

Sec. C.α on the “origin” of the community is concerned with the question of the “verification” of the divine mission in Christ. The speculative aspect of the question (“Does God have a Son whom he sends into the world?”) is properly dealt with in the framework of the trinitarian mediation of spirit as grasped philosophically. But the historical aspect of the question (“Was this Jesus of Nazareth the Christ?”) cannot be answered by supposed historical proofs based on miracles. The only genuine proof is the witness of the Spirit, the evocation of faith by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the departure of Christ. This is the “origin” or “arising” (*Entstehung*) of the community, and indeed the existence of the community is the “proof” of Christ. While the community has a specific historical referent and founder, the proof of the identity of this founder as the Christ—the proof that the history of his teaching, life, death, and resurrection was “strictly adequate to the idea”—is a proof of faith and the Spirit, not a proof of history.

Sec. C.β considers the “being” (*Sein*) of the community. First, this is a community of faith and teaching. Faith is the certainty of absolute truth for spiritual consciousness as a whole; since it has a content or is a form of *objective* truth (and not mere subjective feeling), it can be taught, and this teaching must be secured in fixed expressions (as tradition and doctrine). Second, the developed community is a *church*, which takes on the form of a worldly organization and even generates the principles of civil and political life out of itself. Finally, the central act of the community is *cultic*—“an eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church.” The focus of the cultus is accordingly

the sacraments, and above all the sacrament of Holy Communion or the Lord's Supper. This sacrament entails not only a "mystical union" with but also a sensible "partaking" of God in Christ (*Genuss* is the word Hegel customarily uses for "communion," and it has the connotation of sensible enjoyment or physical partaking). It is only with respect to the cultus that the Western Christian confessions differ from one another: the Catholics venerate the host as such because it is divinity present in sensible form, while the Lutherans claim that the sacrament is efficacious in faith, and the Reformed theologians regard it as a mere memorial. This section concludes with a look at various ways in which the relation between the objectivity of God ("grace") and the subjectivity of human volition and freedom has been understood; it seems to anticipate elements of the discussion in the 1824 lectures of spiritual "rebirth" and the "realization" of faith in the world.

Everything historical eventually passes away (Sec. C.γ). Is the same to be said of the community of the Spirit?²⁴ Such would seem not to be the case if the kingdom of God has been established eternally and if the gates of hell shall not prevail against Christ's teaching and church, although, to be sure, single individuals perish and pass over to the kingdom of heaven. This would be to end on a discordant note, and the signs of the time (n. 251) do indeed point to a considerable discord in this respect. Our age is like that of the Roman Empire in its abandonment of the question of truth, its smug conviction that no cognitive knowledge of God can be had, its reduction of everything to merely historical questions, its privatism, subjectivism, and moralism, and the failure of its teachers and clergy to lead the people. It is indeed an apocalyptic time, but the world must be left largely to its own devices in solving its problems. Philosophy can resolve this discord only in a manner appropriate to itself, by zealously guarding the truth, but it must recognize that its resolution is only partial. The community of Spirit as such is not passing away, but it does seem to be passing over from the ecclesiastical priesthood to the philosophical; if so, the truth of religion will live on in the philosophical community, in which it must now seek refuge.

24. In what follows we do not attend to the variant readings in *W*₂, some of which are significant. See nn. 248, 250, 256, 259.

b. The Lectures of 1824

Introduction

The Introduction is considerably expanded in the 1824 lectures and is divided into four sections, although only two of them are clearly marked (see 1824 lectures, n. 2). In the first section, Hegel enlarges upon his “definition of this religion” found at the beginning of the *Ms.* Against the danger of subjectivism in theology, of which he was especially cognizant in 1824,²⁵ Hegel stresses the objectivity and absoluteness of content of the Christian religion. The “absolute identity” of “infinite and finite spirit” is religion, and since it is the absolute that constitutes this identity—an identity that includes dialectically the element of difference—the absolute itself *is* religion. Since the consummate religion is the awareness of just this content, it is also the “absolute religion” (a title that Hegel employs more frequently in the 1824 Introduction than elsewhere). But the absolute is not simply an external object that lies permanently beyond subjective consciousness; rather it is present in a profound unity with the subject and is itself *absolute* or *infinite subjectivity*. In this way the “great advance” of our age—the turn to the subject—may be affirmed, but only when it is properly defined. The proper subject matter of religion is not the sensibility and feeling of the finite subject, which abandons any cognition of God, but the infinite self-consciousness of the absolute subject, which encompasses finite subjects within itself. If religion lacks divine content, then it will be filled with contingent, empirical content, and a similarity with “Roman times” arises; the comparison that Hegel made at the end of the *Ms.* is thus transferred to the beginning of Part III of the 1824 lectures.

Secs. 2 and 3 expand upon the other “characteristics” of this religion as adumbrated in Sec. 2 of the *Ms.* Introduction, namely,

25. Hegel has in mind the theology of feeling of Schleiermacher in particular but also of Jacobi and Fries. See Vol. 1, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 52; and 1824 *Concept*, nn. 20, 37. One consequence of surrendering all objective content in theology, in Hegel’s view, was the turn to a purely historical attitude, which investigates what was said and done in the past but makes no judgments as to its truth or present-day validity. Theologians are like “countinghouse clerks” (Vol. 1:166). Thus we find not only an antisubjectivist but also an antihistoricist polemic in Hegel’s 1824 lectures.

that it is the revelatory religion and the religion of truth, freedom, and reconciliation. The material is presented more clearly and in somewhat different form, but no new themes are introduced. The concluding brief survey of the relation of the consummate religion to the preceding religions (Sec. 4) anticipates a much fuller articulation in 1827; in the form presented in 1824, it has overtones of the stages of consciousness as delineated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The Metaphysical Concept of God

This is no longer the first moment of an outer triad but the first of the two main divisions of the 1824 lectures. The contrast between these divisions is between the *abstract* and the *concrete* concepts of God in the consummate religion. Abstractly, God is the absolute idea; concretely, he is the inward and outward self-mediation of absolute spirit, by which it “develops” and “actualizes” itself. But this distinction is not hard-and-fast, since even the “abstract” or “pure” or “metaphysical” concept must objectify or realize itself; precisely this is the proof of God’s “being” or “existence.”

Hegel’s summary of the ontological proof in its classical (Anselmian) form and of the modern (Kantian) refutation of it is very similar to the text in the *Ms.*, especially to certain marginal passages that were added when he lectured in 1824. What is primarily new in 1824 is Hegel’s attempt to go beyond the Anselmian form of the ontological proof and to develop a modern, post-Kantian version of it based on his own logic. The primary problem with Anselm’s version is that it is circular: it presupposes metaphysical “perfection,” that is, the unity of concept (thought) and being (reality), and therefore its conclusion is already contained in the presupposition. But the presupposition of the unity of thought and reality is precisely what is at issue in our time. This presupposition must be questioned, even though the modern presupposition that what is most real is sense experience is no more satisfactory. Today we must start from the *difference* between being and thinking, the real and the ideal, and show how their unity results only from the *negation of their antithesis*. Only in this fashion can it be *shown* (as opposed to being merely presupposed) that being is contained

in the concept. This is the case because the concept is a *movement* that determines itself to *be*; it is the process of “self-determination into being,” it *realizes* itself, “it objectifies itself for itself.” The self-objectification of the concept is the idea. “The *idea* is truth in itself and for itself—the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity.”²⁶ Such an argument is based on Hegel’s doctrine of the concept as elaborated in volume 2 of the *Science of Logic*²⁷—the progression from subjectivity to objectivity to idea—but here he gives only the barest sketch of it and does not really present it in the form of a proof of the being of God. Perhaps he could assume that his students were familiar with its logical foundations, especially since he was lecturing on logic and metaphysics during the same term.

The Three Elements

We have already explained how and why the two triads of the Ms. become the “three elements” (or “forms”) of the self-development of the idea of God in the 1824 lectures. Hegel himself alludes to this altered conception (see n. 68). At the outset he establishes a link with the preceding section by claiming that the “concrete” development and realization of the *idea* of God is a further specification of the impulse toward realization already present “abstractly” in the *concept* of God. He then proceeds to an exposition of the three elements or of the moments of the “divine history” by developing the distinctions involved in four different categorial frameworks, those of *logic*, *consciousness*, *space*, and *time*. Presumably he does this because of his insistence that the idea of God must be available not only to philosophers but also to ordinary religious folk, not only to conceptual thought but also to representational expression.

The four frameworks may be set forth in tabular form as shown on the following page.

Of the several observations that could be made about this schema, we shall limit ourselves to two. First, the logical category “particularization” (*Partikularisation*) seems intended to include both the “particularity” (*Besonderheit*) of nature and the individual

26. *Encyclopedia* (1830), § 213.

27. *Science of Logic*, pp. 575 ff. (GW 12:5 ff.).

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

<i>Logic</i>	<i>Subjective Consciousness</i>	<i>Space</i>	<i>Time</i>
Universality eternal being, within and present to self	Thought present to self in pure thought	Outside the World God in and for self in his own place	Eternity outside of time, time in and for itself
Particularization appearance, diremption, being for others (both natural and spiritual)	Representation consciousness in relation to others	World divine history as real, God's <i>Dasein</i> in the world	Past appearance in mere history, a "show"
Absolute Singularity return into self, absolute presence to self, being in and for self through others	Subjectivity thinking of free spirit	Inner Place community, cultus: relationship of finite spirit to absolute spirit	Present + Future spiritual now of individuals & community + future consummation in universality

"singularity" (*Einzelheit*) of finite spirit, so that the second and third phases of the inner triad of the *Ms.* are combined in the second moment of the divine history. The third moment of the latter, "*absolute singularity*," must be understood as the *infinite subjectivity* of absolute spirit, which is intrinsically *intersubjective*, encompassing all individual spirits in the single unity of the whole. It is singularity at a higher level, singularity "as such." The second observation is that the schema as a whole seems to represent an economic Trinity, the first moment of which comprises the inner-trinitarian relations (the immanent or preworldly Trinity), while the second and third moments reenact these inner relations in the real world of space and time (the *oikonomia*).

The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself

In the Christian religion, the "thinking" of God as he is in and for himself first takes the representational form of the doctrine of the *Trinity*. The problem with the terms "Trinity" and "triune" is that number-categories are applied to the infinite self-mediation

of absolute spirit, which can be properly grasped only in purely conceptual fashion. When numbers enter in, the understanding can see only contradictions and puzzles endlessly about how "three equals one." It cannot grasp the dialectic of love, life, friendship, personality.

Thus far, Hegel has not advanced much beyond the *Ms.* But now he makes the observation that reason can employ all the *relationships* of the understanding, but only insofar as it destroys the *forms* of the understanding. The "forms" by which the understanding expresses the trinitarian "relationships" are above all the three "persons" of "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." In themselves, these are childlike (*kindlich*), figurative (*bildlich*) ways of expressing a relationship, and they must be destroyed insofar as they suggest that what we have are three persons rather than personhood as such, which is constituted by inward and outward relationships. But beyond the destruction is a retrieval or a translation; the relations symbolized by the persons can be reformulated logically. The "Father" is the universal, the all-encompassing, the One; the "Son" is infinite particularity, God in the mode of appearance; the "Spirit" is singularity as such, that is, infinite or absolute singularity. But in truth all three are *spirit*; the third is also the first. Here we must shift from the religious to the philosophical understanding of *Geist*. Absolute spirit is a "process" that it itself "works through" but that gives rise to nothing new. What is brought forth is already there from the beginning; it is "presupposed," and spirit is its own "presupposing" (see nn. 66, 90, 93). The differentiation that the divine life goes through is not an external process but solely inward, "a play of self-maintenance." The reenactment of this process outwardly is a matter not of the doctrine of the Trinity in the strict sense, as Hegel sees it, but of the second and third elements.

Much of the actual content of the first element in the 1824 lectures, as in the *Ms.*, is concerned with the "hints and traces" of the Trinity found in the Trimurti, in Plato and Aristotle, and in the pre-Christian and early-Christian Gnostics. While these anticipate the true category, Hegel's intention now is to expose more clearly their deficiencies, using as his criterion the logical definition just worked out.

The Second Element: Representation, Appearance

“This is the element of representation as such or of appearance,” writes Hegel, but other terms could also be used to characterize the second element such as “particularization” or “diremption.” The element as a whole is divided into two phases, which we have characterized as “differentiation” (*Unterscheidung*) and “reconciliation” (*Versöhnung*), following clues in the text. The distinction is not between nature and finite spirit, as in the *Ms.*, for reasons given above. The phase of differentiation (Sec. 1) corresponds to both Sec. B.b and Sec. B.c.α of the *Ms.*, while reconciliation (Sec. 2) corresponds to *Ms.* Sec. B.c.β.

We have further divided Sec. 1 into four subsections (a-d), although there are no such markings in the Griesheim transcript. Sec. 1.a is a revised version of *Ms.* Sec. B.b. We have given it the title it bears because Hegel begins by distinguishing between and comparing differentiation *within* the divine life (here he simply recapitulates what already has been said about the immanent Trinity) and differentiation *in* the world. The former (“the eternal Son”) is the element of self-differentiation within an unbroken identity, while the latter is a *positing* of the distinction as such, a going forth, an appearing of God in the realm of finitude. The treatment here is even briefer than in the *Ms.*

Secs. 1.b-d contain a reworking of *Ms.* Sec. B.c.α. Hegel starts by asking in what sense we can speak of humanity as either good or evil “by nature.” The answer is that we are not good or evil by nature but only in and through *cognition*, although cognition itself is not evil. What cognition entails is essentially a *cleavage, rupture, or severance* (*Entzweiung*)²⁸ within the self and from whatever is outside the self; the “divided will” of Romans 7 is probably in Hegel’s mind at this point (see n. 127). The evil that results from cleavage is the consciousness of “being-for-myself” in opposition both to external nature and to the inward universal. It means “singularizing myself in a way that cuts me off from the universal.” But such “singularization” (*Vereinzelung*) is a necessary step in the

28. On the comparison of the terms *Entzweiung* and *Entfremdung*, see *Ms.* n. 90.

process of becoming a self, a single individual (*Einzelheit*). Humanity, in order to become human, "has to progress to this antithesis of being-for-self as such." Thus evil is a dialectically necessary step in the process of humanization. Cleavage "is what produces the disease and is at the same time the source of health." Cognition is the principle of spirituality: it both occasions the "injury of separation" and heals it. It is the principle of divinity in humanity—which even God recognizes when, communing with himself, he says, "See, Adam has become like one of us." This is the essential meaning of the story of the fall. In contrast with the *Ms.*, in 1824 Hegel engages in an extended speculative discussion of these matters, losing touch almost completely with the text of the biblical story.

The division of Sec. 2 ("Reconciliation") into three subsections is guided by the summary that Hegel gives toward the end of it, namely, that the three moments are the idea of reconciliation (the *concept* of this standpoint for consciousness), the historical presence of Christ (what is *given* to this standpoint, what actually exists for the community), and the transition to spiritual presence (i.e., to the community) (see n. 156).

The first of these (Sec. 2.a) combines points (α) and (β) of *Ms.* Sec. B.c. β . Although Hegel does not express it quite this way, it presents an argument for the *possibility*, *necessity*, and *actuality* of the incarnation, that is, of the "appearance" of the idea of reconciliation in a single individual. If we ask, "What is it that effects reconciliation?" the answer is that the apparent "incompatibility" between the cloven, evil subject and the infinite God is not the "truth"; the truth is the *unity*—the implicit unity—of divine and human nature, of infinite and finite. This is the necessary "presupposition," the condition of possibility, for the occurrence of divine-human reconciliation, without which it would be ontologically impossible. Philosophy must not simply accept this presupposition but must demonstrate it, this being the task of speculative logic.

But then a second question may be posed: "Cannot the subject bring about this reconciliation by itself, through its own efforts, its own activity?" In the first place, any such activity presupposes the

divine-human unity, which cannot itself be posited by the subject (any more than the moral world order can be posited by doing good deeds). The truth of this unity must therefore *appear* to the subject. But *how* can it appear to humanity in the latter's present condition of immediacy, rupture, evil, anguish, being-within-self, and so on? It is *God* who appears, the concrete God, in sensible presence, in the shape of the singular human being, which is the one and only sensible shape of spirit. (Lacking from the argument at this point is any real explanation of why the appearance must be *sensible* and *singular*.) A second aspect of the question of necessity concerns the being of God as distinct from the condition of humanity: "God, considered in terms of his eternal idea, *has* to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself." This has already been established in the first element and is founded in trinitarian dialectics.

Finally we may ask whether God has appeared in *this* particular human being at *this* time and in *this* place. This is what we have called the question of actuality, requiring historical rather than philosophical considerations. We may be able to show, from the course of world history, that the "time had come." But an actual proof that this particular human being is the one in whom God has appeared requires a proof of the Spirit rather than a proof of history, since only the community of faith is able to affirm and confirm that God was sensibly present in this individual.

The next question concerns the *content* that presents itself in this appearance. It is "the divine history as that of a single self-consciousness which has united divine and human nature within itself." The first aspect of this history is the single, immediate human being in whom it is believed that this has occurred, "in all his contingency, in the whole range of temporal relationships and conditions." This is what is taken up in the next section (b), which focuses on the teaching of Christ. Hegel no longer suggests, as he does in the corresponding section of the Ms. (B.c.β(γ)), that this external, sensible history and this teaching offer a kind of verification of what is claimed to be true about him by the community. In 1824 his polemic against the historicizers seems to have altered

his evaluation of the significance of historical information about Christ. The presentation of the teaching of Christ is briefer than that in the *Ms.* but similar to it.

It is not primarily the *teaching* that mediates the content that presents itself in this appearance; nor is it the *life* of Christ (see n. 145), nor is it even his *passion* and *death*. The first part of the final section (c) is based on point (δ) of *Ms. Sec. B.c.β*, but its discussion of the death of Christ is quite brief and does not attribute the same significance to it that the *Ms.* does.

Rather, the focus for the 1824 lectures, beginning with the third paragraph of the final section, is on the “transition [from sensible] to spiritual presence.” Here Hegel draws upon and reorganizes material not only from *Ms. Sec. B.c.β(ε)* but also from the transitional section at the beginning of *Ms. Sec. C*, “Standpoint of the Community in General.” For the spiritual community, immediate presence has passed away, and the community itself is formed with the passage from the sensible presence of Christ to the presence of God in the Spirit—the “Comforter” who can come only when sensible history in its immediacy has passed by. The Son “has been raised up to the right hand of God.” To say this means that in his history the nature of God is accomplished; his story is the story of God. But only the community can say this: it *identifies* him or *recognizes* him as the one who has been raised up, not as him who was once here in sense experience. Therefore all sensory verification falls away, including the miraculous proofs. “We have already discussed that”—indeed, at great length in the treatment of the cultus at the end of Part I of the 1824 lectures (*Sec. B.3.b*); here only a brief reminder is necessary. The proper way to preserve sensible presence is to let it pass away, because by its very nature it is singular and momentary and cannot be repeated but only remembered. Means of repeating and prolonging it are readily available when needed (relics, holy images, etc.), but they engender an illusion and the spiritual community should have no need of them.

The Third Element: Community, Spirit

The relation of the “third element” in 1824 and 1827 to *Sec. C* of the *Ms.* has already been considered. The *Ms.*’s transitional in-

roduction on "the standpoint of the community in general" is dispersed into the last section of the second element and the first section of the third element in 1824 and 1827. In both of the later lectures, the final element is divided into three sections, concerning the "origin," "subsistence," and "realization" of the community. The first two correspond to Ms. Secs. C. α and C. β , respectively. The third section replaces Ms. Sec. C. γ , "the passing away of the community," although some of its content is anticipated by the discussion of the antinomy between freedom and grace at the end of Ms. Sec. C. β . Hegel no longer speaks of the "passing away" of the community; rather it seems to be "passing over" into various forms of worldly, reflective, and conceptual "realization," in the process of which the community itself will be "transformed."

Sec. C.1 on the "origin of the community" evidences Hegel's continuing preoccupation with the question of the transition from sensible to spiritual presence, or the question of the sense in which faith has a historical foundation and/or verification. Much of this material is repetitive, but some points are brought out more clearly than before. Hegel insists that "sensible history constitutes the point of departure for spirit," and that accordingly the faith of the community began from the individual founder. But "that single human being is transformed by the community; he is known as God, characterized as the Son of God." His "entanglement" with finitude and temporal history is cast off, and the content that is mediated by him sensibly is transposed into spiritual, universal truth. "Having left that starting point behind, spirit now stands on a soil of quite a different worth." Thus there can be no question of a sensible verification based on miracles, for such "proofs" must themselves be verified; but then an "infinite number of objections" can be raised, and at best only a relative certainty is attainable. Yet "the church has been right to condemn the attack upon the miracles, the resurrection, etc., because such attacks entail the assumption that these things are what establish that Christ is the Son of God." Hegel concludes this section with the famous statement that "the simply present content" of spirit can be justified only by philosophy, not by history. "What spirit does is no history [*Historie*]" (see n. 190). Spirit is of course in essence a historical (*geschichtlich*)

process, and religious faith has of necessity a sensible, historical foundation, but the *truth* of faith and of spirit cannot be proved by historical (*historisch*) investigations of past events. The only proof is the witness of the Spirit, the pouring out of which is the origin of the community. Hegel's position on this question can be expressed in surprisingly Kierkegaardian terms: faith *does* have a "historical point of departure," but it is not possible "to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge."²⁹

Sec. C.2 on the "subsistence" of the community is similar to the discussion of the "being" of the community in the *Ms.*, even though it is structured differently. The question is how the content of faith is *accomplished* in and for the individual; the answer is through the sacrament of *baptism*, the *rebirth* of the individual by means of doctrine or teaching, and the *partaking* of divine reconciliation through the sacrament of communion.

The final section of the 1824 lectures (C.3) expands certain elements in Sec. C.β of the *Ms.* and replaces Sec. C.γ entirely. Over against the inwardness and spirituality of the community stands a multifaceted objective reality, which opposes or resists reconciliation in various ways, but within which faith must realize itself. Such a "realization of faith" also entails a "transformation of the community."

The first aspect of this objective reality is the external, immediate world, symbolized by the natural heart with all of its passions, self-seeking, and corruption. When it takes upon itself these worldly passions and inclinations, the community becomes a *church*, which both falls into worldliness and struggles against it. Thus the realization of faith in the church remains ambiguous.

The second aspect of objective reality confronting faith is what Hegel calls "reflection," that is, the reflective philosophy of subjectivity of the Enlightenment (n. 204). The reflective critique of religion, which challenges the validity of religion's central symbols

29. See the question on the title page of Søren Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton, 1936). In the background, of course, is Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch": "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason" (G. E. Lessing, *On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power*, in *Lessing's Theological Writings*, trans. H. Chadwick [Stanford, 1957], pp. 53, 55).

and thought-processes as well as its authority, leads in the direction of subjectivism, secularism, deism, and finally atheism, since everything is reduced to a reflection of finite mind, and heart and heaven are “emptied” of objective content. Reflection is an abstract kind of thinking, which cannot tolerate dialectical distinctions and relations. It oscillates between the abstract and empty self-identity of the subject and the equally empty beyond, the “supreme being” of deism. It is encountered in two forms in the modern world, according to Hegel: on the one hand, the ideology of Enlightenment rationalism, which is intrinsically antireligious (n. 207); and on the other, Islamic religion, which is fanatically religious, submerging the human subject totally in the one, absolute God (on Hegel’s treatment of Islam, and the comparison of it with the Enlightenment, see nn. 210, 213, 215). Despite the hostility of rationalism toward Christianity, there is a realization of faith here, since at least the principle of subjective freedom comes to consciousness in it, and the inwardness of the community is now developed within itself. (A comparable statement is not made with reference to Islam: here Christianity simply “finds its antithesis.”)

Against the attacks of reflection, religious content may take refuge in the concept, which is the third and most valid form of the realization of faith. Speculative philosophy finds itself opposed by both the church and the Enlightenment—by the former because it refuses to be bound to the forms of representation and the authority of tradition; by the latter because it refuses to renounce the truth or be indifferent toward religious content. Its goal is to cognize God, in comparison with which nothing else is worth troubling about. Philosophy, then, shows forth the rational content of religion (of the Christian religion in particular), and the purpose of these lectures has been “to reconcile reason with religion in its manifold forms, and to recognize them as at least necessary” (a phrase reminiscent of the *Ms. Concept*, Vol. 1:198). The conclusion, while not nearly as dramatic as in the *Ms.*, does reaffirm that the conceptual cognition of religion has now devolved upon the community of philosophy, the “third estate,” which is not as universal as the first or as popular as the second, but is the custodian of the truth (see n. 224).

c. *The Lectures of 1827*

Introduction

The brief opening section goes back to the definition of the consummate religion found in the *Ms.*, avoiding the expansion that occurred in the 1824 lectures. The polemic of the latter against the subjectivism and historicism of present-day theology is now past, and a new adversary is on the scene in the form of an antispeculative Neopietism, which has brought the charge of pantheism—or even worse, atheism—against Hegel’s philosophy of religion.³⁰ One aspect of this charge is that speculative philosophy does not take finite, “positive,” historical reality seriously but simply identifies the world with God. Hegel is essentially responding to this charge in the new and lengthy introductory section on “the positivity and spirituality” of the Christian religion (see 1827 lectures, n. 6). Thus at some points the 1827 lectures emphasize the very things that were deemphasized in 1824 in the struggle against those who vacate religion of all cognitive content and reduce theology to merely historical studies.

It is now necessary to say that the absolute religion is both *revelatory* and *revealed*: that is, not only is the absolute truth made open and manifest in it, but also this truth has come to humanity from without, in positive, historical fashion. This is true not just of religion but of everything with spiritual or rational content—ethics, laws, scientific discoveries, and so on. “Everything that is *for* consciousness is *objective* to consciousness. Everything must become to us from outside.” But the validity or truth of the content is not constituted by positivity as such but by its conformity to what is rational or conceptual. “The spiritual . . . cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual, the sensible.” Thus we find already in religion itself a critique of proofs based on miracles, and we are led to the insight that the only true verification is by the witness of spirit. Hegel understands the witness of the *Holy Spirit* to occur in

30. See Vol. 1, 1827 *Intro.*, nn. 17, 18; 1827 *Concept*, n. 20. These charges were brought especially by F. A. G. Tholuck, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, 2d ed. (Hamburg, 1825); and *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* (Berlin, 1826). See also Anonymous [Hülsemann], *Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: Absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus* (Leipzig, 1829).

and through the witness of *our* spirit to spiritual truth (see n. 16).³¹ This can occur in diverse ways, ranging from a kind of preconscious “resonance” to the good and the true to the conceptual system of philosophy. But “it is not required that for all of humanity the truth be brought forth in a philosophical way.” For some people, indeed for most, belief on the basis of authority and testimonies still has a place.

The Bible is for Christians the fundamental basis that strikes a chord within them; but, although many people lead pious lives just by holding to it, we must move beyond it to thought, that is, to theology. Indeed, this is unavoidable once attempts are made to interpret the *meaning* of the words of the Bible. Presuppositions are brought in that are not in the Bible itself. Present-day presuppositions such as that humanity is good by nature or that God cannot be cognized make it exceedingly difficult to interpret the Bible, and it is necessary to work through these presuppositions critically and conceptually: that is the task of philosophy. Similarly, the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have by and large disappeared from present-day dogmatics because of its presuppositions, and it is now philosophy that is orthodox, maintaining and preserving the basic truths of Christianity. Hegel ends this second section with the well-known statement that “we” shall not set to work in “merely historical” (*historisch*) fashion but rather shall proceed “conceptually” or “scientifically” (n. 41). Thus, while attending to historical starting points and historical details, these must finally be “put aside” in the speculative redescription of the truth of this religion.

The third introductory section, “Survey of Previous Developments,” is also new in 1827, expanding upon a brief concluding treatment of the relation to previous religions in 1824, and building upon the surveys found in the discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of the concept of religion in Part I of the 1824 lectures. The survey is based on a logical grasp of the dialectics of the relation of finite and infinite, which yields the insight that the “elevation” of the finite to the infinite is at the same time the return

31. See also Vol. 1:337 n. 149.

of the infinite to itself (n. 44). “Our” treatment begins with the concept of religion, then advances to the realization or actualization of the concept as “idea.” The idea first appears in the form of immediacy, or the *natural religions* (n. 49), a second phase of which involves the withdrawal-into-self of spirit from its submersion in the natural (Buddhism, Hinduism, n. 50). The second main stage in the development of religion is *spiritual religion*, for which the natural is not an independent content but only the appearance of something inward. This inwardness is for Greek religion the beautiful human form and soul, and for Jewish religion the one spiritual, personal God (“who first merits for us the name of God”) (see nn. 52, 55). Finally, there is the *religion of purposiveness* or Roman religion (n. 56), which represents a phase distinct from spiritual religion, and indeed does not understand the gods as spiritual subjectivities but rather as abstractions instrumental to the well-being of the state.

Before completing this section, Hegel offers yet another version of the argument based on the logic of the concept: the concept becomes spirit only insofar as it has traversed these finite forms, has achieved determinacy through this circuit. At first, spirit is only a presupposition; it comes to be spirit only through the circuit of self-diremption and self-return. The absolute *idea* is the implicit unity of concept and reality (objectivity); it comes to be *spirit* when this unity has been actualized. At this point Hegel is incorporating elements of the ontological proof, which establishes the identity of concept and objectivity, thinking and being, in terms of the self-mediation of the concept. The ontological proof itself is missing from Part III of the 1827 lectures, having been transferred to Part I along with the other proofs. But traces of it are still discernible in the old location.

The removal of the ontological proof means that the “Division of the Subject” becomes the final section of the Introduction. Of the four categorial frameworks used to articulate this division in the 1824 lectures, Hegel starts with that of subjective consciousness in 1827. The “three ways by which the subject is related to God,” or the “three modes of God’s determinate being for subjective spirit,” are (1) thought or thinking, (2) sensible intuition and rep-

resentation, (3) sensibility and subjectivity. He then repeats the division in a way that draws together the categories of logic and space-time: (1) Universality—the absolute, eternal idea in and for itself, God in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside the world; (2) Particularity: God creates the world of nature and finite spirit, first positing the separation, then reconciling what is alien to himself; (3) Singularity: through this process of reconciliation, God is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit present in its community. This schema makes it clear that reconciliation is a process that begins in the second moment and reaches its consummation in the third.

The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself

The treatment of the Trinity is quite lengthy in 1827 (n. 68), but it is no more clearly organized than in the earlier lectures. Well into the section, Hegel offers an inclusive definition of the triune God in speculative categories, which could helpfully have been placed at the beginning: “God in his eternal universality is the one who distinguishes himself, determines himself, posits an other to himself, and likewise sublates the distinction, thereby remaining present to himself, and is spirit only through this process of being brought forth.” We can express this in the mode of sensibility by saying that “God is love,” for “love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other.” Thus God as love “is this distinguishing and the nullity of the distinction, a play of distinctions in which there is nothing serious, distinction precisely as sublated, i.e., the simple, eternal idea” (n. 71). This obviously has reference to the immanent Trinity; the economic or worldly Trinity, God’s relation to otherness *ad extra*, involves (we might say) a play of distinctions that is “deadly serious”—to the extremity of death on the cross, which is the death of God.

Much of this section is devoted to the argument that the speculative idea of God cannot be grasped by the categories of sense experience or of the understanding, for neither is able to grasp the speculative truth of *identity in difference*. For the understanding, God is either an abstract, undifferentiated monad or a sum of distinct and mutually contradictory predicates that express God’s

relation to himself or to the world. For sensible consideration and the understanding, the Trinity remains an impenetrable *μυστήριον*, as does life itself, with its alternation of distinction, contradiction, and annulment. The situation is not eased by the fact that, “because religion is the truth for everyone,” the content of the divine idea appears in forms accessible to sense experience and understanding, namely, the symbols of the trinitarian “persons.” The understanding is baffled by the seeming contradiction that there is one God, yet three divine persons—even though personality, too, has this dialectic of identity and difference within itself (“the truth of personality is found precisely in winning it back through this immersion . . . in the other”).

The conclusion of the section is taken up by an expanded discussion of anticipations of the triad as the true category in earlier religions. The main thing to know is that “these fermentations of an idea” (n. 105), “wild as they are, are rational.” Jacob Boehme knew this because he recognized that the Trinity is the universal foundation of everything, and he perceived traces of it “in everything and everywhere,” even though his way of representing this was “rather wild and fanciful.” Hegel’s own agenda, especially in the 1827 lectures, might be understood as that of demonstrating traces of the Trinity in everything by showing the rational, dialectical structure of all reality. Thus the idea of the triune God is not an impenetrable mystery or mere theological “decoration,” as was being suggested by recent attacks on the Trinity to which Hegel was at pains to respond.³²

The Second Element: Representation, Appearance

The arrangement of the second element in 1827 is similar to that of 1824, with one exception (n. 118), and we have adopted the same section headings for both lecture series.

Sec. 1.a is presented more clearly than in the earlier lectures. Differentiation within the divine life is basically a matter of the inner-trinitarian dialectic: “the act of differentiation is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture.” In this state it

32. See above, n. 30; also Vol. 1, 1824 *Intro.*, n. 34.

is still only an abstract distinction, lacking realization and reality. But it belongs to the absolute *freedom* of the divine idea that, "in its act of determining and dividing, it *releases* the other to exist as a free and independent being. The other, released as something free and independent, is *the world* as such." In other words, because otherness is already a (sublated) moment within the divine idea, the idea is free to allow this its own *other* also to obtain "the determinacy of other-being, of an actual entity," without losing itself or giving itself up. It can give freedom and independent existence to the other without losing its own freedom: "It is only for the being that is free that freedom *is*." This independence, however, is not autonomy: the truth of the world is its *ideality*, not its reality; it is something posited or created, and has being, so to speak, only for an instant. Its destiny is to sublimate this separation and estrangement from God and return to its origin. Hence the second element as a whole is "the process of the world in love by which it passes over from fall and separation into reconciliation."

The analysis of the creation and fall of humanity, of good and evil, and of knowledge and estrangement in the next three sections is also presented more clearly than in either the 1824 or 1821 lectures. The section on "natural humanity" (1.b) focuses on the ambiguity in the statements that humanity is good or evil "by nature." Humanity is *implicitly* good because created in the divine image; but the human vocation is not to remain in the condition of implicitness. If it does, if it chooses to do so, to exist according to nature, then it is evil; but likewise, passing beyond the natural state is what first constitutes the cleavage, which in turn introduces evil. The story of the "fall" is discussed next (1.c), for the reasons indicated in n. 138. Hegel once again attends to the details of the story, as he did in the *Ms.*, but his concern is not so much to highlight its "contradictions" as to extract the conceptual truth hidden in its representational form—the truth about the involvement of the whole of humanity, about knowledge, about labor, and about immortality.

These themes are drawn together and brought to a conclusion in the final section (1.d), which we have called "Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil." The linkage between these terms is a com-

plex and important matter in Hegel's thought. Cognitive knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) entails an act of judgment or primal division (*Ur-teil*); it thus issues in separation, cleavage, rupture into two (*Ent-zwei-ung*) (n. 141). This cleavage or estrangement (*Entfremdung*)—the words are quite similar, n. 138—is not, strictly speaking, in itself evil, but rather is the inherent condition of finite spirit just because it is consciousness and cognizes, but finitely, that is, is unable finally to overcome the divisions posited by its acts of knowing. It involves evil potentially, however, since self-seeking is necessarily one aspect of what is known, cognized, experienced. Thus it is the *precondition* or *occasion* of evil, since evil entails the conscious or deliberate actualization of the state of separation, the choice to live in isolation from the depths of spirit, to cut oneself off from both the universal and the particular, to gratify immediate desires, to exist “according to nature” (*nach der Natur*). Yet self-rupture or self-estrangement gives rise not only to evil but also to the need for reconciliation, which may be seen when estrangement is associated with the anguish (*Schmerz*) of Jewish religion and the misery or unhappiness (*Unglück*) of Hellenistic-Roman culture. This is a matter emphasized in a special way by the 1827 lectures. Anguish arises from the awareness of the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the infinite and the finite, the good God and evil humanity, whereas misery expresses the awareness of the inability of human beings to find true happiness in finite and worldly ends. When the awareness of estrangement and evil had intensified to the extreme degree—or “when the time had fully come”—there arose a recognition of the need for a reconciliation that is universal, divine, and infinite.

In Sec. 2 of the “Second Element,” Hegel turns specifically to the theme of reconciliation, for which he has so carefully prepared the soil. In the first subsection (a), he addresses the question of why the idea of reconciliation can appear and must appear in a single historical individual. The argument is similar to that presented in 1824. The *condition of possibility* for reconciliation is that the antithesis between divinity and humanity is already implicitly sublated. Because other-being or difference is already present within the divine idea (indeed, is what makes it *spirit*), “the other-being, the finitude, the weakness, the frailty of human nature is not to do

any harm to that divine unity which forms the substance of reconciliation.” The *necessity* of a divinely mediated reconciliation has already been considered at some length: the subject is aware of the incongruity, of the *need* for reconciliation, but cannot bring it about on its own account. The necessity that reconciliation should appear in a single historical individual is grounded in the fact that it must be brought forth not merely for the standpoint of philosophical speculation but in a form accessible to the whole of humanity, namely, the form of *sensible certainty*. Therefore, “God *had* to appear in the world in the flesh”—not just flesh as such, which would be an abstraction, but the flesh of *singular* human being. *Many* or even *several* single incarnations will not do, however, because what is involved here is something that stands *over against* immediate, subjective consciousness in its condition of need. “The unity in question must appear for others as a singular human being *set apart*; it is not present in the others, but only in *one* from whom all the others are excluded.” This one is the human being who is what humanity implicitly is (*das Ansich*, n. 172), humanity in itself as such (*der Mensch an sich*, n. 171); there can be only one such ultimate. For this one, the church has used the “monstrous compound,” the “God-man.”

The question of *actuality* (“*Who was* this one individual?”) is reserved to the next subsection (b). Upon addressing this question in 1827, Hegel initially makes a quite sharp distinction between a “nonreligious” and a “religious” perspective. The nonreligious perspective views Christ as an ordinary human being in accord with his external circumstances; it views him as a Socrates, a teacher of humanity, a martyr to the truth. Yet it must be said that, as Hegel proceeds to expound the nonreligious perspective, the distinction between it and the religious perspective becomes blurred. Although Christ is born and has needs like all other human beings, he does not share the corruption and evil inclinations of others or pursue worldly affairs. “Rather he lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation.” He *is*, his identity is in, his teaching. Hegel’s presentation of the teaching must go back to the *Ms.*, since it is fuller than in 1824, and the same argument is implicitly present, namely, that this is not such an ordinary teacher after all. Christ speaks not

merely as a teacher but as a prophet, that is, as one who expresses the demand *immediately* from God, and by whom God himself speaks it and confirms it. The one who says this is essentially human, but his is an essential humanity in which essential divinity is present. "It is the Son of Man who speaks thus, in whom this expression, this activity of what subsists in and for itself, is essentially the work of God—not as something suprahuman that appears in the shape of an external revelation, but rather as [God's] working in a human being, so that the divine presence is essentially identical with this human being." If this much can be said from the nonreligious perspective—and Hegel insists that this is all that is involved so far—then the "nonreligious" history of Christ does seem to offer a kind of attestation of the truth of the religious perspective, the witness of spirit that God is definitively and reconcilingly present in this individual. On the one hand Hegel is guarding against historical proofs, in accord with the predominant emphasis of the 1824 lectures; but on the other hand he is holding on to the religious and philosophical significance of this particular history in its specificity and detail, thus harking back to a leitmotiv of the *Ms.*

The death of Christ can also be viewed from the nonreligious perspective: he died as a martyr to the truth, who sealed his faith and his teaching by the manner of his death (see the end of Sec. b and n. 196). But his death also inaugurates the transition into the religious sphere, and this is the topic taken up in Sec. c. "Comprehended spiritually," the death of Christ "becomes the means of salvation, the focal point of reconciliation." The "Lutheran" statement, "God himself is dead," represents a spiritual interpretation, because it means that everything human, fragile, and finite is a moment of the divine, that "God himself is involved in this," and that what is happening is a "stripping away" of the human element, an entrance into glory.

When the history of the life and death of Christ obtains a spiritual interpretation, there begins "the history of the resurrection and ascension of Christ to the right hand of God." Since the community of faith also begins at this point, we must assume that the history of the resurrection and the history of the community are in some sense coterminous, although Hegel does not elaborate. The com-

munity is founded on the consciousness and certainty of divine-human unity and divine reconciliation. For it, Christ's history is a "divine history," "the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is." To say that "Christ has died for all" is to understand this not as an individual act but as a moment in the divine history, the moment in which other-being and separation are sublated. All this is predicated on the witness of the Spirit, but the point is not as heavily stressed in 1827 as in 1824.

The Third Element: Community, Spirit

The third element is briefer in the 1827 lectures than in 1824 and 1821; Hegel had run out of time, with only two lectures remaining before the end of the semester (n. 212). In Sec. 1, on the "origin of the community," the matter of the verification of faith could be passed over lightly since it had already been considered in Sec. 2 of the Introduction to Part III, and Hegel was no longer as preoccupied with the polemic against historical proofs based on miracles and other testimonies as he had been in 1824.³³ Instead of this he introduces a new theme, namely, that the community "begins with the fact that the truth is at hand"—the truth that God is a triune God (the recurring affirmation of which is, as we have seen, a leitmotiv of the 1827 lectures). Faith is the inward, subjective appropriation of this truth, the truth that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty by the self-mediation of the triune God. The difficulty residing in the fact that faith is initially the act of single individuals is overcome by taking finite subjectivity up into the infinite subjectivity of the absolute (or Holy) Spirit, which is no longer isolated and singular. Individual human subjects are, as it were, "essentialized" in the transfigured intersubjectivity of the spiritual community.³⁴

33. An interesting twist between 1824 and 1827 is that in the former year Hegel argued that the church has been right to condemn the attack upon miracles, the resurrection, etc., while in the latter year he argued that it has been right to refuse to acknowledge investigations into such matters. The reason is the same in both cases: these things, whether confirmed or questioned, do not establish the truth about Christ.

34. The language here is not exactly Hegel's, but the content is. What Hegel says is that individual subjects still do not exist in a way appropriate to their "inward,

The community as *realized* or *subsisting* (Sec. 2) is the *church*, which is the "institution whereby its subjects come to the truth." The foremost of its institutions is *doctrine*, which is now something presupposed, fixed, taught as universally valid and authoritative. The church is essentially a teaching church. No longer is a person elevated to the absolute by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit; rather he or she is instructed by the appropriate authorities, and this instruction must be assimilated in a process of education and cultivation. The individual partakes of the truth of reconciliation *qua* individual through the rite of *baptism*; one's transgressions are wiped out through the practice of *repentance* or *penitence*; and believers appropriate God's presence in the sacrament of *Holy Communion*.

Sec. 3, the "realization of the spirituality of the community" in universal actuality, is built upon the corresponding section in 1824, but its structure is worked out in a more rigorously logical form, and the contents are unusually suggestive (Hegel's final lecture [n. 242] was tightly packed!). Reconciliation must be actualized not only in the individual heart and in the church but also in the world in the form of rational freedom. The "community" should not remain simply ecclesiastical, nor will it simply pass away; rather it is to become a world-historical community. Three moments of this realization may be distinguished, which are not only logical types but also historical stages:

(a) The first is *real*, or reconciliation in *life*, worldly realization as such. This moment, in turn, is composed of three stages: that of immediacy or renunciation of the world, inner religiousness (primitive Christianity); that in which religiosity and worldliness remain external to each other, and the church has dominion over the world yet takes worldliness into itself (the medieval Catholic church); and

substantial, essentiality," and that in reconciliation, finitude is reduced to an "inessential" state. The language of "essentialization" comes from Friedrich Schelling and has been adopted by Paul Tillich, who also employs the expression "spiritual community." See Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 149 ff., 400 ff. See also Hegel's statement in the 1831 lectures that in the life of the community the "privatism" of individuals is "consumed" (n. 258).

that in which religion and world are reconciled in the “ethical realm” (n. 249), where the principle of freedom has penetrated into ethical life and its institutions of family, civil society, and state (the modern secular-bourgeois world).

(b) The second moment of realization is *ideal*, or reconciliation in *thought*. In the modern world this takes two forms (see n. 261). The first is that of the philosophy of the *Enlightenment*. Since its principle is one of abstract identity, it is directed not merely against externality but also against everything that is concrete—including the idea of the triune God. Since nothing concrete can be known of God, God is not known at all, and the Enlightenment ends with the “servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom.” The other form is that of *Pietism*—“an inward weaving of spirit within itself,” the pious life of feeling, which acknowledges no objective truth and which is “turned polemically against the philosophy that wants cognition.” It was from this quarter that Hegel found himself attacked for his “pantheism” and speculative trinitarianism, and this attack served as the polemical context for the whole of the 1827 lectures. Thus it is not surprising that in 1827 he substituted a counterattack on Neopietism (“subjectivity devoid of content”) for the treatment of Islamic religion that stood in this place in 1824.

(c) The third and final moment is the *ideal-real*: subjectivity develops beyond itself in accord with the necessity of the content, which is objective. This is the standpoint of *speculative philosophy*, according to which “the content takes refuge in the concept and obtains its justification by thinking” (see n. 262). Here we find the true mediation of content and concept, of reality and thought, of the real and the ideal. Such a philosophical mediation is the justification of religion by showing how the content of religion accords with reason. Philosophy “is to this extent theology” because it presents the reconciliation of God with himself and with the otherness of nature and finite spirit—the “peace of God” that does not “surpass all reason” (n. 266) but is what reason is all about.

d. The Lectures of 1831

The excerpts by Strauss are supplemented by a number of substantial passages from the *Werke* (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 1), to which

reference is made in the following analysis. Since these passages were transmitted by the *Werke* primarily because they represent points at which the 1831 lectures differ from or supplement the earlier lectures, they are especially useful for our purposes. Where 1831 text closely parallels 1827 text, we may assume that the *Werke* preferred the generally fuller 1827 version or conflated the sources into a text that differs in minor details from the pure 1827 text transmitted by Lasson.

Introduction

The Introduction appears to treat two themes briefly: the definition of the consummate or revelatory religion, and the transition to this stage. Gone is the lengthy discussion of the positivity and spirituality of this religion (1827 lectures, Sec. 2), as well as the survey of previous developments (Sec. 3). Hegel may have appended such a survey to the end of Part II in 1831 since there is an allusion to it in the introductory paragraph transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 3). The latter also indicates that in 1831 Hegel defines religion as the self-consciousness of God. The God who distinguishes himself from himself and is an object for himself, while at the same time remaining identical with himself, knows himself in a consciousness that is distinct from him; therefore finite consciousness is itself a moment in the divine process.

The Abstract Concept of God

Since in 1831 Hegel is once again treating the proofs of the "existence" of God in relation to the various historical religions, the proper locus of the ontological proof is the Christian religion, and the 1831 lectures return to the structural arrangement of 1824, even though their content is similar to 1827. Fortunately, the *Werke* gives the full text of this section in an appendix at the end of volume 12 (see *Ontological Proof*, n. 1), and our analysis follows this version rather than Strauss's.

In 1827 and 1831 Hegel's treatment of the ontological proof achieved its mature form.³⁵ The 1831 version had the advantage of benefiting from Hegel's *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, which he delivered in the summer of 1829, preparations

35. For the 1827 version, see Vol. 1:433-441.

for the publication of which were virtually complete when he died in the fall of 1831. There was the added advantage of being able to consider this proof directly in relationship to the revelatory religion, which was not possible in 1827 or in the separate *Lectures*. The revelatory religion has both the *abstract concept* of God (the free, pure concept) and the *determinate being* (*Dasein*) of God in his consummate manifestation in and to finite spirit. These determine the two main parts of the treatment of this religion, and the task of the ontological proof is to demonstrate the identity of the two (or better, the organic life-process within God that moves from the one to the other).

Whereas in the cosmological and teleological proofs we had an “ascending” from determinate or contingent being to being-in-and-for-itself, with the ontological proof we start with the free, pure concept, and it is the only genuine proof. The summary of the classical form of the proof in Anselm and others, and of Kant’s critique of it, goes back to the Ms. We have pointed out that in 1824 Hegel attempted to develop a post-Kantian version of the proof, one based on his own logic, which would respond to the Kantian critique. His effort in 1824 did not go much beyond laying the foundations for such an argument; this is where the 1827 and 1831 lectures make a considerable advance.

The problem with the classical argument from “perfection” is that it *presupposes* the very unity of concept (thought) and being (reality) that must be demonstrated. What must be shown is that the finitude of subjectivity is sublated in the concept itself and that the unity of being and concept is not a presupposition but a *result*. To be sure, the concept necessarily contains being implicitly, for being is simple immediacy or relation to self, while the concept, properly defined, is pure mediation in which all categorial determinations, including being, are present and sublated. But the concept does not merely have being within itself implicitly; it sublates its subjectivity and objectifies itself—just as, when human beings realize their purposes, what was at first only ideal becomes something real. The concept “makes itself reality and thus becomes the truth, the unity of subject and object.”

In the Christian religion the self-realization of the concept of God is fully manifest. The concept of God realizes itself, takes on

determinate being (*Dasein*), concrete being, in the consciousness of finite spirit—in the outward, worldly reenactment of the inward mediation. The identity of the concept of God and the being of God is the result of an absolute process, the living activity that God himself is. And the “being” in question is not simply the infinite, purely conceptual actuality that God is as absolute idea; it is *also* the finite, determinate being that God takes on in and through the process of self-diremption and self-return by which he becomes absolute spirit. That is why, in the final analysis, it is not inappropriate to speak of the *Dasein Gottes*.

The Idea of God in Representational Form

The contrast between the two main divisions of the revelatory religion is between the abstract concept of God and the concrete representational forms in which God is manifest for this religion (1831 *Excerpts*, n. 7)—a contrast that harks back to the *Ms*.

Strauss gives a full and clear synopsis of the division of the subject, as confirmed by the 1831 text transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 67). As we indicate in n. 7 of the *Excerpts*, the 1831 division introduces for the first time the designation of the three elements as the “kingdoms” of the Father, Son, and Spirit, which offers a further reinforcement of the Trinity as the central Christian symbolism (a trajectory already established in 1827). The governing principle of the division appears to be divine *self-revelation* in three forms or modes. The moments of the idea of God that correspond to the three kingdoms are universality (or pure ideality), diremption, and reconciliation. The symbol “Father” properly signifies the inner dialectic of the preworldly Trinity (1831 *Excerpts*, n. 8), while the symbol “Son” has two referents—*undifferentiated* otherness within the divine life (the “eternal Son”), and *differentiated*, externalized, worldly other-being (the incarnate Son or the “kingdom of” the Son) (n. 9). With the transition from external or natural history to “divine history,” we have the transition to the kingdom of the Spirit (the consciousness of reconciliation on the part of human beings, and the realization of this consciousness).

If the 1824 lectures are characterized by a polemic against subjectivism, and the 1827 lectures by a defense against the charge of

pantheism, those of 1831 are marked by the attempt to elaborate the trinitarian structure of the Christian religion as clearly as possible. While the worldly mediation of absolute spirit is given special stress in 1831, it is balanced by the insistence that the condition of possibility for God's self-realization in and through world process is his ideal self-relatedness. The ground of the difference between God and world is (to borrow Whitehead's terminology) their "primordial" and "consequent" identity.

The Kingdom of the Father

The treatment of the Trinity in the 1831 lectures is almost identical with that in 1827, with the exception of the "amplification" transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 93). This amplification represents a further attempt to unpack the trinitarian symbols, "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." With help from Aristotle and the Scholastics, we may say that God as *actus purus* is the activity of pure knowing: "to knowing belongs an other, which is known, and since it is knowing that knows it, it is appropriated to it" (reference might also have been made to Augustine, but Hegel does not seem familiar with his thought). What God distinguishes from himself by knowing does not take on the shape of an other-being but remains identical with that from which it has been distinguished. The natural relationship of father and son "is only figurative and accordingly never wholly corresponds to what should be expressed." If we speak of the Father as "begetting" the Son, and of the Son as "obeying" the Father, we must understand that God himself is the entire activity, the totality, and that as such he is the Spirit. God is *alpha* and *omega*, the beginning and the end, and the eternal process that links them, Father-Son-Spirit. The whole of nature and finite spirit is pressing dialectically toward this central point as its absolute truth, and it is the task of the whole of philosophy to *show* that this is the truth. Because the dialectic of identity and difference (identity *in* and *through* difference and as the condition of possibility *for* difference) cannot be grasped by the abstract categories of numbers, they do not help at all in comprehending this mystery.

The Kingdom of the Son

The first paragraph of Strauss's excerpted version of Sec. B, together with the passage transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures,

n. 128), makes it fairly clear that the only topic Hegel treated under the rubric of “differentiation” (B.1) in 1831 was the transition from divine differentiation *ad intra* to worldly differentiation *ad extra*. God is involved in world process, both as its presupposition and as its result. To this discussion, however, he appends an analysis of the sense in which God is “revealed” to finite spirit in nature, concluding that, while God can indeed be cognized in nature, all such cognitions are finally inadequate. This provides a smooth transition to the spiritual revelation of God in the flesh of a human being. The discussion of natural humanity, estrangement, and good and evil, is transferred to Sec. C.1, while the story of the fall drops out completely (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 14).

Although the *Werke* transmits a full version of the 1831 text for Sec. B.2.a (1827 lectures, n. 173), it differs from the 1827 version primarily only in the clarity with which the arguments for the possibility and necessity of the incarnation are presented. Here Hegel makes the point that individual human subjectivity is the only proper “form” or “shape” (*Gestalt*) in which God can appear.

Despite a slight rearrangement of order, Sec. B.2.b in 1831 is also similar to 1827, taking up the contrast between religious and nonreligious perspectives, the teaching of Christ, and the comparison with Socrates. For the latter the *Werke* transmits a lengthy text (1827 lectures, n. 196), which indicates that Hegel developed this point more fully in 1831. Like Socrates, Christ “sealed the truth of his teaching by his death”; and like Christ, Socrates “brought inwardness to consciousness.” Even “unbelief” can go this far (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 19). But at the same time Christ’s teaching has a “different hue” and contains “an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates.”

Strauss gives an unusually detailed synopsis of Sec. B.2.c, and it is a topic to which Hegel evidently devoted considerable attention in 1831. With the death of Christ we have a transition to the “divine view,” according to which it is the nature and history of God that is revealed in Christ. Faith is the certainty that the divine life is “envisaged” (*angeschaut*) in the course of this human life. But in order that the divine life may be so envisaged, there are, says Hegel, “certain conditions”: the teaching of Christ, his statements about himself (which are “prima facie his assurances” with respect to his

oneness with God), and his miracles (which are manifestations of divine power in this individual). These are historical facts, in Hegel's view, and they (together with recognition of the difference between Christ and Socrates) at least provide a *basis* for the reversal in consciousness that begins with the death of Christ. Thus the distinction between the perspectives of "unbelief" and "faith" is not quite as sharp as Hegel had earlier seemed to suggest. But this is by no means a *proof* of faith. Faith rests on the witness of the Holy Spirit, and it "gives to the [historical] appearance of Christ *its full meaning*." In terms of their nuancing of this complex matter, the 1831 lectures return to the point of view first articulated in the Ms., which was altered in 1824 and partially restored in 1827.

At this point the 1831 lectures depart completely from 1827. The *Werke* transmits a lengthy text of the additional material (1827 lectures, n. 199), but since Strauss's synopsis is so clear (and confirmed in details by the *Werke* passage), we shall continue to follow it. "The impulse, generated by the shattering of the particular folk-spirits and of the natural deities of the people, to know God in a *universal* form as *spiritual*"—this is what is fulfilled by the manifestation of the *infinite* subjectivity of God in an actual human subject, and then by the *outpouring* of the Holy Spirit upon the *community of faith*, which is intrinsically a nonprovincial, universal community. Unlike the folk-spirits and the natural deities, it is above all the *death* of Christ that is the "touchstone" of faith, the comprehension of which requires the witness of the Spirit. The three meanings of the death of Christ—the *full presence of both humanity and divinity*, the despair that God himself is dead, and the reversal, the *putting to death of death* and the resurrection into life—these are, as it were, a reenactment of the divine history. "The abstractness of the Father is given up in the Son—this then is death. But the *negation of this negation* is the unity of Father and Son—love, or the Spirit." In other words, it is the abstract God, the supreme being, the Father, who dies in the death of the Son, and who is, as it were, reborn as concrete, world-encompassing Spirit. This is "the speculative Good Friday."³⁶ Finally, the redemption accomplished by Christ is no moral or juridical imputation but an overcoming

36. See *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 191 (GW 4:414).

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE STRUCTURE OF "THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION"

<i>Manuscript</i>	<i>1824 Lectures</i>
Introduction (73a)	Introduction
1. Definition of This Religion (73a)	1. The Consummate Religion
2. Characteristics of This Religion (73a)	2. The Revelatory Religion
	3. The Religion of Truth and Freedom
	4. Relation to Preceding Religions
A. Abstract Concept (74a)	I. The Metaphysical Concept of God
B. Concrete Representation (76a)	II. The Development of the Idea of God
[Division of the Subject]	[Division of the Subject]
a. The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God (77a)	A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself
b. The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World (80a)	B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance
c. Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation (82a)	1. Differentiation
α. Estrangement: Natural Humanity (82b)	a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World
(α) The Original Condition (83b)	b. Natural Humanity
(β) The Fall (85b)	c. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil
β. Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ (88a)	d. The Story of the Fall
(α) Idea of Divine-Human Unity (88a)	2. Reconciliation
(β) Appearance of the Idea in a Single Individual (88b)	a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual
(γ) The Teaching of Christ (89b)	b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ
(δ) The Life and Death of Christ (91b)	c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence
(ε) Resurrection and Ascension of Christ (94a)	
C. Community, Cultus (95b)	C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit
Standpoint of the Community in General (95b)	1. The Origin of the Community
α. The Origin of the Community (98a)	2. The Subsistence of the Community
β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus (101b)	3. The Realization of Faith
γ. The Passing Away of the Community (104a)	

Note: Sections that are aligned horizontally correspond to each other; exceptions are indicated. Reconstruction of the 1831 lectures is based on the Strauss excerpts and therefore is uncertain.

1827 Lectures

Introduction

- (Ms.) → 1. Definition of This Religion
 | 2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion
 |
 3. Survey of Previous Developments
 (*Concept of Religion*, Sec. B.e)
 4. Division of the Subject
 A. The First Element: The Idea of God In and For Itself
 B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance
1. Differentiation
 a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World
 b. Natural Humanity
 c. The Story of the Fall
 d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil
2. Reconciliation
 a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual
 b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ
 c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence
- C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit
1. The Origin of the Community
 2. The Subsistence of the Community
 3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community

1831 Lectures

Introduction

1. Definition of This Religion
2. Transition to This Religion
 I. The Abstract Concept of God
 II. The Idea of God in Representational Form [Division of the Subject]
 A. The Kingdom of the Father
 B. The Kingdom of the Son
1. Differentiation
2. Reconciliation
 a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual
 b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ
 c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence
- C. The Kingdom of the Spirit
1. The Self-Consciousness of the Community
 2. The Realization of Religion

of finitude, death, and evil in general by their being sublated in the divine life. To *know* that *this* is the reconciliation of the world is to bring mere “consideration” to a halt and to be drawn into the anguish of one’s own estrangement.

The Kingdom of the Spirit

In 1831 Hegel combined the previously separate sections on the “origin” and “subsistence” of the community into a single new unit, to which he added the materials on natural humanity, estrangement, and evil that were dropped from consideration under “differentiation” (see 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 26). His reasons for doing so are evident once the text is analyzed. The “kingdom of the Spirit” concerns the relationship of the subject to the three moments of the divine history, which it must itself traverse, thereby bringing itself “conclusively together with its original spiritual nature.” The “soil” upon which this movement occurs is the *community*, and the stages of the community’s “self-consciousness” (in which individual self-consciousnesses are shaped) correspond to the “three stages of God’s process”: immediacy, sublation of immediacy, and assurance of reconciliation. Thus the first stage is the origin of the community and the baptism of the individual believer. The second stage is that of repentance or penance—doing battle with, and working off, naturalness and evil. This is the subsistence of the community, and it is here that materials on natural humanity and good and evil are worked into the discussion. Finally, there is the sacrament of Holy Communion (“the midpoint of Christian doctrine,” 1827 lectures, n. 240), by which the subject receives not merely the assurance of unity with God but the actual enjoyment and vouchsafing of it. This is the consummate realization of religion in the community of faith.

But religion must also realize itself in the worldly sphere, and the imperialism of church over world must give way to the institution of a “just and ethical civil life.” The supplementary text provided by the *Werke* at this point (1827 lectures, n. 250) expresses it in distinctive fashion: “It is in the organization of the state that the divine has broken through into the sphere of actuality; the latter is permeated by the former, and the worldly realm is now justified

in and for itself, for its foundation is the divine will, the law of right and freedom." This is the "authentic discipline of worldliness." As we have seen, this is a characteristic concern of Hegel in 1831.³⁷ The lectures end with the assurance that philosophy does not place itself above religion but only above the representational forms of faith.

37. See the section on "The Relationship of Religion to the State," printed as an item in the Appendix to Volume 1, with which the 1831 *Concept of Religion* ends.

PART III

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT¹

1

[73a]

[Introduction]

[1. Definition of This Religion]

²This religion [was] earlier defined³ as the one in which the *concept* of religion has become *objective* to itself; [it is] the totality in which

1. *Ms. heading*: Part III. The Consummate Religion *Ms. adds (below the heading)*: or Revelatory *Ms. adds (above the heading)*: History – Greek, free spirit – abolition of finitude – objective, absolute freedom *Ms. adds (in the margin)*: (Concept of religion – side of reality developed. Christian religion wholly speculative – can only be grasped as speculative content. Most sublime and only genuine idea of philosophy in it – object of faith – Tertullian)

[*Ed.*] Hegel is probably alluding here to Tertullian's stress upon the knowability of God in Christianity as contrasted with the noncognizability of God in Greek (especially Platonic) philosophy. In the fragment "Volksreligion und Christentum," he refers to Tertullian's *Apology*, chap. 46, in this connection (Nohl, *Jugend-schriften*, p. 11); and in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:8 (*Werke* 15:104), he writes: "The new religion has made the intelligible world of philosophy the world of common consciousness; thus Tertullian says that nowadays even children have a knowledge of God, which the wisest men of antiquity alone attained to." Tertullian did not refer to children but to "the Christian workman" (*opifex Christianus*).

2. *Ms. margin*: (Witness of the Spirit – from the concept – begun with the purpose – [of viewing] the subject as infinite)

3. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:110–111. The concept of religion is the *relationship* and ultimately the *unity* of subjective consciousness and its object, namely God as absolute essence or absolute spirit. The consciousness that knows, and the absolute object that is known, are both spirit, and hence the concept of *spirit* is what relates humanity and the absolute to each other. When the concept of religion becomes objective to itself, then it is above all this relationship that is thematized. Because the Christian religion has this relationship as its central theme—expressed representationally by the doctrine of the incarnation—it is the "consummate" religion.

the concept of religion—developed in different ways to yield its determinate moments—is *posited*; it has existence for others and so becomes an object of consciousness. ([First we had] humanity, the side of consciousness, God as reflected in spirit, in spirit vis-à-vis God, [in] finite spirits. When the time [was] fulfilled,⁴ the soil prepared, finitude had to [be] abolished from the side of finite spirit—it [had to abolish it] on its side, the finite side. [Thus spirit became] sufficiently capable of absolute consciousness for God to reveal or manifest himself. [Spirit is] precisely this image [of God].)

⁵Religion [is] defined generally as the consciousness of God, of God the absolute object; but God's consciousness and subjectivity—the genuine object—is the whole. That God whom we designated as a mere object *over against* consciousness is an abstraction. ⁶God [is] this whole; hence he is the universal, ~the absolutely universal power,⁷ the substance of all existence, the truth—but as consciousness, ([as] infinite form, infinite | subjectivity,) that is, as *spirit*. ([God's] infinite form [is] (α) an object, content, or spirit; and (β) one. God *is* as a process, [he is] self-consciousness, [he is] as an object, as truth.) In this fashion the concept of religion [is] objective to itself, i.e., [it is] in its object. It is not the case that religion as subjectivity makes religious feeling its object, [for] religious feeling, [which] itself [is] subjectivity, (is rather the annulment of religion.)⁸Rather, the *concept* of religion, in pure objectivity *as* an object, is the content of religious consciousness, but precisely therewith and therein it [is] also subjective, and the subjective religious self-consciousness has spirit indwelling⁹ in it, God is manifest in it. (This

4. [Ed.] Hegel alludes to the New Testament idea of the fullness of time. See Mark 1:15, Gal. 4:4, Eph. 1:10.

5. Ms. margin: ((α) absolute content)

6. Ms. margin: ((β) object of self-consciousness)

7. Hegel's abbreviation in the Ms. should perhaps read: the absolute universal, the power,

8. Ms. margin: (Subject as free, thereby present to itself – is free in spirit, in its essence – represented in Christ as this other. Knowledge of this determination, this subjectivity, is something different; this knowledge is the modern assertion that the only thing that matters is religion, what is subjective, not the content)

[Ed.] This statement about religion is found especially in the 1827 lectures in Part I (See Vol. 1:162–163), but in Part III this theme appears above all in the introduction to the 1824 lectures (see below, pp. 167–168). Possibly this marginal passage belongs to the latter lectures.

9. Ms. margin: ((γ) wholly speculative)

manifestation of God occurs in spiritual self-consciousness, and this [is] an infinite form of his reality—i.e., his reality as [one] side. God himself is one in all. Nature reveals itself, [is] for an other. Two things [belong] to this revelation: (α) nature, (β) consciousness. Nature is not these two but only one of them. Spirit reveals itself and is itself these two.)

This, as has been said earlier, [is] the infinite form and unity, the universality, the determination of what *revelation* is.

[2. Characteristics of This Religion]

For this reason, the Christian religion is the religion (α)¹⁰ of *revelation*. What God is, (and the fact that he is known *as* he is,) not merely in historical or some similar | fashion as in the other religions, is manifest [*offenbar*] in it. Revelation [*Offenbarung*], manifestation [*Manifestation*] is itself its character and content. That is to say, revelation, manifestation [is] the being [of God] for consciousness, (indeed, the revelation] for consciousness that he is himself spirit for [spirit], i.e., [that he *is*] consciousness and *for* consciousness.) God is *only* manifest¹¹ as one who particularizes himself and becomes objective, initially in the mode of finitude, which is his own. (God has created the world, has revealed himself, etc. [This is not to be represented as] a beginning, as something *accomplished*, i.e., as a single act, once and for all, not to be repeated, an eternal decree of the [divine] will, and therefore arbitrary; on the contrary, this [is] his eternal nature. [With respect to divine revelation, there are] two sorts of forms: (α) predicates and (β) actions, deeds.) Already in Greek and Roman religion, this mode of finitude [is predicated of] the other—but only the mode of abstract finitude, (which [grasps] the other as finite, not simultaneously as infinite.) (Once finitude [is] forgotten, [we have] this antithesis.) [73b] The nature of spirit itself is to manifest itself, make itself objective; this is its activity and vitality, its sole action, and its action is all that spirit is. This separation and finitization is therefore initially defined here

3

10. *Ms. margin:* ((α) *Revelation* means the infinite form revealed by God. Of course – for God can only reveal *himself*. It is only God who can reveal himself, not an external force or understanding that might unlock him.)

11. *Ms. margin:* (nature reveals itself but is not the act of revealing, is not *what* is manifest)

as itself a divine moment (as [the word] "Creator"¹² already [indicates]). <[This is] precisely the divinity of spirit, [which subsists] without the positing of opposition religiously (but not merely as nature [where we have] common, sensible consciousness). In the positing of opposition, the opposition [is] sublated; [it appears] as spirit, as equal to itself. This [is] manifest only to spirit—just as spirit, [when it is] an object in the religious sense, [is] at the same time nothing other, because this objectification is infinite form, a manifestation at the same time taken back into the infinite. The universal [is] *in* the finite, but the finite [is] not transfigured [into] the shape of spirit, or beauty. In the other religions, God is still something other than what he reveals himself to be: (one God, the necessity | above the gods.) God is the inner and the unknown; he is not as he appears to consciousness. But precisely here [in the Christian religion it is maintained]: (α) that he appears, he reveals his own definition; (β) [that] precisely this appearing—implicitly of the universal, not in a fixed, finite determinate form but as subsumed, the transfigured divine world—is an appearing as he is. (God's being is his action, his revelatory action itself.)

[The Christian religion is] (β)¹³ the religion of *truth*. But if by "truth of the Christian religion" [we mean] that it is historically accurate, this [is] not what [is intended] here; rather *the true* is its content. Whoever possesses it knows the true and cognizes God as he is. A Christian religion that did not cognize God, [or in which] God [is] not revealed, would be no Christian religion at all. Its content [is] the truth itself in and for itself, and it consists in the being of truth *for* consciousness. (Likewise [it knows] God only as spirit (see above), only as manifest, as truth in and for itself. Feeling [is] the opposite of truth.) This content, however, is *spirit*; it is the concept, which is absolute reality, existence, appearance, outgoing [movement]. Objectivity occurs in accord with the concept and is only the empty form of other-being. The concept [is] the entire content of reality. Spirit is itself the process of giving itself this show [*Schein*] and sublating it, of positing it as sublated; both together

12. [Ed.] *Schöpfer* comes from the verb *schöpfen*, which means literally to draw or scoop out, hence to separate.

13. *Ms. margin*: <(β) infinite content: truth – concept and reality – certainty – objective to itself – spirit [is] in spirit – only thus [is it] spirit>

are revelation since this show is the appearing [*Scheinen*] of God, an infinite appearing yet not beyond appearing.

[The Christian religion is] (γ)¹⁴ the religion of *reconciliation*—of the world with God. God, it is said [2 Cor. 5:18–19], has reconciled the world with himself. The fall of the world from God means that it has fixated itself as finite consciousness, as the consciousness of idols, consciousness of the universal not as such but rather in external ways or in regard to finite purposes. To desist from this separation is to turn back [to God], and to *intuit* this turning back of reality [to God]—finitude being taken up into the eternal—[is] to be implicitly the unity of divine and human nature, and the process of eternally positing this unity. | (In this intuition of the truth, [consciousness has] absolute certainty of itself. This certainty seals all subjectivity within itself; it is in spirit, and in the truth of subjectivity, that subjectivity finds itself.) Hence [it is] the religion of *freedom*—the speculative, objective, universal, self-sufficient, absolute passage to being-in-and-for-self.¹⁵

5

([We have] already [dealt with] the concept [of this religion] in *The Concept of Religion* itself.)¹⁶ [74a]

A. ABSTRACT CONCEPT¹⁷

Already [we have developed] the concept [of the consummate religion] in [dealing with] religion [as such]. Metaphysically [it has] this form: God is spirit, God (has reality;)¹⁸ he exists [*existiert*] in virtue of his concept. Proof of the existence of God [derives] from

14. *Ms. margin*: (γ) both together – reconciliation)

15. *Ms. adds*: and it [religion] itself.

16. [*Ed.*] Since the concept of religion has become objective to itself in the consummate religion (see above, n. 3), it is evident that the concept of religion in general and the concept of the Christian religion are implicitly identical. Hegel's presentation of *The Concept of Religion* in Part I, with its focus on the religious relationship, the self-knowing of absolute spirit, and its echoing of such themes as incarnation and Trinity, is already Christian theology philosophically transfigured, but still only implicitly so, and by its own intention applicable to all forms of religious consciousness.

17. *Ms. margin*: (8 August 1821)

18. *Ms. margin*: (Representation of God [is] subjective – the transition [entails] doing away with subjectivity)

his concept. Previously [we had] the transition from finite being to infinite, (universal) being, (i.e., from immediate being to being in its truth, [or from being to] concept;) now [comes the transition] from concept to being.¹⁹ The concept [is] the presupposition.²⁰

The definition of God [is] that he is the *absolute idea*—i.e., that he is *spirit*. However, [three things may be said about] spirit as the absolute idea: (α) It is only as²¹ the *unity of concept and reality*, so that the concept in itself is the *totality*, and likewise the reality.²²

- 6 (β) But this reality, | as was previously shown, is *revelation*—the manifestation that has being on its own. Finite self-consciousness, or what is called human nature, [stands] over against this concept.²³ Since we call the absolute concept the divine nature, the idea of *spirit* is to be the *unity of divine and human nature*. Humanity has arrived at this intuition. But the divine nature is itself only this, to be absolute spirit; hence precisely the unity of divine and human nature is itself absolute spirit.

(γ)²⁴ The truth cannot be expressed in a proposition, however.²⁵ The two—the absolute concept and the idea as the absolute unity—are also distinct from their reality. *Spirit*, therefore, is the *living*

19. [Ed.] Here Hegel contrasts the cosmological and ontological proofs of the existence of God. With reference to the former, he has in mind the treatment in Part II of the cosmological and physicotheological proofs as related to the metaphysical concepts of nature religion, Jewish religion, and Roman religion (see Vol. 2, Ms. sheets 32b–33b, 42a–43a, 62b–64a).

20. Ms. adds: The concept of this religion [is given] already with [our treatment of] religion [as such].

21. Ms. margin: (The pure, universal, infinite end is the concept itself – end – for this reason the end [is] so highly regarded)

22. Ms. margin: (The metaphysical concept is the pure, abstract concept without its concrete determination as spirit, but with a content, to be sure. [It is] the God of representation. The proof in fact reduces itself to the point that the concept is real through itself. The concrete concept is spirit; spirit is its reality, and only in this way is it spirit. Spirit [subsists] as totality of another spirit. Here: (αα) the concept in general, definition of the concept, its reality, being. High standpoint, pertaining to the modern world. Not proceeding from determinate being, but thought beginning from itself, then the transition to reality. Concept, infinite negativity, the starting point – set firmly in the center [of attention].)

23. W₂ reads: Since the manifestation also has within itself the moment of distinction, it includes as well the mode of determinacy of finite spirit, of human nature, which as finite stands over against this concept.

24. Ms. margin: ((α) Ostensibly: concept of God and reality of God. With this content, reality is contained in the concept. [It is] this content itself that demands it.

process by which the *implicit* unity of divine and human nature becomes *explicit*, or is brought forth. What is *in itself* must likewise be *brought forth* [as] an end, and nothing is brought forth that is not in itself. (The cultus is thus brought forth and drawn into play by the idea itself.)

The abstract definition of this idea [of spirit] is the unity of the concept and of being, and it is this abstract definition | that metaphysics [74b] is glimpsing²⁶ in the so-called *ontological* proof of the existence of God; it is concerned to show the unity of concept and being in a formal way.

7

In the other so-called proofs that we have already dealt with,²⁷ the transition is made from a finite being to an infinite being, [to] a power necessary in and for itself, acting in accord with its ends; [the proofs] do not proceed by way of representation, a representation is not laid down as the basis of the process. The proofs proceed from being, and the problem is only about the definition of this being; they proceed from finite (and therewith subjective) objectivity, and make a transition to the universal, to true objectivity and the concept of true objectivity, and (because the concept of contingent being is [that of] necessity) to purposiveness. [In these proofs] relation is the concept itself of truth and substance.

But here the transition [is] from the concept itself to objectivity. (This [may be defined] more precisely: (α) Here [the proof] begins from the concept; earlier, from existence [*Dasein*]. The truth of the latter is the concept, the universal—the universal, absolute power that has being in and for itself; here the converse [is the case]. Both [are] necessary, hence both may occur as something posited, i.e., their one-sidedness [is] sublated; from each of them the show of immediacy [is] taken away.)

(β) But the content is common to the two. Hence there must be a transition as such from concept to reality.

(γ) The content [is] presupposed, but it [is] itself precisely this unity, which [is] therefore not presupposed but proved, i.e., [exhibited] in its very determinations. The transition is to be exhibited.)

25. [Ed.] See Hegel's *Science of Logic*, pp. 91, 623 ff. (GW 11:49, 12:53 ff.).

26. *Ms. margin*: (Its starting point is) not finite; [it proceeds] not from a being or from something finite.)

27. [Ed.] See n. 19.

⟨(β) In and for itself,⟩ this unity itself is presupposed in the concept of God. God is just this; there is no other concept of him. At the point of entry into religion, this unity must be demonstrated, it must be present. The concept is this subjectivity or process realizing itself within itself, giving itself objectivity; [this is its] goal, which is found only in the form of other-being. Being—this abstract quality²⁸ is so impoverished that it is just not worth talking about;²⁹ this immediate identity is only the entirely empty ⟨moment⟩ of the unity of the concept with itself. |

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⟨(γ)⟩ Being, however, is very much in antithesis to the concept or to representation, to fixed subjectivity. ⟨The appearance of the antithesis is a sign of the standpoint of subjectivity subsisting on its own account. That is, the antithesis is sharp because precisely at the depths at which spirit is found is where the self-contained totality of the subject belongs; it is substantial subjectivity, and therewith infinite antithesis. The concept appears not to need being, just as the soul appears not to need the body.⟩ That this subjectivity is a nullity is a matter of interest for reason. On the present level of discussion, which concerns the concept of God, the antithesis now becomes this highest antithesis between representation or subjectivity on the one hand, and objectivity or being on the other. Previously, the antithesis [was] only between finite and infinite being, so that being [was] the common factor, and the antithesis was subordinated to this generality. This [is] the interest of reason; the importance of the antithesis is first present in the totality of the two sides.

⟨(δ) [The question] thrusts itself [upon us] how the antithesis between thinking and being [is] to be resolved. In this connection it becomes apparent that, because this antithesis—subjectivity on the one side, [objectivity on the other]—is *only* subjective, the concept comes off very badly: we have concepts in the head, hence [they have] no reality. But what are they opposed to? Here [we encounter] real subjectivity: the empirical subject [is] the whole, from which the concept as one of its abstract modes is separated and made into a mere “only.” The human being *is*: there is no question about that. Human beings have concepts and thoughts,

28. *Ms. margin*: (a priori)

29. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 82 ff. (GW 11:43 ff.).

but these are only a few of the many things they have; and in contrast with their concrete nature, these concepts etc. are one-sided.

This disparagement of the concept springs from the same comparison that is involved in the proof of the existence of God that we are about to consider. This proof presupposes God as *content*, as the most perfect being, in comparison with which the mere *concept* of God is imperfect. Why does God exist? Anselm answers: because God is perfect, i.e., he is the unity of concept and reality.³⁰ [But] why [is] the concept of God *only* a concept? [This is] the modern question, and the answer [is]: because | human being is a concrete identity, the unity of concept and being. (α) The conclusion [is drawn] that we must therefore hold on to this “only.” But on the contrary, [we must] give up this “only.”³¹ (β) Such perfection [is found] not in intuition but in thought. “Perfection” is unsatisfying because [it is an indeterminate expression].³² [75a]

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⟨In any case this is what happens in the modern point of view, and precisely this empirical unity of thinking and being is maintained as the affirmative, authentic reality—i.e., the empirical human being, the immediate world. Just as [there is] the representation of perfection in Anselm, the thought of what is most universal, so in the modern view [there is] the existence of the concrete [human being].³³ [74b]

30. [Ed.] Hegel summarizes Anselm's argument in his own terms. Anselm himself defines God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” (*Proslogion* 2). Equivalents to the language of “perfection” are found elsewhere in the *Proslogion* (Preface, chap. 3), but not as premises of the Anselmian proof.

31. [Ed.] Because, according to Hegel's *Logic*, the true concept (*Begriff*) does not exclude but rather includes being (*Sein*) in its various modifications, taking it up into the unity of being and essence (*Wesen*), or immediacy and reflection, it is inappropriate to speak of the concept as “only” a concept. Just as the concept without being is an empty representation or subjective opinion, so being without the concept is mere externality and appearance (see fourth paragraph below). The antithesis between concept and being must be overcome and their unity demonstrated, this being the task of the ontological proof. See *Science of Logic*, pp. 577 ff. (GW 12:11 ff.).

32. [Ed.] Hegel's criticism of the indeterminacy of Anselm's expression is anticipated by Gaunilo's *Response* appended to the *Proslogion*. (See Vol. 1:434 n. 155.)

33. [Ed.] This marginal addition at the top of sheet 75a follows the one at the bottom of 74b before the main text resumes at the bottom of 74b.

His metaphysical proof takes this course: (α) The concept of God is within itself a possible concept—[the concept of] the most real essence,³⁴ [but] merely positive, i.e., abstractly positive; (β) being is reality; therefore, (γ) [the concept of God belongs] among these realities. [75a]

(α) Against this proof Kant [objected] that one could not “pluck” [*herausklauben*] being out of the concept, for being is something other [than] the concept. Being is not ⟨a reality,⟩ it is not a definition or a predicate [*Begriffsbestimmung*]; it adds nothing to the content of an object, therefore it [has] no reality but [is] in any event merely a form.³⁵

(β) [With] Anselm, the proof [goes] simply as follows: God should be what is *most perfect*; if God were merely a representation, he would not be the most perfect, for we regard as perfect that which is not merely a representation but to which being pertains also. [This is] quite correct. Perfection is presupposed; generally speaking, the true is [identical with] what representation or the concept is, but [only when] the opposite determination is added to it also, namely, being. [This is also] quite correct. The presupposition, “perfection is this unity [of concept and being],” is present in, lies at the basis of, our representation—[that of] all of us, and of all philosophers. If it is permitted to make presuppositions, then surely this one can be made. Every human mind contains it *actu*, not like the laughable logical proposition, $A = A$, what is, is. ⟨This last they cannot deny, but in good company, i.e., within the guild, [it may be smiled at].⟩ ⟨Against this,⟩ the understanding ⟨now says⟩:
 10 | concept and being are different. Quite so: thus separated, they are finite, untrue, and it is precisely the concern of reason and of ordinary, rational human sense not to remain with the finite and untrue, nor to take them as something absolute. ⟨Thinking is universal within itself, objective.⟩ The concept without any objectivity is an empty representation or opinion; being without the concept [is mere] evanescent externality and appearance.

34. [Ed.] Hegel alludes here, as does Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 624 ff.), to the concept of the *ens realissimum*, which he associates with that of the *ens perfectissimum*, as found especially in Descartes, Wolff, and Baumgarten.

35. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 631, B 626.

Metaphysics has subjected the simple thoughts of Anselm to the formality of argument, and has thereby deprived them of their true meaning and content.³⁶

(α) The concept of God [as] the most real—this content [is] the abstract affirmation. Not the concept of God [in the sense] that [it] might be one of several concepts, [among which there are others] equally good. God is not *a* concept but *the* concept; this (is) the absolute reality (and ideality.) [75b]

(β)³⁷ God [is] all reality, and hence the reality of being too; i.e., being is contained in the concept [of God]. (αα) [This is] correct; [as we said] earlier, being, this immediate identity, [is] a moment of the concept. However, (ββ) the concept as subjectivity [is] differentiated from being, and our concern is precisely the superseding of this distinction, or the removal of subjectivity from the concept. Being (is to be) exhibited in the concept (as a reality, i.e., in the form of attributes, predicates, as in the representations “human being,” “reason,” etc. In general, the concept as such is what subsists, the subject of being as its predicate.) We have thereby shown that the concept [in our sense] is not what is ordinarily meant by “concept,” i.e., something opposed to objective reality, | something that is *not supposed* to have being in it. The concept negates its character of being subjective; this character is negated, or rather the concept itself is this dialectic [of negation and being negated]. This condition or turn constitutes the true transition. It is a question, then, of the negation of the subjectivity of the concept in itself; and

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36. [Ed.] What Hegel is criticizing here is the modern reformulations of the Anselmian proofs in terms of the concept of the *ens realissimum* or *ens perfectissimum*, and of the *ens necessarium*. Cf. Descartes, *Meditations*, chaps. 3, 5 (esp. pp. 115, 137); Leibniz, *Principia philosophiae*, §§ 40–41, 45 (*Philosophische Schriften* 6:607–623); Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars posterior, pp. 4 ff.; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 810.

37. Ms. margin: (The concept [must] do away with its finitude by its own means:

(α) [it must do away with what is] contained in it, i.e., distinguished from it; when one supposes that one has got rid of what is opposed to it—being—that is just when [the concept is] dialectical;

(β) for itself, the concept [is] the activity, [has] the goal, of objectifying itself.

(α) The concept is precisely the concept: A = A; good, but in this form [it is] finite, untrue; (β) not to hold fast to the untrue, the finite; in general, (γ) not to presuppose perfection with reference to God. Finitude [entails] this distinction between the concept and objectivity, reality.)

this is not accomplished—unless, as with Anselm, it is explicitly stated, at least as a presupposition or absolute foundation, that the perfect or the true consists solely in this unity of the concept with reality.

⟨Kant says that [being] is not a predicate. Nothing is added to the content, to the concept of a hundred thalers if [in addition] they also *are*.³⁸ (αα) [This is] correct, precisely because and insofar as [being] is already contained in the concept itself. But (ββ) just the meaning [of Kant's statement] is that [being is] *not* contained in the concept, at least not in the subjective concept. Such a subjective concept or merely subjective representation is what he has in mind, as in the example of the hundred imagined thalers. Here the content as such, i.e., as represented, [is] distinguished from its being. Nothing is added to the content by being; therefore [being is] not a predicate in the sense in which a predicate is used in ordinary demonstrations. The concept is that which encompasses the predicates, as distinguished from the form, i.e., in this case, being. [This is] correct in the finite realm.

But in God the content [is] both concept *and* being; this is the entire content of Anselm's metaphysics; this is the perfection he presupposes. But what right [does he have to] make this presupposition? Here [it is] precisely a question of no longer presupposing that God is the content or the most perfect being, but rather that the unity of concept and being is precisely what is most perfect—the absolute truth. The presupposition is just what has to be proved, and indeed the pure concept as such, (α) not [that of] God, (β) not a finite concept, i.e., [one] in which thought and existence are and remain separated.)

Therefore Anselm's thought [is] on the whole quite correct; [it] is evident to a healthy human understanding were it to succeed in isolating the representation as such. But at the same time God himself is just | this unity for Anselm. This unity of subject and being is subjective, hence for him it is senseless to be held up by this definition of it. But the formal procedure [of metaphysics] sets forth the concept of possibility and others like it, such that these concepts and this possibility are intended to remain, while the interest of reason is precisely to sublate them.

38. [Ed.] *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 627.

⟨The [following] distinction [is made] by modern presuppositions: we have (α) concrete, empirical humanity—a union of reason and sensible [nature]; (β) only a concept [of God], beyond which one cannot go, [so that] the contradiction with (α) [remains] unresolved.⟩ [76a]

B. CONCRETE REPRESENTATION³⁹

⁴⁰Determinateness as (or *in*) reality—the mode of being in regard to the idea—is the determinateness of the concept itself. This [was] indicated earlier;⁴¹ here, ⟨in the spirit (God is spirit),⁴² [it occurs]

39. Ms. reads:

b. Concrete Representation
or rather determination – i.e., development of the idea
weaves itself by itself into cultus

[Ed.] The words beneath the title anticipate a significant structural shift between the lectures in 1821 and 1824 (whether they were added immediately or later is not certain). In 1821, the presentation of the Christian religion is arranged according to the now-familiar categories of “Abstract Concept,” “Concrete Representation,” and “Community, Cultus”—categories inherited from the concept of religion and applied to the determinate religions. “Concrete Representation” contains three “spheres” or “moments” (see below, pp. 76–77): (a) the idea of God in and for itself (the immanent Trinity); (b) the idea in diremption or differentiation (creation and preservation of the natural world); (c) the appearance of the idea in finite spirit (the “history” of estrangement, redemption, and reconciliation). But the 1824 lectures are divided into only two main sections, “The Metaphysical Concept of God” (the ontological proof) and “The Development of the Idea of God.” The divine idea “develops” in terms of three elements: its being in and for self, its self-differentiation in the otherness of the world and in the history of estrangement and redemption (including parts b and c of the 1821 “Concrete Representation”), and its return-to-self through the transfigured subjectivity of the community of faith (replacing the 1821 separate section, “Community, Cultus”). The cultus is now included as the third element of the development of the idea of God rather than standing as a separate category following “concrete representation,” into which the latter “weaves itself,” as in the 1821 lectures. In other words, in the consummate religion the idea of the Trinity, which is implicit in all religions and in the history of religion, now becomes explicit as the structuring principle. The “concrete” or “determinate” representation of God in the Christian religion is as the triune God, who is self-developing in the three moments of self-identity, self-differentiation, and self-return. (On this matter, see further Sec. 2.a of the Editorial Introduction.)

40. Ms. margin: ⟨Reality is the determinacy of the concept, developing from it, posited through it.⟩

41. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:110–111.

42. Ms. adds in margin: ⟨distinction, self-reflecting totality⟩

in the concept of revelation, manifestation.) Precisely this his reality is his determinateness; it is the concept—the fact that the absolute is spirit. What spirit or its concept is can be explicated only through its realization or totality because its concept is precisely to be the idea.⁴³

13 Ordinarily the matter is represented as follows: this concept (and its determination) [come first], followed by an appropriate realization. This | is how it was earlier [in our discussion]:⁴⁴ e.g., [first there is] the power of the Lord, of the One; reality,⁴⁵ external being, [is] determined by this Lord as the power of reality, the reason being that the determination of the concept is abstract; external being therefore is differentiated, and the determination of the Lord occurs only in regard to it. Similarly the Greek gods [are subordinated to] external necessity [and exist in] the shapes of isolated elements and powers. But if the concept now [is grasped as] *idea*—the identity of concept and reality, this means precisely that reality itself constitutes the determinateness of the concept, and the concept in its determinateness is not to be explicated except through this very realization.

Reflection behaves differently from this.⁴⁶ It interprets determinacy as such in the form of a predicate, something at rest—not as the activity of realization and its development, [but rather] in the mode of a simple, abstract determination, (i.e., only as positive characteristics [which] should be linked with the subject only pos-

43. [Ed.] The point here is that the idea already contains within itself the element of reality or objectivity. According to Hegel, the idea is “essentially concrete, because it is the free concept giving reality and determinacy to itself” (*Encyclopedia* [1830], § 213). It is the final category of Hegel’s logic since it is “the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity” (*ibid.*).

44. [Ed.] See Hegel’s description of the religion of sublimity (Jewish religion) in Vol. 2, Ms. sheets 42a–43a.

45. Ms. margin: (Reality: (α) not natural being, not immediacy)

46. Ms. margin: ((β) Manner in which the determinacy of the concept, of thought, first appears – as predicate – reflection, thought – indeed not naturally or immediately – but thus reestablished – mode of immediacy as identity with itself)

W₂ reads: The predicates are indeed not those of natural immediacy; rather they are established by reflection, and in this fashion the determinate content has become just as unshakably self-sufficient as is the natural content under which God was represented in nature religion. Natural objects such as the sun, the sea, etc., are [there]; but the categories of reflection are just as self-identical as natural immediacy.

itively and not simultaneously be distinguished from what is defined as subject.) Hence various predicates result for it, inasmuch as the same basic determination, if it is one, is applied to various sides; but these various sides are themselves understood empirically, i.e., externally, to be the nature of the object. [76b]

Thus there appear diverse predicates of God as he is in the determinacy of spirit: (omnipotence,) righteousness, | goodness, wisdom, providence, omniscience, etc.—and then, subsequent to these predicates and outside of them, as it were, the *history of God*, the activity of God and his work: the creation of the world, his Son, the Trinity, his love for humanity, redemption. In this fashion the manifestation [of God] is separated from these characteristics, (but not in such a way as to reflect the fact that the simple subject [is] distinct from such diversity.)

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Since (differentiation [is] now removed from such attributes in themselves and likewise from their relation to the simple subject, it then emerges in another fashion.) [Since] there are [such] attributes, (α) [they are] different from each other, although (β) [they] ought to be infinite, *sensu eminentiori, excellenti*,⁴⁷ but (γ) [they] are determinate and therefore finite. Thus it is said that they express only our *relations* to God, not his nature, which remains unknown and unexplained since there is no way of explicating or making it available other than through these predicates.⁴⁸ (α) [It is] correct [that there is] this deficiency [in definition by predicates]. (β) But [it is] equally correct that this method of predication [can be] em-

47. *W₂ reads*: Their contradiction is not truly resolved through the abstraction of their determinacy if the understanding requires that they be taken only *sensu eminentiori*.

[Ed.] On the words *sensu eminentiori, excellenti*, see Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, §§ 1096, 1098, 1099, 1066, 1068; Leibniz, *Monadology*, § 41, and *The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason*, § 9 (Leibniz, *Selections*, pp. 541, 528); Leibniz, *Theodicy*, ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E. M. Huggard (New Haven, 1952), §§ 4, 192 (pp. 125–126, 247).

48. [Ed.] Hegel is probably alluding here to Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube*, 1st ed., § 64: "All attributes that we ascribe to God can be taken as denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which we relate our feeling of absolute dependence to God." In the 2d ed., § 50, the concluding clause is revised to read: "... in which the feeling of utter dependence is to be related to him." See Vol. 1:163 n. 33, 279 n. 37.

played in a popularly correct manner. General reflections, although [they are] inwardly a rather indeterminate mode of representation, <bring a grand meaning before the soul, without further development—but also without the sense of being exclusive and finite, as indeed we accept and utilize figurative, symbolic representations and poetic images often enough. It is another matter when they are taken as sharply excluding other attributes in their specific reflective meaning. Then [we say that] these contradictions [are] subjective, [the general reflections] refer only to us, they are subjective representations. We are the ones who also negate them. However, precisely this [is] external reflection, external dialectic. But [it is] not [a question of] externals but of determinacy, [one single] predicate. God is none other than the idea, which determines itself and raises its determination to infinitude, and is only infinite self-termination.> | When determinacy is taken as such, precisely these contradictions arise.⁴⁹ But representation overlooks them, it elevates itself above limitation and holds the universal before its eyes. However, as we already remarked,⁵⁰ the abstract predicates contain their meaning in movement, and this realization is the true finitization of their meaning, in which their absolute content (wisdom, purpose in and for itself, which maintains itself in reality, [in] the show of an other) is contained, and whatever can appear as diverse aspects of this content consists only of moments of this movement itself.

The definition or (to put the point in a more external fashion) the configuration of God is therefore his idea, and the latter consists of *movement*: the attributes [of God] concern and proceed from the mode of differentiation. [77a]

<(γ) Since *we* are familiar with these determinations of the concept in advance, we shall say that [they occur] in three elements. But in themselves these distinctions develop from the concept itself and make the transition into one another. But it can and must be

49. [Ed.] Hegel does not mention here that the *theologia naturalis* of rationalism specifically addressed this problem, seeking to overcome the contradictions by arguing for the compossibility of the attributes (taken *sensu eminentiori*) or by asserting that apparently contradictory attributes modify each other. He alludes to these arguments in the *Science of Logic* (GW 20:100). See Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Pars prior, §§ 1067, 1070; and Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, § 807.

50. [Ed.] See above, p. 74.

our reflection, at least, that the first [determination] is the general concept, the concept in the element of universality.)

God is:

(α) In the first instance, *the concept of God*, the concept as determinateness, i.e., as element; the [process of] thinking himself, God in *eternity, the idea in and for itself*, (God [as] *triune*.)

(β) To be the concept entails a determination of subjectivity by the absolute idea both from our point of view and equally within itself. The concept [is] this *diremption*, giving its different sides the *shape of immediacy*, so [that they appear] as independent. The concept [must], precisely in its mediation, reflect itself back into identity with itself, whereupon the different sides first attain the character of an *immediate world or nature*. (God is the creator of nature and its wise preserver. The appearance of God in nature [occurs as]: (α) nature, (β) the Son of Man—but the latter [appearance is] for faith, [i.e., for] the Spirit of God, [for] certainty, the knowledge of the divine.) |

16

(γ) Objectivity [appears] as *finite spirit*. This immediacy or finitude is finite spirit, *the appearance of God in finite spirit*, as a whole *the history of redemption and reconciliation*—the eternal divine history itself. The subjective side of this history, as [it takes place] in finite spirit, in the individual, takes the form of the cultus.

These [are] the three spheres in which the divine idea is to be considered; it is wholly present in each of them, although differentiated according to the determination of the element.

a. [The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God]⁵¹

(α) God is spirit in the element of thought—that which rightly is called the eternal God, God as such. For here the show of finitude,

51. Ms. reads in margin: (Absolute idea of philosophy)

[Ed.] The “absolute idea of philosophy” is the idea in and for itself, or, in the language of religion, the triune God. We have altered the heading so that it will reflect more precisely the contents of this first sphere of “Concrete Representation.” Under the term “triune,” Hegel ordinarily refers to the “immanent” or “preworldly” Trinity, the inner dialectic of self-differentiation and self-return that constitutes the divine life. This inner dialectic is outwardly reenacted in the “economic” or “worldly” Trinity—God’s relation to the world in creation, incarnation, reconciliation, and spiritual community. Although Hegel does not use the term “Trinity”

of God's divestment and his appearance to an autonomous reality, has not [yet] taken place.

God is *spirit*—that which we call the *triune God*, a purely *speculative* content, i.e., the *mystery* of God. God is *spirit*, *absolute activity*, *actus purus*, i.e., *subjectivity*, *infinite personality*, *infinite distinction of himself from himself*, [as the term] “begetting” [suggests]. However, this that is distinguished—(divinity standing over against itself and objective to itself)—is contained within the *eternal concept of universality as absolute subjectivity*. Thus it is posited in its *infinite differentiation*, it has not arrived at darkness, i.e., being-for-itself, opacity, impenetrability, finitude; rather, both as remaining, in its differentiation, in this *immediate unity with itself*, and in its *inherent differentiation*, it is the entire divine concept, Son and God; (this absolute unity, as of itself self-identical in its differentiation, [is] *eternal love*.) [77b] |

(β) Spirit, love [is] the intuition of oneself in another, this immediate identity (and therefore expressed in the form of feeling), this intuiting itself; but this intuiting, this identity, is posited only as in infinite difference (mere sensation [is only] animal love and afterwards diversity), whereas truth is posited only as differentiatedness, [as] reflection into self, subjectivity—[only in this is] posited *genuine differentiation of the aspects that have been distinguished; thus its unity [is] spirit*. (The intuition of this unity [is found in] the poet, for example, who sings of his love, [who] not only loves but makes his love an object [of contemplation]. This [is] spirit: to know love, [to know] oneself in love.)

God is One, in the first instance the universal.

God is love and remains One, [subsisting] more as unity, as immediate identity, than as negative reflection into self.

God is *spirit*, the One as *infinite subjectivity*, the One in the infinite subjectivity of distinction.

[We shall add a few] *remarks*.⁵²

to refer to the latter and does not employ the language of the classical distinction (“immanent” and “economic”), the “economic” Trinity is in fact coterminous with the three “elements” or “moments” in the “development of the idea of God” as described in the later lectures.

52. *Ms. margin*: (The relationship of concepts [is] speculative, wholly peculiar, a different relationship – metaphysics)

⟨α⟩ [This idea of God is] the absolute content for the concept.⁵³ Speculative science [has] recognized and demonstrated that this idea [is] the truth, the whole truth, the sole truth. [It is] demonstrated and posited by thoughtful mediation. Every determination, every content sublates itself to this end. Faith, so called, [has] accepted [the idea] immediately, holds it to be true by its spirit; [this is] the witness of the divine Spirit.)

[Either] one must be content with these pure speculative determinations of thought, or [it must suffice] for faith to accept the happily naive forms of representation that are available, [such as] “Son,” “begetting.” That is to say, when the understanding applies [itself] to these speculative representations, introducing its forms, they are immediately inverted, and if it has the desire, there is no need for it to cease pointing out contradictions. There *are* | contradictions, but likewise they are resolved. The understanding has the right to exhibit contradictions through making distinctions and reflecting them within itself; but it is God, spirit itself, that eternally posits and sublates this contradiction. Spirit has not waited for the understanding, which wants to remove the contradiction and the determinations that contain the contradiction. It is itself precisely what removes them, but likewise it is what posits these determinations and distinguishes them—this [is its] diremption. Against this the understanding sets an abstract universality [78a] and unity. But this is only another mode of contradiction, which the understanding does not recognize, and which therefore it does not resolve—it is a permanent separation, since such universality [stands] on one side for itself and [there is] no activity or unity in which the distinctions are sublated and precisely preserved. [We] arrive at abstract universality by negation; negation is its proper determination, its genesis.

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(β)⁵⁴ At the very beginning⁵⁵ we were reminded that, in the various simpler, undeveloped religions, reminiscences and traces of

53. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, p. 824 (GW 12:236).

54. *Ms. margin*: ⟨(β) Traces – just as [the idea is] contaminated by understanding (number), so also by representations, [which remain] (α) abstract or (β) common, but [have] not the third [moment] as spirit. – [The second moment,] the Son, the incarnation, expends [itself] in a multiplicity [of figures]; Brahman [is] abstraction, not love. – (α) [In] the Trimurti, Siva [is] alteration, and every moment emerges

ideas and characteristics emerged, which became the major feature only in subsequent development. Thus, in [one] form or another, we find in the various religions the expression of a triad⁵⁶—e.g., in Hindu religion. But it is another question whether a characteristic of this kind is the first, absolute determination, which lies at the basis of everything, or whether it is only one form that emerges among others, as, e.g., Brahmā is the One, without even being the object of the cultus. In the religion of beauty and in that of purposiveness, this [triadic] form can certainly make its appearance, at least; but the limiting measure that reverts to itself is not encountered in this multiplicity and particularization. However, the religion of beauty is not without traces of this unity. Aristotle, when he spoke of the Pythagorean numbers, the triad, | said: “We believe that we have called upon the gods completely when we have addressed them three times.”^{57 58} It was primarily, however, under the influence of Pythagoras that Plato, who borrowed from Pythagoras, defined the abstract idea in the *Timaeus* as threefold;⁵⁹ the Neoplatonists and later the Neopythagoreans did the same thing more specifically and thoroughly.⁶⁰ (In philosophy [this idea has been]

fashioned wildly and multifariously, not as the eternal idea in thought—[fashioned] not as thought [but as] sensible representation.)

[Ed.] Siva is one of the gods of the Hindu triad (Trimurti), the others being Brahmā and Vishnu. Siva represents the principle of destruction, and also the re-productive or restoring power.

55. [Ed.] See Vol. 1, pp. 194, 196.

56. [Ed.] *Dreiheit*, as distinguished from the terms for “triune” and “Trinity,” *dreieinig* and *Dreieinigkeit*.

57. [Ed.] Cf. Aristotle, *De caelo* 1.1 (268a10–15). This is not an exact quotation; Aristotle wrote: “For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and middle and end give the number of an ‘all,’ and the number they give is the triad. And so, having taken these three from nature as (so to speak) laws of it, we make further use of the number three in the worship of the Gods” (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon [New York, 1941], p. 398).

58. [Ed.] ((β) abstract quality of thought)

59. [Ed.] See Plato, *Timaeus* 34c–35b. The three forms of the World Soul are Sameness, Difference, and Existence (Being). For a translation and exposition of this difficult passage, see F. M. Cornford, *Plato’s Cosmology* (New York, 1957), pp. 59–66.

60. [Ed.] See, among others, Proclus, *Platonic Theology*, esp. 3.9–14 (*In Platonis theologia libri sex*, ed. A. Portus [Hamburg, 1618; reprint, Frankfurt a.M., 1960], pp. 135–144).

wholly exhausted, in theology [it is] no longer treated seriously.)⁶¹ In more recent times the form of triplicity has again been brought to mind, chiefly by Kant, [an advance] of great importance.⁶²

((α) But where the forms belonging to the determination of God as spirit [are found], there we have the question (as we said earlier) whether they constitute a fundamental determination. Some people have wanted to belittle the Christian religion because this determination [is] older [than it is], and because it [has] derived these forms from various places.⁶³ (α) This historical observation decides nothing at all with regard to the inner truth; (β) but the ancients [did] not know what they really possessed in these forms, namely, that they contained the absolute consciousness of truth—rather [they preferred] others. [They knew] these as present among other determinations.)

(β) In regard to the understanding we must also stress these forms, [taken] from number. Two awkward factors [emerge] in this connection: ((α) If one attempts to count the moments of the idea—three equals one—this appears to be something entirely ingenuous, natural, and intelligible. But [by means of] the method of counting introduced here, [78b] every quality [is] fixed as one, and then to grasp that three times one is only one appears to be the harshest and, so it is said, the most irrational demand. However, only the absolute autonomy of the numerical one hovers before understanding, [signifying] absolute separation and splintering. But logical

61. [Ed.] The neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity criticized by Hegel here and elsewhere in the *Lectures* may be traced back to deism and neology. See, e.g., W. A. Teller, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens* (Helmstedt and Halle, 1764); and J. G. Töllner, *Theologische Untersuchungen*, 2 vols. (Riga, 1772–1774). Since this criticism is found in a marginal passage, it is conceivable that Hegel has especially in mind Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in the concluding four propositions of the *Glaubenslehre*, where it is described as merely an "appended proposition" (1st ed., § 187). See Vol. 1:127 n. 34; see also n. 63 below.

62. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 110: "In view of the fact that all a priori division of concepts must be by dichotomy, it is significant that in each class the number of categories is always the same, namely, three. Further, it may be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first" (p. 116).

63. [Ed.] Since this remark is contained in a marginal passage, it may date from a later time. In the latter part of the 1820s, Hegel's criticism was directed especially against F. A. G. Tholuck, whose *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des späteren Orients* was published in 1826. See Vol. 1:157 n. 17.

20 consideration⁶⁴ shows the numerical one rather to be dialectical in itself and not something autonomous and genuine; (it [is merely] a thing of the understanding.) One needs only to be reminded of matter, which is the actual numerical one and offers resistance, but | is massive; i.e., it shows the tendency not to be just one but rather to sublimate its being-for-self, acknowledging this to be a nullity. Of course, although it remains only matter, the most external of externalities, it does so all the same only as an unachieved goal. Gravitational mass, which is just this sublating of the one, constitutes the underlying determination of matter, and yet matter is the poorest, most external, unspiritual mode of determinate being.⁶⁵

(β) (But another form coheres with this one, and is still more awkward.) The higher definition of distinctions in the absolute idea is *personality*. [The moments of the idea] have been designated as “persons” in the Godhead, and if the determination of the numerical one already appears to be invincible to abstract understanding, so much more so is personality. (Form is here defined as *infinite form*; each moment [is regarded] as a subject, a personality, an absolute moment, although abstractly, so as to indicate that the antithesis is to be taken absolutely. But personality [is] still the extreme in its abstraction—but as resolved, essentially not maintained in isolation. Representation [at the level of] sensibility: (α) three gods, [in which case] subjectivity would be lost; (β) evil, or [something] deeper.) Personality is the infinite subjectivity of self-certainty; it is reflection into self through distinction, which as abstract form is exclusive vis-à-vis others. (That this determination [is] essential [we have] already seen;⁶⁶ generally speaking, the highest idea [is] absolute reflection, the totality of the aspects in themselves.) That these of themselves infinite ones, which are indeed essentially exclusive—a plurality of such ones—[are still] to be grasped only as *one*, [appears to be] the most stark contradiction.

64. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 164 ff. (GW 11:91 ff.).

65. [Ed.] For Hegel’s concept of matter as the numerical one that offers resistance, and for his definition of mass, see *Encyclopædia* (1817), § 204; (1830), § 262. The hard, resistant material object because of its mass is also a center of gravitational attraction, which reaches out for the other, thereby sublating its being-for-self, its oneness.

66. [Ed.] See above, p. 78.

But in any case, as we [noted] earlier,⁶⁷ the divine idea is not just this contradiction but also the resolution of it—a resolution in the sense not that the contradiction is not [present] but rather that it is to be overcome. Personality or freedom is truly [present] precisely in its infinite being-for-self; its very concept is thus the determination of identity-with-self and of universality. | Speculatively understood, this [is] self-emptying precisely at its highest level; this eternal movement [is] its concept.

21

This [is] expressed in love, in spirit. [We have] the eternal example in self-consciousness, but the pattern of nature also [offers an example]. Birth [presupposes that] the parents [are of] the same species, [but at the same time they are sexually] specific. A family [is] a natural unity of members who are persons, and its ethical unity [subsists] in love. [79a]

⟨In the Christian [religion] generally, [God is understood as] triune—Father, Son, and Spirit; in other [religious] configurations [we find] various approximations. The main category [is] purpose—the concept that maintains itself. [For example,] the life-process brings itself forth, i.e., what is, is endlessly brought forth. Distinction in the process [is] already in and for itself a show, a game, just as reassurance and enjoyment [are] only the abstract form of movement in the reciprocity of love. Reassurance [posits] the one; here [we have] identity as repetition, even for this instant. This instant is exclusive; the law of heaven [is valid] also in this instant. The law remains firm for itself. Calculations are a pleasure for children [because] the rule [is] firm in this case as well, and [they] are entirely certain in advance that the result must [follow] from these procedures. Thus the particular [is] posited only as a show.⟩

(γ) Attention [must] still be directed to the source of manifold modes of representation and definition.

For example, when we say, “God in himself according to his concept is the infinite, self-dirempting (and self-returning) power,” he is this only as infinitely self-relating negativity, i.e., as absolute reflection into self—which is already the definition of *spirit*.

⁶⁸Since, therefore, we want to speak of God in his first determination

67. [Ed.] See above, p. 76.

68. Ms. margin: ⟨More proximate determination of the distinction that comes

22 according to his concept, and arrive at the other determinations from that beginning, we are already speaking about the third determination here: the last is the first. Inasmuch as [we try] to avoid this, or, (if we begin abstractly,) | because the imperfection of the concept occasions a speaking about the first only in accord with its determination, it is the universal; and the activity of creating⁶⁹ and producing is already a principle distinct from abstract universality, which does and can appear as the second principle, as manifestation, self-externalization (Logos, Sophia; the first [is then] the Abyss). At the time of Christ's life and for several centuries after Christ's birth, we see philosophical representations emerge for which the representation of this relationship is the basis. In part these are independent philosophical systems, such as the philosophy of Philo, an Alexandrian Jew,⁷⁰ and in part they are the work of the other Alexandrines; but most notably they are mixtures of the Christian religion with philosophical representations—blended with figurative, allegorical [notions]—mixtures created in large part by heretics, especially by the Gnostics. Thus, for example, in Philo the *ὁν* is the first, the inconceivable, (the uncommunicative, unnameable, ἀμέθεκτος) God; likewise with a number of Neoplatonists. The second is the *Λόγος*, especially the *νοῦς*, the self-revealing, self-emerging [79b] God, the *ὁρασις θεοῦ*, the *σοφία*, *λόγος*, then the archetype of humanity, this man who is the impress of the heavenly and eternal revelation of the hidden Godhead—*φρόνησις*, *Chokma* ((Neander, p. 15)).⁷¹

about in the manifestation, in what is distinguished – the universal – the Father is presupposition)

69. *Ms. margin:* (Transition, progression from the universal to the particular. Differentiated determination – correct, but as an abstraction; each [does] not directly [express] in itself the fulness of the whole.)

70. *Ms. margin:* (In the middle between Orient and Occident. Oriental idealism sublimates Occidental actuality into a thought-world.)

W, reads: In these attempts to grasp the idea of the Trinity, we see, in general, Occidental actuality sublimated into a thought-world by Oriental idealism.

71. [Ed.] Hegel's information on the Neoplatonists' and the Gnostics in this and the next two paragraphs derives largely from August Neander, *Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme* (Berlin, 1818). See esp. pp. 8, 10, 12–15, 34, 94–95, 98. However, the predicate ἀμέθεκτος is not found in Neander's presentation and may derive instead from Hegel's study of Proclus; see Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 23–24 (ed. Portus [above, note 60], pp. 426–427).

Valentinus and the Valentinians <(p. 94)> called that unity βυθός, the abyss, αἰών, namely the τέλειος αἰών ἐν ἀοράτοις καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις | ὑψώμασι, the eternal, dwelling in invisible and inexpressible heights—<not to mention many aeons, universal powers>—βυθός, which in and for itself is elevated above all contact with finite things, from whose superabundant essence nothing can be imparted directly and in and for itself, and [which] is the principle and father of all existence only through the mediation of the Sephiroth, προαρχή, προπατήρ.

23

The self-revelation of the hidden God must precede everything else <(p. 98)>. ⁷² Through his self-contemplation (ἐνθύμησις ἑαυτοῦ) he produces the only-begotten, who is the eternal become comprehensible (καταλήψις τοῦ ἀγεννήτου), the first to be conceived, τὸ πρῶτον καταλήπτον, which is the principle of all determinate existence, the first self-determination and limitation of the infinite, inconceivable essence. The *Monogenes* [only begotten] is therefore the actual Father and basic principle of all existence, πατήρ καὶ ἀρχή, the ὄνομα ἀόρατον. The βυθός is in and for itself ἀνονόμαστος; the *Monogenes* is the πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός.

<The great controversy of the Eastern and Western Christian churches was joined over the issue of whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father and the Son,⁷³ since only the Son is manifest in activity and is revelatory, and hence only from him [would] the Spirit [proceed]. But the Spirit in general does not have this defining importance; insofar as the νοῦς, λόγος, σοφία, the second principle, the revealing one, the Man, etc., is defined, it is as the Demiurge or as the immediate transition thereto.>

72. Ms. adds in margin: <Cf. p. 98: "The Brahmā of the Hindus." Brahmā is not revelatory but self-enclosed.>

73. [Ed.] The controversy between the Eastern and Western church was not, as Hegel here claims in accord with his comparison of the Eastern church with Gnosticism, whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father and the Son, but whether it proceeds from the Father alone (as the Eastern church held) or from the Father and the Son (the *filioque* clause added to the Western version of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed from the 6th century on). Hegel's next sentence suggests that this is not simply a compositional error but an error in his knowledge of the history of dogma. The error may have been prompted by the New Testament references to the sending of the Spirit by the Son upon his departure from the world (an important theme for Hegel, see John 16:7), even though it is clear enough that the Spirit is *sent* by the Son but *proceeds* from the Father (see John 15:26).

24 In brief, the source of many so-called heresies lies purely in the turn of speculation, which, in the transition from the One, the universal, to the process of distinction, distinguishes this activity from the universal, hypostatizes it apart from the universal, which [is supposed] to stand over against it as abstract. Considered more closely, however, this Logos has already itself the characteristic of return within itself, [since it] | contains a moment that (must be distinguished) in order to comprehend the distinction exactly. [80a] The resolution consists in the fact that *Spirit* is the totality, and the first moment itself is grasped as first only because, to begin with, it has the determination of the third, of activity.

b. [The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World]⁷⁴

The *second sphere* for representation is the *creation* and *preservation* of the world as nature—a finite world,⁷⁵ spiritual and physical nature, the inauguration of a quite different region, the world of finitude.

We know from the concept the moment of differentiation, and more precisely, the determinate differentiation.⁷⁶ One side, as the undivided and indivisible concept, [is] the pure subjectivity that keeps itself in unity. The other side is the difference as such in itself, that is to say, what has being outside itself.⁷⁷ It is the absolute judgment or primal division [*Urteil*] that grants independence to the side of other-being; it is goodness that grants the idea as a whole to this [side] in its estrangement, insofar as it can receive this idea into itself in its modality as other-being, and can represent it.

⁷⁸The relation of this second sphere to the first may be defined by saying that it involves the same idea implicitly but in another

74. Ms. margin: (Where – spatial determination [of] where the eternal God is)

75. Ms. margin: (Objectivity – development of the same – i.e., holding fast of the determinate distinctions)

Son – abstract determination of other-being – antithesis of nature and finite spirit)

76. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 623 ff. (GW 12:53 ff.).

77. Ms. margin: (Nature and finite [spirit] – its history in it – its goals – its interests – beating itself to pieces)

78. Ms. margin: (Logical connection of the first and second spheres)

determinate modification. The absolute act of the first judgment or division [is] *implicitly* the same as the second; but representation holds the two apart as quite different grounds and acts. And in fact they should be distinguished and held apart; if it is said that they are *implicitly* the same, then it must be exactly | determined how this is to be understood. Otherwise a false interpretation may arise (one that is false in itself and is also an incorrect grasp of what has just now been expounded) to the effect that the eternal Son of the Father, of divinity having being objectively for itself, is *the same as* the physical and spiritual world—and only this is to be understood under the name “Son.”⁷⁹ [80b]

It has already been suggested,⁸⁰ however, and it is in fact quite obvious, that only the idea of God, as explained previously in what [we] termed the first sphere—(θεὸς νοητός)—is the eternal, true God. Subsequently his higher realization or manifestation in the more detailed process of spirit will be considered in the third sphere.

If the world, as it is immediately, is taken as being in and for itself, as being the sensible and the temporal, then it would be understood either in that false sense just alluded to or as entailing in the first instance two eternal activities of God. God's activity is after all utterly one and the same, not a veritable manifold of various activities, some occurring now, some later on, external to one another, and so forth.

Thus this differentiating [of worldly entities] as something independent is only the explicitly negative moment of other-being, of being-external-to-self, which as such has not truth but is only a moment—temporally speaking, only an instant, yet itself no instant—and only has this mode of independence⁸¹ in contrast with

79. [Ed.] Hegel here establishes an important distinction between the second moment of the divine life *ad intra* (the “eternal Son of the Father”) and the physical and spiritual world. God in the moment of self-differentiation is not simply identical with the world: this would be a crude pantheism, which Hegel consistently avoids. Rather the divine differentiation *ad intra* is the *ground* for the possibility of creating a world of nature and finite spirit whose vocation is *also* to be the otherness of God. The identity of the eternal Son and the world, of the moment of divine self-objectification *ad intra* and *ad extra*, is *implicit* only, not presently actual. See Fragment 2 from Michelet.

80. [Ed.] See above, pp. 77 ff.

81. Ms. margin: (This – present instant – being-for-self)

finite spirit insofar as it is itself in its finitude just this type and manner of independence. In God himself this is the disappearing moment of appearance. (The objectification of God, as it has been portrayed in the primal idea, is the true [objectification].)

26 ⁸²This moment has the range, breadth, and depth of a world, including heaven and earth with their infinite organization (internally and externally.) This is what is expressed if we say that | other-being is an immediately disappearing moment; it is only a flash of lightning that immediately vanishes, the sound of a word that is perceived and vanishes in its outward existence the instant it is spoken. Thus expressed, the instant of time floats before us momentarily with its before and after, in neither the one nor the other of which it is. [81a]

However, all temporal determinacy is to be eliminated, whether in terms of duration or of the now; and only the thought, the simple thought, of the other is to be held fast. [We say] “simple” because the “other” is an abstraction. That this abstraction is extended to the spatial and temporal world is to say that the latter is the simple moment of the idea itself and therefore receives the idea entirely in itself. However, because it is the moment of other-being, it is infinite sensible extension.

⟨(α)⟩ If we ask whether the world or matter ⟨(ῥλη)⟩ is eternal, exists from eternity, or whether on the contrary it has a beginning in time,⁸³ this question belongs to the empty metaphysics of the understanding. [In the phrase] “from eternity,” the latter term, as an infinite time that is represented in terms of the false infinite, is itself an infinity and determination of reflection.⁸⁴ As soon as the world enters into representation, time commences, and then, by a process of reflection, infinity or eternity arises; but we must be aware of the fact that this determination does not apply to the concept itself.

82. Ms. margin: ⟨(α) Conceptualizing cognition of nature is spiritual reconciliation⟩

83. [Ed.] A reference to Kant's description of the first conflict of the antinomy of pure reason (the world is or is not limited with respect to time and space); see *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 454–461.

84. W₂ adds: The world is precisely the region of contradiction; in it the idea is found in a determination inappropriate to it.

⟨(β)⟩ Another question, or what is in part a further determination of the previous question, concerns the fact that the world, or matter, insofar as it is supposed to be eternal, is uncreated and is immediately there on its own account. (α) The separation made by the understanding between form and matter⁸⁵ lies at the basis of this question. (β) According to their fundamental determination, however, matter or world is much rather this other, the negative, which is itself only the moment of positedness, the opposite of something independent, and | in its very existence consists solely in sublating itself and being a moment in the process. The natural world ⟨is relative,⟩ it is appearance; that is to say, it is relative and is appearance not only for us but also in itself. This is its quality, namely, precisely to pass over, moving itself forward, so as to take itself back into the final idea. The diverse metaphysical positions and diverse definitions concerning the *ύλη* of the ancients, as well as that of the philosophizing Christians, and especially the Gnostics, have their basis in the determination of the independence of other-being.

27

⟨(γ)⟩ Because the world [is] imperfect,⟨ a third [question arises, concerning] the Demiurge⁸⁶ or the Son, the creator of the world. But this is not a particular person; [it is] God in general, the universal (therefore the Father), who [stands] ⟨over against⟩ objectivity, world, ⟨other-being.⟩ [81b]

This other-being as world is such that it is purely and simply what is created, ⟨it does not have being in and for itself;⟩ and if a distinction is made between the beginning as *creation* and the *preservation* of what is extant, precisely this distinction is prior to the representation that such a sensible world is extant and is something that is. It has therefore been held all along with justification that—since being or self-subsistent independence is not attributable to the world—preservation and creation are identical, and that preservation is a creation. But can one say that creation is also preservation? One could say this insofar as the moment of other-being is

85. [Ed.] On Hegel's definition of the relationship between form and matter, see *Science of Logic*, pp. 450–454 (GW 11:297–301).

86. [Ed.] The view found in many Gnostic systems that not an evil but only an unknowing Demiurge created the world may have been encountered by Hegel in the systems of Basilides and Valentinus through the information contained in Neander's *Gnostische Systeme* (see pp. 38 ff., 119 ff.).

itself a moment of the idea; or rather it would be presupposed, as in former times, that something existent precedes creation.

Now, since other-being [is] defined as the totality of an appearance, it expresses in itself the idea, and this is in general what is meant by the *wisdom* of God in nature, a definition according to which nature has in advance a concept that has being in and for itself, which is not nature [itself] as the element of other-being. <(<α) The wisdom of God [is] a profound concept, which is lacking in the earlier religious standpoints because it contains the idea that is determinate in and for itself.> | (ββ) This wisdom is a universal expression, and it is the concern of philosophical cognition to recognize this concept in nature and to grasp nature as a system, as an organization, in which the divine idea is mirrored.⁸⁷ This idea <(<α) is made manifest; (β) its content is itself the manifestation>—the manifestation differentiating itself, revealing itself as an other and [taking] this other back into itself so that this return is just as much external as it is internal. In nature, therefore, these stages lie outside each other as a system of adjacent entities, the kingdoms of nature, the highest of which is the kingdom of the living.

But life, which is the highest exhibition of the idea in nature, means precisely the sacrifice of self—the negativity of the idea vis-à-vis this its existence [*Existenz*]—and the coming into being of spirit. Spirit is this coming forth by means of nature; that is to say, spirit finds its antithesis in nature, so that, through the sublation of this antithesis, spirit is *for* itself, i.e., is spirit. Nature, [however, is] the idea subsisting only *in* itself, i.e., posited in immediate form or in otherness. [82a]

c. [Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation]⁸⁸

The third sphere is therefore objectivity in the form of *finite spirit*, the appearance of the idea in and to the latter, *redemption* and

87. [Ed.] Hegel addresses himself to this task in the second part of the *Encyclopedia*, the “Philosophy of Nature.”

88. *Ms. margin*: (17 August 1821)

[Ed.] This is the longest section in Part III of the *Ms.*, comprising over a third of the text. It includes the discussion of both estrangement and reconciliation,

reconciliation as the divine history itself (and at the same time as the sublation of external objectivity in general—and thereby the real consummation of spirit.)

This [is] the moment of divine, developed objectivity, wherein divinity arrives at its most extreme [mode of] being-outside-itself no less than it finds its *turning point* there; and this moment of return itself consists in both the most extreme estrangement [*Entfremdung*] and the pinnacle of divestment [*Entäusserung*]. |

29

Since this [is] the history of the divine idea in finite spirit, this history itself directly contains two sides: it is the history of *finite consciousness itself* as isolated in immediacy; and [it is] this history as an object for consciousness, *as objective in and for itself*, i.e., as the history of God as it is in and for itself. This [is our concern] here, that [is the concern of] the community.⁸⁹

The necessity of such a history is found, first of all, in the divine idea: God as spirit is this process, whose moments have them-

whereas these are more sharply distinguished in the later lectures. Hegel's point in joining them here is that the appearance of human being as finite spirit and its fall into estrangement represents both the pinnacle of divine self-differentiation *and* the "turning point," the beginning of the history of redemption, which becomes explicit, however, only in the story of Christ. In the later lectures, the turning point—"When the time had come"—is located differently, with the appearance of Christ (see 1824 lectures, p. 215).

If Hegel began lecturing on this material on Thursday, 17 August 1821, as the marginal notation suggests, he must have covered an astonishing amount of material during the remaining six lectures of the course, since the semester ended on Friday the 25th. (Possibly he scheduled an additional hour during the last week of the term.) As of the 17th, he had completed less than a third of the text for Part III, and still had 22 Ms. sheets remaining to be covered. Prior to this date he had been lecturing at a more leisurely pace, since he covered the preceding 8 sheets in the five lectures between the 8th and the 17th of August (see above, n. 17). He may have been led into a false sense of security by the belated discovery that the summer semester did not end on the 16th of August but on the 25th (see *Loose Sheets*, n. 20). The bulk of this material was probably composed between mid-July and mid-August.

89. [Ed.] *Dies hier – jenes die Gemeinde*. This sentence is difficult to construe. It could be a reference to the division of Sec. B.c into two subsections, α (estrangement) and β (redemption and reconciliation), in which case the "this" refers to the first side and the "that" to the second. Or it could mean that *our* concern is with the history of the divine idea "as objective in and for itself" (the second side), while the concern of the community is with the history "of *finite consciousness itself*" (the first side).

selves the shape of complete reality and thereby of finite self-consciousness; hence the divine idea actualizes itself in and to finite self-consciousness. The other aspect of the necessity of this manifestation, however, is that it takes place for self-consciousness, precisely because it is this history in finite self-consciousness. God must be for himself as the whole of his revelation; only thus is he revealed. This history of his must be an object for him, but in *its own* objectivity and truth.

This true history of finite spirit is what now must be grasped. [82b]

α. [*Estrangement: Natural Humanity*]⁹⁰

In accord with the idea of its truth, spirit is first in its character as universality (Father). But what finite spirit <is means precisely not being in the element of thinking; it means that the moments> of the concept of spirit <[are found] not in the concept, not in an abstract universal posited in thought, [but occur rather in] immediate being,> [i.e.,] as distinguished, held apart, falling indifferently asunder; it means that the first form of universality is [posited] as first only as what has being and is immediate. The positive⁹¹ is abstract universality because of the falling asunder [of the moments]; it is not yet defined as a totality. Hence the | first modality of spirit is to be as finite and natural spirit, as *natural humanity*.

This determination is to be grasped according to its concept. Immediately, it is an internally unresolved *contradiction*. Spirit is

90. [Ed.] Although we have employed the well-known term “estrangement” in the section heading, the term that Hegel more commonly uses is *Entzweiung* (“cleavage,” “rupture”) rather than *Entfremdung* (“estrangement,” “alienation”). There is no substantial difference between the terms, since “cleavage” (within the self, and of the self from the infinite, from spirit) issues in “estrangement.” The expression “natural humanity” (*natürlicher Mensch*) does not suggest that the natural being of humanity (the “flesh”) is evil as such. Such would be a Manichaean dualism, clearly rejected by Hegel. Rather it is when human being constitutes its existence, establishes the criteria for its life, *according to* the immediacy, particularity, and *externality* of the physical nature it shares with all created things, that “cleavage” occurs and evil arises. The true vocation of humanity is to exist according to *the Spirit* rather than according to nature. Surely the Pauline κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ πνεῦμα are in the background of Hegel’s thought at this point.

91. Ms. margin: (Consciousness of what it is)

spirit only as unending return into itself, as mediation of itself with itself, a mediation that is likewise sublated. Immediacy, on the other hand, is the nonmediated, indeed not even the living, far less the spiritual—it is something dead, as though something could be without this mediation. The natural spirit is essentially what spirit ought not to be or to remain.

This is a very important and truthful characterization, and for this reason the one according to which [finite spirit] must be represented by religion, as the knowledge of truth. We must now consider what is contained in it more closely and in more concrete ways.

Natural humanity does not exist in the form that it ought to; it is determined by the singularity of its existence. To begin with, it is the *willing* human being, for the will is the faculty of decision; it is that whereby the human being is constituted as an individual opposed to others, that which puts up resistance and establishes separation. It is not yet thinking humanity, which determines itself in thoughtful fashion according to the universal and the good, i.e. (from the viewpoint of the will), according to a purpose that is in and for itself. To think and to determine oneself according to the universal already entails an abandonment of the immediacy and sheer naturalness that adheres to humanity in an unmediated state. [83a]

Thus the natural human being⁹² is not liberated⁹³ within itself vis-à-vis itself and external nature. It is the human being of desire,

92. *Ms. margin:* (Immediate human being as negative is secondly: (α) Innocence – naive immediacy; (β) Immediacy for spiritual consciousness in the relationship corresponding to its true vocation)

93. *Ms. margin:* (Unfree – feeling of dependence – not religious)

[Ed.] Hegel's Preface to H. W. F. Hinrichs's *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1822), written only a few months after the *Ms.*, suggests that the reference here to the natural human being who is unfree is an indirect criticism of Schleiermacher. For in the Preface the critique of natural humanity is found in the context of Hegel's polemic against Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the "feeling of dependence." Hegel identifies the natural human being with the ψυχικός άνθρωπος of 1 Cor. 2:14, so that Schleiermacher's position appears to be that of the natural or psychic human being, while Hegel, together with the Apostle, assumes the position of the πνευματικός, the spiritual person. Hegel also makes it clear that the feeling of dependence is not, properly speaking, a religious feeling but a purely natural feeling. "The human spirit on the contrary has its

31 of savagery and self-seeking, of dependence and fear. In its *dependence* on nature, [it can be either more or less mild (or savage.) In a mild climate (and this is the main determining factor), where nature (gives) it the means to satisfy its physical needs, its natural traits are able to remain mild, benevolent, characterized by simple needs and conditions; geography and travel-accounts provide pleasing depictions of such a state of affairs. But in part these amiable customs [are] simultaneously mixed in with barbaric practices and customs (such as human sacrifice), becoming completely bestial (in the case of the tribal chiefs in the Friendly Islands,⁹⁴ the higher their rank, [the more they] have themselves fed like animals, lying as it were in the feeding trough). [There are] fascinating depictions of these customs [from] the islands and coasts of East Asia. This sort of condition does appear to depend on fortuitous circumstances—such as climate, isolation from others, an insular situation—and without such this condition is outwardly impossible; in part, however, it does not derive from empirical possibilities at all. Besides, such observations and accounts⁹⁵ concern the outer, good-natured disposition of human beings toward strangers, toward others; they do not enter into the interior aspect of relationships and conditions, (and [hence] they establish an [overly] narrow standard for what human being ought to be.) The question is not just what kind of state of affairs one has taken a fancy to and would like oneself—or humanity as a whole—to be in. Actuality already stands opposed

liberation and the feeling of its divine freedom in religion.” See Hinrichs, p. xviii; translated by Merold Westphal as an appendix to *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. Frederick G. Weiss (The Hague, 1974), p. 238. See also Hegel’s *Berliner Schriften*, p. 74. The allusion to Schleiermacher is of course confirmed by the marginal passage. In the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher spoke rather loosely of *pious feeling* as “a pure feeling of dependence” (see § 9.3); see our Vol. 1:279 n. 37.

94. [Ed.] Hegel’s information derives from Georg Forster’s account of the travels he and his father undertook with Captain Cook, *Johann Reinhold Forster’s Reise um die Welt, während den Jahren 1772 bis 1775*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1784), pp. 248–249. However, the practices to which Hegel refers were encountered not on the Friendly Islands (i.e., Tonga-Tapu) but in Tahiti; and Forster specifically emphasized the greater social equality of the Friendly Islands as compared with the social hierarchy of Tahiti (p. 344).

95. W₂ adds: which we have of those presumably innocent people,

to all such views—(insipid possibilities that proceed from abstractions divorced from such circumstances, not from concrete conditions)—and to the wishes of a sick philanthropy;⁹⁶ but essentially the concept, the nature of the case, is opposed to them too—and the “nature of the case” is this character of naturalness. | Spirit’s vocation does not lie in the direction of this naturalness and innocence, which is contrary to its concept. (Necessity appears in the shape of external conditions; and the retailers of possibility believe that everything has been done when they have posited the possibility that the external circumstances [are] nothing in and for themselves and could be otherwise. But external circumstances [are] only occasions, shaped in one form or another, of a necessary development, which itself [utilizes] such external conditions.

However agreeable such a state of affairs is, it is (α) not without gruesome aspects, (β) but in general it also lacks that universal self-consciousness with its consequences and developments, which constitute the glory of spirit.)⁹⁷ [83b]

The other aspect to be considered here is precisely the concept of spirit itself without the character of immediacy, without this antithesis. This general concept of spirit is that which is in and for itself—the divine idea itself. Human being, because it is spirit, is implicitly this idea. Indeed, because the concept, especially in human being as finite through and through, is the vis-à-vis [of God], the objectivity of the divine idea, this idea alone is defined as the in-itself of humanity—not as human being or finite spirit actually is, but as its inner substance, its truth, which it does not immediately exist as, the truth to which [it] has first to raise itself as spirit, a truth that is itself only truly brought forth as spiritual.

The following two characteristics are found in human being existing immediately: (α) its concept or possibility—for the concept is its possibility, but only that; (β) its immediacy, its self-consciousness, [which is] not as it ought to be. (When the former [is repre-

96. *W₂ adds:* which people wish for the return of in its original state of innocence,

97. *Ms. adds in margin:* (This natural and more or less [savage] state contains, furthermore . . .)

[*Ed.*] It seems quite probable that an inserted sheet containing the continuation of this marginal addition has been lost.

sented] as [its original] condition, existence [*Existenz*], or history, then the transition to this latter status [its immediate self-consciousness] [is] the fall into sin.) |

33

The necessary unification of these two characteristics lies in the essence of spirit, as initiating spirit, to have the immediacy by virtue of which it posits itself as an immediate object opposed to itself. [We must here] observe the distinction between representation and conception. What is thus defined conceptually becomes, in the realm of representation, [different] states of existence [*Existenz*], and a transition from one condition to another. ([We must] first briefly consider this representational mode.)

((α)) [*The Original Condition.*] We need to be reminded only briefly that the portrayal of the first moment, conceptually speaking, is by means of the representation that human being was *originally created in the image of God* [Gen. 1:27], was brought forth on its own, and that this characteristic has then been represented as its *original state*—[namely that it] was the state of perfection, indeed of spiritual perfection as well as a physical state in which nothing was lacking to it. (Those agreeable empirical conditions spoken of earlier, even if they appear to be touching, are scarcely to be given out as a condition of perfection, any more than the condition of childhood is in human life. Desires, self-seeking, evil, etc., are already to be found in the state of childhood, just as they are in those empirical conditions, although neither the bad nor the good is as pronounced.) One can paint this condition further at will, but precisely by doing so one becomes entangled in difficulties and empty fancies as to how they can be resolved: e.g., the fact that women bear children painfully [Gen. 3:16] [84a] is based on the feminine constitution—but how is this [constitution] to be represented if it [painful childbirth] is something that ought not to be? The necessity of the death of individuals is based on the same [human] constitution—but how then [could it] be imagined that they should not grow older, should not die? More precisely, what is involved here is a confusion about time and the unending sensuous persistence of the bodily state. |

34

(There are three modes of representation that can be specified with regard to this primitive condition:

(α) It is maintained on philosophical grounds that such a primitive [condition] is also the original condition, actually and temporally—but not (in accord with those empirical descriptions) as a condition of merely external well-being or bodily health, of mild, well-meaning customs, and an appropriate but still limited development of intelligence. Rather it has⁹⁸ been philosophically grasped as a condition of the highest spiritual perfection,⁹⁹ of human being in unity with nature, hence as an untroubled intelligence, which does not turn away from nature and into itself by means of reflection, an intelligence that penetrates and permeates nature as its spiritual center, yet not by standing over against it or separating from it, (but as an intelligence that exists as a pure and highest knowledge,) comprehending the core of metals, the innermost qualities of plants and animals, and recognizing and grasping their true relation to the corresponding aspects of human existence. Thus its attitude to nature is as to a suitable garment that does not destroy its organization: (nature [is one's own] body objectified and cast off, all the tones, colors, and shapes of nature corresponding to an accent of spirit. The intuition of this unity (the comprehending of nature) is human being. To know the characteristics of nature and one's own corresponding characteristics is the cognition of nature from oneself.) But this way of thinking is empty when it is consid-

98. Ms. adds in margin: ((β) Human being as speculative; (γ) human being as good by nature – without transition [to sin] and return [to self-identity in God].)

[Ed.] These second and third points are developed in the main text below.

99. [Ed.] Hegel here is criticizing the acceptance of a condition of original perfection, which was still current in his time. From his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* it may be assumed that he has in mind especially Schelling and Schlegel. See the reference to Schelling and to Schlegel's *Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* found in a lecture transcript (*Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 5th ed. [Hamburg, 1955], p. 158), as well as the reference to Schlegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte* 1:44 in Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1830 (*Vernunft in der Geschichte*, p. 159 n. f; the latter reference is found in the translation by J. Sibree of the 2d German edition [1840], *The Philosophy of History*, rev. ed. [New York, 1899; reprint, 1956], p. 58). See F. W. J. Schelling, *On University Studies* (1803), trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 83; and Friedrich Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier: Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Alterthumskunde* (Heidelberg, 1808), pp. 295, 303 (*Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, vol. 8 [Munich, Paderborn, Vienna, 1975], pp. 295–297, 303). We may not assume, however, that Hegel's description of the state of original perfection derives from these two works in a detailed way.

ered in a fundamental perspective, no matter how much it commends itself as an ideal of phantasy and supposedly has its roots in the idea itself, on the grounds (namely) that it is the original condition and that the actual condition conforms to this idea just as much as the ideal one.

35 But this first, immediate relationship [to nature] is thus a relationship of feeling, of instinct, or in consciousness, of intuition | — an immediate relation, not one that has been reconstructed by thinking (or that has returned [to itself] out of the infinite antithesis,) ¹⁰⁰ or that has developed by means of it. (It is easy to speak of feelings and intuitions as manifold because intuition and feeling [are] unmediated and hence [are] as manifold as their objects, but both alike [are] only developed [into a manifold] through reflection. It is of no help that heaven and earth, humanity and the arts in their beauty are opened up before the eyes of the body, since what and how any of this is in [the mind of] the subject is lacking unless it [is] inwardly cultivated [by] reflection.) [This] is the condition of feeling, which is one of being inwardly concentrated and nonmanifold. Nature in all its spread of wealth does not have a relation to the subject, but is rather totally dense. It is first of all the process of thinking—reflection generally [is] distinction—that develops the wealth of relations [84b] for feeling or intuition. ¹⁰¹ Otherwise feeling is concentrated within itself as the feeling of its singularity; and intuition is just sensible intuition instead, i.e., an external attitude to externals. It is (its *own* hard-won and highly-prized *internality*)—without interest and theoretical, i.e., without interest in the inward essence [of objects], without interest in the developed, determinate inward aspect. This inward essence is the laws of nature, which are not intuited (([it] is of no help to continue viewing heaven so piously, innocently, and credulously)) and are not an immediate relationship, but rather are the product of thought only by means of penetrating into intuition and sublating the sensible relationship of unmediated externality.

100. Ms. adds in margin: <(α) Concentrated within itself – feeling – not developed – lacks manifoldness>

101. Ms. margin: <(β) Intuition [grasps] not the essential and true nature of things but rather their sensible nature; (γ) only thought>

It is an entirely different matter to comprehend the idea of spirit in general as the center of nature and as the totality of its identity with it, (and to recognize the way in which this idea | is actualized in self-consciousness, and the path that it utilizes to achieve this end. We have still to observe this insurmountable knot, and [the way that] this exposition [of the original identity] has to work itself out laboriously in order to comprehend [it]—the fall, the becoming other [of humanity].)¹⁰² 36

However, it is something else again¹⁰³ when this idea is brought before the imagination: here it is unavoidable that it should be represented as a primitive condition of humanity as it comes forth from the hand of God. It is a high and in essence a true faith that humanity is created in the image of God; this is its original vocation, its true being-in-itself. It is also true that the [human] condition that does not correspond to this idea is an ungodly condition, one that ought not to be, and furthermore (as we shall show later¹⁰⁴) it is our fault that we should be estranged from the idea.

(β) Another form or elaboration of this definition of human nature as implicitly divine, a form that is based on the speculative idea, is that found among the philosophers, both pagan and Christian, who had the profound idea that lies at the basis of Christianity before their minds in more obscure or purer configurations. [85a] [In order] to grasp the relationship of human and divine nature in a philosophically speculative way and in pure thought, it may be indicated that they comprehended the first human being, i.e., human being as such, as the Only-begotten, the Son of God, as the moment of the objectification of God in the divine idea: Adam Kadmon ((J. Boehme)), the Logos, the Primal Man.¹⁰⁵ (This holds together

102. *This marginal addition replaces the following bracketed passage in the main text:* as (α) the fact that [the idea] is made known and knows itself not merely in universality but rather in a state of determinacy; and (β) the immediacy of the latter, as it actually is, precisely the determinacy of immediate being.

103. *Ms. margin:* (If it is only to be done on that account,)

104. *[Ed.]* See below, p. 102.

105. *[Ed.]* Hegel is here apparently drawing again on Neander's *Gnostische Systeme*, p. 102: "As the Father of all the remaining aeons, the λογος, together with ζωη, first begets the Primal Man (άνθρωπος), and then with him as his συζυγος the heavenly community (ἐκκλησια). This idea of the Adam Kadmon, as the recipient

[as follows]:) It is precisely the idea of human being [that is depicted]: $\langle(\alpha)$ in its truth (hence as a moment of God in his eternal being); and $\langle\beta)$ [in] the moment of manifestation.)

- 37 $\langle\gamma)$ That humanity [is] good “by nature” [is a doctrine of] recent times.¹⁰⁶ In the modern | sense, human inclinations and natural tendencies [are considered to be good] in the sense that [humanity] exists not in accord with its idea but as it is empirically, by nature, in accord with its vital agency and existence. \langle To will is good, \rangle and development, for its part, is only a positive bringing out of these tendencies, \langle unhindered within itself and not passing through negativity, \rangle passing [out of] possibility into actuality and activity without being mediated by a negative moment, \langle and nurturing good inclinations and tendencies. On this view, \rangle whatever is found in humanity that ought not to be [is there] only because of external contingencies or an accidental failure to satisfy those natural tendencies; it could only be the absence of a free opportunity for their development. [This is] the barren viewpoint of the pedagogy of our time,¹⁰⁷ which on the one hand nourishes vanity, fostering and

and disseminator of the divine vital powers, is found in many forms among the Valentian systems.” Hegel’s marginal reference to Jacob Boehme is expanded in the 1824 lectures and may derive from the latter (see below, 1824 lectures, n. 106). The analogy established by Hegel between the Logos as the Only-begotten and Lucifer in Boehme is not as clear in the 1824 philosophy-of-religion lectures as in the history-of-philosophy lectures; see *Vorlesungen*, Vol. 9, original pagination 162–163.

106. [Ed.] In Part I of the *Lectures* Hegel ascribes this modern view that humanity is good by nature to Kant (see Vol. 1:288), although it was precisely Kant who, in opposition to the Rousseauian acceptance of the goodness of human nature, asserted the presence of radical evil in humanity. Kant held that an original kernel of goodness could be reawakened through adherence to the moral law. See Rousseau’s *Émile* (1762) and *Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755); and Kant’s *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960), pp. 27 ff., 50 ff. (Kant, *Werke* 6:32 ff., 45 ff.).

107. [Ed.] Hegel attacked the pedagogy of his time in Part I (see Vol. 1:241), but there it was in connection with the question whether religion can be taught. His criticism is directed not against the neo-humanistic tendencies of his time but against philanthropinism (a system of education based on so-called natural principles), and is shaped essentially by the work of his friend, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, *Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unsrer Zeit* (Jena, 1808).

engendering all that is vain, and on the other hand does not perceive—[because it] does not investigate the depths of humanity and attains to no depths itself but moves in barren circles, complacent and self-satisfied—that truly serious and good education consists in *discipline*. It is discipline that has the effect of putting aside natural and self-seeking tendencies, especially through intellectual formation, the provision of an intellectual diet of what is rational and universal, and good, upright customs. (But [this is] precisely what is not meant when we say “by nature.” At all events, [if humanity is held to be good by nature,] the moment of negativity appears to recede and [does] not emerge in this glaring fashion—to spare the rod is to spoil the child.) But in order to attain this condition of an ethical people, the [original] conditions must be glaringly present, and education is itself the history [of this condition]—but in softer tones—and [its] progression. <(α) A good feature, the depth of modern times, is [to regard] human being [as] good by nature and its development [as] merely a positive bringing out [of the nature that is within]—the ethical condition of the Greeks. (β) But [given] a submersion in this kind of complacent self-satisfaction without negativity, [the historical condition] will break in from the outside whenever the opportunity presents itself. [But people are] of the opinion that nothing further is lacking than good educational institutions.>¹⁰⁸ [85b]

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<(β)> [*The Fall*]¹⁰⁹ Although the idea of humanity as such [is represented] as a paradisiacal condition, this idea is actual only in the form of a natural and thus of an existent condition. Hence the connection between the first and the second is a *transition*—indeed a transition to something worse, a becoming other, a *fall* from the divine idea, from the image of God.

(α) We have attributed the fact that the connection is represented

108. Ms. adds: The truth [is] the first moment without such forms: <(α) actual intellectual perfection; (β) altogether good by nature.>

109. [Ed.] This β marks the beginning of the second topic to be treated under the theme of natural humanity, namely, the transition from the original condition of humanity as created in the image of God to its actual condition of existing in a state of immediacy and evil—a transition represented biblically by the story of the “fall.” See above, pp. 95–96.

as a transition *between two conditions* directly to representation.¹¹⁰ What belongs to it as such is only [the supposition] that there are two conditions related to each other, and not that nature itself in its immediacy is a transition [into fallenness]. This [must be] considered more closely.

(αα) The first condition [is] an immediate, natural state of *desires* and tendencies generally. But this natural condition is one of *consciousness*. Life is already immediate, but only as a process: consciousness is even more so. [That the subject has] the consciousness of desire does not occur without [its] will; rather desire is the willing of consciousness, its willing in its freedom.

⟨(ββ) Willing what is natural is, more precisely defined, *evil*.⟩ [It is] the willing of separation, the setting of one's singularity against others. [There is] opposition within it—in an immediate sense, [the opposition between] one's singularity and universality. Human being [is] consciousness and also thinking: universal qualities, the good, [are] before it. Human being [exists] only as a transition, [distinguishing] good and evil. Evil, generally speaking, [is to be] in a way that one ought not to be (we must here be satisfied with this general description). Both [good and evil are] before the human being; [it has] the choice between them, and its will is evil. [Hence evil is] its *fault* [*Schuld*]. This evil is its self-seeking: [its] goals [relate] only to its singularity insofar as it is opposed to the universal, i.e., insofar as it is natural. That human being is a natural [being] is a matter of its will, its doing. No excuse to the effect that human being is as it is by nature, education, | or circumstances [can] justify, excuse, or take away the guilt. [86a] In this alone, that [evil] is a matter of human responsibility, is human *freedom* recognized—its being posited by humanity itself; humanity has dignity only through [the acceptance of] guilt.

⟨Hence it is the case that the previously designated¹¹¹⟩ immediacy of natural being itself exists only as something posited, as a willing, a transition: this [is] the accurate way of defining the matter. In a purely abstract natural condition, humanity is neither good nor

110. [Ed.] See above, p. 96.

111. [Ed.] Hegel apparently is referring not to a specific passage but to the whole of the preceding section (α) on the original condition.

evil; this means, however, that it is not yet actually human. (Because human being is spirit, immediacy [is] posited within it as it truly is. Thus the world and immediate nature [are] created, the realm of immediacy and appearance in general [is created], and in itself is in the same way only the second [state].

In more precise terms, this transition is in general a consciousness of the cognitive kind; (the feeling, the consciousness of the idea, of the universal, and the defining and grasping of what preexists according to the idea [as] a universal determinate in and for itself—[as] good or evil—is cognition.

(γγ) In consciousness, [there is] *cognition*.) Only through cognition does human being exist—because it exists only through knowledge and consciousness. Human will is not unconscious, it is not an instinct. But cognition and volition or consciousness are, generally speaking, the willing of evil just as much as of the good. Hence the first will, the first existence [*Dasein*], [is] not necessarily evil. But will or cognition is in any case and in general (as already mentioned¹¹²) to be understood as that which contains its turning point within itself. Furthermore, the first will is the natural will; the will (as what is first is precisely the immediate content of finitude, the first content, the first purpose,) [the will] of desire. Cognition, will—[will is] precisely the form, the infinite form of cognition, its content. But the immediate content is precisely the natural, having singularity | and self-seeking as its goal; this is the first, immediate content, it is still formal freedom.

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Thus evil, the will of self-seeking, exists only through consciousness and cognition, and constitutes the first form of will. One must keep the concept of the thing before one's mind. [One] can say that there is indeed formal freedom, but right along with it the content [is] given—[so it is] not free will and [there is] no guilt. It does not matter here whether this first, evil will is fixed or transitory, whether it is the impulse or the life of one human being or of a people; [it is] a necessary transitional point, whether it is momentary or long-lasting. (But the divine principle of turning, of return to self, is equally present in cognition; it gives the wound and heals it, [because] the principle is spirit and is true.)

112. [Ed.] See the preceding paragraph.

⟨(β)⟩¹¹³ [We shall] call attention briefly to the chief moments in the *representation* [of the fall]: (α) Adam in Paradise, the Garden of Eden, ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; (β) the serpent said, “You will be like God” [Gen. 3:5]; ⟨(γ) they [Adam and Eve] thereby first became finite and mortal; and at the same time, (δ)⟩¹¹⁴ God said, “Behold, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil” [Gen. 3:22]. [86b] ([This is] a profound story. God’s prohibition against eating the fruit [is] a secondary matter. To be sure, this deviation from the idea is something that ought not to be, in the sense that it should be sublated.)

In considering this story, we must first observe its contradictions. It is represented that the man [is] forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. He transgresses this command, is outwardly tempted by the promise that by eating he will be like God, foolishly believes it (bumblebees and wasps [are] gods—if apple-eating makes gods!¹¹⁵), and is punished for it. Hence everything follows in a completely finite and ordinary sequence—everything depends on such an external | inheritance of evil—entirely lacking in ideal or speculative character. ⟨It [is] all so logical.⟩ The first act of disobedience is something contingent or accidental. It is no longer a question of comprehending sin; rather it is a *story* that we have before us and of which we are externally aware. ⟨(α) [It was] God’s interdict, to be sure, but [what God forbade is] not [to be understood as] eating from a tree; that [would be] *formal* obedience, and the content [of the story would then be no more than] what such a formal concept of obedience called for. (β) [Since it was just] this individual, [his] fault, freedom, and accountability oppose [his desire to be like God].⟩ However, what appears at once

113. Ms. adds in margin: ⟨Representation⟩

114. Ms. reads: (δ) . . . (ε) instead of: (γ) . . . (δ)

115. [Ed.] *Hummeln und Wespen – Götter – wenn das Äpfelfressen Götter tät’ machen*. This is from Sebastian Sailer’s Swabian dialect play, *Die Schöpfung*, which probably dates from 1746. At the beginning of Act 3, God chastises Eve for having not recognized that the “long worm” that offered her the forbidden fruit was the devil, and he underscores her foolishness with these words (see the edition by Martin Stern [Stuttgart, 1969], p. 39). This popular play was published in many editions, and it is not certain when Hegel first read it (or saw it performed). There is an allusion to it in a letter from Hegel to Immanuel Niethammer of 3 November 1810 (*Briefe* 1:338).

to be inconsistent in this most excellent chain of consistency is (α) that not *any* tree but the tree of the knowledge of good and evil [is prohibited]. This [is] the major point: it is not a question of just any tree and ordinary fruit; [the allusion to] good and evil leads us at once into an entirely different region. These are absolute, substantial characteristics of spirit, not something like the eating of an apple. (But here [the situation is] still more difficult, for the inconsistency [is] infinite.) (β) Thus it is supposedly forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; yet this knowledge is what constitutes the nature of spirit—otherwise the man is a beast. (γ) This knowledge, so the serpent promises, will make him like God. [This is] the temptation of evil, deceit, and pride, and subsequently it is God who says ((Gen. 3:22),) “Behold, Adam has become like one of us, knowing good and evil.” Here it is placed on the lips of God himself that precisely knowledge—the specific knowledge of good and evil in general, that is—constitutes the divine in humanity. [87a] Just as the necessity of [our gaining this] knowledge is contradicted, so our knowledge itself appears to be contradicted by the fact (δ) that punishment is incurred by this knowledge and is to take the form of physical necessity—(and of mortality, | [which is] a necessary consequence of finitude.) ((ε) And [yet mortality is] also not [to be viewed] as punishment: “Lest he eat also of the tree of life . . .” [cf. Gen. 3:22].)¹¹⁶

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It must be observed, quite generally, that a deep speculative content cannot be portrayed in its true and proper form in images and mere representations, and hence it essentially cannot be portrayed in this mode without contradiction. (Each of the opposites [is] as essential as the other. But in the representation, one of them [is] the absolute idea, [it is] original.) For the speculative content is precisely the comprehension of the concept of the thing—[which involves] the concept’s development—and hence [the comprehension of] the inner antithesis that the concept contains and through which it moves.

Once the original divine idea has been represented as a human

116. [Ed.] The text continues: “. . . and live for ever—therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden.” See the third paragraph below, “Humanity [is] also banished . . .,” and n. 118.

condition, it is consistent for representation that it should represent the knowledge of good and evil as a condition which, in contrast, ought not to have occurred, (and from this everything else follows that appears as inconsistent. Reason [on the other hand] does not allow itself to be confused because of these inconsistencies.) For in fact this first [form of] reflection, according to which the natural is [regarded] as evil, is a situation that ought not to be, i.e., it ought to be sublated—but it is not one that ought not to occur: it has occurred because human being is consciousness. (Moreover, the knowledge of good and evil is not evil on its own account—[this is] another inconsistency.) The story is the eternal history of humanity. The deep insight of this story is that the eternal history of humanity, to be consciousness, is contained in it: (α) the original divine idea, the image [of God]; (β) the emergence of consciousness, knowledge of good and evil, (and at the same time responsibility; (γ) [the knowledge of good and evil emerges] as something that both ought not to be, i.e., it ought not to remain as knowledge, and also as the means by which humanity is divine. Knowledge
43 heals the wound that it itself is. <[It | is] the category within which the finitude of spirit falls. It is not, as is the case [with] the rest of the finite world, an existing limitation; rather separation is consciousness—its severing, its positing, its distinguishing, and thus labor, toil, and mortality as consequences or punishment, the way the story tells it. On mortality: “In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return” [Gen. 3:19]. [Our] final destiny [is] higher only through eternal life.)

Humanity [is] also banished from Paradise so that it may not eat of the tree of life (the *Hom* of the Parsees¹¹⁷) and live forever.

117. [Ed.] Cf. W₂ 11:417: “Among trees, there is one that is especially marked off—*Hom*, the tree from which flow the waters of immortality” (from Hegel’s description of Parseeism). According to Iranian tradition, a tree of life and regeneration grows on earth, guarded by a serpent or lizard, and has a prototype in heaven. Earthly *haoma*, or yellow *hom*, is found in the mountains, having first been planted by Ahura Mazda. Its prototype is in heaven, and it is the heavenly *haoma* or white *hom* that gives immortality to those who drink of its sap. Among ancient religions—Indian, Iranian, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Greek, Israelite—it was common to find a primeval man (or hero) in search of immortality, a tree of life placed

Again, [this is] inconsistent. In one place [the story has it that the ground shall] “bring forth thorns and thistles” [Gen. 3:18]—(this is [the meaning of] being expelled from Paradise.) Finitude [thus acquires] its own characteristic knowledge, (v. 17): “Because you have done thus and so. . . ,” [says God; hence the punishment is] altogether the consequence of knowledge. Animals are better off, their needs more easily satisfied. In another place [the expulsion is the means to ensure mortality; God says], v. 22: “. . . lest he put forth his hand (and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.)” [Humanity must depart from Paradise] merely in order not to eat of this tree; but mortality [is] a necessary consequence of finitude.¹¹⁸

(The depth of the idea [is present here] speculatively; [it is] a story concerning the nature of humanity itself, [yet it is] never again mentioned in the Old Testament, [neither in the Books of] Moses [nor in] the Prophets, but only in Sirach 25:32: “The woman is guilty.”¹¹⁹ [Israel has] always gone forth; the God of Abraham and Isaac led the people out of Egypt. Always [it is a matter of] their particularity, evil, stiff-neckedness—in brief, [the story for them is] wholly prosaic and particular.) [87b]

Inasmuch as this representation [of the fall] was no longer contained in the Jewish worldview or in the consciousness of its con-

in some inaccessible spot, and a serpent or monster guarding the tree. See Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. R. Sheed (New York, 1974), pp. 287–290.

118. [Ed.] This paragraph is an expansion and clarification of the fifth point (ε) made at the end of the third paragraph preceding. The biblical story seems to offer two conflicting accounts of human mortality: (a) It is a punishment for sin (Gen. 2:17, 3:3, 19); (b) It is a concomitant of finitude. The latter is implied by the banishment from the Garden (Gen. 3:22–23) in order to prevent Adam from eating of the tree of life. In other words, according to the first view, humanity was created immortal but lost its immortal nature because of sin; according to the second view, humanity was created mortal but had the possibility of gaining immortality by eating of the mythical tree, an opportunity that was lost. By exposing the contradictions in the story, Hegel was attempting to show that the whole “punishment” theme is mythical and to elucidate the speculative truth concerning the origin of evil that is concealed therein.

119. [Ed.] This is a free paraphrase based on Luther's translation. In modern editions of the Apocrypha, the verse is numbered 24; the full text reads: “From a woman sin had its beginning, and because of her we all die.”

44 dition, the following insight was just as essentially dormant within it: "Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. This "has become" gives expression to the particular moment: not [that of] the first and original likeness of God, but of the likeness that is to be regained. | It is represented as something that has already come to be, expressing generally this other aspect of knowledge, namely, that it is in itself the turning point. [In his] new translation of the Bible, Meyer¹²⁰ interprets this "Adam" as the new Adam, as Christ, and ~in fact there is nothing else lying within it than the likeness of God that is to be regained. One can call this likeness the promise of the new Adam.¹²¹ It is expressed figuratively as prophecy in what God says to the serpent: "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel" [Gen. 3:15]. Since in the serpent the principle of knowledge is represented as autonomous, found outside of Adam and indeed [on] the side of evil, it is wholly consistent that the other side [of knowledge], the side of turning about and reflection, is contained in humanity as concrete cognition, and that this other side will bruise the head of the serpent. This promise, the infinite side of knowledge, was likewise slumbering in the Jewish people, submerged in the limitation and particularity of this people. Only later did the drive, the need, the longing [awaken] within them, and then only in a limited fashion, of hoping especially for a worldly and religious savior—religious, [however,] only in the sense of the reestablishment of their form of worship.

45 (This entire first point¹²²) has the closest connection (with the concept) of freedom—[it is] the story of human freedom. A collision [occurs]—the problem of combining evil with God's foreknowledge, goodness, (will,) etc., of combining the absolute divine will with human freedom. [It] belongs to the divine life, which is divine spirit, to objectify itself in free and initially finite spirit, which [is] God *implicitly*. [88a] |

120. [Ed.] See Johann Friedrich von Meyer, *Die heilige Schrift: Berichtigte Übersetzung mit kurzen Anmerkungen* (Frankfurt, 1819). Note 6 to Gen. 3:22: "Cf. 1:16; the eternal man, Christ, is to be understood."

121. *W₂ reads:* Involved in this is the promise and certainty of the regained likeness of God.

122. *Ms. margin:* (This first [point] is the wrath of God)

β. [*Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ*]

(α) [*The Idea of Divine-Human Unity*]. The second [moment], however, is the elevation of spirit out of its natural will, out of evil, out of the willing of singular selfishness, out of every type of restriction whatsoever, and therefore also [out of the restriction] of religion [itself as] finite religion. This elevation consists generally in the fact that humanity comes to consciousness of the universal in and for itself, and indeed is conscious of it as *its* essence; [humanity comes to] consciousness of *its own* infinity as having being substantially in and for itself. One moment is as essential as the other, absolute objectivity as well as infinite subjectivity. Belonging to self without seeking for self is the infinite form of consciousness, and without self-seeking [it is] precisely universality. God as spirit, who is infinite subjectivity, infinite determinacy within himself, is both the absolute truth and the absolute goal of the will. That is to say, the particular subject as such recognizes this goal to be its own universal goal—infinite freedom—and makes it as such its own as this particular subject. (‘[Here we have] absolute truth as an object: objectivity with absolute form, absolute spirit, inward process; [we have absolute truth] as a subject: infinite subjectivity, absolute form with infinite inward value, infinite inward purpose.’)

By consciousness of the unity of divine and human nature we mean that humanity implicitly bears within itself the *divine idea*, not bearing it within itself like something from somewhere else but as its own substantial nature, (as its own vocation or the unique possibility of such a vocation: this infinite possibility is its subjectivity.) (α) In this consciousness humanity knows (the divine idea,) the universal, and [knows] itself to be determined for the universal, i.e., elevated above all locality, nationality, condition, life-situation, etc. Human beings [are] equal; slavery [is] intolerable; [there is] worth and absolute validity only in this perspective. (β) Humanity’s vocation [is] in | the spiritual [realm], its goal is a universal goal, it is in itself utterly fulfilled, and all that matters here is that the subject should bring itself into conformity with it, i.e., that the subject should (α) know or intuit that it has the possibility of an infinite value within itself, and that (β) it should actually give itself this value; (‘[but it is] not its *merit* to produce the good, the divine

idea.) [88b] This consciousness *consummates religion as the cognition of God as spirit*, for God is spirit in the process of differentiation (and return,) which we [have] seen in the eternal idea.¹²³ This means that the unity of divine and human nature has a significance not only for the definition of human nature but just as much for that of the divine. This is because all differentiation, all finitude, though it is a transitory moment, is a moment of the process of the divine nature, which it develops, and hence it [is] grounded within the divine nature itself.

(β) [*Appearance of the Idea in a Single Individual*]. ~This cognition constitutes the highest stage of the spiritual being of humanity, i.e., of its religious determination. This is the vocation of humanity as human in general, to enter wholly into the consciousness of human finitude—the ray of eternal life that shines clearly for it within the finite.

This cognition must therefore^{~124} come to it. (It comes to us as humanity in general, i.e., without our being especially conditioned by a particular locality or culture, but just as we are immediately) in the mode of religious consciousness in general. This cognition must [come] to us [in such a way] that it actually can be empirically universal, universal for immediate consciousness. For the immediate consciousness this can only happen as the demonstration of the unity [of divine and human nature] to it in a wholly temporal, completely ordinary worldly appearance | in a single human being—
 47 this one man who is known at the same time as the divine idea, (not as a teacher,) not merely as a higher being in general, but as the highest [idea], as the Son of God.

What is involved here is this intuitive certainty, not a divine teacher—not to mention a mere moral instructor, or even a teacher of the [philosophical] idea; and it is not a matter of representation or persuasion, but rather the *immediate* certainty and presence of divinity. For immediate certainty of [divine] presence is the infinite

123. [Ed.] See above, p. 86.

124. *W₂ reads:* If, on the contrary, the consciousness of the unity of divine and human nature, of this determinate characteristic of humanity as humanity in general, has to be *given* to humanity, or if this cognition has to penetrate fully into the consciousness of human finitude as the ray of eternal life that shines clearly for it within the finite, then it must

form, the way in which the "Is" [*das Ist*] is for natural consciousness.¹²⁵ All mediation through feelings, representation[s], or rational grounds lacks this "Is," which returns [to us] only in philosophical cognition by way of the concept, in the element of universality; hence [philosophy] has something in common [with immediate certainty].¹²⁶

⟨The "Is" of truth as it is for immediate consciousness [is] the infinite form; the other is the infinite content. The "Is" of feeling, of the heart, concerns the content. The "Is" [is] a moment, [there is] no form without content. [It is] not what [simply] "is" [that] is true, the absolute idea [is] for itself (ontological proof of the existence of God). Solely for the idea is this "Is" the form of truth—but not as though the "Is" gives a content, a particular truth.⟩ [89a]

This is a point of the greatest importance. [The idea is present] (α) *implicitly or in itself*,¹²⁷ God's objectivity | realized¹²⁸—realized in the whole of humanity immediately: "from the chalice of the entire realm of spirits foams forth to him infinitude."¹²⁹ ¹³⁰ ⟨In [Goethe's] *Divan*, p. 117) —Timur, millions of souls, roses:

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125. *W₂ adds*: This "Is" eradicates all traces of mediation; it is the culminating point, the final source of illumination that was previously missing.

126. *W₂ reads*: The divine is not to be grasped merely as a universal thought or as something inward, merely subsisting in itself. The objectification of the divine is not to be grasped merely as something that is present in all human beings, for then it would be understood merely as the plurality of the spiritual in general; and the development that absolute spirit has in itself and that has to advance to the form of the "Is," of immediacy, would not be contained in it.

127. *Ms. margin*: ((β) explicitly or for itself, (γ) [in its] consummate development) [Ed.] This is an anticipation of points β and γ, which are developed below.

128. *W₂ reads*: This idea and the objectivity of God are also real implicitly in the process in which other-being sublates itself, and indeed are

129. [Ed.] From the concluding stanza of Friedrich Schiller's poem "Die Freundschaft" (1782):

Freundlos war der grosse Weltenmeister
Fühlte *Mangel*—darum schuf er Geister
Sel'ge Spiegel *seiner* Seligkeit!—
Fand das höchste Wesen schon kein Gleiches,
Aus dem Kelch des ganzen Seelenreiches
Schäumt *ihm*—die Unendlichkeit.

(Cf. Schiller, *Werke: Nationalausgabe*, vol. 1 [Weimar, 1943], p. 111.) Hegel's formulation here holds the mean between Schiller's text and Hegel's quotation of these lines at the conclusion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 493 (GW 9:434): "From

(To possess a tiny flask,
 Which forever holds the scent,
 Slender as thy fingertips—
 For this a world is needed,
 A world of love-impulses,
 Which in the fullness of their striving
 Reproved already the nightingale's loves,
 Its soul-stirring song.)
 (Ought such torment to afflict us,
 Since it enhances our desire?
 Has not Timur's dominion
 Consumed myriads of souls?)¹³¹

(The idea [is realized] (β) *for humanity*; [its] appearance and
 existence [occur] only in this *single individual*. ($\alpha\alpha$) [We have] al-

the chalice of this realm of spirits / Foams forth to him his own infinitude." In both cases, Hegel substitutes *Geisterreiches* (realm of spirits) for *Seelenreiches* (realm of souls).

130. W, *adds*: The anguish that the finite senses in being thus sublated is not anguish, since it is by this means raised to a moment in the process of the divine.

131. [Ed.] J. W. von Goethe, *West-Östlicher Divan*, Buch des Timur, Poem 2, "An Suleika" (*Goethes Werke* [Hamburg, 1949], 2:61):

Um ein Fläschchen zu besitzen,
 Das den Ruch auf ewig hält,
 Schlank wie deine Fingerspitzen,
 Da bedarf es einer Welt.

Einer Welt von Lebenstrieben,
 Die in ihrer Fülle Drang
 Ahndeten schon Bulbuls Lieben,
 Seelerregenden Gesang.

Sollte jene Qual uns quälen,
 Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt?
 Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen
 Timurs Herrschaft aufgezehrt?

In line 3, Hegel writes *diese* (these) instead of *deine* (thy); in line 5 *Liebestrieben* (love-impulses) instead of *Lebenstrieben* (life-impulses). Bulbul (line 7) is the Persian name for "nightingale." Hegel omits the first stanza of "An Suleika," which reads as follows:

Dir mit Wohlgeruch zu kosen,
 Deine Freuden zu erhöh'n,
 Knospend müssen tausend Rosen
 Erst in Glut untergehn.

To caress thee with a fragrant scent,
 To heighten thy delights,
 Budding, a thousand roses
 Must first be burned to ashes.

ready seen the principle of individuality in the Greek ideal,¹³² and there, of course, [it is] for the intuiting self-consciousness. [Then God reveals himself as] the One [in the religion] of the Jews, in thought, not in intuition; for this reason [the Jewish God does] not attain to the consummation of spirit. "To attain the consummation of spirit" means precisely that subjectivity should offer itself up as infinite: this absolute antithesis is the outermost extremity of spiritual appearance and negative, infinite return; [that is, it is] subjectivity, and precisely *this* subjectivity; [it is] an individual for the intuiting consciousness. [The idea is realized] ($\beta\beta$) for humanity [as] an individual, unlike the Greek ideal (α) of a stone or metal, or (β) an ideal individuality. The latter lacks precisely the universal infinity that is in and for [itself]. [It is] not a question merely of a living being; the universal posited as universal is found only in the subjectivity of consciousness, [and in fact is] only this infinite inward movement in | which all determinateness of existence is simultaneously resolved and [posited] in the most finite existence. Only in

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Goethe's *West-östlicher Divan*, a collection of poems interweaving Oriental and Occidental themes, was published in 1819, two years before Hegel's lecture manuscript; the poem "An Suleika," the second of two poems making up the "Book of Timur," was written in 1815. Timur or Tamburlaine (1336–1405) was an infamous Oriental conqueror who subjugated parts of Persia, Russia, India, and Syria. Suleika is the Persian name by which Goethe addresses one of his lovers, Marianne von Willemer. As is the case with many of Goethe's lovers, she is an embodiment of a divine or cosmic lover. Hence in a sense the poem is addressed to God, and the meaning appears to be that just as Timur destroyed myriads of human beings to gain a kingdom, so the perfume-maker consumes thousands of roses to produce a tiny flask of fragrant scent; likewise an entire world is needed to offer up a love worthy of God. By juxtaposing this poem with the line from Schiller, and by highlighting the words "Timur," "millions of souls," and "roses," Hegel seems to be saying that from the anguish or suffering (the "chalice") of this whole human world there "foams forth to God" his own infinite love.

W_2 omits the poem except for two lines ("Ought such torment to afflict us, / Since it enhances our desires?"), which support the variant contained in n. 130. If the source of the variant is *Hn*, Hegel may have omitted quoting from the poem when lecturing (except for the two lines), thus focusing his interpretative comment on the line from Schiller. On the other hand, the variant and the omission of the poem may have been due to the editor, B. Bauer. When the poem as a whole is quoted, it conveys a somewhat different sense from that of the variant in W_2 , if our reading of it is correct. The point is not so much that the anguish in being sublated is not *really* anguish (although this *also* is true) as that it is the *entire* realm of spirits which is needed to give up to God his own *infinitude*.

132. [Ed.] See Vol. 2, Ms. sheet 56b.

the latter as subjectivity [is there found] an intuition of infinite universality, i.e., of thinking that is for itself. Thus the idea [appears] directly as the same sort of nature as the rest of humanity; [it is] an ordinary finite being, and as an individual is at the same time exclusive, is on its own account something wholly different [from other individuals, just] as every subject [exists] for itself, objectively; [hence] other individuals are not already themselves this divine idea. (γγ)¹³³ This individual is *unique*; [there are] not several [like the Lamas]. In one, all [are encompassed]; in several, divinity becomes an abstraction. [This individual appears] utterly and exclusively other over against them all, in order that they might be reconstituted.)

But [the idea is realized] (γ) for humanity only in the form of *this* single individual, and only *one* such individual—"this" individual—[is] the *infinite* unity ([in this] subjectivity, in a "this" [of this kind]). In [comprehending] the *singular* (as in the particular judgment¹³⁴) [as] *several* (in the same way as with the Hindus [the deity has several] incarnations), [I have] precisely this prosaic inner rigidity of self-consciousness [such as posits more than one "this"]. It is only *then* [when I posit only one "this" that the unity is] objective, that [the idea is] in and for itself for the first time.¹³⁵ [It is] not that a few are chosen—[that is] the Calvinist view, a matter of unfortunate fate. [Likewise, it is] superfluous [to posit] several:

133. [Ed.] This (γγ) summarizes the theme of the next paragraph, namely, that only *one* single, unique individual is the ultimate appearance of universality. The primary theme of the present paragraph, elaborated under (αα) and (ββ), is that individual subjectivity *as such* is the true form in which universality appears. Hegel altered the arrangement of his argument by adding the whole of paragraph (β) in the margin. What was initially a two-step analysis—presence of the idea implicitly or in the whole of humanity immediately (par. α), and its realization for humanity in the form of *this one* individual (par. γ, initially β)—becomes a three-step analysis, attending, in the middle step, to the *principle* of individuality (marginal par. β. αα. ββ).

134. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 645–647 (GW 12:73–74).

135. [Ed.] This passage is unusually fragmented and complex in the original. Our construal of it depends partly on reading *sowie* rather than *so wie* (the Ms. can be read either way). The German text is as follows: "Aber (γ) für sie nur als in diesem Einzelnen, und NUR EIN solcher Dieser eben die unendliche Einheit – Subjektivität – in diesem; sowie Eins – als im particulären Urteil – Einige (wie bei den Indern Inkarnationen) – eben diese prosaische Festigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins in sich, in diese Einzelnen; so objektiv – gerade dann erst an und für sich."

superfluous here means counter to the concept of individual subjectivity. *Once is always*.¹³⁶ The subject must have recourse to a subject, without option. To make this one into its holy one also has a local and exclusive occasion. In the eternal idea [there is] only one Son, one only exclusive of other finite beings—not in and for himself but eternal love.

⟨The consummation of reality in immediate singular individuality [is] the most beautiful point of the Christian religion. For the first time the absolute transfiguration [of finitude is] intuitively exhibited [so that everyone can] give an account of it and have an awareness of it.⟩ [89b]

⟨(γ)⟩¹³⁷ [*The Teaching of Christ*]. The next question [is this]: By what means does this individual attest | to others that he is the divine idea? This question belongs to the transition to the formation of the community,¹³⁸ ⟨similarly, [we shall speak] of miracles later on.¹³⁹⟩ “The Spirit will guide you into all truth” [John 16:13], says Christ. The representation of some sort of spectacular verification in nature—a conversion or success—or in the Spirit as divine power, something external, would be much more apt to result in a spiritless condition. And [it would] be a spiritless plea to say that his being and faith in him would [by this means] be raised beyond all doubt.

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¹⁴⁰His teaching, however, belongs to his appearance [as] a free relationship of spiritual consciousness to spiritual consciousness. But since it is a question of the appearance of spirit in immediate existence and for immediate intuition, it is the divine idea as por-

136. [Ed.] Hegel here apparently is alluding to the Pauline christology. See 2 Cor. 5:14–15: “For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised.”

137. Ms. adds in margin: ⟨Process of this individual – [how] the idea takes its course in him so that his temporal presence is able to be a presentation of the idea – teaching – life – suffering – and death – and resurrection – ⟩

138. [Ed.] See below, pp. 133–142.

139. [Ed.] See below, pp. 144–149.

140. Ms. margin: ⟨(α) Teaching: (α) The universal and divine brought [to expression] by him in thoughts, in mind; for it is thought, is capable of being portrayed for intuition. – But the remaining action, the remaining reversal – (β) The actual – precisely what remains belongs to the emergence, the actuality – ⟩

trayed in [the whole of] his life and destiny that is integrated by his teaching. The teaching taken by itself alone affects only one's impressions [*Vorstellung*], one's inner feeling and disposition; it does not give this content as a story [*Geschichte*] for immediate consciousness.

By itself, the teaching can contain only the universal, the universal soil, since it exists for subjective representation, (for thoughts. Conversely, the universal as such can be only in inwardness, only in thought, not as an external reality;) inwardness is the subjectivity of the idea. This universal soil is the element, the world, in which spirit must find its homeland; it is by virtue of this that humanity [has] its worth, its infinitude, an absolute worth in inwardness, in the spirit as such. (Humanity [must] prepare this soil for itself inwardly.) [This is] an elevation into a quite other and higher sphere.

51 The universal soil | is the *heavenly kingdom*, the *kingdom of God*—a substantial, intelligible world in which all values that are sought in earthly, mundane things are cast away. ([It occurs] as a state of affairs; [it is] not God alone, the One, but rather a *kingdom of God*, the eternal as a homeland for spirit, the eternal as the dwelling place of subjectivity.) This elevation is brought before the representation with infinite energy, summoning and stimulating the inward element of the soul. [90a]

~Jesus appeared on the scene in the Roman world and among the Jewish people in particular. This people, more stiff-necked than ever in its religion, because of the way its form of worship was endangered and harmed under the domination of the Syrian kings and the Romans, had fallen low.^{~141} The Romans, in contrast, [enjoyed] the imperial lordship of the world. Jesus appeared when the common people were without counsel [from their leaders, and said] (Matt. 11:25): "I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes." ([His words are] addressed to people

141. *W₂ reads:* Jesus appeared on the scene at a time when the Jewish people, because of the danger to which its form of worship had been and still was exposed, was more stubbornly absorbed than ever in its religion, and at the same time was compelled to despair at reality since it had come into contact with a universal dimension of human existence, which it could no longer deny, and which nevertheless was completely spiritless—in short,

who were done with the world and with whom the world was done. [Let us] Jews rid [ourselves] of all the debris [of the past], which can no longer be of help to us and cannot make itself effective. [The Jews] despair at reality, [but they are in] touch with a universal dimension of human existence, which they could not deny, but which nonetheless is a completely spiritless universality.¹⁴² [89b]

⟨Three aspects of this teaching [are to be] distinguished: (a) [In] the Sermon on the Mount⟩ (Matt. 5:3[-8]), [he says:] “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [90a] Blessed are those who mourn, for | they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. . . . Blessed are ⟨the pure in heart, for they shall see God,⟩” and so on.

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~In all of this there is a language of inspiration that displaces all other human interests, eradicating them completely—penetrating tones that shake the very foundations; and, as Hermes leads souls forth from their bodies, so [Christ] leads us out of the temporal sphere.¹⁴³ ⟨Christ speaks further of the Mosaic dispensation of the law [Matt. 5:20 ff.]. The sum and substance is that this type of service, this enslavement, this external activity has no worth. ~Only *intention* [*Gesinnung*] imparts infinite worth to activity; however, it is not an abstract intention but the true, inward intention that issues in a true activity.¹⁴⁴ “Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well” ⟨(Matt. 6:33)⟩.

Throughout these exaltations his sadness over the lost condition of his people and of humanity is conveyed. In brief, his teaching is a complete abstraction from what is regarded in the world as

142. [Ed.] This paragraph, which is found on the middle of sheet 90a, is transposed ahead of the next three paragraphs by reference marks.

143. *W₂ reads:* This is proclaimed in the language of inspiration, in such penetrating tones as to shake the soul, and, as Hermes, the Leader of Souls, did, to draw it out of the body and bear it away beyond the temporal into its eternal home.

[Ed.] Hegel here alludes to one of the meanings Hermes had for Homer and later poets, where he is the Leader not only of the living but of the departed souls; see, e.g., Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 1547; Homer, *Odyssey* 14.1–10, 11.626.

144. *W₂ reads:* And it is only intention [*Gesinnung*] that imparts value—but not an abstract intention, not this or that opinion, but rather absolute intention, which has its basis in the kingdom of God. In this connection, the infinite value of inwardness first comes into view.

great—(an elevation to a heaven within, access to which is open to everyone, and in comparison with which everything else counts for nothing.)

53 This universal divine heaven within, this substantial element, leads in [his] more specific reflection[s] to moral and other imperatives, which are nothing other than particular prescriptions in specific | circumstances and situations. But even these imperatives have a restricted range, on the one hand, and on the other hand they are nothing exceptional ~for this stage, which is concerned with something higher, the absolute truth. (The moral imperative can be expressed as love—not what is legally right but the well-being of the other, hence a relationship to the particularity of the other, and to my sensibility.) The most outstanding and at the same time comprehensive teaching of Christ is, as is well known, *love*, and indeed:¹⁴⁵ “Love your neighbor” [Matt. 22:36-40]. In its abstract, more extensive connotation, as love of humankind in general, [90b] [this commandment] prescribes the love of all humanity—and thus it becomes a lame abstraction. The human beings whom one can love are a few particular individuals. The heart that seeks to embrace the whole of humanity within itself indulges in a vain attempt to spread out its love until it becomes a mere pretense [*Vorstellung*], the very opposite of what love is.

54 Love in Christ’s sense [is]: (α) moral love for one’s neighbor in the particular circumstances in which one is related to him; ~ (β) the love that | is the relationship, the bond among the apostles, [who are] one in love. [It is] not [the case that] each [of them has] a particular occupation, interest, or way of life and then in addition [is] loving. Rather [they are] singled out and removed [from all others], and love [constitutes] the very center of their being. (Love of enemies is also contained here [Matt. 5:44]. [The disciples] are supposed to love and nothing else; they are to renounce everything else. [They are] to make only this unity, this community in and for itself their goal—not the liberation of humanity [as] a political goal—and [they are] to love one another for its sake. (We do have

145. W₂ reads: or else they are already contained in other religions and in the Jewish religion. These imperatives are gathered together and focused in the commandment of love, which has as its goal not the legal right but the well-being of the other, and is thus a relationship to the particularity of the other.

objective goals of this kind, and we love for their sake, or are indifferent, or hate. Varying definitions of the goal itself and of the means [to it] are possible. Division immediately [arises] in regard to this objectivity; [there is] a fixation upon goals, and a parting of the ways for subjectivity, which is particularized.) But love is the abstract personality [of the community] and its identity in *one* consciousness; no possibility of particularity remains.) This independent love, which is made the midpoint [of all the commandments], then immediately becomes the higher, divine love itself—the ground, the¹⁴⁶ calling [*Bestimmung*] of the Holy Spirit.

(β) The second aspect of this teaching is this breaking away in the negative sense from everything established—(just this love as such, being without an objective goal, without any goal as such, [is a breaking away]. At first [Christ directs himself] against the established order of Judaism (see the Sermon on the Mount). [There is] the picking of corn on the Sabbath, and the healing of a withered hand,¹⁴⁷ which could have waited until the next morning.¹⁴⁸ [All such ordinances are brought to an end by his proclamation:] “The kingdom of heaven is at hand”—as an actual state of affairs (Matt. 10:7).) [This proclamation is,] so to speak, sansculottism,¹⁴⁹ or, in the Oriental perspective, revolutionary.

(αα) “Consider the lilies of the field—and the birds—they neither

146. Ms. possibly reads: the ground of the

147. [Ed.] See Matt. 12:1–13.

148. W₂ reads: but above all it is meant to express the relationship between his disciples and followers, the bond in which they are one. And here it is not to be understood in such a way that each of them has a particular occupation, interest, and way of life, and then in addition is loving; rather, this love, as something apart that abstracts from all else, is to be the midpoint in which they live and have their occupation. They are to love one another, nothing else, and consequently they are not to have any particular end in view, family ends, political ends, nor are they to love because of these particular ends. Love is rather the abstract personality [of the community] and its identity in *one* consciousness, where no possibility for particular ends remains. Here, therefore, there is no other objective end than this love. This independent love, which is made the midpoint [of all the commandments], finally becomes the higher, divine love itself.

At first, however, this love as such, which as yet has no objective end, is directed polemically against the established order, especially against the established order of Judaism. All those actions commanded by the law, by means of which people established their worth apart from love, are declared to be dead, and Christ himself heals on the Sabbath.

149. [Ed.] A reference to the radical republicans of the French Revolution.

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sow nor reap, and your heavenly Father cares for them.” Matt. 6:31: “Therefore, do not be anxious for the morrow, saying, ‘What shall we eat?’ or ‘What shall we drink?’ or ‘What shall we wear?’ The Gentiles ([for whom] such cares are appropriate) seek all these things.”¹⁵⁰ Even beggars are anxious about the coming day, for they have their place [to worry about]. Only thieves and soldiers are capable of this lack of anxiety; thieves know that tomorrow they will find [what they want]. | [He said to] the young man who came to him: “Give what you have to the poor and follow me” [cf. Matt. 19:21].

(ββ) Or [he preaches a breaking away from one’s] family. Matt. 12:46[-50]: “While he was still speaking with the people, his mother and his brothers stood outside, asking to speak to him. Someone told him, ‘Your mother and your brothers are standing outside, asking to speak to you.’ But he replied to the man who told him, ‘Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?’ And stretching out his hand toward his disciples, he said, ‘Here are my mother and my brothers! For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother, and sister, and mother.’” (Or Matt. 8:21[-22]: “Another of his disciples said to him, ‘Lord, let me first go and bury my father.’ But Jesus said to him, ‘Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their own dead.’”)

⟨[There is] no mention of the state. “Render to Caesar” [(Matt. 22:21), he says, but] the consequences [are] not dealt with.⟩

⟨[Yet there is] the well-known passage, Matt. 10:34[-37]: “Do not think that I have come to bring peace [on] earth, but a sword. For I have come to set [parents] against son, son against parents, brother against brother, a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother; and a man’s foes will be those of his own household. He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he who loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.”¹⁵¹ [91a]

150. [Ed.] The first quotation is a conflation of Matt. 6:28 (“lilies”) and 6:26 (“birds”). The second quotation conflates the beginning of Matt. 6:34 with 6:31–32.

151. [Ed.] Hegel has conflated elements of Matt. 10:21 and Luke 12:53 with this passage.

In this sense, social groups and bodies will always arise among a people—among a people, a community, that [shuts] itself off, in the world too, in opposition to rational cohesion and existence—[sects that] take this distillation of the entire established order back into the simple heart, into simple love, ~and | behave outwardly in merely a forbearing, submissive manner, offering their necks [to the executioner]. (<[We find this] among the Muhammadans, especially in Africa.>) But it is impossible to remain in this withdrawn state, for the latter represents the fanatic beginning of suffering and forbearance, whose inner energy will rise after a time to an equally fanatic act of violence when it has gained sufficient strength.¹⁵² 56

(γ) The third aspect of the teaching of Christ has to do with the more precise definition or the proper definition and determinacy of the kingdom of God, i.e., with the relationship of Christ himself to God and of humanity to God and Christ. (In this exaltation of his spirit,¹⁵³ he said: “Woman, your sins are forgiven” [Luke 7:48]—this awful majesty of spirit, which can make all that has been done to be undone and declare outright that this [has] come about.>) His being sent from God [is thereby manifest]. He states very specifically his identity with the Father: “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30). (<“Then the Jews took up stones to stone him” [John 10:31].>) “All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him” [Matt. 11:27]. “The Father loves the Son, and has given all things into his hand. He who believes in the Son has eternal life; he who does not believe the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God rests on him” (John 3:35[-36]).¹⁵⁴

~Christ also refers to himself as the Son of Man¹⁵⁵—like a son

152. *W₂ reads:* Indeed, if at the beginning this suffering appears outwardly to be only a matter of forbearance, of submission, of offering one's neck, after a time its inner energy, when it has grown stronger, will be directed outwardly in an equally fierce act of violence.

153. *W₂ adds:* and in the certainty of his identity with God

154. [*Ed.*] The biblical text reads “does not obey” instead of “does not believe.”

155. [*Ed.*] Hegel's statement fails to recognize the eschatological character of this title, which stems from Jewish apocalypticism and is not at all used in the sense claimed by Hegel.

57 of the Ababda.¹⁵⁶ All [are] one stem, not this or that single individual, but | a member, one of the Ababda as such; [and thus] one man [is] humanity as such.

In these and other passages, the question is not whether exegesis [can] of itself flatten out these expressions, [as for instance by] piously [explaining that Jesus was] well-pleasing to God, and that all [human beings are] God's children, just as all the stones <and animals> [are his] creation. Rather [the words of Christ confirm] the truth of the idea, what he [has] been for his community; [they confirm] too the higher idea <of truth,> which [has] been in him in his community.^{~157} [91b]

⟨(δ) *The Life and Death [of Christ].*⟩ ~With reference to such teachings, we suppose at the outset—<this [is] nothing speculative>—that the life of this teacher is in conformity with them; not only this, but also that his life is completely devoted to them, that he does not shun the hazards and the death that he must expect because of what he has begun among his people. [It] will be found appropriate that he seals his faith by his death—which is not much [to expect] in any case and is shared [by him] with a host of others. <[This is only what is] abstractly fitting: that is, the content, action, and deeds of this life are defined by that content. [Everywhere we get] an unwavering view of one and the same content.⟩^{~158}

156. [Ed.] The Ababda are one of the Beja tribes of North African Arabs, probably the Gebadei of Pliny and the Troglodytes of classical writers. The Ababda called themselves "sons of the Jinns." W deciphers *Ababda* as *Araber* (see n. 157), which is either a mistake or an attempt to clarify an obscure reference. The source of Hegel's information is unknown.

157. W reads: Christ refers to himself as the Son of God and the Son of Man. These titles are to be taken in their strict meaning. The Arabs mutually describe one another as the son of a certain tribe. Christ belongs to the human race; this is his tribe. Christ is also the Son of God; it is possible to explain away by exegesis the true sense of this expression, [W₂ adds: the truth of the idea, what Christ has been for his community, and the higher idea of the truth that has been in him in his community,] and to say that all human children are children of God, or are meant to make themselves children of God, and so on.

158. W₂ reads: At the outset the primary point is the abstract correspondence between the action, deeds, and sufferings of this teacher and his teaching itself, namely, that his life is completely devoted to it, that he has not shunned death and by death has sealed his faith.

But here life and death have another, quite different relation to the teaching [of Christ]. Its content is the kingdom of God—not a universal essence but a living, spiritual life, a | divine community. 58
 ((αα) The teaching as such [is] the universal form of the content—the kingdom of God, the first, eternal idea itself, but in concrete terms. (ββ) The kingdom of God—or spirit—is to move from the universal to determinacy, to pass over into actuality. This movement, the process of determining, takes place in the life of Jesus. The eternal idea is precisely what allows the category of subjectivity to appear immediately as something actual, distinct from mere thoughts. It is what makes the distinct actuality come to itself ([in its] actualization), and only as thus actualized is it the kingdom of God.) ~This kingdom of God is linked with individuals (who are supposed to attain to the kingdom) through that *one* individual. The kingdom is the universal idea still presented in representational form; it enters into actuality through this individual, and the history of spirit, the concrete content of the kingdom of God, has to portray itself in this divine actuality.¹⁵⁹ (And since the kingdom of God is represented to us as the teaching of a divine individual, the divinity of Christ is at first only implicit. He is the God-man for spirit only as the process of spirit constitutes itself as such. The God-man has to manifest himself in order that he may represent the progress of the idea and be the manifestation of its absolute content, its determinate forms—in order that this absolute content may be manifest, as it were an allegorical or symbolic portrayal of the content—[such is this] teaching as such.)

This portrayal—this objectivity of the intuition of the history of spirit—shows that spirit in itself, which is other than itself [as] the natural will and existence [of humanity], sublates this its other-being, and that it now is for itself in all its glory—namely | issuing 59

159. *W₂ reads:* Since the teaching of Christ, taken by itself alone, concerns only representation, inner feeling and disposition, it is supplemented by the portrayal of the divine idea in his life and fate. The kingdom of God, as the content of his teaching, is at first the universal idea still presented in representational form; but it enters into actuality through this individual, so that those who are to attain this kingdom can do so only through this one individual.

[Ed.] Note the contrast, both in this variant and in the text of the Ms., between “representation” (*Vorstellung*) and “portrayal” (*Darstellung*).

forth to be spirit through this history. What constitutes this intuition is the history of this spirit, a process transpiring in the modes of finitude, the history of spirit in this peculiar medium, namely that of external, common human existence. Since it is the divine idea that courses through this history, it occurs not as the history of a single individual alone, but rather it is implicitly the history of actual humanity as it constitutes itself as the existence of spirit. [92a]

⟨The teaching and the love with which he conducted himself belong to the previous point about fittingness.¹⁶⁰ Our present point concerns his ordinary life as something external and existent.⟩

⟨The life of Christ [is] a natural, ordinary life and existence; accordingly, his death is the natural negativity whose inner core is unmediated dual opposition.⟩

⟨Thus the kingdom of God has its representative (i.e., the mode of its existence) initially in this existing human being. This existence is a natural, ordinary life, which shows [itself] to be imprisoned in the needs of ordinary human life, and in these limits [consists] finitude. But the highest limit, the supreme finitization, is death, and this human being [experienced death].⟩

This invests the death of Christ with this more precise significance:¹⁶¹ (αα) [As] the seal of his teaching, as what befits it, [his death] is morally, formally grand, [but it is] not a moment of the divine idea. It is the latter (ββ) under the aspect that death is the highest pinnacle of finitude. If the unity of divine and human nature is to be envisaged in one present individual, then incarnation, as immediate existence in the form of finitude, constitutes this aspect just as much as does the immediate existence, the divestment of the universal, of the divine—(but a divestment of itself such that it still is in this divestment, not like the external world over against consciousness—this [is] nature | in the [perspective of finite] purpose.) It is this immediate existence, inasmuch as it is the divine idea become subjective; it portrays the unity [of the divine and the human] to itself therein, and it is at the same time the cleavage, the other-being.

However, the pinnacle of finitude is not actual life in its temporal course, but rather death, the anguish of death; death is the pinnacle

160. [Ed.] See above, p. 122.

161. Ms. margin: (becoming-other of the divine)

of negation, the most abstract and indeed natural negation, the limit, finitude in its highest extreme. The temporal and complete existence of the divine idea in the present is envisaged only in [Christ's] death.¹⁶²

⟨(α) The highest divestment of the divine idea—as divestment of itself, i.e., [the idea that] is in addition this divestment—is expressed as follows: “God has died, God himself is dead.”¹⁶³ [This] is a monstrous, fearful picture [*Vorstellung*], which brings before the imagination the deepest abyss of cleavage.

But (β) at the same time this death is) to this extent the highest love. [It is] precisely love [that is] the consciousness [of] the identity of the divine and the human, and this finitization is carried to its extreme, to death. Thus here [we find] an envisagement of the unity [of the divine and the human] at its absolute peak, the highest intuition of love. For love [consists] in giving up one's personality, all that is one's own, etc. [It is] a self-conscious activity, the supreme surrender [of oneself] in the other, even in this most extrinsic other-being of death, the death of the absolute representative of the limits of life. The death of Christ [is] the vision of this love itself—not [love merely] for or on behalf of others, but precisely *divinity* in this universal identity with other-being, death. The monstrous unification of these absolute extremes is love itself—[this is] the speculative intuition. |

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(γ)¹⁶⁴ [(α)] The speculative [aspect] is that the Son¹⁶⁵ goes to death as the divine (the presupposition [is that there is] a reversal in death)—he who is, on his own, the absolute love. However, this speculative meaning is to be considered in its universal meaning.

162. Ms. margin: ⟨Death (α) in the divine idea – immediate⟩

163. [Ed.] From the second stanza of the passion hymn “O Traurigkeit, O Herzeleid” by Johannes Rist (1641):

O grosse Not!
Gott selbst liegt tot.
Am Kreuz ist er gestorben;
hat dadurch das Himmelreich
uns aus Lieb' erworben.

O great woe!
God himself lies dead.
On the cross he has died;
And thus he has gained for us
By love the kingdom of heaven.

164. Ms. canceled: ⟨(But this love is what is universal, abstract – love in itself, and its reflection – is reality)⟩

165. Ms. reads: death

[It is] death in respect of spirit impinging on spirit, and as, [at the same time,] a moment of spirit. <(<β>) Death [is] a moment in connection with the more determinate concept of spirit.>

On the basis of this death the assertion is justified that Christ [was] given *for us*, [and that his death] may be represented as a sacrificial death, as the act of absolute satisfaction. The common objection to this way of representing it [is] that all individuals must answer for themselves and for their own deeds; others cannot atone for them, nor can they receive absolution in that way. From the standpoint of formal justice this is indeed the case, i.e., from the standpoint according to which the subject is viewed as an individual person. Here this standpoint does not apply (<but at the same time [should be] considered more closely). The other standpoint appears to have a specific meaning that is distant from us. <[Let us consider] now the meaning of this death.> In order to explain this speculative reversal in regard to it, in order to get to this point, [we must] consider [it] more closely in the concrete sense.

In general, death is both the extreme limit of finitude and at the same time the sublation [92b] of natural finitude, of immediate existence, the overcoming of divestment, the dissolution of limitation. ~[Death is] the moment of spirit¹⁶⁶ in which it grasps itself inwardly, the moment of perishing to the natural, of infinite abstraction from the immediacy of volition and consciousness—submerging itself within itself and taking only its determinations | ~ and its being, all that has worth and validity for it, out of this pit. <Its being, its true essence, [is] precisely absolute universality itself, which appears as love [in] religion, just as it does in sensibility.>¹⁶⁷

<(<γ>) Although death appears here as natural death,> this death, this suffering, the anguish of death, <is> the element of the reconciliation of spirit with itself, with what it is and contains implicitly. This negative moment, which pertains only to spirit as such, is its inner conversion and transformation. <Death is not portrayed and

166. *W₂ reads:* This sublation of the natural is to be comprehended in the spiritual essentially as the movement of spirit

167. *W₂ reads:* and its true essence and absolute universality, out of this pit. What is valid for it, what is valuable to it, it has only in this sublation of its natural being and willing.

accomplished here in its concrete significance; at first it is) represented as a natural death. In the divine idea, (this negation) can be portrayed in (no) other way: it is the external portrayal of the history of spirit in the natural state. In the process of actualization of the divine idea, evil can only have in it the modality of the natural. Hence the return [of spirit to itself can occur] only in the manner of a natural death.¹⁶⁸

⟨(δ) But although [it is] a natural death, [this is] the death of God, and now its relevance for us, how we are placed in relation to it, [must be considered]:) this death is one that makes satisfaction for us because it presents the absolute history of the divine idea as a history that has taken place in itself and happens eternally. That the single human being does something, achieves something, that [a certain] goal is attained, is grounded in the fact that the thing itself, in its concept, behaves in this way. Thus my eating an apple means that I destroy its organic self-identity and assimilate it to myself. That I can do this | entails that the apple in itself (already in advance, before I take hold of it) has in its nature the character of being subject to destruction, and at the same time it is something that has in itself a homogeneity with my digestive organs such that I can make it homogeneous with myself. That the criminal can be punished by the judge, and that this [punishment] [93a] is the carrying out of the law, its satisfaction, is not something accomplished by the judge, nor by the criminal through his suffering (the punishment) as a particular, external occurrence or consequence. This is not¹⁶⁹ an accidental sequence of occurrences, [which] thus comes accidentally to that conclusion; rather what happens is the nature of the thing that the law expresses, (the necessity of the concept.) We have this process before us in a double way—on the one hand, in our thought or imagining of the law and concept; on the other hand, in the single case. In the latter, the process proceeds in such and such a way because this is the nature of the matter, without which there would be neither the judge nor his action, neither

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168. *W₂ adds*: The divine idea can advance only to this determination of the natural.

169. [*Ed.*] *es ist dies nicht*. The *Ms.* reading, *es ist dies ist*, is clearly a compositional error.

suffering of punishment by the criminal nor the satisfaction of the law. The foundation and substance of all this is the nature of the matter.

This applies also in the case of the satisfaction [made] for us—that is, it has occurred in and for itself.¹⁷⁰ It is not an extrinsic sacrifice that is performed, nor a matter of someone else [being] punished so that punishment might be rendered, ⟨nor of life [being] negated and other-being sublated,⟩ [as in the case of] natural death. Besides, everyone dies on his own,¹⁷¹ and everyone must be and achieve on his own, out of his own subjectivity and obligation, what he ought to be. For one to lay hold of the merit of Christ means that,¹⁷² if one is to accomplish this merit within oneself, this conversion that abandons the natural will and natural interest, and if one is to exist in infinite love, then this is the matter in and for itself. One's subjective certainty, one's sensibility and consciousness, is | truth, is *the* truth; i.e., it is, in and for itself, the true nature of spirit, in which spirit is adequate to its concept. The ground of redemption is, therefore, this history, ⟨this perishing of the natural,⟩ for this is the matter in and for itself. It is not a capricious accident, or merely a particular deed and happening, but rather is true and consummating. This verification that it is the true is the intuition given by this history.¹⁷³ It is not the history of a single individual; rather it is God who accomplishes it—i.e., it is the intuition that this is the universal history which has being in and for itself. [93b]

⟨The significance of this [death] in its relation to the dissemination of the Christian religion [has to be considered]—the polemical significance of the manner of this death, its character and significance for the external [world]. Natural will [is] surrendered. All distinctiveness, all traits of personality, all interests and purposes toward which the natural will might direct itself, [are] as nothing. [This is] a revolutionary element to the extent that it gives the world

170. *W₂ reads:* What lies at the basis is that this satisfaction has occurred in and for itself.

171. *Ms. canceled:* God is no longer a God of the law

172. *W₂ reads:* But what one thus is for oneself may not be something contingent, a matter of one's free choice, but must rather be something truthful.

173. *W₂ adds:* and in which the single individual takes hold of the merit of Christ.

another shape. All things great and of worldly value [are] as nothing; [all these things are] buried in the grave of spirit. This, too, [is made] visible.^{~174)}

We still have to consider the particular character of this death: specifically, it has been defined as the uttermost pinnacle of finitude. In addition to the fact that it is a natural death, it is the death of a criminal, the most degrading death on the *cross*. | Taken as something external, life is natural and immediate, but (<also my existence, qua existence [*Dasein*], i.e., in the representation of others—the value they attribute to me. I have value and am objective to the extent that I know how to make myself valued by others and am valued by them. My value is their representation and^{~175} their comparison of me with whatever they reverence, with what they regard as the in-itself.) But immediately, in the opinion of others, my existence is one of honor or shame, a dishonoring death. In a natural death finitude as a natural condition [is] at the same time transfigured [by civil honor]; but here (civil) dishonor, [death on] the cross, [is] transfigured. That which is represented as the lowest and which the state uses as an instrument of dishonor is here converted into what is highest. (<Love [occurs] in immediate other-being; other-being and finitude [are] transfigured; other-being is what is ignominious.^{~176)} What has counted for the lowest (and most despised) is now made the highest. We find here the direct expression of a complete revolution against all that is established and regarded as valuable. (Death is natural; all human beings must die; but [their

174. *W₂ reads:* A special characteristic of this death is to be emphasized first of all, namely, its polemical aspect toward the external world. In it, not only is the surrender of the natural will brought into view, but also everything distinctive, all interests and purposes toward which the natural will might direct itself, everything great and of worldly value—all these things are buried in the grave of spirit. This is the revolutionary element by means of which the world is given a totally different shape.

175. *W₂ reads:* Other-being has in fact besides its immediate natural being a more extended sphere and a further determination. It belongs essentially to the existence of the subject that it should also be for others; the subject exists not merely for itself but also in the representation of others; it exists, it has value, and is objective to the extent that it knows how to make itself valued by others and is valued by them. Its value is the representation of the others and rests on their

176. *W₂ reads:* But in surrendering the natural will, this finitude, this other-being, is at the same time transfigured.

external existence is one of honor, not that of criminals¹⁷⁷).) Since the dishonoring of existence has been elevated to a position of highest honor, all the bonds of human corporate life are fundamentally assaulted, shaken, and dissolved. The cross corresponds to our gallows. If this symbol of dishonor is made into a badge [of honor] and is raised up as a banner whose positive content is at the same time | the kingdom of God, then ~the inner disposition [of the citizens]¹⁷⁸ is at root withdrawn from the life of the state and from civil affairs. The substantial foundation of public life is removed, and this whole structure no longer has any actuality. Its inner reality [is now only] something external—an empty appearance, which must soon come crashing down. The fact that it is no longer anything in itself must also become manifest in [worldly] existence.

66 (Let us compare what this outward existence of Christianity simultaneously disclosed, not just immediately at the time of Christ itself, but in a web of connections that are, in their universal aspect, contemporary.)¹⁷⁹ For its part, imperial authority degraded everything esteemed and prized by humanity. All the venerable forms of justice and constitutional government remained; [nevertheless] the lot of each individual depended on the caprice of the emperor, who was subject neither to internal nor to external constraints. But, besides life, all virtue and worth, [94a] the dignity of old age, one's station in life, and one's race—all these things were thoroughly dishonored. The slave of the emperor was next to him the highest power, or had even more power than the emperor himself; the Senate debased itself in proportion as everything was debased by the emperor. The emperor did not inflict disgrace on the Senate; on the contrary the Senate courted it and freely made it its own. Thus, the majesty of world dominion, all virtue and right, every-

177. *Bracketed phrase canceled in Ms.*

178. *Ms. reads:* the opposite [of dishonor], according to the inner disposition [of the citizens], indeed according to the external sign of honor,

179. [Ed.] On Hegel's criticism of the political conditions of the Roman Empire, see his portrayal of the religion of expediency in Vol. 2 as well as his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg, 1923), esp. pp. 680 ff., 711–719. Cf. *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, rev. ed. (New York, 1899; reprint, 1956), pp. 314–318.

thing sacred in human institutions and affairs, the majesty of everything that has infinite value—all are cast upon the dung heap. In this way the secular authority of the earth for its part reduced the highest to what is most lowly (and despised; on the | other hand we saw what is most despised elevated to the highest, to a banner.) In this way, the secular government for its part radically perverted the [moral] disposition [of its citizens] in accord with this [transvaluation], so that there was nothing left in the inner [life] to set against the new religion. Everything established, everything ethical, everything commonly viewed as having authority was destroyed, and there remained to the established order only an entirely bare, external, cold authority—only death—from which the (degraded but existing) life that was inwardly aware of itself did not recoil.

⟨(ε) *Resurrection and Ascension [of Christ]*.⟩ But the conclusion of the whole course has still to be considered.

Death accomplishes the process whereby the divine idea has divested itself, divested itself unto the bitter anguish of death and the shame of a criminal, and thereby human finitude is transfigured into the highest—[this is] the highest love. That is the deepest anguish, this the highest love; in anguish love [is contained]. This transfiguration also [occurs] in the subjective [mode] of love and in the most extreme disruption—the most violent interiorization and internality alone; existence [is] simultaneously this despair. What has still to be added is the *envisaged consummation* of the return [of the divine idea to itself] that is contained in it. [94b]

In this connection, I need only to recall the well-known modes of this envisagement: they are the *resurrection* and the *ascension*. Like everything that precedes it, this exaltation [of Christ] has appeared for immediate consciousness in the mode of actuality. “Thou wilt not abandon thy Righteous One to the grave, nor let thy Holy One see corruption”¹⁸⁰—instead, this death of death, the overcoming of the grave and of Sheol,¹⁸¹ the triumph over the negative, is equally present for envisagement. ⟨[This triumph is] not an abstrac-

180. [Ed.] See Acts 2:27: “For thou wilt not abandon my soul to Hades, nor let thy Holy One see corruption.”

181. [Ed.] See Ps. 16:10: “For thou dost not give me up to Sheol, or let thy godly one see the Pit.”

68 tion from human nature or a putting | off of it; rather it is the preservation of it, precisely in death itself and in the highest love. Spirit is spirit only as the negation of the negative, which thus contains the negative within itself. God [is envisaged] as reconciled, as love; this [involves] the exaltation (of human nature) to heaven, where the Son of Man sits at the right hand of the Father, and the identity and the glory of divine and human nature appear to the spiritual eye in the highest possible way.¹⁸²

⟨This [is] the totality of the history [of redemption].⟩ Thus what this life of Christ brings to representation for us—indeed, for the empirical, immediate, and general consciousness—[is] this process of the nature of spirit—God in human shape. In its development, this [process is] the going forth of the divine idea into the uttermost cleavage, even to the opposite pole of the anguish of death, which is itself the absolute reversal, the highest love, containing the negation of the negative within itself [and being in this way] the absolute reconciliation, the sublation of the prior antithesis between humanity and God. The end is [presented] as a resolution into glory, the festive assumption of humanity in the divine idea.

That initial [cleavage], God in human shape, is God's reality in this process, which shows the separation of the divine idea and its reunification, its consummation for the first time as truth. [95a]

If we now glance back at the three spheres that [we have] considered,¹⁸³ and at their connection, [they may be summarized as follows]: the first [is] the eternal God in his pure idea in thinking spirit (and all spirit is thinking); the second [is] this universal realizing itself in nature [as] an entirely external existence, a veritable ⟨divestment;⟩ the third [is the universal realizing itself] in an externality that is at the same time utterly inward, [i.e.,] in finite spirit, which therefore is at the same time the consummation of externality
69 in deepest cleavage, in conscious negation, and | thereby the return

182. [Ed.] This paragraph is given in modified form as a footnote in *W*₂ 12:300, with the editorial notation: "From the 1821 notebook in Hegel's own hand." This is the only such notation in *W*₂. See the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1 of this edition, pp. 28, 50.

183. [Ed.] The three spheres of "Concrete Representation" (see above, p. 77).

to the eternal idea, which is thus actualized in self-consciousness, to eternal spirit, although in the first place abstractly.

Now this, however, is [only] *one* aspect: this return and elevation to the right hand of God is only one side of the consummation of the third sphere.¹⁸⁴ For this third sphere is the idea in its character as singularity but in the first instance its portrayal as only *one* singular individual—the divine singularity, universal singularity, singularity as it is in and for itself. One is all; once is always, implicitly, in accord with the concept, a simple determinacy. But singularity as being-for-self is (this act of releasing the distinct moments to free immediacy and independence;) [it is] immediacy, essentially and exclusively. Singularity means precisely at the same time to be empirical singularity.

Singularity exclusively is *for others*; [it is] immediacy and is the return from the other into itself. The singularity of the divine idea, the divine idea as *one* human being, is first brought to completion in actuality to the extent that initially it has *many* single individuals confronting it, whom it brings back into the unity of the Spirit, into the *community*, and therein it is [present] as actual, universal self-consciousness.

C. COMMUNITY, CULTUS

⟨Standpoint of the Community in General⟩¹⁸⁵

[We need] still to speak briefly of this [community] in accord with its idea. [To consider it] in concrete form, as tied to a [specific]

184. [Ed.] The last two paragraphs of this section form a transition to Sec. C, "Community, Cultus." They seem to represent an acknowledgment on Hegel's part that the distinction between the third sphere of "Concrete Representation" (the appearance of the idea in "the history of redemption and reconciliation") and "Community, Cultus" is not a clear-cut one. The history of redemption includes not only the single individual in whom the divine-human unity was first accomplished, but also the community of individuals, the community of the Spirit, in which reconciliation is brought to completion and Christ is universally actualized.

185. Ms. adds in margin (first two words canceled): (Universal antithesis – spirituality – unity [restored by resolving] the antithesis)

[Ed.] The heading is preceded by an α , which we have omitted. These initial pages serve as a general introduction to Sec. C of the Ms. as a whole, the first of

history and empirical existence, would lead us too far afield, tempting as this might otherwise be.

186⁷ The determinate transition of the idea to sensible presence¹⁸⁷ [has] been accomplished [in Christianity]. Precisely this [is] the distinctive feature of Christianity | [as] the religion of spirit. All moments [are here] developed to their completion. (This juxtaposition of the sensible presence of divinity—of this single individual who is divine—with this ordinary consciousness)¹⁸⁸ can occur only in the religion of spirit. [It is] certain of itself as the absolute truth and accordingly [is] to be afraid of nothing, not even of sensible presence. To shun the sensible in monkish fashion is to exhibit cowardice of thought. For spirit [is] at home with itself in the sensible; the sensible appearance of the divine [is now] the immediate object.

[There is] a revolting arrogance that is directed against the moment of sensible presence generally ~[and against] its congeniality, its [supposed] spiritlessness¹⁸⁹ aspiring to be abstract thought. The

whose main points, “α. Origin of the Community,” does not begin until the bottom of sheet 98a. In this section, which is one of the richest of the *Ms.*, Hegel argues that human subjectivity, when it is renewed, transfigured by the indwelling of the Spirit of God, becomes a *communal* subjectivity, giving up its old independence and exclusivity. The “infinite love that arises from infinite anguish” creates a unique and unsurpassable intersubjectivity, distinguished from all other forms of human love and friendship. This section is much abbreviated in 1824 and disappears completely in 1827.

186. *Ms. margin*: (God – idea in sensible presence – for others. To have this idea –)

187. [*Ed.*] *die sinnliche Gegenwart*. This expression, used frequently in this section, refers to the “sensible presence” of God in Christ, a presence that must be sublated in the spiritual community, since Christ is no longer immediately present in a sensible mode, although he is present “spiritually,” in the mode of representation for faith.

188. *Ms. adds in margin*: (I, this [manikin] – [this] *ego homuncio* – am not supposed to resist evil, like Jupiter – the *ego homuncio* ought by contrast – to be modest, to make itself humble, in order to be humble in truth, in order to be allowed to be base.)

[*Ed.*] Hegel refers here to Terence, *Eunuchus* 591. The contrast is between superhuman (Jupiter) and manikin (*homuncio*) strength, a distinction that is no longer appropriate in the Christian religion since it has been overcome in principle. See below, p. 141.

189. *Ms. margin*: Two aspects: <(α) abstract universality of thought, (β) subjective particularity, feeling>

poet honors the sensible shape (just as Oriental religious life does) as having spirit within it. But [the poet] does not just honor his own sensible nature or the feeling of his own subjectivity, but rather sensible presence [as such, which is] the death of feeling. Sentimentality [is] precisely contempt for sensible presence. [This] fixation and limitation in this infinite love [is what] previously¹⁹⁰ [we] designated precisely as “speculative”; love in death [is] a transition. [It is] a relationship of one single sensible presence to others like it. ([Such] love [can be envisaged] by women, by people of tender disposition—[this is] easy [for] people of a loving disposition [such as] John, but infinitely hard for the independent concept, for the man.)¹⁹¹ | The freedom of the subject rebels [against] this reconciliation and unification, [96a] the reverencing of a single living individual as God. Not so the Oriental—[but then] he is nothing, he is implicitly cast aside, without however having cast *himself* aside, i.e., without [having] the consciousness of infinite freedom within himself. ~Yet this love [that arises from infinite freedom], this recognition, [is] the supreme miracle, the highest in the realm of spirit.¹⁹²

71

Accordingly, this sphere (of infinite love) [is] the kingdom of the Spirit. [It involves] knowing oneself as having within oneself, as this individual, infinite worth, absolute freedom, and the infinite power to maintain oneself in this other pure and simple. Love equalizes all things, [but not] in the sense [that] people nowadays want to love and live in love, [implying] that others ought to give themselves up to the same commonality—([which is] the most spiritless [of conditions].) Death runs counter to this love, even a sentimental (death, [as when two lovers are] prepared to drown

190. [Ed.] See above, pp. 125–126.

191. *W₂ reads:* It is now required of individuals in the community that they should venerate the divine idea in the mode of singularity and appropriate it to themselves. For the tender, loving disposition, that of woman, this is easy; but on the other side is the fact that the subject which is thus expected to love exists in a condition of infinite freedom and has grasped the substantiality of its self-consciousness. For the independent concept, the man, this expectation is accordingly infinitely hard.

192. *W₂ reads:* But here this love, this recognition, is the direct opposite, and this is the supreme miracle, which is precisely spirit itself.

themselves together.) Only spirit itself, which has grasped and envisaged the truth, absolute objectivity, provides the supreme independence.

72 The intuition of this religion demands the despising of all that is present and has value—power, worldly grandeur—the intensity of this disdain [is unlimited]. [This religion is] wholly polemical, (recognizing ideality and yet sensible presence only in a single individual, and [such presence] as | infinite.) [This is in] absolute antithesis to Oriental religion—([which] made this Oriental feature [of disdain] its enemy.) Infinite value thus [lies] within oneself, in one's inner being. [This religion entails] a rocklike stability and a surrendering of this stability. (A particular point [concerns] the definition of subjective consciousness. How is self-consciousness, the subjective side, defined? For it, for self-consciousness, this solidity [has been] overcome; how is this overcoming portrayed?)

(Well, this singular sensible presence is that in which [everything is] gathered together—only *one*, therefore *universal*, even *ideal*.)

73 (α) The divine idea occurs in the Christian religion as a¹⁹³ present, immediate individual. For single individuals all worldliness has been concentrated in this individual; this is the one and only sensible presence that has value, ~the infinite abstraction of the present. (Being in love [is] like this too; but in the present case [we live] at the same time in an infinite abstraction from all worldliness. Subjective happiness, [my] being in love with any particular individual I chance to be attracted to, [is here] sublated. Particular sensibility, strictly particular, is opposed to the universal, being exclusive with respect both to this object and to my subjectivity. It is [not then] the divine idea that I want but its opposite, my exclusive particularity objectified.) [96b] |

193. *W₂ reads:* implying that the individual has infinite worth within itself, knows itself to be absolute freedom, possesses within itself the most solid stability, while at the same time it surrenders this stability and maintains itself in what is utterly other. Love equalizes all things, even absolute opposition.

The intuition of this religion demands the despising of all that is present, of everything that otherwise has value; it is the perfect ideality, which is directed polemically against all worldly grandeur. In this single person, in this

(β)¹⁹⁴ The next stage is for this singularity, this individuality, to be¹⁹⁵ removed from the senses and raised to the right hand of God. So it is altogether an individual presence *only for representation*—a certainty without *immediate sensible* presence, unlike the Dalai Lama in the Orient, or [the sacred bull] Apis,¹⁹⁶ [who] is an immediate sensible presence. (This concentration of presence into death,) the shameful death [of the cross], and this withdrawal [of Christ] have the implication that humanity is [now] directed only inward, that all worldly grandeur (as well as the weakness of immediate friendship) has disappeared. The representation that has been given to single individuals as the infinite truth, [as] the divine idea, is [that of] the absolute unity of the universal and the singular, of divine and human nature, infinite love that exists only as infinite anguish, as the death of everything worldly and immediate.

(α) The retreat to inner self-consciousness that is contained in this intuition is not the Stoic retreat, which has value because it thinks by the strength of its own spirit, and seeks the reality of thought in the world, nature, natural things, and their comprehension. The Stoic retreat is without infinite anguish, and [has] at the same time a thoroughly positive relation to the world. Instead, [this Christian retreat] endlessly divests itself of its particularity and self-possession and has its infinite value only in the love that is contained in infinite anguish and comes from it. All of the immediacy in which

194. *Ms. margin*: (Because [this individual is] *universal* singularity, just for that reason [his] form [is] singularity in universality. Thus (β) the definition of the subject is ($\alpha\alpha$) to have disappeared [into the grave], ($\beta\beta$) the positive aspect of this subjectivity as an unending surrender of its particularity and naturalness, [of everything that] belongs to it in this world.)

195. *W₂ reads*: Hence this singular individuality is [there] as absolutely universal. This infinite abstraction from all worldly things is found even in ordinary love, and the loving subject centers all of its satisfaction in a particular individual; but this satisfaction still belongs altogether to particularity. It is particular contingency and sensibility that opposes itself to the universal and desires in this way to become objective to itself.

By contrast, that individuality in which I will the divine idea is utterly universal; it is for this reason directly

196. [*Ed.*] See Hegel's portrayal of the religion of the enigma (Egyptian religion) in Vol. 2 of this edition, lectures of 1824 and 1827. In the *Ms.*, Hegel does not discuss Egyptian religion and Apis in any detail.

74 humanity might find some value is cast away; it is only in absolute mediation that humankind gains value, but the value is infinite. This subjectivity is truly infinite in and for itself, but human being is infinite only through this mediation, not immediately. Thus it is *capable* of having an infinite value, and this capacity or possibility is its positive, absolute defining character. This character is the reason why the immortality | of the soul becomes a specific doctrine of the Christian religion: the soul or singular subjectivity has an infinite, [97a] eternal vocation to be a citizen of the kingdom of God. This is a vocation, a life, that is removed from time and temporality, [existing] for itself, and since it [is] also opposed to temporality, this eternal vocation is defined as a future of immortality. The infinite demand to see God, i.e., to become conscious in the Spirit of his truth as a present reality, is not possible in this temporal present for the consciousness that intuits sensibly and is representational.

(β)¹⁹⁷ Subjectivity has given up all external distinctions in this infinite value, distinctions of mastery, power, position, even of sex and wealth. Before God all human beings are equal. This comes to consciousness for the first time here and now, in the speculative and negative [elements] of the infinite anguish of love; herein lies the possibility and the root of truly universal justice and of the actualization of freedom. The formal justice of Roman life proceeds from a positive standpoint and from the understanding. It has no principle within itself for the absolute verification of the standpoint of justice, but is thoroughly worldly. The sexual freedom of women¹⁹⁸ and monogamy—all these characteristics are connected with it.

(γ)¹⁹⁹ This speculative [mode] of love that arises from infinite

197. Ms. reads: (ββ)

[Ed.] Three sets of intervening Greek letters—(αα), (ββ), and (αα)—have been omitted in the preceding paragraph.

198. [Ed.] *Geschlechtsfreiheit der Frauen*. Hegel is probably referring here to the emancipation of women from a subservient role based on sex, especially the equality and reciprocity that should be part of the monogamous marriage relationship in the Christian community (see, e.g., 1 Cor. 7). It is conceivable, though, that he has in mind the free sharing of sexual partners in the primitive Christian community (as part of a general communalism of love) to which he refers in "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," *Early Theological Writings*, p. 280 (Nohl, p. 323).

199. Ms. margin: (Extension of the specific concept to a community)

anguish, this purity of subjectivity, occur through the infinite mediation; and this infinite mediation has its objective shape [in] the life, suffering, death, and exaltation of Christ. "This subjectivity is implicitly universal, not exclusive, and the relation of the many, of individuals, to each other, is the²⁰⁰ unity of faith in the representation of faith, in this third [the community of Christ]."²⁰¹ [97b] It is neither human love—love of humanity, | sexual love—nor friendship. Surprise has often been expressed that so noble a relationship as friendship is not among the duties enjoined by Christ. The relationship of the disciples [to each other] is not one of friendship, for friendship is a relationship burdened by subjective particularity. (That wherein [the disciples are] objectively [one] must be a third, a syllogistic conclusion, [suitably expressed] for representational, self-subsisting subjects.)²⁰² Men are friends (not so much directly as objectively) in a substantial bond, in a third [factor], in fundamental principles, absolute purposes, studies, science. In brief, the bond [of the disciples] is an objective content; it is not attraction as such, like that felt by a man for a woman (as this particular personality or beauty), but [lies] in the intuition of this speculative [element], the infinite love that comes from infinite anguish, i.e., from the worthlessness of particularity and the mediation of love through it. Of course, the love of a man for a woman and friendship can occur, but they are essentially defined as subordinate, not as something evil but as something imperfect, not as something indifferent but essentially as [a state in which we are] not to remain; they themselves [are] to be sacrificed in order that they may do [no] injury to that absolute direction and unity.²⁰³

(δ) This unity in the infinite love that arises from infinite anguish

200. *W₂ reads:* On the other hand, this subjectivity likewise possesses this mode of its reality in itself, that it is a multiplicity of subjects and individuals; but since it is implicitly universal, not exclusive, this multiplicity of individuals has absolutely to be posited as only a semblance, and precisely the fact that it posits itself as this semblance is what constitutes the

201. *W₂ adds:* This is the love of the community, which seems to consist of many subjects, while this multiplicity is merely a semblance.

202. [*Ed.*] The meaning seems to be that the "third"—the community of Christ—must be represented in sensible form as the "body" of Christ for persons who think representationally.

203. *Ms. margin:* ((α) The third, the objectivity that mediates; (β) as subjectivity, a self-conscious yet universal unity, a unity that subsists in and for itself)

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is, accordingly, in no way a sensible, worldly linkage, not dependent upon the particularity and naturalness that are still left over and retain validity, but rather a unity simply in the Spirit. Love as [originating] in infinite anguish is precisely the concept of spirit itself. It becomes objective in Christ as the focal point of faith at an infinite distance and sublimity, but [at the same time] in an infinite nearness, and with a relevance that peculiarly belongs to the individual subject. ~⟨Humanity, death, infinite limitation | [are] taken up into the divine idea.⟩ But it is not for the [individual] (the latter is nothing particular [98a] but, in regard to the idea, itself universal), but rather for [all] individuals, and *as thus actual in their subjectivity*, that the divine idea is spirit²⁰⁴—the *Holy Spirit*. The Holy Spirit is in them; they are, they constitute, the universal Christian church, the communion of saints. Spirit is the infinite return into itself, infinite subjectivity, not represented but actual divinity, the *presence* of God, not the substantial in-itself of the Father or of the Son and of Christ, who is the truth in the shape of objectivity. The Spirit is rather what is subjectively present and actual; and it is only through this mediation [in the community] that it itself is subjectively present as the divestment into the objective intuition of love and its infinite anguish. This [is] the Spirit of God, or God as the present, actual Spirit, God dwelling in his community. Christ [says]: “Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of you” [Matt. 18:20];²⁰⁵ “I [am] with you always, even unto the end of the world” [Matt. 28:20]. Christ [is] objective, but in the expressions “with you,” “in you,” he is the Holy Spirit. This [is] the absolute significance of the Spirit, this the highest, ⟨pure⟩ consciousness of the absolute idea, and of absolute truth, the idea as the self-consciousness of the truth.

Accordingly, in this profound sense the Christian religion is the religion of spirit, though not in the manifold, trivial sense of being a spiritual religion, ⟨venerating abstraction, regarding it as substance, essence. On the contrary, [the Christian religion is] the uni-

204. *W₂ reads:* and what thus initially embraces individuals as a third is also what constitutes their genuine self-consciousness, their most inner and distinctive character. Thus this love is spirit as such

205. [Ed.] The text of Matt. 18:20 reads “them,” not “you.”

fication of the infinite antithesis, the one and only genuinely speculative [enjoyment] of the nature of God, or of spirit. ~This is its content and its vision, | and it is there²⁰⁶ for the ordinary, uneducated consciousness. (The antithesis is: God and the world, I, this *homuncio* [manikin].)²⁰⁷ All persons are called to blessedness. This [is] the highest calling, and alone the highest. Therefore Christ says: "All sins can be forgiven human beings, save only sin against the Spirit" ((Matt. 12:31); ~"All sins will be forgiven human beings, even the blasphemies they utter against God; but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation" (Mark 3:28[–29]).²⁰⁸ People have often racked their brains trying to determine what sin against the Holy Spirit is,²⁰⁹ and they have trivialized this category in a variety of ways in order to get rid of it entirely.) Everything can be consumed in the infinite anguish of love, but this consuming process itself is nothing else but the inwardly present spirit. What is devoid of spirit is not sinful except [when done] with a knowing and willing that is directed against the acknowledged spirit—it knows not spirit and thus is innocent. But this is the innocence that is judged and condemned precisely in itself: (be it never so vain—*nos prona natamus*²¹⁰—not to have shared in the truth [means that] it has not had eternal life in itself. [This is the meaning that] always comes through in one way or another.) [98b]

206. *W₂ reads:* This is the content of the Christian religion; it is what makes it the religion of spirit, and this content also is there

207. [Ed.] See above, n. 188.

208. *W₂ reads:* The injuring of absolute truth, of the idea of this unification of the infinite antithesis, is described, therefore, as the highest offense.

[Ed.] Hegel's quotation of the two biblical texts is an imprecise paraphrase.

209. [Ed.] See G. E. Lessing, *Nathan der Weise* (1779), act 4, scene 7. Sin against the Holy Spirit

... das ist, die Sünde,	... is the sin
Die aller Sünden grösste Sünd' uns gilt	That is the greatest of all our sins,
Nur dass wir, Gott sey Dank, so recht	Except that, thanks be to God, we
nicht wissen,	don't know
Worin sie eigentlich besteht . . .	What it actually consists in . . .

210. [Ed.] "We swim horizontally." Perhaps the meaning of this unidentified aphorism is that one cannot swim in the ocean of spirit by remaining in an upright or standing position.

Hence this aspect of community is the distinctive region of spirit. The Holy Spirit has been poured out upon the disciples. From then on they exist as a community—the community is their immanent life—and joyfully they went out into the world, in order to elevate it to the universal community and to spread abroad the kingdom of God.

78 First we considered (a) the pure concept of God in the Christian religion, then (b) its concrete representation or manifestation. This entire manifestation—which presents itself in the three spheres of thinking, representation, and actuality—is an appearance or manifestation for an | other, the region of existence, of objectivity, [but] here of subjective immanence, of becoming immanent. Consequently, this is (c) the kingdom of the Spirit. The kingdom of God is the Spirit. [Thus] subjects [are] implicated in the process. The divine idea, which is there for them as infinite love in infinite anguish, is present within them precisely in this intuition: they [are] the community of the Spirit—([this is their] faith, their laying hold of the merit [of Christ].) At first, singularity is exclusive; in the infinite love it [is] led back [into community]. Christ [is] in the midst of them, and so [is] the Spirit; this process itself [is] the Spirit.

Following this general definition, [we proceed] in more detail.

α. The Origin of the Community

This [is] the first aspect, in accord with which we apprehend once more the standpoint of exclusive individuality: Christ as this man who was temporally present among his friends. The formation of the community comes about as his friends are filled by the Spirit. The beginning [of this is] the temporal presence of an ordinary man—so the community begins from the highest externality of appearance. The question [therefore is] how his friends came or [99a] could have been brought to recognize the divine idea in this individual, to acknowledge him as the Son of God.

[This is] the question, then, of the *verification* (of the divine mission of Christ [*Christus*²¹¹]). It seems that proofs of the truth

211. [Ed.] These terms demonstrate that Hegel customarily used *Christus* ("Christ") as a proper name designating Jesus of Nazareth, indeed as synonymous with the latter, while the title *der Christ* ("the Christ") designates the Messiah, the

of the Christian religion (can be) reduced to the point formulated in this way, ([the supposition being that] these first individuals later handed the content down to others.)

This question immediately divides itself into two questions: (α) Is it true *in general* that God has a Son, that he sends or has sent him into the world? | (β) Was *this Jesus of Nazareth* in Galilee, a carpenter's (son,) the Christ [*der Christ*²¹¹]? 79

The two questions are so interwoven that if Jesus were not the Son sent by God, if this could not be proved true of him, then there would be nothing at all to his mission. Either we should have to wait for another, (if indeed one is to come, if there is a promise to this effect, i.e., if it is necessary in and for itself, conceptually and ideally;) or rather, since the correctness of the idea is made to depend on the proof of that mission, there is in general nothing more and nothing further to think about with reference to it.

(αα) But we must first ask the essential question: Is such an appearance true in and for itself? This is what we [have] seen,²¹² that it is only as what is called "triune" that God is God as spirit: he is his own manifestation, [his] self-objectification while remaining identical with [himself] in this objectification; [he is] eternal love. This objectification, developed to its consummate form in the extreme of universality ([the universality] of God and of finitude or death), is God's return into self in sublating the harshness of the antithesis; [it is] love in infinite anguish, which likewise is healed in the process. The truth in and for itself ~[is found] in philosophy,²¹³ and only recent philosophy [has] attained this conceptual depth. The unphilosophical shallowness (that wants to philosophize—thinking, reasoning, enlightenment²¹⁴)—has nothing to say on this; similarly the contradiction it makes [between love and suffering] is without any value, utterly spiritless—[albeit] innocent

Son of God. The distinction is not between the earthly and the risen Christ, since the name can refer to both, but between a *name* and a *title*, with the latter designating the divine identity and role of the individual who bears the name.

212. [Ed.] See Sec. B.a above, pp. 77–86.

213. W₂ reads: that God is not an abstraction but something concrete, is explicated by philosophy,

214. [Ed.] Hegel here uses the term *Aufklärung*, indicating that he has in mind the Enlightenment philosophers.

according to [the views] indicated above²¹⁵—in its sin against the Holy Spirit; [it is] prideful (and self-satisfied,) vulgar in its concepts, ([which it regards as] complete.) [99b]

80 But this concept must not be [thought of] as complete the way it is found in philosophy. On the contrary, the relationship of philosophy [to the truth] is *to grasp conceptually what [already] is*. What is must | be *actual* on its own account, before philosophy comes—([it must] not just [be] what is true implicitly, but [must be] in general empirical consciousness.) Everything true begins in its appearance, i.e., in its being in the form of immediacy. The concept must (therefore) [be] present in the self-consciousness of humanity, in spirit as such, in the world-spirit, and the latter must have comprehended itself in this way; ([this is] another mode of necessity.) This self-comprehending, however, is the necessity [that occurs] as the process of spirit, a process that exhibits itself in the previous stages of religion, primarily the Jewish and ~pagan,²¹⁶ and that has this result as its truth—namely, the concepts of the absolute unity of divine and human nature, the actuality of God, which is God's objectification of himself. Thus world history is the exhibition of this truth as the result [that occurs] in the immediate consciousness of spirit. (In time [there is] this succession of stages.)

“When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son” [Gal. 4:4]. “When the time had fully come”—this means: when spirit [had] entered so deeply into itself as to know its infinitude and to know the substantial as [present] in the subject of immediate self-consciousness, but in pure subjectivity, an infinite negativity, and for that very reason absolutely universal.

(ββ) The verification that this particular individual is the Christ is another matter and refers only to the determinate statement that this one [is the Christ] and not some other one; it does not concern the question whether the idea does not therefore exist at all. Christ said: “Do not run hither and thither, the kingdom of God is within you” [Luke 17:23, 21].²¹⁷ Many others among the Jews and pagans

215. [Ed.] See above, p. 141.

216. W₂ reads: the Greek and Roman

217. [Ed.] This quotation is a paraphrase and conflation of two verses. Luke 17:21 is more accurately translated: “in the midst of you” (ἐντὸς ὑμῶν).

have been venerated as divine, as gods. John the Baptist preceded Christ; among the Greeks and Romans [there was] Demetrius Poliorcetes, for example, [to whom,] when he came to Athens, statues [were erected] as to a god.²¹⁸ The Roman emperors [were] venerated as God. Apollonius of Tyana²¹⁹ and many others [were] believed | to be miracle workers; <it [would be] even more miraculous if it were not true [that Jesus is the Christ], for his understanding, insight, depth of thought, honesty, [are] greater miracles than those they narrate.> In earlier times, Hercules [was] (among the Greeks) the only individual who was represented as human, yet because of his deeds, which were merely deeds of obedience, entered the circle of the gods and became a god, a prototype. <Among the Hindus, moreover, this great multitude of incarnations [is found], this elevation of the Brāhmans to Brahṁā, [this] becoming God.>

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However, the infinite idea of humanity could attach itself only to Christ [100a] and see itself realized only in him, <for the time had fully come, the idea was completely mature in its depths. In another [such as] Hercules [it was] incomplete; e.g., through his heroic deeds the nature of spirit in its history [was] not exhibited at all.> The history of [Christ's] teaching, life, death, and resurrection [has] taken place; thus this history exists for the community, and it is *strictly adequate to the idea*. ~<[It is] not [just] teaching, a [merely] intellectual foundation.> This is the crucial point on which everything depends, this is the verification, the absolute proof.²²⁰ This is what is to be understood as the witness of the Spirit, of the

218. [Ed.] Plutarch, in his *Lives of Illustrious Men*, tells how Demetrius and Antigonos were venerated by the Athenians and given the name "deliverer gods." Demetrius was a successful military leader who liberated the Athenians in 305 B.C.E.

219. [Ed.] Apollonius of Tyana was a first-century Neopythagorean concerning whom reports are found in Dio Cassius, *Histories* 77.18, 68.18; Augustine, *Letters* 102.32; Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.41. Stories about miracle workers are found especially in biographies by Moiragenes, upon which Origen drew, and by Flavius Philostratus. The comparison between the miracles of Jesus and those of Apollonius is an ancient theme of pagan apologetics; see the writing of Hierocles of Bithynia mentioned by Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 5.3. Hegel's source of information about Apollonius is unknown.

220. *W₂ reads:* while it is only the effort of spirit to attain this determination of the implicit unity of the divine and the human that lies at the basis of those earlier forms and is recognizable in them.

Holy Spirit, for a single individual. It is the Spirit, the indwelling idea, that has attested Christ's mission, and this is the verification for those who believed, and for us [to know] in the developed concept.

82 [(α)] We have now to refer to the *miracles*, which are supposedly what constitute the immediate verification. In and for itself, miracle is only a relative verification.²²¹ (α) Christ says reproachfully: "Unless you see wonders, you will not believe. Many will come (to me saying) [that] in my name [they] perform signs, cast out demons, | make the blind see, the deaf hear, the lame walk, etc. And I will declare to them, 'I have never known you, depart from me!'"²²² What sort of interest still attaches in this connection to the working of miracles? How many miracles by oracles and by men, especially for example [by] the Neopythagoreans,²²³ are not narrated! (β) What is relative is in any case temporal, limited to the formation of the community. [To use miracles as a basis for] belief in this individual was of interest only for those who are outside; it was for the conversion, so to speak, of Jews and pagans. But the community that is formed needs miracles no longer; it has within itself the Spirit that leads into all truth.²²⁴ It is the Spirit [that verifies], the power [*Macht*] of the Spirit, by its truth as spirit, ~over spirit.²²⁵ Miracle is merely a force [*Gewalt*] over natural connections and hence only a force exerted on the consciousness that is bounded within the consciousness of these limited causal connections. How could the eternal idea itself come to consciousness through the representation of such a force? (γ) But there always remains a certain curiosity or inquisitiveness: How are the miracles to be construed or [100b] explained? In other words, how can they be grasped in such a way that they are not miracles at all but rather in some sense natural effects? A curiosity of this kind presupposes

221. *W₂ adds:* or a verification of an inferior sort.

222. [Ed.] This quotation is a conflation of John 4:48, Matt. 7:22–23, and Matt. 11:5.

223. [Ed.] See above, n. 219.

224. [Ed.] See John 16:13.

225. *W₂ reads:* [it] is the genuine force over spirit, i.e., a power by means of which there is left to spirit all of its freedom.

doubt²²⁶ and disbelief, and [one] would like to find a plausible support by means of which the moral virtue and integrity of the persons involved can be saved—one is so reasonable and well-meaning that Christ and his friends | are allowed to remain honorable people. (Therefore, [one makes] the assumption that a delusion is involved, but not an intentional one, i.e., no deception was perpetrated.) Otherwise, the briefest way of settling the matter would be to throw out the miracles entirely. If someone does not believe in any miracles, finds them opposed to reason, [even those] of Apollonius of Tyana and others, [which are] well attested, then it helps not at all to want to prove them to him. They have to rest on sense perception, but [there is] an insurmountable resistance in human beings to allowing what is attested only in that way to count as truth. In the range of sense perception, one can find hundreds and thousands of possibilities for what happened. For possibilities and probabilities of this kind are what count in this sphere, and the proofs are themselves nothing but probabilities of the same kind, involving the subjectivity of finite grounds.

The main point [is] that curiosity of this kind proceeds already from the absence of faith. Faith, however, rests on the witness of the Spirit, not on miracles but on the absolute truth, on the eternal idea and its content, and from this standpoint the miracles have little interest. They can be cited as subjective reasons of an incidental and edifying character, or they can be left aside. ([It is of] no interest [to faith] to investigate what the wedding guests at Cana really drank, and if it was wine, whose wine.)²²⁷ (Miracles are supposed to attest, and [yet] they have to be attested themselves [first]. What is supposed to be attested by them is the idea; [but that] has no need of them, and therefore no need to attest *to* them.)

226. *Ms. margin:* ([One might advise:] Don't have doubts and then they are resolved! But I *must* have them, I cannot lay them aside unanswered; [they] press upon me and rightly should be answered. The necessity of answering them rests on the necessity of having them. The necessity of having them [is found] in reflection, [which] makes this claim, i.e., [it treats] as absolute the demand for such finite reasons. But it is precisely in piety that finite reasons, or human understanding so called, have long since been set aside.)

227. [*Ed.*] See John 2:1–11.

84 There still remains this to be said: miracles [are], in general, effects produced by the power of spirit on the natural nexus, a higher intervention in the natural process, in the eternal laws of nature. Speaking generally, spirit is this absolute intervention. Life itself is already an intervention in these so-called eternal laws of nature. Life digests, i.e., it supersedes the [101a] eternal laws of physics [*Mechanismus*] and chemistry. Food, [as] material, [behaves in accord with the eternal laws of physics, and as chemical, [with those] of chemistry; life puts an end to this. Still more marked is the effect on life of the power of spirit and its weakness. [There is such a thing as] death caused by fright; [people can become] sick from grief. In the same way joy and trust also [can bring life and health]. Animal magnetism [i.e., hypnosis] has disclosed these powers to us in a more familiar form. In all ages, [there is] infinite faith, infinite trust, [the influence of] spirit upon spirit; cripples are healed, the blind see, the deaf hear, right up to the present day.²²⁸ Unbelief in such effects is based on a superstitious belief in the so-called powers of nature and their independence vis-à-vis spirit.

(β) This first means of verification is an external mode of faith, a contingent one. Genuine faith rests on the spirit of truth, while that [first kind of verification] still involves a relation to sensible, immediate presence. Genuine faith is spiritual and exists in the spirit. It has the truth of the idea as its basis, and since this idea is at the same time [present] for representation in a temporal, finite fashion in this one individual, it can actually appear [only] as realized in this individual, can enter into play only after his death and his removal from the temporal sphere. For only then is the process of envisagement itself brought to its consummation as a spiritual totality. In other words, believing in Jesus itself means no longer having the sensible appearance as such before one, (the sensible perception of which is in other cases supposed to constitute the verification. It is said: "If only [I had] seen him, if only I [had] had the sensible before me—a human being such as one sees every day of the week—[if only I had] heard [the words] of his mouth!"²²⁹

228. [Ed.] See Jesus' response to the disciples of John the Baptist, Matt. 11:5.

229. [Ed.] In this paragraph Hegel is arguing that the idea precisely *as it appears*

So [what we have is] not a sensible verification by seeing for oneself [but rather] through witnesses. The latter can err; they themselves are supposed to have seen it, but they themselves [are] also only witnesses; so [this is] no help at all. Thus [we have] probability and a judicial examination of the testimony; [but this too] is no help.)

This [witness of faith] is represented as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the departure of Christ. "I will send you a Comforter, the Spirit; the Spirit will lead you into all truth."²³⁰ And for this | Spirit sensible history exists in essence only as accomplished—sublated²³¹ to the right hand of God; hence it exists essentially as a *past* history—past in the sense that [what is] sensible is past for representation. All eternal history, [like] the creation of the world, [is viewed] as something past. [101b]

85

⟨β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus⟩

(α) It is now the community that is formed and in which the Holy Spirit dwells; and from this Spirit the community explicates its faith.

(αα) It has a *faith*. "Faith" [is] an ambiguous word. Here [it means] faith in the truth, i.e., certainty of absolute truth—of what God is, God [as] spirit, and this his actualization. [This is] faith neither in authority nor [as a consequence of] what [has been] seen

in Jesus can now be verified only spiritually, not immediately or sensibly; faith entails spiritual envisagement (*Anschauung*) rather than sensible perception (*Wahrnehmung*). The essential reality of Jesus—the appearance of the idea of divine-human unity—can be properly apprehended only after his death, by spiritual faith. Jesus was in historical, sensible fact the "God-man," according to Hegel (a fact most concretely expressed by the *infinite love* that arises from the infinite anguish of the cross), but he can be *properly* (i.e., spiritually) envisaged as such only by faith after his death and departure. Even a direct, sensible perception of Jesus by eyewitnesses could not provide a verification of the truth claimed for him.

230. [Ed.] An inexact conflation of John 16:7, 13. Ironically, Hegel's defense of the proof of the Spirit is itself based on a supposed historical proof, namely, Jesus' statement in the Gospel of John to the effect that he must depart in order that the Spirit may be sent.

231. [Ed.] Hegel here uses *aufgehoben* ("sublated") where one might have expected *aufgestanden*, *erhoben*, or *aufgegangen* ("raised," "ascended"). For Hegel the resurrection of Jesus from the dead indeed entails an *Aufhebung*—an annulling of his sensible presence, yet a preservation of his real presence and its transfiguration into the modality of spirit.

and heard; rather it is the eternal, substantial nature of spirit that has come to consciousness here, exists for consciousness, [so] that what is truth in and for itself has certainty for me. This can happen [for philosophical consciousness] through the *concept*—but here it is not so; [it happens] for spiritual consciousness as a whole, and for that reason it is called faith, which does not have to rest on grounds, authority, etc. Grounds or reasons [are appropriate] for what is limited, for what appears, for the finite, not for the eternal, [because] grounds are always contingent. That I should come to have faith in the eternal can also appear to have grounds, but these [are] contingent, indifferent, external [occasions], subjective in character, depending on how an accidental incident [may have] stirred an individual's heart. But the faith of the community rests solely on reason itself, on the Spirit. In other words, [what is involved is] a mediation that sublates all mediations; hence it is necessarily expressed as a faith brought about by God.²³² As Adam [said of the woman], "Flesh of my flesh, bone of my bones" [Gen. 2:23], so it is [with] the self-subsisting divine idea in human shape, the *imago Dei*; it is from God, and—"spirit of my spirit"—a witness of God. |

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(ßß) Faith as a form of *objective* truth. Initially [it is] not feeling [but rather is] an *object* of consciousness, and this represented truth is first of all the ground that determines feelings. Spirit [is] higher than [what occurs] in the form of feeling. The animal [has] feeling too. [Human beings have] consciousness, [102a] by means of whose content [feelings] are determined. If feeling were only intended to designate "*immanence*," then it would be ⟨a religious feeling⟩ that is indifferent [to its content]. But feeling [is] the form that locks particular subjectivity, the natural human being and natural will, within itself; ⟨[it is] what throws everything together and keeps it together,⟩ essentially impure. Spirit, by contrast, is from the first this conversion that is self-appropriating; by this appropriation [it is] what is liberated from feeling, [it is what] conquers feeling, purifies and determines it.

232. *W₂ reads:* Or this self-consciousness, expressed as a faith that rests on the Spirit, i.e., on a mediation that sublates all finite mediation, is the faith brought about by God.

The *doctrine* or *teaching* [*Lehre*] of the Christian church [is] the principal thing that serves to awaken feelings—but feelings that proceed from the teaching of truth, from representation and from objectivity, and [are], therefore, genuine feelings for the first time. Such teaching forms, creates, and explicates [these feelings] from itself. <[It is] a necessity that doctrine be withdrawn from arbitrariness and contingency of insight, and that it be preserved as truth that is in and for itself, as something that is secure. Therefore [it is] deposited in [creedal] symbols, bound to fixed expressions, whether [they have been] formed on the basis of written sources or on that of an [oral] tradition. In the written sources, further development appears as an interpretation of the Bible; in the tradition, as a positing, articulating, doctrinalizing of tradition. [Tradition], too, is doctrine; it, too, is something given, not [simply] created from itself. It is the Spirit of the community as a whole [that is creative]; the doctrine of the church [is] not produced by²³³ the church but is cultivated by the Spirit present within it. Whether the historical origin [is] in the Bible or in tradition is not the primary issue; the community²³⁴ is the infinite power and authority needed for its development, for the progressive determination of its doctrine.²³⁵

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(β) The developed community is a *church*, which as an existing community undergoes expansion, but is fixed as far as its determinate being in the actual world is concerned; it is inwardly at peace and endures through time. Thus an organization enters into play in it. The church is the kingdom of God, the achieved presence, life, preservation, and enjoyment of the Spirit.

233. Ms. reads: in

234. Ms. reads: it [sie]

235. W₂ reads: The distinction as to whether the community gives expression to its consciousness on the basis of written sources or attaches its self-determinations to the [oral] tradition is not an essential one. The main point is that, by means of the Spirit, which is present in it, the community is the infinite power and authority needed for the development and progressive determination of its doctrine. This authority makes itself felt in both of these cases. The exposition of a source lying at the basis [of a doctrine] is always in turn a form of knowledge and develops into new determinations; and even if, in the tradition, [the doctrine] is attached to something given and presupposed, the tradition itself in its historical development is essentially a form of positing.

[We need] only briefly to point out that the initial, polemical tendency of renunciation that was opposed to any external worldly presence intrinsically falls away and is no longer valid here. [A saying such as] "I have not come [to bring] peace, but a sword" [Matt. 10:34], the disruption of family bonds, the renunciation of property—[these] could only apply in special situations within the community²³⁶ itself. ("Give all that you have to the poor" [Matt. 19:21] contains within itself the insulation of this command. If everyone gave everything to the poor, then soon there would be no more poor to give anything to, or no more persons who would still have something to give. Or rather, the poor would now be rich, and those who had been rich would now be poor, so that what was previously theirs would be returned to them.) [Such an injunction] is self-negating. Family, property, temporal concerns arise of themselves, [and in turn give rise to] laws and governance; and all that is needed is that out of the womb of the church there be formed a free life, (a civil and) political life, stemming from eternal principles, (a rational, worldly kingdom in accord with the idea of freedom and the absolute character of rights. With what is legal, rational, and universal belonging in this way to the worldly sphere, there remains to the church the salvation of individual souls—[the sphere of] particular subjectivity; the worldly universal becomes its own affair.) |

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(γ) *The cultus*

Doctrines [concerns] an awakening of souls, a continuous laboring for their salvation. (The preservation of the community, like the creation and preservation of the world, [is] a continuous activity that creates the community, forming and bringing it forth. [It entails] an eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church. [This] is eternally accomplished and is portrayed as mediated either externally or more inwardly. [We have here the following progression:] natural will, confession, penitence, anguish, dying [to self], partaking of the sacrament, exaltation, glory. In the mass, this [is] objectively [represented by] the sacrifice of the mass, [where] Christ is daily offered up.)²³⁷ [102b]

236. Ms. reads: it [ihrer]

237. W₂ reads: If the permanent preservation of the community, which is at the

The *sacraments*—they in fact attach to the inner certainty of the truth; the immediate certainty of the kingdom, that of being received into it, of being [its] citizens, [is] a mystical union. [They attest] the implicit unity of divine and human nature. The partaking [of the sacrament] here [in this life] is the certainty of such unity. The Spirit fills its community; it [is brought] to (sensible) awareness that each (singular subjectivity,) this [particular individual], is a member of the community, i.e., that God is in it and that it is in God.²³⁸ This [certainty is] not an assurance, attestation, or corroboration, but rather is only partaking or communion. This immense elevation and exaltation of the individual [comes] to consciousness. |

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([Involved in the cultus is] (α) the completion of this movement in the spirit. [First there is] the natural will; [then is introduced] its reconstruction; [and finally] it is adequate to the rational, universal will. (β) This [consciousness]—which subsists in and for itself and [is] therefore a divine history, mediation, appearance, activity—[is] not just the theoretical, speculative consciousness [of philosophy]. (γ) The divine history in and for itself, as accomplished upon and within Christ, not as in the pure idea of God, [is found] under the particular representation and determination [given by the cultus] as the laying hold of the history of Christ and his merit—as though another [had] accomplished [redemption for us], and satisfaction [had already] occurred through him, as though he [had] offered himself up and our conversion had an absolute value only in him. (This has been discussed earlier.²³⁹) Absolute value [is found

same time its unbroken creation, is itself the eternal repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the church, then this repetition is expressly accomplished in the sacrament of the Last Supper. The eternal sacrifice here means that the absolute content, the union of the subject with the absolute object, is offered to the individual to partake of in an immediate way; and since the individual is reconciled, this completed reconciliation is the resurrection of Christ.

238. *Ms. margin:* (But in order to make this present for representation and the presence [of the worshipers]—in other words, in order to create a sensible object [portraying] the union of the subjective and the objective—[something is needed in] the manner of a symbol—wine and bread, like the mystical [festivals of] Bacchus and Ceres.)

239. [*Ed.*] See above, p. 128.

only] through [the being] in and for itself [of the idea]. This [is what is] represented in Christ—the general consciousness of the divinity of this action. Consciousness then [becomes] pure enjoyment of its result, especially in the sacraments; confession [is] also a Catholic sacrament.)

It is in their cultus that the Christian confessions are distinct from one another. [We shall] mention only the Western [churches]; <[there is found here] an important vantage point in general for purposes of understanding.> <In doctrine they are one, although of course the particular relationship of the subject in the cultus also constitutes a part of doctrine itself. Regarding the content of doctrine in general, it should be said that the deviations occur in that part of the content which is concerned with the cultus. Thus in the cultus, and more specifically in the sacrament, the unity of the subject and its absolute object, the kingdom of God, is given for purposes of immediate communion and immediate certainty. [This applies especially to] the chief sacrament [of communion]; whether several [sacraments are necessary we prefer] not to consider here. This aspect, [that of] an immediately sensuous partaking, is [expressed in] the mode of eating and drinking, and this is in fact the | only possible form. For, unlike breathing and the relation of skin to air and water, eating and drinking are just this: appropriating something consciously, and indeed on an individualized basis, to oneself as this and only this sensible, singular subject; [it is] itself a mode [of relationship] of the individualized [subject] to the universal, neutral [environment]. Here [the communion] occurs in the mode of an external, sensible object such that the divine is eaten and drunk—not merely a symbol of the divine, where the meaning is found only in the [mode of] representation, but rather sensible communion as such, immediate certainty. Hence the sensible as such must [be] validated, must be transformed or transubstantiated into the divine substance itself; the two become one.>

Truth and spirit are [there] in doctrine in an objective form, and the sacrament is the enjoyment of God by the subject. [The only point of] difference [among the confessions concerns] whether this kind of [edible, drinkable] object is the divine as an external [thing] on its own account. The *Catholics* venerate the host as such, even

when [it is] not [being] partaken of. The same [is] true of doctrine, [where they demand] not insight but obedience, stern objectivity, (subjection,) and the doing of works. (This form of external objectivity with respect to what subsists in and for itself is not limited to this sacrament but occurs elsewhere in accord with the same principle. Thus, the doctrine of the church stands there rigidly on its own, to be taken into the possession of the church by its members in a purely receptive fashion, as the ongoing development and tradition of the church itself. Equally [if not] more unconditional is the demand for action, for works.) The laity [are] excluded from (having any say in the development) and self-understanding of doctrine. (Thus [it functions as] law for the faithful,)²⁴⁰ [who are expected] to conduct themselves in a receptive fashion. Grace, the dispensation of grace and of the sacraments, [falls to] a particular office. The church [is] the external proprietor and dispenser of the means of grace. Hence this grace [is] a "mass."²⁴¹ |

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The *Lutheran, Evangelical* (doctrine) [regards] the host [as actual] only in faith and in the partaking. This [is] its consecration in the faith and the spirit of each individual. The minister does nothing in particular; it is not the case that he consecrates the host and the others [are] merely recipients. Every father of a household [is] equally a teacher, a baptizer, a confessor—and the host set apart as a thing is only a piece of bread, not God.

The *Reformed* view lacks this mystical element. [The communion is] a memorial, an ordinary psychological relationship; everything speculative [has] disappeared, being sublated in the relationship of the community. (The Reformed Church [is] therefore the place

240. Ms. adds in margin (canceled): The Council of Trent was accepted only by the priesthood in France.

[Ed.] As a result of the conflict between Curialism and Gallicanism in France, the Tridentine decrees were rejected by Parliament and eventually by the Estates General in 1614. But at a meeting on 7 July 1615, they were accepted by the priesthood.

241. [Ed.] The term Hegel uses here, *Messe*, also means "market" or "fair" in German, and he undoubtedly intended the double meaning. The Roman Catholic "mass" dispenses grace and divinity in a fashion similar to the way that goods are displayed and sold at a fair, and there is a similar element of enjoyment and festivity. Although the word is the same in German, the two meanings go back to different roots.

where divinity and truth collapse into the prose of the Enlightenment and of mere understanding, into the processes of subjective particularity. Luther [was] fully justified in not yielding, however much he was assailed for it.²⁴² [103a]

~(Generally speaking, [it is a question of] the antinomy between freedom and the objectivity of God or grace.) There are three representational modes to be considered with regard to the pathway of the soul, and the distinction between them is instructive:²⁴³ (α) the moral portrayal, (β) the pious or religious in general, (γ)²⁴⁴ the mystical and churchly.

92 [(α)] The first, the *moral*, (has its antithesis in a relationship of self-consciousness that is wholly external—a relationship which, taken by itself, might appear either as a fourth or as the first relationship [or representational mode], a despotic, Oriental relationship, a denial of one's own volition, thinking, etc.) [The moral portrayal] posits an absolute purpose; [it posits] the essence of spirit in a purpose that takes the form of volition, | and indeed a volition that is only my will, so that this subjective side is the principal matter. Law, universality, rationality are in me as my rationality; and likewise the volition and actualization that make these things my own, make them into subjective purposes, are also mine. (And insofar as the representation of something higher, or the highest, of God and the divine, enters into this view, [this] itself is a subjective postulate of my reason, something essentially posited by me.²⁴⁵ It ought to be something unposited, an absolutely independent power; but in its not-being-posited, I do not forget myself, so that even this not-being-posited is itself a being-posited by me—I, my subjectivity, not absolutely self-united as absolute form but [obliged] to remain in this subjective antithetical relationship. In love I am also preserved, but in a wholly different way, namely, by surrendering my antithetical relationship, my positing; [it involves] a mea-

242. [Ed.] On the lower margin; reading "assailed" is uncertain.

243. *W₂ reads:* For the elucidation of the antinomy that resides in this pathway of the soul, the distinction between the three representational modes that have been formed in this regard can also be of use.

244. *Ms. reads:* (δ)

245. [Ed.] On the postulates of practical reason, see Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 126–139 (*Werke* 5:122–134).

sure of making-to-appear and of relativity. The result is the same, whether in the form of the postulate or of one's [saying] with reference to God and redemption: "My feeling of dependence,²⁴⁶ my feeling of the need for redemption, are what come first." In either case, the genuine objectivity of truth is annulled.)

(β) *Piety* adds the insight, with regard to decision and still more with regard to universality and law, that this is the divine will, a firmly established content, and [that] power, even the power of a good decision, is a divine power. (Piety is content to abide in this quite general connection.)

(γ) The *mystical* and *churchly* [mode of representation] defines this connection between God and subjective volition and being more precisely, and brings it to consciousness in the specific form that we [have] seen—i.e., the speculative [form] of the nature of the idea.

The moral view is that of free will as subjective; the view standing over against it is the opposite, even if its content [is] the truth. And if the content is also that of spirit, it can | be represented as the grace of God or predestination—(which extends to the most wretched contingency, as in the Calvinistic view)—and as the working of grace, it can be taken as something purely external. One sees here a collision, an antinomy between the freedom of humanity and unfreedom or loss of will, a mere surrender. [103b]

93

The various churches and their ecclesiastical representations are attempts at a resolution of this antinomy, (this implicit and explicit antithesis between the divine and the finite.) But the earlier attempts to grasp this solution in thought were especially concerned with this antinomy. The Lutheran version is undoubtedly the most ingenious, although it is not speculative.²⁴⁷

The resolution provided by Christianity is to be understood thus: that it is just the moral history of the soul that is in and for itself, that the mystical, churchly [mode of representation] contains precisely the speculative content of this resolution, and that the cultus

246. [Ed.] In terms of their meaning, Hegel places the postulates of the critique of practical reason on the same level with Schleiermacher's understanding of religion; on the feeling of dependence, see above, n. 93.

247. *W₂ reads*: even if it has not yet completely attained the form of the idea.

is the resolution for each self-conscious individual. Only in this way, [consequently,] does [each individual's] own action have validity because [it is] such an action in and for itself.

If now [we have spoken of] (α) the origin, and then of [(β)] the existence and preservation [of the community, it remains finally to discuss—] [104a]

γ . The Passing Away of the Community²⁴⁸

94 ~In a formal sense, [the following sequence applies to historical phenomena]: *origin*, *preservation*, and *perishing*, with the latter following upon the former. But ought we to speak here of this sequence [if] the kingdom of God [has been] established eternally? If so, then *perishing* or *going under*²⁴⁹ would [in fact] be a *passing over* to the | kingdom of heaven [and would apply] only for single subjects, not for the community; the Holy Spirit as such has eternal life in its community. (Christ [says]: “The gates of hell shall not prevail against my teaching” [Matt. 16:18].)²⁵⁰ To speak of a *passing away* would mean to end on a discordant note.

~[We shall undertake] an empirical description of the so-called

248. [Ed.] The heading is preceded by a “c” instead of a “ γ .” It is found at the top of the last sheet of the Ms., 104a. After making a false start in the middle of sheet 103b (see below, n. 252), Hegel skipped to the top of the next sheet for this final section, leaving empty space at the bottom of 103b, to which he returned when he ran out of marginal space on sheet 104a (see below, n. 257). The version of this concluding section offered by W_2 differs in significant respects from the Ms. itself. Whether these differences derive from the Henning transcript or from editorial adjustments introduced by Bruno Bauer can no longer be determined. The variant passages are given in the footnotes at the appropriate places.

249. [Ed.] Note the interplay in this paragraph between *Untergehen* (perishing, going under), *Übergang* (passing over), and *Vergehen* (passing away).

250. W_2 reads: But if now, after having considered the origin and steady subsistence of the community, we see that in attaining realization it falls into a state of inner discord in its spiritual actuality, then its realization appears to be at the same time its passing away. But ought we to speak here of a perishing when the kingdom of God is founded eternally, when the Holy Spirit as such lives eternally in its community, and when the gates of hell are not to prevail against the church?

[Ed.] W_2 corrects Hegel's citation of Matt. 16:18 (the reference is to the church, not the teaching of Christ). But W_2 omits Hegel's statement in the Ms. that the “perishing” entails a passing over to the kingdom of heaven and applies only to individual subjects, not the community.

signs of the time.²⁵¹ [Let us] compare [our age] with the age of the Roman Empire.²⁵²

(α) Where, in how many textbooks, one might ask, is the content of the Christian faith still taken to be true [now that] the gods, and everything else that counted as true in the Greek and Roman | worlds, [have] fallen into the hands of human beings, [who themselves] create gods, and everything has been profaned? <[The Roman age was one] when rationality necessarily took refuge solely in the form of private rights and private goods because the universal unity based on religion had disappeared, along with a universal political life. [Ordinary people,] helpless and inactive, with nothing to trust, left the universal alone and took care for themselves. [It was an age] when what subsists in and for itself was abandoned even in the realm of thought. Just as Pilate asked, “What is truth?” [John 18:38], similarly in our time the quest for private welfare and enjoyment [is] the order of the day; moral insight, [the basis] of personal actions, opinions, and convictions, [is] without objective truth, and truth [is] the opposite. I acknowledge only what I believe subjectively. [For some time,] the teaching of the philosophers has corresponded [to this view]: we know and cognize nothing of God, [having] at best a dead and merely historical sort of information.>²⁵³

(β) Although among the people, i.e., the lower classes, [there is still] faith <in objective truth, the teaching of this truth is no longer justified in terms of faith, once the time has come when what is

251. [Ed.] The “signs of the time” are apocalyptic signs, contained in Jesus’ prophecy of the end of the age and the coming of the Son of Man (Mark 13, Matt. 24, Luke 21). That Hegel has this allusion in mind is confirmed by his reference to “passing away.” But the particular signs to which he refers are the signs of decadence of the Roman Empire, with which he intends to compare his own age. See the variant in W₂ contained in n. 256, which parallels the Ms. beginning with this sentence.

252. [Ed.] A doublet to these two sentences occurs opposite them on sheet 103b, following the end of the main text, written across the entire width of the sheet: “Empirical description of [present] conditions with a view to the Christian religion. It might occur to us to compare it with the age of the Roman Empire.” After writing these words, Hegel apparently decided to start a new section at the top of sheet 104a.

253. [Ed.] A reference to the Kantian view, popularized by Jacobi, that theoretical knowledge of God is not possible, only the practical faith that God exists. See Vol. 1:87 n. 15. On Hegel’s criticism of historical theology, see Vol. 1:108.

96 demanded is justification by the concept; nor is justification achieved by harshness, objective commands, and external supports, nor by the power of the state. > [If] the clergy, whose office [is] always to stimulate religion, [renounces] this service, [it falls into] mere argumentation, a particular [i.e., not universal] history, i.e., something past. When [religious truth is] treated as historical, that spells an end [to it]; then it no longer [lives] in immediate consciousness, i.e., in actuality, [as] the unity of the inner and the outer. [When] moralistic views and motivations, moralistic or subjective feelings and virtuosities,²⁵⁴ [prevail], then [something else] is put in its place—[certainly] not the speculative truth! Where [the gospel is not preached to] the poor, who [are] the ones closest to infinite anguish; where the teaching of love in infinite anguish [is abandoned in favor of] enjoyment, love without anguish; where the gospel [is] preached in a naturalistic way—[there] the salt [has] lost its savor [Matt. 5:13]. When everything [is done] in this way, and the moral man is satisfied [in] his reflection and opinion, | his conviction, in his finitude; <[when every] foundation, security, the substantive bonds of the world, [have been] tacitly removed; when [we are left] inwardly empty of objective truth, of its form and content—[then] one thing alone [remains] certain: finitude [turned] in upon itself, arrogant barrenness and lack of content, the extremity of self-satisfied dis-enlightenment.)²⁵⁵ [103b]

(What is the connection of this decay with the state of religion itself? At the point where the doctrines of religion [have become] representations, mere factual data, [what is supposedly] required [is] thinking as a reflective activity. It is what causes the secure to waver, dissolves everything dialectically, and leads it back to the subjective, whether it is an empty abstraction of the universal or is reduced to feeling, which it makes the foundation. The [common] people, in which reason remains constantly under pressure, [this] class in whose cultivation the truth can exist only in the form of representation, that is helpless vis-à-vis the pressure of its interior

254. [Ed.] *Virtuositäten*. An apparent allusion to the first edition of Schleiermacher's *Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (Berlin, 1799), where it is stated that the ability to see the infinite in everything finite, and to associate all sensations and actions with religious feelings and views, is "the true and highest goal of virtuosity in Christianity" (pp. 298–299).

255. [Ed.] "the extremity of self-satisfied dis-enlightenment" translates *Spitze*

impulses, and that experiences pain and need more concretely—indeed, infinite pain and need—[has been] abandoned by its [theological] teachers. The latter have helped themselves by means of reflection, and have found their satisfaction in finitude, subjectivity, and precisely thereby in vanity; but the [common] people, who form the substantial nucleus [of the population as a whole], cannot find its satisfaction in such things.

Instead [of allowing] reason and religion to contradict themselves, [we must] resolve the discord in the manner [appropriate] to us—[namely,] reconciliation in [the form of] philosophy.²⁵⁶ How

der Ausklärung befriedigt in sich. Hegel is here engaging in a wordplay between *Ausklärung* (“dis-enlightenment”) and *Aufklärung* (“enlightenment”), the standard term for the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. (A more vulgar overtone may also be intended, since *Aus-klärung* means literally “clearing out,” suggesting perhaps a kind of intellectual diarrhea.) This wordplay is not original with Hegel. In an appendix to the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* 2, no. 3 (1803), 60, Schelling alludes to Böttiger’s complaint that Protestant theologians have been nicknamed *Ausklärer* (“dis-enlighteners”) by representatives of the most recent idealism (namely, Schelling and Hegel). While inveighing against those who offer the “rubbish” (*Auskehrbricht*) of the Protestant Enlightenment as the highest wisdom, Schelling insists that this nickname has not been used in any writings by the idealists. Yet he himself does employ it in his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studium*, published in the same year, 1803. See *On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 96: “One of the operations of the modern pseudo-enlightenment [*Aufklärerei*]²⁵⁷—which, with respect to Christianity, might rather be called a dis-enlightenment [*Ausklärerei*]²⁵⁸—is the attempt to ‘restore’ it, as the saying goes, to its ‘original’ meaning. . . .”

256. *W₂ reads:* Only, how can it be helped? This discordant note is present in actuality. Just as in the age of the Roman Empire, because universal unity based on religion had disappeared and the divine was profaned, and because, further, universal political life was helpless and inactive, lacking in confidence, reason took refuge only in the form of private rights; or, because what subsists in and for itself was abandoned, individual well-being was elevated to the rank of an end—so too it is now. Moralistic views, personal opinions and convictions without objective truth, have attained authority, and the quest for private rights and enjoyments is the order of the day. Once the time has come when what is demanded is justification by the concept, then the unity of the internal and the external no longer exists in immediate consciousness, in actuality, and nothing is justified by faith. The harshness of an objective command, an external support, and the power of the state can effect nothing here; the process of decay has gone too deep for that. When the gospel is no longer preached to the poor, when the salt has lost its savor, and all the foundations have been tacitly removed, then the common people, for whose reason, constantly under pressure, the truth can exist only in the form of representation, are helpless vis-à-vis the pressure of their interior impulses. They are nearest to the condition of infinite anguish, but since love has been perverted into a love and an enjoyment from which all anguish is absent, they find themselves abandoned by

the present day is to solve its problems must be left up to it. In philosophy itself [the resolution is only] partial. These lectures have attempted to offer guidance to this end.)²⁵⁷ [104a]

97 ~Religion [must] take refuge in philosophy. (For [the theologians of the present day], the world [is] a passing away into [subjective reflection because it has as its] form merely the externality of contingent occurrence.²⁵⁸) | But philosophy, [as we have said, is also] partial: [it forms] an isolated order of priests—a sanctuary—[who are] untroubled about how it goes with the world, [who need] not mix with it, [and whose work is to preserve] this possession of truth. How things turn out [in the world] is not our affair.^{259 260}

their teachers. The latter have, to be sure, helped themselves by means of reflection, and have found their satisfaction in finitude, in subjectivity and its virtuosity, i.e., in vanity; but the [common] people, who form the substantial nucleus [of the population as a whole], cannot find its satisfaction in such things.

For us, philosophical knowledge has resolved this discord.

[Ed.] Note that the *Ms.* lacks the words, “Only, how can it be helped? This discordant note is present in actuality.” The remainder of the *W₂* passage represents an abbreviated smoothing-out of *Ms.* text, although the confidence reflected in the last sentence is very much qualified in the *Ms.*

257. [Ed.] Strictly speaking, this is not a marginal passage. It is written across the entire width of the bottom half of sheet 103b. It is connected to the last marginal passage on sheet 104a by reference marks for insertion at this point.

258. [Ed.] “Welt ihnen ein Vergehen in ihr; nur diese Form der Äusserlichkeit des zufälligen Geschehens.” Any construal of this passage, which we have set off with parentheses, requires guessing what the antecedents of the pronouns *ihnen* and *ihr* are intended to be.

259. *W₂* reads: But this reconciliation is itself only a partial one, lacking outward universality. Philosophy forms in this connection a sanctuary apart, and those who serve in it constitute an isolated order of priests, who need not mix with the world, and whose work is to preserve the possession of truth. How the empirical present day is to find its way out of its discord, and how things are to turn out for it, are questions that must be left up to it and are not the immediate practical business and affair of philosophy.

[Ed.] *W₂* omits the problematic sentence that we have placed in parentheses and in the last sentence adds the qualifier “immediate” before “practical business and affair,” suggesting that in the long run the practical affairs of the world may indeed be the concern of philosophy.

260. *Ms.* adds below: (Concluded 25 August 1821

Duplicated several times [Mehrmal dupliert])

[Ed.] The last phrase, written in Hegel’s hand but at a later date, presumably is a reference to the fact that in the subsequent lecture series a partial use of the *Ms.* was made for Parts II and III, *Determinate Religion* and *Consummate Religion*. We know, however, that the *Ms.* was not used again for Part I, *The Concept of Religion*, except at a few isolated points.

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION¹ THE LECTURES OF 1824

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Introduction

1. The Consummate Religion²

This is the *consummate religion*, the religion that is the being of spirit for itself, the religion in which religion has become objective to itself.³ We have called religion the consciousness of God, the

1. [Ed.] The title in G reads simply: "Part III. The Revelatory Religion," although Hegel begins the 1824 lectures by defining this religion as "the consummate religion." The titles in the other sources are as follows: D: "III. The Necessary, the Revelatory, the Christian Religion." P: "The Consummate Religion or the Revealed Religion, the Christian Religion." Ho: "Part Three. The Christian Religion."

2. [Ed.] None of the transcripts has a heading or number at this point, but one is implied by the numbers "2" and "3" that are found in G at the points marked by our second and third headings. In this initial section of the 1824 Introduction Hegel expands considerably his definition of the Christian religion as the religion "in which the *concept* of religion has become objective to itself," which is found at the beginning of the Ms., Part III. Because the concept of religion entails the *unity* of subjective consciousness and its object, namely God as absolute essence or spirit, when the concept of religion becomes objective to itself, this unity of finite and infinite consciousness comes fully to expression. For this reason, Christianity is the "consummate" or "absolute" religion—terms Hegel tends to use synonymously in this section, although elsewhere he favors the former. In the present section Hegel develops this point by warning against the danger, present in the culture and theology of the time, of thematizing *merely* the subjective element in religion, while not attending to the fact that it is *infinite* subjectivity or *absolute* spirit that is the true content of religion. Here the polemic against Schleiermacher, characteristic of the 1824 lectures, is quite evident. Hegel also transposes the comparison between present times and the Roman age, which is made at the very end of the Ms., forward into this introductory section of the 1824 lectures. Following this expanded section, he takes up the other characteristics of the Christian religion that are enumerated in the Ms., namely, that it is the revelatory religion and the religion of truth and freedom (Secs. 2–3 below).

3. Thus G, P; W (HgG/1831?) adds: —the Christian religion. In it, universal and singular spirit, infinite and finite spirit, are inseparable; their absolute identity

consciousness of the absolute essence—and that is the concept of this religion.⁴ Consciousness is inward differentiation, spirit that differentiates itself. Now, therefore, God is [present] as consciousness, or the consciousness of God means that finite consciousness has its essence, this God, as its object; and it knows the object as its essence, it objectifies it for itself. In the consciousness of God there are two sides: the one side is God, the other is that where consciousness as such stands. With the consciousness of God we arrive directly at one side, which is what we have called religion.⁵ This content is now itself an object. It is the whole that is an object to itself, or religion has become objective to itself. It is *religion* that has become objective to itself—religion as the consciousness of God, or the self-consciousness of God as the return of consciousness into itself.⁶

This religion is precisely what we have called *spirituality*. “Spirit” means precisely not what immediately is, but what is objectively for itself. Spirit is *for* spirit in such a way that the two are distinct. They are defined by their contrast: the one as universal, the other as particular; the one as inner, the other as outer; the one as infinite spirit, the other as finite spirit. ~This | distinction is religion, and at the same time religion is~⁷ the sublation of this distinction, i.e., the self-consciousness of freedom—a spirituality which was there *for us* in all the preceding formative stages of religion, but which is now the *object*. The single self-consciousness finds the consciousness of its essence in it; hence it is free in this object, and it is just this freedom that is spirituality—and this, we say, is religion. In other words, spirit is now the object. Spirit ~has been all along~⁸

is this religion and its content. *W* adds a further sentence based on *Ho*: Universal power is substance, which, since it is likewise implicitly subject, now posits this being-in-self, and so differentiates itself from itself, imparts itself to knowledge, to finite spirit. Yet in so doing, because finite spirit is a moment of itself, it remains present to itself, and even in this division of it, it returns undivided to itself.

4. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:314–318.

5. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:327–328.

6. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:317–318, 146–147.

7. *Thus P*; *G* reads: Thus there is this distinction in religion, but at the same time there is

8. *G* reads: is previously [*ist vorher*]

an object for us that stands neither [solely] on the finite nor on the universal side; rather this *relationship* of spirit to spirit—this alone is religion. It is religion, then, that has now become what is objective in that the object of finite consciousness is known as spirit by spirit; this one substance is the absolute truth for itself, the truth of everything, inasmuch as the universal is the absolute power in which everything is negated; it is posited as organic, not only as substance but as subject. The freedom of self-consciousness is the content of religion, and this content is itself the object of the Christian religion, i.e., spirit is its own object. This absolute essence distinguishes itself at one and the same time into absolute power and subject; it communicates itself in what is distinguished from it while at the same time remaining undivided, so that the other is also the whole—all this, along with its return to itself, is the concept of religion. [It] constitutes the totality of spirituality, it is the very nature of spirituality. This concept is the absolute idea, which has previously been [an object] for us in our study of religion,⁹ and [is] now itself the object [for itself]; spirit is identical with spirit.

In this religion, religion has become objective to itself; the object or content by means of which religion is fulfilled, what is objective for it, is now its *own* definition, namely that spirit is [present] only *for* spirit. Universal and singular spirit, infinite and finite spirit, are here inseparable; their absolute identity is religion, and absolute religion is the awareness of just this content. Since we have expressed it initially in this form, one can say that what is at issue here, the whole, the absolute, | is religion. One can say this in contrast with defining what is at issue—the absolute, the essential—as the majesty of God; for the latter implies that we know God only as an object that stands over and above us for all time, that we know about this object, are cognizant of it.

~At first sight,¹⁰ what theology is about is the cognition of God as what is solely objective and absolute, what remains purely and simply separate from subjective consciousness. Therefore God is an external object—like the sun or the sky—but still a thought-object.

9. *P adds*: To the extent that this also characterizes the contemporary standpoint, [Ed.] The text of *P* breaks off and the remainder of the page is blank.

10. Thus, *G, D; W (HgG/Ed?) reads*: Ordinarily,

An external object of consciousness exists where the object permanently retains the character of something other and external. In contrast with this, we can designate the concept of absolute religion as follows: what is involved here, the essence of what is involved, is not this external object but religion itself, i.e., the unity of this object with the subject, the way in which it is in the subject.

We can regard the present age as concerned with religion, with religiosity, or with piety, in which no regard is had for what is objective. People have had various religions; but—[according to] the present dogmatics,¹¹ at least—that does not matter, as long as they are pious. We cannot know God as an object, we cannot cognize him, and it is the subjective attitude that is important. This standpoint has been recognized in our earlier discussion, and we have already spoken of its one-sidedness.¹² It is the standpoint of the age, and at the same time it is a very important advance, which has validated an infinite moment; for it involves the recognition of the consciousness of subjectivity as an absolute moment. There is the same content on both sides, and this being-in-itself of both sides is religion. The great advance of our age is that subjectivity has been recognized as an absolute moment; thus subjectivity is an essential category. But everything depends on how we define it.

102 In the first place, this *must* be viewed as a great advance. For as we take it up first in the determination of consciousness, | religion is so constituted that its content flees into the distance, and seems at least to remain far off. Consciousness is [the awareness] that there is an object that is simply determined as an other and remains over against me, e.g., a mountain, sun, sky. In this characterization of consciousness, the [religious] content flees into the distance and remains remote. Religion may have whatever content it likes. When fixed at the standpoint of consciousness, its content is one that

11. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 8. Here, in the 1824 lectures, Hegel probably has in mind especially Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, which interprets the traditional content of religion as the expression of the feeling of utter dependence. See also above, Ms., n. 93.

12. [Ed.] This standpoint is criticized in Part I of the lectures; see Vol. 1:282–283. It is found more especially in the 1827 text; see Vol. 1:162–163. Also, the evaluation of the standpoint of the time that follows finds a more appropriate expression in the 1827 lectures than in the present text.

stands over and above it, and even when the specifications of supernatural revelation are added, the content still remains simply given and external to us. Along with a representation of this sort—that the divine content is merely given, inaccessible to reason, that our role is to comport ourselves passively in faith, etc.—[there is another one, namely,] that all of this is not the sole standpoint of the religion of consciousness, and that there is still room for the subjectivity of sensibility, of feeling, the subjectivity that is the result of sensibility and of divine worship.¹³ The devout submerge themselves in their object with their heart, devotion, and will; thus at the pinnacle of devotion they have sublated the separation. For their consciousness, this devotion or intensity can be considered a separation if the Spirit of God, the grace of God, is something alien to humanity, something it must allow to come upon it—an alien thing working in it, which it must allow to come upon it, in relation to which it is merely something passive and dead. Thus, as we have already noted, even in what I have called the standpoint of consciousness, there also occurs this elevation, this non-alien condition, this submersion of spirit in the depth that is no depth or the remoteness that is absolute nearness and presence instead. In contrast with this, then, there is separation, which has a different shape: the finite subject confronts the object as absolute spirit. This separation can be represented as the standpoint of the consciousness or feeling of the individual. It is against this separation that the objection is raised that what is involved here is religion as such, | i.e., the subjective consciousness that wills, inwardly senses, and purposes what is divine. Thus it is in ~the subject¹⁴ that this inseparability of subjectivity and of the other, which appears as objective, exists. The validating of this subjectivity is the important thing, or [the recognition] that this subjectivity is absolutely essential for the whole sphere of the religious relationship. Thus this standpoint elevates subjectivity into the essential characteristic of the whole

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13. Thus *P*, which reads: . . . room for subjectivity, sensibility, feeling, which are the result . . . *G*, *W*₁ read: there is also, on the other hand, subjectivity; [givenness] is not the sole standpoint. *W*₂ (*Var*) reads: there is also, on the other hand, the subjectivity of sensibility, which is the end, the result, of divine worship.

14. Thus *G*, *W*; *P* reads: religion

range of the religious relationship. There is a rather close bond between it and the freedom of spirit, in that spirit has reestablished its freedom, and there is no standpoint within which it is not at home but stands opposed to [something like] a rock. That is what is important in this definition. It is inherent in the concept of the absolute religion that it is the religion that is objective to itself, the one where religion *is* what is objective. But this is only the concept of religion; the consciousness is something else. Consciousness can have this concept as something otherworldly. This concept is one thing and the consciousness of it is another.

Hence in the absolute religion too, the concept may be this implicitly, and yet consciousness [as such] may be unfree; the third moment is the consciousness of what this concept is in itself. This is the aspect that has emerged and come to consciousness in the determination that it is religion which is here involved. But the concept—yes, even the concept—is itself still one-sided when taken as merely implicit; that is how it is in this one-sided form. Subjectivity itself here becomes one-sided or has the character of just one of the sides, is merely infinite form, pure self-consciousness. That is to say, subjectivity is pure knowledge of itself, but a knowledge that is, on its own account, contentless, void of content. It has no content because religion as such is grasped only in its implicit potential. It is not the religion that is objective to itself, but only a religion whose form is not yet ~self-determining and self-regulating,¹⁵ able to provide its own content. What has no objectivity has no content. |

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But to the extent that religion is without content, it must still *have* a content, for it is ~the right of what is true~¹⁶ always to be, although it can, to be sure, have either a truthful or a disguised form. But because the content is not self-determined through subjectivity, because it is not religion itself that is objective to itself, this content has a contingent, empirical, finite character, and a similarity with Roman times arises. The period of the Roman em-

15. *P* reads: self-determining *G* reads: real and self-regulating *W* (*HgG/Ed?*)
reads: real and self-objectifying

16. *G* reads: the right, the true *Ho* reads: the right of the truth

perors has much similarity with our own.¹⁷ ~Just because [the subject] is abstract, it is finite. This is the highest pinnacle we have reached, namely, that religion [is] what is empirical, arbitrary, contingent, etc.¹⁸ The result is that this freedom, which has a contingent content, is only one that allows a beyond to subsist as a [goal] of yearning; it simply denies spirituality as such, or what we call the standpoint of consciousness. In this way it repudiates the essential moment of spirit and thus is spiritless subjectivity.¹⁹ It is what is richest in spirit—but [in that] there is still the reversal into what is poorest in spirit.

We have said that religion is here its own content; inasmuch as it is the content, what is objective, this means that what it contains is religion. The beyond is the object, and religion as religion is only the one side, whose content stands on the side of finite subjectivity.

Thus the absolute religion has essentially the character of *subjectivity* or of *infinite form*, which is equivalent to substance. This subjectivity—we may call it knowledge, cognition, pure intelligence—is infinite form, the infinite elasticity of substance that enables it to dirempt itself inwardly and make itself its own object. Hence the content is ~an organic~²⁰ content because it is this *infinite*, substantial *subjectivity* that makes itself into the object and content. In this antithesis one side is termed the finite and the other the infinite. The infinite side—God as spirit—is when he remains above,

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17. [Ed.] See Hegel's portrayal of the religion of expediency in Vol. 2. However, a comparison of the age of the Roman Empire with the present day is not found there but in the present volume, *Ms.*, nn. 252, 256.

18. Thus P; W₂ (*MiscP*) reads: The subject, as it subsists, is comprehended as infinite, but as abstract it turns immediately into the opposite and is merely finite and limited.

19. Thus G, P; W₁ adds a passage based on Ho; Ho reads: For religion is spirit's knowledge of itself as spirit; as *pure* knowing it does not know itself as spirit and thus is not substantial but subjective knowledge. But the fact that it is *merely* subjective—and therefore *limited* subjective—knowing does not reside for subjectivity in the shape it assumes, i.e., the shape of knowledge. Rather its shape is its immediate in-itself, which it initially finds within itself, and which is thus—in knowing itself as what is utterly infinite—a feeling of its finitude, and consequently a feeling of infinitude as an otherworldly in-itself as opposed to its own for-itself. This is the feeling of longing for the unrecognized world beyond.

20. Thus G, P, W₁; W₂ (*Var*) reads: a self-identical

when he is not [present] as the living spirit of his community, [but then] he is characterized in only a one-sided way as object. This is the first point in the definition of the concept [of this religion].

This is the concept. It is the concept of the idea, of the absolute idea. The reality is now that spirit is *for* spirit, has itself as its object.

2. The Revelatory Religion

The second point in the definition is that this religion is the *revelatory religion*. God reveals himself. As we have seen, “revealing” refers to the primal division [*Urteil*] of infinite subjectivity or infinite form; it means determining oneself to be for an other. This revealing or self-manifesting belongs to the essence of spirit itself. A *spirit that is not revelatory is not spirit*. It is said that God has created the world and has revealed himself. This is spoken of as something he did once, that will not happen again, and as being the sort of event that may either occur or not occur: God could have revealed himself, he could have created the world, or not; his doing so is one of his capricious, contingent characteristics, so to speak, and does not belong to the concept of God himself. But it is the essence of God as *spirit to be for an other*, i.e., to *reveal* himself. He does not create the world once and for all, but is the eternal creator, the eternal act of self-revelation. This *actus* is what he is; this is his concept, his definition.

[True] religion is thus revelatory inasmuch as it is spirit *for* spirit. It is the religion of spirit—not a secret that has to remain closed but rather is open or revelatory and has to be for an other, but for an other that is only momentarily so. God is this process of positing the other and then sublating it in his eternal movement. Thus the essence of spirit is | to ~appear to itself, to manifest itself.²¹ [If we ask,] ~“What is revealed?”²² the answer is that what God reveals is this infinite form that we have called *subjectivity*; i.e., it is the act of determining or positing distinctions, of positing content.

21. Thus P, D; G, W₁ read: appear to itself. W₂ (MiscP) reads: appear to itself—this is what it does and this is what its vitality consists in; this is all that it does, and spirit itself consists solely in what it does.

22. Thus P; G reads: “What then does God reveal?” W (HgG) reads: “What indeed does God reveal other than that he is this process of self-revealing?”

What God reveals in this way is that he *is* manifestation, i.e., the process²³ of constituting these distinctions within himself. It is his nature and his concept eternally to make these distinctions and at the same time to take them back into himself, and thereby to be present to himself. The content that becomes manifest [*offenbar*] is what is revealed [*geoffenbart*], namely, that God is for an *other* but [also] eternally for *himself*. This is what is specified by “revealing.”

3. The Religion of Truth and Freedom

Thirdly, therefore, this religion is the religion of *truth* and the religion of *freedom*. For “truth” means that in what is objective we are not relating to something alien. “Freedom” expresses the very thing that truth is, but with a logical character of negation. The [consummate] religion is the religion of truth: it is precisely *spirit* that is for spirit, and it is so *for* spirit. *Spirit* is its presupposition; we begin with *spirit*.²⁴ In this way spirit is identical with itself, it is the *eternal* intuition of itself; i.e., it is simultaneously comprehended only as a result, an end. In this way it is both what presupposes itself and the result, and it is only as end—as this self-differentiation, this act of presupposing itself. Truth consists in the mutual adequacy to each other of what we have characterized as subject and object. That spirit as object *to itself* constitutes the reality, the concept, the *idea*: this is the truth.

Likewise, it is the religion of freedom. In the abstract, freedom means relating oneself to something objective without its being something alien. This is the same definition as that of truth, except that in the case of freedom the categorial moment of the negation of difference or of otherness is emphasized, and freedom therefore appears in the | form of *reconciliation*. Reconciliation begins with differentiated entities standing opposed to each other—God, who confronts a world that is estranged from him, and a world that is estranged from its essence. [They are] in conflict with one another, and [they are] external to one another. Reconciliation is the negation

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23. Thus G; W (HgG) reads: is the power

24. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: spirit as subject.

of this separation, this division, and means that each cognizes ~itself in the other, finds itself in its essence.²⁵ Reconciliation, consequently, is freedom and is not something quiescent;²⁶ rather it is activity, the movement that makes the estrangement disappear.

All of these [moments]—reconciliation, truth, freedom—constitute a universal process, and thus cannot be expressed in a simple proposition except one-sidedly. ~One can express it in a more determinate fashion by saying that it is posited in a religion that a representation of the unity of divine and human nature occurs.²⁷ God has become human: this therefore is a revelation. This unity is to be regarded as implicitly [present], but as revealed it is *only* what is implicit. Yet it is the movement that consists in being eternally brought forth, and this bringing forth is *liberation, reconciliation*, which is only possible precisely through what is implicit. The *substance* that is identical with itself is this unity, which as such is the foundation; but as *subjectivity* it is what brings forth. We may accept this as the concept of this religion.

That ~this idea is absolute truth²⁸—this is the result of the whole of philosophy. In its pure form it is what is logical,²⁹ but is also the result of considering the concrete world. This is the truth: that nature, life, spirit are completely organic—i.e., that everything that exists on its own account is itself just the mirror image of this idea, such that the idea presents itself in each thing as singularized, as a process involving it, so that it manifests this unity in itself. But what is singularized is not a single [entity].

4. Relation to Preceding Religions³⁰

The general relation [of the consummate religion] to the preceding religions has been expounded from the beginning [of these lectures]

25. *Thus P; G reads:* itself, finds itself and its essence, in the other.

26. *Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* or something that [merely] is;

27. *Thus P; G, W₁ read:* One specific form it takes is the assertion that in a religion the representation of the unity of divine and human nature is posited. *W₂ (Var) reads:* The principal representation is that of the unity of divine and human nature.

28. *Thus P, D; G reads:* in this alone consists the idea of absolute truth *W₁ (Ed) reads:* all there is is this idea of absolute truth *W₂ (Ed) reads:* this idea alone is absolute truth

29. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 824–825 (GW 12:236–237).

30. [Ed.] This brief concluding section of the Introduction in the 1824 lectures is much expanded in 1827. See 1827 lectures, n. 6.

and follows from what has just been said. | First we had *nature religion*, i.e., religion from the standpoint of *consciousness* alone. In the absolute religion this standpoint is still [present], but only momentarily, as a transitory moment, whereas in nature religion it was the essential determination. In nature religion God is represented as an other, in a natural configuration—sun, light, mountain, river—so that the [divine] is defined as an other; or in other words religion has only the form of consciousness.

The second form was that of *spiritual religion*, but it was the religion of the spirit that remains finitely determined; to this extent it is the religion of *self-consciousness*. ~ Here we saw absolute power, or necessity: the One who is absolute power and who is wisdom only in an abstract sense is not yet spirit because he³¹ is only abstract power—not absolute subjectivity with respect to his content but only abstract necessity, simple, abstract self-possession. Abstraction³² constitutes finitude, and it is the particular powers and gods, defined according to their spiritual content, that first constitute the totality.³³

The third form, which we are now considering, is the *religion of freedom*, the religion of ~the self-consciousness (or of the consciousness) that is *self-contained*, for in it there is equally both the objectivity of spirit and the freedom of self-possession: this is [its] definition of consciousness.³⁴ *Freedom* is the [true] definition of self-consciousness.

I. THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT OF GOD³⁵

We now proceed to the *abstract, metaphysical* concept. The *concrete* concept of this sphere [i.e., the consummate religion] is that

31. Thus *P*, similar in *D*; *G* reads: —i.e., of absolute power, of necessity, as we have seen. This One, this power, is defective, because it

[Ed.] Hegel's reference here is to Jewish religion.

32. Thus *G*, *D*, *W*₁; *W*₂ (*MiscP*) adds: in which power and necessity are still grasped at that level,

33. Thus *G*, *W*₁; *W*₂ (*MiscP*) adds: since they add real content to this abstraction. Finally,

[Ed.] Here the reference appears to be to Greek religion.

34. Thus *G* (also in *W*₁), with *P*; *W*₂ (*MiscP*) reads: self-consciousness; but at the same time it forms a consciousness of the encompassing reality, the determinacy of the eternal idea of God himself, and in this objectivity it is self-possessed.

35. [Ed.] In this section Hegel incorporates his discussion of the ontological

109 spirit is *for* spirit | and that it is itself spirit only in this way. The two sides into which spirit differentiates itself are both spirit, together they are the totality, and just this is its reality now. With the metaphysical concept, however, all we have before us is the pure, *abstract* concept in its determinations or moments, without these being this totality, without their having this concrete content. Therefore what now constitutes the metaphysical concept is that the content is the *concept*, the pure concept, and that we have only to discuss the pure concept—but it is also real per se. Concretely the pure concept is the concept that is for itself; in other words, the *concreteness of spirit* means that spirit inwardly differentiates itself into itself, inwardly opposes itself and sets itself as another spirit over against itself. The definition we have here is that we have the pure concept, which realizes itself, which is in itself real; and we here call this determination merely “reality”—in other words, [it has] also to be defined vis-à-vis the concept as either being or existence [*Existenz*]. But there is a content in it, too—and this content is God, but God as represented, not God as spirit internally developed; and we shall see that it is the pure concept. In appearance, however, we have the concept of God—the fact that it is the concept of God that *realizes* itself; but, as we shall see, what ultimately matters here is the general relationship of the concept to reality or to being.

The content seems to be a determinate concept; [it seems that] the discussion is about the concept of God, and that his being follows from his concept. And it seems, at first, that we are discussing a determinate or specific concept of God, not the concept generally. But we shall see that this content “God” dissolves itself, that it essentially has the meaning of the *unity* of the concept; i.e., it has the meaning both of the pure concept and of reality, and of the unity of the two.

The metaphysical concept is the concept of God and *the unity of that concept with reality*. In the form of the proof of God’s being [*Sein*], of the determinate being [*Dasein*] of God, of the existence

proof of the existence of God. Cf. Sec. A of the Ms. Our heading is similar to that in *Ho*.

[*Existenz*] of God, what we have is a proof which is just this transition or mediation: that God's being follows from his concept. This is what is called the *ontological proof*. |

It should be noted that in the other proofs³⁶ we proceeded from finite being, which was the immediate, and from it we concluded to the infinite, the genuine being that appeared for us in the form of infinitude, necessity, absolute power, the power that is at the same time wisdom, and posits its own ends inwardly. But here our starting point is the concept, and the transition is from the concept to being. Both ways are necessary, and in order to demonstrate *this* unity it is necessary to begin both from being and from the concept, for the identity of the two is what is genuine. Both the concept and being (determinate being, the world, the finite) are one-sided ~determinations, and only³⁷ in the idea is their truth to be found, i.e., the truth that they are both *posited*. Neither of them must be defined solely as the term that permanently has the initiative or is the origin; they must rather be portrayed as passing over into the other, i.e., each of them must be a posited term. In this way each displays itself as a transition into an other, or as a moment, so that it must be demonstrated of both of them that they are *moments*. This transition has two opposite meanings: each term is portrayed as a moment; i.e., on the one hand, as what has being, it is something that passes over—essentially it is by passing over from the immediate to the other (so that each of them is reduced to something merely *posited*); on the other hand, each term also has the significance that it is posited by something else, it is brought forth. For if a determination is shown to have been brought forth, then it has equally been shown to be merely something set up. In this transition each term sets itself down as something transient, not genuinely primitive. The other is then what has issued forth from it. Hence the one side is movement, the passing over from finite to infinite, but so too is the other.

36. [Ed.] The cosmological and teleological proofs, which, in the 1824 lectures as well as 1821, are treated in Part II in relation to the various determinate religions.

37. Thus G, similar in P, D; W continues as in Ho; Ho reads: determinations, each of which turns into the other, proving in the first place that it is not an independent moment and, secondly, that it produces the other, which it carries within itself. Only

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Now we see the transition from concept to being. Here the argument begins from the concept, and more directly from the concept of *God*. The transition to being is to be demonstrated from this content, or from this concept. This is the first point; but secondly it must | at once be said that the category of "being" is in fact totally impoverished; it is the relation of self-identity, abstract equality with self, the ultimate abstraction—affirmation, indeed, but in its ultimate abstraction, completely indeterminate immediacy and self-reference. So if there were nothing more in the concept of God, or [in] the concept as such, then at least this utterly poor abstraction must belong to it. For the concept itself is defined only as infinitude or, in a more concrete sense, as the unity of universal and particular, as the universality that particularizes itself and so returns into itself. Thus this negation of the negative is the sublation of the difference, this relation to self *is* being, taken abstractly. This determination, this self-identity, is *ipso facto* essentially contained in the concept.

In the third place it must be said that the transition from concept to being is ~of the utmost importance~³⁸ and holds the deepest interest for reason. To grasp this relationship of concept to being is also the special concern of our time. We must now explain in more detail the reason why this transition or relationship is of such interest. The appearing of this antithesis between concept and being is a sign of *subjectivity*, a sign that subjectivity has attained its being-for-self³⁹ and has arrived at totality.⁴⁰ The essential characteristic of the revelatory religion is the form through which substance is spirit.⁴¹ This antithesis of concept and being appears so difficult and endless because reality—this one side that we have called the side of *subjective spirit*—because finite spirit has arrived inwardly at the comprehension of its infinitude. Only when the

38. Thus P; D reads: the most important point G reads: very weighty W (HgG) reads: very weighty and informative

39. Thus G, D; W (Ed?) reads: the culminating point of its being-for-self Ho reads: its culminating point, its being-for-self

40. Thus G, P; Ho adds, similar in W: inwardly to know itself as absolute and infinite.

41. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (MiscP/Var?) adds: The one side in the antithesis is the subject restored to itself, i.e., the realization of the idea in its concrete significance.

subject is the totality and has inwardly attained this freedom, this | infinitude that belongs to it, only then is it being. Then it is the case that *this* subject is indifferent to *this* being, that the subject is *for itself* and being stands over against it as an indifferent other. Then, too, the other is a thing-in-itself, something that stands over against it, a reality that exists outside it. This is the specific reason why the antithesis can appear to be endless; and at the same time, therefore, the impulse to resolve the antithesis is present in the subject. The requirement that this antithesis—this other—should be resolved is directly involved in the subject's totality, but the task of sublating it has become infinitely difficult just because the antithesis itself is so endless, and the other, as something out there beyond it, is so entirely free.

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This then is the grandeur of this standpoint, the standpoint of the modern world: that the subject has so sunk itself within itself that the finite knows itself as infinite and in this infinitude it is afflicted with finitude, is afflicted with this antithesis that it is driven to resolve. The question now is how it is to be resolved. This antithesis pertains to modern times. How is it to be resolved?⁴² I am the subject, I am free, I am a person for myself, and outside me there is a world. Precisely because I am free, I freely let that other go from me too, the other that is "out there" and remains so. The ancients did not arrive at this antithesis, they did not come to this estrangement. To reach it is the highest capacity of spirit, and to be spirit is nothing but the grasping of this antithesis, the comprehending of oneself infinitely within it. The way the standpoint is given for us now is that we have the *concept* of God on the one side, and on the other side, set against the concept, we have *being*. What is required, therefore, is the mediation of the two, in such a way that the concept, which is self-contained infinitude, resolves itself into being, and that being is *conceived* from the concept. What this proof requires is that what is purely and simply other, the contrary of the concept, should proceed from the concept. The |

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42. Thus G, P; W adds a sentence based on Ho; Ho adds: The infinite is thus confronted by an infinite, and consequently posits the infinite as finite, in such a way that the subject, owing to its infinitude, [is] compelled to sublimate the antithesis, which has itself penetrated to its own infinity.

way this happens, and the form that it has for understanding, must now be briefly expounded.

As we have already said, the shape that this mediation takes is what is called the ontological proof of the existence of God, the argument that takes the concept of God as its starting point. But what is the concept of God? The concept of God is fixed as follows: God is the most real of all essences, the conceptual sum of all reality;⁴³ he can only be grasped affirmatively, he is inwardly determined, a content, but one that is to contain no limitation; he is the whole of reality but is only reality, without limitation; but in fact this leaves us with only a dead abstraction, as we remarked earlier.⁴⁴ The second point is [to show] that this concept is possible, that it contains no contradiction, and [this] is shown⁴⁵ according to the canon of the understanding.⁴⁶ About this second point it is said that being is a reality, while nonbeing is a negation, a lack, utterly antithetical. Being⁴⁷ is therefore reality, and hence it figures among the real predicates of God. God contains all reality; being is a reality; therefore he also contains this reality, being.⁴⁸

The next point is Kant's objection to this proof, an objection that has become universal, a refutation of the proof that all the world takes for granted. Kant says, to be precise, that on the one hand we have the concept of God—but that we cannot “pluck” [*herausklauben*] being from this concept, for being is something other than the concept. The two are distinguished and opposed to each other; therefore the concept cannot contain being; “being” stands opposed to it. He goes on to say that “being” is not a “reality.” “Being is not a reality, therefore it”⁴⁹ is not contained in

43. [Ed.] On the concept of the most real essence, see above, Ms., n. 34. On the designation of the *ens realissimum* or the *omnitudo realitatis* as the conceptual sum of all reality, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 601, B 610–611.

44. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:116 n. 8, 117 n. 9, 125–128.

45. Thus P with G; Ho, W read: The possibility of this concept, i.e., its identity without any contradiction, is exhibited

46. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 49.

47. Thus G; P reads: being utterly antithetical. That [being] W (HgG) reads: utterly antithetical. The third point is the conclusion. Being

48. [Ed.] See Descartes, *Meditations* 5 (pp. 136 ff.). See also above, Ms., n. 34.

49. Thus P; G reads: All reality is attributed to God, therefore being

the concept of God, so that it is not a determination of content, or predicate. "Being is no predicate and therefore not a "reality."⁵⁰ Whether I imagine a hundred thalers or actually possess them makes no difference; the content is one and the same whether I possess them or imagine them.⁵¹ Kant thus takes the content as | that which *constitutes* the concept; it is not what is *contained* in the concept. One can say this, to be sure, if one understands by "the concept" the determination of content, and distinguishes that from the *form*, which contains thought on the one side and being on the other. All content is thus on the side of the concept, and being is the other to this content. What this amounts to is (briefly) that the concept is not being and the two are distinct; this is the basic notion, to which frequent reference has already been made. We have no cognition of God, we know nothing of him; to be sure, we can form concepts of him, but the fact that we form a representation of this kind does not mean that these concepts are so. This, then, is what the Kantian destruction of the proof reduces to.

We know quite well, of course, that one can build castles in the air, but that this does not bring them into existence. Thus the argument has a popular appeal, which is why Kant has, in the general judgment, produced a refutation [of the ontological argument].⁵²

Anselm of Canterbury, a thoroughly learned philosophical theologian of the twelfth century, set forth the proof as follows. God is what is most perfect, the conceptual sum of all reality; but if God is merely a representation, merely a thought or concept, he is not what is most perfect, for we regard as perfect only that which is not merely represented but also has being.⁵³ This is entirely correct, and it is a presupposition that underlies all philosophy. If it is permitted to make presuppositions, this presupposition is one that all persons hold within themselves, namely, that what is only represented is only imperfect, and only what also has reality is

50. *Thus P; G reads:* Being is therefore not a "reality." *Ho reads, similar in W:* but only pure form.

51. [Ed.] See above, Ms., nn. 35, 38.

52. *Thus G; W (HgG) adds:* and won the masses over to his side.

53. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 30.

perfect.⁵⁴ Now God is what is most perfect, therefore he must be real, he must have being, just as he is concept. Our notions include both the view that concept and representation are different, and likewise the view that what is merely imagined is very imperfect, whereas God is also ~what is most perfect.⁵⁵ | Kant does not demonstrate the difference between concept and being; it is merely accepted in popular fashion. We grant its validity where we can appeal to sound human sense, [i.e., where we speak] of imperfect things and representations.

To establish the case more soundly, [the following] remark must be made regarding this form, whether we mean the form of the Anselmian proof or the form of the argument adduced in the proof nowadays. The latter runs as follows: God is the conceptual sum of all forms of reality; consequently he also includes being.⁵⁶ This is entirely correct. Being is so poor a determination that it belongs immediately to the concept. The other point, however, is that being and concept are also different from one another. Being and thinking, the real and the ideal, reality and ideality, are different from and opposed to each other. True difference is also opposition in any case, and the task therefore is to sublimate this antithesis. The unity of the two determinations has to be demonstrated in such a way that it results from the negation of the antithesis, and it is shown that being is contained in the concept. [To talk of] this reality as "unrestricted" is only to utter empty words, mere abstractions.⁵⁷ So the first step is that the determination of being is exhibited as affirmatively contained in the concept; this then is the unity of concept and being.

But in the second place they are also different from each other; thus their unity is the negative unity of the two, and the task now is to sublimate the difference. The difference must be spoken of also, and what has to be done is to establish and demonstrate the unity *after* this differentiation. This demonstration is the task of logic.⁵⁸

54. Thus G, P; W adds, following Ho: that truth is only what is, as well as being *thought*. Ho adds: that only what is, as well as being *thought*, contains truth.

55. Thus W (HgG/Ed?); G reads: the most perfect [representation].

56. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 49.

57. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 47.

58. [Ed.] See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, esp. pp. 81 ff., 705 ff. (GW 11:43–44, 12:127 ff.).

That the concept *is* the movement by which it determines itself to be, that it is this dialectical movement of self-determination into being, or into its own opposite—this logical dimension is a further development, which we do not find in the ontological proof—and this is where it is defective.

Let us now consider first the form of the Anselmian proof and then compare with it the view of the present time.

Concerning the form of Anselm's thought, we have remarked that his argument goes that the concept of God *presupposes* reality because God is what is most perfect. Another point to notice is this: I have said that the essential thing, the first point at issue, is the transition from concept to reality, i.e., that the concept objectifies itself and that, properly speaking, it makes no difference whether what has to realize itself is the concept of *God*—although it seems that this necessity can only hold good [for] God. The point is that the concept objectifies itself for itself.

So, then, that God is what is most perfect is presupposed. But when he is only posited in the imagination, without reality, then he is not that; and it is when measured against what is most perfect that the mere concept of God appears to be deficient. The criterion is the concept of perfection, and by that criterion God as mere concept, thought, the subjectivity of this content of God, is inadequate. God is supposedly what is most perfect; God in the form of thought does not correspond to this. God is what is most perfect; it is this then [that is here presupposed].

The second thing to note in this connection is that the "perfect" is only an indeterminate notion [*Vorstellung*].⁵⁹ What is it then to be perfect? For it to be something determinate, the perfect must be defined. The definition of what is "perfect" we can see immediately in what is counterposed to the referent of this notion. For what is imperfect is just the mere thought of God, and hence the perfect is the unity of the thought (or the concept) with reality. Thus this unity is here presupposed. The perfect, therefore, is not mere subjective being but objectivity.

The third point is that since God is posited as what is most perfect, he has no further definition [in the argument]. He is only

59. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 32.

what he is; he is only what is perfect, and what is perfect is the unity of the concept with reality. He only *is* as such, and this is his determinateness. Hence it is evident that the only thing that is properly relevant here is this unity of concept and reality. This unity is the definition of perfection and of God himself at the same time. It is also in fact the definition of the idea in general; but it is only the abstract idea, and certainly there is more than that involved in the definition of God. |

The second point [regarding what has just been said] about Anselm's way of [abstracting] the concept is that its presupposition is in fact the unity of concept and reality. This is why the proof cannot afford satisfaction for reason, since the presupposition is precisely what is at issue. That this presupposition should now be proved, that the concept sublates its one-sidedness, that it determines itself implicitly, objectifies itself, realizes itself, this is a further insight which [needs] first to have emerged from the nature of the concept. This insight, which is not present—and could not occur—in Anselm or even in later times, is an insight into the extent to which the concept itself sublates its one-sidedness. This is one of the most important points.

The other thing [we said we would do] is to compare Anselm's position with the view of our own time, which derives in particular from Kant. According to this view, to say that we think is to say this: that we intuit and we will, and our willing and intuiting is accompanied by thinking. We think too, we comprehend too; a human being is a concrete [being] of sensation, and also a rational [being]. Secondly, so we are told, the concept of God—the idea as such, the infinite, the unlimited in general—is *only* a concept that we make for ourselves; we should not forget that it is only a concept and its place is in our heads. Why do we say, "It is only a concept, it is the indeterminate, and hence it is only something imperfect"? The concept is something imperfect inasmuch as thinking, conceiving, is only one quality, one human activity among others. That is to say that we measure our comprehension by the reality that we have before us, and by concrete human beings. To be sure, human beings do not just think, they are also sentient, and even in thought they can have sensible objects. In fact this is the merely

subjective aspect of conceiving, that we only find it to be imperfect on account of the criterion we have, since this criterion is the concrete human being. One might also say that the concept is declared to be only a concept and that the sensible is declared to be reality. What we can grasp with our hands, what we see, feel, or sense, this is what we call reality—a sensory datum, something sensed. So reality is also what we have sense awareness of—so far as that goes. One could assert this, and indeed many people do say it. They acknowledge as actual only what they sense; however, the fact that there are people who ascribe actuality only to the sensible, not to the spiritual, is not such a terrible tragedy. It is the concrete | human nature, the total subjectivity of human beings, that hovers before their eyes as the whole and [that they] take as a yardstick. By that standard, conceiving is conceiving and nothing more. 118

When we now compare the two, Anselm's pattern, his thought, and the thought of the present day, what they have in common is the fact that they both make presuppositions. Anselm presupposes perfection, which in itself is still indeterminate, while the modern view ~presupposes concrete~⁶⁰ humanity as such in a general sense. Compared with perfection on the one hand and this empirically concrete unity on the other, the concept is seen as something one-sided and unsatisfying. In the thought of Anselm the definition of perfection also has, in fact, the sense that it is the unity of concept and reality. Later on, in Descartes and in Spinoza too,⁶¹ God is the first reality; in God we find the absolute unity of thought with ~space,⁶² *cognito ergo sum*, absolute substance—it is the same in Leibniz too.⁶³ What we thus have on one side is the presupposition

60. Thus P, similar in G, W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: presupposes the concrete subjectivity of

61. [Ed.] Hegel alludes to the connection seen by Descartes between the *cogito ergo sum* and the idea of God: Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1:13, 14 (pp. 189–190); and *Discourse on Method* 4 (pp. 27 ff.). With regard to Spinoza, see his *Ethics*, Part I, Definition vi; Part II, Props. i, ii (*Chief Works* 2:45, 83–84).

62. Thus P; G reads: the sensible W (HgG/Ed?) reads: being

63. [Ed.] An exact source for this brief allusion cannot be found in Leibniz's work. Hegel may have in mind those passages in which God is indeed understood as substance, but the difference is emphasized between God as original substance and the monads as created substances. See Leibniz, *Monadology* 48 (*Selections*, p. 542); and *Brief an Bierling vom 12. August 1711* (*Philosophische Schriften* 7:502).

of what is concrete in fact, as the unity of thought and being; and measured by this standard, the subjective concept appears defective. The modern view insists that this is as far as we can go, to say that the concept is only the concept, the concept is as it were placed on one side, and does not correspond to the concrete. Anselm, on the other hand, says we must give up wanting to let the subjective concept stand as something firm and independent; on the contrary, we must get away from this one-sidedness and [begin from] the unity of subjective and objective in general.

Both views have in common that they have presuppositions; the difference is that the modern view is based on the concrete, while the metaphysical, Anselmian view is based on absolute thought, the absolute idea, which is the unity of concept and reality. The old view is superior insofar as it takes the concrete to be not empirical human beings and empirical actuality but thoughts. It does not take
 119 its stand on the claim that we must hold fast to the imperfect, | adhere to the subjective concept; [instead it takes its stand on] a concept that is at the same time reality. There is an unresolved contradiction in the modern view because both what is concrete and the one-sided subjective concept are accepted as valid. Now in recognizing the concrete, we have already passed beyond the subjective concept. But it is the subjective concept that is valid and must be accepted as something subjective; one must stand by it, one must not pass beyond it. Thus the older view is at a great advantage in that it is founded on the idea; in one respect the modern view is more advanced, in that it posits the concrete as unity of the concept and reality, whereas the former view took its stand upon an abstract form of perfection. But on the other hand [it has] lapsed into the empirical way of looking at things. Certainly Descartes and Spinoza made further progress in the defining of "the perfect." But in saying that substance is the unity of concept and being, Spinoza [and Descartes⁶⁴] were merely presupposing it to be so, and not proving it. It is only thinking that has that unity immediately before it.

64. [Ed.] Hegel most likely is alluding to Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy* 1:51, 52 (pp. 206–207). Regarding Spinoza, see n. 61.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF GOD⁶⁵

Our next step is to proceed to concrete representation, to the development and more specific determination of the idea.

We have defined the metaphysical concept as the concept that realizes itself, the one that is itself real; the whole of finitude subsists within it. God is the absolute idea, the fact that reality matches the concept. What we have called reality in the metaphysical concept is now reality as such, being, etc. But, more precisely, it is not *natural* being. In nature religion, "being" was naturalness in general—the sky, the sun, etc. The reality we are now speaking of constitutes the determinateness of God. It is not something natural. Similarly, God's determinateness is not constituted by a predicate or a plurality of predicates. "Predicates" (characteristics such as wisdom, justice, goodness) are not, to be sure, natural and immediate; but they are stabilized by reflection—[each predicate is] a content that has attained through reflection the form of universality, of relation to self. Thus each determinate content has become just as immovable, just as rigidly *for itself*, as the natural content was to begin with. About the natural we say, "It is." These "predicates" are just as self-identical as [natural] immediacy. The predicates do

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65. [Ed.] This is the second main section of the 1824 lectures, corresponding to Sec. B, "Concrete Representation," in the Ms. As we have noted above (see Ms., n. 39, and the Editorial Introduction), Hegel revised the Ms. at this point, possibly when he made use of it in 1824, so as to indicate that the "concrete representation" of the Christian religion entails the "determination" or "development" of the idea of God (these words are almost exactly repeated at the beginning of this section in the 1824 lectures). The idea of God "develops" (for the consummate religion, at least) in terms of the three moments of the Trinity—in representational language, the "persons" of the Father, Son, and Spirit; in conceptual language, the moments of divine self-identity, self-differentiation, and self-return. These yield the three "elements" that constitute the substance of Hegel's speculative redescription of the Christian religion. Before proceeding to the "first element," Hegel offers a survey or "division of the subject," just as he did in 1821. To highlight the structural difference between the 1824 lectures and the Ms. at this point we prefer "The Development of the Idea of God" as a title, although "Concrete Representation" could also be used, and indeed the latter is found as a heading in *D*, *P*, and *Ho*. But in 1824, "Concrete Representation" includes "Community, Cultus" as the third element.

not correspond to the reality of the concept; the reality of the concept is more precisely the first [natural] reality, namely, that the concept in itself is real, wholly free totality, free totality present to itself. The one side, spirit, the subjective side, the concept, is itself the idea, while the other side, reality, is likewise the whole or spirit, posited at the same time as distinct. Reality is thus the reality of the idea itself, in such a way that each side is the idea, the free idea, present to itself, so that spirit, this idea, knows itself, is present to itself. It is real, places itself vis-à-vis [itself] as another spirit, and is then the unity of the two. And this is what the idea is.

The next point is to explicate the idea [of God in its self-development] as follows. Universal spirit—the totality that it is—posits itself [*setzt sich*] in its three determinations, i.e., it develops itself, realizes itself; and it is complete only at the end, which is at the same time its presupposition [*Voraussetzung*]. At first, it is in itself as the totality; [then] it sets itself forth [*setzt sich voraus*], and likewise it is only at the end.⁶⁶

We thus have to consider spirit in the three forms, *the three elements*, into which it posits itself. These three forms are: (1) Eternal being, within and present to itself—the form of *universality*. (2) The form of *appearance*, that of *particularization*, of being for others. (3) The form of return from appearance into itself, the form of *absolute singularity*, of absolute presence-to-self.⁶⁷

It is in these three forms that the divine idea explicates itself. Spirit is the divine history, the process of self-differentiation, of

66. [Ed.] Hegel is here engaged in a wordplay based on the verb *setzen*: *sich setzt* (“posits itself”), *Voraussetzung* (“presupposition”), and *setzt sich voraus* (“sets itself forth [or forward]”). Spirit must not merely posit itself “in itself” (*an sich*); it must also “set itself forth” or “appear” in the world in order to arrive at its end and thus *be* spirit in the full sense. For this reason the end is at the same time the “presupposition” (*Voraussetzung*) of spirit. This wordplay is repeated several times below.

67. [Ed.] With the distinction between “universality” [*Allgemeinheit*], “particularization” [*Partikularisation*], and “singularity” [*Einzelheit*], Hegel alludes to the three determinate categories of the concept and to the three figures of the syllogism. See *Science of Logic*, pp. 600 ff., 666 ff. (GW 12:32 ff., 92 ff.); and *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 183–187. Thus this first form of the distinction can be considered the logical distinction, as compared with those that follow, based on subjective consciousness, space, and time.

diremption and return into self; it is the *divine* history and therefore is to be viewed in each of the three forms.

These three forms are also determined as follows in regard to *subjective consciousness*. The first form [is determined] as the element of *thought*, that God is in pure thought as he is in and for himself; he is manifest but not yet issued forth into appearance—God in his eternal essence, present to himself, yet manifest. The second form is that he is [present] in the element of *representation*, in the element of particularization, that consciousness is entrapped in its relation to the other; this is appearance. The third element is that of | *subjectivity* as such. Partly this subjectivity is immediate subjectivity, disposition, thought, representation, sensation, but also it is partly a subjectivity that is the concept, i.e., it is thinking reason, the thinking of free spirit, which is inwardly free only through the return [into itself].

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We can also explain these three forms as follows. We can say that these histories take place as it were in different *locales*. Thus the first divine history is *outside the world*, it is not in space, but outside finitude as such—God as he is in and for himself. The second locale is the *world*, the divine history as real, God having his determinate being in the world. Thirdly there is the *inner place*, the community, first of all in the world, but also the community insofar as it simultaneously raises itself to heaven, or already has heaven within itself on earth—the community which, as the church, is full of grace, and in which God is active and present.

We can then define these three elements differently in regard to *time*. Thus the first element is God outside of time, God as the eternal idea in the element of the pure thought of *eternity*, but eternity only in the sense in which it is set against time. This time that is in and for itself explicates itself by unfolding into past, present, and future. The second element is the divine history as appearance, but as a *past* time; it is [there], for appearance means something that is, that has being, but it has a mode of being that has been reduced to mere show. As appearance it is an immediately determinate being, which is simultaneously negated; this is the past—exactly what is called history, which proves itself to be mere appearance by the very fact that it is *only* history. The third element

122 is the *present*, but only the limited present, not the eternal present as such but the present that distinguishes past and future from itself. This is the element of heart and mind, of immediate subjectivity—the spiritual “now” as it is in this [single] individual. But this present has also to be the third element; the community raises itself to heaven as well. So it is a present that raises itself, it is essentially reconciled, brought to consummation through the negation of its immediacy, consummated in universality, but in a consummation that is not yet achieved, and which must therefore be grasped as *future*—a now of the present that | has consummation before its eyes; but because the community is posited now in the order of time, the consummation is distinguished from this “now” and is posited as future. These are the three universal ideas in which we have to consider the divine history.

It should be noted that I have not made the distinctions that I made previously between *concept*, *figure*, and *cultus*;⁶⁸ in the subsequent treatment we shall in fact see how the relationship [among the forms of the divine idea also] enters into the cultus. In general it may be remarked that the element in which *we* exist is [that of] the Spirit. Spirit is simply self-manifestation, it is utterly *for* itself. So as it is grasped, it is never found alone but always has the character of being utterly manifest or of being for an other, for its *own* other, i.e., for the side that is finite spirit. And the cultus is the relationship of finite spirit to absolute spirit. Accordingly, we at once find before us the cultic aspect in each of these elements.

In this connection we have to distinguish between how the idea is for the *concept* in the various elements and how this comes to *representational* expression. Religion is universal and does not exist only for educated, conceptual thought, for philosophical conscious-

68. [Ed.] A reference to the categories by means of which the determinate religions were treated in Part II. These categories were carried over to the consummate religion in the Ms. but were dropped in 1824 and thereafter, for the reasons explained in the Editorial Introduction. Hegel here uses the term *Gestalt* (“figure”) instead of the more commonly employed *Vorstellung* (“representation”). He notes here that the cultus is to be included among the three forms in which the idea of God develops (as the “third element”), rather than being added on as a separate topic.

ness; instead the truth of the idea of God is manifest for representational consciousness and ~it has this necessary characteristic: that it *must* be universal[ly accessible] for representation.”⁶⁹

A. THE FIRST ELEMENT:
THE IDEA OF GOD IN AND FOR ITSELF

The first element in which we have to consider the idea of God is the element of thought, the idea in its eternal present, as it is for free thought, the thought whose basic character is to be untroubled light, or identity with itself. This is an element that is not yet burdened by other-being.

In this element too a defining character is necessary because thinking *in general* is different from *conceptual* thinking as | such. The eternal idea is in and for itself in thought, as the idea in its absolute truth. Therefore religion essentially has a content, and the content is an object. Religion is *human* religion, and (among its other modes) human consciousness is *thinking* consciousness, so that the idea must also be [available] for thinking consciousness. But it is not only in this way (not just among other modes) that the human being is a thinker. It is in thinking that humanity truly exists for the first time. The universal object, the essence of the object, *is* only for thinking, and since in religion God is the object, he is such essentially for thinking. He is *object* just as spirit is consciousness, and he is *for thinking*, because it is God who is the object.

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It is not for sensory or reflective consciousness that God can have being *as God*, i.e., in his eternal essentiality in and for itself. His *appearance* is another matter: appearance *is* for the sentient consciousness. But if God were *merely* in sensation, human beings would stand no higher than the animals; to be sure, God also is for feeling, but only in his appearance. Nor is he ~this or that limited

69. Thus G, W_1, W_2 (Var) reads: has the necessary characteristics that are inseparable from representation.

content for the argumentative consciousness (the thinking of the well-ordered understanding).⁷⁰ God is not that kind of content either. He is therefore essentially *for thought*. This is what we have to say if we take the subjective, the human, as our starting point. But we also arrive at precisely the same point if we begin with God. Spirit only is as a self-revealing, a self-differentiation *for spirit*. This [other] spirit, for which it *is*, is the eternal idea, thinking spirit, spirit in the element of its freedom. In this field God is the act of *self-revealing* because he is spirit; but he is not yet the act of *appearing*. Thus it is of the essence that God is for spirit.

124 The second point to note is that spirit *thinks* spirit. In this pure thinking there is initially no difference that divides them; there is nothing between them. Thinking is pure unity with itself, | where all obscurity and darkness disappears. This thinking can also be called pure *intuition*, as the simple activity of thinking, such that between the subject and object there is no [difference] and, properly speaking, subject and object are not yet present. This thinking has no limitation, it is this wholly universal activity, and the content is only the universal itself. *Thinking is simply knowing*.⁷¹

The third point is that the absolute diremption is also differentiation. How does this come about? *Thinking as actus* is indeterminate.⁷² The very first distinction is for the two sides we have seen to be distinguished as the two modes of the principle, according to the starting point adopted. One side, that of subjective thinking, is the movement of thinking insofar as it begins from immediate, singular being and elevates itself therein to the universal, to the infinite, as we have seen it do in the first proofs of the existence of

70. *G reads*: for the argumentative consciousness, for the thinking of the well-ordered understanding, nor for this or that limited content. *W₁ reads*: for the argumentative consciousness, for the thinking of its well-ordered understanding, in accord with this or that limited content. *W₂ (Var) reads*: for the argumentative consciousness; while reflecting is a form of thinking, it is also contingency, for which the content is any limited content. *Ho reads*: for the argumentative consciousness nor [for that] of reflective thinking, whose content is purely contingent, since such thinking, as lacking content, must itself receive its content as something given.

71. Thus *D*; *W₂ following Ho reads*: It [i.e., pure thinking] is pure inward pulsating. *Ho reads*: He [i.e., God] is pure inward pulsating.

72. Thus *G*, *W₁*; *W₂ (Var) reads*: *Actus* imposes no limitation on thinking.

God. To the extent that it has arrived at the universal, thinking is unlimited; its end is infinitely pure thinking in which all the mist of finitude has disappeared. At that point it thinks God: all particularity has disappeared, and thus religion, the thought of God, begins. The second side is that which adopts the other starting point, which proceeds from the universal, from the result of the first side—a result that is also movement—from the universal, from thinking, from the concept; ~and hence⁷³ it consists in differentiating itself inwardly, but keeping the difference *within itself* in such a way that it does not disturb the universality. The universality is here one that has a distinction within itself, yet is in harmony with itself. This is the abstract content of thinking, i.e., it is abstract thinking, it is the result ~that has elevated itself.⁷⁴

The two sides stand opposed to each other ~as follows. The first and simpler | mode of thinking⁷⁵ is also a process, an inward mediation; but this process goes on outside it, it is so to speak beyond it, behind this thought. Only insofar as the thought has elevated itself does religion begin. Thus there is in religion pure, motionless, abstract thinking; the concrete, on the other hand, pertains to its *object*, for this is the thinking that starts from the universal, differentiates itself [from it], yet is in harmony with it. This concrete element is the object for thinking simply as such. So this thinking, as such, is abstract thinking and therefore it is *finite* thinking; for the abstract is finite. The concrete is the truth, the *infinite* object. 125

Regarding the content more specifically, the following remarks need to be made. We have long been familiar with them, so we can be brief. There is little to be said about them, and we need only call to mind what is essential.

In the first place, God is spirit; in his abstract character he is defined as universal spirit that particularizes itself. This is the ab-

73. Thus G, W_1 , similar in D ; W_2 (Var) reads: But the universal in turn is also movement within itself, and

74. Thus G, W_1 ; W_2 (Var) reads: that has emerged.

75. Thus G, W_1 ; D reads: in such a way that subjective thinking [is] simple thinking. It W_2 (Var) reads: as follows. Subjective thinking, the thinking of finite spirit,

solite truth, and the religion that has this content is the true religion. In the Christian religion this is what is called the *Trinity*—it is “triune” insofar as number categories are applied. It is the God who differentiates himself but remains identical with himself in the process. The Trinity is called the *mystery* of God; its content is mystical, i.e., speculative. But what is for reason is not a secret. In the Christian religion one *knows*, and this is a secret only for the finite understanding, and for the thought that is based on sense experience. There the distinctions are immediate, and natural things are accepted as valid; this is the mode of externality. But as soon as God is defined as spirit, externality is sublated, and for sense this is a mystery; for sense everything is external to everything else—objects change, and the senses are aware of them in different ways. The changing is itself a sensible process, occurring in time. The sun exists: once it did not exist, some day it will not exist—all these states are external to one another in time. “The being [of a thing] is *now*, and its⁷⁶ nonbeing is separated from now; for time is what keeps the determinations apart from one another, | external to one another. For the understanding too [nonbeing] is other [than being]; thus the understanding, like the sensible [realm], is a holding fast to abstract characteristics in such a way that each exists on its own account. The negative is distinct from the positive; so for the understanding it is something else.

Certainly, when we say “Trinity” or “triune,” the unfortunate formal pattern of a number series (1, 2, 3) comes into play. Reason can employ all the *relationships* of the understanding, but only insofar as it destroys the *forms* of the understanding. And so it is with the Trinity. Hence the very word “triune” is an extreme of misuse as far as the understanding is concerned—for it believes the mere fact of the formula being used establishes its rights; but to use it as one does here to say “three equals one” is to misuse it. Consequently it is an easy matter to point out contradictions in such ideas, distinctions that go to the point of being opposites.⁷⁷ Everything concrete, everything living contains contradiction within

76. G reads: Their being is *now*, and their

77. Thus G; W (HgG) adds: and callow understanding prides itself on amassing such contradictions.

itself; only the dead understanding is identical with itself. But the contradiction is also resolved in the idea, and the resolution is spiritual unity. The living thing is an example of what cannot be grasped by the understanding. "God is love" is an expression very much to the point: here God is present to sensation; as "love" he is a person, and the relationship is such that the consciousness of the One is to be had only in the consciousness of the other. God is conscious of himself, as Goethe says,⁷⁸ only in the other, in absolute externalization. This is spiritual unity in the form of feeling. In the relationship of friendship, of love, of the family, this identity of one with the other is also to be found. It is contrary to the understanding that I, who exist for myself and am therefore self-consciousness, should have my consciousness rather in another; but the reconciliation [of this conflict] is the abstract content—the substantial, universal *ethical* relationship as such.

The second remark is a reflection upon the foregoing. We can find traces of the Trinity in other religions. They occur, for example, in the Trimurti or in the triad of Plato, while Aristotle says: We believe we have invoked the gods completely only when we have invoked them three times.⁷⁹ But wherever else we turn, we encounter only imperfect definitions. In Plato,⁸⁰ the "one" and the | "other" and the "mixture" are wholly abstract in character, while in the Trimurti the wildest mode [of fanciful imagination] has entered into play, and the third moment is not that of spiritual return, for, as Siva, it is merely alteration, not spirit.⁸¹

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A further point is that in the Christian religion it is not merely asserted that God is triune but also that he subsists in *three persons*. This is being-for-self taken to the extreme, the extreme being not only *one* but *person*, personality. Being a person is the highest intensity of being-for-self. Here the contradiction seems to be pushed so far that no resolution, no mingling of one person with another, is possible. But just this resolution is expressed in the assertion that God is *only* one; the three persons are thus posited

78. [Ed.] The citation in this form cannot be referenced.

79. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 57.

80. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 59.

81. [Ed.] See Hegel's portrayal of the religion of fanciful imagination in Vol. 2.

merely as ~a transient moment or aspect.⁸² "Personality" expresses the fact that the antithesis is to be taken as absolute,⁸³ that it is not a mild one, and it is only when it is pushed to this extreme that it sublates itself. Of this too we have a representation. In love and friendship it is the *person* that maintains itself and *through* its love achieves its subjectivity, which is its personality. But in religion, if one holds fast to personality in the abstract sense, then one has three gods, and ~subjectivity is likewise lost. Infinite form, infinite power is then all there is to the moment of divinity.⁸⁴ Furthermore, if one holds fast to personality as an unresolved [moment], one has *evil*. For the personality that does not sacrifice itself in the divine idea is evil. It is precisely in the divine unity that personality, just as much as it is posited, is posited as resolved; only in appearance does the negativity of personality appear distinct from that whereby it is sublated.

128 The Trinity has also been brought under the relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit. This is a childlike relationship, a childlike⁸⁵ form. The understanding has no other category, no other | relationship that would be comparable with this in respect of its appropriateness. But we must be aware that this is merely a figurative relationship; the Spirit does not⁸⁶ enter into this relationship. "Love" would be more suitable, for the spirit [of love] is assuredly what is truthful.

There is a third point that we must not overlook, because it has given rise to many so-called heresies. As we have said,⁸⁷ the abstract God, the Father, is the universal, ~what is all-encompassing, what is One.⁸⁸ We are now on the level of spirit; the universal here

82. Thus W (Ed/HgG?); G reads: a different moment or aspect. D reads: transient.

83. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: not as a trivial antithesis,

84. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: infinite form, absolute negativity is forgotten, or

85. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: natural

86. Thus G, D; W (HgG/Ed?) adds: clearly

87. [Ed.] In the preceding materials Hegel has not depicted the Father as universal in this explicit form, but such a reference might not have been transmitted by the sources.

88. Thus D; G, W read: eternal, all-embracing, total particularity. Ho reads: encompasses all particularity and is without defect.

includes everything within itself. The other, the Son, is infinite particularity, the [realm of] appearance; the third, the Spirit, is singularity as such. ~But we must be aware that all~⁸⁹ three are spirit. In the third, we say, God is the Spirit; ~but the Spirit is also “presupposing,” the third is also~⁹⁰ the first. It is essential to hold on to this; it is explained by the nature of the [logical] concept. We encounter it in every goal and every kind of life process. Life maintains itself; self-maintenance means entering into differentiation, into the struggle with particularity, [the organism] finding itself distinguished from an inorganic nature, and its going outwards. Thus life is only a result because it ~has produced~⁹¹ itself and is a product; moreover if we are asked, “What is produced?” the answer is that what is produced is the life process itself, i.e., life is its own presupposition. This is just what the universal consists in: that it works through its process and that the process gives rise to nothing new; what is brought forth is already [there] from the beginning. It is the same with loving and being loved in return. Insofar as love is present, its ~utterance~⁹² and all the activities to which it gives rise, whereby it is simultaneously brought forth and supported, merely confirm it. What is brought forth is already there: the confirmation of love is a confirmation whereby nothing | comes forth 129 save what is already there. Similarly, spirit sets itself forth,⁹³ it is the initiating.

The differentiation that the divine life goes through is not an external [process] but must ~be defined solely as internal,~⁹⁴ so that the first, the Father, is to be grasped just like the last [the Spirit]. Thus the process is nothing but a play of self-maintenance, a play of self-confirmation.

This definition is important in that it provides the criterion for

89. *Thus D; G, W₁ read:* But all *W₂ (Var) reads:* But the universal as totality is itself spirit, all *Ho reads:* Thus each moment is itself totality, is spirit. All

90. *Thus G; D reads:* Spirit is the result and the “presupposing” of itself, the last no more than

[*Ed.*] See above, n. 66.

91. *Thus G; D reads:* nourishes

92. *Similar in G; W (Hg/Ed?) reads:* starting point

93. [*Ed.*] See above, n. 66.

94. *Thus W (Hg/Ed?); G reads:* merely be defined as external,

evaluating many representations of the essence of divinity, and for appraising and recognizing their deficiencies. We must recognize where they are defective, and the defect arises especially from the fact that this definition is often overlooked.⁹⁵

I have already pointed out that hints and traces of the idea of God, which essentially is the Trinity, emerged most notably shortly before and after the time when the Christian religion appeared on the scene—the church called these other views heresies. These are the Gnostic representations, which arise from the need to *cognize* God.⁹⁶ Philo, a Jewish Platonist, defines God as the *ὄν*, as what has being, in other words the hidden God who is unknowable, uncommunicative, inconceivable. If the first [the Father] is defined as what is only abstractly universal, and [all] determinations are allowed to come only *after* what is universal, *after* the *ὄν*,⁹⁷ then this first is, to be sure, inconceivable because it is without content; anything conceivable is concrete and can *be* conceived only inasmuch as it is determined as a moment. The defect lies here, therefore, in the fact that the first is not itself grasped as entire totality. The second definition is as the Logos, *Λόγος*, that which reveals itself, the [first] mover, which posits differentiation, the moment of determining generally. In respect of this second definition there is a great diversity of representations—the Son of God, Sophia, Wisdom the archetype of humanity, the First Man, the eternal one, heavenly revelation of the godhead, thinking, effective power. This is the second, and is a genuine distinction that touches the quality of both; | but it is still one and the same substance, so the distinction is after all just a superficial one, though defined as a difference of persons.

According to another representation, the first is the *βυθός*, the abyss, the depths, the *αἰών*, the eternal one whose dwelling is in the inexpressible heights, and who is exalted above all contact,⁹⁸ from whom nothing can be developed, the principle, the father of all essence and all existence. The first is termed *προπατήρ*, Father

95. Thus G; W(HgG) adds: or misunderstood.

96. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 71.

97. Thus W₂ (Var/Ed?); G, W₁ read: actual being, the *ὄν*, is taken as ensuing from it,

98. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: with finite things

only mediately, προαρχή, before the beginning. The revealing of this abyss, this hidden God, is defined as self-contemplation, i.e., reflection into self, concrete determination in general. Self-contemplation begets, it is in fact the begetting of the only-begotten; this begetting is how the eternal becomes comprehensible, because it is here that it achieves determination. Thus this μονογενής, the only-begotten one, also signifies the *Father*, the principle that grounds all essentiality etc. The defect in all these representations is that what is first is not grasped in the determination of totality, as what is last [also].

As we have seen, the content is an object for pure thinking, for the finite, subjective spirit, which is here still posited in the form of infinitude, of pure intuition, of *thinking*. This relationship must be considered in greater detail. On the one side, then, we have an absolute content, the eternal idea. This is *object*, and it is object *essentially*. Self-revelation, being object for himself, is what God essentially is. God is the concrete, the idea; for pure thinking he is object, the simple directing and concentrating of thought—in other words, pure devotion. For this thinking there is only this object, the absolute truth, before which it is simply in awe—not fear but awe. In pure thinking there is nothing to be feared, all mortality and dependence are already surrendered and removed as negated and vanishing. It is a simple and pure relationship, to which the name of reverence can be applied. This concrete [relationship] is on the one hand pure thinking; on the other it is the same thought as absolute power, essentially concrete within itself, absolute plenitude; hence the relationship to what is absolutely true is one of freedom, one of blessedness, the blissful intuition of absolute truth. |

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When we engage in reflection on this relationship, we see the inequality between the two sides, namely that subjective spirit is defined as universal thinking, not as concrete within itself; what is concrete within itself, the genuine idea, is the object. That for which the idea is, is only pure intuition, this universal thinking, and God only is for thinking. This thinking is not conceptual because it is abstract. It is not posited as activity, not posited as *concrete*; and the concrete object that it must be posited as, is the *truth*. Spirit

bears witness unto spirit, but this spirit that bears witness to what is true is not yet posited concretely; therefore finite spirit only *receives*, the content is only something *given*. Because it is not posited as concrete in itself, [spirit] relates to itself in the sentient mode, and this is the more precise definition of the finitude of spirit. Our reflection continues as follows: that spirit, because it is finite in this way, is not *active*; it does not possess itself because it is not concrete. Reverence is its object, its essence, and hence, although it is blissful in the presence of its truth, it still does not have the character of the concrete posited with respect to itself.⁹⁹

This is the standpoint of the first element in general; we can now proceed to the second element.

B. THE SECOND ELEMENT: REPRESENTATION, APPEARANCE¹⁰⁰

This is the element of representation as such or of appearance.

1. Differentiation

a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World

We can say that ~the absolute idea—the way it is determined as an object, subsisting in and for itself—is complete. On its subjective side, however, this is not so; it is neither complete in itself—[for] it is not [yet] concrete—nor is it complete as consciousness with

99. [Ed.] These last two paragraphs help to clarify Hegel's opposition to feeling as the basic form of the religious relationship. Feeling and sensibility (*Gefühl*, *Empfindung*) are basically receptive (*empfangen*), dependent, passive, whereas the true relationship to the infinite, in Hegel's view, must be active, concrete, participatory. It is a relationship of awe or reverence (*Ehrfurcht*), not fear (*Furcht*), of freedom rather than of dependence. This relationship takes place in the form of thinking—initially an intuitive thinking, not conceptual. But it must become conceptual if it is to be adequate to the object—the true object—that posits itself in the religious relationship. The thinker must become engaged in the object of thought.

100. [Ed.] On the organization of the “second element,” which is similar in both the 1824 and 1827 lectures, see the Editorial Introduction. Materials from the Ms. have been reworked into a more logical arrangement, which we have sought to articulate by editorial section headings.

respect to what it has as its object. It is not reflected into self, it is not posited as *differentiated*. The subject does not view itself in the divine idea.¹⁰¹ This is the second element; it is what is lacking in the first relationship, and it has now to be supplied. In this second element the subjective | aspect comes on the scene as such—and with it comes *appearance*. In its development the subjective aspect contains the ground of [true] religion, namely, the need for truth. The Christian religion begins with truth itself; this truth is God, and God is truth; and it is from God that truth first passes over to the subject. This second aspect must now be defined more closely.

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There are two sides from which the definition must be grasped. First from the side of the *idea*: from this side we have said that spirit in the categorial determination of universality posits itself in that of particularity; but this new category is still the eternal idea; God is the entire totality. Or we can say that it is the *Son* that is to be analyzed; he unites these two determinations. ~[He is] the difference—~but in love, and in the Spirit, or posited also as being identical with the idea in the form of universality.¹⁰² Other-being is the first determination, while the second is that this in-itself of the other is also the divine idea. In the process of analysis the two determinations are initially to be posited as distinct—but only for an instant, as it were, since they are not truly distinct. Both in its being and in its ~being distinguished¹⁰³ the concept includes the fact that what is being has negation, it is only a moment, and is sublated too. It is representation that holds these two sides apart—otherwise it would not be a real representation. [Indeed,] it is also the awareness that negation, the implicit being of the divine idea, is a true moment as well; but representation holds the two sides apart in time: now [the other is] estranged and [has] fallen away, and then [the divine idea] comes forth vis-à-vis this other-being.¹⁰⁴

101. Thus, G, D; W₂ (Var) reads: as objectivity or as in itself, the absolute idea is complete, but not the subjective side, neither *in itself* as such nor as subjectivity in the divine idea, *for the idea*.

102. Thus D; G reads: —that of being totality *in himself* and that of being posited as other.

103. Thus D; G reads: immediate being

104. [Ed.] This passage is paralleled by Fragment 4 from Michelet.

The other side is what we have defined as *finite spirit*. Finite spirit is here pure thinking and has in view the truth, the eternal truth, to which its relationship is that of thinking. This thinking is its result, its end. Finite spirit begins from immediacy, it raises itself from the sensible to the infinite, to the element of thinking. But in fact it is not the *result* of thinking; on the contrary, thinking exists only through movement, through the process of elevation. And spirit is intrinsically the process of elevation. It is this process we now have to consider. |

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From the first standpoint, the relationship is that God in his eternal truth is represented as a state of affairs in time, for the blessed spirits ("that the morning stars may praise me," etc.).¹⁰⁵ This relationship is thus expressed as a state of affairs in *time*, although for the object it is the *eternal* relationship of thinking. Later on, what is termed a "fall" occurred. This is the positing of the second standpoint—on the one hand it is the analysis of the Son, the keeping apart of the two moments that are contained in him. Jacob Boehme represented it as the fall of Lucifer, the firstborn, and the begetting of another son in his place.¹⁰⁶ This happened in heaven in the eternal idea, as it were. Thus in the analysis of this other the other is itself contained, though not posited. But then the other side is what we have termed subjective consciousness, finite spirit; the other side is that subjective consciousness as pure thinking is in itself the process, that it has begun from immediacy and has elevated itself to the truth. This is the second form.

105. *Thus D; G reads:* in time, as the mystery wherein the angels praise the children of God. *Similar in W₁ (Ed):* in time, as the mysteries wherein reside the angels, his children. *W₂ (Ed/Var?) reads:* conceived of prior to time, as how things were when the blessed spirits and the morning stars, the angels, the children of God praised him.

[*Ed.*] See Job 38:4–7: "Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? . . . On what were its bases sunk, or who laid its cornerstone, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" Both *G* and *W₁* misconstrue the passage—whether on their own or as a result of its being misquoted by Hegel is not clear—whereas B. Bauer, the editor of *W₂*, or one of his sources must have checked it.

106. [*Ed.*] See Jacob Boehme, *Aurora, oder Morgenröthe im Aufgang*, in *Theosophia revelata* (1715), col. 149. On the context of this reference to Boehme, see above, Ms., n. 105.

At this point we enter the determinacy of *space*, of the finite world and finite spirit, or—to express it more precisely—we begin upon the positing of determinations *as* determinations, the positing of a distinction that is momentarily held fast. This is a going forth—the appearing of God in [the realm of] finitude. For finitude is properly the separation “of what in itself is identical”¹⁰⁷ but is maintained in separation. From the other side, however, from the side of subjective spirit, this is posited as pure thinking; but in itself pure thinking is result, and it is to be posited the way it is, implicitly as this movement. In other words, pure thinking has to go into itself, and for that reason it posits itself first as *finite*.

The first thing we have to consider is this movement. As a going into itself the subjective consciousness of self consists in its being *for* itself what it is *in* itself. In itself it is this process, so this process has | to be for it. But when what it is in itself is *for* it, the need for its reconciliation “arises.”¹⁰⁸ Since it is for itself in this way, and is first posited as subject, there arises the need that subjectivity too should be present for it in the divine idea, that it should know subjectivity within the idea. In the first relationship, subjectivity is not yet posited for the subjective consciousness, because it is not yet conceptual knowing. The other aspect, then, is that the need is *satisfied*, in other words that God *appears* for the subjective consciousness in the shape of subjectivity, of “immediate consciousness.”¹⁰⁹ These are the two aspects that we now have to consider.

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b. Natural Humanity

In the first place, subjective consciousness is posited as it is. As spirit it consists on the one hand in starting from immediacy and raising itself to pure thinking, to the infinite, to the knowledge of God. When one considers this in its determinate form, it contains what we know from the Christian religion. First, consciousness has to enter into itself, it has to become concrete, become what is in itself; hence it starts from immediacy, and through the sublation of this

107. *Thus* W_2 (Var); *G*, W_1 read: of what in itself is finite *Ho* reads: of the identical

108. *Thus* *D*; *G* reads: is thereby justified.

109. *Thus* *D*; *G* reads: what is immediately particular.

immediacy it elevates itself to thinking. This means that its true nature is to abandon its immediacy, to treat it as a state in which it ought not to be: as immediately natural human beings, we *ought* to regard ourselves as being what we *ought not* to be. This has been expressed by saying that human beings are *evil by nature*, i.e., they ought not to be the way they immediately are; hence they are as they ought not to be.

135 In the condition of human immediacy two characteristics are present: first, there is what humanity is implicitly, human talents and rationality, spiritual potential, the image of God, nature as what is intrinsic within us; and second, there is natural being, the fact that human rationality has not yet developed. What is lacking here is that humanity is [only] *implicitly* rational and spiritual; this is precisely the deficiency, for spirit ought not to be implicitly spirit—it is spirit only because it is so *explicitly*. Nature is only implicitly rational; this implicit potential constitutes its laws. For this reason it is *only* nature. Humans on the other hand ought to be spirit *explicitly*, not merely spirit *implicitly*; their merely implicit potential, their natural being, must | be sublated. This sublation comprises two different things. All that has to be sublated is the *form* of implicit being; the absolutely primordial, that humanity *is* implicitly spirit, is what maintains itself, what abides, just as the goal or end maintains itself in the divine idea. We can therefore rightly say, on the one hand, that because human beings are implicitly spirit, they are *good* “by nature.” But this is not yet “being good,” for human beings are not yet what they ought to be. Immediacy is what a human being ought *not* to be, what has to be sublated.

So this first definition of the human condition is expressed by saying that “by nature” we are evil. This is a troublesome expression and can produce many false impressions. The crucial thing is that human beings are “by nature” such as they ought not to be; humanity ought to be spirit, but natural being is not spiritual being. We should notice that certain objections to this view immediately occur to us. Children are not evil, and this definition does not seem to fit many peoples and individuals. No. Children are innocent; and that is because they have no will and they are not yet account-

able. It pertains to evil to be able to decide, to have a will, to possess insight into the nature of actions. Inasmuch as the will is established through the process of growing up, it appears initially as caprice, which can will what is good just as easily as it can will evil, and by no means wills only evil according to its nature. But, of course, we cannot appeal to empirical, particular conditions at all. As regards the condition of the child, it is one of innocence, neither good nor evil. A human being, however, ought not to be like a child: adults are not innocent in this sense but must be responsible for what they do. That the condition of childhood also includes will is an empirical fact, but a child is still not what is meant by a "human being," for a human being possesses insight, his will has been trained. The adult ought not to remain in the condition of childhood.

As for the second point, that the will is caprice and can will good or evil, this caprice is in fact not the genuine will. It becomes will only insofar as it comes to a decision, for insofar as it still wills merely this or that, it is not genuine. The natural will is the will of appetite, or of inclination; it wills the *immediate* but it does not yet will *this* [particular act]. For it to be rational will, there must be a | consciousness that has some knowledge of the universal, and the will itself must have insight that the law is what is rational. What is demanded of human beings is that they should not exist as natural will, that they should not be just what they are by nature. Certainly the concept of willing is also what is called "human nature." But the concept of willing is something else; as long as human beings still exist in this "nature," they are only *implicitly* will, not yet actual will, they do not yet exist as spirit. This is the general situation, the special aspects of which must be left out of consideration; it is only within a particular condition [of culture] that we can speak of what pertains to the sphere of morality—this does not concern the nature of spirit.

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Now comes another objection to the view that the will is evil. There is something wrong here, in that when we view humanity concretely, and speak of will, this concrete, actual will cannot merely be something negative. The evil will, however, is posited to be merely evil volition. This is just an abstraction, and even if we

are not by nature what we ought to be, we are still implicitly rational, still implicitly spirit—this is what is affirmative in us. But we have to realize this, we have to go further, and the fact that we are not by nature what we ought to be refers therefore only to the form of our willing. The essential point is that humanity is implicitly spirit. That which is implicit persists, and in the surrender of the natural will, the *concept* is what persists, it is what produces itself. What spirit is implicitly is no longer something implicit, it is something that has been *produced*. If we contend on the other side that the will is evil by nature, then we are speaking of the will considered only negatively; thus we also have this concrete [reality] in mind, which this [negative] abstraction contradicts. ~So much is this the case that if we set up the devil, we have to show that there must be something affirmative in him; and Milton's devil—his strength of character, energy, and consistency—appears far better, far more affirmative, than many of his angels;~¹¹⁰ in a concrete [reality] affirmative characteristics must emerge at once. |

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In all of this it is forgotten that when we speak of human beings, these are human beings who have been educated and trained by customs, laws, etc. We are told, people aren't so bad after all, just look around you. But these are people with ethical and moral training, already reconstructed and put into a certain pattern of reconciliation. The main point is that such conditions, like that of childhood, are not to be looked for [empirically]. In religion, as in the portrayal of truth, what is essentially represented is rather the unfolded history ~of what humanity is.~¹¹¹ It is a speculative mode of treatment that dominates here; the abstract distinctions in the

110. *Thus G with D; W follows Ho; Ho reads:* This is generally personified as the devil. As the negative that wills itself, the devil is thus a self-identity, and there must therefore be something affirmative about him also, as in Milton, where in his striking energy he is better than many an angel in Paradise.

[*Ed.*] See Satan's speech to Beelzebub in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, canto 1, lines 8–10. It cannot be determined which edition of Milton Hegel used. Since he twice refers to *Paradise Lost* in his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst* (*Werke* 10/3:372, 416) (cf. *Aesthetics*, trans. T. M. Knox [Oxford, 1975], 2:1075, 1109), we may assume that he had read Milton's poem in German translation. A rather different depiction of the devil as "an extremely prosaic person" is found elsewhere in the *Aesthetics* (1:222).

111. *Thus G; D reads:* of spirit.

concept are presented one after another. If educated and cultured human beings are to be considered, then the transformation, reconstruction, the discipline through which they have passed, the transition from natural volition to true volition, must be visible in them, and their immediate, natural will must be seen to be sublated in all that. The first definition [of humanity], therefore, is that human beings in their immediacy are not what they ought to be.

c. Knowledge,¹¹² Estrangement, and Evil

The second point is that they ought to *regard* themselves in this way; the fact of being evil is then set in the relationship of being *looked at*. This can then easily be taken to mean that it is only with reference to *cognition* that human beings are posited as evil, with the implication that such consideration is a kind of external demand or condition, so that if people do not regard themselves in this way, then the other characteristic—the fact that they *are* evil—falls away as well.

Since such consideration is made into a duty, one may imagine that this alone is the essential thing, and that without it there is no content either. In the second place, the relationship involved in it is also stated in such a way as to imply that it is the consideration or the cognition that *makes* people evil, so that consideration and cognition [themselves] are what is evil, and that [therefore] such cognition is what ought not to exist [because it] is the *source* of evil. The coherence between being evil and cognition lies in this representation. This is a point of essential importance.

The more precise way of representing this evil [condition] is to say that human beings become evil by cognizing, or, as the Bible represents it, that they have eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil [Gen. 3:5–6]. Through this story cognition, intelligence, and theoretical capacity | come into a closer relationship with the will, and the nature of evil comes to more precise expression. Against this it may be said that it is in fact cognition that is the

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112. [Ed.] In deference to familiar biblical language, in this section and the next the term *Erkenntnis* is sometimes translated as “knowledge” rather than as “cognition.” For Hegel himself, “cognition” is a particular form of “knowing” (*Wissen*), to be distinguished from other such forms.

source of all evil, for knowledge or consciousness is the only act through which separation is posited at all—negation, evil,¹¹³ and cleavage, the more specific categories involved in being-for-self as such. Human nature is not what it ought to be: it is cognition that discloses this and brings forth the mode of being in which human beings ought not to be. Natural humanity is not as it should be; this “should” is the human concept, and that humanity does not conform to it first emerges in the separation, in the comparison with what humanity is in and for itself.

It is cognition that first posits the antithesis in which evil is to be found. Animals, stones, and plants are not evil: evil first occurs within the sphere of rupture or cleavage; it is the consciousness of being-for-myself in opposition to an external nature, but also in opposition to the objective [reality] that is inwardly universal in the sense of the concept or of the rational will. It is through this separation that I exist for myself for the first time, and that is where the evil lies. Abstractly, being evil means singularizing myself in a way that cuts me off from the universal (which is the rational, the laws, the determinations of spirit). But along with this separation there arises being-for-self and for the first time the universally spiritual, laws—what ought to be. So it is not the case that [rational] consideration has an external relationship to evil: it is itself what is evil. Inasmuch as it is spirit, humanity has to progress to this antithesis of being-for-self as such. Humans must have ~their antithesis~¹¹⁴ as their objective—what for them is the good, the universal, their vocation. Spirit is free; freedom has the essential moment of this separation within itself. ~In this separation being-for-self is posited and evil has its seat; here is the source of all wrong, but also the | point where reconciliation has its ultimate source. It is what produces the disease and is at the same time the source of health.~¹¹⁵

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113. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: primal division

114. Thus D; G, W read: something confronting them

115. Thus G; Ho reads: This separation is the source of all ill, the poisoned chalice from which human beings drink death and decay; at the same time this point where humanity is firmly posited as evil is the point where reconciliation has its source. For to posit oneself as evil is the implicit sublation of evil.

d. *The Story of the Fall*

We can now compare this more specifically with the way in which it all happens in the story of the fall. In this story sin is described by saying that Adam and Eve ate of the tree of knowledge, etc. This gives rise to the cognition, cleavage, and separation through which good first comes to be for humanity, but therewith evil also. ~According to the story, it is forbidden to eat of the tree, so evil is represented formally as the transgression of a divine command.¹¹⁶ In this way the rise of consciousness is posited; but at the same time it is to be represented as a standpoint that ought not to be, and where we ought not to rest, a standpoint that must be sublated; for we ought not to stand fast in the cleavage involved in being-for-self.

Moreover, the serpent says that by eating the fruit of the tree Adam and Eve will become like God, and this appeals to human pride. God later communes with himself, saying, "Behold, Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. So the serpent did not lie, for God confirms what it said. The explication of this text has been the occasion of much labor, and some have gone so far as to explain what God says as irony.¹¹⁷ The higher explanation, however, is that by this "Adam" the second Adam, or Christ, is understood.¹¹⁸ Cognition is the principle of spirituality, and this—as we said—is also the principle by which the injury of the separation is healed. It is in this principle of cognition that the principle of ~divinity¹¹⁹ is also posited, which through a further process of adjustment must arrive at the reconciliation, the authentic state of humankind. The story says moreover that humanity has received natural punishments, natural ills [Gen. 3:16–19]; this is an uncertain content, but

116. *Thus G, W₁; W₂ adds:* whose content could have been anything. But here the command is essentially concerned, as content, with this cognition. *Ho reads:* Evil has here its own definite shape—it appears as the transgression of a divine interdict.

117. [Ed.] This remark could be directed against Herder, who offers such an interpretation. See J. G. Herder, *Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts*, vol. 2 (Riga, 1776), pp. 108–109.

118. [Ed.] For support of this interpretation, Hegel refers in the *Ms.* to Johann Friedrich von Meyer (see *Ms.*, n. 120).

119. *Thus G; D reads:* spirituality

140 in any case Adam's labor is a consequence of his cognition. Animals do not labor; the act of laboring is at the same time the stamp of humankind's higher spiritual nature. We are also told that Adam and Eve were driven out of Paradise so that they would not also taste of the tree of life [Gen. 3:22–24]. This means that although individuals | arrive at cognition, each remains a single [being] and hence a mortal one.

One more characteristic has to be added. For in this separation human beings are defined as being for themselves. As consciousness, being-for-self is self-consciousness; it is infinite self-consciousness, abstractly infinite, because [the independent being] is conscious of its freedom, its wholly abstract freedom. This is the infinite presence-to-self [*Beisichsein*]¹²⁰ that did not come to consciousness in this way in the earlier religions, where the antithesis did not progress to this absoluteness, this depth. Because this has now happened, human dignity is simultaneously raised to a much higher plane. Because of it the subject acquires absolute importance and becomes an essential object of the interest of God, since it is a self-consciousness that has being on its own account. As this pure inward certainty of itself, it is formal subjectivity. To be sure, it is abstract—but it is abstract being-in-and-for-self. This comes forth in the shape that human being as spirit is *immortal*, the object of divine interest, elevated above finitude, dependence, and external conditions, [having] the freedom to abstract from everything. This implies that humanity is outside the range of mortality. Just because its antithesis is infinite, it is in religion that the immortality of the soul is such an important moment.

“Mortal” means something that can die, while whatever can reach a state into which death does not enter is “immortal.” When we say “combustible” and “incombustible,” combustion is only a possibility that impinges on the object externally. The determination of being is not a possibility of this kind but an affirmatively defined quality that a thing already possesses in itself. Hence the immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality. Spirit is

120. Thus G, D, Ho; W (HgG/Ed?) reads: being-for-self [*Fürsichsein*]

eternal, and for this reason it is already present; spirit in its freedom does not lie within the sphere of limitation. As pure knowing or as thinking, it has the universal for its object—this is eternity. Eternity is not mere duration¹²¹ but *knowing*—the knowing of what | is eternal. Hence the eternity of spirit is brought to consciousness at this point, in this cognition, in this very separation that has attained to the infinitude of being-for-self, which is no longer entangled in the natural, the contingent, the external. Now this inner eternity of spirit ~is what spirit is implicitly to begin with;¹²² but the very next standpoint, where we are at present, is that spirit ought not to be the way that it is as merely natural spirit, but rather the way it is in and for itself. Spirit should contemplate itself, and this gives rise to its rupture. But it ought not to remain at this point where its being [for itself] is not the way it is in itself; ~it should become concordant with its concept, with absolute spirit.¹²³ At the point of rupture, this [duty] ~is initially something other,¹²⁴ and spirit itself is initially natural will, inwardly ruptured. There is this rupture inasmuch as [there is] a feeling of consciousness of contradiction; and this posits the need for sublating the contradiction—i.e., it posits reconciliation. Here at this standpoint, reconciliation has its own distinctive form.

Human beings must consider themselves as [being initially the way] they ought not to be. From this separation an infinite need arises. In this cognition [of self], in this separation and rupture, the subject, as we have said, here defines itself, grasping itself as the extreme of abstract being-for-self, or abstract freedom; the soul plunges into its depths, right down into its abyss. This soul is the undeveloped monad, the naked monad,¹²⁵ the empty soul lacking

121. *Thus D; W₂ (Var) adds:* in the sense that the mountains endure, [Ed.] The source of this variant is the lost transcript by Michelet; see Fragment 3.

122. *Thus D; G, W read:* means that spirit is implicit to begin with;

123. *Thus D; G, W read:* as universal spirit it should become concordant with its concept.

124. *Thus D:* initially *with G:* is something other *W₁ follows G; W₂ reads:* its being-in-self, is something other for it,

125. [Ed.] See Leibniz, *Monadology* 24 (*Selections*, p. 537): the dazed state is the condition of “simply bare monads.”

fulfillment; but since it is implicitly the concept, what is concrete, this emptiness or abstraction contradicts its vocation, which is to be concrete. Thus the universal means that in this separation, which develops as infinite antithesis, this abstractness is to be sublated. Even the abstract ego has a will implicit in it, it is concrete, but the fulfillment that it finds there is the natural will. The soul finds nothing before it but desire, selfishness, etc., in that fulfillment; and it is one of the forms of the antithesis that | I, the ~soul in its depths,¹²⁶ and my real soul are so distinct from one another that the real soul is not one that [can be] made to match the concept, and therefore brought back to it, [but one] that finds in itself only natural will. The antithesis in which the real side is further developed is then the *world*, and the unity of the concept thus has the natural will as a whole opposed to it, the will whose principle is selfishness in general, and the actualization of which takes the form of depravity, brutishness, etc. The objectivity that this pure ego has, and that is for it as what is appropriate to it, is not its natural will, nor is it the world. Instead, this appropriate objectivity is just the universal essence, this One who is not fulfilled in the ego and to whom *all* fulfillment [in] the world stands equally opposed.¹²⁷

Now the consciousness of this antithesis, of this separation of the ego and the natural will, is the consciousness of an infinite contradiction. This ego exists in immediate relation with the natural will and with the world, yet at the same time it is repelled from them. This is the infinite anguish, the suffering of the world. ~A reconciliation can take place at this standpoint, but it is unsatisfactory and one-sided.¹²⁸ It consists in an inner equilibrium of the ego, in the way that this ego exists for itself in Stoic philosophy. It knows itself as a thinker, and its object is what is thought, the universal; this is for it absolutely everything, it is the genuine essence for it, so that this universal is valid for it. Something that is thought belongs to the subject, because it is posited by it. But a reconciliation

126. Thus G, W; D reads: abstract soul,

127. [Ed.] This entire discussion reflects the Pauline theology of the divided will; see esp. Romans 7.

128. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: The reconciliation we have thus far encountered at this standpoint is only partial and therefore unsatisfactory.

of this kind is itself only abstract; all determination lies outside this thought, which is merely formal identity with itself. An abstract reconciliation such as this cannot and should not take place at the absolute standpoint where we now are. Even the natural will cannot be inwardly satisfied [with it], for those who have comprehended their infinitude cannot be contented either with the natural will or with the state of the world. The abstract depth of this absolute antithesis demands an infinite suffering of the soul and, with it, a reunification that is equally complete. |

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2. Reconciliation¹²⁹

a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual

Such is the nature of the need. The question now is: "How can it be satisfied?" "What is it that effects reconciliation for it?" This reconciliation can come about only by the separation being sublated for it. Both for the need and for the representation, it must turn out that what *seems* incompatible—the infinite and the inner ego, ~and~¹³⁰ [on the other hand] pure essence or God, and fulfillment—is *not* so, that this antithesis is null and void, and that the truth, or what is affirmative and absolute, is the *unity* of the finite and infinite, the unity of subjectivity, in its various determinations, and objectivity. This is expressed in the determinate form that the resolved contradiction comes into being for the need itself; divine and human nature enter into a unity wherein both have set aside their abstractness vis-à-vis each other. These extremes, divine and human nature, are not in themselves extremes, but the truth is their identity instead—the unity of abstract, rigid being-for-self and its fulfillment, so that what is concrete is the truth. And to the extent that this stands opposed to concrete divinity, this weak antithesis too is done away with, and there remains the [unitary] determination of divine and human nature. The subject is in *need* of this truth, and this truth must come into being for it. "Divine and human nature" is a puzzling and difficult expression, and the kind of rep-

129. [Ed.] On the organization of this section, see below, n. 156.

130. *G reads:* or

resentation we associate with it should be forgotten. What it means is spiritual essentiality [*die geistige Wesenheit*]; in the unity of divine and human nature everything that belongs to external particularization has disappeared—the finite [itself] has disappeared.

144 The second question is this: “Cannot the subject bring about this reconciliation by itself, through its own efforts, its own activity—so that through its piety and devotion it makes its inner [life] conform with the divine idea, and expresses this conformity through its deeds?” “And further, is this not within the capability [not merely] of a single subject but of all people who genuinely wish to take up the divine law within themselves, so that heaven would exist on earth and the Spirit would be present in reality and dwell in its community?”¹³¹ The question is whether the subject cannot bring this about on its own, as subject. It is commonly | believed that it can. It is to be noted here that we must bear carefully in mind that the subject we are dealing with is the extreme case—it is the subject that is *for itself*. Subjectivity has the characteristic of *positing*—something is so through *my agency*. This positing and activity happens through my agency, let the content be what it may; so bringing it forth is itself a one-sided determination, and the product is only something posited. It abides as such only in abstract freedom. In other words, the question is whether or not the subject can produce this result through its own positing activity. And this is always one-sided.

This positing must essentially be a *presupposing*, in such a way that what is posited is also something implicit. The unity of subjectivity and objectivity—this divine unity—must be a presupposition for my positing. For only then does the latter have a content;¹³² otherwise it remains subjective and formal. This is the way in which it gains for the first time true, substantive content. By taking on the character of a presupposition, it loses its one-sidedness; with the signification of a presupposition of this kind it enters into possession of this one-sidedness, takes it into itself, and thereby gets rid of it. Kant and Fichte maintain that we can sow,

131. [Ed.] Reading *Gemeinde* (“community”) instead of *Gnade* (“grace”), as in G.

132. Thus G; W (HgG) adds: namely, spirit, substance;

do good only on the presupposition of a moral world order.¹³³ We do not know whether what we do will prosper and succeed, and we can act only on the assumption that the good bears fruit in and of itself, that this is not simply something posited but is an objective fact in virtue of the very nature of the good. This presupposition therefore constitutes an essential condition [of human action].

The harmony, the resolution of this contradiction, must be represented as something that is in and of itself, it must be a presupposition for the subject. Since the concept cognizes divine unity, it recognizes that God is in and of himself. "The one-sidedness that appears as the activity and so forth of the subject is merely a moment [that] simply subsists; it is nothing on its own account but exists only by virtue of this"¹³⁴ presupposition. | The truth must therefore appear to the subject as a presupposition, and the question is how and in what guise the truth can appear at the standpoint at which we now find ourselves, i.e., the standpoint of infinite flight and abstractness. This is the infinite anguish, the pure depth of soul, and it is for this anguish that the contradiction is to be resolved. To begin with, the resolution necessarily has the form of a presupposition because the subject is, as we have seen, a one-sided extreme. More precisely, the subject is now defined as this profound being-within-itself, this flight from reality, this complete withdrawal from immediate existence, from fulfillment. But at the same time this

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133. [Ed.] Kant advances this argument in connection with his theory of the existence of God as a postulate of practical reason. See *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 130 (*Werke* 5:126); and *Critique of Judgment*, p. 118 (*Werke* 5:450): "We must assume a moral world-cause, that is, an author of the world, if we are to set before ourselves a final end in conformity with the requirements of the moral law." With regard to Fichte, see especially "On the Foundation of Our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe" (1798), in *Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. P. L. Gardiner (New York, 1969), p. 25 (Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe* 5:354–355): "The moral world order is the absolute beginning of all objective knowledge (just as your freedom and your moral vocation are the absolute beginning of all subjective knowledge)." See also Fichte, *Appellation an das Publikum* (1799) (*Gesamtausgabe* 5:429).

134. *D reads*: The one-sidedness that appears as the activity and so forth of the subject is merely a moment and is nothing without this. *G, W₁ read*: and consequently only insight, activity, the subject simply subsists; it is nothing on its own account but exists only by virtue of this *W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads*: and consequently the insight and activity of the subject is nothing on its own account but exists and subsists only by virtue of this

abstraction of the ego is defined, in its reality, as an immediate being. So this subjective [element], this ego, is itself something presupposed too. It does have the aspect of a reality as well, for the idea is the unity of concept and reality, and its reality is determined according to the definition of the concept; here it is subjective reality. The subjective [element] is ~ this profundity involved in the fact that the ego and its fulfillment (the world) is an other. But what is as idea is also actual, and hence it has the determinate character of reality. Empty, naked reality is, as sensible, defined in a strictly exclusive way. Thus there is ~¹³⁵ consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity, objectivity being defined as abstractly as consciousness itself. Consciousness exists in the mode of sensible being; it is simple, abstract being-within-self and does not yet reflect, for reflecting is an inner relating, thinking; reflection is not abstract being-within-self—just as the thinking of Stoicism is not.

This infinite suffering that is wholly unfulfilled is without reflection. Hence for consciousness its sensible content is one that ought not to be, and it still lacks any extended world within itself; so in its infinite depth it relates to itself as sensible consciousness. Therefore, since the truth now has to be *for it*, there is on the one hand the *presupposition* of the unity of divine and human nature, and on the other hand, because it is *sensible* self-consciousness, this unity *appears*. God appears as the concrete God. For this reason the idea appears in sensible immediacy, in sensible presence too, for the form of being for others is the immediate and sensible form. |

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Consequently God appears in sensible presence; he has no other figure or shape [*Gestalt*] than that of the sensible mode of the spirit that is spirit in itself—the shape of the *singular human being*. This is the one and only sensible shape of spirit—it is *the appearance of God in the flesh*. This is the monstrous reality whose necessity we have seen. What it posits is that¹³⁶ divine and human nature are not intrinsically different—God [is] in human shape. The truth is that there is only one reason, only one spirit; we have seen that spirit as finite does not have genuine existence.

135. Thus G; D reads: a sensible existence as a strictly exclusive

136. Thus W (HgG/Ed?); G adds: the unity of

The essential aspect of the shape of appearance is thus explicated. Because it is the appearance *of God*, it occurs essentially for the community; it must not and cannot be taken in isolation. Appearing is being for an other; this other is the *community*.

The verification of this appearance has two aspects. The first concerns the *content* of the appearance, which is the unity of the finite and the infinite, the fact that God is not an abstraction but what is utterly concrete. Inasmuch as God is *for consciousness*, the verification of this is from our present standpoint a purely *inner* verification, a witness of the Spirit. Philosophy has to make explicit that the witness is not merely this mute inner one; it has to bring it to light in the element of thinking. This is the one side, the *imago*-aspect of human nature; human beings are the image of God [Gen. 1:26–27].

The second aspect [of the verification] is the one that we have observed earlier,¹³⁷ that God, considered in terms of his eternal idea, *has* to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself, in such a way that what is distinguished is wholly he himself; and their union is love and the Spirit. The suffering of the soul, this infinite anguish, is the witness of the Spirit, inasmuch as spirit is the negativity of finite and infinite, of subjectivity and objectivity being conjoined but still as conflicting elements; if there were no longer any conflict, there would be no anguish. Spirit is the absolute power to endure this anguish, i.e., to unite the two and to be in this way, in this oneness. Thus the anguish itself | verifies the appearance of God.

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As for the other mode of verification,¹³⁸ namely, that God appeared in *this* human being, at *this* time and in *this* place—this is quite a different matter, and can be recognized only from the point of view of world history. It is written: “When the time had come, God sent forth his Son” [Gal. 4:4]; and *that* the time had come can only be discerned from history.

137. [Ed.] See Sec. A, The First Element.

138. [Ed.] Hegel here actually introduces a *third* consideration, distinct from the second. These three paragraphs taken together summarize what might be described as a threefold argument for the *possibility*, *necessity*, and *actuality* of the appearance of God in a single human individual. The final point serves as a transition to the next section, since it requires attending to concrete historical matters.

b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ

The question is now more precisely this: "What content must present itself in this appearance?" The content can be nothing else than the history of spirit, the history of God (which is 'God himself), the divine history as that of a single self-consciousness which has united divine and human nature within itself—the divine nature in this [human] element.

The first [aspect] of this history is the *single, immediate human being* in all his contingency, in the whole range of temporal relationships and conditions. To this extent this is a divestment of the divine. What is to be seen here is that this aspect is for the community. There is in it the unity of the finite and the infinite, but there is at the same time in this sensible mode a divestment of the idea, and this has to be sublated.

The second point relates to the *teaching*. What must the teaching of this individual be? It cannot be what later became the doctrine of the church or community. The teaching of Christ is not Christian dogmatics, not the doctrine of the church; Christ did not expound what the church later produced as its doctrine. For his teaching evokes sensations through representation, and it has a content. It is this content, which at the highest level is an explication of the nature of God, that has to be initially directed specifically at the sentient consciousness, coming to it as an *intuition*. Hence it is not present as a doctrine, which begins with assertions.

The main content of this teaching can only be universal and abstract, it can only contain abstract and universal [images]. If something new, a new world, a new religion, a new concept of God is to be given to the world of representational awareness, then two aspects are involved. First there [is] the universal soil, and second there is what is particular, determinate, and concrete. The world of representational awareness, insofar as it thinks, can achieve only abstract thinking, it thinks only the universal. It is reserved solely for conceptualizing spirit to cognize the particular from the universal, to let the particular emerge from the concept by its own power. | For the world of representational awareness, ~determinate [reality] and the soil of universal thought are mutually exclusive."¹³⁹

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139. Thus G; W₁ (Ed?) reads: The two are mutually exclusive, and this is the

So what can initially be produced here by teaching is the universal soil for the concept of God. This can be expressed briefly as the *kingdom of God*.¹⁴⁰ This has been taught: it is the real divinity, God in his *determinate being* [*Dasein*], in his *spiritual actuality*, the kingdom of heaven. This divine reality contains already within itself God and his kingdom, the community—a concrete content. This is the main content.

This teaching, insofar as it cannot initially advance beyond the universal, has in this universal (as an abstract universal) the character of negation vis-à-vis everything in the present world. Insofar as it affirms the universal in this way, it is a *revolutionary* doctrine that partly leaves all standing institutions aside and partly destroys and overthrows them. All earthly, worldly things fall away as valueless, and they are expressly declared to be so. What is brought before the imagination is an elevation to an infinite energy in which the universal demands to be firmly maintained on its own account. This is how we interpret the following sayings. When Christ is among his disciples and his mother and brothers come to speak to him, he asks: “Who are my mother and my brothers? Behold my mother and my brothers! For whoever does the will of God is my brother, and sister, and ~mother~¹⁴¹” (Mark 3:31–35). “To another he said, ‘Follow me.’ But he said, ‘Lord, let me first go and bury my father.’ But Jesus said to him, ‘Leave the dead to bury their own dead; but as for you, go and proclaim the kingdom of God.’ Another said, ‘I will follow you, Lord; but let me first say farewell to those at my home.’ Jesus said to him, ‘No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God’” (Luke 9:59–62). All of the relationships that refer to property disappear, | but at the same time they inwardly sublate themselves—for if everything is given to the poor, there are no poor any more. Christ says: “Do not be anxious about another day, for each day is anxious for itself.”¹⁴² Such concerns, however, are proper for human beings.

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soil of universal thought. *W₂ (Var) reads*: the soil of universal thought and particularization and development are separate.

140. [Ed.] See Mark 1:15 and parallels.

141. *G reads*: brother

142. [Ed.] Cf. Matt. 6:34: “Do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day’s own trouble be sufficient for the day.”

Family relationships, property, etc., recede in the face of something higher, namely, following Christ. This perfect independence is the abstract, primal soil of spirituality. On the one hand, morality as such has its place at a subordinate level here, and it is nothing peculiar; for the commands of Christ are for the most part already to be found in the Old Testament. On the other hand, *love* is made the principal commandment—not an impotent love of humanity in general but the mutual love of the community,¹⁴³ such that no one has ~any~¹⁴⁴ particular purpose [of his or her own]; for this community the universal can consist in the spiritual tie that binds them together.

As for the particular [duties of life], all that is supplied from elsewhere, so to speak, for the representational consciousness. We find quite concrete examples of this in other spheres. In the Islamic doctrine there is merely the fear of God: God is to be venerated as the One, and one cannot advance beyond this abstraction. Islam is therefore a religion of formalism, a perfect formalism that allows nothing to take shape in opposition to it. Or again in the French Revolution, liberty and equality were affirmed in such a way that all spirituality, all laws, all talents, all living relations had to disappear before this abstraction, and the public order and constitution had to come from elsewhere and be forcibly asserted against this abstraction. For those who hold fast to the abstraction cannot allow anything determinate to emerge, since this would be the emergence of something particular and distinct in contrast with this abstraction. (I am bringing in all of this to illustrate how far the representational consciousness can go by itself, and how it can be self-possessed with its own freedom and knowledge in this abstraction; but the particular must come into play in some other way.)

And the particular *is* the determinate aspect that comes into play here in equally distinctive fashion. Although to be sure the soil for it is the universalism of [Christ's] teaching, and some individual traits point to that, | still the main point is that this [particular] content does not impinge on our representation through teaching

143. [Ed.] Hegel seems to refer here not to the love of God but only to the love of neighbor (cf. Matt. 22:36–39).

144. *G* reads: no

but through sense-intuition. This content is nothing other than the life,¹⁴⁵ passion, and death of Christ.

c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence

For it is *this* suffering and death, this sacrificial death of the individual for all, ~that¹⁴⁶ is the nature of God, the divine history, ~the being that is utterly universal and affirmative. This¹⁴⁷ is, however, at the same time to posit God's negation; in death the moment of negation is envisaged. This is an essential moment in the nature of spirit, and it is this death itself that must come into view in this individual. It must not then be represented merely as the death of *this individual*, the death of this empirically existing individual. Heretics have interpreted it like that,¹⁴⁸ but what it means is rather that *God* has died, that *God himself is dead*.¹⁴⁹ God has died: this is negation, which is accordingly a moment of the divine nature, of God himself.

In this death, therefore, God is satisfied. God cannot be satisfied by something else, only by himself. The satisfaction consists in the fact that the first moment, that of immediacy, is negated; only then does God come to be at peace with himself, only then is spirituality posited. God is the true God, spirit, because he is not merely Father, and hence closed up within himself, but because he is Son, because he becomes the other and sublates this other. This ~negation¹⁵⁰ is intuited as a moment of the divine nature in which all are reconciled. Set against God there are finite human beings; humanity, the finite,

145. [Ed.] Although Hegel mentions the "life" of Christ, he does not in fact discuss it further in the 1824 lectures—as he did at the beginning of Sec. 8 of the lecture Ms., headed "The Life and Death [of Christ]," where he showed the "conformity" between the life of Christ and his teaching. Rather the 1824 lectures turn directly to the passion and death of Christ, and the discussion of his "life" has focused entirely on his teaching. The same is true of the 1827 lectures.

146. *G* reads: for this

147. *Thus D*; *G* reads: the subjectivity that is absolutely and utterly affirmative, universal. [To affirm] this kind of subjectivity

148. [Ed.] Hegel is apparently thinking especially of Gnostic teachings, with which he was familiar through Neander's descriptions; cf. the latter's *Gnostische Systeme*, pp. 43–44, 49–50.

149. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 163.

150. *Thus G*; *D* reads: incarnation

is posited in death itself as a moment of God, and death is what reconciles. Death is love itself; in it absolute love is envisaged. The identity of the divine and the human means that God is at home with himself in humanity, in the finite, and in [its] death this finitude is itself a determination of God. Through death God has reconciled the world and reconciles "himself"¹⁵¹ eternally with himself. This coming back again is his return to himself, and through it he is *spirit*. So this third moment is that | Christ has risen. Negation is thereby overcome, and the negation of negation is thus a moment of the divine nature.

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The Son is raised up to the right hand of God. Thus in this history the nature of God, namely, spirit, is accomplished, interpreted, explicated for the community. This is the crucial point, and the meaning of the story is that it is the story of God. God is the absolute, self-contained movement that spirit is, and this movement is here represented in the individual. There are quite a number of ways in which the matter can be represented, which refer to finite, external relationships. In particular a number of false relationships have been introduced: for example, the sacrificial death offers occasion for representing God as a tyrant who demands sacrifice; this is untrue. On the contrary, the nature of God is spirit, and that being so, negation is an essential moment.

As for the *verification* of this individual, this involves essentially the witness of the Spirit, of the indwelling idea, of spirit in itself. Spirit is here brought to intuition; what is given is an immediate *witness of the Spirit to spirit*, which only conceptualizing spirit recognizes in its true necessity. Outward attestations are of a subordinate character and do not belong here.

Essentially the Son is recognized by the community as the one who has been raised to the right hand of God (i.e., that he is essentially a determination for the nature of God itself), not as he who was here in sense experience. So all sensory verification falls away, including miracles in the way in which they fall within the empirically external consciousness of faith. This is another field, another soil, but we readily imagine that the individual [Jesus] must

151. Thus G, W₁, similar in D; W₂ (Var) reads: it

have attested himself through the marvelous phenomenon of miracles and through absolute power over nature, since we humans ordinarily picture God as the power in nature. We have already discussed that. But it may be recalled that Christ himself renounces miracles. He says, "You wish to see signs and wonders."¹⁵² It is not a matter of signs and wonders; Christ renounced them. In any event, this is by its very nature an external, spiritless mode of attestation. We are rightly aware that God and his power are present in nature in and according to eternal laws; | the true miracle is spirit itself. Even the animal is already a miracle vis-à-vis plant life, and still more spirit vis-à-vis life, vis-à-vis merely sentient nature.¹⁵³ However, the genuine mode of verification is quite different—it is through power over minds. We must insist that this is the genuine [proof]. But even this power over minds is not an external power like that of the church against heretics; rather it is power of a spiritual type, which leaves¹⁵⁴ spirit's freedom completely intact. This power has subsequently been manifested through the great community of the Christian church. One can say that this again is only an effect and [thus] an external mode [of verification]. But to say this is to fall into self-contradiction, for what is demanded is proof of the *power*, and this consists merely in its effect; the proof of¹⁵⁵ the *concept* requires no verification.

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This, then, is what this history is. The first moment is the concept of this standpoint for consciousness; the second is what is given to this standpoint, what actually exists for the community; the third is the transition to the community.¹⁵⁶

This appearance of God in the flesh occurs in a specific time and

152. [Ed.] Cf. John 4:48: "Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe." The renunciation of "signs and wonders" is found at various places in the Synoptic tradition, e.g., Luke 17:20–21; Mark 13:21–23; Matt. 7:22–23.

153. Thus G; D reads: Life is already spirit itself, it is already a miracle vis-à-vis inorganic nature, and spirit vis-à-vis merely animal nature.

154. Thus G with D; W₂ (Var/Ed?) reads: The same is true of confirmatory proof, which is a power in spiritual fashion and not an external power like that of the church against heretics, but such as to leave

155. Thus G; W₁ (HgG?) reads: that consists in

156. [Ed.] This is a summary of the three main points taken up under the theme of the history of reconciliation (Sec. B.2)—the idea of reconciliation, the historical presence of Christ, and the transition to spiritual presence, i.e., to the community.

in this single individual. Since it is an appearance of this kind, of itself it passes by and becomes past history. This sensible mode must disappear and rise again in the sphere of representation. The formation of the community has just this content—that the sensible form passes over into a spiritual element. The manner of this purification of immediate being ~preserves the sensible element precisely by ~¹⁵⁷ letting it pass away; this is negation in the way that it is posited and appears in the sensible individual as such. Only in regard to that single individual is this intuition given; it is not capable of being inherited or renewed.¹⁵⁸ | This cannot happen because as “this” event, a sensible appearance is by its very nature momentary, and its destiny is to be spiritualized. It is therefore essentially something that *has been*, and it will be raised up into the sphere of representation in general.

For the spirit that has need of it, sensible presence *can* be brought forth again in various ways, in pictures, ~relics, holy images.¹⁵⁹ There is no lack of such mediations when they are needed. But for the spiritual community, immediate presence (the now) has passed away. At first, then, sensible representation reintegrates the past, which is a one-sided moment for representation; the present includes the past and the future as moments within itself. Hence sensible representation includes the coming again of Christ, ~which is essentially an absolute return, but then takes [the shape of] a turning from externality to the inner realm¹⁶⁰—a Comforter, who can come only when sensible history in its immediacy has passed by.¹⁶¹

157. Thus G, W; D reads: contains immediate being in the very fact of

158. Thus G, W; W₂ adds: like the appearance of the substance in the Lama. Ho adds: as in India or as in the case of the Lama.

159. Thus G; D reads: relics. W₁ reads: relics, etc. W₂ (MiscP) reads: not viewed of course as works of art but as wonder-working pictures (wonder-working in their sensible existence). And then it is not just the corporeality and body of Christ alone that can satisfy the need for something sensible but the sensible aspect of his corporeal presence in general, the cross, the places where he walked. Thus there are relics and holy images.

160. Thus G, similar in W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: as its completion, but a return that is essentially absolute consists in a turning from externality to the inner realm; it is Ho reads: whereas an absolute return consists in a turning from representation to spiritual subjectivity

161. [Ed.] Cf. John 16:7: “It is to your advantage that I go away, for if I do

This then is the point relating to the formation of the community, in other words the third point—namely, the Spirit.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT: COMMUNITY, SPIRIT

This is the transition from externality, from appearance, to inwardness. What it is concerned with is subjectivity, the certainty felt by the subject of its own infinite, nonsensible essentiality, | the certainty with which it knows itself to be infinite, to be eternal, immortal. Beyond that there is the subject's being filled with the truth, and the fact that this truth is in self-consciousness *as* self-consciousness, that it is not external but is there as the inward truth of thought, as the representation of inwardness as such. At first, subjectivity and the knowledge of its essence is the knowledge of a sensibly present content. This is obviously nonspiritual, transitory; yet it is not merely transitory, but essentially *transitional*—it is a door where one cannot tarry, a form that is destined to be sublated, a form that is defined not merely as past but as belonging eternally to the spiritual nature of God. This is the turning to the inward path, and in this third realm we find ourselves on the soil of spirit as such—this is the *community*, the *cultus*, *faith*.

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We have defined the manifestation of God first as revelatory and second as appearance. The third [moment of manifestation] is knowledge or faith, for faith is also knowledge, but in a distinctive form. This third [moment] we now have to consider.

It consists, then, in the divine content being posited as *self-conscious* knowledge of this content, posited in the element of self-consciousness, of inwardness. On the one hand it is the knowledge that the content is the truth, and [on the other hand] that it is the truth of ~finite¹⁶² spirit as such—that is to say, the knowledge of it belongs to finite spirit so that finite spirit has its freedom in this knowledge, and is itself the process of casting off its particular individuality and of liberating itself in this content.

not go away, the Counselor will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you." See also John 15:26.

162. Thus G, D; W (Ed?) reads: infinite

155 Regarding this cultus and community, etc., we have once more three aspects to be considered: (1) the *origin* of the community and the coming to be of faith; (2) the *existence* [*Dasein*] or *subsistence* [*Bestehen*] of the community; (3) the *realization of faith*, which is at the same time the process by which faith passes over [into worldly actuality], the transformation and transfiguration of faith itself. |

1. The Origin of the Community

The first [aspect] concerns the origin of faith and the community. This lies in the generation and discovery of the doctrine of the Spirit (or better, of the content of this doctrine). Thus it is more precisely the explication of what we have already indicated in general in the process of making the transition to the community.¹⁶³

If we begin by comparing the community with what we have already seen, we first considered the eternal idea in the element of thinking, and second in the element of divestment, in the sensuously external, immediate mode of presentation. It was *we* who considered it in this way, it was *for us*. But if we ask, "Who are 'we'?" we are nothing other than the community itself, subjective consciousness. It is therefore manifest to us, we know about it; hence we are the presupposition, [that] for which it is. But at this point we have ourselves proceeded to the realization of the idea, so that spirit is *for* spirit, and what spirit is for spirit, it is as sense-consciousness. Thus there are two that are for one another. The side that we directly constitute stands now over against us. Just as in a drama the spectators have themselves in the form of the chorus standing objectively over against them, so here the standpoint is that the content is for spirit, and this relationship must be considered in its essence.

Initially this spirit has been defined as sense-consciousness. However, it ought no longer to be for us as it is for consciousness, in this one-sided way. Or, to the extent that we have defined it as sensible, this part of the whole relationship must—if we are at the true standpoint—raise itself to our standpoint, which is that of considering the truth. Such a consideration presupposes the com-

163. [Ed.] See above, pp. 221–223.

munity in actual fact. The origin of the community is the production of the content for the community, for subjective self-consciousness. We have considered the idea first in the element of thinking, and second how it realizes itself outwardly, posits itself in differentiation. In the community, the stages are at first in the opposite order: the community begins with the sensible appearance, and the next step is the discovery of its content, the promulgation of its teaching. In other words, as has been said, the origin of the community lies in the generation of doctrine. Initially the community is immediate self-consciousness, and truth | comes to it in this sensible mode as a determination of sense; and it is in moving on from this sensible mode to the attainment of eternal truth that it first raises itself into a community.

Initially, then, the content is ~for immediate~¹⁶⁴ consciousness, where it was possible for the truth to appear in a diversely sensible fashion. For the idea is one in all, universal necessity; actuality can only be a mirror of the idea. The idea, therefore, can issue forth for consciousness from everything; for it is always just the idea that is in these infinitely numerous drops that reflect it back again. The idea is represented, recognized, foreshadowed in the seed, which is the fruit, the ultimate determination of the tree; the seed first dies out in the earth, and only through this negation does the plant spring forth. A story—an intuition, a portrayal, an appearance of this kind—can also be raised by spirit to the level of the universal, and thus the history of the seed or of the sun becomes a symbol of the idea, but only a symbol; these are configurations that, in terms of their peculiar content or specific quality, are not adequate to the idea. What is known in them lies outside of them; their meaning does not exist in them as meaning.

The object that does exist in itself as the concept is spiritual subjectivity, human being. As thinking being it is in itself meaningful; meaning does not lie outside of it. It is all-interpreting, all-knowing, it is not a symbol. ~Human consciousness, what is specific to humanity,~¹⁶⁵ is essentially history itself, and the history of the

164. Thus W_2 (Var/Ed?); G, W_1 read: that of immediate

165. Thus D; G, W_1 read: Human consciousness W_2 (Var) reads: Rather human subjectivity, its inner shape, the self,

spiritual does not take place in an existence that is not adequate to the idea.¹⁶⁶ Thus what is necessary ~in regard to humanity is that the thought, the idea, should become objective in the community.^{~167} Initially, however, the idea is present in the single individual in sense-intuition; this must be stripped away and the meaning, the eternal, truthful essence, must be made to emerge. This is the faith of the nascent community. It began from¹⁶⁸ the individual [founder]; that single | human being is transformed by the community, he is known as God—characterized as the Son of God, but entangled in everything finite that pertains to subjectivity as such. ~Subjectivity itself, the form that is finite, then disappears in the face of substantiality. This is the transformation of the sensible appearance into something spiritual and the knowledge of what is spiritual.^{~169} It is the community as it begins from faith; but on the other hand, it is the faith that is brought forth as spirit, so faith is at the same time the result. We have now to bring out the different meanings of faith and verification.

Since faith begins from the sensible mode, it has a temporal history before it. What it holds to be true is an outward, ordinary occurrence, and its verification is [by means of] the historical [*historisch*], juridical method of attesting a fact, [which gives] sensible certainty. Or again, the representation of the foundation [of truth] is based on the sensible certainty of other persons regarding certain sensible facts, and it brings other evidence in support of this.

The content in this kind of attestation is of a wholly sensible nature—for instance, that Christ lived in Palestine. But faith changes its significance; in other words, it is not merely a question of faith

166. *Thus G, W; W₂ (Var) adds:* but in its own element.

167. *Thus D; G, W₁ read:* in regard to humanity is that the thought, the idea, should become objective. *W₂ (Var) reads:* for the community is that the thought, the idea, should become objective.

168. *Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* faith in

169. *Thus G with D; W₁ follows G:* The form, which is finite, disappears then in the face of substantiality. [*Ed:* The representation of sensible G: Sensible] appearance is transformed into the knowledge of God. *W₂ (Var) reads:* in its development, but as subjectivity it is separate from substantiality. Sensible appearance is now transformed into knowledge of what is spiritual. *Ho reads:* subjectivity as separate from substantiality.

as belief in [what happened at this] time and in this external history, but rather of faith that this man was the Son of God. Thereby the sensible content becomes something quite different; it is transformed into something else, and the demand then is that this latter should be attested. The object has been completely transformed from something that exists sensibly and empirically into something divine, into what is essentially the highest moment of God himself. This content is no longer something sensible, for the transition consists precisely in sublating the sensible. Thus if the demand is made to attest the content as a fact in the same sensory way as before, this way at once proves to be inadequate, because the object is of an entirely different nature. |

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If one defines the content in such a way that Christ's miracles are themselves sensible phenomena that can be attested in historical fashion, and likewise regards his resurrection and ascension as sensible events, then with regard to the sensible it is no longer a question of the relationship of historical verification to these phenomena,¹⁷⁰ but of the relationship of verification by the senses per se and of sensible events (of both together) to spirit, to the spiritual content. Verification of the sensible, whatever its content, ~occurs through [sense-]intuition etc. It¹⁷¹ remains subject to an infinite number of objections because sensible externality lies at its basis; and that is something entirely different from spirit, from consciousness. In such verification, consciousness and object are separated, and this fundamental separation brings with it the possibility of error, deception, and lack of the culture needed to comprehend a fact correctly, so that one can have doubts.¹⁷² A sensible content is in fact one that *cannot* be certain in itself because it is not certain by virtue of spirit as such, because it stands on a different soil and is not posited by the concept. One might suppose that we must get to the root

170. *Thus G, W₁, similar in D; W₂ (MiscP) adds:* —the matter is not presented as if there were not sufficient evidence for Christ's miracles, his resurrection and ascension, as themselves outward phenomena and sensible events—

171. *Thus D; W₂ (Var) reads:* and whether it occurs through the testimony [of others] or [one's own] intuition,

172. *Thus G, W₁; W₂ (MiscP) adds:* and can regard the Holy Scriptures, so far as their merely external, historical aspects are concerned, as profane writings, without necessarily mistrusting the good will of those who bear witness.

of things by comparing all the evidence and circumstances, or that there must be grounds for deciding in favor of one possibility or the other; but this entire mode of attestation, and the sensible content as such, has to be ~replaced by¹⁷³ spirit. What is to have truth for spirit as spirit, what spirit is to believe, must not be a sensory belief; what is true for spirit | is something for which in fact sensible appearance becomes subordinate. Since spirit begins from the sensible and advances [from that] to what is worthy of itself, its relationship to the sensible is at the same time a negative attitude, even though the sensible is its point of departure.

This is a basic characteristic, and it is basic to all cognition insofar as it is directed in any way toward something universal. [For example,] it is well known that Kepler discovered the laws of the heavens.¹⁷⁴ They are valid for us in a twofold fashion; they are the universal. The discovery began from [the observation of] single cases; certain movements were referred back to laws, but these were still only single cases. One might think that millions of other cases were possible, and that there were bodies which do *not* fall¹⁷⁵ in this way; thus even [as applied] to the heavenly bodies this is no universal law. This is, to be sure, how we have ~initially become aware of the matter;¹⁷⁶ it has come ~within the ken of¹⁷⁷ our representative capacity. But the interest of spirit is that such a law be true in and for itself; [the concern is] whether [it] is in conformity with reason, i.e., that reason finds its counterpart in the law. Where it does so, it recognizes it to be true in and for itself. By contrast with this cognition on the basis of the concept, cognition through the senses takes on a subordinate place. It is indeed the starting point, the point of departure, and should be gratefully acknowledged as such, but a law of this kind stands on its own feet, and

173. *Thus D; G, W₁ read:* led back to the requirement of *W₂ (Var) reads:* replaced by the requirement of

174. [Ed.] See Johannes Kepler, *Harmonice mundi*, book 5, chap. 3 (*Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 6, ed. Max Caspar [Munich, 1941], p. 302).

175. [Ed.] Hegel apparently spoke of both moving bodies (Kepler) and falling bodies (Galileo), but Griesheim has confused or conflated them in this passage.

176. *D reads:* awareness initially of the matter; *G, W₁ read:* become aware of the matter; *W₂ (Var) reads:* become aware of these laws through induction;

177. *D reads:* about for

therefore its verification is of another sort. It is the *concept*, and sensible existence is reduced to the level of a dream image,¹⁷⁸ above which there is a higher region with its own enduring content.

The relationship is the same as we have seen in connection with those proofs for the existence of God that begin from the finite.¹⁷⁹ The defect in them is that the finite is grasped only in affirmative fashion; but at the same time the transition from the finite to the infinite is such that the realm of the finite is abandoned, and the sensible is reduced to a subordinate status, to a distant image that now subsists only in the past and in recollection—not in spirit, which is strictly present to itself. Having left that starting | point behind, spirit now stands on a soil of quite a different worth. This is the relationship involved in the transition, which should in essence be attended to. Piety can build on whatever opportunity comes to hand; this furnishes its point of departure, but it leaves that behind as it passes over to a spiritual [interpretation]. It has been demonstrated that several of Christ's quotations from the Old Testament are incorrect, so that [the meaning that] derives from them is not grounded in the immediate sense of the words, or the fathers of the church have made something else out of the words. The word was presumably something hard-and-fast, yet spirit makes of it what has truth. In the same way, sensible history constitutes the point of departure for spirit.¹⁸⁰ These two categories [sense and spirit] must be distinguished: the chief thing that matters is spiritual consciousness, the return of spirit into itself.

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The church has been right to condemn the attack upon the miracles, the resurrection, etc., because such attacks entail the assumption that these things are what establish that Christ is the Son

178. *Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: of earthly life*

179. [Ed.] A reference to the cosmological and physicotheological proofs of the existence of God. See Hegel's portrayal of nature religion and his treatment of the metaphysical concept of God in the religion of spiritual individuality in Part II of the 1824 lectures (Vol. 2). The physicotheological proof, according to Kant, is based on natural or physical teleology, whereas the ethicotheological proof is based on moral teleology and practical (rather than theoretical) reason. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, pp. 100–101 (*Werke* 5:436). The physicotheological proof is akin to those forms of the cosmological proof that focus on the matter of design.

180. *Thus G; W (HgG) adds: and for belief.*

of God. But this claim stands secure on its own account, even though the miracles etc. were its point of departure, to be sure.

This transition is what is termed the *outpouring of the Spirit*. It could occur only after ~the Christ who had become flesh had withdrawn,¹⁸¹ after his sensible, immediate presence had ceased; then for the first time the Spirit issued forth.¹⁸² What the Spirit alone produces is something else, has another form.

We have arrived, then, at the issuing forth of the Spirit in the community. About this emergence of the spiritual being of the community in this self-conscious spirit, there are two things worthy of note. The first question is, "What does spirit know?" It is itself the object [of its own knowing] because it is spirit. [The second question is,] "What then is its content, what is its teaching?" [Its content is that] this objective spirit, while standing over against the community, also posits itself, realizes itself therein; even as it was first
161 posited objectively, | it now posits itself, is posited, subjectively. What objective spirit knows is first of all God, his essence. But God does not merely have being in general; he is now a living, active God, the God who possesses activity, who produces himself; he himself *is* his activity, he makes himself objective. This objectivity has initially the character of the otherness, the distinctness, the finitude that is termed the Son of God. This is the witness of spirit, that God has a Son, the absolute decree of spirit, which it has not yet conceptually comprehended, but which it testifies immediately from its own nature, in an instinctive manner so to speak. This is the second [moment]; the third is that the Spirit defines itself as the unity of the first two. Only in thought does history first achieve the form by which it has absolute interest for spirit. This third [moment] consists in what was already there in the Son—namely, that spirit is objective for itself, that it objectifies itself as the unity of the first and the second [moments], so that the second [moment], otherness, is sublated in eternal love. But this love expresses initially [i.e., in God made flesh] a relationship, a knowing, a seeing of the one in

181. *Thus D; G reads:* Christ in the flesh had withdrawn, W (HgG/Ed?) *reads:* Christ had withdrawn from the flesh,

182. *Thus G, D, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* for here the whole story is ended and the image of the Spirit stands completely before the intuition.

the other, such that the two extremes remain independent; it expresses an identity in which the two extremes are not absorbed. Now, on the contrary, it is love [itself] that is defined as what is objective; this is the Spirit.

It is possible, in the form of a [particular] religion, to advance basically no further than the representation of the Son and those about him. This is perhaps the case principally in Catholicism, with the result that Mary, the Mother of God, and the saints are exalted, the Spirit being also recognized as spirit, but only entering into the picture, as it were, rather than dwelling in the church and abiding in its decrees. As a result the second [moment] is brought to the fore in its sensible form for sensible imagination, rather than being spiritualized, and spirit does not essentially | become an object.¹⁸³

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The other side is the converse of this, namely, that now—just as, in the emerging community, doctrine took shape in such a way that the eternal truth is also something known, something posited in and through the community—so also the reverse is true, and finite spirit abides in itself not in an objective way but rather brings forth spirit in itself, begetting itself in its self-consciousness. This exaltation happens by means of the content that we have seen. This content is the mediator, for it is a one-sided view to characterize faith in the form of subjectivity, meaning that the community raises *itself* into the form of self-consciousness, that it has its being in the activity of bringing forth. All activity is mediated: what is to be brought forth must already exist in and for itself. Activity is merely positing, it imparts only the character of being-for-self; spiritual activity is possible only if what is to be posited is presupposed. “Is it possible that this can be done?” means, “Is it already so in and for itself?”

183. Thus *G* with *D*; *W*₂ (*MiscP*) reads: Another possible standpoint is to advance no further than the Son and his appearance, as in Catholicism, where Mary and the saints are added to the reconciling power of the Son, and the place of the Spirit is rather solely in the church as hierarchy, and not in the community. But then the second moment in the definition of the idea remains in the sphere of representation rather than being spiritualized. In other words, the Spirit is known less as objective than merely as this subjective form in which it is, in the sensible present, the church and lives in the tradition. In this shape of actuality, the Spirit is, as it were, the “third person.”

We have seen finite subjectivity taken up into the content. Reconciliation is already implicitly accomplished. This is the representational image of the Spirit, and only by means of this image can reconciliation be brought forth. Thus the activity of the community is already determined by the fact that reconciliation is implicitly accomplished, i.e., that God is spirit. This is the spiritual element of religion, and this content is what the community *brings forth*. ~It¹⁸⁴ is evident that the community brings forth ~this doctrine, this relationship within itself,¹⁸⁵ that it cannot be brought forth, so to speak, ~from the words, from the mouth of Christ,¹⁸⁶ but is produced through the community, through the church.¹⁸⁷ The empirical way in which | [this] has happened does not concern us here. The story may be full of the passionate disputes of bishops at church councils and so on—this is of no account. What is the content in and for itself?¹⁸⁸ Only by philosophy can ~this simply present content¹⁸⁹ be justified, not by history [*Geschichte*]. What spirit does is no history [*Historie*].¹⁹⁰ Spirit is concerned only with what

184. [Ed.] Reading *Es* with *W* (*Ed*) rather than *Er* with *G*.

185. Thus *G*; *W* (*HgG/Ed?*) reads: this content of belief implicitly,

186. Thus *D* with *G*; *W* (*HgG/Ed?*) reads: through the words of the Bible,

187. Thus *G*, similar in *D* and *W*₁; *W*₂ (*MiscP*) adds: Nor is it sensible presence but the Spirit that teaches the community that Christ is the Son of God and sits eternally at the right hand of the Father in heaven. That is the interpretation, the testimony and decree of the Spirit. When grateful peoples placed their benefactors only among the stars, that was how spirit recognized subjectivity as an absolute moment of the divine nature. The person of Christ is made the Son of God by the decree of the church.

188. Thus *G*; *W* (*HgG/Ed?*) adds: —that is the question.

189. Thus *D*; *G* reads: this content *W* (*HgG/Ed?*) reads: the genuine, Christian content of faith

190. [Ed.] This is one of Hegel's most famous (or notorious) statements. It is significant that he uses the term *Historie* here (though not in the preceding sentence). He does not, of course, intend to deny that in the more fundamental sense spirit is historical (*geschichtlich*) in its process of self-distinguishing and self-reintegrating. Especially in the 1827 and 1831 lectures, he refers to "the divine history" or "the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is." But this historicity of God as spirit is not subject to the external, empirical mode of investigation suitable for past, factual data; in this sense it is no *Historie*. There remains in Hegel's thought an unresolved tension between the two senses of history—the intrinsically historical (*geschichtlich*) and "simply present" process that spirit is, and the now-past historical (*historisch*) events in which this process "appears." (Unfortunately Hegel does not consistently maintain the terminological distinction in order to convey the conceptual one, as is evident from the present passage.)

is in and for itself, not something past, but simply what is present. This is the origin of the community.

2. The Subsistence of the Community

The second aspect is its continuation, the subsistence of the community, its self-maintenance. "Within itself the community is an eternal becoming that presupposes itself. Spirit is an eternal process of self-cognition in self-consciousness, streaming out to the finite focus of finite consciousness, and then returning to what spirit actually is, a return in which *divine* self-consciousness breaks forth."¹⁹¹ The community is a process of eternal becoming.

More precisely, in the subsistence of the community, doctrine is already complete, and the individual is merely attracted to a doctrine that is already there in a finished state. It is evident that a doctrine is necessary. The content must be made representationally visible, and it is a content in which what is to be accomplished in the individual as such is accomplished, exhibited in and for itself.

[(1)] The sacrament of *baptism* is the first thing to play a part in this connection. The individual, that is, is already born within the community of the church; | he or she is not born in misery and will not be confronted by a hostile world but by a world that is a church, so that each one simply has to be grafted as subject upon a community that already exists as the individual's current environment.

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Doctrine comes to the individual through the *authority* of the church. The beginning of all our knowing is and must be authority. Even in the case of sense-knowledge we begin with the authority of being: it is the way it is, immediately, and it is valid for us as such—this is the authority of the sensible. Representational images with which we are familiar are the authorities from which we begin our philosophizing. They are given us as true; they are not our own

191. *Thus G with D; W₁ (MiscP) reads:* The subsistence of the community is its continuous, eternal becoming, which is grounded in the fact that spirit is an eternal process of self-cognition, dividing itself into the finite flashes of light of individual consciousness, and then re-collecting and gathering itself up out of this finitude—inasmuch as it is in the finite consciousness that the process of knowing spirit's essence takes place and that the divine self-consciousness thus arises. Out of the foaming ferment of finitude, spirit rises up fragrantly.

insight. Our own insight comes only later on through the reworking, assimilation, appropriation, and taking back of this material.

[(2)] This second moment is therefore the assimilation involved in *rebirth* by means of doctrine or teaching. Human beings must be born twice, first naturally, then spiritually, like the Brāhmans. Spirit is not immediate; it is only insofar as it engenders itself from itself.¹⁹² That is why there is a grief belonging to the natural state. This rebirth is no longer the infinite melancholy arising from the pangs of birth;¹⁹³ but there is also present the antithesis arising from the purely private preoccupations of human beings, their further interests, passions, self-seeking, etc. Only so can they have a natural heart, being other than they should be. The natural heart in which they are imprisoned is the enemy that is to be combated, but in the community this enemy is so determined as to be implicitly overcome.

The representation of a perennial struggle is not here the last word, as it is in the Kantian philosophy, where the strife is unending and the resolution is put off to infinity, so that we must take our stand upon the "ought."¹⁹⁴ Here the contradiction is resolved; hence the nature of spirit also is represented to the individual in such a way that evil is implicitly overcome. It does not have an absolutely independent subsistence, as it does in the eternal struggle between light and darkness of the Persian religion; [nor] is there a mechanically external relationship between | the sensible and the rational, as in the Kantian philosophy, where the two realms remain independent.¹⁹⁵ Here the power belongs to spirit; but spirit is the ab-

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192. Thus G, similar in D; W (HgG) adds: it only is as what is reborn.

193. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: of the community in general;

194. [Ed.] In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:461, 498 (*Werke* 15:593, 633), Hegel criticizes the Kantian-Fichtean view that the good on the one hand remains bound to the moral activity of the individual subject, but on the other hand can be realized only in infinite progress. See Vol. 1 of this edition, p. 349 n. 170.

195. [Ed.] Hegel discusses Persian dualism in Part II of the 1824 lectures (Vol. 2). As for Kant, he has in mind the Kantian distinction between the sensible world and the rational or intelligible world. Because the connection between these worlds is not comprehensible, it is impossible to understand how moral freedom might exercise a causality in the sensible world. See, e.g., Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics* (1785), trans. Otto Manthey-Zorn (New York, 1938), pp. 71–72, 79 (*Werke* 4:452, 458–459).

solute and is what is here known—the awareness that what has happened as such, what has been found to be the case, the natural being of humanity, can be undone. Here there is the awareness that, just as the natural will can be given up, so there is no sin that cannot be forgiven, except for the sin against the Holy Spirit,¹⁹⁶ the denial of spirit itself; for spirit alone is the power that can itself sublimate everything. Spirit has only to deal with itself in the element of the soul, of freedom, of spirituality; it does not continue to stand over against natural being or action and deed. Only spirit is free; its energy is not restricted. There is no power that is equal to it ~ or that can come against it;¹⁹⁷ no mechanistic or spiritless relationship is possible.

It is true that there are very many difficulties about this topic, difficulties that arise from the concept of spirit and of freedom. On the one hand there is spirit as universal spirit, and on the other hand human being-for-self, the being-for-self of the single individual. It must be said that it is the divine Spirit that effects rebirth; this is the free grace of God, for everything divine is free. It is not fate or destiny. On the other hand, however, the self-consciousness of the soul stands fast, too, and the question now is to ascertain how much is due to human agency. A *velleitas*, a *nisus* remains to it, but stubborn persistence in [its own contribution to] this relationship is itself what is unspiritual. ~The first being [of a human, its] self-being, is the concept in itself, implicit spirit; and what has to be sublated is the form of its immediacy, of its singularized, private being-for-itself.¹⁹⁸ This self-sublating and coming to self on the part of the concept is universal nature, in the same way that in the element of thought, spirit that comes to itself is free spirit; but free spirit is unlimited, universal spirit. |

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(3) The third [moment] in regard to this rebirth is that of *partaking* [*Genuss*]¹⁹⁹—the consciousness of this divine grace, the consciousness of being a ~citizen¹⁹⁹ of God's kingdom—what is called mystical union, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, where human

196. [Ed.] See Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28.

197. Thus G; D reads: there is nothing that can limit its energy;

198. Thus G; D reads: The essence of this self, this singular point or atom, is to sublimate itself according to its immediate selfhood—the process that is spirit itself.

199. Ms. reads: citizen (*Bürger*) G reads: henceforth (*fürder*) D reads: member

beings are vouchsafed the consciousness of their reconciliation with God in a sensible, intuitable form, the indwelling and lodging of the Spirit within them.

The content of the sacramental actions is also the development of spirit. There are three ways of representing the content of this sacrament. For the content begins from the representation, which is based on the sensible; but the sublation of this sense-element is the certain knowledge, in worship, of the grace of the divine Spirit. What is represented in the sacrament is that Christ is eternally sacrificed and rises again in the heart; this is correct. The eternal sacrifice is the process through which single individuals make themselves their own, the process by which their implicit being passes away. But since they belong to grace and are reconciled, the resurrection of Christ also takes place within them. The differences within the Christian religion are essentially involved in this point.

The first representational image is that Christ is present in the host in a sensible, bodily, unspiritual fashion. He is in this *thing* through the consecration of the priest: the divine is to be found in this externality. This is the view of the Catholics; the divine is literally eaten by the worshipers.

The second view is that God is present only in spirit, in faith, or in a spiritual way: this is the great image of the Lutheran confession. It too begins from eating and drinking, as in the Eleusinian mysteries;²⁰⁰ the starting point is the consumption of God objectively present. The advance is that the individual worshiper takes up this consumption inwardly, and the sensible is first spiritualized in the subject. The Father is what exists only insofar as it surrenders itself; but it first exists as real spirit, spirit realized, in self-consciousness. The crucial point in this interpretation is that transubstantiation takes place only in the partaking of communion, in faith, and only in a spiritual fashion.

167 The third view is that the deity is not present here at all, but is only remembered as an image. This is | the Reformed view: [the sacrament] is merely a lively recollection of the past, devoid of spirit. It is not divine presence, there is no actual spirituality.

200. [Ed.] The religious mysteries at Eleusis, in ancient Attica, in worship of Demeter and Persephone.

Such are the main considerations regarding the subsistence of the community.

3. The Realization of Faith

The third aspect to be considered is the realization of faith; but this also involves the transformation of the community, its recasting and modification.

The fact is that religion, as we have seen it, is spiritual religion, and the community exists primarily in what is inward, in spirit as such. This inwardness, this subjectivity that is inwardly present to itself, but not inwardly developed, is feeling or sensibility. The community also essentially possesses consciousness and its ~representations in the form of doctrine etc.,²⁰¹ but this brings with it separation and differentiation. The divine objective idea confronts consciousness as something other, which is in part given by authority, in part appropriated in worship. Or again, the moment of communion is just one single moment; or yet again, the divine idea, the divine content, is not intuited, it is only represented. The “now” of communion dissolves in its representation, partly into a beyond, an otherworldly heaven, partly into the past, and partly into the future.²⁰² But spirit is *simply present to itself*; it demands a fulfilled present, it requires more than merely²⁰³ confused images. It requires that the content should itself be present, or that feeling, sensibility, should be developed and expanded.

Thus over against the community, and the kingdom of God in the community, there stands an *objective reality*. As the external, *immediate* world, this objective reality is the *heart* and the concerns of the heart. Another form of objectivity is that of *reflection*, of abstract thought or understanding; and the third form, the true one, is that of the *concept*. Accordingly, we must consider the manner in which faith *realizes* itself in these three elements. |

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The realization of faith or of religion in general is simply the *reconciliation of spirit*. Initially, this reconciliation still has an an-

201. Thus G; D reads: representations, W (Var) reads: representations [W₁: in the form of doctrine], needs, drives, worldly existence in general,

202. [Ed.] Probably an allusion to the Catholic, the Reformed, and the Lutheran forms of communion.

203. Thus G; W (HgG/Ed?) adds: love or

tithesis, and we must consider its relationship to it, the way in which the antithesis is sublated, how the idea takes shape in it and seems in so doing to run the risk of losing itself.

[(1)] The first thing that opposes reconciliation is the natural *heart*. Religious reconciliation proceeds within the heart as that which is most inward and deep. On the other hand, the heart is also something private: it is the *natural* heart, with passions, inclinations, self-seeking, and egoism; hence in its one-sidedness it is forsaken by the universal, removed from faith. The direct reconciliation of the community with this worldliness, a reconciliation that is only immediate, is through the community's taking all these passions, inclinations, etc. up into itself, so that the *church*, which has its existence in its subjects, lets them do as they like, takes them up into itself as they are immediately, and thereby receives into itself all the coarseness and passions etc. [of human life]. The church is, on the one hand, the struggle with what is worldly; but on the other hand, standing as it does in the existence of a crude world, it falls into worldliness and corruption. So this initial reconciliation has rather the character of the church's corruption.

[(2)] The second [realm] to which the church is related is reflection.²⁰⁴ It is indeed through the contact between the inward and

204. [Ed.] "Reflection" (*Reflexion*) is Hegel's term for the philosophy of the Enlightenment, i.e., the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity," as expressed in the subtitle to *Faith and Knowledge*. Reflective philosophy is critical philosophy because it interprets objective reality in terms of the critical categories of the mind. What is "reflected," then, is the cognitive faculty of finite consciousness, not the rational structure of objective reality or of the "concept," as is the case with truly "speculative" philosophy. Reflective philosophy represents an indispensable advance beyond the immediacy and dogmatism of everyday experience (empiricism) and precritical metaphysics and theology. Thus the clash between the church (or church dogmatics) and reflection was inevitable. But because reflection is locked into the finite categories of the "understanding" (*Verstand*), it is unable to grasp the dialectical identity that underlies its abstract and partial images. It thus remains a finite, "alienated" mode of thought, oscillating between an abstract, empty unity on the one hand and a capricious, arbitrary individualism on the other. The decay and fragmentation of the bourgeois world to which Hegel alludes in the concluding section of the *Ms.*—in whose stead the present section stands in the 1824 and 1827 lectures—is attributable in part to the role of "reflection" in modern philosophy, science, and technology. For a helpful discussion of "reflection," see the *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 21–22, 24, 81, 112, 174–175.

the worldly or finite that reflection, indeed thinking in general, is first awakened, as the mediation of the real, worldly side with the ideal. This proximate and initial reconciliation can only be an abstract one; it is a self-disclosure of the understanding, of reflection, a self-disclosure of the reflection of a universality that is at first the abstract universality of the understanding.

Inasmuch as reflection thus sets [itself] up as a standard, there arises a hostile relationship to the church. Since the church seeks to imprint its image on the understanding, while the understanding imagines itself to be the content of religion, there emerges the sharpest possible apparent conflict. The community has the peculiarity of containing within itself the infinite antithesis between absolute spirit, having being in and for itself, and subjective, single spirit. The latter, in its character as singular self-consciousness, represents the extreme of formal freedom. As such, this extreme is what we have previously called the innermost realm. Over against this innermost realm stands "natural humanity" with | all of its private 169 concerns, so that the subject itself is this infinite contradiction. This antithesis is reconciled in and for itself, and the reconciliation is portrayed in religion. Implicitly it is reconciled in the concept too, and this is the subjectivity, the infinitude of the ego within itself, what was previously pointed out as the principle of immortality.²⁰⁵ Here the realization of faith consists in the fact that this inward element does not remain simply the inward heart, simply the depths of the heart, but develops itself within itself. So if we say that faith grows in the soil of what is most inward, the natural human self is quite distinct from this; and because the innermost element is not [yet] developed within itself, this truth [about faith] is for it a sensible history, a representation of God; it is spiritual truth as merely objective, as a datum.

The requirement is that the inmost element shall develop inwardly itself, that it shall exist for itself as the idea, albeit only as the subjective idea. This is what is meant by saying that faith realizes itself in reflection. What is awakened initially is thinking in general, the demand for the unity of what is inmost with one's own particular

205. [Ed.] See above, pp. 208–209.

worldly life. This is a demand for universality, in the first place for abstract universality. What it produces or manifests by itself is that this infinite inwardness, or pure thinking within itself, turns against authority and demands the form of selfhood with regard to every content that is to be accepted by it as true. Faith is indeed the testimony of the Spirit to the truth. The sensibility of devotion receives and has within itself the fulfillment afforded by the Spirit, but the individual worshipers do not exist for themselves therein; the truth has the form of authority, and the self lacks the determination of its own being-for-self in it.

170 The second [moment] is that thinking itself then produces hard-and-fast characteristics within itself and by itself. It discovers in the self a content, namely, that it is natural humanity; and since it is the universal, and its activity is that of universality, it extracts the affirmative element from the content and gives it the form of universality. Thus it arrives at hard-and-fast characteristics. For instance, the family relationship [is] a content of this kind—family life or family love, justice in general, contractual provisions, the relation of individuals to official authority, the relations of sovereigns and states. There is the testimony of spirit for these also that they are essential relationships. | In human life they become fixed characteristics—the family against celibacy, [property] rights against the poverty enjoined by the church, obedience to civil authority against the blind obedience of the church ([i.e.,] against the demand that one surrender all one's will and know nothing of determinations fixed within oneself and by oneself). Thus, in the second place, reflection also arrives at a hard-and-fast content; the content becomes fixed by obtaining the form of universality and, therewith, the form of identity with itself. Thinking thus enters into an antithesis to the church; it bases itself on fixed determinations; it brooks no contradiction. Whatever contradicts these fixed determinations is invalid; pretensions and ordinances of the church that run counter to them have no validity for it.

Abstract thinking, with its principle of identity, assails the inner content of the church even more violently. This content is concrete; it is the unity of the two [the universal and the particular]—the divine Trinity. This concrete content stands in contradiction to the

abstract law of identity. In the same way the relationship of God to humanity, the process of grace, the unity of divine and human nature, the mystical union—[all of these] represent an absolute²⁰⁶ coupling of opposite determinations. This content is annulled in thought; and reflection then has as its final result the objectivity of identity itself, namely, that God is nothing but the supreme being [*das höchste Wesen*]²⁰⁷—which (for the very reason that it is not concrete, without definition, and empty) is simultaneously defined for cognition as what is beyond it. For every determination makes [what is determined] concrete, and cognition is only the knowledge of concrete content. This consummation of reflection is the antithesis of the Christian church.

There are two forms of this abstract unity. [For the first,²⁰⁷] what counts as the true is empty unity, something other opposed to cognition. Vis-à-vis the subject, this empty unity is a negation, for the subject knows itself as concrete. Finitude stands on this side of the empty essence. It has become free for itself, and it is of absolute value within itself, it is independent. In this way, finitude is its own criterion of value in various forms, as, for example, | the personal uprightness of individuals. The further consequence of this is not only that the objective reality of God is thus removed into the beyond and negated, but also that all other objective determinations, all of the determinations that are valid implicitly and explicitly (and are posited in the world as rights, customs, etc.), explicitly disappear. Since the subject withdraws to the pinnacle of its own infinite, what is good, just, etc. is contained only within it; it makes good and justice into its subjective decisions, they constitute *its* thoughts. What bodies out this good is then derived from natural caprice, contingency, passion, etc. The [single] subject is simply the consciousness that objectivity is shut up within itself; it is conscious that objective reality has no subsistence; only the principle of iden-

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206. Thus *G* with *D*; *W* (*Ed/HgG?*) reads: the unity of the two, divine grace and human freedom—this is all a

207. [*Ed.*] Hegel here describes the ideology of Enlightenment rationalism. It accepts the reflective critique of traditional religious dogma but substitutes for it merely subjective ethical and cognitive criteria, ending with abstract and empty self-identity over against the equally empty beyond.

tity is valid for this subject. It is an abstract subject, it can be bodied out with any sort of content; it has the capability (so deeply implanted in the human heart) of subsuming each and every content. Thus subjectivity is caprice and the knowledge of its power over everything—its power to produce objectivity, the good, and imbue it with content.

172 ~The second form [of abstract unity] is that, vis-à-vis the unity toward which it has stretched out, subjectivity has no being on its own account, and therefore it does not allot to itself an affirmative private sphere; instead its vocation is ~²⁰⁸ to submerge itself in the unity of God, of the infinite. Thus the subject has no private purpose, and no absolute purpose other than that of willing itself to exist for this One, and it alone, of making its sole purpose the glory of the one God. This other form is religion: it contains an affirmative relationship to one's essence, which is this One, wherein the subject yields itself up. This religion has in general the same content as the Jewish religion, but the relationship in which human beings stand is broadened. No particularity remains to it; | here there is no ~defining characteristic like the Jewish sense of national value.^{~209} Here there is no limitation to a particular people; humanity relates itself to the One as purely abstract self-consciousness. This is the characteristic of the *Islamic religion*.²¹⁰ In it Christianity finds its

208. Thus *G* with *D*, similar in W_1 ; W_2 (*Var*) reads: The other development of this standpoint is that the subject does not have being on its own account vis-à-vis the unity into which it has emptied itself. It does not retain its private domain; instead it takes it as a vocation simply *Ho* reads: Hence subjectivity veers around in its caprice, no longer aspiring to maintain itself vis-à-vis the abstract unity into which it has emptied itself but merely to subsist therein, aspiring with the totality of its private interests

209. Thus *G*, W_1 ; W_2 (*Var*) reads: Jewish sense of national value, which posits this relationship to the One. *Ho* reads: Jewish sense of national value, which posits this relationship.

210. [Ed.] This is the only significant discussion of Islamic religion (*mohammedanische Religion*) in the lectures (there are brief references to it in this volume, *Ms.*, p. 121, 1824 lectures, p. 218, 1827 lectures, p. 316, and in Volume 2, where it is compared with Judaism [*Ms.* sheet 47b–48a]). Islam lacks a place in Hegel's schema of determinate religions. The reason appears to be that, unlike the other religions, Islam does not represent an earlier phase of religious consciousness that has been or can be sublated in the consummate religion. Rather it stands in antithesis to Christianity as a contemporary rival. Thus the proper place for its treatment, in Hegel's scheme, is in the context of various challenges to the Christian religion in the modern world.

antithesis because it occupies a sphere equivalent to that of the Christian religion. It is a spiritual religion like the Jewish, but its God is [available] for self-consciousness only within the *abstract* knowing spirit. Its God is on a par with the Christian God to the extent that no particularity is retained. Anyone, from any people, who fears God is pleasing to him, and human beings have value only to the extent that they take as their truth the knowledge that this is the One, the essence. ~The differentiation of²¹¹ subjects according to their station in life or class is sublated; there may be classes, there may even be slaves, but this is merely accidental.

The antithesis consists in the fact that in Christianity spirituality is developed *concretely* within itself and is known as Trinity, as spirit; and that human history, the relationship to the One, is likewise a *concrete* history that begins with the natural will, which is as it ought not to be. The surrender of the natural will and the coming to be of the [spiritual] self takes place through the negation of our [natural] self for the sake of our [spiritual] essence. The religion of Islam, by contrast, hates and proscribes everything concrete; its God is the absolute One, in relation to whom human beings retain for themselves no purpose, no private domain, nothing peculiar to themselves. Inasmuch as they exist, humans do in any case create a private domain for themselves in their inclinations and interests, and these are all the more savage and unrestrained in this case because they lack reflection. But coupled with this is also the complete opposite, namely, the tendency to let everything take its own course, indifference with respect to every purpose, absolute fatalism, indifference to life; no practical purpose has any essential value. But since human beings are in fact practical and active, their purpose can only be to bring about the veneration of the One in all humanity. | Thus the religion of Islam is essentially fanatical.

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The [stance of] “reflection” that we have been considering is on a par with Islam in that God has no content and is not concrete. In this way the concrete historical content of the life of Christ also disappears; ~his exaltation to be the Son of God, the transfiguration

211. Thus G, W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads: No dividing wall of any kind between believers or between them and God is recognized. Before God the determinacy of

of self-consciousness, etc.²¹² have no place here. ~The distinction²¹³ consists in the fact that ~this independence of Islam [from everything concrete and worldly] is not preserved [by reflection]; here, on the contrary,²¹⁴ subjective reflection retains for itself the power to fill out its own contingent free will. This is the religion of the Enlightenment, of reflection, of abstract thinking, which means in fact that the truth cannot be cognized, cannot be known—that it is not there for subjective self-consciousness [proper] but only for its opinion, its contingency, and its pleasure.²¹⁵

212. *Thus G, similar in W₁; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* consequently the appearance of God in the flesh, the exaltation of Christ to be the Son of God, the transfiguration of the finitude of the world and self-consciousness to reveal the infinite self-determining of God,

213. [Ed.] Presumably between the “reflective” thinking of the Enlightenment and Islam. This reading is supported (and clarified) by the variant from *MiscP* in *W₂* given in n. 215. It requires reading “not preserved” in this sentence rather than “not abandoned” as in *G*. The editor of *W₁*, following *G*, construed the distinction as one between Christianity and Islam/Enlightenment religion (see n. 214), which makes little sense in the context. We assume that *MiscP* lay behind Hegel’s oral presentation in 1824; we accordingly construe the meaning in conformity with *W₂*.

214. *Thus G; W₁ (Ed) reads:* in Islam

215. *Thus G with D; W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Christianity [according to reflection] is valid only as doctrine, and Christ counts as the emissary of God, as a divine teacher, in other words as a teacher like Socrates, only even more excellent than Socrates, since he was without sin. But that is only a half-truth. Either Christ was only a man or he was the “Son of Man.” Nothing remains of the divine history, and Christ is spoken of in exactly the same way as in the Koran. The difference between this [reflective] stage and Islam is that the latter, whose intuition bathes in the aether of limitlessness, being itself this infinite independence, simply surrenders everything particular—enjoyment, status, personal knowledge, every form of vanity. From the standpoint of the Enlightenment, on the other hand, based as it is on the understanding, God is otherworldly and has no affirmative relationship to the subject; human beings, therefore, are regarded abstractly as being on their own account. They recognize the affirmative universal only to the extent that it is within them, but also they possess it only *abstractly*, and consequently they derive the fulfillment of it only from contingency and caprice.

[Ed.] Hegel’s critical remark concerning the comparison of Socrates and Christ is directed against a common theme that assumes many different forms in the Enlightenment. See Benno Böhm, *Sokrates im achtzehnten Jahrhundert: Studien zum Werdegange des modernen Persönlichkeitsbewusstseins* (Leipzig, 1929; reprint, Neumünster, 1966), esp. pp. 134–154. It is not clear whether Hegel’s criticism is directed generally against the comparison between Jesus as the exponent of revealed religion and Socrates as the exponent of natural religion, or against more specific themes in this literature. Despite Hegel’s implication here, sinlessness was often attributed to Socrates as well. Hegel is likely to have been familiar with J. A. Eberhard’s *Neue Apologie des Sokrates* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1772) and F. V. Reinhard’s *Versuch*

The final point is that a reconciliation can also be recognized in this last-mentioned form; thus this last mode of appearing is also a realization of faith. For since all content and all truth perish | in this subjectivity that inwardly knows itself as infinite yet remains private, the principle of subjective freedom thereby comes to consciousness in it. What is called inwardness in the community is now developed within itself. It is not only inwardness and conscience, but is the subjectivity that divides, differentiates itself, that is concrete; it knows within itself the universal that it produces from itself. This is the subjectivity that is for itself and inwardly determines itself, the consummation of the subjective extreme to the point of being the self-contained idea. But the deficiency here is that this is only formal and lacks true objectivity; it represents the ultimate pinnacle of formal development without inner necessity. For the true consummation of the idea, what has been differentiated must be set free, must in itself constitute a totality of objective reality.

(3) The third relationship of faith is to the *concept*, to the *idea*. Once reflection has invaded the sphere of religion, thinking or reflection assumes a hostile attitude toward the representational form in religion and toward the concrete content. And once thinking has begun in this way, it does not stop; it carries through, it ~empties heart and heaven; cognitive spirit and the religious content then take refuge in the concept. Here they must find their²¹⁶ justification; thinking must grasp itself as concrete and free, not maintaining the distinctions as merely posited, but letting them go free and in that way recognizing the content as objective.

über den Plan, den der Stifter der christlichen Religion zum Besten der Menschen entwarf (Wittenberg, 1781).

The Koran describes Jesus as the son of Mary, as one sent by Allah, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, as a servant of Allah and one near to Allah, etc. In contrast with the more radical wing of Enlightenment criticism of religion, it allows for the supernatural conception of Jesus, but it contests the idea of Jesus' divine sonship and rejects the Trinity as tritheism. It cannot be shown, and in fact is unlikely, that Hegel had direct knowledge of the Koran.

216. Thus G, W_1 ; D reads: empties spirit and heaven, and the religious content then takes refuge in the concept. Here it must find its W_2 (Var) reads: empties heart, heaven, and cognitive spirit; and the religious content then takes refuge in heaven. Here it must find its

[Ed.] See 1827 lectures, n. 262.

175 *Philosophy* therefore has the task of ~mediating these two relationships.²¹⁷ Religion and the need for ~religion²¹⁸ can take refuge in the form of feeling or sensibility as well as in the concept. It can limit itself to giving up the truth and renouncing all hope of knowing a content, with the result that the holy church no longer has any commonality and splits into atoms, each with its own worldview. For commonality is based on | doctrine, but individuals have each their own feeling, their own sensations. It is just this form that does not correspond to spirit, which is resolved to *know*.²¹⁹

Thus philosophy stands between two opposing views. On the one hand it seems to be opposed to the church; because it conceptualizes, it shares with the development of culture and with reflection the refusal to remain bound to the form of representation. Instead, it [advances to the point] of comprehending [the truth] in thoughts; and in the process it also recognizes the necessity of the form of representation. But the concept is the higher form because, even while encompassing the various [representational] forms and acknowledging their legitimacy, it has its own content. So this opposition [to the church] is only a formal one. The other opposition is between philosophy and the Enlightenment. Philosophy is opposed to the [attitude of] indifference toward the content, it is opposed to mere opinion, to the despair involved in its renunciation of the truth, and to the view that it does not matter what content is intended. The goal of philosophy is the cognition of the truth—the cognition of God because he is the absolute truth. In that context nothing else is worth troubling about compared with God and his explication. Philosophy knows God essentially as concrete, as the spiritual, realized universality that is not jealous but communicates itself. Even light communicates itself. Whoever says that God cannot be cognized is saying that God is jealous, and is not making a serious effort to ~achieve cognition when²²⁰ he speaks of God.²²¹ The Enlightenment—that vanity of understanding—is the most vehement

217. *Thus D; G, W read:* establishing the relationship to the two preceding stages.

218. *Thus G, D; W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* piety

219. *Thus G; W (HgG/Ed?) adds:* how it stands in that respect.

220. *Thus G; W (HgG) reads:* believe in God, however much

opponent of philosophy. It takes it very ill when philosophy demonstrates the rational content in the Christian religion, when it shows that the witness of the Spirit, the truth in the most all-embracing sense of the term, is deposited in religion. ~Thus the task of philosophy~²²² is to show forth the rational content of religion.

That was the purpose of these lectures, to reconcile reason with religion in its manifold forms, and to recognize them as at least necessary.²²³ |

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This conceptual cognition of religion is by its nature not universal, but is rather only the cognition of a community.²²⁴ For that reason three stages take shape in regard to the kingdom of the Spirit: the first estate is that of immediate, naive religion and of faith; the second is that of the understanding, the estate of the so-called cultured, of reflection and the Enlightenment; and finally the third estate is ~the community of philosophy.~²²⁵

221. [Ed.] In Part I of the lectures, Hegel appeals to Plato and Aristotle for a refutation of the view that God is "jealous" of any knowledge of himself. See Vol. 1:382 n. 45.

222. *Thus G; W (HgG) reads:* In the [branch of] philosophy that is theology, the one and only task

223. *Thus G; W₂ (Var) adds:* and to rediscover truth and the idea in the revelatory religion.

224. [Ed.] That is, the community of philosophy. The *conceptual* cognition of religion is not universally available to the whole of humanity in the same way that the representational forms of religion are. Cf. the discussion of the "partiality" of philosophy in the *Ms.*, p. 162. Thus although philosophy is the highest or final stage, it is not as universal as religion, and the latter is a permanent "estate" (*Stand*) in the kingdom of the Spirit. In Hegel's view, the theology of the time belongs to the second estate, although "true" theology is a citizen of the third. The "community" (*Gemeinde*)—the community of faith, of the Spirit, the Christian community—seems now to have passed over into the philosophical community, and along with it its cognitive (i.e., its theological) activity.

225. *Thus G; D reads:* that of the community, of philosophy. *W (HgG/Ed?) reads:* the stage of philosophy. *Ho reads:* that of the philosophizing community.

THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION¹ THE LECTURES OF 1827

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Introduction

1. Definition of This Religion²

The first [division] was the *concept of religion* in general; the second, religion in its particularity or *determinate religion*, the last of these being the religion of expediency. The third is the *consummate religion*, the religion that is for itself, that is objective to itself.

This is always the pattern in scientific knowledge: first the concept; then the particularity of the concept—reality, objectivity; and finally the stage in which the original concept is an object to itself, is for itself, becomes objective to itself, is related to itself. So this is the pattern in philosophy: first the concept of the conceptualizing science—the concept that *we* have. But at the end science itself grasps its concept, so that this concept is for itself.³

1. [Ed.] The title found in the Königsberg Anonymous, used by Lasson, is: "Part III. The Revelatory Religion." Erdmann offers as a title the words used by Hegel in the second sentence: "Part III. The Consummate Religion, the Religion That Is For Itself, or the Religion That Is Objective to Itself." The titles in the extant transcripts are as follows: *An*: "III. The Revealed Religion"; *Hu*: "Part III. The Christian Religion"; *B*: "III. The Revelatory Religion, or the Religion That Is Objective to Itself."

2. [Ed.] In this section, Hegel briefly summarizes the substance of the introductory remarks found in the *Ms.* and (in considerably expanded form) in the 1824 lectures. The agenda of the 1827 introduction is different, as we shall see below in Secs. 2–3. The polemic against the subjectivism of present-day theology is past, and Hegel now faces a different challenge.

3. *W* (1831) reads: We have now arrived at the realized concept of religion, the *consummate religion*, in which it is the concept itself that is its own object. We have defined religion more precisely as the *self-consciousness of God*. Self-consciousness

And therefore the sphere into which we are now entering is the concept of religion that is for itself, i.e., the *revelatory religion*. Religion is for the first time what is revelatory, is manifested, when the concept of religion is for itself, i.e., when religion or its concept has become objective to itself—not in limited, finite objectivity, but such that it is objective to itself in accord with its concept. |

This can be defined more precisely as follows. Religion, in accord with its general concept, is the consciousness of God as such, consciousness of absolute essence. Consciousness, however, is a differentiating, a division within itself. Thus we have already two moments: consciousness and absolute essence. These two are, first of all, externalized forms in a finite nexus and relationship—empirical consciousness on the one hand, and essence in the abstract sense on the other. They stand in a finite relationship to each other, and to this extent they are both finite; in consciousness we accord-

in its character as consciousness has an object, and it is conscious of itself in this object; this object is also consciousness, but it is consciousness as an object, and consequently it is finite consciousness, a consciousness that is distinct from God, from the absolute. Determinateness and consequently finitude are present in this form of consciousness. God is self-consciousness; he knows himself in a consciousness that is distinct from him, which is implicitly the consciousness of God, but is also the divine consciousness explicitly since it knows its identity with God, an identity that is mediated, however, by the negation of finitude. It is this concept that constitutes the content of religion. We define God when we say that he distinguishes himself from himself and is an object for himself but that in this distinction he is purely identical with himself—that he is *spirit*. This concept is now realized; consciousness knows this content and knows that it is utterly interwoven with this content: in the concept that is the process of God, consciousness is itself a moment. Finite consciousness knows God only to the extent that God knows himself in it; thus God is spirit, indeed the Spirit of his community, i.e., of those who worship him. This is the consummate religion, the concept that has become objective to itself. Here it is manifest what God is: he is no longer a “beyond,” an unknown, for he has made known to human beings what he is, and has done so not merely in an external history but in consciousness. We have here, therefore, the religion of the manifestation of God, since God knows himself in finite spirit. God is utterly revelatory: this is the [essential] circumstance here. The transition was our having seen that the knowledge of God as free spirit is still burdened with finitude and immediacy so far as its content is concerned. This finitude had yet to be done away with by the labor of spirit; it is nothingness, and we have seen how this nothingness has been made manifest to consciousness. The unhappiness, the anguish of the world was the condition, the preparation on the subjective side for the consciousness of free spirit as absolutely free and consequently infinite spirit.

We dwell initially on (A) the universal features of this sphere.

ingly have two elements that are related to each other in a finite, external way. Thus consciousness knows even the absolute essence only as something finite, not as what is true. God, however, is himself consciousness, differentiating himself within himself. Since God, as this differentiating of himself within himself, is consciousness, so is he, as consciousness, such that he gives himself as object for what we call the side of consciousness.

But when religion grasps itself,⁴ its content and | object is this whole—*consciousness relating itself to its essence*, knowing itself as its essence and knowing its essence as its own—and that is spiritual religion. 179

This means that *spirit* is the object of religion,⁵ and the object of the latter—essence knowing itself—is spirit. Here for the first time, spirit is as such the object, the content of religion, and spirit is only *for* spirit. Since it is content or object, it is, as spirit, this self-knowing or self-differentiating, and it itself furnishes the other side, that of subjective consciousness, which appears as finite. It is the religion whose fulfillment is itself.

2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion⁶

This is the abstract determination of this idea or the sphere where religion is in fact idea. This is because an idea in the philosophical

4. *Thus also* W; L (1827?) *adds*: the other determination in it emerges. The consciousness of God means that finite consciousness has this God, who is its essence, as an object—it knows him as its essence, sets him over against itself. Thus

5. *Thus* L, *similar in* B, Hu, An; W (1831) *adds*: Thus we have two elements, consciousness and object; but in the religion that has itself as its fulfillment, that is revelatory, that has comprehended itself, religion or the content itself is the object.

6. [Ed.] This section is new in the 1827 lectures, although it incorporates some materials used elsewhere in the earlier lectures. Against the charges of his critics, Hegel insists that Christianity is a *positive* religion, whose truth is mediated to consciousness in sensible historical fashion, and which has a necessary element of external authority. Yet the essential, rational truth revealed by this religion, while mediated positively, derives solely from its *spirituality* and can be verified only by the witness of spirit (see n. 16), not by historical proofs. Here materials from the Ms.'s treatment of the cultus in Part III (see above, Ms., Sec. C) and from the 1824 lectures' treatment of the cultus in Part I (see Vol. 1, 1824 *Concept*, Sec. B.3.b) are incorporated into the 1827 introduction to the revelatory religion. In contrast with the whole debate in late Enlightenment thought over reason versus revelation, Hegel claimed that the *revealed* (positive) religion is also one in which reason and truth are made open, manifest (*offenbar*). The term "revelatory" gathers up both the positivity and the spirituality of this religion.

sense⁷ is the concept that has an object, has determinate being, reality, objectivity; it objectifies itself, and is no longer merely inner and subjective, but its objectivity is at the same time a return to itself.⁸

The consummate religion is the idea and has as its object what it [actually] is, namely, the consciousness of essence; thereby it is objectified.⁹ This absolute religion is the *revelatory* [*offenbar*] religion, the religion that has itself as its content and fulfillment. But it is also called the *revealed* [*geoffenbart*] religion—which means, on the one hand, that it is revealed by God, that God has given himself for human beings to know what he is; and on the other hand, that it is a revealed, *positive* religion in the sense that it has come to humanity from without, has been given to it. In view of the peculiar meaning that attaches to the positive, it is interesting to see what positivity is.

180 In the first place, the absolute religion is, of course, a positive religion in the | sense that everything that is *for* consciousness is *objective* to consciousness. *Everything must come to us from outside*. The sensible is thus something positive. Initially there is nothing positive other than what we have before us in immediate intuition. Everything spiritual also comes to us in this fashion, whether it be the spiritual in general or the spiritual in finite or historical form. This mode of external spirituality, and spirit expressing itself outwardly, are likewise positive. The ethical realm, the laws of freedom, entail a higher, purer spirituality; the ethical by nature has nothing *externally* spiritual about it; it is not something external and contingent but is the nature of rational spirit itself. But even the ethical comes to us in an external mode, chiefly in the form of education, instruction, doctrine: it is simply given to us as something valid as it stands. Laws—e.g., civil laws, laws of the state—are likewise something positive: they come to us and are there for us as valid. They are not merely something external

7. [Ed.] See esp. *Science of Logic*, pp. 755 ff. (GW 12:173 ff.).

8. Thus B, Hu, An; L, W (1827?) add: or—to the extent that we speak of the concept as a goal—is the fulfilled, accomplished goal, which precisely as such is objective.

9. Thus B; L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: [now] exists in a fashion similar to how at first it was the concept—or *our* concept—and the concept alone.

for us, as are sensible objects, so that we can leave them behind or pass them by; rather, in their externality, they also ought to have, for us subjectively, an essential, subjectively binding power. When we grasp or recognize the law, when we find it rational that crime should be punished, this is not because law is positive but rather because it has an essential status for us. It is not simply valid for us externally because it *is* so; rather it is also valid for us internally, it is rationally valid as something essential, because it also is itself internal and rational. Positivity does not in any way detract from its character as rational and therefore as something that is our own. The laws of freedom always have a positive aspect, an aspect marked by reality, externality, contingency in their appearance. Laws must be determinate. Externality already enters into the determination or the quality of punishment, and even more into its quantity. Positivity simply cannot be removed from punishment but is wholly necessary to it. ~This final determination of the immediate, this immediate [factor],¹⁰ is something positive, i.e., not at all rational in and for itself. For example, in the case of punishment, round numbers determine the amount of the penalty; | it is not possible to determine by reason what the absolutely just penalty is. Whatever is positive *according to its nature* is also irrational. It must be determinate, and is so in such a way that it has or contains ~nothing rational~¹¹ in it.

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This aspect is also necessary in the case of the revelatory religion. Since historical, externally appearing elements are found in it, there is also present a positive and contingent [feature], which can just as well take one form as another.¹² Because of the externality and appearance that are posited along with it [i.e., revelation], this positive [feature] is always present. However, we must distinguish between the positive as such, the abstract positive, and ~[the positive in the form of] rational law.¹³ The law of freedom is not valid simply because it is there, but rather because it is the determination

10. *L* reads: —this final determination of the immediate. This immediate [factor] *W* (*Var*) reads: This final determinacy of the immediate

11. Thus *Hu*, *W*; *L* reads: a rational element

12. Thus *L*, *Hu*, *An*; *W* (*Var*) adds: This occurs also in the case of religion.

13. Thus *L*; *W*₁ (*Var*) reads: law, the rational law. *W*₂ (*Var*) reads: the positive in the form of and as the law of freedom.

of our rationality itself. When it is known in this way, then it is not something that is merely positive or externally valid. Religion also appears as positive in the entire content of its doctrines. But it should not remain in this form; it should not be a matter of mere representation or of bare remembrance.

182 The second aspect of positivity is connected with the verification of religion, namely, that this external [feature] should bear witness to the truth of a religion, and should be regarded as the ground of its truth. Verification may sometimes take the form of the positive as such—namely, *miracles* and *testimonies*, which are supposed to verify the fact that this individual has done this or that,¹⁴ has given this or that doctrine. Miracles are positive occurrences, sensible givens, perceptible alterations in the sensible world, and this perception itself is sensible because it consists in a sensible alteration. In regard to this form of positivity, it has already been remarked¹⁵ that it certainly | can bring about a kind of verification for human beings as sentient beings. But that is only the beginning of verification, it is the sensible or as it were unspiritual verification, by which precisely what is spiritual cannot be verified. The spiritual as such cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual, the sensible. The chief thing about this aspect of miracles is that in this way they are actually put aside. For, on the one hand, the understanding can attempt to explain the miracles naturally, it can advance many probabilities against them; but this involves confining one's attention to the external, eventlike character of miracles and directing one's arguments against this aspect. What matters most to reason with respect to miracles, on the other hand, is that what is spiritual cannot be verified externally. For the spiritual is higher than the external; it can be verified only from within and through itself; it is confirmed only in and through itself. This is what can be called "the witness of spirit."¹⁶

14. *L* reads: which are supposed to verify the fact that this individual *Hu* reads: that this individual has done this or that, *An* reads: that this individual W_1 (*Var*) reads: the verification that this individual W_2 (*Var*) reads: which are supposed to prove the divinity of the revealing individual, and that this individual

15. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:411–413.

16. [*Ed.*] The expression *Zeugnis des Geistes* contains an ambivalence or double meaning for Hegel. On the one hand, it can refer to the witness of the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God, by which authentic faith is awakened in human subjects; on

This very point has found expression in religious narratives. Moses performs miracles before Pharaoh, and the Egyptian magicians imitate him;¹⁷ which is to say that no great value is placed on miracles. The main point, however, is that Christ indeed says, "You demand signs and wonders," and so reviles the Pharisees, who demand from him attestations of this sort;¹⁸ he himself also says, "After ~my death~¹⁹ many will come who perform miracles in my name, but I have not recognized them."²⁰ Here Christ himself rejects miracles as a genuine criterion of truth. This is the essential point, and we must hold fast to it. Verification by miracles, as well as the attack upon miracles, belong to a lower sphere that concerns us not at all.

The witness of spirit is the authentic witness. It can be of diverse sorts. ~In an indeterminate, more general way,~²¹ it can be whatever accords with spirit, whatever awakens in it, or produces in its inwardness, a deeper resonance. In history, all that is noble, lofty, and divine speaks to us internally; to it our spirit bears witness. This witness may remain nothing more than this general resonance, this inner agreement, | this empathy and sympathy. But beyond this, the witness of spirit may also be connected with insight and thought. Insofar as this insight is not sensible in character, it belongs directly to thought; it appears in the form of reasons, distinctions, etc., in the form of mental activity, exercised along with and according to the specific forms of thought, the categories. This thinking may

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the other hand, it can refer to the witness of *our* spirit to spiritual truth. (See Vol. 1:337 n. 149.) The two meanings are in fact two aspects of a single truth, since the Spirit of God witnesses only in and through our spirits: there is no divine witness apart from the activity of human spirit; however, the latter is not an autonomous, singular activity but the inner working of the one holy and universal Spirit. In some contexts, especially those concerned with the formation of the community of the Spirit, Hegel intends the former meaning, while in others (such as the paragraphs immediately following) the stress falls on the latter. In accord with our principle of capitalizing "spirit" when it has the representational-religious function of referring to the Holy Spirit, we translate as either "the witness of the Spirit" or "the witness of spirit," depending on how we construe the primary intention of specific passages.

17. [Ed.] See Exod. 7:9–12, 22; 8:3.

18. [Ed.] A conflation of John 4:48 and Matt. 12:38–39.

19. *Thus An*; *L reads*: my resurrection

20. [Ed.] A paraphrase of Matt. 7:22–23.

21. *Thus L*; *W (Var) reads*: indeterminately and generally,

appear in more or less mature forms; it may serve as the presupposition of one's heart or of one's spiritual life in general—the presupposition of universal principles, which are acknowledged to be valid and which direct the life of a human being, serving as one's maxims. These need not be conscious maxims, but they are the means by which the character of a human being is formed, the universal that has obtained a firm foothold in one's spirit. This is a permanent, governing element in one's spirit. It is upon firm foundations of this kind, on presuppositions like this, on ethical principles of this type, that the powers of reasoning and defining can begin. In this respect the levels of development and ways of life of human beings vary considerably, just as do their needs. The highest need of the human spirit, however, is so to think that the witness of spirit is present [for it] not merely in that first resonating mode of sympathy, nor in the second way of providing firm foundations²² upon which views may be established and firm presuppositions from which conclusions can be drawn and deductions made. The witness of spirit in its highest form is that of philosophy, according to which the concept develops the truth purely as such from itself without presuppositions. As it develops, it cognizes—in and through its development it has insight into—the necessity of the truth.

184 Faith and thought have often been opposed in such a way that we say: one can "be convinced"²³ of God, of the truths of religion, in no other way than by thinking.²⁴ But the witness of spirit can be present in manifold and various ways; it is not required that for all of | humanity the truth be brought forth in a philosophical way. The needs of human beings are different in accord with their cultivation and their free spiritual development; and this diversity in accord with the stage of development also encompasses that standpoint [we call] trust or belief on the basis of *authority*. Miracles

22. Thus L; W (Var) adds: and principles

23. Thus B; L, W₁ (Var) read: have an awareness W₂ (Var) reads: have a genuine conviction

24. Thus B, An, similar in Hu; L, W (Var) add: Hence the proofs of the existence of God have been declared the sole means of knowing the truth and of being convinced.

also have their place here, but it is interesting to note that miracles have been reduced to a minimum—namely, to those recounted in the Bible.

²⁵That sympathy of which we have spoken earlier, where the spirit or the soul cries out, “Yes, that is the truth”—that sympathy is so immediate a form of certainty that it can be as secure for one person as thinking is for another. [It is] something so immediate that just for this reason it is something posited, given, or positive; [it is so immediate] that precisely this immediacy has the form of positivity and is not brought forth by means of the concept.²⁶ We ought to bear in mind, however, that only human beings have religion. Religion has its seat and soil in the activity of thinking. The heart and feeling that directly sense the truth of religion are not the heart and feeling of an animal but of a thinking human being; they are a thinking heart and a thinking feeling, and whatever [measure] of religion is in this heart and feeling is a thought of this heart and feeling.²⁷ But to be sure, insofar as we begin to draw conclusions, to reason, to give grounds, to advance to the categories of thought, this is invariably thinking.

Since the doctrines of the Christian religion are present in the Bible, they are thereby given in a positive fashion; and if they are subjectively appropriated, if spirit gives witness to them, this can happen in an entirely immediate fashion, with one’s innermost being, one’s spirit, one’s thought, one’s reason, being touched by them and assenting to them. Thus the Bible is for Christians the basis, the fundamental basis, which has this effect on them, which strikes a chord within them, and gives firmness to their convictions.

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25. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W₂*: In general, however, there is still something positive in these different forms of the witness of spirit.

26. *Thus L with Hu, An; W₂ (Var) reads*: Because of its immediacy, sympathy—this immediate certainty—is itself something positive, and the reasoning that proceeds from something posited or given has just such a foundation.

[Ed.] Cf. the following footnote.

27. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: Likewise, as we have noted in the second instance, in any process of reasoning that has a firm foundation and presupposition, the foundation is something positive, posited, given. Reasoning has a foundation that has not investigated itself, that has not been produced by the concept.

[Ed.] Cf. the preceding footnote.

Beyond this, however, human beings, because they are able to think, do not remain in the immediacy of assent and testimony, but also indulge in thoughts, in deliberation, in considerations concerning this immediate witness. These thoughts and considerations result in "a developed"²⁸ religion; in its most highly developed form it is *theology* or scientific religion, whose content, as the witness of spirit, is [also] known in scientific fashion.

But here the opposing thesis perhaps comes in, for the theologians say that we ought to hold exclusively to the Bible. In one respect, this is an entirely valid principle. For there are in fact many people who are very religious and hold exclusively to the Bible, who do nothing but read the Bible, cite passages from it, and in this way lead a very pious, religious life. Theologians, however, they are not; such an attitude has nothing of a scientific, theological character.²⁹ But just as soon as religion is no longer simply the reading and repetition of passages, as soon as what is called explanation or interpretation begins, as soon as an attempt is made by inference and exegesis to find out the *meaning* of the words in the Bible, then we embark upon the process of reasoning, reflection, thinking; and the question then becomes how we should exercise this process of thinking, and whether our thinking is correct or not. It helps not at all to say that one's thoughts are based on the Bible. As soon as these thoughts are no longer simply the words of the Bible, their content is given a form, more specifically, a logical form. Or certain presuppositions are made with regard to this content, and with these one enters into the process of interpretation. These

28. Thus L, B, An; W (Var) reads: still further development in

29. Thus L, An, W₁, similar in Hu; W₂ (MiscP) adds: Goeze, the Lutheran zealot, had a celebrated collection of Bibles; the Devil quotes the Bible too, but that by no means makes the theologian.

[Ed.] The Hamburg Hauptpastor Johann Melchior Goeze was Lessing's chief opponent in the controversy surrounding Reimarus's *Fragments*. It began with the publication of Goeze's book, *Versuch einer Historie der gedruckten niedersächsischen Bibeln vom Jahr 1470 bis 1621* (Halle, 1775), with which it is unlikely that Hegel was familiar. But Lessing alluded many times to Goeze's Bible collection; see his *Anti-Goeze*, d.i. *Notgedrungene Beiträge zu den freiwilligen Beiträgen des Herrn Pastor Goeze* (Braunschweig, 1778), nos. 1, 9, in Lessing, *Vermischte Schriften*, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1791), pp. 159, 275 (Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* 13:142, 195).

presuppositions are the permanent element in interpretation; one brings along representations and principles, which guide the interpretation. |

The interpretation of the Bible exhibits its content, however, in the form of a particular age; ~the interpretation of a thousand years ago³⁰ was wholly different from that of today. Among the presuppositions that one brings to the Bible today belong, for example, the views that humanity is good by nature, or that we cannot cognize God.³¹ Thus here the positive can enter again in another form: we bring with us certain propositions such as that human beings have these feelings, are constituted in this or that particular way. So everything then depends on whether this content, these views and propositions, are true; and this is no longer the Bible, but instead words that spirit comprehends internally. If spirit expresses in a different way what is expressed in the Bible, then this is already a form that spirit gives [the content], the form of thinking. The form that one gives to this content has to be investigated. Here again the positive enters, in the sense that, for example, the formal logic of inference has been presupposed, namely, finite relations of thought. In terms of the ordinary relations of inference, only the finite can be grasped and cognized, only the understandable, but not the divine. This way of thinking is not adequate to the divine content; the latter is ruined by it. Insofar as theology is not a mere rehearsal of the Bible but goes beyond the words of the Bible and concerns itself with what kinds of feelings exist internally, it utilizes forms of thinking, it engages in thinking. If it uses these forms haphazardly, ~because one³² has presuppositions and prejudices, the result is something contingent and arbitrary. [What is pertinent here] can only be forms that are genuine and logically developed in terms of

30. *Thus Hu; An reads:* indeed a thousand years ago [it] *L reads:* the first interpretation in the early period of the church *W (Var) reads:* the first interpretation

31. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Imagine how someone with these prejudices in mind must distort the Bible! People bring these prejudices to the Bible, although the meaning of the Christian religion is precisely the cognition of God; it is indeed the religion in which God has revealed himself, has said what he is.

[*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, nn. 106, 253.

32. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* because it

187 necessity. But the investigation of these forms of thought falls to philosophy alone. Thus theology itself does not know what it wants when it turns against philosophy. Either it carries on unaware of the fact that it needs these forms, that it itself | thinks, and that it is a question of proceeding in accord with thought; or ~it fosters~³³ a deception, by reserving for itself the option to think as it chooses, in contingent fashion, when it knows that the cognition of the true nature of spirit is damaging to this arbitrary sort of cognition. This contingent, arbitrary way of thinking is the positive element that enters in here. Only the *concept* on its own account liberates itself truly and thoroughly from the positive. For in philosophy and in religion there is found this highest freedom, which is thinking itself as such.

Doctrine itself, the content, also takes on the form of the positive, as noted above; it is valid, it is firmly established, it is ~an entity that has to be reckoned with in actual society.~³⁴ Everything rational, every law, has this form.³⁵ But only its *form* is positive; its *content* must be that of spirit. The Bible has this *form of positivity*, yet according to one of its own sayings,³⁶ "The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life" [2 Cor. 3:6]. It is a question, then, as to which spirit we bring in, which spirit gives life to the positive. We must know that we bring with us a concrete spirit, a thinking, reflecting, sensing spirit; we must be aware of this spirit, which is at work, comprehending the content. This comprehension is not a passive acceptance, but since it is spirit that comprehends, it is at the same time its activity. Only in the mechanical sphere does one of the sides remain passive in the process of reception. Spirit, therefore, reaches out to, attains the positive realm; it has its representations

33. Thus L; W₁ (Var) reads: it is . W₂ (Var) reads: it is not serious about it but rather is

34. L (Var) reads: an entity reckoned with by everyone. Hu reads: a thing to be reckoned with in actual society. W (Var) reads: something binding, to be reckoned with in society.

[Ed.] Cf. the following footnote.

35. Thus L; W (Var) adds: namely, that it is an entity and, as such, is what is essential and binding for everyone.

[Ed.] Cf. the preceding footnote.

36. In B's margin: 26 July 1827

and concepts, it is logical in essence, it is a thinking activity. This, its [own] activity, spirit must know.

This thinking can proceed in one or another of the categories of finitude. It is, however, spirit that begins in this way from the positive but is itself there essentially alongside it. It is to become the true and proper Spirit, the Holy Spirit, which comprehends the divine and knows its content to be divine. This is the witness of spirit, | which, as we have shown above,³⁷ may be more or less developed. In regard to positivity, the main point is that spirit conducts itself in a thinking fashion and its activity occurs within the categories or determinations of thought; here ~spirit is purely active, sentient, or rational.³⁸ But most people are not conscious of the fact that they are active in this reception. Theologians are like the Englishman who didn't know that he was speaking prose;³⁹ because they work exegetically and (so they believe) in a passively receptive way, [they] have no inkling of the fact that they are thereby active and reflective. But if thinking is merely contingent, it abandons itself to the categories of finite content, of finitude, of finite thinking, and is incapable of comprehending the divine in the content; it is not the divine but the finite spirit that moves in such categories. As a result of such a finite thinking and comprehending of the divine, or of what is in and for itself, as a result of this finite thinking of the absolute content, the fundamental doctrines of

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37. [Ed.] See above, pp. 255–257.

38. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* spirit is active, whether it be in sentient or rational fashion, etc.

39. [Ed.] Hegel is alluding here to the dialogue between M. Jourdain and the teacher of philosophy in Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, act 2, scene 4, where the philosopher assures M. Jourdain that he is indeed speaking prose (and that one must really speak either prose or verse). Hegel erroneously ascribes M. Jourdain's lack of culture to an Englishman. That this is actually an error of Hegel and not of Hube's transcription (our only source for this passage) is confirmed by the following comment about Newton's lack of awareness of the conceptual presuppositions of the physical sciences, found in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:323 (*Werke* 15:447): "Newton is so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions that his case is like that of another of his countrymen who was surprised and rejoiced to learn that he had talked prose all his life, not having had any idea that he was so accomplished." It was probably because of this association with Newton that the erroneous ascription of M. Jourdain's naïveté to an Englishman came about. Cf. Hegel, *Briefe* 2:251.

Christianity have for the most part disappeared from dogmatics. Philosophy is preeminently, though not exclusively,⁴⁰ what is at present essentially orthodox; the propositions that have always been valid, the basic truths of Christianity, are maintained and preserved by it.

In our present consideration of this religion, we shall not set to work in *merely historical* fashion, which would entail starting with external matters, but rather we shall proceed *conceptually*.⁴¹ The form of activity that begins with externals appears to be [capable of] comprehension only on one side, while on the other it is independent.⁴² Our attitude here essentially takes the form of an activity such that thinking is conscious of itself, of the process involved in the categories of thought—a thinking that has tested and recognized itself, that knows how it thinks and which are the finite and which the true categories of thought. The fact that we began from the other side, from the positive side, from the individual development of the subject, from education in faith—[this has]⁴³ to be put aside insofar as we proceed *scientifically*.

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3. Survey of Previous Developments⁴⁴

This is the point at which to survey our previous course and to discuss the relation of this course to the final stage of religion; here

40. Thus *L*, similar in *W*; *An (Var)* reads: alone is

41. [Ed.] In the *Philosophy of Religion* as a whole, Hegel offers a speculative transfiguration of religion, not a merely historical (*historisch*) description of it. This is true also of the Christian religion, to which he now turns; it is already being viewed and interpreted from the standpoint of the absolute philosophy. Hegel does not intend to deny the positive, historical (*geschichtlich*) character of religion, and of the Christian religion especially; but since his intention is to proceed *scientifically* in this work, as he says in the last sentence of the paragraph, and since scientific cognition entails the speculative grasp of what is true, actual, rational, and spiritual, merely historical details are deemphasized.

42. Thus *Hu*; *L*, *W (Var)* read: [merely] activity.

43. Thus *An* with *Hu*; *L (Var)* reads: occurs in education etc., and has *W (Var)* reads: occurs in education and is necessary there, but here it has

44. [Ed.] This section expands considerably the brief concluding section to the 1824 introduction (Sec. 4), where Hegel discussed the relation of the consummate religion to the preceding religions. The present survey is developed in rather strictly logical categories and describes the process by which finite spirit “rises” to the absolute through the various forms of religious consciousness, which, when taken together, constitute the history of religion. The survey reflects Hegel’s penchant for

for the first time we are able to comprehend the course as a whole and its meaning. We refer back to what has already been said.⁴⁵ Religion is spirit as consciousness of its essence. On the one hand, there is a spirit that is the spirit of distinction; the other spirit is spirit as essence, as true, nonfinite spirit. This separation or disreption, this distinguishing, which resides in the concept of spirit, is what we have called the elevation of spirit from finite to infinite.⁴⁶ This elevation appears metaphysically in the proofs for the existence of God. Finite spirit makes infinite spirit its object, knows it as its own essence. If we allow ourselves to speak this way, the word “finite” becomes an indefinite, abstract word, in turn making the word “infinite” also indefinite; and spirit, defined as infinite, is designated only in an indeterminate way—indeed, not only indeterminately but also one-sidedly.

One must be clear about these logical definitions of “finite” and “infinite.”⁴⁷ When we keep them apart, we are in the realm of finite thinking. When we say “infinite spirit,” the word “infinite” is itself understood in a one-sided way because it has the finite over against it. In order not to be one-sided, spirit must encompass finitude within itself, and finitude in general means nothing more than a process of self-distinguishing. Consciousness is precisely the mode of finitude of spirit: distinction is present here. One thing is on one side, another on the other side; something has its limit or end in something else, and in this way they are limited. Finitude is this distinguishing, which in spirit takes the form of consciousness. Spirit must have consciousness, distinction, otherwise it is not spirit; accordingly, this is the moment of finitude in it. It must have this character of finitude within itself—that may seem blasphemous. But if it did not have it within itself, and thus if it confronted finitude

summing up previous stages of the discussion, but it may also reflect the closer association with the *Logic* that is characteristic of the 1827 lectures as a whole. Hegel is at pains to show in these lectures that the concept of religion and the various historical forms that it assumes correspond strictly to logical moments of the concept itself.

45. [Ed.] See above, p. 249, as well as Vol 1:380 ff.

46. L (1827?) adds: Just as spirit defines itself as finite, it [also] defines itself vis-à-vis spirit as infinite.

47. [Ed.] For this and what follows, see *Science of Logic*, pp. 137–156 (cf. GW 11:78–85).

190 from the other | side, then its infinitude would be a spurious infinitude. When we view the characteristic of finitude as something contradictory to God, then we take the finite as something fixed, independent—not as something transitional, but rather as something essentially independent, a limitation that remains utterly such—and then we have not properly recognized the nature of the finite and the infinite. The finite is not, however, the absolute. Neither are finite things absolute, nor is the absolute the definition of finitude logically or in thought; rather the definition of the latter is precisely to be not true in itself. If God has the finite only over against himself, then he himself is finite and limited. Finitude must be posited in God himself, not as something insurmountable, absolute, independent, but above all as this process of distinguishing that we have seen in spirit and in consciousness—a distinguishing that, because it is a transitory moment and because finitude is no truth, is also eternally self-sublating. Infinite spirit is posited in a one-sided abstraction when we say that the finite elevates itself to the infinite. The finite is here taken just as indefinitely as infinitude. This is the deficiency; this abstraction of the infinite has to be sublated, and likewise the abstraction of the finite, in which we initially perceive the finitude. The *consideration* of finitude is what gives us development and progressive determination.

We began with the *concept of religion*.⁴⁸ Religion is the spirit that relates itself to itself and thus to its essence, to true spirit; it is reconciled with true spirit and finds itself in it. Because this concept of religion is *only* a concept, it is finite; it is not yet the *idea*, the realization, the actualization of the concept. It is *in* itself the true, but it is not yet *for* itself; but the essence of spirit is to be for itself what it is in itself or what its concept is. Since, therefore, finitude is so defined that this being-in-itself is only spirit in its concept or religion in its concept, any advance appears to sublate the concept, i.e., the one-sidedness, deficiency, or mere abstraction of the concept, whether it be grasped now as finitude or as abstract infinitude. Our advance had, therefore, the signification or character of sublating this abstraction. The second point is this: whatever is

48. [Ed.] As treated in Part I of the lectures.

conceptual to begin with | —i.e., merely conceptual or subjective in the sense that it has the content only in itself—is at the same time the first or immediate. Whatever is only in itself or in accord with its concept—such as the human being as a child—is, in its existence as a determinate being, at first only something immediate; and immediacy, therefore, is the finitude that we have to deal with first.

So this is the course we have taken. First we have considered the concept of spirit or of religion. But this in-itself, or the concept merely as such, is nothing but the immediate modality of the concept, immediate being, and this we have in *the natural*.⁴⁹ The natural is whatever is *immediately*; finitude is immediate being. In its immediate being, spirit is empirical consciousness, immediate self-consciousness, which views itself as essence, knows itself as the power of nature. This immediate spirit is indeed fulfilled, determinate in itself, concrete, but it is only empirically concrete. For the content by which it is filled is the content of inclinations and desires, instincts and passions; and this first fulfillment is the fulfillment of spirit's merely natural state. This constitutes the finitude of spirit, its natural, empirical self-consciousness. Spirit is fulfilled, but empirically, not by its concept; but what is needful is that it must become *for* itself what it is *in* itself, it must arrive at its concept. This progression is logical: it lies in the nature of the determining process itself to determine itself further in this way—this is logical necessity.

The further form of this finitude we have also seen. This finitude, which is unmediated being, can also be defined as the unitary being of immediate, finite spirit with itself, or as spirit that has not yet arrived at the separation through which it distinguishes this natural state and desire from itself, and therefore it is not yet self-contained, it has not yet attained the determination of freedom. In order to be free, spirit must remove this immediate, natural, empirical state, withdrawing from it. The next step, therefore, is the withdrawal-

49. [Ed.] "Nature Religion" constitutes the first of the three main divisions of Part II, *Determinate Religion*, in the 1827 lectures. The religion of natural immediacy, or magic, represents the first and most primitive form of nature religion.

into-self of spirit from its submersion in the natural. We have seen various forms of this.⁵⁰ The outstanding example is the religion of India—this being-within-self, Brahman, pure self-consciousness, the severance by means of which the being-within-self of pure self-consciousness is posited in abstraction from everything concrete and natural | and from all worldly delight and imagery. But this separation is at the same time abstract: this way of thinking is on the one hand still empty; on the other hand it is an immediate self-consciousness that has not yet distinguished itself from itself, has no object, and is nothing other than subjective, abstract knowledge. From this sort of cognition, then, there emerges a first form of unity or reconciliation,⁵¹ namely, that this inwardness fills itself with externality, that it shows itself no longer as an abstraction but as something concrete, that it takes this externality into itself, showing itself above all as *power*. This is the unrefined condition in which the inward has only the signification of something external, an external that still remains only in its natural state.

The second stage was the beginning of *spiritual religion*,⁵² namely, a religion of being-withdrawn-into-self,⁵³ a religion of the freedom of spirit, for which the natural (which was the previous fulfillment) is not an independent content, constituting a fulfillment in an immediate way, but is only the appearance of something inward instead, the appearance of the ethical, which has rational inwardness as its defining character. This inwardness is so concrete

50. [Ed.] Hegel here turns to the second form of nature religion, the religion of being-within-self (*Insichsein*), which in this summary he identifies with Buddhism and Hinduism, but which in his actual treatment he distinguishes, regarding Buddhism (the religion of being-within-self in the strict sense) as the earlier form, and Hinduism (the religion of phantasy) as the higher form.

51. [Ed.] This is an apparent reference to what are described in the 1827 lectures as "the religions of transition" from nature religion to spiritual religion, namely, the religion of light (Persian religion) and Egyptian religion, and in particular to the connection in these religions between the pure (spiritual) inwardness of the good and the pure (natural) externality of light.

52. [Ed.] "Spiritual religion" (or the religion of spiritual individuality, in which "spirit" is still construed as *finite*) is the second main division of *Determinate Religion*. In this paragraph Hegel describes Greek religion as the religion of ethical inwardness.

53. [Ed.] *Insichgegangensein*, literally, "being-gone-within-self."

within itself, therefore, that concreteness belongs to it and constitutes the definition or nature of inwardness: the concrete is the ethical as such. But it does indeed have the natural as its manifestation, its appearance; this concrete inwardness—the ethical—is, however, not yet posited within itself as subjectivity. Thus a condition of finitude comes about in which the ethical distinguishes itself into particular ethical powers; it is only a collection of these powers with a particular content—an encompassing totality, to be sure, though only a wholeness and not subjectivity—for the appearance still occurs in sensible fashion.⁵⁴

The other mode of finitude is that the external still is [has the character of] sensible being. In this second sphere of withdrawal-into-self, over against the *religion of beauty* we have seen the *religion of sublimity*⁵⁵—that is, spirituality fulfilled within itself in such a way that these particularities, these ethical powers, are brought together in a single purpose by means of which the One, the spirit, is defined as having being within itself, | as wise. Here, therefore, we have spirit in its freedom, at once inwardly concrete and inwardly determinate, which is to say that it exists as the Wise One. This spirit first merits for us the name of God, while the previous one did not. It is no longer substance but subject. Thus spirit has a purpose within itself; it is inwardly determinate. But the content of its subjectivity, its infinite determination, its inner content that we call purpose, is still abstract.

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The third stage is the one where *purpose*⁵⁶ receives a comprehensive, universal content, although chiefly within the world in external fashion—[specifically] among the Romans. Wisdom is a

54. L (1827?) reads: One can make light of the fact that particularity has not been taken up into absolute harmony or unity.

55. [Ed.] The religion of beauty (Greek religion) and the religion of sublimity (Jewish religion) together constitute spiritual religion (the religion of spiritual individuality). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel treats Greek religion first, followed by Jewish religion—just the reverse of the order in which he discusses these religions in the other lecture series. In Jewish religion, what is “external” over against the ethical inwardness of the Greeks—namely, the one good, wise, all-powerful God—is still construed as a finite, sensible being.

56. [Ed.] The “religion of purposiveness” (*Zweckmässigkeit*) or Roman religion constitutes the third and final division of *Determinate Religion*.

purpose [of this kind], but in the form of an abstraction. Once this purpose is developed, its mode is externality. It is a worldly purpose, a unity, but still an abstract unity, which even in this reality is only abstract and consequently [mere] domination as such. The purpose, therefore, takes the form of subjectivity possessing comprehensive reality, but in such fashion that the subject, while comprehensive, comprehends only what is finite.

The transition [to the consummate religion] is the spirit that has entered into itself: it is the concept that has only *itself* as its purpose—this inwardly subsisting mode [of being] whose purpose is only itself, is God himself. The idea has only itself as purpose; and now this concept is purified in order to have a more comprehensive purpose, but one that is also taken back into subjectivity. Spirit now has as its final purpose its concept, its concrete essence itself; it eternally realizes and objectifies its purpose, and is free in it—indeed it is freedom itself because this purpose is its own nature. Thereby finitude is sublated. This progression has the more specific character of containing that which is inwardly self-determining, the determinateness of spirit. It involves the fact that spirit shows itself in this sphere as inwardly posited. Spirit is precisely that which determines itself infinitely. To be sure, the series of forms that we have passed through is a succession of stages that follow upon one another; but these forms are encompassed within the infinite, absolute form, in absolute subjectivity, and only the spirit so defined as absolute subjectivity *is* spirit.

194 On the one hand we have seen a stripping away of these determinacies, these modes of finitude and of finite forms. On the other hand it is the nature of spirit, of the concept itself, to determine itself in this way; | in order to be spirit, the concept must first traverse these forms. Only when this content has traversed these determinations is it spirit. Spirit is essence—but only insofar as it has returned to itself from out of itself, only insofar as it is that actual being which returns and is at home with itself, that being which posits itself from itself as at home with itself. This positing produces the distinctive determinations of its activity, and these distinctive determinations are the forms through which spirit has to move.

We have said that spirit is immediate. This is a mode of finitude. All the same, it is spirit, the concept, that determines itself. The first of its determinate forms is that of inward self-diremption and of being immediately, in accordance with this form of finitude. The concept determines itself, posits itself as immediate; that concept for which spirit so determines itself, posits itself as immediate, we ourselves still are. The last stage, however, is that this concept, this subjectivity for which spirit is, is not to remain something external to spirit, but rather is itself to be absolute and infinite subjectivity, infinite form. The infinite form is the circuit of this determining process; the concept is spirit only because it has achieved determinacy through this circuit, has moved through it. This is how it first becomes concrete.⁵⁷ This means on the one hand a stripping away of the mode of finitude, and on the other hand a self-diremption and a return to self from diremption; only so is it posited as spirit. At first, spirit is only a presupposition; that it *is* as spirit and comes to be comprehended as spirit is nothing immediate, and cannot happen in an immediate fashion. It is spirit only as that which dirempts itself and returns into itself again—i.e., only after traversing this circuit. What we have traversed in our treatment is the becoming, the bringing forth of spirit by itself, and ~only as such, or as eternally bringing itself forth, is it spirit.⁵⁸ This course is, therefore, the grasping or comprehension of spirit. It is the concept that determines itself, and takes these determinations back into itself, as the concept; in this way the concept is | infinite subjectivity.⁵⁹ What results is the concept that posits itself, and has itself as its content. This, then, is the absolute idea. The idea is the unity of concept and reality; it is concept *and* objectivity. Truth consists in objectivity being adequate to the concept; but what is adequate to the concept is only the concept itself insofar as it has itself as its counterpart or object. The content as idea is the truth.

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57. *In B's margin*: 27 July 1827

58. *Hu reads*: that which it now traverses, it is as such, namely, spirit.

59. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: In this way, the absolute objectification of spirit consists precisely in the fact that the concept determines itself, fulfills itself with its own concept, with itself. The circuit of these forms is the process of self-positing by the concept. These forms, comprehended together in their unity, are the concept.

Freedom is the following aspect of the idea: the concept, because it is conceptually at home with itself, is free. The idea alone is what is true, but equally so it is freedom. The idea is what is true, and the true is thus absolute spirit. This is the true definition of spirit. The concept that has determined itself, that has made itself into its own object, has thereby posited finitude in itself, but posited *itself* as the content of this finitude and in so doing sublated it—that is spirit.

196 ⁶⁰We are accustomed to say of God that he is the creator of the world, that God is wholly just, all-knowing, totally wise. But this is not the authentic way of cognizing what the truth is, what God is; it is the way of representation, of understanding. It is necessary, of course, to define the concept by predicates too, but this is an incomplete, reflective way of thinking; it is not thinking by means of the concept, thinking the concept of God, the idea. Predicates signify particular determinations; attributes, as particular determinations of this kind, are distinguished from one another. If one thinks of these differences determinately, they fall into contradiction with each other, and this contradiction is not resolved, or is resolved only in an abstract, superficial manner. We resolve it merely in an abstraction, by allowing the | attributes to temper each other mutually or by abstracting from their particularity.⁶¹ The outcome is that in this way God, because he is thus defined by predicates, is not grasped as living. This amounts to the same thing we have just stated, namely, that the contradictions are not resolved, or they are only abstractly resolved. The vitality of God or of spirit is nothing other than a self-determining (which can also appear as a predicate), a self-positing in finitude, [which involves] distinction and contradiction, but [is] at the same time an eternal sublating of this con-

60. *Precedes in L* (1827?): The task of philosophy is to cognize what God, the absolute truth, is. The customary, usual procedure (apart from proofs for the existence of God) is to assert this or that about God and to define him by means of predicates. His attributes tell us what he is, render him determinate.

[Ed.] Hegel is criticizing here the procedure of the *theologia naturalis*, which appends to the proofs a derivation of the divine attributes. See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Part I, chaps. 1–4; Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, chaps. 1–2, has a similar structure.

61. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 49.

tradition. This is the life, the deed, the activity of God; he is absolute activity, creative energy [*Aktuosität*], and his activity is to posit himself in contradiction, but eternally to resolve and reconcile this contradiction: God himself is the resolving of these contradictions. From this point of view, definition by predicates is incomplete, since they are only particular determinations whose contradiction is not resolved. They represent God as though he were not himself the resolution of these contradictions, as though he were not himself the one who resolves them. It would seem, then, that it is only our human particularity that comprehends specific, distinguishable aspects in God, and that these characteristics are rather just our own. But the particularity does not merely belong to our reflection; rather it is the nature of God, of spirit, it is his concept itself. In the same way, however, God is the one who resolves the contradiction—not by abstraction but in concrete fashion. This, then, is the living God.⁶²

4. Division of the Subject⁶³

Since we have now indicated the position of our earlier discussion in relation to the idea of God itself—namely, that it is the concept itself that sets up these distinctions and attains to itself through them, becoming for the first time idea in this way—we are now able to view the idea in its development and completion. We turn first to the division of the subject. In its outward aspect, | we can say that this idea is for us. We now have the following distinctions regarding God as the absolute idea.

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(1) First, God is the absolute idea for [us in the mode of] *thought* or *thinking*. Insofar as the content is [present] for thought, for the

62. L (1827?) adds: That God is living, the vitality of God, signifies that the particularities in him and their resolution are not merely an external aspect and are not grasped merely from our side.

63. [Ed.] In the Ms. and in the 1824 lectures, the “division of the subject” is found at the beginning of the second main section (“Concrete Representation” in the Ms., “The Development of the Idea of God” in the 1824 lectures). Since the 1827 lectures lack a first section, containing the ontological proof of the existence of God—which in 1827 has been moved to *The Concept of Religion*—the “division” falls logically into the introduction, followed by the three main sections in which the three “elements” of the consummate religion are explicated.

soil of thinking, it can and must be grasped also in the mode of representation. Since indeed the eternal idea is for the thinking of humanity as a whole, and the thinking of humanity as a whole is extraneous to philosophical thinking, which transposes itself into the form of thinking itself, this thinking must also occur in the mode of representation. The idea of God is first to be considered as it is for thinking or in itself. This is *the eternal idea of God for itself*, what God is for himself, i.e., the eternal idea in the soil of thinking as such.

(2) Second, God is the eternal idea, not for us in the mode of thinking, but rather for finite, external, empirical spirit, for *sensible intuition*, for *representation*. The determinate being that God gives himself for the sake of representation is, in the first instance, *nature*; and therefore one of the ways God is there for representation is that finite, empirical spirit recognizes God from [the evidence of] nature. The other way, however, is that God is [present] for finite spirit as *finite spirit*. Thus, finite, concrete spirit is itself necessarily involved in the way that God is for it, the way God is manifest for it. To be more precise, God as such cannot properly *be* for spirit as finite; rather the basis of his being for finite spirit lies in the fact that the latter does not hold fast to its finitude as a subsisting being or something fixed, but is instead precisely the process of reconciling itself with God. As finite spirit, it is placed in a condition of separation; it has fallen away from God, it is apart from God. Since it is still related to God in this state of being apart from God, the contradiction consists in its cleavage and separation from God. The *concrete spirit*, the finite spirit defined as finite, is therefore in contradiction to its object or content, and this gives rise above all to the need to sublate this contradiction and separation that appear in finite spirit as such—in other words, the need for *reconciliation*. This need is the starting point; the next step is that God comes into being for finite spirit, that the latter should arrive at a knowledge and certainty of the divine content, and that the divine content should represent *itself* to that finite spirit which is at the same time the *representing* spirit, spirit in finite, | empirical form. This can happen only insofar as spirit does indeed appear to it, but in an external fashion, and insofar as it is able to bring to consciousness (in this external fashion) what God is.

(3) ⁶⁴Third, God comes to be, one may say, for *sensibility*, for *subjectivity* and in the subjectivity of spirit, in the innermost being of subjective spirit. Here reconciliation, the sublation of that separation, is made actual; here *God as spirit is [present] in his community*, and the community is liberated from that antithesis and has the consciousness or certainty of its freedom in God.

These are the three ways by which the subject is related to God, the three modes of God's determinate being for subjective spirit. Since it is *we* who have made this distinction, this trichotomy, we have arrived at it more or less empirically, from our own standpoint. We know, in terms of our own spirit, that first of all we are able to think without this antithesis or cleavage within us, that secondly we are finite spirit, spirit in its cleavage and separation, and that thirdly we are spirit in the state of sensibility and subjectivity, of return to self—[which is] reconciliation, innermost feeling. Of these three, the first is the realm of *universality*; the second, the realm of *particularity*; the third, that of *singularity*.⁶⁵ These three realms are a presupposition that we have taken up as our definition. They are not to be regarded, however, as realms that are externally distinct, or as externally subsisting modes vis-à-vis God; rather it is the idea itself that makes these distinctions. The absolute, eternal idea is:

(1) First, in and for itself, God in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside the world.

(2) Second, God creates the world and posits the separation. He creates both nature and finite spirit. ⁶⁶What is thus created is at first an other, posited outside of God. But God is | essentially the reconciling to himself of what is alien, what is particular, what is posited in separation from him. He must restore to freedom and

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64. *Precedes in L* (1827?): Thus we have God in the first sphere of thinking in general; second, we have him in the form of representation.

65. [Ed.] The moments of universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*), and singularity (*Einzelheit*) are the constitutive moments in the dialectic of the concept. See *Science of Logic*, pp. 600–621 (GW 12:32–52); *Encyclopedia*, §§ 183–187. The logical idea is the principle of universality; nature, the principle of particularity; and finite spirit, the principle of singularity. Each of these, in turn, mediates between the other two; together they constitute the structure of Hegel's entire philosophical system. The unity of all three is the infinite subjectivity of absolute spirit.

66. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*: This creation [W: What is created], this other-being, divides of itself into two sides—physical nature and finite spirit.

to his truth what is alien, what has fallen away in the idea's self-diremption, in its falling away from itself. This is the path and the process of reconciliation.

(3) In the third place, through this process of reconciliation, spirit has reconciled with itself what it distinguished from itself in its act of diremption, of primal division, and thus it is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit [present] in its community.

These are not external distinctions, which *we* have made merely in accord with what we are; rather they are the activity, the developed vitality, of absolute spirit itself. It is itself its eternal life, which is a development and a return of this development into itself; this vitality in development, this actualization of the concept, is what we have now to consider.⁶⁷

67. W adds the "Division of the Subject" contained in the 1831 lectures; the fuller version of *W₂* reads: We have, speaking generally, to consider the idea as divine self-revelation, and this revelation is to be taken in the sense indicated by the three determinations just mentioned.

According to the first of these, God is [present] for finite spirit purely and solely as thinking. This is the theoretical consciousness in which the thinking subject has an attitude of full composure and is not yet posited in this relationship itself, is not yet posited in the process [of reconciliation], but remains in the wholly undisturbed calm of thinking spirit. Here God is thought for thinking spirit, the latter's thought consisting in the simple conclusion that God brings himself into harmony with himself, is immediately present to himself, by means of his differentiation—which, however, is still [found] here in the form of pure ideality and has not yet reached the form of externality. This is the first relationship, which is only for the thinking subject, and is occupied only with the pure content. This is *the kingdom of the Father*.

The second determination is *the kingdom of the Son*, in which God is [present] for representation in the element of representing as such. This is the moment of particularization as such. In this second standpoint, that which was God's "other" in the first moment, though without being defined as such, now obtains the *determination* of the other. Considered from the first standpoint, God as the Son is not distinguished from the Father, but is merely expressed in the mode of sensibility. In the second element, however, the Son obtains the determination as other, and thus we pass out of the pure ideality of thinking and into representation. If, according to the first determination, God begets only a son, here he brings forth nature. Here the other is nature, and distinction comes into its own. What is distinguished is nature, the world as a whole, and the spirit that is related to it, the natural spirit. What we have earlier designated as "subject" comes into play as itself the content; human being is involved in this content. Since human beings are here related to nature and are themselves natural, they have the character of subjects only within the sphere of religion, and consequently we have here to consider nature and humanity from the point of view of religion. The Son comes into the world, and this

A. THE FIRST ELEMENT:
THE IDEA OF GOD IN AND FOR ITSELF⁶⁸

In accord with the first element, then, we consider God in his eternal idea, as he is in and for himself, prior to or apart from the creation | of the world, so to speak.⁶⁹ Insofar as he is thus within himself, it is a matter of the eternal idea, which is not yet posited in its reality but is itself still only the abstract idea. But God is the creator of the world; it belongs to his being, his essence, to be the creator; insofar as he is not the creator, he is grasped inadequately. His creative role is not an *actus* that “happened”⁷⁰ once; [rather,] what takes place in the idea is an *eternal* moment, an eternal determination of the idea. |

Thus God in his eternal idea is still within the abstract element of thinking in general—the abstract idea of thinking, not of conceiving. We already know this pure idea, and therefore we need only dwell on it briefly.

Specifically, the eternal idea is expressed in terms of the holy

is the beginning of faith. When we speak of the coming of the Son into the world, we are already using the language of faith. God cannot properly *be* for finite spirit as such because, to the extent that God is for it, it follows immediately that finite spirit does not hold fast to its finitude as a subsisting being, but rather is in a relation to spirit, reconciles itself with God. As finite spirit its stance is one of falling away, of separation from God; thus it is in contradiction to its object, its content, and this contradiction constitutes, in the first instance, the need for the sublation of the contradiction. This need is the first step, and the next one is that God should come to be for spirit, that the divine content should represent itself to spirit—though at the same time this spirit exists in an empirical, finite fashion. Hence what God is appears to it in empirical fashion. But since in this history the divine steps into view for spirit, the history loses the character of external history. It becomes divine history, the history of the manifestation of God himself.

This constitutes the transition to *the kingdom of the Spirit*, which comprises the awareness that human beings are implicitly reconciled with God and that reconciliation exists for humanity. The process of reconciliation itself is comprised in the cultus.

68. [Ed.] “The First Element,” like that of the 1824 lectures, and like Sec. B.a of the Ms., “The Idea In and For Itself,” concerns the immanent or logical Trinity. It is given an especially full treatment in the 1827 lectures, perhaps in response to recent attacks on the doctrine of the Trinity by F. A. G. Tholuck and others (see Vol. 1, 1827 *Intro.*, nn. 17, 18).

69. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, p. 50 (GW 11:21).

70. Thus L; W₁ (Var) reads: was undertaken

Trinity: it is God himself, eternally triune. Spirit is this process, movement, life. This life is self-differentiation, self-determination, and the first differentiation is that spirit *is* as this universal idea itself. The universal contains the entire idea, although it only contains it, it is only implicitly the idea. In this primal division is found the other, the particular, what stands over against the universal—that which stands over against God as distinguished from him, but in such a way that this distinguished aspect is God's entire idea in and for itself, so that these two determinations are also one and the same for each other, an identity, the One. Not only is this distinction implicitly sublated, and not only do we know that, but also it is established that the two distinguished moments are the same, that this distinction is sublated insofar as it is precisely what posits itself as no distinction at all; hence the one remains present to itself in the other.

That this is so is the Holy Spirit itself, or, expressed in the mode of sensibility, it is eternal love: *the Holy Spirit is eternal love*.

When we say, "God is love," we are saying something very great and true. But it would be senseless to grasp this saying in a simple-minded way as a simple definition, without analyzing what love is. For love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other. The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two—to be outside of myself and in the other—this is love. I have my self-consciousness not in myself but in the other. I am satisfied and have peace with myself only in this other—and I *am* only because I have peace with myself; if I did not have it, then I would be a contradiction that falls to pieces. This other, because it likewise exists outside itself, has its self-consciousness only in me, and both the other and I are only this consciousness of being-outside-ourselves and of our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge of our unity. This is love, and without knowing that love is both a | distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction, one speaks emptily of it. "This is the simple, eternal idea."⁷¹

71. Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in W₁, first and last sentence similar in W₂: God is love: he is this distinguishing and the nullity of the distinction, a play of distinctions in which there is nothing serious, distinction precisely as sublated, i.e., the simple, eternal idea. We deal with the simple idea of God—the fact that

⁷²When we speak of God in order to say what he is, it is customary to make use of attributes: God is thus and so; he is defined by predicates. This is the method of representation and understanding. Predicates are determinate, particular qualities: justice, goodness, omnipotence, etc. Because they have the feeling that this is not the authentic way to express the nature of God, the Orientals say that God is πολυώνυμος [worshiped under many names] and does not admit of exhaustion by predicates⁷³—for names are in this sense the same as predicates. The real deficiency in this way of defining by predicates consists in the very fact that gives rise to this endless number of predicates, namely, that they designate only particular characteristics, of which there are many, and all of them are borne by the subject.⁷⁴ Because there are particular characteristics, and because one views these particularities in their determinateness, one thinks and develops them, they fall into opposition and contradiction with each other as a result, since they are not only distinct but opposed, and these contradictions remain unresolved.

This is also evident when these predicates are taken as expressing God's relation to the world.⁷⁵ The world is something other than God. Predicates as particular characteristics are not appropriate to the nature of God. Here, then, is the occasion for the other method, which regards them as relations of God to the world: e.g., the omnipresence and omniscience of God in the world. Accordingly, the predicates do not comprise the true relation of God to himself, but rather his relation | to an other, the world. So they are limited and thereby come into contradiction with each other.

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We are conscious of the fact that God is not represented in living fashion when so many particular characteristics are enumerated alongside one another. Put in another way, this is the same point

[W₁ reads: as] it is in the simple element of thinking and is the idea in its universality; this is the essential determination of the idea, the determination by which it has truth. We make the following remarks about this idea, its content and form.

72. In B's margin: 30 July 1827

73. [Ed.] Hegel may be referring here to Philo, to whom Neander attributes just this expression (*Gnostische Systeme*, p. 12).

74. Thus L, B, Hu, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds: which is inwardly without distinction.

75. [Ed.] Most likely an allusion to Schleiermacher's derivation of the divine attributes, namely, as modifications of the feeling of absolute dependence, or of God's relation to self and world. See above, Ms. n. 48.

that was stated earlier: the contradictions among the different predicates are not resolved. The resolution of the contradiction is contained in the idea, i.e., in God's determining of himself to distinguish himself from himself while [remaining] at the same time the eternal sublation of the distinction. The distinction left as is would be a contradiction.⁷⁶

If we assign predicates to God in such a way as to make them particular, then we are immediately at pains to resolve their contradiction. This is an external action, a product of our reflection, and the fact that it is external and falls to us, and is not the content of the divine idea, implies that the contradictions cannot in fact be resolved. But the idea is itself the resolution of the contradictions posited by it. Its proper content, its determination, is to posit this distinction and then absolutely to sublate it; this is the vitality of the idea itself.

At the point where we now stand, our interest is in passing over from concept to being. We should also recall our characterization of the metaphysical proofs of God,⁷⁷ which serve as the route for going from the concept to being.⁷⁸ The divine idea is the pure concept, without any limitation. The idea includes the fact that the concept determines itself and thereby posits itself as what is self-differentiated. This is a moment of the divine idea itself, and because the thinking, reflecting spirit has this content before it, the need arises for this transition and progression. |

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We observed the logical aspect of this transition earlier.⁷⁹ It is contained in those so-called proofs by means of which the transition ought to be made, in, from, and through the concept, into objectivity

76. *Hu adds*: This resolution is forever and always sublated, not left standing on its own account. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W*: If the distinction were permanent, then finitude would persist. The two sides confront each other independently, yet remain in relation; hence an unresolvable contradiction emerges. The idea does not involve leaving the difference alone, but rather resolving it. God posits himself in this distinction and likewise sublates it.

77. [*Ed.*] In the 1827 lectures, all the proofs for the existence of God are treated in Part I, *The Concept of Religion*, Sec. B.4.c. In this paragraph and the next, Hegel provides a brief summary of the ontological proof.

78. *Thus B; W₂ (Var) adds, similar in W₁*: so that the concept is not merely concept but also *is*, has reality.

79. [*Ed.*] See Vol. 1:432–441.

and being (all within the element of thought). What appears as a subjective need and demand is the content, is one moment of the divine idea itself. When we say, "God has created the world," this also entails a transition from concept to reality; but the world is there defined as the essentially other of God, as the negation of God, it is what has being outside God, without God, godlessly. Insofar as the world is defined as the other, we do not have the distinction as a distinction within the concept itself; it is not contained in the concept before us. But now being and objectivity are to be exhibited *in* the concept as its activity and consequence, as a determination of the concept. This shows, therefore, that what we have here, within the idea, is the same content and exigency that is found in the form of those proofs of the existence of God. In the absolute idea, in the element of thinking, God is this utterly concrete universal, the positing of self as other, but in such a way that the other is immediately defined to be himself, and the distinction is only ideal, it is immediately sublated, and does not take on the shape of externality. This means precisely that what is distinguished ought to be exhibited in and within the concept.⁸⁰ It is the logical aspect in which it becomes clear that every determinate concept is self-sublating, it occurs as the contradiction of itself, and "is a positing of what is distinguished from it."⁸¹ Thus the concept itself is still burdened with one-sidedness and finitude, as indicated by the fact that it is something subjective, posited as subjective; the characteristics of the concept and its distinctions are posited only as ideal and not as distinctions in fact. This is the concept that objectifies itself.⁸²

When we say "God," we speak of him merely as abstract; or if we say, "God the Father," we speak of him as the universal, | only abstractly, in accord with his finitude. His infinitude means precisely that he sublates this form of abstract universality and immediacy, and in this way distinction is posited; but he is precisely the sublating

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80. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* What this transition itself concerns we have considered at the appropriate time.

81. *Thus L, An; W (Var) reads:* is thus a coming to be of what is distinguished from it and a positing of itself as such.

82. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* This is the logical aspect, which is presupposed.

of the distinction. Thereby he is for the first time true actuality, the truth, infinitude.

This is the speculative idea, i.e., the rational element, insofar as it is thought, the thinking of what is rational. For the nonspeculative thinking of the understanding, distinction remains as distinction, e.g., the antithesis of finite and infinite. Absoluteness is ascribed to both terms, yet each also has a relation to the other, and in this respect they are in unity; in this way contradiction is posited.

The speculative idea is opposed not merely to the sensible but also to what is understandable; for both, therefore, it is a secret or mystery. It is a *μυστήριον* for the sensible mode of consideration as well as for the understanding. In other words, *μυστήριον* is what the rational is; among the Neoplatonists, this expression already means simply speculative philosophy.⁸³ The nature of God is not a secret in the ordinary sense, least of all in the Christian religion. In it God has made known what he is; there he is manifest. But he is a secret or mystery for external sense perception and representation, for the sensible mode of consideration and likewise for the understanding.

The sensible in general has as its fundamental characteristic externality, the being of things outside each other. Space-time is the externality in which objects are side by side, mutually external, and successive. The sensible mode of consideration is thus accustomed to have before it distinct things that are outside one another. Its basis is that distinctions remain explicit and external. In reason this is not the case. Therefore, what is in the idea is a mystery for sensible consideration. For in [the region of] the idea, the way [things are looked at], the relations [ascribed to things], and the categories [employed] are entirely different from those found in sense experience. The idea is just this distinguishing which | at the same time is no distinction, and does not persist in its distinction. God intuitively

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83. *Thus L; Hu reads:* The speculative is accordingly [canceled: reason] the mysteries, and nothing else—simply reason. In the pagan religions God is no secret. *W (Var) reads:* For both it is a *μυστήριον*, with respect, that is, to what is rational in it.

[*Ed.*] Hegel attributes the connection between mystery and speculation to Proclus in particular; see Vol. 1:382 n. 44.

himself in what is distinguished, he is united with himself only in his other, and is only present to himself in it; only there does God close with himself and behold himself in the other. This is wholly repugnant to sense experience, since for it one thing is here and another there. Everything counts as independent; what counts for it is not to be the sort of thing that subsists because it possesses itself in another. For sense experience, two things cannot be in one and the same place; they exclude each other. But in the idea, distinctions are not posited as exclusive of each other; rather they are found only in this mutual inclusion of the one with the other. This is the *truly supersensible* [realm], not ~ that of the understanding,⁸⁴ which is supposed to be above and beyond; for the latter is just as much a sensible [realm] where things are outside one another and indifferently self-contained.⁸⁵

In the same way this idea is a mystery for the understanding and beyond its ken. For the understanding holds fast to the categories of thought, persisting with them as utterly independent of each other, remaining distinct, external to each other, and fixed. The positive is not the same as the negative, the cause is not the effect, etc. But for the concept it is equally true that these distinctions are sublated. Precisely because they are distinctions, they remain finite, and the understanding persists in finitude. Indeed, even in the case of the infinite, it has the infinite on one side and finitude on the other. But the truth of the matter is that neither the finite nor the infinite standing over against it has any truth; rather both are merely transitional. To that extent this is a mystery for sensible representation and for the understanding, and both resist the rationality of the idea.⁸⁶

⁸⁷What has life *is*, and it has drives and needs; accordingly, it

84. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* the ordinary supersensible,

85. *Thus L; W (Var) omits:* self-contained *and adds:* To the extent that God is defined as spirit, externality is sublated; accordingly, this is a mystery to the senses.

86. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* The opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity are merely the partisans of sensibility and understanding.

87. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* Moreover, the understanding is equally powerless to grasp anything else whatever, to grasp the truth of anything at all. Animal life, for example, also exists as idea, as the unity of the concept, as the unity

207 has | distinction within itself, the latter arises within it. Thus life itself is a contradiction, and the way the understanding comprehends such distinctions is that the contradiction remains unresolved; when the distinctions are brought into relation with each other, only the contradiction remains, which is not to be resolved.⁸⁸ Life has certain needs and thus is in contradiction, but the satisfaction of the need annuls the contradiction. I myself am distinguished ~for myself⁸⁹ from myself in my drives and needs. But life is the resolving of the contradiction, the satisfying of the need, giving it peace, though in such a way that the contradiction emerges once more. The distinction, the contradiction, and its annulment alternate back and forth.⁹⁰ When considering drive and satisfaction on their own account, the understanding does not grasp the fact that even in the act of affirmation and self-feeling, the negation of self-feeling, limitation, and lack are simultaneously found, yet at the same time, as self-feeling, I reach beyond this lack. This is the determinate representation of the *μυστήριον*; a mystery is called inconceivable, but what appears inconceivable is precisely the concept itself, the speculative element or the fact that the rational is thought. It is precisely through thinking that the distinction comes out specifically.⁹¹ Now when the understanding comes to this point, it says, "This is a contradiction," and it stands still at this point; it stands by the contradiction in the face of the experience that it

208 is life itself which sublates the contradiction. | When [for example] drive is analyzed, the contradiction appears, and then the understanding can say, "This is inconceivable."

of soul and body. For the understanding, by contrast, each is on its own. To be sure, they are distinct, but equally it is their nature to sublata the distinction. Life or vitality is simply this perennial process.

88. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: This is the case; the contradiction cannot cease when the distinctions are maintained to be perennial in character, just because the fact of this distinction is insisted upon.

89. *Thus L; W (Var) reads: in myself*

90. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: They do not occur simultaneously but succeed each other in temporal progression, and accordingly the entire process is finite.

91. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: The thinking of the drive is only the analysis of what the drive is; as soon as I think "drive," I have the affirmation and therein the negation, the self-feeling, the satisfaction, and the drive. Thinking it means recognizing what is distinguished, what is within it.

Thus the nature of God is inconceivable; but, as we already said, this is just the concept itself, which contains the act of distinguishing within itself. The understanding does not get beyond the fact of the distinction, so it says, "This can't be grasped." For the principle of understanding is abstract identity with itself, not concrete identity, in accord with which these distinctions are [present] within a single [concept or reality]. According to the abstract identity, the one and the other are independent, each for itself, yet at the same time are related to each other.⁹² This is what is called inconceivable. The resolution of the contradiction is the concept, a resolution which the understanding does not attain because it starts from the pre-supposition that the two [distinguished moments] both are and remain utterly independent of each other.

~One of the circumstances contributing to the assertion that the divine idea is inconceivable is the fact that, | in religion, the content of the idea appears in forms accessible to sense experience or understanding, because religion is the truth for everyone. Hence we have the expressions "Father" and "Son"—a designation taken from a sentient aspect of life, from a relationship that has its place in life. In religion the truth has been revealed as far as its *content* is concerned; but it is another matter for this content to be present in the *form* of the concept, of thinking, of the concept in speculative form.⁹³

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92. Thus L; W (Var) adds: therefore the contradiction is present.

93. Cf. the amplification of this theme by the 1831 lectures, inserted by W₁ in the context of the 1824 lectures at p. 192, and by W₂ in the context of the 1827 lectures at p. 276; W₃ reads, similar in W₁: This eternal idea, accordingly, finds expression in the Christian religion under the name of the Holy Trinity, which is God himself, the eternally triune God.

Here God is present only for the person who thinks, who remains silently within himself. The ancients called this "enthusiasm";³ it is a purely theoretical contemplation, the supreme repose of thought, but at the same time its highest activity, namely, to grasp the pure idea of God and to become conscious of that idea. The mystery of the dogma of what God is, is imparted to human beings; they believe in it, and already have the highest truth vouchsafed to them, although they apprehend it only in the form of representation, without being conscious of the necessity of this truth, without conceiving it. Truth is the disclosure of what spirit is in and for itself; human beings are themselves spirit, and therefore the truth is for them. Initially, however, the truth that comes to them does not yet possess for them the form of freedom; it is for them merely something given and received, though they can receive it only because they are spirit. This truth, this idea, has been called the *dogma* of

Yet another form of understandability is the following: When we say, "God in his eternal universality is the one who distinguishes himself, determines himself, posits an other to himself, and likewise

the Trinity—God is spirit, the activity of pure knowing, the activity that is present to itself. It was chiefly Aristotle who comprehended God under the abstract determination of activity.^b Pure activity is knowing (in the Scholastic age, *actus purus*), but in order to be posited as activity, it must be posited in its moments: knowing requires an other, which is known, and since it is knowing that knows it, it is appropriated to it. This explains why God, the actual being that is eternally in and for itself, eternally begets himself as his Son, distinguishes himself from himself—the absolute primal division. What God thus distinguishes from himself does not take on the shape of an other-being, but rather what is thus distinguished is immediately only that from which it has been distinguished. God is spirit, and no darkness, no coloring or mixture enters into this pure light. The relationship of father and son is drawn from organic life and is used in representational fashion. This natural relationship is only figurative and accordingly never wholly corresponds to what should be expressed. We say that God eternally begets his Son, that God distinguishes himself from himself, and thus we begin to speak of God in this way: God does this, and is utterly present to himself in the other whom he has posited (the form of love); but at the same time we must know very well that God is himself this entire activity. God is the beginning, he acts in this way; but he is likewise simply the end, the totality, and it is as totality that God is the Spirit. Merely as the Father, God is not yet the truth (he is known in this way, without the Son, in the Jewish religion). Rather he is both beginning and end; he is his own presupposition, he constitutes himself as presupposition (this is simply another form of differentiation); he is the eternal process. The fact that this is the truth, and the absolute truth, may have the form of something given. But that this should be *known* as the truth in and for itself is the task of philosophy and the entire content of philosophy. In it is seen how all the content of nature and spirit presses forward dialectically to this central point as its absolute truth. Here we are not concerned to prove that this dogma, this tranquil mystery, is the eternal truth; this comes to pass, as has been said, in the whole of philosophy.

In *W₁* there follows a further passage from the 1831 lectures, which in *W₂* is transmitted at a later point (p. 283, 1st par.), in part more fully, in part abridged; *W₁* reads: Against this truth the understanding adduces its categories of finitude. But there is no reference at all here to the notion of three as a number; it would be the most thoughtless and unconceptual procedure to introduce this form here. Principally, the understanding sets up its notion of identity against it [the truth of divine self-differentiation]: God is the One, the essence of essences, it says. But this is only an untrue abstraction, a product of the understanding without truth, empty identity as an absolute moment. God is spirit, making himself objective and knowing himself in this objectivity: this is concrete identity [*W₂* continues: and thus the idea is also an essential moment], whereas identity without distinction is the false product of the understanding and of modern theology; identity by itself is a false, one-sided characteristic. The understanding, however, believes that it has done everything when it detects a contradiction; it believes that it has prevailed over everything since

sublates the distinction, thereby remaining present to himself, and is spirit only through this process of being brought forth," then the understanding enters in | ~ and counts one, two, three.⁹⁴ Oneness is to begin with wholly abstract. But the three ones are expressed more profoundly when they are defined as persons. Personality is what is based upon freedom—the first, deepest, innermost ~mode,⁹⁵ but it is also the most abstract mode in which freedom announces its presence in the subject. "I am a person, I stand on my own"—this is an utterly unyielding position. So when these distinctions are defined in such a way that each of us [is taken] as one or indeed as a person, then through ~this definition of the person⁹⁶ what the idea demands appears to be made even more unattainable, namely, to regard these distinctions as distinctions which are not distinct but remain absolutely one, [and so to attain] the sublating of this distinction. Two cannot be one; each is a rigid, unyielding, independent being-for-self. Logic shows that the category of "the one" is a poor category, the wholly abstract unit.⁹⁷ If I say "one" [of God], I [must also] say this of everything else. | But as far as personality is concerned, it is the character of the person, the subject, to surrender its isolation and separateness. Ethical life,

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identity is supposed to be the foundation [of everything]. But [even] if there were a contradiction, it is the nature of spirit to sublate it eternally. Here, however, opposition and contradiction are not yet found in the first element, but only in the second.

[Ed.] ^aIn referring to "enthusiasm" as a "purely theoretical contemplation," Hegel apparently has in mind Plato: "The love for ideas is what Plato calls enthusiasm" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:30 [Werke 14:199]). He is thinking especially of the description of the contemplation of the ideas in *The Republic* 475e–477b, although Plato does not speak there of "enthusiasm." In any case, both Hegel and Plato distinguish enthusiasm in this sense from any sort of suprarational ecstasy, which would be the opposite of presence of mind; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 71e–72a. ^bSee Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072b18–30.

94. Thus L, similar in B, Hu, An; W (1831) reads: and brings its categories of finitude to bear, counts one, two, three, mixing in the unfortunate form of number. But there is no reference to number here; counting betokens a complete lack of thought. Thus by introducing this form, one introduces a complete absence of concept.

95. Thus B; L, W (Var) read: freedom

96. Thus L, similar in W₁; W₂ (Var) reads: this infinite form, namely, that each moment should be as a subject,

97. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 164–170 (cf. GW 11:91–97).

love, means precisely the giving up of particularity, of particular personality, and its extension to universality—so, too, with friendship.⁹⁸ In friendship and love I give up my abstract personality and thereby win it back as concrete. The truth of personality is found precisely in winning it back through this immersion, this being immersed in the other.⁹⁹

¹⁰⁰But, even though representation grasps the content in its own forms, the content still belongs to thinking. We are considering the idea in its universality, as it is defined in and through pure thinking. This idea is the one truth and the whole truth; therefore everything particular that is comprehended as true must be comprehended according to the form of this idea. Nature and finite spirit are products of God; therefore rationality is found within them. That something is made by God involves its having the truth within it, the divine truth as a whole, i.e., the determinateness of this idea in general. The form of this idea is only in God as spirit; if the divine idea is grasped in the forms of finitude, then it is not posited as it is in and for itself—only in spirit is it so posited. In the finite forms it exists in a finite way; but, as we have stated, the world is something produced by God, and therefore the divine idea always forms the foundation of what the world as a whole is. To cognize the truth of something means to know and define it according to the truth, in the form of this idea in general.

212 In the earlier religions, particularly in Hinduism, we have had¹⁰¹ anticipations of the triad as the true category.¹⁰² | This idea of threefoldness indeed came to expression with the recognition that the One cannot remain as one, that it is what it ought to be not as one¹⁰³ but rather as movement and distinction in general, and as the relation of these distinctions to each other. Nevertheless,

98. *L* (1827?) *adds*: Inasmuch as I act rightly toward another, I consider the other as identical with myself. *W* (*Var*) *reads*: family, friendship; here this identity of one with another is present. Inasmuch . . . [*continues with L*]

99. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: Such forms of the understanding show themselves immediately in experience as the sort that annul themselves.

100. *In B's margin*: 31 July 1827

101. *Thus B, similar in Hu, An; L, W₂ read*: have

102. *W₁ (Var) adds*: and we see that the category of the triad is the true category.

103. *Thus L; W (Var) adds*: —the One is not what is true—

the third element here—“in the Trimurti”¹⁰⁴—is not the Spirit, not genuine reconciliation, but rather origin and passing away, or the category of change, which is indeed the unity of the distinctions, but a very inferior union—a reconciliation that is still abstract. Even in the Christian religion the Holy Trinity does not appear in the immediate appearance [itself]; rather the idea is first completed only when the Spirit has entered into the community and when the immediate, believing spirit has raised itself to the level of thinking.¹⁰⁵

It is also well known that the Trinity played an essential role for the Pythagoreans¹⁰⁶ and Plato, but its determinate characteristics are left entirely in a state of abstraction: partly in the abstraction of numerical units (one, two, three); partly (and specifically for Plato) in somewhat more concrete fashion, the nature of the one, then the nature of the other (that which is distinct within itself, *θάτερον*); and finally the third, which is the unity of the two.¹⁰⁷ Here the triad is found not in the Hindu mode of fanciful imagination but in mere abstraction. These are categories of thought that are better than numbers, better than the category of number, but they are still wholly abstract categories of thought. They are found, most surprisingly, in Philo, who carefully studied Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, among the Alexandrian Jews and in Syria. Consciousness of this truth, this triune idea, arose especially among the heretics, indeed primarily among the Gnostics,¹⁰⁸ although they brought this content to expression in obscure and fanciful notions.¹⁰⁹ |

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104. *Thus Hu; W (Var), preceding this sentence, reads:* The Trimurti is the most uncontrolled form of this [triadic] category.

[*Ed.*] The Trimurti is later Hinduism's divine triad: Brahmā, Vishnu, Siva.

105. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* It is of interest to consider these fermentations of an idea and to learn to recognize their ground in the marvelous appearances that manifest themselves.

106. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 60.

107. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 59.

108. [*Ed.*] Hegel's information on Philo and the Gnostics in this paragraph and the next derives primarily from Neander's *Gnostische Systeme*. See above, *Ms.*, n. 71.

109. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* We see here, however, at least the struggle of spirit for the truth, and that merits recognition.

Apart from those already mentioned above, one can point to a countless number of forms in which the content of the Trinity appeared distinctly and in various religions. But this properly belongs to church history. The main features are as follows: First, the Father, the One, the *ὅν*, is the abstract element that is expressed as the abyss, the depth (i.e., precisely what is still empty), the inexpressible, the inconceivable, that which is beyond all concepts. For in any case what is empty and indeterminate is inconceivable; it is the negative of the concept, and its conceptual character is to be this negative, since it is only a one-sided abstraction which makes up only one moment of the concept.¹¹⁰ The second moment, other being, the action of determining, self-determining activity as a whole, is, according to the broadest designation, *λόγος*—rationally determinative activity, or precisely the word. The word is this simple act of letting itself be heard that neither makes nor becomes a hard-and-fast distinction, but rather is immediately heard, and that, because it is so immediate, is likewise taken up into interiority and is returned to its origin. This second moment is also defined as *σοφία*, wisdom, the original and wholly pure human being, “an existing other”¹¹¹ or as that initial universality, something particular and determinate.¹¹² For this reason it has been defined as the archetype of humanity, Adam Kadmon, the only-begotten. This is not something contingent but rather an eternal activity, which does not happen merely at one time. In God there is only one birth, the act as eternal activity, a determination that itself belongs essentially to the universal.¹¹³ The essential point is that this *σοφία*, the only-begotten, remains likewise in the bosom of God; so that the distinction is no distinction. |

These are the forms in which this truth, this idea, has fermented. The main point is to know that these appearances, wild as they are,

110. *L, W (1827?) add:* The One for itself is not yet the concept, the true.

111. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* something existing, something other,

112. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* God is the creator, and is such indeed in the specification of the Logos as the self-externalizing, self-expressing word, as the *ὁρασις*, God’s vision.

113. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* This is a genuine differentiation, which affects the quality of both; however, it is only one and the same substance, and thus the distinction here is still constituted only superficially, indeed as a person.

are rational—to know that they have their ground in reason, and to know what sort of reason is in them. But at the same time one must know how to distinguish the form of rationality that is present and not yet adequate to the content. For this idea has ~in fact~¹¹⁴ been placed beyond human beings, beyond the world, beyond thought and reason; indeed, it has been placed over against them, so that this determinate quality, though it is the sole truth and the whole truth, has been regarded as something peculiar to God, something that remains permanently above and beyond, and does not reflect itself in the other (in what appears as the world, nature, humanity). But to this extent, this fundamental idea has not been treated as the universal idea.

Jacob Boehme was the first to recognize the Trinity in another manner, as universal. His way of representing and thinking is rather wild and fanciful; he has not yet risen to the pure forms of thinking. But the ruling foundation of the ferment [in his mind], and of his struggles [to reach the truth], was the recognition of the presence of the Trinity in everything and everywhere. He said, for example, that it must be born in the hearts of human beings.¹¹⁵ The Trinity is the universal foundation of everything considered from the point of view of truth, albeit as finite, but in its finitude as the truth that lies in it. Thus Jacob Boehme sought to make nature and the heart or spirit of humanity representable—in his own way, to be sure, but according to the [logical] determinations of the Trinity.

In more recent times, especially through the influence of the Kantian philosophy, the triad has been put to use again as a type or a schema for thought, so to speak—not in any extensive way, certainly, though indeed in quite specific categorial forms.¹¹⁶ But this is the one aspect, namely, that when this idea is known as the essential and sole nature of God, it must not be regarded as something above and beyond, as it was formerly; rather it is the goal of cognition to know the truth in particular things as well. If it is thus cognized, then whatever in such particular things is the true

114. *Thus L; W (Var) reads: frequently*

115. [Ed.] See Jacob Boehme, *Aurora, oder Morgenröthe im Aufgang*, in *Theosophia revelata* (1715), 10.116.

116. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 62.

215 contains the form of this idea. For cognition in fact means knowing something in its | determinateness; but its nature is that of determinateness itself, and the nature of determinateness is what has been expounded in the idea. "[To show] that this idea is what is true as such, and that all categories of thought are this movement of determining, is the [task of] logical exposition."¹¹⁷

B. THE SECOND ELEMENT: REPRESENTATION, APPEARANCE¹¹⁸

1. Differentiation

a. Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World

We now consider, therefore, the eternal idea in the second element, in the form of *consciousness* or of *representation* in general; in other words, we consider this idea insofar as it emerges out of universality and infinitude into the determinacy of finitude.

Once again, the first aspect or form is that of the universality of the idea with respect to content—but precisely in this sense: that God is everywhere. He is everywhere present; the presence of God is just the element of truth that is in everything. We can comment further here: ¹¹⁹what is universal or abstract must precede everything else in scientific knowledge; scientifically, one must start with it. But in existence it is in fact what comes later. It is the in-itself, which nevertheless appears subsequently, specifically in knowledge—the in-itself that comes to consciousness and knowledge later.

117. Thus *L*, similar in *W*₁; *Hu* reads: To show that the Trinity is what is true is the task of logic. *W* (*Var*) adds: and is logical necessity.

[*Ed.*] Cf. Hegel's formulation of the result of this logical exposition at the beginning of the section on the absolute idea in *Science of Logic*, pp. 824–825 (GW 12:236–237).

118. [*Ed.*] The structure of "The Second Element" in the 1827 lectures is almost identical with that of 1824, and we have adopted the same section headings. The only structural variation in 1827 is that the treatment of the story of the fall precedes the discussion of the knowledge of evil and estrangement. There are, however, differences of content and emphasis between 1827 and 1824.

119. *Precedes* in *L* (1827?), similar in *W*: At first the idea was found in the element of thinking; this is the foundation, and we began with it.

The form of the idea comes to appearance as a result, even though this result is essentially the in-itself, the beginning. Just as the content of the idea is such that the last is first and the first last, so it is that what appears as a result is at the same time the presupposition, the in-itself, the foundation. And now we have to consider this idea in the second element, the element of *appearance* in general.

We can comprehend this progression from two sides.

First of all, the subject for which this idea is [present] is the thinking subject. Even the forms of representation take | nothing away from the nature of the fundamental form, namely, that this latter is [available] for human being only as a thinking being. The subject behaves in general as a thinking subject, thinking this idea; yet the subject is also concrete consciousness. The idea must therefore be [present] for this subject as concrete self-consciousness, as an actual subject.

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Or one might say that this idea is the absolute truth. Absolute truth is for thinking. But the idea must not only be the truth for the subject; the subject must also have the [sort of] certainty about the idea that belongs to the subject as such, as a finite, empirically concrete, sentient subject. The idea possesses certainty for the subject only insofar as it is a perceptible idea, insofar as it exists for the subject. If I can say of anything, “it is so” [*das ist*], then it possesses certainty for me; this is immediate knowledge, this is certainty. To prove that “what is so” is also *necessary*, that it is what is true that is certain for me—that is the further process of mediation and is no longer something immediately apprehended; so this mediation is the transition into the universal.¹²⁰

The other side of this progression starts from the idea. Eternal being-in-and-for-itself is what discloses itself, determines itself, divides itself, posits itself as what is differentiated from itself, but the difference is at the same time constantly sublated. Thereby actual being in and for itself constantly returns into itself—only in this way is it spirit. What is distinguished is defined in such a way that

120. *L* adds (1827?), similar in *W*: Having started with the form of truth, we now proceed to the fact that the truth obtains the form of certainty, that it exists for me.

the distinction immediately disappears, and we have a relationship of God, of the idea, merely to himself. The act of differentiation is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture. The other is to this extent defined as "Son"; in terms of sensibility, what-has-being-in-and-for-itself is defined as love, while in a higher mode of determinacy, it is defined as spirit that is present to itself and free. In the idea as thus specified, the determination of the distinction is not yet complete, since it is only abstract distinction in general. We have not yet arrived at distinction in its own proper form; [here] it is just one | determinate characteristic.¹²¹ The distinguished elements are posited as the same; they have not yet come to be defined so that they are distinctly determined.

From this side the primal division of the idea is to be conceived in such a way that the other, which we have also called "Son," obtains the determination of the other as such—that this other exists as a free being for itself, and that it appears as something actual, as something that exists outside of and apart from God. Its ideality, its eternal return into actual being in and for itself, is posited in the first form of identity, the idea, in an immediate and identical way. Otherness is requisite in order that there may be difference;¹²² it is necessary that what is distinguished should be the otherness as an entity. Only the absolute idea determines itself and is certain of itself as absolutely free within itself because of this self-determination. For this reason its self-determination involves letting this determinate [entity] exist as something free, something independent, or as an independent object. It is only for the being that is free that freedom *is*; it is only for the free human being that an other has freedom too.¹²³ It belongs to the absolute freedom of the idea that, in its act of determining and dividing, it releases the other to exist as a free and independent being. This other, released as something free and independent, is *the world* as such.

121. Thus L, W_1 ; *precedes in* W_2 (Var): To that extent we can say that we have not yet arrived at distinction.

122. Thus L, W_1 ; W_2 (Var) *adds*: and that it may come into its own,

123. Thus L, W ; *Hu adds*: As free, human beings do not comport themselves according to desires; they leave them aside.

The truth of the world is only its *ideality*—for it is not true that it possesses genuine actuality. Its nature is to *be*, but only in an *ideal* sense; it is not something eternal in itself but rather something created, whose being is only posited. For the world, to be means to have “being only for an instant,”¹²⁴ so to speak, but also to sublimate this its separation or estrangement from God. It means to return to its origin, to enter into the relationship of spirit, of love—to *be* this relationship of spirit, of love, which is the third element. The second element is, therefore, the process of the world in love by which it passes over from fall and separation into reconciliation. |

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This is the second element—the creation of the world. The first element, within the idea, is only the relationship of the Father to the Son in eternal reconciliation, or, alternatively, nonreconciledness, because no fall is present yet. But the *other* also obtains the determinacy of *other-being*, of an actual entity. It is in the Son, in the determination of distinction, that the advance to further distinction occurs, that distinction comes into its own as [true] diversity.

As we have already said,¹²⁵ Jacob Boehme expressed this transition inherent in the moment of the Son as follows: the first only-begotten one was Lucifer, the light-bearer, brilliance and clarity, but he inwardly fancied himself, i.e., he posited himself for himself, he strove to be, and thereby he fell. But the eternal only-begotten One appeared immediately in his place. Looked at from this standpoint, that [first] other is not the Son but rather the external world, the finite world, which is outside the truth—the world of finitude, where the other has the form of being, and yet by its nature is only the ἕτερον,¹²⁶ the determinate, what is distinct, limited, negative. The finite world is the side of distinction as opposed to the side that remains in unity; hence it divides into the *natural world* and

124. *Thus B, An; L, W (Var) read: only an instant of being,*

125. [Ed.] This cross-reference was probably introduced into the text by Lasson in order to camouflage the repetition relating to the 1824 lectures (see 1824, n. 106), but possibly Hegel is referring to p. 289 above.

126. [Ed.] From Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:64 (*Werke* 14:233), we may assume that he is here alluding to Plato (see *Sophist* 254c–259d and *Parmenides* 143a–c).

the world of *finite spirit*. On its own account, nature ~ enters into relationship⁻¹²⁷ only with humanity, not with God, for nature is not knowledge. God is spirit; nature knows nothing of spirit. It is created by God, but of itself it does not enter into relationship with him—in the sense that it is not possessed of knowledge. It stands in relation only to humanity, and in this relationship it provides what is called the dependent side of humanity. But to the extent that thinking recognizes that nature is created by God, that understanding and reason are within it, nature is known by thinking human beings. To that extent it is posited in relation to the divine, because its truth is recognized.¹²⁸ |

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127. Thus *L*, *Hu*, *W*₁, similar in *An*; *B*, *W*₂ (*Var*) read: appears in relationship

128. *W*₂ (1831) adds, located elsewhere in *W*₁: The manifold forms of relationship of finite spirit to nature do not belong here [in the philosophy of religion]. Their scientific treatment forms part of the phenomenology of spirit or the doctrine of spirit.^a Here this relationship has to be considered within the sphere of religion, so as to show that nature is for human beings not only the immediate, external world but rather a world in which humanity knows God; in this way nature is for humanity a revelation of God. We have already seen^b how this relationship of spirit to nature is present in the ethnic religions where we encountered those forms that belong to the advance of spirit from immediacy, in which nature is taken as contingent, to necessity and to a wise and purposeful mode of activity. Thus the consciousness of God on the part of finite spirit is mediated by nature. Humanity sees God by means of nature; thus far nature is only the veil and the untrue configuration [of God].

What is distinguished from God now is actually an other, and has the form of an other: it is nature, which is for spirit and for humanity. Through it unity is to be accomplished and the consciousness attained that the goal and destination of religion is reconciliation. The first step is the abstract consciousness of God, the fact that humanity raises itself in nature to God: this we have seen in the proofs for the existence of God; and here too belong those pious reflections as to how gloriously God has made everything and how wisely he has arranged all things. These elevated thoughts go straight to God and may start from any set of facts. Piety makes edifying observations of this kind, it starts with the most particular and insignificant things, recognizing in them something that is higher in principle. Mixed in with these observations there is often the distorted notion that what goes on in the world of nature is to be regarded as something higher than what is found in the human sphere. This way of looking at things, however, is inappropriate because it starts from singulars. Another form of observation can be opposed to it, namely, that the cause should be appropriate to the appearance and should itself contain the element of limitation that belongs to the appearance; we require a particular ground on which this particular effect is based. The observation of a particular appearance always has this inappropriate aspect. Further, these particular appearances belong to the realm of the natural. God, however, must be conceived as spirit, and the

b. *Natural Humanity*

¹²⁹—The truth is [now to be] considered as posited in the second element, in the finite element.¹³⁰ The first thing we have now to consider is the *need* for truth; the second is the *mode* and *manner* of its appearance. |

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Regarding the first point, the need for truth, it is presupposed that there is present within subjective spirit the demand to know the absolute truth. This need directly implies that the subject exists in a state of untruth. As spirit, however, the subject implicitly surmounts its untruth at the same time, and consequently the latter is for it something that *ought* to be overcome. More strictly defined, untruth means that the subject exists in a state of cleavage from itself; hence the need [for truth] expresses itself in this way: that the cleavage within the subject and its attendant cleavage from the truth should be annulled, that the subject should be reconciled, and that this reconciliation can in itself be only a reconciliation with the truth. This is the more precise form of the need. The way it is defined is that the cleavage is all within the subject, that the subject is evil, that it *is* the split and the contradiction—yet not a contra-

element in which we cognize him must likewise be spiritual [cf. John 4:24]. “God thunders with his thundering voice,” it is said, “and yet is not recognized” [cf. Job 37:5]; the spiritual person, however, demands something loftier than what is merely natural. In order to be recognized as spirit, God must do more than thunder [W₁ reads: God is more than a mere thunderer].

Follows additionally in W₂ (MiscP): The higher mode of viewing nature, and the deeper relation in which it is to be placed to God, is that in which nature itself is conceived as something spiritual, i.e., as the natural aspect of humanity. It is only when the subject ceases to be classed as belonging to the immediate being of the natural and is posited as what it intrinsically is, namely, as *movement*, and when it has gone into itself, that finitude as such is posited, and indeed as finitude in the process of the relationship in which the need for the absolute idea and its appearance come to exist for it.

[Ed.] ^aIt is not clear from this reference whether Hegel has in mind the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807 or the chapter by the same title in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), §§ 413–439. It is probably the latter since the “doctrine of spirit” could refer to the “Psychology” of the *Encyclopedia*, §§ 440–482. ^bThis is a reference to the cosmological and physicotheological proofs of the existence of God found in Part II; see the physicotheological proof according to the lectures of 1831 in the Appendix to Vol. 2.

129. *In B's margin:* 2 August 1827

130. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in W₁:* The absolute idea must come to be *for* consciousness and *in* it; it must become the *truth* for the subject and in it.

diction that simply falls apart, but rather one that simultaneously holds itself together. It is only through its holding together that it is split and has the contradiction within itself.

Consequently, it is requisite that we recall to mind and define the nature or character of humanity on its own account—how it is to be regarded, how human beings should regard themselves,¹³¹ what they should know about themselves. At this point we encounter two opposed definitions, both at once. The first is that *humanity is by nature good*. Its universal, substantial essence is good; far from being split within itself, its essence or concept is that it is by nature what is harmonious and at peace with itself. Opposed to this is the second characterization: *humanity is by nature evil*—that is, its natural, substantial aspect is evil. These are the antitheses that are present for us at the outset for | external consideration: sometimes one view has been in vogue, and sometimes the other. It should be added, moreover, that this is not just the way that *we* view the situation; it is human beings [generally] who have this knowledge of themselves, of how they are constituted and what their definition is.

*Humanity is by nature good:*¹³² This is the more or less predominant notion of our time.¹³³ If only this proposition is valid, that humanity by nature is good, is not cloven, then it has no need of reconciliation; and if reconciliation is unnecessary, then the entire process we are here considering is superfluous.

It is [indeed] essential to say that humanity is good: human beings are implicitly spirit and rationality, created in and after the image of God [Gen. 1:26–27]. God is the good, and human beings as spirit are the mirror of God; they, too, are *implicitly* good. This is a correct statement. Precisely on this proposition, and on it alone, the possibility of their reconciliation rests. The difficulty and ambiguity of the proposition, however, reside in the definition of the “implicitly” [*an sich*]. Humanity is “implicitly” good: this seems

131. Thus L, Hu; B, W read: it An reads: it (themselves)

132. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 106.

133. L adds (Var/Ed?): In treating the community, a topic for consideration will be how religious intuition and the religious relationship are developed and determined within it.

to say it all, but the “implicitly” designates precisely a one-sidedness which implies that everything has *not* been said. Humanity is “implicitly” good: this means that human beings are good only in an inner way, or according to the concept, and not according to their actuality. But insofar as they are spirit, they must be in actuality, i.e., *explicitly*, what they are in truth. Physical nature remains in the condition of implicitness [*Ansich*]; it is “implicitly” the concept.¹³⁴ Precisely this word “implicitly”—the notion that humanity is “implicitly” good—contains the deficiency. The implicitness of nature consists in the laws of nature; it remains true to its laws and does not go beyond them. It is this that constitutes its substantiality, and hence it is within the sphere of necessity. The other side, however, is that human beings ought to be explicitly what they are implicitly—they ought to become this explicitly. “Good by nature” means “immediately good,” and spirit is precisely something that is not natural and immediate. On the contrary, humanity as spirit is what steps forth out of natural life | and passes over into a separation between its concept and its immediate existence. But in the case of nature the concept of nature does not arrive at its being-for-self; this separation of an individual from its law, from its substantial essence, does not occur in nature just because [in it] the individual is not free. But human being is what sets its implicit being, its universal nature, over against itself and enters into this separation.

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The other characterization derives immediately from what has just been said, namely, that human being ought not to remain as it is immediately, but should pass beyond its immediacy: this is the concept of spirit. It is correct that human beings are good by nature; but with that, one has only said something one-sided. It is this passing beyond the natural state of humanity, beyond its implicit being, that for the first time constitutes the cleavage within humanity; it is what posits the cleavage. Thus the cleavage is a stepping forth out of natural life and immediacy. But this is not to be construed to mean that there would be no evil until the stepping forth;

134. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: But in it the concept does not arrive at its being-for-itself [*Fürsichsein*].

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rather this stepping forth is already contained in the natural state itself. "The implicit constitutes"¹³⁵ the immediate; but because the implicit being of human being is spirit, humanity in its immediacy is already involved in stepping forth from immediacy, in falling away from it, from its implicit being. Here lies the basis for the second proposition: *humanity is by nature evil*; its implicit being, its natural being, is what is evil. In the natural being of humanity, the deficiency is directly present. Because human being is spirit, it is distinguished from its implicit being and is the cleavage.¹³⁶ When humanity exists only according to nature [*nur nach der Natur ist*], it is evil. The way humanity is implicitly, or according to its concept, is of course what we refer to abstractly as humanity "according to nature"; but concretely the person who follows passions and instincts, and remains within the sphere of desire, the one whose law is that of natural immediacy, is the natural human being. At the same time, a human being in the natural state is one who wills, and since the content of the natural will is only instinct and inclination, this person is evil. From the formal point of view, since the natural human being has volition and will, | it is not an animal any more; but the content and purposes of its volition are still natural. It is from this standpoint—obviously the higher standpoint—that humanity is evil by nature; and it is evil just because it is a natural thing.

What we vacuously represent to ourselves, in taking the original condition of the human being to have been the state of innocence, is the state of nature, the animal state. Humanity ought not to be innocent [in this sense], it ought not to be brutish; insofar as human being is good, it ought not to be so in the sense that a natural thing is good. Rather it is up to its responsibility [*Schuld*], its will, to be good—it ought to be *imputable*. Responsibility means, in a general sense, the possibility of imputation. The good person is good by and through his will, and hence in virtue of his responsibility. Innocence [*Unschuld*] means to be without a will—without indeed being evil, but also at the same time without being good. Natural

135. Thus L, W₁; W₂ reads: The implicit and the natural state constitute

136. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: In the natural state, one-sidedness is directly present.

things and animals are all good, but this kind of goodness cannot be attributed to humanity.¹³⁷

What is absolutely required is that human being should not persist as a natural will, a natural essence. It is simultaneously possessed of consciousness, to be sure, but as human being it can still be essentially natural inasmuch as the natural constitutes the purpose, content, and definition of its volition. We must look at this definition more closely: the human being is human as a subject, and as a natural subject it is *this* single individual; the will involved is this singular will, and it is fulfilled with the content of its singularity. This means that natural humanity is selfish. But we demand of one who is called good that he should at least be guided by general principles and laws. Strictly speaking, the naturalness of the will is the selfishness of the will; in its naturalness, the will is private, distinguished from the universality of willing and opposed to the rationality of the will that has been cultivated into universality.

So whenever we consider what humanity is implicitly, the deficiency of implicit being is directly involved. But the fact that, insofar as its will is natural, humanity is evil, does not annul the other side, the fact that it is implicitly good, which always remains part of its concept. Humanity, however, is reflection and consciousness, | and therefore it engages in the process of distinguishing; for this reason it is something actual, a "this," a subject, distinct from its concept. And since this subject exists to begin with *only* in a state of distinction and has not yet returned to unity, to the identity of subjectivity and the concept, to rationality, the actuality that it has is the natural actuality that is selfishness. The condition of evil directly presupposes the relation of actuality to the concept; this simply posits the contradiction between implicit being or the concept and singularity, the contradiction between good and evil. This is the antithesis that is our first topic of inquiry. It is false to ask whether humanity is only good by nature or only evil. That is a false way of posing the question. In the same way, it is superficial to say that

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137. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: Insofar as one is good, one should be so by means of one's will.

humanity is both good and evil equally. Implicitly, according to its concept, human being is good; but this implicitness is a one-sidedness, and the one-sidedness is marked by the fact that the actual subject, the "this," is only a natural will. Thus both of them, both good and evil, are posited, but essentially in contradiction, in such a way that each of them presupposes the other. It is not that only one of them is [there], but instead we have both of them in this relation of being opposed to each other.

This is the first fundamental definition, the essential determination of the concept [of natural humanity].

*c. The Story of the Fall*¹³⁸

This accordingly is the mode and manner of the shape in which this conceptual determination appears representationally as a story and is represented for consciousness in an intuitable or sensible mode, so that it is regarded as something that *happened*. It is the familiar story in Genesis. The gist of it is that God created human beings in his own image: this is the concept of the human being.¹³⁹ Humankind lived in Paradise; we can call it a zoological garden. This life is called the state of innocence. The story says, too, that

138. [Ed.] In the 1827 lectures, the discussion of the story of the fall (Gen. 3) is not simply appended at the end of the treatment of differentiation and natural humanity, as in the Ms. and the 1824 lectures. Rather it is integrated as the representational, storylike version of what has just been treated conceptually. This then enables Hegel to conclude the entire discussion of differentiation with the conceptual insight that it is humanity's cognitive capacity—specifically the knowledge of good and evil—that gives rise to estrangement (or cleavage) and hence to evil (Sec. d). A smooth transition is then provided from the fact of estrangement to the need for reconciliation, which is taken up in Sec. B.2.

In this section and the next, the term *Erkenntnis* is translated as "knowledge" rather than as "cognition" when the reference is to such familiar expressions as "the tree of knowledge" or "the knowledge of good and evil." Also in these sections Hegel customarily uses the term *Entzweiung* ("cleavage," "rupture," etc.) instead of *Entfremdung* ("estrangement," "alienation"). The terms are virtually synonymous since to be "split" or "cloven" within oneself is to exist in a state of estrangement or self-alienation. We have maintained the terminological distinction, although in the present context "estrangement" could be a more idiomatic rendering of *Entzweiung*.

139. L (1827?) adds: This concept is now represented as something that also has being.

the tree of the knowledge of good and evil stood in Paradise, and that human beings disobeyed God's command by eating of it. On the one hand, it is formally set down that this eating was the transgression of a commandment. The content, however, is the essential thing, namely, that the sin consisted in having eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and | in this connection there comes about the pretense of the serpent that humanity will be like God when it has the knowledge of good and evil.

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It is said, then, that human beings have eaten of this tree. It is clear, as far as the content is concerned, that the fruit is an outward image—it belongs only to the sensible portrayal. What it really means is that humanity has elevated itself to the knowledge of good and evil; and this cognition, this distinction, is the source of evil, is evil itself. Being evil is located in the act of cognition, in consciousness. And certainly, as we already said earlier,¹⁴⁰ being evil resides in cognitive knowledge; cognition is the source of evil. For cognition or consciousness means in general a judging or dividing, a self-distinguishing within oneself. Animals have no consciousness, they are unable to make distinctions within themselves, they have no free being-for-self in the face of objectivity generally. The cleavage,¹⁴¹ however, is what is evil; it is the contradiction. It contains the two sides: good and evil. Only in this cleavage is evil contained, and hence it is itself evil. Therefore it is entirely correct to say that good and evil are first to be found in consciousness.

The first human being is represented as having brought about this fall. Here again we have this sensible mode of expression. From the point of view of thought, the expression "the first human being" signifies "humanity in itself" or "humanity as such"—not some single, contingent individual, not one among many, but the absolutely first one, humanity according to its concept. Human being

140. [Ed.] This cross-reference has probably been inserted into the text by Lasson in order to camouflage the repetition of the corresponding passage in the *Ms*.

141. [Ed.] Hegel here draws upon the etymological similarity between the terms *Entzweiung* ("cleavage," "division into two" [*Ent-zwei-ung*]) and *Urteil* ("judgment," "primal division" [*Ur-teil*]). Because knowledge or cognition (*Erkenntnis*) entails an act of judgment, it issues in division, cleavage, and estrangement; and because evil is "contained" in the cleavage, knowledge is the source of evil.

as such is conscious being; it is precisely for that reason that humanity enters into this cleavage, into the consciousness that, when it is further specified, is cognition. But inasmuch as universal humanity is represented as a first man, he is represented as distinguished from others. Hence the question arises: if there is only one who has done this, how is that deed transmitted to others? Here the notion of an inheritance of sin that is passed on to all others comes into play. By this means the deficiency involved in viewing humanity as such representationally as a first man is corrected. The one-sidedness involved in representing the cleavage belonging to the concept of human being generally as the act of a single individual is absorbed by this notion of a communicated or inherited sin.

226 Neither the original representation | nor the correction are really necessary; for it is humanity as a whole that, as consciousness, enters into this cleavage.

But in the same way as this cleavage is the source of evil, it is also the midpoint of the conversion that consciousness contains within itself whereby this cleavage is also sublated.¹⁴² The story reports that an alien creature, the serpent, seduced humanity by the pretense that, if one knows how to distinguish good and evil, one will become like God. In this way the story represents the fact that humanity's deed springs from the evil principle. However, the confirmation of the fact that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to the divinity of humanity is placed on the lips of God himself.¹⁴³ God himself says: "Behold, Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. So the words of the serpent were no deception. This is customarily overlooked along the lines of the ingrained prejudice to the effect that this is an irony of God,¹⁴⁴ that God has made a joke.¹⁴⁵

142. *L* (1827?) *adds*: The highest cleavage, the distinction between good and evil (good as such by definition exists only in contrast with evil, and evil only in contrast with good), is certainly cognitive knowledge; and human being as such, as spirit, eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

143. *In B's margin*: 6 August 1827

144. [Ed.] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 117.

145. *L* (1827?) *adds*: However, what distinguishes human being as human, as spirit, is precisely cognition and cleavage.

Labor and the childbearing of woman are then declared to be the punishment for sin [Gen. 3:16–19]. In general, this is a necessary consequence. The animal does not labor, or it does so only when compelled, and not by nature; it does not eat its bread in the sweat of its brow or produce its own bread, but rather finds the satisfaction of all its needs directly in nature. Human beings, too, find the material for their satisfaction in nature, but this material is, so to speak, the least important element for them; the infinite provision for the satisfaction of their needs occurs only through labor. Labor done in the sweat of one's brow, or bodily work, and the labor of the spirit, which is the harder of the two, are immediately connected with the knowledge of good and evil. That | humanity must make itself what it is, that it must produce and eat bread in the sweat of its brow, belongs to what is most essential and distinctive about it and coheres necessarily with the knowledge of good and evil.

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The story further depicts a second tree, a tree of life, that stood in Paradise. God wanted to drive Adam out [of Paradise (Gen. 3:22–23)], so that he would not be immortal. This, too, is expressed in a simple, childlike image. For the wishes of human beings, there are two ~directions.¹⁴⁶ One line is directed toward living in undisturbed happiness, in harmony with oneself and external nature; it is the animals that remain in this unity, while humanity has to pass beyond it. The other line answers rather to the wish to live eternally. And the representation of the tree of life is formed in accord with ~this latter wish.¹⁴⁷ When we consider it more closely, it is directly evident that this is only a childlike representation. Human being as a single living thing, its singular life, its natural life, must die.¹⁴⁸ So on the one hand, it is said that human beings in Paradise and without sin would be immortal; they would be able to live forever.¹⁴⁹ For, if outward death were only a consequence

146. Thus L; W₁ (Var) reads: branches. W₂ (Var) reads: types of good.

147. Thus An; B reads: the wish. L reads: these two wishes. W reads: these wishes.

148. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: But when the story is viewed more closely, this is seen to be the wondrous aspect of it, the self-contradictory aspect.

149. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: (In this story, immortality on earth and immortality of the soul are not separate.)

of sin, then humanity in Paradise would be implicitly immortal. On the other hand, however, it is also said that human beings will become immortal for the first time when they have eaten of the tree of life—but it cannot be assumed that they would have eaten of the tree of life without sin, for this was forbidden them.

228 The fact of the matter is that humanity is immortal only through cognitive knowledge,¹⁵⁰ for only in the activity of thinking is its soul pure and free rather than mortal and animallike. Cognition and thought are the root of human life, of human immortality as a totality within | itself. The animal soul is submerged in corporeality, while spirit is a totality within itself. This is the first point that is represented.

d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil

The second point is that the view we have grasped as essential in [the realm of] thought should become actual in humanity as such—i.e., that human beings should realize the infinity of this antithesis between good and evil within themselves, and that as natural beings they should *know* themselves to be evil in their naturalness. They should become conscious of this antithesis¹⁵¹ within themselves and know that they are the ones who are evil. But it also pertains to this that evil at the same time refers to the good, that there is present [along with evil] the demand of the good, of being good, and that one becomes aware of this contradiction, undergoing anguish because of it, because of this cleavage. We have encountered the form of this antithesis in all religions. But the antithesis to the power of nature, to the ethical law, the ethical will, and ethical life, or to fate—these are all subordinate antitheses that contain only ~something~¹⁵² particular. The person who violates a commandment is evil, but only in this particular case; he stands in opposition to this particular commandment. In the Parsee religion,¹⁵³ we saw that

150. [Ed.] See Fragment 3 from Michelet.

151. *Thus L*; *W₂ adds*: not only in general but of it

152. *Thus L*, *W₁*; *W₂ (Var) reads*: the antithesis to something

153. [Ed.] The religion of Persia, or Zoroastrianism.

good and evil, light and darkness, stand in universal antithesis to each other. There, however, the antithesis is *external* to human beings, and they themselves are outside it. This abstract antithesis is not present within them.

It is therefore required that ~humanity should comprehend this abstract antithesis *within* itself.¹⁵⁴ It is not that one has transgressed this or that commandment, but rather that one is intrinsically evil—universally evil, purely and simply evil in one's innermost being.¹⁵⁵ This evil character is the essential definition of one's concept: this is what one must bring to consciousness. It is with this depth that we are concerned. Depth means abstraction | —the pure universalization of the antithesis so that its two sides attain this wholly universal specification vis-à-vis each other.

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Speaking generally, this antithesis has now two forms. On the one hand, it is the antithesis of evil as such, the fact that it is humanity itself that is evil: this is the *antithesis vis-à-vis God*. On the other hand, it is the *antithesis vis-à-vis the world*, the fact that humanity exists in a state of rupture from the world: this is unhappiness or misery, the cleavage viewed from the other side.

We have first to consider the relation of the cleavage to one of the extremes, namely, to God. It is an aspect of there being the need for universal reconciliation in humanity—and this means divine, absolute reconciliation—that the antithesis has attained this infinite degree, that this universality [of evil] encompasses the innermost being, that nothing remains outside this antithesis, and that therefore the antithesis is not something particular. This is the deepest depth. Human beings are inwardly conscious that in their innermost being they are a contradiction, and have therefore an infinite *anguish* concerning themselves. Anguish is present only where there is opposition to what ought to be, to an affirmative. What is no longer in itself an affirmative also has no contradiction, no anguish.

154. Thus L; W₁ (Var) reads: humanity should overcome this abstract antithesis. W₂ (Var) reads: humanity should have this abstract antithesis within itself and should overcome it.

155. Thus L; W (Var) adds: evil in one's core.

Anguish is precisely the element of negativity in the affirmative, meaning that within itself the affirmative is self-contradictory and wounded. This anguish is thus one moment of evil. Evil merely on its own account is an abstraction; it is only in antithesis to the good, and since it is present in the unity of the subject, the latter is split, and this cleavage is infinite anguish. If the consciousness of the good, the infinite demand of the good, is not likewise present in the subject itself, in its innermost being, then no anguish is present and evil itself is only an empty nothingness, for it is only in this antithesis.

Evil and anguish can be infinite only when the good or God is known as *one* God, as a pure, spiritual God. It is only when the good is this pure unity, only when we have faith in *one* God, and only in connection with such a faith, that the negative can and must advance to this determination of evil and negation can advance to this universality. One side of this cleavage becomes apparent in this way, through the elevation of humanity to the pure, spiritual unity of God. This anguish and this consciousness are the condition of the absorption [*Vertiefung*] of humanity into itself, | and likewise into the negative moment of cleavage, of evil. This is ~an objective,¹⁵⁶ inward absorption into evil; inward absorption of an affirmative kind is absorption into the pure unity of God.

At this point it is evident that humanity, I as a natural human being, ~do not correspond to¹⁵⁷ what the truth is, but likewise the truth of the one good remains firmly fixed within me. This lack of correspondence is characterized as what ought not to be. The task and demand are infinite. One can say: Since I am a natural human being, I have, on the one hand, consciousness of myself, but on the other hand my natural being [*Natürlichkeit*] consists rather in a lack of consciousness with regard to myself, in being without a will. I am the sort of being that acts according to nature, and in this respect I am innocent, it is often said, having no consciousness

156. Thus L, W_1 ; W_2 reads: a negative,

157. L, W_1 read: does not correspond to $Hu.$ reads: am unsuitable to W_2 reads: do not correspond to, and am caught in the many natural particularities [vis-à-vis]

of what I do, being without a will of my own, acting without inclination, allowing myself to be surprised by instinct. But *here*, in the antithesis that we have observed, the innocence disappears, for precisely the natural being of humanity, lacking in consciousness and will, is what ought not to be. In the face of the pure unity and perfect purity that I know as absolute truth, this natural being is declared to be evil. What has been said implies that¹⁵⁸ the absence of consciousness and will is to be considered as itself essentially evil. And thus the contradiction remains, no matter how one twists ~oneself¹⁵⁹ about. Since this so-called innocence is defined as evil, my lack of correspondence to my essence and to the absolute remains; and from one side or the other I know myself always as what ought not to be.

This is the relation to the one extreme, and the result, the more determinate mode of this anguish, is my humiliation, my remorse; I experience anguish because I as a natural being do not correspond to what at the same time I *know* to be my own essence, to what I should be in my own knowing and willing. |

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Concerning the relation to the other extreme, the world, the separation appears as *unhappiness* [*Unglück*]¹⁶⁰—the fact that humanity is not satisfied in the world. As natural beings, human beings are related to other natural beings, and others are related to them as powers [*Mächte*], and to this extent each is as contingent as the other. However, the higher requirements of humanity, those having to do with ethical life, are requirements and determinations of freedom. Insofar as these requirements, which are implicitly justified in the concept of humanity—for human beings know what is good, and the good is in them—do not find satisfaction in existence, in the external world, humanity is in a state of unhappiness.

It is this unhappiness that drives and presses human beings back into themselves; and since the fixed demand that the world should be rational is present within them but does not find fulfillment, they

158. Thus L; W (Var) adds: when we arrive at this point

159. Thus L; W (Var) reads: it

160. L (1827?) adds, similar in W: Its natural needs have no further right or claim to satisfaction.

renounce the world, seeking happiness and satisfaction in the harmony of the self with itself. [The demand becomes] that they renounce the world and achieve the satisfaction of their happiness [in this inner harmony]. In order to achieve the harmony of their affirmative side with their determinate being, they give up the external world, transfer their happiness into themselves, and seek satisfaction within themselves.

"This element"¹⁶¹—the anguish that comes from universality, from above—we saw in the Jewish people; it does not release me in my natural existence, in my empirical willing and knowing, from the infinite demands of absolute purity. The other form [of cleavage or estrangement], the being driven back into oneself by unhappiness, is the standpoint at which the Roman world arrived—the universal unhappiness of the world. We saw the formal inwardness that satisfies itself in the world "as the dominion of God's purpose,"¹⁶² which is represented, intended, and known as a worldly dominion.

232 Each of these sides has its one-sidedness. The first may be described as the sensation | of "humiliation;"¹⁶³ the other is the abstract elevation of human being inwardly—the human being who is concentrated within himself—and hence it is Stoicism and Skepticism. The Stoic or Skeptic sage was directed back to himself and was supposed to be satisfied within himself. Through independence and rigid self-containment, he was supposed to find happiness and be in harmony with himself; in this abstract self-absorption, in the presence of [his own] self-conscious interiority, he was supposed to be at rest.

These are the highest, most abstract moments of all; here the antithesis is at its height, and both sides embrace the antithesis in its most complete universality—in the universal itself—and in its innermost essence, its greatest depth. But, as we have said, both

161. *Thus Hu, similar in An; L reads:* We already found these two forms of cleavage in the particular religions. *W₁ (Var) reads:* We found these two forms: *W₂ (Var) reads:* With respect to this demand and this unhappiness, we found these two forms:

162. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* [we saw] this dominion, the purpose of God,

163. *Thus Hu, W; L (Var) reads:* humility;

forms are one-sided. The first contains that anguish and abstract humiliation the crowning feature of which is the utter lack of correspondence between the subject and the universal, the cleavage or rupture that is not bridged, is not healed. This is the standpoint of the most abstract antithesis between the infinite on the one side and a fixed finitude on the other—and this finitude is abstract finitude. Here everything that is reckoned as belonging to me is simply evil. This abstraction finds its complement on the other side, namely in the process of internal thought; here we have the correspondence of self with self, [the claim] that I am satisfied, and can be satisfied within myself. This second form, however, is just as one-sided on its own account, because it comprises only the affirmative side, and indeed the one-sided affirmation of myself within myself. The contrition of the first side is only negative, lacking in self-affirmation; the second side is now supposed to be this pure affirmation, this self-satisfaction. But this satisfaction of myself within myself is only an abstract satisfaction; it occurs only by means of flight from the world and from actuality—by means of this inactivity. Since this is a flight from actuality, it is also a flight from *my* actuality—and indeed not from my external actuality, but from that of my own volition. The actuality of my volition—I as a specific subject, as a will filled with content—is no longer mine, but what remains for me is the immediacy of my self-consciousness. To be sure, the latter is completely abstract, but the final extremity of depth is contained therein, and “I have preserved it therein.”¹⁶⁴ It is not an abstraction from the abstract actuality within me or from my immediate self-consciousness, from the immediacy of my self-consciousness. On this side, therefore, affirmation is the predominant factor, but it does not include the negation of the one-sidedness of immediate being found on the other side; while on that side the negation is [itself] the one-sided factor. These two moments contain within themselves the need for a transition.

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The concept of the preceding religions has refined itself into this

164. Thus L; B reads: and that which I have preserved for myself therein. W (Var) reads: I have preserved myself therein.

antithesis; and the fact that the antithesis has disclosed and presented itself as an actually existing need is expressed by the words, "When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son" [Gal. 4:4]. This means: the Spirit is at hand, the need for the Spirit that points the way to reconciliation.

2. Reconciliation

a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual

¹⁶⁵The deepest need of spirit is that the antithesis within the subject itself should be intensified to its universal, i.e., its most abstract, extreme. This is the cleavage, the anguish that we have considered. That these two sides do not fall completely apart, but rather constitute a contradiction within the unity of the subject, demonstrates at the same time that the subject is the infinite power of unity: it can bear this contradiction. This is the formal, abstract, yet infinite energy of unity that it possesses. What satisfies this need is the consciousness of atonement, of the sublation, the nullification of the antithesis, so that the latter is not the truth. Rather, the truth is the attainment of unity through the negation of the antithesis; this is the peace, the reconciliation, that the need demands. Reconciliation is what is demanded by the need of the subject, and this exigency resides in the subject as infinite unity or as self-identity.

The sublation of the antithesis has two sides. First, the subject must become conscious of the fact that the antithetic opposites are not [things] in themselves, but that instead the truth, the inner nature [of spirit], consists in the sublatedness of the antithesis. Second, because the antithesis is implicitly and truthfully sublated, | the subject as such, in its being-for-itself, can reach and attain peace and reconciliation through the sublation of the antithesis.

That the antithesis is *implicitly* sublated constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility that the subject should also sublate this antithesis *explicitly*. In this respect it may be said that the subject does not attain reconciliation on its own account, i.e., as this [single] subject and in virtue of its [own] activity or conduct;

165. In B's margin: 7 August 1827

reconciliation is not brought about, nor can it be brought about, by the subject in its way of conducting itself. The subject's activity consists only in positing, in doing, the one side. The other side is what is substantial and foundational, that without which there is no possibility of resolving the antithesis—namely, that implicitly this antithesis is not present. Put more precisely, the antithesis arises eternally and just as eternally sublates itself; there is at the same time eternal reconciliation. That this is the truth may be seen in the eternal, divine idea: God is the one who as living spirit distinguishes himself from himself, posits an other and in this other remains identical with himself, has in this other his identity with himself. This is the truth.

It is this truth that constitutes one side of what must come to consciousness in humanity, namely, the side that has substantial being in itself. This can be expressed more precisely as follows: the antithesis is incongruous in principle. The antithesis (or evil) is the natural state of human being and willing; it is human immediacy, which is precisely the modality of natural life. Along with immediacy, finitude is likewise posited, and this finitude or naturalness is incongruous with the universality of God, with the infinite, eternal idea, which is utterly free within itself and present to itself. This incongruity is the point of departure that constitutes the need [for reconciliation]. But the more precise determinacy [of it] is not that this incongruity of the two sides disappears for consciousness. The incongruity is [there], it resides in spirituality. Spirit is the process of self-differentiating, the positing of distinctions. If the distinctions are made, then in the respect that they are distinct they are not equal; they are distinct, not congruous with one another. *This* incongruity cannot disappear, for otherwise the judgment of spirit, its vitality, would disappear, and it would cease to be spirit. It is rather the case that the two sides are not merely incongruous and that the identity of the two persists in spite of their incongruity. The other-being, the finitude, the weakness, the frailty of human nature is not to do any harm to that divine unity which forms the substance of reconciliation. That no harm is done has been seen in the divine idea. For the Son is other than the Father, and this otherness is difference—otherwise it would not be spirit. But the

other is [also] God and has the entire fullness of the divine nature within itself. The character of otherness in no way detracts from the fact that this other is the Son of God and therefore God.¹⁶⁶ This otherness is what eternally posits and eternally sublates itself; the self-positing and sublating of otherness is love or spirit.

Evil, the one side, has been abstractly defined as only the other, the finite, the negative, and God is placed on the other side as the good, the positive, the true. But this is not a true representation. For that which is negative and other also contains affirmation within itself. It must be brought to consciousness¹⁶⁷ that the principle of affirmation is contained within that negative, and that in the affirmative principle there lies the principle of identity with the other side—even as God, as truth, is not just abstract identity with himself, but on the contrary the other, negation, the positing of oneself otherwise, is God's own essential determination, and the proper determination of spirit. ~Hence this need could come to consciousness. This implicit being, this implicitly subsisting unity | of divine and human nature, must come to consciousness in infinite anguish—but only in accord with implicit being, with substantiality, so that finitude, weakness, and otherness can do no harm to the substantial unity of the two. Or expressed differently, the substantiality of the unity of divine | and human nature comes to consciousness for humanity in such a way that a human being¹⁶⁸ appears to consciousness as God, and God appears to it as a human being. This is ~the necessity and need~¹⁶⁹ for such an appearance.

Furthermore, the consciousness of the absolute idea that we have in philosophy in the form of thinking¹⁷⁰ is to be brought forth not for the standpoint of philosophical speculation or speculative thinking but in the form of *certainty*. The necessity [that the divine-human unity shall appear] is not first apprehended by means of thinking; rather it is a certainty for humanity. In other words, this content—the unity of divine and human nature—achieves certainty,

166. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* nor does it detract from this other in human nature.

167. *Thus L, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* within finite being

168. *Thus L, Hu; An adds:* (but not every human being)

169. *Thus L; W₁ (Var) reads:* the necessity of this need

170. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 824–844 (GW 12:236–253).

obtaining the form of immediate sensible intuition and external existence for humankind, so that it appears as something that has been seen in the world, something that has been | experienced. It is essential to this form of nonspeculative consciousness that it must be *before* us; it must essentially be *before* me—it must become a certainty for humanity. For it is only what exists in an immediate way, in inner or outer intuition, that is certain. In order for it [this divine-human unity] to become a certainty for humanity, *God had to appear in the world in the flesh* [cf. John 1:14]. The necessity that God [has] appeared in the world in the flesh is an essential characteristic—a necessary deduction from what has been said previously, demonstrated by it—for only in this way can it become a certainty for humanity; only in this way is it the truth in the form of certainty.

~At the same time there is this more precise specification to be added, namely, that the unity of divine and human nature must appear in *just one human being*. Humanity in itself as such is the universal, or the thought of humanity.¹⁷¹ From the present standpoint, however, it is not a question of the thought of humanity but of sensible certainty; thus it is just one human being in whom this unity is envisaged—humanity as singular, or in the determinacy of singularity and particularity. Moreover, it is not just a matter of singularity *in general*, for singularity in general is something universal once more. But from the present standpoint, singularity is not something universal; universal singularity is found in abstract thinking as such. Here, however, it is a question of the certainty of intuiting and sensing. The substantial unity [of God and humanity] is what humanity implicitly is; hence it is something that lies beyond immediate consciousness, beyond ordinary consciousness and knowledge. Hence it must stand over against subjective consciousness, which relates to itself as ordinary consciousness and is defined as such. That is exactly why the unity in question must appear for others as a singular human being set apart; it is not present in the others, but only in one from whom all the others are excluded.

171. Thus L; W (Var) reads: The unity of divine and human nature, humanity in its universality, is the thought of humanity. W₂ (Var) adds: and the idea of absolute spirit, which has being in and for itself.

Thus this one stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—a single individual [who is there] as the soil of certainty.¹⁷² |

Thus there are two conditions for this appearance. The first is that consciousness can achieve this content, this substantial unity, the consciousness of which is given and which is its reconciliation. The second condition is the consciousness of the determinate form of this exclusive singularity.¹⁷³

172. Thus L, which reads in German: *So ist er ihnen drüben als das Ansich und ein Einzelner als Boden der Gewissheit*. *W₁ (Var) reads:* Thus it [es (the unity?)] stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—singularity on the soil of certainty. *Hu reads:* For only in this way does this one become what stands over there [das Drüben] for the intuition of human beings. *W₂ (Var) reads:* —but no longer as what implicitly is [das Ansich], which is over there [das drüben ist], but as singularity on the soil of certainty.

173. *W₁, and in part also W₂, transmit a parallel to this passage from the 1831 lectures. The text below follows W₁, but the passages contained in W₂ in somewhat fuller form are also given. W₁ (1831) reads:* The one mode of revelation that leads as a whole to the elevation [of spirit], whose general characteristics we have considered earlier, is revelation by way of nature and the world. The other mode is the higher one and occurs through finite spirit. This is what first displays the interest of the standpoint at which we now find ourselves. Divinity is recognized by finite human beings in what is objectively available to intuition, sensibility, and immediate consciousness.

This is the appearance of God in the flesh. God should be known as being for other, for humanity, and the human is an intuiting and sensing being—this singular human being. The possibility of reconciliation is present only when the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is known. Human beings can know themselves to be taken up into God only when God is not something alien to them, only when they are not merely an extrinsic accident upon God's nature, but rather when they are taken up into God in accordance with their essence and freedom. The implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature must be revealed to humanity in an objective way; this is what happened through the incarnation of God.

W₂ reads: The possibility of reconciliation resides only in the fact that the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is known; this is the necessary foundation. Human beings can know themselves to be taken up into God inasmuch as God is not something alien to them and they are not related to him as an extrinsic accident [*W₁ reads:* as something extrinsic]—[i.e.,] when they are taken up into God in accordance with their essence, their freedom and subjectivity [*W₁ reads:* when they are subjects in God in accordance with their essence and freedom]. But this is possible only in virtue of the fact that this subjectivity of human nature is [present] within God himself. *W₁ continues:* and the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is [there] for them when God appears as human. Similarly, in a quite inferior form we have seen the incarnations of the Hindu deities, the Dalai Lama, and Buddha—[these are] human beings revered as deities. Among the Greeks there

In the church Christ has been called the “God-man.” This is a monstrous compound, which directly contradicts both representation and understanding. But what has thereby been brought into human consciousness and made a certainty for it is the unity of divine and human nature, implying that the otherness, or, as we also say, the finitude, weakness, and frailty of human nature, does not damage this unity, just as otherness does not impair the unity

is even a human being, Heracles, who swings himself up into heaven through his bravery and his deeds, and is received among the gods. All this is quite different from what we have before us at this point; but all the same the impulsion toward this way of determining the implicitly subsisting unity is unmistakable. The form is still quite inferior, to be sure: in Hindu pantheism, substance dons only the mask of subjectivity, for it does not attain to actual, free subjectivity.

W₂ reads: This determination, namely, that God becomes human [*dass Gott Mensch wird*], and consequently that finite spirit has the consciousness of God within the finite itself, is the most difficult moment of religion. According to a common representation, which we find among the ancients especially,^a the spirit or soul has been relegated to this world as something alien; this indwelling [of the soul] in the body, and this singularization to [the limit of] individuality, are held to be a degradation of spirit. This is what characterizes the purely material side, or immediate existence, as untrue. But on the other hand immediate existence is at the same time an essential determination; it is where spirit is sharpened to a final point in its subjectivity. Human beings have spiritual interests and are spiritually active; they can feel that they are hindered in exercising these interests and activities because they feel that they are physically dependent and must make provision for their sustenance etc. Thus they fall away from their spiritual interests because of their bondage to nature. But the moment of immediate existence is contained within spirit itself; it is [logically] characteristic of spirit to advance to this moment. Natural life is not merely an external necessity; on the contrary, spirit as subject, in its infinite relatedness to itself, has the [logical] character of immediacy in it. Now, inasmuch as it is to be revealed to humanity what the nature of spirit is, and the nature of God is to become manifest in the entire development of the idea, this form [of immediacy] must also be present here, and this is precisely the form of finitude. The divine must appear in the form of immediacy. This immediate presence is only the presence of the spiritual in its spiritual shape, i.e., in the human shape. In no other way is this appearance genuine—not, for instance, the appearance of God in the burning bush [Exod. 3:2 ff.], and the like. God appears as a single person to whose immediacy all [the usual] physical needs are attached. In Hindu pantheism a countless number of incarnations occur; but there subjectivity, the human being, is only an accidental form in God; it is only a mask that substance adopts and exchanges in contingent fashion. As spirit, on the other hand, God contains the moment of subjectivity and uniqueness in himself; his appearance, therefore, can only be a single one, it can take place only once.

[Ed.] ^aHegel is referring to Gnostic representations of the imprisonment of the spirit and soul in matter, with which he was familiar through Neander's *Gnostische Systeme* (on Basilides, see pp. 36–37; on Valentinus, pp. 106–107).

that God is in the eternal idea. It is the appearance of a human being in sensible presence; God in sensible presence can take no other shape than that of human being. In the sensible and mundane order, only the human is spiritual; so if the spiritual is to have a sensible shape, it must be a human shape.

b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ

This "appearance of the God-man"¹⁷⁴ has to be viewed from two different perspectives at once. First, he is a human being in accord with his external circumstances. This is the nonreligious perspective [*die irreligiöse Betrachtung*] in which he appears as an ordinary human being. Second, there is the perspective that occurs in the Spirit or with the Spirit. Spirit presses toward its truth because it has an infinite cleavage and anguish within itself. It wills the truth; the need of the truth and the certainty thereof it will have, and must have. Here for the first time we have "the religious view [*das Religiöse*]." ¹⁷⁵ |

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When Christ is viewed in the same light as Socrates, then he is regarded as an ordinary human being, just as in Islam he is regarded as a messenger of God in the general sense that all great men are messengers of God.¹⁷⁶ If one says no more of Christ than that he is a teacher of humanity, a martyr to the truth, one is not adopting "the religious standpoint;"¹⁷⁷ one "says"¹⁷⁸ no more of him than of Socrates. But there is this human side of Christ too—his appearance as a living human being—and we shall mention briefly its moments.

The first moment is that he is *immediately a human being* in all the external contingencies, in all the temporal exigencies and conditions, that this entails. He is born like every other human being,

174. Thus L; Hu, An reads: appearance W (Var) reads: historical appearance

175. Thus L, Hu; An reads: the religious perspective [*religiöse Betrachtung*]. W (1831) reads: the genuine perspective in religion. These two sides are to be distinguished here—the immediate perspective and that of faith. Through faith we know that this individual has a divine nature, and in that way the "beyondness" of God is superseded [*Durch den Glauben wird dieses Individuum als von göttlicher Natur gewusst, wodurch das Jenseits Gottes aufgehoben werde*].

176. [Ed.] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 215.

177. Thus L, Hu; W (Var) reads: the Christian standpoint, that of the true religion;

178. Hu reads: speaks

and as a human he has the needs of other human beings; only he does not share the corruption, the passions, and the evil inclinations of the others, nor is he involved in particular worldly interests, along with which integrity and teaching may also find a place. Rather he lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation; his activity consists solely in completing the higher consciousness of humanity.¹⁷⁹

Thus the second moment is that of his teaching office.¹⁸⁰ The question now is this: "How can, how must this teaching be constituted?" This original teaching cannot be constituted in a manner similar to the later doctrine of the church; it must have its own distinctive aspects, which in the church¹⁸¹ partly take on another character and are partly set aside.¹⁸² Once the community is established, once the kingdom of God has attained its determinate being and its actuality, these teachings are either interpreted in other ways or else they fall by the wayside.¹⁸³ |

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Since what is at issue is the consciousness of absolute reconciliation, we are here in the presence of a new consciousness of humanity, or a new religion. Through it a new world is constituted, a new actuality, a different world-condition, because [humanity's] outward determinate being, [its] natural existence, now has religion as its substantiality. This is the aspect that is negative and polemical, being opposed to the subsistence of externality in the consciousness¹⁸⁴ of humanity. The new religion expresses itself precisely as a new consciousness, the consciousness of a reconciliation of

179. *Thus L, similar in An; W₁ (1831) adds:* This affords an intuition of what is available for the community. It is available at the same time in a sensuous way, and to this extent it is an emptying out [*Entäusserung*] of the divine, of the idea, which has to annul itself.

180. *Thus L, similar in An; W (1831) reads:* The teaching of Christ also belongs on this human side.

181. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in necessary fashion

182. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* As this immediate teaching, Christ's teaching cannot be Christian dogmatics, cannot be the doctrine of the church.

183. *Thus L; W₁ (1831) adds:* The primitive [*unmittelbare*] Christian teaching arouses sensibilities by means of representation. Its content, which at the highest level is explication of the nature of God, is [directed] precisely at sensible consciousness and comes to the latter as intuition, not doctrine, which has the concept as its form—this only became necessary in the church later on when science began.

184. *Thus Hu; W (Var) adds:* and faith

humanity with God. This reconciliation, expressed as a state of affairs, is the kingdom of God, an actuality.¹⁸⁵ The souls and hearts [of individuals] are reconciled with God, and thus it is God who rules in the heart and has attained dominion.

This kingdom of God, the new religion, thus contains implicitly the characteristic of negating the present world. This is its polemical aspect, its revolutionary attitude toward all the determinate aspects of that outer world, [all the settled attitudes] of human consciousness and belief.¹⁸⁶ So what is at issue is the drawing of those who are to achieve the consciousness of reconciliation away from present actuality, requiring of them an abstraction from it. The new religion is itself still concentrated and does not actually exist as a community, but has its vitality rather in that energy which constitutes the sole, eternal interest of its adherents who have to fight and struggle in order to achieve this for themselves, because it is not yet coherent with the world consciousness and is not yet in harmony with the condition of the world.

242 Hence the first emergence of this religion directly contains this polemical aspect. It poses the demand that one should remove oneself ~from finite things~¹⁸⁷ | and elevate oneself to an infinite energy for which all other bonds are to become matters of indifference, for which all other bonds—indeed, all things hitherto regarded as ethical and right—are to be set aside. Thus Christ says: “Who is my mother, who are my brothers? Whoever does the will of God is my mother, [my] sister, and [my] brother.” Or: “Follow me! Leave the dead to bury the dead. Go forth and proclaim the kingdom of God.” “I have not come to bring peace on earth, but rather children will leave their parents and follow me.”¹⁸⁸

185. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in which God rules.

186. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* The previous [state of things] is now altered; the way things used to be, the previous condition of religion and the world, cannot continue as before.

187. *Thus L, W; An reads:* from worldliness *Hu reads:* from the world *B reads:* from worldly, earthly thought

188. [Ed.] Here Hegel conflates and quotes loosely from Matt. 12:48, 50; Mark 3:33–34; Luke 9:59–60; Matt. 8:21–22; and Matt. 10:34–38. The last clause (“but rather children will leave . . .”) is not found in any of the Gospels but may be inferred from Matt. 10:35–38. These quotations are found in the extant sources rather than *L*, which at this point interpolates 1824 text in place of 1827.

We see here a polemical attitude expressed against the ethical relationships that have hitherto prevailed. These are all teachings and characteristics that belong to its first appearance, when the new religion constitutes the sole interest [of its adherents], which they were bound to believe they were still in danger of losing. This is the one side.

This renunciation, surrender, and setting aside of all vital interests and moral bonds is an essential characteristic of the concentrated manifestation of the truth, a characteristic that subsequently loses its importance when the truth has achieved a secure existence. "Beyond that"¹⁸⁹ is the proclamation of the kingdom of God. Humanity must transpose itself into this kingdom¹⁹⁰ in such a way as to cast itself immediately upon this truth. This is expressed with the purest, most colossal boldness, as, for example, at the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the [poor] in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of God. Blessed are the pure in heart, [for] they shall see God" [Matt. 5:3, 8].¹⁹¹ |

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¹⁹²Nothing is said about any mediation through which this elevation [of soul] may come to pass for humanity; rather what is spoken of is this immediate being, this immediate self-transposition into the truth, into the kingdom of God. It is to this kingdom, to this intellectual, spiritual world, that humanity ought to belong.

With respect to details, there are more specific teachings, among which the teaching about love constitutes a focal point: "Love your neighbor as yourself" [Matt. 22:39].¹⁹³ But these teachings are already found in the Old Testament [cf. Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18].¹⁹⁴

189. *Thus Hu; L, W₁ read: It W₂ (Var) reads:* Beyond that, in the affirmative sphere,

190. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* as the kingdom of love for God

191. *W (1831) adds:* Words like these are among the greatest that have ever been uttered; they are an ultimate focus that annuls every superstition, every bondage on the part of human beings. It is of the highest importance that, by means of Luther's translation of the Bible, a folk-book has been placed in the hands of the people, a book in which the heart, the spirit, can find itself at home in the highest, infinite fashion; in Catholic lands there is in this respect a great lack. There [in Protestant regions?] the Bible is the means of deliverance from all servitude of spirit.

192. *In B's margin:* 8 August 1827

193. *Thus Hu; W₁ (Var) reads:* "Love God above all and your neighbor as yourself" [cf. Matt. 22:37–39].

194. *Thus Hu, similar in B; W₁ (1831/Var?) adds:* What can be regarded as

Thus the following [distinctive] moment or determinate aspect enters into these teachings. Because the demand, "Seek first . . ." ¹⁹⁵—[i.e.,] cast yourself upon the truth—is expressed so directly, it emerges almost as a subjective declaration, and to this extent the person of the teacher comes into view. Christ speaks not merely as a teacher, who expounds on the basis of his own subjective insight and who is aware of what he is saying and doing, but rather as a prophet. He is the one who, because his demand is immediate, expresses it immediately from God, and God speaks it through him. His having this life of the Spirit in the truth, so that it is simply there without mediation, expresses itself prophetically in such a way that it is God who says it. It is a matter of the absolute, divine truth that has being in and for itself, and of its expression and intention; and the confirmation of this expression is envisaged as God's doing. It is the consciousness of the real unity of the divine will and of his harmony with it. In the form of this expression, however, the accent is laid upon the fact that the one who says this is at the same time essentially human. It is the Son of Man who speaks thus, in whom this expression, this activity of what subsists in and for itself, is essentially the work of God—not as something suprahuman that appears in the shape of an external revelation, but rather as [God's] working in a human being, so that the divine presence is essentially identical with this human being. |

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We still have to consider the fate of this individual, namely, that he became, humanly speaking, a martyr to the truth in a way that coheres closely with his earlier role, because the establishment of the kingdom of God stands in stark contradiction to the worldly

moral commandments are [found] partly in other religions and partly in the Jewish religion.

195. [Ed.] See Matt. 6:33: "Seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well." The phrase that follows ("Cast yourself upon the truth"), while appearing to be a saying of Jesus, is in fact found nowhere in the Gospels. Hegel may have had in mind a saying such as that found in Luke 16:16 ("The law and the prophets were until John; since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached, and everyone enters it violently"), or John 16:13 ("When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth"); but more likely it is intended as Hegel's interpretation of what it *means* to seek and to enter the kingdom of God (see the preceding two paragraphs).

authority [*vorhandenen Staate*], which is grounded upon another mode, a different determinate form, of religion.

These are the principal moments in the appearance of this man, upon the human view of it. But this is only one side, and it is not a religious view.¹⁹⁶ |

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196. Thus *L; W* (1831) reads: human appearance [*W*, reads: teaching] of Christ. This teacher gathered friends about him. Inasmuch as his teachings were revolutionary, Christ was accused and executed, and thus he sealed the truth of his teaching by his death. Even unbelief can go this far in [the view it takes of] this story: it is quite similar to that of Socrates, only on a different soil. Socrates, too, brought inwardness to consciousness; his *δαμόνιον* is nothing other than this. He also taught that humanity must not stop short at obedience to ordinary authority but must form convictions for itself and act according to them. Here we have two similar individualities with similar fates. The inwardness of Socrates was contrary to the religious beliefs of his people as well as to their form of government, and hence he was put to death: he, too, died for the truth.

Christ happened to live among another people, and to this extent his teaching has a different hue. But the kingdom of heaven and the purity of heart contain, nonetheless, an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates. This is the outward history of Christ, which is for unbelief just what the history of Socrates is for us.

With the death of Christ, however, the reversal of consciousness begins. The death of Christ is the midpoint upon which consciousness turns; and in the comprehension of it lies the difference between outward comprehension and that of faith, which entails contemplation with the Spirit, from the Spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. According to the comparison made earlier, Christ is a human being like Socrates, a teacher who lived his life virtuously, and who brought humanity to the awareness of what the truth really is and of what must constitute the basis of human consciousness. But the higher view is that the divine nature has been revealed in Christ. This consciousness is reflected in those often-quoted passages which state that the Son knows the Father, etc.—sayings which of themselves have at the outset a certain generality about them and which exegesis can draw out into the arena of universal views, but which faith comprehends in their truth through an interpretation of the death of Christ. For faith is essentially the consciousness of absolute truth, of what God is in and for himself. But we have already seen what God is in and for himself: he is this life-process, the Trinity, in which the universal places itself over against itself and therein remains identical with itself. God, in this element of eternity, is the conjoining of himself with himself, the closure of himself with himself. Only faith comprehends and is conscious of the fact that in Christ this truth, which has being in and for itself, is envisaged in its process, and that through him this truth has been revealed for the first time.

[*Ed.*] On the *daimonion* ("genius" or "demon") of Socrates, see esp. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.7–9; Plato, *Apology* 10–14; also Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 421–425 (cf. *Werke* 14:94–101). On the comparison of Socrates and Christ, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 215. On the conclusion to the note, see Fragment 1 from Michelet.

c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence

It is this second view that leads us for the first time into the religious sphere as such, where the divine itself is an essential moment. Among those friends and acquaintances who were taught by Christ, there was present this presentiment, this representation, this desire for a new kingdom, a new heaven and a new earth, a new world. This hope and certainty penetrated the actuality of their hearts and became entrenched there. But the suffering and death of Christ superseded his human relationships, and it is precisely in his death that the transition into the religious sphere occurs.¹⁹⁷ On the one hand it is a natural death, brought about by injustice, hatred, and violence.

But in the hearts and souls [of believers] is the firm [belief] that the issue is not a moral teaching, nor in general the thinking and willing of the subject within itself and from itself; rather what is of interest is an infinite relationship to God, to the present God, the certainty of the kingdom of God—finding satisfaction not in morality, ethics, or conscience, but rather in that than which nothing is higher, ~the relationship~¹⁹⁸ to God himself. All other modes of satisfaction involve the fact that they are still qualities of a subordinate kind, and thus the relationship to God remains a relationship to something above and beyond, which in no sense lies present at hand.

The defining characteristic of this kingdom of God is the *presence of God*, which means that the members of this kingdom are expected to have not only a love for humanity but also the consciousness that God | is love. This is precisely to say that God is present, that his presence must exist as one's own feeling, as self-feeling. The kingdom of God, God's presentness, *is* this determination [of one's feeling]; so the certainty of God's presentness belongs to it. But since the kingdom is on the one hand [present] in need or feeling [on the part of the subject], the latter must, on the other hand, distinguish itself from it, must establish a distinction between this

197. *L* adds: it is the meaning of or the way of comprehending this death. *W (Var)* adds: It is a question of the meaning of, of the way of comprehending, this death.

198. Thus *L*; *W*₁ (*Var*) reads: relationship *W*₂ (*Var*) reads: absolute relationship

presence of God and itself, but in such a way that this presence remains certain to it, and this certainty can here occur only in the mode of sensible appearance.¹⁹⁹~Because this is how the content

199. *W₁ here contains a lengthy passage from the 1831 lectures, which is also found in W₂, although dispersed into several disconnected segments. Our text follows the order of W₁, which is also confirmed by S, but the wording is that of W₂. The parallel in the main text follows, ending with the penultimate paragraph of this section. W₂ (1831) reads:*

We have seen God as the God of free humanity, though still at first in the subjective, limited forms of the folk-spirits and in the contingent shapes of phantasy; next we saw the anguish of the world following upon the suppression of the folk-spirits. This anguish was the birthplace for the impulse of spirit [*W₁ reads: the birthplace of a new spirit, the impulse*] to know God as spiritual, in universal form and stripped of finitude. This need was engendered by the progress of history and the progressive formation of the world-spirit. This immediate impulse, this longing, which wants and desires something determinate—this instinct, as it were, of spirit, which is impelled to seek for this [*W₁ reads: —this is the witness of the Spirit and the subjective side of faith. This need and this longing*—demanded such an appearance, the manifestation of God as infinite spirit in the shape of an actual human being. [*W₁ reads: The faith that rests upon the witness of the Spirit then makes the life of Christ explicit for itself. Instead of this sentence, W₂ gives as a transition: The eternal idea itself means that the characteristic of subjectivity as actual, as distinguished from mere thought, is allowed to appear immediately. On the other hand, it is faith, begotten by the anguish of the world and resting on the testimony of the Spirit, which explicates the life of Christ.*] The teaching and the miracles of Christ are grasped and understood in this witness of faith. [*W₁ reads: The words of Christ are truly grasped and understood only by faith.*] The history of Christ is also narrated by those upon whom the Spirit has already been poured out. The miracles are grasped and narrated in this Spirit, and the death of Christ has been truly understood through the Spirit to mean that in Christ God is revealed together with the unity of divine and human nature. Thus the death of Christ is the touchstone, so to speak, by which faith is verified, since it is here, essentially, that its understanding of the appearance of Christ is set forth. This death means principally that Christ was the God-man, the God who at the same time had human nature, even unto death. It is the lot of human finitude to die. Death is the most complete proof of humanity, of absolute finitude; and indeed Christ has died the aggravated death of the evildoer: not merely a natural death, but rather a death of shame and humiliation on the cross. In him, humanity was carried to its furthest point.

Now, however, a further determination comes into play. *God has died, God is dead*—this is the most frightful of all thoughts, that everything eternal and true is *not*, that negation itself is found in God. The deepest anguish, the feeling of complete irretrievability, the annulling of everything that is elevated, are bound up with this thought. However, the process does not come to a halt at this point; rather, a reversal takes place: God, that is to say, maintains himself in this process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed. The resurrection is something that belongs just as essentially to faith [as the crucifixion].

247 behaves, | we have here the religious aspect, and the formation of the community begins here. This content is the same as what is called the outpouring of the Holy Spirit: it is the Spirit that has

After his resurrection, Christ appeared only to his friends.⁴ This is not an external history for unbelievers; on the contrary, this appearance occurs only for faith. The resurrection is followed by the glorification of Christ, and the triumph of his ascension to the right hand of God concludes this history, which, as understood by [believing] consciousness, is the explication of the divine nature itself. [*W₁ reads: of God. This history is the explication of the divine nature itself.*] If in the first sphere we grasped God in pure thought, then in this second sphere we start from the immediacy appropriate to intuition and sensible representation. The process is now such that immediate singularity is sublated: just as in the first sphere the seclusion of God came to an end, and his original immediacy as abstract universality, according to which he is the essence of essences, has been sublated, so here the abstraction of humanity, the immediacy of subsisting singularity, is sublated, and this is brought about by death. But the death of Christ is the death of this death itself, the negation of negation. We have had the same course and process of the explication of God in the kingdom of the Father, but this is where it occurs insofar as it is an object of consciousness. For at this point the urge to *see* the divine nature was present.

Concerning Christ's death, we have still finally [*W₁ reads: particularly*] to emphasize the aspect that it is God who has put death to death, since he comes out of the state of death. In this way, finitude, human nature, and humiliation are posited of Christ—as of him who is strictly God—as something alien. It is evident that finitude is alien to him and has been taken over from an other; this other is the human beings who stand over against the divine process. It is their finitude that Christ has taken [upon himself], this finitude in all its forms, which at its furthest extreme is evil. This humanity, which is itself a moment in the divine life, is now characterized as something alien, not belonging to God. This finitude, however, on its own account (as against God), is evil, it is something alien to God. But he has taken it [upon himself] in order to put it to death by his death. As the monstrous unification of these absolute extremes, this shameful death is at the same time infinite love.

It is out of infinite love that God has made himself identical with what is alien to him in order to put it to death. This is the meaning of the death of Christ. It means that Christ has borne the sins of the world and has reconciled God [with the world (2 Cor. 5:18–19)].

Suffering and death interpreted in this way are opposed to the doctrine of moral imputation, according to which all individuals are accountable only for themselves, and all are agents of their own actions. The fate of Christ seems to contradict this imputation, but the latter only applies in the region of finitude, where the subject stands as a single person, not in the region of free spirit. It is characteristic of the region of finitude that all individuals remain what they are. If they have done evil, then they *are* evil: evil is in them as their quality. But already in the sphere of morality, and still more in that of religion, spirit is known to be free, to be affirmative within itself, so that its limitation, which extends to evil, is a nullity for the infinitude

revealed this. The relationship [of believers] to a mere human being
is changed into a relationship | that is completely altered and trans- 248
figured by the Spirit, so that the nature of God discloses itself
therein, and so that this truth obtains immediate certainty in its
manner of appearance.

In this experience, then, Christ, who at first was regarded as a
teacher, friend, and martyr to the truth, assumes quite a different
posture.²⁰⁰ | On the one hand, the death of Christ is still the death 249
of a human being, a friend, who has been killed by violent means;
but when it is comprehended spiritually, this very death becomes
the means of salvation, the focal point of reconciliation. To have
before oneself the intuition of the nature of spirit and of the sat-
isfaction of its needs in a sensible fashion is, therefore, what has
been²⁰¹ disclosed to the friends of Christ only after his death.²⁰²
²⁰³The authentic disclosure was given to them by the Spirit, of whom
Christ had said, "He will guide you into all truth" [John 16:13].
By this he means: only that into which the Spirit will lead you will
be the truth. Regarded in this respect, Christ's death assumes the
character of a death that constitutes the transition to glory, but to
a glorification that is only a restoration of the original glory. Death,

of spirit. Spirit can undo what has been done. The action certainly remains in the
memory, but spirit strips it away. Imputation, therefore, does not attain to this
sphere.

For the true consciousness of spirit, the finitude of humanity has been put to
death in the death of Christ. This death of the natural has in this way a universal
significance: finitude and evil are altogether destroyed. Thus the world has been
reconciled; by this death it has been implicitly delivered from its evil. In the true
understanding [*Verstehen*] of death, the relation of the subject as such [to death]
comes into view in this way. Here any merely historical view comes to an end; the
subject itself is drawn into the process. The subject feels the anguish of evil and of
its own estrangement, which Christ has taken upon himself by putting on humanity,
while at the same time destroying it by his death.

[Ed.] ^aSee Matt. 28:9–10, 17–20; Mark 16:9 ff.; Luke 24:13 ff.; John 20–21.

200. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: Up to this point only the beginning has been
posited, which is now carried forward by the Spirit to an end, a result, the truth.

201. *Thus B, Hu; L reads: was*

202. *W (Var) adds*: Thus the conviction that they were able to derive from his
life was not yet the proper truth; rather first the Spirit [had to be sent].

203. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W*: Prior to his death he was to them an
outwardly sensible individual.

the negative, is the mediating term through which the original majesty is posited as now achieved. The history of the resurrection and ascension of Christ to the right hand of God begins at the point where this history receives a spiritual interpretation.²⁰⁴ That is when it came about that the little community achieved the certainty that God has appeared as a human being.

But this humanity in God—and indeed the most abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependence, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility—is natural death. “God himself is dead,” it says in a Lutheran hymn,²⁰⁵ expressing an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself, that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside of God and do not, as otherness, hinder unity with God. | Otherness, the negative, is known to be a moment of the divine nature itself. This involves the highest idea²⁰⁶ of spirit. In this way what is external and negative is converted into the internal. On the one hand, the meaning attached to death is that through death the human element is stripped away and the divine glory comes into view once more—death is a stripping away of the human, the negative. But at the same time death itself is this negative, the furthest extreme to which humanity as natural existence is exposed; God himself is [involved in] this.²⁰⁷

The truth to which human beings have attained by means of this history, what they have become conscious of in this entire history, is the following: that the idea of God has certainty for them, that humanity has attained the certainty of unity with God, that the human is the immediately present God. Indeed, within this history as spirit comprehends it, there is the very presentation of the process of what humanity, what spirit is—implicitly both God and dead.

204. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* Religious history is [found] where a spiritual interpretation of the history of Christ before his death prevails; for, of course, even the Gospels were written only after the outpouring of the Spirit. *In An's margin:* The overstepping of sensible verification: the church cannot undertake an investigation of it [the history of Christ] in a sensible manner.

205. [Ed.] See above, *Ms.*, n. 163.

206. *Thus L, W₁; W₂ (Var) reads:* cognition of the nature of the idea

207. *Thus L with Hu; W (Var) reads:* and just for that reason, God himself, is exposed.

This [is] the mediation whereby the human is stripped away and, on the other hand, what-subsists-in-itself returns to itself, first coming to be spirit thereby.

It is with the *consciousness* of the community—which thus makes the transition from mere humanity to the God-man, to the intuition, consciousness, and certainty of the union and unity of divine and human nature—that the community begins; this consciousness constitutes the truth upon which the community is founded. This is the explication of reconciliation: that God is reconciled with the world, or rather that God has shown himself to be reconciled with the world, that even the human is not something alien to him, but rather that this otherness, this self-distinguishing, finitude as it is expressed, is a moment in God himself, although, to be sure, it is a disappearing moment.²⁰⁸

For the community, this is the history of the appearance of God. | This history is a divine history, whereby the community has come to the certainty of truth. From it develops the consciousness that knows that God is triune. The reconciliation in Christ, in which one believes, makes no sense if God is not known as the triune God, [if it is not recognized] that God *is*, but also is as the other, as self-distinguishing, so that this other is God himself, having implicitly the divine nature in it, and that the sublation of this difference, this otherness, and the return of love, are the Spirit.²⁰⁹

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These are the moments with which we are here concerned and which establish that humanity has become conscious of the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is. Other forms such as that of sacrificial death reduce automatically to what has been said here. “To sacrifice” means to sublimate the natural, to sublimate otherness. It is said: “Christ has died for all.”²¹⁰ This is not

208. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: But in this moment he has shown himself to the community.

209. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: This consciousness involves the fact that faith is not a relationship to something subordinate but to God himself.

210. [Ed.] See 2 Cor. 5:14–15: “For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised.”

a single act but the eternal divine history: it is a moment in the nature of God himself; it has taken place in God himself.^{211~}

This is the presentation of the second [element of] the idea, the idea in appearance, the eternal idea as it has become [present] for the immediate certainty of humanity, i.e., as it has appeared. In order that it should become a certainty for humanity, it had to be a sensible certainty, which, however, at the same time passes over into spiritual consciousness, and likewise is converted into the immediately sensible—in such a way that the movement and history of God is seen in it, the life that God himself is.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT: COMMUNITY, SPIRIT²¹²

252 The third element is the element of the community. The first [moment of this element] is, then, the immediate origin of the community—this we have | already observed. It is the outpouring of the Holy Spirit [Acts 2]. [It is] spirit that comprehends this history

211. *L* (1827?) adds, first sentence similar in *W*: It is also said that in Christ all have died [cf. 2 Cor. 5:14]. In Christ this reconciliation has been represented [as being] for all, just as the Apostle compares faith in the crucified with viewing the bronze serpent.

[*Ed.*] From the context it must be assumed that Hegel is referring to the Apostle Paul, in which case it is likely that he has conflated two texts: 1 Cor. 10:9 and John 3:14. Paul alludes to the first part of the story concerning the setting up of a bronze serpent on a pole (Num. 21:5–9), but the comparison with faith in Christ is not found in Paul, as claimed by Hegel; see 1 Cor. 10:9: “We must not put the Lord to the test, as some of them did and were destroyed by serpents.” Therefore it is probable that Hegel has in mind not the words of the Apostle but rather those of Jesus in conversation with Nicodemus in John 3:14–15: “And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whoever believes in him may have eternal life.” (According to the story in Numbers, anyone bitten by a serpent would save him- or herself from death, by viewing the bronze serpent set up on a pole.)

212. [*Ed.*] The treatment of the “third element” is relatively brief in the 1827 lectures as compared with 1824 and 1821. The semester ended on Friday, 10 August, in 1827, and Hegel had already nearly completed the lecture on Wednesday, 8 August, before reaching the “third element” (see n. 192). The Wednesday lecture was an addition to the regular schedule, and during the last week of the course Hegel lectured five straight days, Monday through Friday. Fortunately, several of the themes treated in the final section of the lectures in 1824 and 1821 had already

spiritually as it is enacted in [the sphere of] appearance, and recognizes the idea of God in it, his life, his movement. The community is made up of those single, empirical subjects who are in the Spirit of God. But at the same time this content, the history and truth of the community, is distinguished from them and stands over against them. On the one hand, faith in this history, in reconciliation, is an immediate knowledge, an act of faith; on the other hand, the nature of spirit in itself is this process, which has been viewed both in the universal idea and in the idea as [it occurs] in appearance; and this means that the subject itself becomes spirit, and thus a citizen of the kingdom of God, by virtue of the fact that the subject traverses this process in itself. "It has been set forth above"²¹³ that the human subject—the one in whom is revealed what is through the Spirit the certainty of reconciliation for humanity—has been marked out as singular, exclusive, and distinct from others."²¹⁴ Thus for the other subjects the presentation of the divine history is something that is objective for them, and they must now traverse this history, this process, in themselves. In order to do this, however, they must first presuppose that reconciliation is possible, or more precisely, that this reconciliation has happened in and for itself, that it is the truth in and for itself, and that reconciliation is certain.²¹⁵ In and for itself, this is the universal idea of God; but the other side of the presupposition is that this is certain for humanity, and that this truth is not [valid] for it [simply] through speculative thinking. This presupposition implies the certainty that reconciliation has been accomplished, i.e., it must be represented as some-

been discussed in 1827, such as the transition from sensible to spiritual presence, and the question of the verification of faith (whether by miracles or the witness of the Spirit). Thus Hegel could cover "the origin of the community" rather briefly.

213. [Ed.] See above, pp. 313–314.

214. *Thus L (the cross-reference is not found in B, Hu, or An); W₂ (MiscP) reads:* Thus in this divine drama the other that is for [human] subjects is objective to them in the same way that in the [Greek] chorus the audience finds itself objectified. *W (Var) continues:* Initially, of course, the subject, the human subject—the one in whom is revealed what becomes through the Spirit the certainty of reconciliation for humanity—has been defined as singular, exclusive, and distinct from others.

215. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* The perishing of sin and the negation of immediacy are indicated by the bodily, sensible death [of Christ].

253 thing historical, as something that has been accomplished on earth, in [the sphere of] appearance.²¹⁶ | This is the presupposition in which we must first of all believe.

1. The Origin of the Community

~For the origin of faith there is necessary²¹⁷ first a human being, a sensible human appearance, and second, spiritual comprehension, consciousness of the spiritual. The content is spiritual, involving the transformation of immediacy into what has spiritual character. Verification is spiritual, it does not lie in the sensible, and cannot be accomplished in an immediate, sensible fashion.²¹⁸ The transformation of something immediate into a spiritual content is a transition that we have seen in the form of the proofs for the existence of God²¹⁹—namely, that there is also a sensible world, although the truth is not the sensible, not the immediate world of finitude, but is rather the infinite.

²²⁰As to the empirical mode of the appearance, and investigations concerning the conditions surrounding the appearance of Christ after his death, the church is right insofar as it refuses to acknowledge such investigations; for the latter proceed from a point of view implying that the real question concerns the sensible and historical elements in the appearance [of Christ], as though the confirmation of the Spirit²²¹ depended on narratives of this kind about something

216. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: For there is no other mode of what is called certainty.

217. *Thus L*; *W* (Var/1831?) reads: 1. The origin of the community is what occurs as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The origin of faith is

218. *L* (1827?) adds: Accordingly, objections can always be raised against the sensible facts.

219. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:414–441.

220. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*₁: This conversion, which already begins with the resurrection and ascension, is what we call the origin of the community.

[Ed.] This sentence, if authentic, indicates that the resurrection belongs as much to the history of the community as it does to the history of Christ. It constitutes the point of transition from the Son to the Spirit, from the second to the third element. In nonrepresentational language, the resurrection means for Hegel the spiritual presence of Christ in the community, Christ's presence *as spirit*. However, he uses resurrection language with reference to this actuality only infrequently.

221. *Thus L*; *W* (Var) adds: and its truth

represented as [merely] historical [*historisch*], in historical [*geschichtlich*] fashion. It is said that the Holy Scriptures should be treated like the writings of profane authors. One can do this with regard to what concerns the merely historical, the finite and external. But for the rest, | it is a matter of comprehension by the Spirit; 254 the profane [aspect] is not the attestation of the Spirit.

²²²Thus the community itself is the existing Spirit, the Spirit in its existence [*Existenz*], God existing as community.

The first moment is the idea in its simple universality for itself, self-enclosed, having not yet progressed to the primal division, to otherness—the Father. The second is the particular, the idea in appearance—the Son.²²³ It is the idea in its externality, such that the external appearance is converted back to the first [moment] and is known as the divine idea, the identity of the divine and the human. The third element, then, is ~this consciousness—God as the Spirit.²²⁴ This Spirit as existing and realizing itself is the community.

The community begins with the fact that the truth is at hand; it is known, extant truth. And this truth is what God is: he is the triune God; he is life, this process of himself within himself, the determining of himself within himself. The second aspect of this truth, then, is that it has also appeared, it has a relation to the subject, and is [present] for the subject; moreover, the subject is essentially related to it, and is meant to be a citizen of the kingdom of God. That the human subject ought to be a child of God implies that reconciliation is accomplished in and for itself within the divine idea, and secondly that it has appeared too, and hence the truth is certain for humankind. The appearing is precisely this certainty, the idea as it comes to consciousness in the modality of appearance. The third aspect is the relationship of the subject to this truth, the fact that the subject, to the extent that it is related to this truth,

222. *In B's margin*: 9 August 1827

223. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W₁*: Insofar as the first element is concrete, otherness is indeed already contained in it; the idea is eternal life, eternal bringing forth.

224. *Thus B, Hu, W₁*; *An reads*: God as the Spirit within consciousness. *L (Var) reads*: this consciousness of God as the Spirit.

arrives precisely at this conscious unity, deems itself worthy of this known unity, brings this unity forth within itself, and is fulfilled by the divine Spirit.

255 The fact that the single subject is now filled by the divine Spirit is brought about by mediation in the subject itself, and the mediating factor is | that the subject has this faith. For faith is the truth, the presupposition, that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty in and for itself. Only by means of this faith that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty and in and for itself is the subject able and indeed in a position to posit itself in this unity. This mediation is absolutely necessary.

In this blessedness mediated through the laying hold of the truth, the difficulty that is immediately involved in the grasping of the truth is overcome. This difficulty is that the relationship of the community to this idea is a relationship of the single, particular subject; it is removed in the truth itself. It consists in the fact that the subject is different from absolute spirit.²²⁵ This difference is removed, and its removal happens because God looks into the human heart, he regards the substantial will, the innermost, all-encompassing subjectivity of the human being, one's inner, true, and earnest willing. But apart from this inner will, and distinct from this inner, substantial actuality, there is still the external and deficient side of humanity: we commit errors; we can exist in a way that is not appropriate to this inward, substantial essentiality, this substantial, essential inwardness. The difficulty is removed by the fact that God looks into the heart and sees what is substantial, so that externality—otherness, finitude, and imperfection in general, or however else it may be defined—does no damage to the absolute unity; finitude is²²⁶ reduced to an inessential status, and is known as inessential. For in the idea, the otherness of the Son is a transitory, disappearing moment, not a true, essentially enduring, absolute moment.

This is the concept of the community in general, the idea which, to this extent, is the process of the subject within and upon itself,

225. Thus L , W_1 ; W_2 (Var) adds: it is what appears as its finitude.

226. Thus L , similar in An ; W (Var) reads: But externality—otherness in general, finitude, imperfection, or however else it may be defined—is

the process of the subject that is taken up into the Spirit, is spiritual, so that the Spirit of God dwells within it. This process, which is its pure self-consciousness, is at the same time the consciousness of | truth, and the pure self-consciousness that knows and wills the truth is precisely the divine Spirit within it. 256

2. The Subsistence of the Community

The community, whose concept we have just seen, also *realizes* itself. The real community is what we generally call the *church*. This is no longer the *emerging* [*entstehende*] but rather the *subsisting* [*bestehende*] community, which maintains itself. In the subsisting community the church is, by and large, the institution whereby [its] subjects come to the truth, appropriate the truth to themselves, so that the Holy Spirit becomes real, actual, and present within them and has its abode in them, whereby the truth can be within them and they can enjoy and give active expression to the ~truth of~²²⁷ the Spirit; it is the means whereby they as subjects *are* the active expression of the Spirit.

The first thing that is present in the church is its universality, which consists in the fact that the truth is here presupposed, that it exists as truth already present—not, as in the case of the emerging church, that the Holy Spirit is poured out and engendered for the first time. This is a changed relationship to the beginning [of their religion] for [its] subjects, and for the subjects in their beginnings. The presupposed, extant truth is the *doctrine* of the church, its doctrine of faith. We know the content of this doctrine: it is²²⁸ the doctrine of reconciliation. It is no longer the case that a person is elevated to [the sphere of] absolute meaning by the outpouring and ordaining of the Spirit, but rather that this meaning is something that is known and acknowledged. It is the absolute capability of the subject, both within itself and objectively, to share in the truth, to come to the truth, to abide in the truth, to attain to the consciousness of truth. This consciousness of doctrine is here present and presupposed.

227. Thus L; W (Var) reads: truth, of

228. Thus L; W (Var) adds: in one word

257 Thus it is that doctrine is elaborated within the community itself only as something presupposed and finished. The Spirit that was shed abroad is the beginning, that which makes the beginning, which raises up. The community is the consciousness of this Spirit, the expression of what | spirit has discovered and what it has been touched by, namely, that Christ is for spirit. Hence doctrine has been essentially brought forth and developed in the church. First it is [present] as intuition, faith, feeling—as the felt witness of the Spirit like a flame of fire. “But it is supposed to be present and presupposed; thus it must be developed from the concentration and interiority of feeling into representation as something immediately present.”²²⁹ Accordingly, the doctrine of faith is essentially constituted in the church first of all, and then later it is thinking, developed consciousness, which also asserts its rights in the matter, adducing the other [forms of truth] to which it has attained by way of the cultivation of thought, by way of philosophy. For these thoughts, on behalf of these thoughts, and on behalf of this otherwise known truth, thinking first develops a consciousness that is only intermixed with other, impure thoughts. Thus doctrine is developed out of other concrete contents that are intermixed with impurities. This doctrine is present to hand and must then be preserved too. This happens in the church. There, that which is doctrine must also be taught. It *is*, it exists, it is valid, it is acknowledged and immediately presupposed. But it is not present in a sensible manner, such that the comprehension of the doctrine can take place through the senses—in the way that the world, for example, is of course presupposed as a sensible entity, to which we are related externally and sensibly. Instead, spiritual truth exists only as known, and the fact that it also appears, and the mode of its appearance, is precisely this, that it is taught. The church is essentially a teaching church, by virtue of which there is a teaching office whose function is to expound doctrine.

Human beings are already born into this doctrine; they have their beginnings in this context of valid truth, already present, and

229. Thus *L* with *B* and *Hu*, similar in W_1 ; W_2 (*MiscP*) reads: But this characteristic of bringing forth is itself merely a one-sided one because the truth is at the same time implicitly present and presupposed; the subject is already taken up into the content.

in the consciousness of it. The relationship of single members to this presupposed truth that subsists in and for itself has yet a second aspect. Since individuals are born into the church, they are destined ~straightaway, while they are still unconscious,²³⁰ to participate in this truth, | to become partakers of it; their vocation is for the truth. The church expresses this too, in the sacrament of *baptism*, which says that the human being, the individual, is in the fellowship of the church, where evil has been overcome, implicitly and explicitly, and God is reconciled, implicitly and explicitly.²³¹ Initially, doctrine is related to this individual as something external. The child is at first spirit only implicitly, it is not yet realized spirit, is not yet actual as spirit; it has only the capability, the potentiality, to be spirit, to become actual as spirit. Thus the truth is something external to it, and comes to the subject initially as something presupposed, acknowledged, and valid. This means that the truth necessarily comes to humanity at first as *authority*.

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All truth, even sensible truth—although it is not truth in the proper sense—comes to people initially in the form of authority; i.e., it is something present that possesses validity and exists on its own account. That is how it comes to me—as something distinct from me. Similarly, the world comes to us in sense perception as an authority confronting us: it *is*, we find it so, we accept it as something that is really there and relate ourselves to it as such. That is how it is, and it is valid just the way it is. Doctrine, which is spiritual, is not present as a sensible authority of that kind; it must be *taught*, and it is taught as valid truth. Custom is something that is valid, an established conviction. But because it is something spiritual, we do not say, “It is,” but rather, “It is right.” However, because it confronts us as what is real, we also say, “It is.” And because it presents itself to us as something valid, we call its way of being “authority.”

Just as people have to learn sensible content from authority, and to be content with the way things are just because they are so—

230. Thus *L*; *W* (*Var*) reads: although still unconsciously, nonetheless

231. Thus *L*; precedes in *W*₁ (1831), similar in *W*₂: Even though the individual is not spared the real, infinite anguish of being unfit in its relationship to God, it is nonetheless eased; but this is no longer the real struggle from which the community arose.

259 the sun is there, and because it is there I must put up with it—so also they have to learn doctrine, the truth.²³² What is learned in this way must | be taken up by individuals into themselves in order to assimilate it, to appropriate it. As we have already said,²³³ the inner spirit is the absolute possibility of this knowledge; it conforms to this content that is itself spirit. What is there in human inwardness, i.e., in one's rational spirit, is therefore brought to consciousness for the individual as something objective; or what is found within the individual is developed so that one knows it as the truth in which one abides. This is the concern of education, practice, cultivation. With such education and appropriation it is a question merely of becoming habituated to the good and ~the true [*Wahrhafte*].²³⁴ To this extent it is not a matter of overcoming evil because evil has been overcome in and for itself.²³⁵ The child, inasmuch as it is born into the church, has been born in freedom and to freedom. For one who has been so born, there is no longer an absolute otherness; this otherness is posited as something overcome, as already conquered. The sole concern of such cultivation is to prevent evil from emerging, and the possibility of this does in general reside in humanity. But insofar as evil does emerge among human beings when they do evil, at the same time it is present as something implicitly null, over which spirit has power: spirit has the power to undo evil.

Repentance or *penitence* signifies that, through the elevation of human beings to the truth, which they now will, their transgression

232. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: The latter, however, arises not through sensible perception, through the activity of the senses on us, but rather through doctrine as what is really there, or through authority.

233. [Ed.] See above, p. 332.

234. B reads: truths [*Wahrhaften*]. L reads: the rational [*Vernünftige*]. W (Var) reads: the true [*Wahre*].

235. Thus L; W (1831) adds: It is a question only of contingent subjectivity. Linked with that element of faith consisting in the determination that the subject is not as it ought to be, there is simultaneously the absolute possibility that the subject can fulfill its destiny, can be received into the grace of God. This is the concern of faith. The individual must lay hold of the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature; this truth is laid hold of through faith in Christ. Thus God is no longer a beyond for the individual; and the laying hold of this truth is opposed to the basic determination referred to above, namely, that the subject is not as it ought to be.

is wiped out. Because they acknowledge the truth over against their evil and will the good—through repentance, that is to say—their evil comes to naught. Thus evil is known as something that has been overcome in and for itself, having no power of its own. The undoing of what has been done cannot take place in a sensible manner; but in a spiritual | manner or inwardly, what has been done can be undone.²³⁶ Therefore it is the concern of the church that this habituating and educating of spirit should become ever more inward, that this truth should become ever more identical with the self, with the human will, and that this truth should become one's volition, one's object, one's spirit. The battle is now over, and the consciousness arises that there is no longer a struggle, as in the Parsee religion or the Kantian philosophy,²³⁷ where evil is always sure to be overcome, yet it stands in and for itself over against the supreme good, so that in these views there is nothing but²³⁸ an unending progression.²³⁹

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The subsistence of the community is completed by sharing in the appropriation of God's presence [i.e., the *communion*]. It is a question precisely of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, the *unio mystica*, [one's] self-feeling of God, the feeling of God's immediate presence within the subject. This self-feeling, however, since it exists, is also a movement, it presupposes a movement,

236. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: The sinner is forgiven; he is reckoned as one accepted by the Father among human beings.

237. [Ed.] On Hegel's criticism of the Kantian idea of an unending improvement in ethical conditions, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 194; and on the comparison of Iranian (Parsee) and Kantian dualism, see Vol. 2 of this edition. On the concept of an unending progression, see Hegel's *Science of Logic*, pp. 227–228 (cf. GW 11:140–142).

238. Thus L; W (Var) reads: the good, and the highest thing is

239. L (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: Here, by contrast, evil is known in the Spirit to be overcome in and for itself, and because it is overcome in and for itself, the subject has only to make its own will good in order for evil, the evil deed, to disappear. After an insertion from the 1824 lectures, W (1831) continues: Acting in the belief that reconciliation has been implicitly achieved is, on the one hand, the act of the subject, but on the other hand it is the act of the divine Spirit. Faith itself is the divine Spirit that works in the subject. But the subject is not a passive receptacle; rather the Holy Spirit is equally [*ebenso*] the subject's spirit to the extent that the subject has faith. In such faith the latter acts in opposition to its natural life, sets it aside, puts it away.

261 a sublation of difference, so that a negative unity issues forth.²⁴⁰ This unity begins with the host.²⁴¹ ²⁴²Concerning the latter, three kinds of view are now prevalent. According to the first, the host—this external, sensible thing | —becomes by consecration the present God, God as a thing in the manner of an empirical ~thing.²⁴³ The second view is the Lutheran one, according to which the movement does indeed begin with something external, which is an ordinary, common thing, but the communion, the self-feeling of the presence of God, comes about only insofar as the external thing is consumed—not merely physically but in spirit and in faith. God is present only in spirit and in faith.²⁴⁴ Here there is no transubstan-

240. W (1831) adds: Thus the Lord's Supper is also the midpoint of Christian doctrine, and from this point all the differences within the Christian church receive their coloration and definition.

241. Thus L; among the extant sources only the following is found in Hu (probably added later): Communion [*Genuss*] is the consciousness of God's immediate presence in the subject's heart: *unio mystica*. W (Var) reads: The ultimate in this sphere is sharing in this appropriation, in this presence of God [*der Genuss dieser Aneignung, der Gegenwärtigkeit Gottes*]. It is precisely a matter of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, the *unio mystica*, [one's] self-feeling of God.

242. In B's margin: 10 August 1827

[Ed.] Since B lacks the preceding passage, it is obvious that Hegel's final lecture began with the topic of this paragraph, the sacrament of communion, for which he uses the difficult-to-translate term *Genuss*.

243. Thus Hu; L reads: existence. W (1831) reads: thing [possibly from 1824 (G): —likewise partaken of empirically by human beings]. Since God is thus known as something external in the Lord's Supper—this midpoint of doctrine—this externality is the foundation of the whole Catholic religion.^a Thus arises the servitude of knowledge and activity [in this religion]; this externality pervades all further characteristics [of it] since the true is represented as something fixed and external. As something existing outside the subject, it can pass into the control of others; the church is in possession of it as well as of all the means of grace. In every respect the subject is a passive, receptive subject that knows not what is true, right, and good, but has only to accept the standard from others.

[Ed.] ^aSee Hegel's defense against the reproach of his having defamed the Catholic religion in *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 572–575.

244. Thus L; W (1831) adds: Sensible presence is nothing on its own account, nor does consecration make the host into an object of veneration; rather the object exists in faith alone, and thus it is in the consuming and destroying of the sensible that we have union with God and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here the grand awareness has arisen that, apart from communion and faith, the host is a common, sensible thing: the process is genuine only within the subject's spirit.

tiation, or at any rate only one by which externality is annulled, so that the presence of God is utterly a spiritual presence—the consecration takes place in the faith of the subject. The third view is that the present God exists only in representation, in memory, and to this extent he does not have this immediate subjective presence.²⁴⁵

“The subject is expected to *appropriate* doctrine, the truth, and hence | the third aspect of the community’s self-maintenance is the partaking of the presence of God.”²⁴⁶ 262

3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community

The third [aspect] is the *realization* of the spirituality of the community in universal actuality. This involves the *transformation* of the community at the same time. The standpoint is this: in religion the *heart* is reconciled. This reconciliation is thus in the heart; it is spiritual. It is the pure heart that attains to this partaking [*Genuss*] of God’s presence within it, and consequently reconciliation, the enjoyment [*Genuss*] of being reconciled. At the same time, however, this reconciliation is abstract and has the world as such over against it. The self that exists in this reconciliation, in this religious communion, is the pure heart, the heart as such, universal spirituality; but at the same time the self or subject constitutes that aspect of spiritual presence in accord with which there is a developed worldliness present in it, and thus the kingdom of God, the community, has a relationship to the worldly. In order that reconciliation may be real, it is required that it should be known in this development, in this totality; it should be present and brought forth [into actuality]. The principles for this worldly realm are ready to hand in the spirituality of the community; the principle, the truth, of the worldly *is* the spiritual.

The spiritual is the truth of the worldly realm in the more prox-

245. Thus L; W (1831) adds (adopting a statement from the 1824 lectures and the Ms.): [it is] a merely moral relationship.

[Ed.] The reference here, of course, is to the Reformed view (see the Ms., p. 155), but it applies properly only to Zwingli, not to Calvin. See below, 1831 Excerpts, n. 29.

246. Thus L; Hu reads: These are the three modes of the community.

[Ed.] The three are doctrine, repentance, and communion.

imate sense that the subject, as an object of divine grace and as one who is reconciled with God, already has infinite value in virtue of its vocation; and this is made effective in the community. On the basis of this vocation, the subject is known as spirit's certainty of itself, as the eternity of spirit. The vocation to infinitude of the subject that is inwardly infinite is its *freedom*. The substantial aspect of the subject is that it is a free person, and as a free person it relates itself to the worldly and the actual as a being that is at home with itself, reconciled within itself, an utterly secure and infinite subjectivity. This vocation of the subject ought to be foundational in its relation with what is worldly. This freedom of the subject is its rationality—the fact that as subject it is thus liberated and has attained this liberation through religion, that in accord with its religious vocation it | is essentially free. This freedom, which has the impulse and determinacy to realize itself, is rationality. "Slavery contradicts Christianity because it is contrary to reason."²⁴⁷ What is required, therefore, is that this reconciliation should also be accomplished in the worldly realm.

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The first form of this reconciliation with worldliness is the immediate one, and just for this reason it is not the genuine mode of reconciliation. It appears as follows: at first the community contains the element of spirituality, of being reconciled with God, within itself, in abstraction from the world, so that spirituality renounces the worldly realm, placing itself in a negative relation to the world and also to itself. For the world is in the subject; it is there as the impulse toward nature, toward social life, toward art and science. What is concrete in the self, its passions etc., certainly cannot be justified vis-à-vis the religious aspect just because they are natural impulses; but on the other hand, monkish withdrawal means that the heart is not concretely developed, that it exists as something undeveloped, or that spirituality, the state of being reconciled, and the life of reconciliation are and ought to remain concentrated within themselves and undeveloped. But the very nature of spirit is to develop itself, to differentiate itself even unto worldliness.

The second way of defining this reconciliation is that worldliness and religiosity do indeed remain external to each other, but they

247. *Thus An*

have to enter into relation all the same. Hence the relation in which they stand can itself only be an external one, or more precisely, a relation in which one prevails over the other, and thus there is no reconciliation at all. The religious, it is felt, should be the dominant element; what is reconciled, the *church*, ought to prevail over what is unreconciled, the worldly realm. Accordingly, this is a uniting with a worldly realm that remains unreconciled. In itself, the worldly sphere is uncultured, and as such it ought only to be dominated. But the dominating power takes this same worldliness up into itself, including all of its passions; as a result of its dominion, there emerges in the church itself a worldliness devoid of spirit²⁴⁸ | just because the worldly realm is not in itself reconciled. A dominion predicated on the lack of spirit is posited, in terms of which externality is the principle and humanity in its relatedness exists at the same time outside itself—this is the relationship of *unfreedom* in general. In everything that can be called human, in all impulses, in all attitudes that have reference to the family and to activity in public life, a cleavage enters into play. The ruling principle is that humanity is not at home with itself. In all these forms, it exists in a general condition of servitude, and all these forms count for nothing, they are unholy. Inasmuch as human being subsists in them, it is essentially a finite and ruptured being which has in that form no validity; what is valid is something else. This reconciliation with the worldly realm, and with the human heart, comes about in such a way that it is precisely the opposite of [genuine] reconciliation. The further development of this condition of rupture within reconciliation itself is what appears as the corruption of the church, the absolute contradiction of the spiritual within itself.

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The third way is that this contradiction is resolved in the *ethical realm*,²⁴⁹ or that the principle of freedom has penetrated into the

248. *Thus An:* including . . . passions; and *L:* as . . . spirit W_1 is similar to L ; W_2 (*Var*) reads: all inclinations, all passions, whatever is worldliness devoid of spirit emerges in the church as a result of this very dominion

249. [*Ed.*] This theme is explicitly developed by Hegel under the category of “objective spirit” in the *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 483 ff., and in the whole of the *Philosophy of Right*. The terms used here are *Sittlichkeit* (ethical realm, ethical life, social ethics) and *Sittliche* (ethics, the ethical), not *Moralität*, which refers to the subjective morality of conscience.

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worldly realm itself, and that the worldly, because it has been thus conformed to the concept, reason, and eternal truth, is freedom that has become concrete and will that is rational.²⁵⁰ The institutions of ethical life are divine institutions—not holy in the sense²⁵¹ that celibacy is supposed to be holy by contrast with marriage or familial love, or that voluntary poverty is supposed to be holy by contrast with active self-enrichment, or what is lawful and proper. Similarly, blind obedience is regarded as holy, whereas the ethical is an obedience in freedom, a free and | rational will, an obedience of the subject toward the ethical. Thus it is in the ethical realm that the reconciliation of religion with worldliness and actuality comes about and is accomplished.

Thus reconciliation has three *real* stages: the stage of immediacy [or of the heart], which is more an abstraction than it is reconciliation; the stage in which the church is dominant, a church that is outside itself; and the stage of ethical life.

The second [moment] is that the *ideal* side emerges explicitly in religious consciousness. Inwardness knows itself as subsisting with itself²⁵² precisely in this reconciliation of spirit with itself; and this knowledge of being at home with itself is precisely thinking. Thinking means reconciledness, being at home or at peace with oneself, even though the peace is a wholly abstract, undeveloped one.²⁵³

250. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* It is in the organization of the state that the divine has broken through [*eingeschlagen*] into the sphere of actuality; the latter is permeated by the former, and the worldly realm is now justified in and for itself, for its foundation is the divine will, the law of right and freedom. The true reconciliation, whereby the divine realizes itself in the domain of actuality, consists in the ethical and juridical life of the state: this is the authentic discipline [*Subaktion*] of worldliness.

[*Ed.*] See *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1952), §§ 257–258, 260, 270 remark.

251. *Thus L, W₁; W₂ (Var) adds:* according to which the holy is opposed to the ethical

252. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and being at home with itself

[*Ed.*] The distinction is between *bei sich selbst seiend* in the main text and *bei sich selbst zu sein* in the footnote. The latter phrase occurs subsequently in the main text.

253. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* Thus arises the infinite demand that the content of religion should be confirmed by thought, and this requirement should not be turned aside.

Thinking is the universal, the activity of the universal, and it stands generally in contrast with the concrete, as it does with the external. It is the freedom of reason that has been acquired in religion and now knows itself to be for itself in spirit. This freedom now turns against merely spiritless externality and servitude, for the latter is utterly opposed to the concepts of reconciliation and liberation. Thus thinking enters in, defying and destroying externality in whatever form it appears. This is the negative and formal mode of acting which, in its concrete shape, has been called the *Enlightenment*.²⁵⁴

This thinking first emerges as abstract universality as such, and is directed not merely against the external but also against the concrete in general. For this reason, it is also directed against the idea of God, against the idea that God as triune is not a dead abstraction but rather relates himself to himself, is at home with himself, and returns to himself. In concreteness there are of course determinations and distinctions. Since abstract thinking turns against externality in general, it also is opposed to distinction as such because in distinction a reciprocally opposed externality is indeed present—but in the idea of God, in the *concrete* truth, this externality is likewise resolved.²⁵⁵ Abstract identity prevails as the rule for this abstract thinking, for understanding. *Genuine identity* is the truth of the concrete. When everything concrete in God has been thus eradicated, this is expressed by saying: “We cannot know God”—i.e., know something specific about God.²⁵⁶ For to know God cognitively means to know him according to his attributes; but [on this view] he is to remain a pure abstraction. The principle of freedom, inwardness, and religion itself is grasped by this formal perspective, but at first only abstractly.

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But then the other way in which determination enters into universality, according to this abstraction, is the characteristics that reside in the natural impulses and inclinations of the subject. From

254. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: It consists in this: that thinking has turned against externality, and that the freedom of spirit that resides in reconciliation is maintained.

255. *L* (1827?) *adds, similar in W*: This thinking therefore proceeds to annul everything that is concrete and determinate in God.

256. [*Ed.*] See above, *Ms.*, n. 253.

this standpoint it is said that human being by nature is good.²⁵⁷ This pure subjectivity indeed clings to the category of the good, since the latter coincides with this identity and pure freedom; but the good itself must by the same token remain for it an abstraction. Here the category of the good is nothing other than the caprice and contingency of the subject as such. This is the extreme of this form of subjectivity and freedom, which renounces the truth and its development and moves within itself, knowing that what it regards as valid is only its own definitions, and that it is the master of what is good and evil. This is an inward weaving of spirit within itself, which can just as readily assume the form of hypocrisy and extreme vanity as it can peaceful, noble, pious aspirations. This is what is called the pious life of feeling, to which *Pietism* also restricts itself. Pietism acknowledges no objective | truth and opposes itself to dogmas and the content of religion, while still preserving an element of mediation, a connection with Christ, but this is a connection that is supposed to remain one of mere feeling and inner sensibility.²⁵⁸ Such piety, together with the vanity of subjectivity and feeling, is then turned polemically against the philosophy that wants cognition. The result of this subjectivity is that everything fades away in the subject, without objectivity, without firm determinacy, without any development on the part of God, who in the end no longer has any content at all.

~The mode [of thought] first designated [i.e., the Enlightenment] is the ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time.²⁵⁹ But the two extremes opposing each other in the further development of the community are, first, this unfreedom and servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom, and second, abstract subjectivity or ~subjectivity²⁶⁰ devoid of content.²⁶¹

257. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 106.

258. Thus L; W (1831) adds: For such piety, everyone has his own God, his own Christ, etc. This privatism [*Partikularität*], in which everyone has his own individual religion, worldview, etc., is certainly present among humanity. But in [true] religion, by means of life in the community, this privatism is consumed, it no longer has validity for truly pious people, it is set to one side.

259. Thus L; W (Var) reads: This ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time is simultaneously the greatest crudity since it possesses only the *form* of culture.

260. Thus L; W (Var) reads: subjective freedom

261. This paragraph is found only in L; among the extant sources, only the

The third [moment], then, consists in the fact that subjectivity develops the content from itself, to be sure, but in accord with necessity. It knows and acknowledges that a content is necessary, and that this necessary content is objective, having being in and for itself. This is the standpoint of *philosophy*, according to which the content takes refuge in the concept²⁶² and obtains its justification by thinking. This thinking is not merely the process of abstraction and definition according to the law of identity; it does not have the concrete “over there,” but rather is itself essentially concrete, and thus it is comprehension, meaning that the concept determines itself in its totality and as idea. It is free reason, which has being on its own account, that develops the content in accord with its necessity, and justifies the content of truth. This is the standpoint of a knowledge that recognizes and cognizes a truth. “The Enlightenment of the understanding and Pietism volatilize all content. The purely subjective | standpoint”²⁶³ recognizes no content and hence no truth. The concept indeed produces the truth—this is subjective freedom—but it recognizes this truth as at the same time not produced, as the truth that subsists in and for itself. This objective standpoint is alone capable of bearing witness to, and thus of expressing the witness of, *spirit in a developed, thoughtful fashion*.²⁶⁴ Therefore, it is the justification of religion, especially of the Christian religion, the true religion; it knows the *content* [of religion] in accord with its necessity and reason. Likewise it knows the *forms* in the devel-

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following is found in Hu: These are the two extremes in the life of the community.

[Ed.] The two extremes are, in other words, the religion of the Enlightenment (the “servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom”) and of Pietism (“subjectivity devoid of content”). Between these two extremes, speculative philosophy will find the mean.

262. [Ed.] *in den Begriff flüchtet*. This famous metaphor inspired the title of a recent collection of essays on Hegel’s philosophy of religion, *Die Flucht in den Begriff* (“The Flight into the Concept”), ed. F. W. Graf and F. Wagner (Stuttgart, 1982); to which W. Jaeschke has offered the appropriate rejoinder, “Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)” (“The Flight from the Concept . . .”), in *Hegel-Studien* 18 (1983), 295–354.

263. *Thus An with L; W reads, similar in L:* The purely subjective standpoint, the volatilization of all content, the Enlightenment of the understanding, *W₂ (Var) adds:* as well as Pietism,

264. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and it is contained in the better dogmatic theology of our time.

opment of this content. The two belong together: form and content. We have seen these forms: the modes of the appearance of God, the ways in which it is represented for the sensible consciousness and for the spiritual consciousness that has arrived at universality and thought, this whole development of spirit we have seen. The content is justified by the witness of spirit, insofar as it is thinking spirit. The witness of spirit is thought. Thought knows the form and determinacy of the appearance, and hence also the limits of the form. The Enlightenment knows only of negation, of limit, of determinacy as such, and therefore does an absolute injustice to the content. Form and determinacy entail not only finitude and limit; rather, as totality of form, determinacy is itself the concept, and these various forms are themselves necessary and essential. In the appearance of God, God determines himself. Sustained by philosophy, religion receives its justification from thinking consciousness.

Ingenuous piety has no need of [justification]; the heart gives the witness of spirit and receives the truth that comes to it through authority; it has a sense of satisfaction and reconciliation through this truth.²⁶⁵ But insofar as thinking begins | to posit an antithesis to the concrete and places itself in opposition to the concrete, the

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265. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* In faith the true *content* is certainly already found, but it still lacks the *form* of thinking. All the forms that we have considered earlier^a—feeling, representation, etc.—are indeed capable of having the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form, which makes the true content necessary. Thinking is the absolute judge, before which the content must verify and attest its claims.

Philosophy has been reproached for placing itself above religion. But as a matter of fact this is surely false because philosophy has only this and no other content, although it gives it in the form of thinking; it places itself only above the *form* of faith, while the *content* is the same in both cases.

The form of the subject as one who feels, etc., concerns the subject as a single individual; but feeling as such is not eliminated by philosophy. The question is only whether the *content* of feeling is the truth and can prove itself to be true in thought. Philosophy *thinks* what the subject as such *feels*, and leaves it to the latter to come to terms with its feeling. Thus feeling is not rejected by philosophy but rather receives its true content through philosophy.

[*Ed.*] ^aSee Vol. 1:390–403. Not much material on this topic has been preserved from the 1831 lectures; see the excerpts by D. F. Strauss in Vol. 1:465–469.

process of thinking consists in carrying through this opposition until it arrives at reconciliation.

This reconciliation is philosophy. Philosophy is to this extent theology. It presents the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature, showing that nature, otherness, is implicitly divine, and that the raising of itself to reconciliation is on the one hand what finite spirit implicitly is, while on the other hand it arrives at this reconciliation, or brings it forth, in world history. This reconciliation is the peace of God, which does not “surpass all reason,”²⁶⁶ but is rather the peace that *through* reason is first known and thought and is recognized as what is true.²⁶⁷

Two positions are opposed to philosophy. First there is the vanity of the understanding, which is displeased by the fact that philosophy still exhibits the truth in religion and demonstrates that reason resides within it. This Enlightenment wants to have nothing further to do with the content, and therefore is highly displeased that philosophy, as conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the fancies, the caprice, and the contingency of thinking. In the second place, ingenuous religiosity [is opposed to philosophy]. The different positions are as follows: | (a) immediate religion; (b) the Enlightenment of the understanding; and (c) the rational cognition of religion. ~It is this last that I have sought to exhibit in these lectures.^{268 269}

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266. [Ed.] An allusion to the German translation of Phil. 4:7, which uses *Vernunft* (“reason”) rather than *Verstand* (“understanding”): “And the peace of God, which surpasses all reason, will keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.”

267. L (1827?) adds: This reconciliation by means of the concept is also the goal of these lectures.

268. Thus Hu, similar in B; L (1827?) reads: It is my hope that these lectures have afforded a guide and contributed to this rational cognition of religion as well as to the general advancement of [genuine?] religious piety [*Religiosität*].

269. Follows below in B, similar in Hu: Concluded 10 August 1827.

APPENDIXES

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

ACCORDING TO

THE LECTURES

OF 1831¹

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The first thing to be considered in the sphere of the revelatory religion is the *abstract concept* of God; the basis is the free, pure, revelatory concept. God's *determinate being* [*Dasein*] consists in his manifestation, his being for an other, and the soil in which he has determinate being is finite spirit. This is the second thing to be considered; finite spirit and finite consciousness are concrete. The main point in regard to this religion is to cognize this process, that God manifests himself in finite spirit and is identical with himself in it. The identity of the concept with determinate being is the third thing to be considered. (Properly speaking, identity is here a misleading expression, for what is essentially involved is organic life within God.)

In the previous forms we have had an ascending, a starting from a determinate being characterized in various ways. In the one case,

1. [Ed.] In the 1831 lectures, Hegel once again treated the proofs for the existence of God in relation to the various religions, as he had done in the Ms. and the 1824 lectures. In an appendix at the end of volume 12, following the text of Hegel's *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God* (1829), the *Werke* printed materials on the proofs extracted from the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. It gave the text treating all the proofs from *The Concept of Religion* in the 1827 lectures, preceded by the text on the teleological proof from *Determinate Religion* in the 1831 lectures, and followed by the text on the ontological proof from *The Consummate Religion* also in the 1831 lectures. In our edition, the first of these groups of texts is contained in Volume 1 (using Lasson's text of the 1827 lectures, however, rather than the *Werke*'s); the second is contained in Volume 2; and the third in the present volume. Our text follows W₂ 12:546–553; it may be compared with Strauss's excerpted version of the same section (Sec. I. The Abstract Concept of God), printed below.

being was characterized in the most comprehensive way, as contingent being, in the cosmological proof: the truth of contingent being is being that is in and for itself necessary. Determinate being was also characterized as containing within itself purposive relations, and this yielded the teleological proof: here there is an ascending, a starting from a presently given, determinate being. So these proofs fall under the finite aspect of the definition of God. But the concept of God is what is boundless, not boundless in the bad sense but rather as what is at the same time most determinate, pure self-determination. Those first proofs fall on the side of a finite coherence, or of finite determination, inasmuch as the starting point is something given. Here, on the contrary, the starting point is the free, pure concept, so it is at this stage that the ontological proof of God's existence comes in. This proof constitutes the abstract, metaphysical foundation of this stage, and was first discovered, in Christendom, by Anselm of Canterbury.² It is then adduced | in all later philosophers—Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff—but always alongside the other proofs, though it is the only genuine one.

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The ontological proof has the concept as its starting point.³ The concept is regarded as something subjective and characterized as opposed to the object and to reality. Here the concept is the beginning, and what matters is to show that being also pertains to this concept. In more detail the argument runs as follows: The concept of God is set up, and it is shown that it cannot be grasped except as including being within itself; to the extent that being is distinguished from the concept, the concept exists only subjectively, in our thinking. As thus subjective, it is what is imperfect, what falls only within finite spirit. That it is not just *our* concept but also *is*, irrespective of our thinking, has to be demonstrated.

Anselm states the proof in the following simple form:⁴ God is what is most perfect, beyond which nothing can be thought; if God is mere representation, he is not what is perfect; but this is to contradict the first premise, for we deem as perfect that which is

2. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 30.

3. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 36.

4. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 30.

not just representation but which possesses being as well. If God is only subjective, we can adduce something higher, possessed of being as well. This has then been further elaborated, as follows: We begin with what is most perfect, defined as the quintessential reality, the essential sum of all reality.⁵ This has been called possibility, the concept as subjective, inasmuch as it is distinguished from being as the *merely* possible concept—or it should, at least, *be* possible. According to traditional logic, possibility is found only where no contradiction can be exhibited.⁶ On this view realities are to be apprehended in God only in their most affirmative aspect, without any restrictions, or in such a way that negation is to be left aside.⁷ It can easily be demonstrated that all that is then left is the abstraction of what is one with itself. For when we speak of realities, we mean different characteristics, such as wisdom, justice, omnipotence, omniscience; and these are properties that can easily be exhibited as standing in contradiction to one another. Goodness is not justice, absolute power runs counter to wisdom, for wisdom presupposes purposes while power is totally unrestricted in its negating and producing activity. So if (according to the | stipulation) the concept is not to be self-contradictory, all determinacy must fall away, for every difference is driven into an opposition. God, so we say, is the essential sum of all reality; being is also one form of reality, so being is inseparably bound up with the concept.

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This proof has survived down to recent times; we find it expounded in a particularly circumstantial fashion in Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden*.⁸ Spinoza defines the concept of God as that which cannot be conceived without being.⁹ The finite is that whose existence does not correspond to its concept. The genus is realized in existent individuals, but they are ephemeral; the genus is the uni-

5. [Ed.] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 43.

6. [Ed.] Hegel apparently is referring to the Leibnizian-Wolffian school philosophy. See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1736), § 85.

7. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 47, as well as Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Part II, § 16.

8. [Ed.] See Moses Mendelssohn, *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes*, Part I (Berlin, 1786), esp. pp. 284–305, 306–328.

9. [Ed.] See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. xi (*Chief Works* 2:51).

versal on its own account, so its determinate being does not correspond to the concept. In the inwardly determined infinite, on the other hand, the reality *must* correspond to the concept—for this is the idea, the unity of subject and object.

This proof was criticized by Kant;¹⁰ his objection is as follows. If God is defined as the essential sum of all realities, this does not include being, for being is not a reality; it makes no difference to the concept whether it is or is not—it remains the same. Even in Anselm's day the same point was made by a monk;¹¹ as he put it, what I represent to myself does not yet exist simply on that account. Kant maintains¹² that a hundred thalers remain of themselves the same thing whether I merely imagine them or have them; this means that being is not a reality, for it does not add anything to the concept. We may concede that being is not a predicate, but we are not supposed to be adding anything to the concept. Rather we are removing from it the shortcoming that it is only something subjective, not the idea. (In any case it is already very misleading to call each and every existent entity, however bad, a concept.) The concept that is only something subjective, separate from being, is a nullity. In the form of the proof as Anselm gives it, infinitude consists precisely in not being something one-sided or merely subjective, to which being would not belong. The understanding holds being and concept rigidly apart, each as self-identical. But even according to the ordinary view, the concept devoid of being is something one-sided and untrue, just as being in which there is no concept is too—the being that is devoid of concept. This antithesis that is found in finitude can in no wise occur in what is infinite, God.

10. [Ed.] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 620–630.

11. [Ed.] An allusion to Gaunilo (see above, Ms., n. 32). However, Gaunilo's objection to Anselm's proof is not that being is not among the realities included within the concept of the *ens realissimum*, but rather that, because of the difference between thought and being, actual existence cannot be proved. The objection that being is not among the perfections included within the concept of the most perfect being is brought by Gassendi against Descartes; see Descartes, *Objections contre les Méditations, avec les Réponses* (1641) (*Œuvres*; ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery [Paris, n.d.], 7:323, 325).

12. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 627.

But there is the following circumstance in this case, which makes the proof unsatisfactory. | That most perfect and most real of all things is a *presupposition*, and being and the concept, on their own account, are one-sided when measured against it. Descartes and Spinoza¹³ define God as self-caused, *causa sui*. His concept and determinate being are identical, or in other words God cannot be grasped as concept apart from being. What is unsatisfactory is that this is a presupposition, so that when measured against it the concept must of necessity be something subjective.

But the finite and subjective is not just something finite as measured against that presupposition. It is finite in itself, and hence it is the antithesis of itself; it is the unresolved contradiction. Being is supposed to be distinct from the concept. We believe that we can regard the concept as strictly subjective, as finite; but the characteristic of being is in the concept itself. The finitude of subjectivity is sublated in the concept itself, and the unity of being and concept is not a presupposition vis-à-vis the concept, against which it is measured.

Being in its immediacy is contingent; we have seen that its truth is necessity. In addition, the concept necessarily includes being. Being is simple relation to self, the absence of mediation. The concept, if we consider it, is that in which all distinction has been absorbed, or in which all categorial determinations are present only in an ideal way. This ideality is sublated mediation, sublated differentiatedness, perfect clarity, pure transparency and being-present-to-self. The freedom of the concept is itself absolute self-relatedness, the identity that is also immediacy, unity devoid of mediation. Thus the concept *contains* being implicitly; it consists precisely in the sublating of its own one-sidedness. When we believe that we have separated being from the concept, this is only our opinion. When Kant says that reality cannot be “plucked out” of the concept,¹⁴ then the concept is there being grasped as finite. But

13. [Ed.] See Descartes, *Objections contre les Méditations, avec les Réponses* (*Œuvres* 7:119); and Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Def. i (*Chief Works* 2:45), Props. vii, xi (pp. 48, 53).

14. [Ed.] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 631.

the finite is what sublates itself, and when we were supposed to be treating the concept as separate from being, what we had was the self-relatedness that is implicit in being itself.

275 However, the concept does not only have being within itself implicitly—it is not merely that we have this insight but that the concept is also being on its own account. It sublates its subjectivity itself and objectifies itself. Human beings realize their purposes, i.e., what was at first only ideal is stripped of its one-sidedness and thereby made into a subsisting being. The | concept is always this positing of being as identical with itself. In intuiting, feeling, etc., we are confronted by external objects; but we take them up within us, so that they become ideal in us. What the concept does is to sublate its differentiation. When we look closely at the nature of the concept, we see that its identity with being is no longer a pre-supposition but the result. What happens is that the concept objectifies itself, makes itself reality and thus becomes the truth, the unity of subject and object. God, says Plato,¹⁵ is an immortal living thing whose body and soul are posited together, and those who separate the two sides have not advanced beyond the finite and the untrue.

Our present standpoint is that of Christianity. Here we have the concept of God in all its freedom. For this concept is identical with being, which is the poorest of all abstractions; no concept is so poor as not to have this determination in it. We do not have to consider being in the poverty of its abstraction, or in false immediacy, but as the being of God, as wholly concrete being, distinct from God. The consciousness of finite spirit is the concrete being, the material in which the concept of God is realized. We are not here talking about any adding of being to the concept or about a simple unity of concept and being—expressions like that are misleading. The unity in question is to be grasped rather as an absolute process, as the living activity of God—but in such a way that both sides are also differentiated in it so that it is the absolute activity of eternally producing itself. We have here the concrete representation of God as spirit. The concept of spirit is the concept that

15. [Ed.] See Plato, *Phaedrus* 246b–d.

has being in and for itself—or *knowledge*; this infinite concept is negative relation to self. Related negatively to itself, it becomes the process of dividing and differentiating itself; but what has been thus distinguished, though it may at first appear as something external, devoid of spirit, extradivine, is identical with the concept. Absolute truth consists in the development of this idea. In the Christian religion it is known that God has revealed himself, and the very being of God consists in revealing himself. Self-revealing is self-differentiation; *what* has been revealed is precisely that God is revelatory.

Religion must be for all of humanity as a whole—for those who have so purified their thinking that they know what is [present] in the pure element | of thinking, [i.e., for] those who have attained to speculative cognition of what God is, as well as¹⁶ for those who have not advanced beyond feeling and representation.

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Humanity does not just exist as pure thinking; instead, *thinking* itself is manifested as intuiting, as representing. Hence the absolute truth, as revealed to human beings, must also be [present] for them as representational, intuitive beings, as beings engaged in feeling and sensation. This is the form that distinguishes religion in general from philosophy. Philosophy *thinks* what otherwise only *is* for representation and intuition. In representing, human beings are also thinking, and the content of truth comes to them as thinking beings. Only what thinks can have religion, and thinking includes representing; but it is only thinking that is the free form of truth. The understanding is also a form of thinking, but does not advance beyond the identity: “concept is concept” and “being is being.” These categories always keep this one-sided form for it, whereas in *truth* these finite forms do not count as [independently] self-identical [simply] because they are; on the contrary they are only moments of a totality.

16. *Thus W*; cf. *S*: not just for . . . but also

[*Ed.*] This variant occurs in the transitional section at the beginning of Sec. II, “The Idea of God in Representational Form,” in Strauss’s excerpts (below, pp. 361–62). In fact, the last four paragraphs of text in the *Werke* do not pertain to the ontological proof proper but serve as a transition from conceptual to representational ways of thinking about God.

Those who are angry with philosophy for *thinking* religion do not know what they are asking. Hatred and envy are both at work here under the outward show of humility. True humility consists in sinking one's spirit in the truth, in what is most inward, in having the object, and nothing but the object, in oneself; in this way everything subjective that is still present as sensation disappears.

Our task is to consider the idea from a purely speculative standpoint and justify it against the understanding—against the understanding that rebels against every content for religion in general. Any such content is said to be a mystery¹⁷ because it is concealed from the understanding; the understanding does not attain to the process that is this unity, so that the whole range of speculation is for it a mystery.

17. [Ed.] See above, 1827 lectures, n. 83.

EXCERPTS

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BY DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF THE LECTURES OF 1831¹

PART III. THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION²

Introduction³

The content of religion is that God is simply object to himself, but is purely and simply identical with himself in this differentiation; and so he is spirit, *absolute* spirit. Consciousness knows itself to be entwined in this content; it knows itself as a moment of this movement; it knows God only insofar as God knows himself in it. So God is [present] as spirit in his community, and we are in the

1. [Ed.] On the Strauss excerpts of the 1831 lectures, see the Editorial Introduction to Volume 1. In Part III of the lectures, Hegel appears in 1831 to have returned to the structural arrangement of the 1824 lectures, although the differences between 1824 and 1827 are not great at this point. The change was necessitated primarily by his decision to treat the proofs for the existence of God once again in relation to the various historical religions rather than in a single section in *The Concept of Religion*, as in 1827 (see below, n. 4). All section headings are editorial unless otherwise noted. For Part III of the lectures especially, the editors of the *Werke* included a number of substantial passages from no-longer-extant transcripts of the 1831 lectures. In accord with the principles of this edition, these have been footnoted in relation to corresponding passages of 1827 text. Reference is made to these materials at appropriate points below.

2. [Ed.] This heading is in Strauss.

3. [Ed.] The Introduction appears to discuss two themes: the definition of the consummate or revelatory religion, and the transition to this stage. See the first paragraph of the 1831 Introduction as transmitted in W (1827 lectures, n. 3). Gone is the lengthy discussion of the positivity and spirituality of this religion (1827 lectures, Sec. 2), as well as the bulk of the survey of previous developments (Sec. 3) and the division of the subject (Sec. 4) (the latter is moved to the beginning of Part II, as in 1824).

presence of the *revelatory* religion. The transition to this level was that in Greek religion humanity knew God as free spirit, which was, however, still infected with finitude; but in the Roman world this finitude was elaborated on the side of subjective spirit, so that in this regard the way was paved for passing over to the consciousness of this absolute, free spirit.

I. THE ABSTRACT CONCEPT OF GOD⁴

The *abstract foundation* of this standpoint is the *concept of God*. In the previous religions we had the ascent to God from being as *contingent* and as *purposive*.⁵ These proofs pertain to the side of finitude, proceeding as they do from something given. The *ontological* proof, on the other hand, pertains to the religion of the infinitude of the free concept, and constitutes its foundation.⁶ The starting point here is the concept of God, but still as subjective concept, and the point is to demonstrate that determinate being [*Dasein*] also accrues to it. God is what is most perfect; but that to which being also accrues is more perfect than that to which it does not; therefore being also accrues to God. In other words, God is the concept informing all realities.

Kant criticized this proof as follows. Being is no reality; it adds nothing to the content of a concept; a hundred imagined thalers have the same content as a hundred actual thalers, but the fact that I imagine them, think them, does not mean that I have them. In this connection, the distinction between finite and infinite is disregarded. The finite does not correspond | to its concept, the in-

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4. [Ed.] Since in 1831 Hegel is once again treating the proofs of the existence of God in relation to the various religions, the proper locus for the ontological proof is the Christian religion. *W₂* gives the text for this section in an appendix to volume 12, which we have reproduced above, thus making it possible to compare Strauss's excerpts with a secondary transmission of the full text.

5. [Ed.] That is, the cosmological and teleological proofs, which Hegel discussed in relation to the determinate religions of Vol. 2 (see the Appendix containing the 1831 text for the teleological proof).

6. [Ed.] For an indication of the sources to which Hegel alludes in his presentation of the ontological proof, see the footnotes to the preceding section.

dividual is not identical with its genus, and consequently it passes away; but in the infinite this difference is sublated. The imperfection of this proof, however, lies in the fact that the unity of concept and object in God—or that what is most perfect must also *be*—is merely presupposed. It has therefore to be demonstrated that the concept already includes being within itself. Being is this relation to self that is itself without mediation. But the concept is itself that in which all differentiatedness is only ideational; it is perfect transparency and identity with itself—and this is nothing other than immediacy. So the concept has being implicit in it. We too, the ones who think, in striving to realize our concepts, show forth this striving of what is [only] ideational to be rid of its one-sidedness and pass over into reality. The concept knows itself as not true if it is not also posited.

However, we do not here have the abstract logical identity of concept and being as immediates; what we have in this relationship between the two sides of the ontological proof is God as spirit itself. Spirit is the concept that has being in and for itself. What this concept then differentiates from itself by a process of diremption, of primal division, is devoid of spirit, is [mere] being; but in this distinction, spirit is simply identical with itself—it is pure light. In this way God has revealed himself, in this way he is manifest.

II. THE IDEA OF GOD IN REPRESENTATIONAL FORM⁷

As revelatory religion, however, this religion is for the whole of humanity. It is not just for those who engage in speculative thought and know God in the pure element of thinking. Because thinking

7. [Ed.] According to Strauss, at the beginning of Part II in 1831, Hegel stressed the representational form of the consummate religion qua revelatory religion, contrasting it with the abstract form of the ontological proof or of sheer knowledge of God's being. (This is confirmed by the last four paragraphs of the *Ontological Proof* [see n. 16], which do not pertain to the proof as such but are transitional, corresponding to the first paragraph of Strauss's excerpts below.) Here Hegel approximates the *Ms.*, which is reflected by our editorial section heading. There follows immediately the "division of the subject," as in the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures. But this division introduces another innovation, namely, the designation of the three spheres or elements as the "kingdoms" of the Father, Son, and Spirit, respectively.

is not merely pure but also manifests itself in representing and intuiting, the absolute truth must also be [present] for human beings as feeling, intuiting, and representing beings. This then is the form under which religion distinguishes itself from philosophy. Representing is a mode of thinking too, but it is not thinking in its free form. The content of religion, like that of speculation, transcends the understanding; for the understanding there is, for example, no identity of thinking and being, and it makes the judgment that thinking is thinking and being is being.

We shall have to consider this idea, this content, in three spheres:

1. the idea in free universality, or the pure essence of God—the *kingdom of the Father*;
2. the inward diremption of the idea, held fast for a moment in its differentiation—the *kingdom of the Son*; |
3. the reconciliation of this finite spirit with spirit that has being in and for itself—the *kingdom of the Spirit*.

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The relationship between these spheres is more specifically as follows: in all three the idea is *divine self-revelation*.

(1) This occurs first in the element of pure *ideality* and *universality*, in the silent abode of the thinking spirit. The revelation here is the simple conclusion that God is immediately present to himself through his differentiation, which, however, is not yet externalized at this stage. It is by virtue of this [inner] movement that God is spirit. Thus the *doctrine of the Trinity* pertains to this sphere, although it is preferentially termed the *kingdom of the Father*.⁸

This language is not found in the earlier lectures, although there are some anticipations of it. For example, references to the “kingdom of the Spirit” are found in the Ms., pp. 135, 142, and in the 1824 lectures, p. 247. It is the representational language in which the distinctively Christian idea of God is set forth; it is, in other words, the language of the Trinity, and it has reference to the “economic” or world-encompassing Trinity at that. This terminology was adopted by the *Werke* in its presentation of Part III, presumably on the assumption that it was Hegel’s latest articulation of the subject. *W*₂ transmits the full text of the 1831 division, which we have given above as a footnote to the 1827 lectures, n. 67.

8. [Ed.] This statement indicates Hegel’s awareness that the first of the trinitarian symbols, “Father,” properly signifies the inner dialectic of the divine life or the “immanent” Trinity, rather than a divine “person” related to other divine “persons.”

(2) The second element is that of *particularity*, of *representation*. The Son, which in the first sphere was the other as undifferentiated from the First,⁹ comes now to be determined as something external, as world and nature, to which finite spirit (as natural) belongs. But because [we are here] in the realm of religion, this is a *religious* consideration of nature and humanity; in other words, the unity [of humanity] with God again asserts itself, and we see the Son coming forth upon the stage of nature—this emergence being the beginning of faith. Initially the Son as human has an external, natural history; but then it loses this character and becomes the divine history, the history of the manifestation of God. This constitutes the transition from the *kingdom of the Son* to

(3) The *kingdom of the Spirit*. The distinctive element of this is the self-conscious awareness of human beings that they are reconciled with God, and the fulfillment of this consciousness in church and cultus.

A. The Kingdom of the Father¹⁰

In the first instance, then, God is for human beings as *thinking* beings. This cognition comes to them as dogma in such a way that where they do not *conceptualize* dogma, they can take it up in belief in the form of *representation*. This [representation] is the dogma of the Trinity. As spirit, God is the *activity of free knowing* present to itself; as *an activity* this must posit itself in [different] moments, and as concept it must divide itself in judgment—but in such a way that what is differentiated is, without mediation, that from which it was differentiated. In the dogmatic image this is expressed by saying that God as Father eternally begets his Son. We say, “God does this in order to beget a Son for himself.” But all of this “doing”

This inward dialectic is outwardly reenacted in God’s relation to the world, as signified by the kingdoms of the Son and of the Spirit.

9. [Ed.] In the *inward divine life*, the Son is “other” than the First (the Father) but is not yet outwardly differentiated or distinguished from God in the same sense that the world is. This supports the distinction Hegel draws in the Ms. between the “eternal Son of the Father” and the historical, incarnate Son, or the *kingdom of the Son*, the world of nature and finite spirit. See above, p. 87, and n. 79.

10. *S reads: 1.*

is God himself; he is only the totality, and taken abstractly as the Father, he is not the true | God. And this is only the abstract truth—in religion it is believed, in philosophy it is conceptualized.¹¹

But this is where the understanding brings its categories into play—the determinate category of number, which is of all things the most lacking in conceptual grasp, or the identity that involves no differentiation. There is, we are told, a division of judgment in this [dogma]; and in any case the differentiation of spirit can go as far as a primal division, although this happens only in the second sphere.

Traces of the awareness that the triad embraces only a totality are to be found abstractly even in earlier times, in the Pythagorean *τρίαξ*—the thrice-holy;¹² [cf.] the Kantian trichotomy.

God as Father is the first universality, that which is indeterminate and unknowable, which is why the Gnostics called him *βυθός*. But he is also that which differentiates itself, the *λόγος*, the Son, the moment of manifestation, which is doubtless why the Gnostics also called him *πρώτη κατάληψις ἑαυτοῦ*.¹³ At this initial stage the idea does not develop into any further determinations, only that God is comprehended as a subject with many properties. These, being differentiated, inevitably yield primal division; and the understanding seizes on the information that it abstracts from this determinacy so that only abstract reality remains. But in the idea of God thus indicated, the eternal positing and resolving of the primal judgment is given, not as our subjective activity, but as the objective or rather the absolute activity of spirit itself. The further result of this initial pure form is that the idea is the truth when characterized in this way as the act of self-mediating with self.

11. [Ed.] An amplification of this theme is transmitted by W (see 1827 lectures, n. 93).

12. [Ed.] *das Dreimalheilig*. Hegel appears to be thinking less of the liturgical *trishagion* than of a description of the Pythagoreans found in Aristotle. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 1:221–222 (*Werke* 13:256–257), he quotes Aristotle to the effect that the Pythagoreans believe that the gods are properly addressed only “when we call upon them three times in prayer—thrice holy [*dreimal heilig*].” In other words, the threefold calling upon the gods and the liturgical *trishagion* are understood analogously by Hegel. On the Pythagorean *trias*, see above, Ms., n. 57; on the triad in Kant, Ms., n. 62.

13. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 71.

B. The Kingdom of the Son¹⁴

1. Differentiation

The differentiation, which in the first [moment] of the idea was only a show [*Schein*], now comes into its right. This sphere consists in the determination of the Son. What is differentiated is in the form of other-being. Spirit relates itself to the other; this means that it is no longer absolute but finite spirit that is posited; and inasmuch as what is differentiated is itself something internally differentiated into nature and finite spirit, we have the creation of the world, the form in which the Son actually becomes the other. God is creator, but as λόγος, or as he who externalizes himself. For human beings, the world is at first something presupposed, an immediate being and a manifold; but secondly they cognize God in it too, as we have seen in regard to the earlier religions and the proofs of God's existence. But there is always something inappropriate about cognizing God from nature in this way, | in that the limited character of the appearance one takes as one's starting point is also transposed to God. God thunders awesomely with his thunder, yet he is not recognized.¹⁵

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2. Reconciliation

a. The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual

God must reveal himself in spiritual, not merely in natural fashion. And for him to reveal himself thus as spirit for a humanity

14. *S reads: 2.*

[*Ed.*] This is the longest section of the excerpts for Part III, comprising about half the total. Of it, however, only one paragraph concerns the theme of differentiation, and the remainder is given over to reconciliation, where the topics familiar from 1824 and 1827 are elaborated in considerable detail—the idea of reconciliation and its appearance in a single individual, the historical, sensible presence of Christ, and the death of Christ and the transition to spiritual presence. This focus of attention could of course reflect Strauss's own christological interests, and one can detect nuances that were to appear shortly in his own *Life of Jesus* (1835). If Strauss's excerpts are accurate, one of the innovations of the 1831 lectures is that the discussion of natural humanity and good and evil, treated under the theme of differentiation in Sec. B.1 of the earlier lectures, is transferred to Sec. C.1 (see below, n. 26). The treatment of the story of the fall drops out completely.

15. [*Ed.*] Cf. Job 37:5: "God thunders wondrously with his voice; he does great

that is finite, sentient, and intuitive, he must appear in the flesh, he must become human. This is possible only because of the unity of divine and human nature. We have already encountered a becoming-human of God in the Hindu incarnations, in the Dalai Lama, and also in the deifications of Greek heroes and Roman emperors. In all this there is a struggle toward this definition of the implicit unity of divine and human nature. But in these Oriental forms, humanity is only a mask, it is nothing essential. What lies at the basis of this representation is that spirit is cast down into the alien *ύλη* and that its embodiment is a kind of imprisonment.¹⁶ This contains an element of truth; but on the other hand, it is the ultimate refinement of spirit to be defined in terms of such subjectivity, and this is a moment that must not be lacking in the life of God. Since spirit involves the characteristic of immediacy within its infinite relation to self, this moment of immediacy must also be present in God if he is to be revealed to humanity as spirit. But God no longer appears in natural immediacy—in which, for that matter, he was not even truly immanent, as in the burning bush¹⁷—but in spiritual immediacy, in human shape. And whereas in pantheism countless incarnations occur because subjectivity is only accidental, God can appear as spirit on only one unique occasion because uniqueness is a [logical] moment of spirit.¹⁸

b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ

When we have reached this point in [the development of] the concept, its otherness [takes the form] that the unity of divine and human nature becomes universal consciousness too, since a single human being is known as “God-man.” On the one hand, then, we have here a single human being, born to just these parents, one who eats, drinks, etc. But on the other hand this individual is known

things which we cannot comprehend.” See the fuller version of this passage transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 128).

16. [Ed.] See above, 1827 lectures, n. 173 (editorial addition).

17. [Ed.] Cf. Exod. 3:2 ff. According to the story, it is the *angel* of the Lord who appears in the flame of fire, not the Lord himself; it is only when God *speaks* that Moses knows he is there.

18. [Ed.] See the fuller version of this paragraph transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 173).

as God, and the beyond of God [is] sublated in this characterization. The first way of considering the matter, on its own account, is the nonreligious way, while the second is [that of] faith, and one must be led from the former to the latter. If one starts from the appearance of Christ in external form, | one can follow it up to the point of his death; but at this point a definite divorce occurs between faith and unbelief.

What has to be considered first, then, is the *human side*, but in the sense that it is already the start of our being led over to what is higher. The *teaching* of Christ belongs here; this is still something human, but its role is to lead belief on to the soil of inner spirituality. The *miracles* belong here too.

Initially the history of Christ is a purely external one—he is simply a *teacher*. But when we look more closely at the *content* of his teaching, it is a *moral* teaching, a teaching especially of *love* for humanity. This is, at first sight, an abstraction: I cannot love human beings who are in no way in touch with me. What is closer to the mark is the love of one's neighbor. But this commandment is also to be found in other religions. What Christ's teaching includes in addition is the proclamation of the *kingdom of heaven*, i.e., the awakening of consciousness to inwardness, to this native soil of humanity, this absolute value, as against which all earthly things are seen to be valueless. This exaltation to inwardness is an outstanding feature of Christ's teaching, and it is brought before our representational imagination in an infinitely forceful manner in his teaching—[for instance, in the words with which] Christ begins his ministry in the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" [Matt. 5:8]. This is the greatest thing that can be said. Moreover, all unfreedom, all externality, and all superstition are superseded in these words. That is why it is infinitely important for the people to have the Bible in their hand; it is the absolute book of the people. Further on, it is brought out that only the absolute disposition (but not any abstract opinion) has value. We are to seek first the kingdom of God [Matt. 6:33]; compared with this ascent into pure inwardness, talent and power or lack of culture are secondary matters. The infinite value of this inwardness, of this drawing away from everything external, is also expressed

when Christ says to the rich young man, "Give all that you have to the poor and follow me" [Matt. 19:21], or when he says, "Those who do the will of my Father are my mother and brothers" [Matt. 12:50]. When Christ calls himself the Son of God and the Son of Man, and when he says, "No one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" [Matt. 11:27], this has directly the general sense that human beings *are* children of God and that they should *make themselves* children of God. This teacher | collected friends around him and instructed them in his teaching. But because his teaching was revolutionary, he was accused, and so he sealed his teaching with his death.

Unbelief can go this far. Then Christ is similar to Socrates, who also opposed the gods of his people with the inwardness of his teaching and was consequently condemned to death.¹⁹ But not only does Christ's teaching have a different hue from that of Socrates because he belonged to a different people; his teaching regarding the kingdom of heaven has an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates. This then is the external history of Christ, as it exists for unbelief.²⁰

c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence

But with the death of Christ the reversal begins, and the contemplation of faith, of the Holy Spirit, enters into play—the *divine view* [*göttliche Betrachtung*], according to which it is the nature of God that is revealed in Christ. This believing consciousness is now reflected in expressions similar to those quoted above: "Whoever sees me sees the Father" [John 14:9].²¹ Initially such sayings have an indeterminate universality, but faith *is* their correct exegesis, just

19. [Ed.] On the condemnation of Socrates, see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.1, and Plato, *Apology*. On the comparison of Socrates and Christ, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 215. This comparison was of importance to Strauss later on, in his essay "Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum," *Freihafen* 1/3 (1838), 1–48, as well as in the 3d edition of *The Life of Jesus*, also published in 1838.

20. [Ed.] See the fuller version of this paragraph transmitted by the *Werke* (1827 lectures, n. 196).

21. [Ed.] The passages quoted earlier were from the Gospel of Matthew rather than John, but this seems to be of no significance to Hegel. He construes this as an actual saying of Jesus, but its proper interpretation (he suggests) requires the perspective of post-Passion and post-Easter faith, namely, that Jesus is the God-man.

as it is the correct exegesis of Christ's death in particular. For to be precise, faith is nothing else than the consciousness of the absolute truth, the consciousness of what God is. God is the Trinity, i.e., he is the course of life that consists in being the universal that has being in and for itself, or in differentiating itself and then in setting itself over against itself, yet in so doing, being identical with itself—in a word, it consists in being this syllogism. Now the faith that God is in Christ is the certainty that this course of the divine life is and has been envisaged in the course of this [human] life. In order for it to be possible that the divine life should be so envisaged, there are certain conditions [*Bedingungen*]²²—for example, the teaching of Christ and especially what he has to say about himself. These sayings are *prima facie* his assurances [with respect to himself, but] in terms of their content they are such that they can also be reduced exegetically to the general representational sphere. The other criterion is that we do see divine power in this individual—his *miracles*. Against these, people can raise all manner of objections, saying that this was the age of belief in miracles, that there have been other miracle workers, etc. But the other view of the matter is that of faith. If Christ is the God-man, the miracles no longer present any difficulty. On the other hand, the miracles exist only for faith anyway; and for faith they become something of little account once more, being self-explanatory. |

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It is always faith resting on the witness of the Holy Spirit that gives to the appearance of Christ its full meaning. The disciples had lived with him, heard all his teachings, seen all his works, and yet Christ undertakes first to send the Holy Spirit to them;²² in other words, the conviction they had gained about him during his life was not yet the real truth. This pouring out of the Holy Spirit is then represented at the feast of Pentecost. The witness of the Spirit is a subjective disposition. It is the infinite need of the spirit of that age—the impulse, generated by the shattering of the particular folk-spirits and of the natural deities of the people, to know God in a universal form as spiritual.²³ This impulse requires the appearance

22. [Ed.] See, e.g., John 15:26; Acts 1:7–8.

23. [Ed.] From this point to the end of the subsection, the *Werke* transmits a lengthy text (1827 lectures, n. 199) which confirms Strauss's version in detail.

of God in this way, it demands a manifestation of the infinite spirit in the form of an actual human being.

The infinite subjectivity of God is [present] for the intuiting consciousness in the form of singularity. Faith now explicates itself [in] the life of Christ as it has already been told by those upon whom the Spirit fell. But it is particularly the death of Christ that can be understood only through this witness of the Spirit; his death is the touchstone upon which faith proves itself. It has *first* the sense that Christ was God, the God who had human nature implicit in him. He had it in full, even unto death—and he had it therefore in absolute finitude, even unto the death of the transgressor. This death is the testimony that humanity is in Christ even to the most extreme point. But then the *second* determination enters into play: God himself is dead—despair as to any higher truth. But then at once there enters, *thirdly*, the reversal. The death of God is *infinite* negation, and God maintains himself in death, so that this process is rather a putting to death of death, a resurrection into life. We are told that Christ himself appeared to his disciples again after his death, and that this was followed by his ascension and his sitting at the right hand of God.²⁴

287 This history is the same explication of the divine nature itself that was present in the first sphere [that of the Father], except that here it begins in immediacy for the intuition, and runs its course in singular individuality. The abstractness of the Father is given up in the Son—this then is death. But the negation of this negation is the unity of Father and Son—love, or the Spirit. Thus we have | here the same course of the divine nature as before, but now it is made explicit for consciousness.

It is essential to consider one further point about the death of Christ. The humiliation and [the extreme of] humanity [associated with the death of the cross] is something alien to Christ, something that he takes upon himself, since he was [with] God from eternity. This alien element in Christ is as such what pertains to others; these others are the human race, so Christ has taken their finitude to and

24. [Ed.] See Matt. 28:9, 17; Mark 16:9 ff.; Luke 24:13 ff.; John 20–21; Acts 1; 7:55.

upon himself in all its forms—the chief of these forms being evil. Thus humanity is known as a moment of the divine life on the one hand; but inasmuch as Christ puts it to death, it is equally recognized as something that does not pertain to God [on the other]. Or in other words, Christ bore the sin of the world and slew it. This conflicts with [the theory of] juridical (= moral) imputation, which requires that each of us must take the stand for him- or herself. But this imputation has its place only upon the field of finitude, not upon that of the free spirit in itself. Already in morality, and still more in the religious sphere, spirit is known as *free*: the barrier comprised in evil is of no account for it, since it can undo what has been done. Thus it is finitude in general, evil in general, that has died for faith in Christ's death; in this way his death acquires a universal significance, it is the reconciliation of the world. But this is where mere "consideration" comes to a halt; the subject itself is at the same time drawn into the anguish of its own estrangement, and this is the transition to the third part.

C. The Kingdom of the Spirit²⁵

1. *The Self-Consciousness of the Community*²⁶

This part contains the relationship of the subject to this whole sphere. The subject has to traverse in itself the cycle encompassing these three moments; it has to bring itself conclusively together with its original spiritual nature, or with the divine *imago* imbuing it. This process begins with the consciousness that humanity is by nature not what it ought to be, i.e., that humanity is by nature evil.

The soil upon which this movement occurs is the *community*, God knowing himself in this other. We have seen how the com-

25. *S reads*: 3. The Kingdom of the Spirit, the Community

26. [*Ed.*] The third part appears to fuse together the separate discussions of the "origin" and "subsistence" of the community that are found in the earlier lectures into the general theme of "the self-consciousness of the community" (a phrase that occurs at the end of the sixth paragraph). Included here are elements of the problem of natural humanity and good and evil, which were treated in Sec. B.1 of the earlier lectures. The *Werke* transmits several shorter passages relating to the treatment of the community, especially of communion (1827 lectures, nn. 235, 239, 240, 243, 244). These are insufficient to confirm Strauss's arrangement and content, but there is no reason to question it either, and indeed, internal analysis confirms it.

munity is founded through the establishment of faith. Individuals are members of the community through baptism, and it is in the community that they have to live the spiritual life, which we have seen to be the movement of what is true. This is the proper beginning of the community, and from this moment the subject | is in the community. Inasmuch as subjects are brought up in this faith, they are thereby already in the element of conquered evil, or in the kingdom of reconciliation. This does not save them from the infinite anguish or from the battle, but merely alleviates it. Because the faith is *taught* to individuals, it comes to them as something external, ready-made, the positive doctrine of the church.

Hence the subject is not by nature as it should be; but at the same time the possibility is there for it to become so, and to be admitted by God into his grace. To this end, the individual grasps the truth of the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature, taking hold of it in faith and representational imagination. It is in this faith, this presupposition, that the subject then works off its naturalness, does battle with it. On the one hand, this is the doing of the subject, and on the other of the Holy Spirit; but the Holy Spirit is nothing external to the subject—it is its own spirit, whereon it believes.

In the third place, the subject receives the assurance of its unity with God, of its reconciliation. This is conditional upon the second point that we have just been considering, namely repentance and penance—in other words, upon the putting aside of natural will. Provided this condition is fulfilled, persons are assured of such unity in the second sacrament, the *Lord's Supper*, which is the enjoyment of this unity. Into this last midpoint of religion differences enter, which endow all the other differences in religion with their significance. For the Lord's Supper is not merely the assurance of unity with the divine but the actual vouchsafing [of it]; the divine is enjoyed in bodily fashion.²⁷ According to the one doctrine, the divine is posited initially in distinction from the subject as something other, as the host, as an external [thing] that people are to enjoy.

27. *Follows, canceled:* Thus the divine is initially distinct from the subject, and it is on this basis that unity has to be posited.

This is the *Catholic* religion, and all of its externality and lack of freedom depends upon this externality of God in it.²⁸ The *Lutheran* attitude is that it is only in consuming the sensible elements and in faith that the subject is united with God; and that outside of its being partaken of the host is nothing out of the ordinary. The third view, that of *Zwingli* or *Calvin*,²⁹ is | that the Eucharist is a mere representation and remembrance, a purely moral relationship.

Such then is the community, and the three stages of God's process in it are as follows: (1) immediacy, (2) the sublation of immediacy, (3) the assurance of reconciliation. The community consists in this faith being available for everyone as a presupposition—that is how spirit is universally present. The opposite view is that all of us possess our own doctrine for ourselves; but this is a mere matter of chance, and in religion this privacy of belief is consumed.

This is the absolute truth wholly explicated: *first*, God as the eternal inward life of love; *second*, this absolute truth is portrayed as subject for the representing finite spirit in such a way that the sensible shape of that subject is interpreted through the Spirit. *Third*, there is the explication of this life of love—of the same process which *is* God and which is *represented* in Christ—in the self-consciousness of the community.

2. *The Realization of Religion*

But since the field of *worldliness* is also present alongside religion, religion must realize itself in this field too. And since in Catholicism the subject is something external, under the sway of the church, we find the Catholic Church demanding that the secular field should be under its sway too. But since the secular world also constitutes human freedom, it resists this demand fiercely. So the true realization of religion in the worldly sphere is the inward realization,

28. [Ed.] See above, 1827 lectures, n. 243.

29. [Ed.] In this passage from the excerpts, the identification of the Zwinglian and Calvinist doctrines of the Lord's Supper, which Hegel repeatedly hints at elsewhere, is stated explicitly. It is justified to the extent that Calvin, like Zwingli, rejects the Lutheran assumption of a real presence of Christ in the sacrament and of the validity of the sacrament for just and unjust alike; but Calvin does not hold to a merely symbolic or significative view of the sacrament, and accepts a mystical activity or presence of the transfigured heavenly body of Christ.

namely, that a just and ethical civil life should be instituted. But inasmuch as such a civic life is now established, it absorbs all of this expansion of the divine, being itself divinity in this field, so that the entire content shrinks.³⁰ Once the laws of the state are known as *universal* laws, thought attacks the content of God too, requiring that it must stand the test of thought. Thought is now spirit seeking to bear witness. Faith comprises the true content, but in the form of representation; what is still needful is to give the form of thought to the content. Philosophy, which achieves this, does not thereby place itself above religion but only above the form of faith as representation.³¹

30. [Ed.] See the passage transmitted by the *Werke* that supplements this point (1827 lectures, n. 250).

31. *S* adds below: Fin. 5 February

[Ed.] This is the date, in the winter of 1832, on which Strauss finished these excerpts. See the *Werke's* version of the concluding remarks (1827 lectures, n. 265).

LOOSE SHEETS

291

RELATING TO HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT¹

[155a]

Disposition [of heart and soul], elevation of human will – gathering ears
of corn on the Sabbath, healing of withered hand²

Love – not the general soft-headed, individual sentiment

“Thus do you love one another”³ – *infinitude* as transcending the finitude
(α) of laws

(β) of offenses – forgiveness of sins, *undoing what is done* – Mary
Magdalene: *much* forgiven because she loved *much* (transcending
morality) – anointed instead of giving to the *poor*.⁴

(γ) Substantive relationship to God – forgiveness of sins

Death of Christ: (a) external story (b) religious story – Son of God

Divinity passed through actuality and disgrace – this passing
through, this human pain and abasement, is the supreme moment.

The eternal life of God is this.

On the other side the *blessed gods* – we in this abasement (which
itself is hallowed).)

1. [Ed.] See the Editorial Introduction to this volume. Sheets 155 and 162–165 contain preparatory materials for Hegel's treatment of the Christian religion in the Ms. The order of the text does not follow the sheet numbers but rather the original folding of the sheets and the sequence of lettering and headings within the text. We are designating by angle brackets all passages that are written alongside or above or below the main text, whether or not these additional passages are actually in the margins.

2. [Ed.] See Matt. 12:1–13.

3. [Ed.] See esp. John 13:34; 15:12.

4. [Ed.] See Luke 7:36–50 (esp. v. 47) and John 12:1–8. Hegel has combined the reports of the two anointings and therefore has identified (as church tradition has done in part) the woman who was a sinner (in Luke's account) with Mary the sister of Lazarus (in John's account) on the one hand and with Mary Magdalene (Luke 8:2; Mark 15:40, 47) on the other.

Underlying ground – love of God, embracing consciousness of the highest, and humility

Objectivity of love – I, for myself – individuality

Forgetfulness of self in *cognizing* God

Love

(1) Purely natural moral sentiment

(2) Forgiveness of sins – deeper unity, elevation above the purely natural and finite, which is the domain of (1), for which everything finite, everything transient, is valid [as overcome]

(a) Nature – sin

(b) Transient, natural, external *punishment* – *punishment* as such in general |

(c) *Eternal* punishment – inwardly, in heart and mind; no forgiveness in (b); its nothingness annulled [through] his majesty and love

(3) Substantive relationship – thought *otherworldly*, abstract, universal; Love subjective, individual, seemingly quite different – to sublimate absolute separation.

Intuition of this identity in Christ not an individual matter – Son of Man. (Stephen saw him face to face at the right hand of God)⁵

Reconciliation – come about in and for itself

Church for each and every one

In Christ the unity of human and divine nature (a) life and passion, (b) resurrection and ascension – whether actually happened, doubts arising from circumstances and individual features – puerile and pitiful

Steeping oneself in Christ's sufferings

Extremes – nobility and lowliness

Gueux, beggars, Low Country noblemen⁶

Anguish exalted to the highest, source [of happiness]

[Do] not look at what is contemptible or foolish

5. [Ed.] See Acts 7:55.

6. [Ed.] The Gueux was a league of patriotic nobles and gentlemen of the Netherlands formed in 1566 to resist Spanish tyranny and defend religious freedom. They referred to themselves as Gueux (French, "beggars") in allusion to a remark by an opponent that they were only beggars; they were ready, they said, to become "beggars" in their country's cause. These "Low Country noblemen" (*niederländische Edelleute*) thus combined both nobility (*Hoheit*) and lowliness (*Niedrigkeit*). They even adopted the emblems of beggarhood, the wallet and the bowl, as trinkets to be worn on their hats and girdles. This may be what Hegel has in mind later (p. 383) when he suggests that what is "utterly despised" is made "of highest account," such as the "beggar's sack by the Gueux in Holland." This allusion, with its word play and double meanings, did not find its way into the *Ms*.

⟨In an individual

Universal Holy Spirit

- (a) Behold the individual
- (b) Anguish, nothingness
- (c) Universal

[155b]

Holy Spirit

- (a) God's kingdom, an invisible church – from all areas, different religions
- (b) The outward church – Protestants and Catholics – distinction between laity and *priests* – church a solid *actuality* – Protestants no priests and [only] teachers

Church and state

The church opposed to the brutality of *secular power* |

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Church represents the “higher life”

Sunday observances – teaching – acceptance within the *actually present* community – assurance of being so accepted

(α) Baptism

(β) Holy Communion:

- (α) Catholics – as a thing outside of faith and partaking
- (β) Lutherans – an actual communion in *faith* and *partaking* – subjectivity, actuality
- (γ) Reformed

Catholics in general more unspiritual

Action devoid of spirit, works – mysticism the Catholic's inwardness

Faith, subjectivity, disposition – the Protestant's hallmark

⟨Christendom [is] the people of God – pope and emperor – Egyptian, Indian: theocracy. Temple, lights, external sun extinguished – one's own inward nature)⟩

That evil [is] vanquished in and for itself [is] Christian – only laid hold of by heart and mind – *actuality*

No priests in Protestantism – Protestants practice personally through the truth, divine strength and authorization

Protestant ministers – minister in the name of God

Christian religion – religion of spirit, history

Resurrection, *eternal* life – Christ alone

Spirit eternal because it encompasses itself in its infinitude.

[163b]⁷

LOVE – distinguished from SPIRIT – love the mode of sentiment – *relation-*

7. [Ed.] The first half of sheet 163b is concerned with Roman religion and therefore is included among other sheets relating to Greek and Roman religion in Vol. 2.

ship only to one another – *I love you*. But love itself as distinct from these extremes – spirit – relationship to two – love

(α) God [is] this *distinguishing* – abstract definition – comprised in wisdom, activity, spirit, self-consciousness

(β) *within himself* – for he is unity |

(γ) The differentiated *totality* – as in natural birth – genus – dissemination of thoughts

Abstract mode of the understanding – the One – abstract, dead, cold One – differentiating, distinguishing characteristics [are] only properties

(δ) Sophia, Logos – determinacy of *person*

(α) God [as] *universality* (producing, active) – relationship to *love* (itself what is differentiated) – by Sophia the Son begotten, the world created

(β) This follows – as activity God already [implies] return – infinite negativity – matter, inorganic, what is worst – this itself – is *difficult*

“The last shall be first”

Taking back [of what is posited] – the last [is first] and the first [is last]

(ε) That this [is] the truth – all philosophy the proof

Faith, immediate acceptance

If to be proved, all philosophy

(α) One [God] (β) A person

(ζ) An echo or forms of this in all religions

Number (Pythagoras), Plato – Aristotle⁸

Triplicity – [for the] understanding (α) number – *one*, resistance, matter, difficult [to comprehend]

[162a]⁹

Christian religion – truth

Purposiveness – determinate concept – not limited, but within itself a universal absolute determination – spirit

(α) in predicative fashion: wisdom – providence – general representations, predicates

(α) metaphysical concept – abstract concept and being. Not a foundation – presupposition, finite starting point

8. [Ed.] See above, Ms., nn. 57, 59.

9. [Ed.] The first three lines of sheet 162a are concerned with Roman religion and therefore are included among other materials relating to Greek and Roman religion in Vol. 2.

[Starting point] the concept of *God* – [of] what is most real.

In itself the highest, *absolute* concept. But a concept that was finite, i.e., was opposed to being, would not be the absolute concept | – this is correct – but there is a further presupposition – [which] occurs in two ways in our knowing, representing, thinking.

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Christian: (α) [What is] affirmed – the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity – unity of divine and human nature

Speculative truth is religious truth

(β) [What] configuration [it takes] – spirit shaping its character inwardly for itself – conferring objectivity [upon itself]

Variety of forms

For representation the distinct spheres can be distinguished:

- | | |
|--|---|
| (α) absolute objectivity | (α) objectivity of pure thought –
God is spirit – Trinity |
| (β) finite objectivity, nature | (β) external (physical) objectivity
– creation of nature – wisdom
– concept maintaining itself therein |
| (γ) in finite spirit | (γ) objectivity as of finite spirit –
an objectivity in which God
returns into himself in self-
consciousness – cultus |
| (αα) as God's appearing, no
longer mere wisdom) | |

Miracles [pertain] to temporal life – but [are the work of] the Spirit
This an aspect of the infinitely manifold forms of self-consciousness
For this [one] the divine history must be objectified in self-consciousness itself

(Image of God – divine and human nature – not like a coat or mere semblance of a body but an actual human being

Thus human nature is divine, recognized as identical with the divine) |

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(α) as Son of God, in common temporal actuality

(β) suffering and dying

Divestment – two senses

(α) of divinity

(β) of finite natural state – in anguish – experience of nothingness – negative experience of oneself

(α) Divestment of divinity is:

Passing through the human state and in it and from it returning to self)

[(γ) Cultus – formation of the community

(α) Starting point – evil by nature – cognition – separation

(β) Belief in mediator – in this everlasting inward divine grace – to lay hold of and be laid hold of – in representation leave obscure – metaphysics of the understanding

(γ) External cultus

[162b]

The Son of God

Creation, world – as can be said – the same as the Son

This appearance – the mode of being – that eternal truth

Creation – an *other* act than the begetting of the Son, namely, stopping at the stage of other-being

(α) Second sphere – for representation – another act

Transition – necessity

Ditto – eternal truth

Here therefore God, without further qualification – [we are] not to ask which is the Creator – heresies – Demiurge¹⁰ – because world [is] bad

Christ appeared “in the fullness of time” – but only transiently in time
History in finite spirit – moment of return – conversion – from other-being

What is meant by this return? The concept of finite spirit:

(α) The universal (corresponding to Father) is – immediacy of being –

But positivity is something abstractly universal |

Finitude (αα) Natural spirit – (ββ) Consciousness of an object

Definition based *on the idea* – that [human beings] are *not* as they are intended to be.

This is how religion represents nature, according to how [human beings] are on the basis of the idea. Evil by nature – but *antithesis* (of what they are *in themselves*) – i.e., the concept – image of God

The progenitor of the human race – Adam Kadmon¹¹ – the divine Son

Originally [things were] so, this represented as *first* state, and sin as second – by virtue of cognition (α) evil (β) “has become like one of us” – in Christ – cognition is this middle and turning point

(β) Image – in and for self. Cognition’s task to grasp the truth, the truth is intended to be for cognition

Unity of divine and human nature appeared for consciousness

(α) That it appeared in *time* – [was] necessary. The building up of consciousness for it

(β) Thus this concrete individual human being [appears] in immediate form for consciousness

10. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 86.

11. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 105.

How his divinity is proved for human beings – (α) in human manner
– miracles – starting point for the community

[163a]

(γ) Passion, death, and resurrection

(αα) Sublation of the natural state – and only

(ββ) as divine history

Anguish of (mortality) – natural state – itself an absolute moment

The two are combined, both being intuited in one person:

(α) Suffering, dying – divestment of divinity – acme and highest expression of mortality, finitude, the human state.

Anguish – not merely finitude but feeling – knowledge of this is for the first time true finitude

(β) Divestment of finitude, of the natural state (its dying off) – not remaining in the tomb

(No other mode of appearing, i.e., becoming for immediate consciousness |

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At an earlier stage: (α) Immediate nature – in itself

(β) reflection, entailing *separation* – human being is only natural

Definition on the basis of the idea –

Opposition of idea and immediate being

(α) positing evil

(β) positing and cognizing evil)¹²

⟨This is an act of cognition, and such an act is tantamount to equality with God. What does this mean?⟩

⟨God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob – led them out of Egypt – this litany – and nothing beyond – evil nowhere in prophets, only Sirach 25:32⟩¹³

Actual appearance – i.e., only in this way [is it] not just a theoretical doctrine – in thoughts – the particular cultural preparation presupposed, but something universal for all humanity, whatever their cultural background

Doctrine as a story for immediate representation and immediate sensibility

Universality, according to the concept – unity of human and divine nature – human nature envisaged in the divine nature

All particularity fallen away

Equality of human beings before God

Humanity sanctified – human being as in and for itself

This form of history is itself essential for the community, i.e., God's appearance in finitude

12. [Ed.] This passage is transferred from sheet 162b by reference marks.

13. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 119.

[165b]

Review of the three spheres

For subjects

(α) Faith – miracles, testimony of the Spirit

(β) Formation of the community – do away with the revolutionary element

Laying hold on, tradition

The lowest, highest – for the highest [is] lowest – bringing low

Complete reversal of disposition

299 Roman Emperor for his part – slaves the supreme power |

All the majesty of the world authority dragged in the dust

(Stress the category of death

The ignominy of *death*

The cross transfigured

Then the ties of human coexistence are loosed – this sort of slogan and cockade [belongs to] world revolution)

The final act the resurrection and ascension

Natural history from a formal standpoint – *natural life*

The child

In itself

The youth

Rupture of his projects (subjective idea) – of his subjectivity

Externalization

Entering into opposition

Duplicated

The adult

Objective idea

Works in a set framework

To maintain what is and so reproduces it

Old age and death

Opposition surrendered

Life of Christ – to envisage in divine idea

God – divested unto death – deep anguish

Humanity exalted in the life and death of Christ – the supreme finitude transfigured – love – supreme love in deepest anguish

God and humanity seen to be reconciled

Consciousness in Christ's death

Look back at 3 spheres

Combine (α) everlasting God – inwardly pure idea

(β) issuing forth in nature

(γ) in finite spirit |

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Return of the *finite* to the eternal idea – the right hand of God

Scission (α) Return to God – idea – full

(β) Individuality, exclusive, turned against other individuality

“For itself” the idea and highest moment

But this third sphere, thus regarded, [is] imperfect – individual – but universal individuality

Individuality as such – community, *spirit*

[164a]

Doctrine

(α) The absolute content not itself explicitly the content of its teaching – “the Spirit will lead you into all truth”¹⁴ – speculative intuition

(β) Love – universal basic moral principles already found in the Old Testament

(γ) But – kingdom of God – human intelligence in the highest degree

(δ) Complete severance, withdrawal from the world – ⟨heals the withered hand on the Sabbath, plucks the ears of corn⟩¹⁵

Heavenly Father – the way in which his divinity is defined in his words is matter for historical exegesis – no direct concern of ours here.

“Your sins are forgiven” (Luke 7:48)

Utterly despised – of highest account

Despised like the beggar’s sack by the Gueux in Holland

For them as immediate consciousness – not exclusive – as something other than themselves

Doctrine the universal soil – kingdom of God – love – complete severance from the world

(α) Death – confirmation [of] the intuition of *utter finitude* – and of utter love – anguish of death

(β) Spirit – Natural state dies away, barrier raised – divestment is human nature – and natural death sublates this divestment

Sensibility [is] consciousness of finitude, barrier – death the utmost sensation and dissolution of the barrier |

The sensibility of the community is tied to [Christ’s] death, knowledge of finitude

God is dead – has delivered himself up to death – wholly for others, as appearance

Delivered up for us – objection: another cannot stand in [for us]

[164b]

Community

(α) The concept [is] its defining characteristic – *for such* as enter into the process absolutely – made their own what is *for them* – Actual kingdom of God – God as spirit in his community – Region of the *Holy Spirit*

⟨Immortality [is] *infinite value within oneself* – Slavery – emancipation – “flesh of my flesh, spirit of my spirit”¹⁶ – *Suffering*, abase-

14. [Ed.] See John 16:13.

15. [Ed.] See Matt. 12:1–13.

16. [Ed.] See Gen. 2:23.

ment the highest [moment] – banner of the cross)

“Whosoever [sins] against the Spirit, his sin cannot be forgiven him”¹⁷ – A pregnant saying

(β) Faith – attestation – through *faith* to objective truth

Miracles, witness of spirit to the formation of the community (on the basis of the Spirit – in the form of tradition or exposition of the Scriptures) – objectivity, secular existence – sublation, falling away of the negative orientation

(γ) Death – ascension – withdrawal of sensible presence – past – outpouring of the Holy Spirit – now left to their own devices – (in the church, history not something *past* – polemics eschewed) – “Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them”¹⁸

(δ) (α) Doctrine – objective shape of truth – through

(β) Cultus, sacraments – partaking – baptism and Holy Communion – not made something particular

Difference between confessions concerns *relationship, life in the community* – not doctrine. Such relationship in the community also reappears as doctrine – but [a matter of] form, the content is a question of relationship

Truth

(α) in form of *abstract* objectivity – host, works, merit

(β) essentially in spiritual subjective form

(γ) Reformed church – no mysticism, purely prosaic, merely for veneration – psychological

((a) Formation of the community – a continuing process

(b) Being of the community – cultus – confessions

(c) Passing away of the community

Ending on a note of discord – take refuge in philosophy

As in the time of the Roman Empire

Preaching the gospel to the poor¹⁹

17. [Ed.] See Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28.

18. [Ed.] See Matt. 18:20.

19. [Ed.] An allusion to Jesus’ reply to the question of the Baptist, Matt. 11:5.

20. In upper right margin: 24

16 th 16

7 th 8

[Ed.] This is probably a calculation of the number of lecture hours remaining—namely, twenty-four—between 16 July 1821 (16/7) and 16 August (16/8). Hegel made this calculation as he completed these preliminary notes and planned the remaining lectures for the course. Since the notes are concerned primarily with the third part of the lectures and must have been completed before the Ms. was written, the date of 16 July 1821 would be the *terminus post quem* for the composition of

Middle classes – spirituality
 Ordinary people still Christian)
 [165a]
 Ending on a note of discord²⁰
 Age of Roman Emperors
 Leveling down – Roman law – private property
 Whosoever head is not cut off
 Testamentary dispositions
 Unconcern about truth – Pilate: “What is truth?”²¹
 (α) Representational form – argumentation
 Cultus, moral improvement, linked in the sacraments with the divine.
 Is something done by the individual, and at the same time something
 divine. Contradiction in regard to *freedom* and grace.
 Temporal, secular life – at the same time life in the church, i.e., individual
 private life – interfere in everything, advise, pious
 The divine – in objective EXTERNAL shape, as grace of God – the Devil
 Doctrine firmly fixed – churches and continuing education – laity mere
 receivers, without insight of their own |
 Church externally vested with grace
 (α) Divine in and for itself – idea
 (β) Church – for itself – communal quantum of external merits – surplus
 ⟨(α) Private rights and morals
 (β) Secret worship – to seek in this and that⟩
 (γ) Laity
 (α) Moral
 (β) Pious, general, nonspeculative relation to God
 (γ) Churchly, mystical

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Part III. The calculation of twenty-four lecture hours between 16 July and 16 August assumes the necessity of lecturing five hours per week rather than the customary four for the remainder of the semester. However, the summer semester ended on 25 August in 1821, and there are twenty-four hours between 16 July and 25 August on a four-hour-per-week basis. In 1820 the term ended on 16 August, and Hegel may have assumed the previous year's dates in making this calculation, only to discover that he had more time than originally estimated. Nevertheless, he fell behind in his lecture schedule, and a great deal of material remained to be covered in the last six lectures of the course, from the 17th to the 25th of August (see above, *Ms.*, n. 88). Quite likely he began composing this material shortly after completing these sketches in mid-July.

21. [Ed.] See John 18:38.

FRAGMENTS

FROM THE MICHELET TRANSCRIPTS ¹ 305

Fragment 1

This development does not occur without the faith of others.²

Fragment 2

In [the sphere of] representation, God's activities are of two kinds. It is necessary to hold fast to the *other* as the mode in which God is outside himself, but it is also necessary to know that this is not God's *genuine* determination.³

Fragment 3

Eternity is not mere duration, as mountains endure. On the contrary, it is *knowing*, and, thus understood, it is what spirit is in itself.⁴

1. [Ed.] Source: Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, Part 2 (Berlin, 1838), pp. 649–650 (Fragment 1), 652 (Fragment 2), 639 (Fragment 3), 651–652 (Fragment 4). For further details, see the Editorial Introduction.

2. [Ed.] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1821 lectures was incorporated by him into a text from the lectures of 1831 in order to reinforce D. F. Strauss's interpretation of Hegel. See the end of the 1831 text contained in n. 196 to the 1827 lectures.

3. [Ed.] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1821 lectures was incorporated by him into the fourth of these fragments in order to reinforce Strauss's emphasis on the inferiority of representation. Its authenticity is confirmed by the Ms.; see above, Ms., n. 79.

4. [Ed.] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1824 lectures was introduced by him in order to sharpen two statements contained in the lectures of 1824 and 1827; see above, 1824, n. 121, and 1827, n. 150. Probably, therefore, Bruno Bauer introduced this variant into the text of *W*₂.

Fragment 4

In love the Son is identical with the idea in the form of universality. But there is also present the determination of other-being. The two determinations are to be posited as distinct, as it were for an instant, for they are not genuinely distinct. The being, the distinction of the concept is such that this being, negation, immediacy is only a moment. But for representation the two are held apart; otherwise the representation would not be religious. Representation holds them apart in time: now the other has fallen away, and the divine idea comes forth in this other-being.⁵

5. [Ed.] This fragment from Michelet's transcript of the 1824 lectures was introduced by him to supplement the statement concerning the "analysis" of the Son found on p. 199. Michelet recognized that a passage was missing from the text transmitted by *W*₁ and *W*₂. His version confirms and corrects the text given by *G* and *D* (see above, 1824 lectures, n. 104), and at the same time the authenticity of Michelet's fragments is verified.

PAGINATION OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES

HEGEL'S LECTURE MANUSCRIPT

The Ms. numbers ("a" = recto, "b" = verso) are given in the text in square brackets but are reproduced here for the sake of convenience.

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2. Characteristics of This Religion	73a–73b
A. Abstract Concept	74a–75b
B. Concrete Representation	76a–77a
a. The Idea In and For Itself: The Triune God	77a–80a
b. The Idea in Diremption: Creation and Preservation of the Natural World	80a–81b
c. Appearance of the Idea in Finite Spirit: Estrangement, Redemption, and Reconciliation	82a
α. Estrangement: Natural Humanity	82b–87b

β. Redemption and Reconciliation: Christ	88a–95a
C. Community, Cultus	
Standpoint of the Community in General	95b–98a
α. The Origin of the Community	98a–101a
β. The Being of the Community; the Cultus	101b–103b
γ. The Passing Away of the Community	104a, 103b, 104a

THE LECTURES OF 1824

The pagination given here is that of the Griesheim transcript (volume 2). While our basic text is *G*, it has been supplemented and corrected by *P* to the end of Div. I (where *P* terminates), and to a minor extent by *D* throughout. These supplementary transcripts are not noted either in the text itself (except where there is an uncertainty about the reading) or in this listing.

Griesheim (vol. 2)

The Consummate Religion

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c. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil	229–232
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2. Reconciliation	
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b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ	247–253
c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence	253–259
C. The Third Element:	259–261
Community, Spirit	
1. The Origin of the Community	261–275
2. The Subsistence of the Community	275–281
3. The Realization of Faith	282–297

THE LECTURES OF 1827

The pagination given here is that of the Lasson edition (volume 2/2). When Lasson's text has been supplemented or replaced by two or more sentences from one of the extant sources (*An*, *B*, *Hu*), this is noted in the following list by the symbol "Q" (meaning *Quelle*, source). Commas indicate breaks in Lasson's text.

Lasson (vol. 2/2) + *Q*

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- B. The Second Element: Representation, Appearance
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 - c. The Story of the Fall 126-129
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*THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF ACCORDING TO
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STRAUSS EXCERPTS – THE LECTURES OF 1831

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GLOSSARY

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. General principles of translation are discussed in Sec. 6 of the Editorial Introduction to Vol. 1. In its successively amended versions, the glossary has served only as a guide, to which the translators have not felt obliged to adhere when context or English idiom have required different renderings. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first, while terms following a semicolon may be suitable in less technical contexts. "Cf." indicates related but distinguished German terms, which generally are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings. This glossary is indexed only on German terms; the indexes to each volume serve partially as English-German glossaries.

<i>German</i>	<i>English</i>
absolut	absolute
Absolute	the absolute
allgemein	universal, general
Allgemeine	the universal
Andacht	devotion, worship
Anderssein	other-being, otherness
anerkennen	recognize, acknowledge (cf. "erkennen")
Anerkenntnis	recognition (cf. "Erkenntnis")

angemessen	suitable, appropriate, commensurate, fitting
anschauen	intuit, envisage
Anschauung	intuition, envisagement (cf. "Wahrnehmung")
an sich	in itself, implicit (cf. "in sich")
Ansich	in-itself, implicit being
Ansichsein	being-in-self
Anundfürsichsein	being-in-and-for-self
Arbeit	labor (cf. "Werk")
auffassen	comprehend, grasp (cf. "begreifen," "fassen")
Auffassung	comprehension
aufheben	sublate; transcend, supersede, annul
Aufhebung	sublation; transcendence, supersession, annulment
auflösen	resolve, dissolve
Auflösung	resolution
Bedeutung	meaning, significance (cf. "Sinn")
Begierde	desire, appetite
beglaubigen	verify, attest, confirm
Beglaubigung	verification, attestation
begreifen	conceive
Begreifen	conception, conceiving
Begriff	concept
bei sich	with self, present to self, at home
Beisichsein	presence with (to) self, self-communion, at home with self
beobachten	observe
Beobachtung	observation (cf. "Betrachtung")
Beschäftigung	occupation, concern
besonder	particular
Besonderheit	particularity
bestehen	subsist
Bestehen	subsistence

GLOSSARY

bestimmen	determine, define, characterize
bestimmt	determinate, definite
Bestimmtheit	determinateness, determinacy
Bestimmung	determination, definition; character(-istic, -ization), destination, vocation, specification
betrachten	consider, treat, deal with
Betrachtung	consideration, treatment (cf. "Beobachtung")
Bewusstsein	consciousness
beziehen	relate, connect
Beziehung	relation, connection, reference (cf. "Verhältnis," "Zusammenhang")
Bild	image
bildlich	imaginative, figurative
Bildung	culture, formation, cultivation
bloss	mere, simple, sheer
Boden	soil, ground, territory
Brahm	Brahman (ultimate reality)
Brahma	Brahmā (first member of the Hindu triad)
Brahman, Brahmine	Brāhman (member of the priestly caste)
darstellen	present, portray, set forth
Darstellung	presentation, portrayal, exposition (cf. "Vorstellung")
Dasein	determinate being, existence (cf. "Existenz," "Sein")
Denkbestimmung	category, thought-determination
denken	think
Denken	thinking, thought (cf. "Gedanke")
denkend	thinking, thoughtful
Einbildung	imagination (cf. "Phantasie")
Eine (der, das)	the (personal) One, the (neuter) One
einfach	simple

Einzelheit	singularity, single (or singular) individual (cf. "Individuum")
einzel	single, singular
Einzelne	single individual (cf. "Individuum")
Element	element (cf. "Moment")
empfinden	sense
Empfindung	sensibility, sensation (cf. "Gefühl")
entäussern	divest, externalize
Entäusserung	divestment, externalization
Entfremdung	estrangement
entgegensetzen	oppose
Entgegensetzung	opposition
Entzweiung	cleavage, rupture, severance; cleaving, split
erheben	elevate, raise up
Erhebung	elevation, rising above
Erinnerung	recollection (cf. "Gedächtnis")
erkennen	cognize; recognize (cf. "anerkennen," "kennen")
Erkenntnis	cognition (cf. "Anerkenntnis," "Kenntnis," "Wissen")
erscheinen	appear (cf. "scheinen")
Erscheinung	appearance, phenomenon (cf. "Manifestation")
Erziehung	education
Existenz	existence (cf. "Dasein"—when the distinction is important, "Existenz" is given in square brackets)
existieren	exist (cf. "sein")
fassen, erfassen	grasp (cf. "auffassen," "begreifen")
Form	form (cf. "Gestalt")
für sich	for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit
Fürsich	for-itself
Fürsichsein	being-for-self, explicit being

Gebiet	field, realm
Gedächtnis	memory (cf. "Erinnerung")
Gedanke	thought, thoughts (cf. "Denken")
Gefühl	feeling (cf. "Empfindung")
Gegensatz	antithesis, contrast; antipathy, opposition (cf. "Entgegensetzung")
Gegenstand	object
gegenständlich	objective
Gegenwart	presence, present
Geist	spirit
Gemeinde	community
Gemüt	disposition; mind, soul, heart (cf. "Gesinnung")
Genuss	enjoyment, partaking, communion
geoffenbart	revealed (cf. "offenbar")
Geschichte	history; story (cf. "Historie")
geschichtlich	historical (often used as synonymous with "historisch")
Gesinnung	conviction, disposition
Gestalt	figure, shape
Gestaltung	configuration
Glaube	faith, belief
glauben	believe
Gleichgültigkeit	indifference
Gleichheit	equivalence
Glück	fortune
Glückseligkeit	bliss, happiness
Grund	ground, reasons
Grundlage	foundation
herabsetzen	degrade, reduce
hinausgehen	overpass, go beyond
Historie	history (cf. "Geschichte")
historisch	historical (often used as synonymous with "geschichtlich")
ideal, ideell	ideal

Idee	idea
Individuum	individual (cf. "Einzelne")
in sich	within itself, into self, inward, internal, self-contained (cf. "an-sich")
jenseitig	otherworldly
Jenseits	the beyond, the other world
kennen	know (cf. "wissen")
Kenntnis	information, acquaintance (cf. "Erkenntnis," "Wissen")
Kraft	force, strength, energy (cf. "Macht")
Kultus	cultus
Lehre	teaching, doctrine
lehren	teach
Leidenschaft	passion
Macht	power (cf. "Kraft")
Manifestation	manifestation (cf. "Erscheinung")
Mannigfaltigkeit	manifold(ness)
Mensch	human being
Menschheit	humanity
mit sich	with self; integral
Moment	moment (cf. "Element")
Moral	morals
Moralität	morality (cf. "Sittlichkeit")
nachdenken	deliberate, meditate, ponder
Nachdenken	deliberation, meditation, meditative thought
Natur	nature
natürlich	natural
Natürliche	the natural
Natürlichkeit	natural life, natural state, naturalness; simplicity, unaffectedness
offenbar	revelatory, manifest (cf. "geoffenbart")
Offenbaren	revealing
Offenbarung	revelation
partikulär	private (cf. "besonder")

Phantasie	phantasy; fanciful imagination (cf. "Einbildung")
Positive	the positive, positivity
Räsonnement	argumentation, reasoning
realisieren	realize (cf. "verwirklichen")
Realität	reality (cf. "Wirklichkeit")
Recht	right
reflektiv	reflective
Reflexion	reflection
rein	pure
Sache	matter, subject matter; thing, fact, cause
Schein	semblance, show
scheinbar	seeming
scheinen	seem
schlechthinnig	utter, simple (cf. "absolut")
schliessen	conclude, infer
Schluss	syllogism, conclusion
Schmerz	anguish, sorrow; pain
seiend	having being, subsisting
(part. and adj.)	
Seiende(s)	actual being (God and cognates); a being, entity, subsisting being (finite objects)
sein (verb)	be: is (God and cognates); is, exists, occurs, etc. (finite objects)
Sein (noun)	being
setzen	posit
Setzen	positing
Sinn	sense, meaning (cf. "Bedeutung")
sinnlich	sensible, sentient, sensuous
Sinnlichkeit	sensuousness, sensible nature
sittlich	ethical
Sittlichkeit	ethics, ethical life, ethical realm (cf. "Moralität")
spekulativ	speculative
Spekulative	the speculative, speculation

Subjekt	subject
Subjektivität	subjectivity
substantiell	substantive, substantial
teilen	divide
Teilung	division, separation (cf. "Urteil")
trennen	separate
Trennung	separation
Trieb	drive, impulse, instinct
Übergang	transition, passing over
übergehen	pass over
übergreifen	overreach
überhaupt	generally, on the whole; altogether, after all, in fact, etc.
Überzeugung	conviction
umfassen	embrace, contain
unangemessen	incongruous, unsuitable, inadequate, incommensurate
Unglück	misery, unhappiness
unmittelbar	immediate (cf. "unvermittelt")
Unmittelbarkeit	immediacy
unterscheiden (verb)	distinguish, differentiate
Unterscheidung	differentiation, distinction (cf. "Unterschied")
Unterschied	distinction (cf. "Unterscheidung")
unterschieden (past part. and adj.)	distinguished, differentiated (part.); distinct, different (adj., cf. "verschieden")
unvermittelt	unmediated (cf. "unmittelbar")
Urteil	judgment, primal division (cf. "Teilung")
urteilen	judge, divide
Vereinzelung	singularization
sich verhalten	comport oneself, relate oneself
Verhalten	attitude, comportment
Verhältnis	relationship, relation (cf. "Beziehung," "Zusammenhang")

Verhältnisse (pl.)	conditions, circumstances, state of affairs
vermitteln	mediate
Vermittlung	mediation
Vernunft	reason
vernünftig	rational
verschieden (adj.)	different, distinct (cf. "unterschieden")
Verschiedenheit	difference, diversity
versöhnen	reconcile
Versöhnung	reconciliation
Verstand	understanding
verwirklichen	actualize (cf. "realisieren")
Verwirklichung	actualization (cf. "Wirklichkeit")
vollendet	consummate; perfect, complete, final
Vollendung	consummation
vorhanden	present, at hand, extant
vorhanden sein	be present, be at hand, exist (cf. "sein")
vorstellen	represent; imagine
vorstellend	representational, representative
Vorstellung	representation; image, imagination, view, notion
wahr	true
Wahre	the true
wahrhaft(ig)	true, genuine, authentic
Wahrheit	truth
Wahrnehmung	(sense) perception (cf. "Anschauung")
Werk	work (cf. "Arbeit")
Wesen	essence; being
Widerspruch	contradiction
Willkür	caprice, arbitrariness; free choice, free will
wirklich	actual
Wirklichkeit	actuality (cf. "Realität")

GLOSSARY

wissen	know (cf. "kennen")
Wissen	knowledge, knowing (cf. "Erkenntnis," "Kenntnis")
Wissenschaft	science, scientific knowledge
Zeugnis	witness, testimony
Zufall	chance
Zufälligkeit	contingency
Zusammenhang	connection, connectedness, nexus, coherence (cf. "Beziehung," "Verhältnis")
Zweck	purpose; end, goal, aim
zweckmässig	purposeful, expedient
Zweckmässigkeit	purposiveness, expediency

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